Sandhurst Occasional Papers

No 5

The Inherent Tensions in

Military Doctrine

Dr Paul Latawski

Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

2011
SANDHURST OCCASIONAL PAPER NO 5
Series Editor: Sean McKnight (Director of Studies, RMAS)

© 2011. No part of this publication, except for short extracts, may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form without the prior permission of
the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

ISBN: 978-1-907628-04-7

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2
Introduction

Military doctrine is a subject that has not received the attention it

deserves despite the fundamental importance it has in determining how
armed forces think, what experience is carried forward, how they
currently fight, train and adapt to changing operational conditions and
look to the future. The purpose of doctrine is to provide a cohesive body
of thinking to approach the business of war. The expression ‘military
doctrine’ can also provoke a vision of intellectual rigidity where the firm
foundation of experience can represent an unhelpful ossification of past
military practice. Nevertheless, to ignore the past and not bring a
historical perspective to military doctrine also carries the risk of replacing
enduring principles of war with a mindset that marches to the drumbeat of
intellectual fashion. Fashionable ‘big ideas’ may be nothing new in the
history of war and neither is their impact so profound as to change its
nature or character. History provides the critical reality test that separates
empty jargon from revolutionary change. Doctrine must be a living
intellectual body of thought that draws on the past, lives in the present,
evolves, develops and, if necessary, gives way to a new thinking relevant
to the present or anticipated future operational conditions and changing
weapons technology.

The development of doctrine is a speculative and risky undertaking

as it is dependent, to a certain extent, on trying to predict future war. To
adopt doctrine not suited to the character of future conflict can lead to
catastrophe and this was dramatically illustrated by the military collapse
of France in 1940.1 Nevertheless, as Colin S. Gray warned: ‘Doctrine can

1
Robert Alan Doughty, The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine
1919-1939, (Hamden Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985), pp. 179-180.

3
be wrong. However, this powerful caveat is not a sound reason for
hostility to doctrine per se’.2 While not losing its need to have
applicability to future war, the development of doctrine rests on
something more concrete once a conflict is underway. The evolution of
doctrine draws on the events of the battlefield to guide change. In those
circumstances the development of doctrine is dependent on the ability of
armed forces to learn and apply lessons to the conflict at hand.

The subject of military doctrine is enormous. The intention in this

paper is to examine two broad themes that are relevant to military
doctrine in general as a cohesive body of military thinking. The first will
explore the problem of defining ‘military doctrine’ and its purpose.
Having a common understanding of what is meant by ‘military doctrine’
is something of fundamental importance if doctrine is to have any utility
to its users. The second will consider the inherent tensions in doctrine
when trying to formulate it, disseminate it or apply it. How these inherent
tensions or ‘contradictions’ are resolved shapes the efficacy of the
military doctrine and reflects the character of its users.

Defining Doctrine

Finding a standard and widely accepted example of military

doctrine would seem a straightforward task. The Cold War period saw
much standardisation in the understanding of basic concepts achieved as a
result of alliances such as NATO or the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. The
United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and
Definitions describes doctrine as:

2
Colin S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, (Oxford: OUP, 2010), p. 250.

4
 Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their
actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires
judgement in application.3

The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions contains an identical

definition with the entry dated 1 March 1973. Indeed the British glossary
definition originates from NATO and not the other way around.4 The US
Department of Defence’s glossary offers a slight variation on the British
and NATO definitions defining doctrine as: ‘Fundamental principles by
which military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of
national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in
application’.5 The US glossary also includes separate entries for
multinational, joint and multi-service doctrine. Curiously ‘multi-service’
doctrine is a cross-reference under the US glossary’s doctrine entry but is
not defined anywhere in the document.6 None of these additional
definitions of doctrine appears in the UK or NATO glossaries.

The US glossary definition of ‘joint doctrine’ does, however, take

the basic definition of doctrine a bit further. The US defines ‘joint
doctrine’ as:

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military

forces in coordinated action toward a common objective. Joint
doctrine contained in joint publications also includes terms,

3
The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions, Joint
Doctrine Publication 0-01.1 (JDP 0-01.1) Edition 7 June 2006, p. D-12.
4
NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French) Listing terms of military
significance and their definitions for use in NATO, AAP-6 22 March 2010, p. 2-D-9.
5
Department of Defence Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02,
12 April 2001 (As Amended Through 30 September 2010), p.14.
6
Ibid, p. 245 and p. 309.

5
 tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is authoritative but requires
judgement in application.7

So far, the basic definition of ‘doctrine’ only indicates that it

contains ‘fundamental principles’ and that despite its authority it requires
some level of interpretation. The definition of ‘joint doctrine’ introduces
‘coordinated action’ between the different armed services (presumably
coordinated action within a single service is desirable) and that joint
doctrine includes ‘terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures’ (as does
single service doctrine).

Glossaries are not the only military sources to define military

doctrine. Indeed, in doctrine itself, definitions and the purpose of doctrine
is often explained although not always with a great deal of consistency.
The publication of the British Army’s Design for Military Operations –
The British Military Doctrine stated that ‘put most simply, doctrine is
what is taught’ and introduced the NATO glossary definition.8 This
publication is very important not only for its overall impact on the
development of British military doctrine at the operational level but also
because it represents one of the earliest attempts to introduce into British
doctrine a basic definition of military doctrine and an elaboration of its
purpose. Indeed, it divided doctrine into three levels: ‘military doctrine’
(highest level), operational (theatre level) and tactical (for fighting the
battle).9 The idea of levels of war, as Michael Codner has pointed out, is
itself a ‘doctrinal construct’.10 Nevertheless, in British Army doctrine the

7
Ibid., p. 245.
8
Design for Military Operations – The British Military Doctrine, Army Code No. 71451, 1989,
p. 3.
9
Ibid., pp.3-4.
10
Michael Codner, ‘Purple Prose and Purple Passion: The Joint Defence Centre’, RUSI
Journal, Vol. 144, No. 1 (February/March 1999), p. 37.

6
bulk of the doctrine historically has been written for the tactical level
where ‘tactics, techniques, and procedures’ predominate even if
philosophy and principles underpin content that is more ‘actions on’ than
a reflective guide for action. The higher the level of doctrine, the less
prescriptive and procedural it becomes and the more theoretical in
character.11 The issue of levels in war underscores the fact that doctrine
has to be written for many different military users.

The development of British joint doctrine in the late 1990s also

brought with it further efforts to build on the definitions and purpose set
out in the 1989 Design for Military Operations. The first edition of
British Defence Doctrine (Joint Warfare Publication JWP 0-01)
elaborated on the purpose of doctrine in the following manner:

Doctrine is not a set of rules, which can be applied without

thought; it is, rather, a framework for understanding the nature of
armed conflict and the use of force. . . . Its purpose is to guide,
explain and educate, and to provide the basis for further study and
informed debate.12

The second edition of British Defence Doctrine published in 2001

devoted less space to the definition of doctrine than its predecessor.13 The
most recent third addition published in 2008 reduced this even more.
Abandoning altogether the opening chapter devoted to doctrine, the latest
version of British Defence Doctrine offered a modest definition that

11
Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, p. 79, p. 220.
12
British Defence Doctrine Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, First Edition 1999, p. 1.2.
13
British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, Second Edition October
2001, p. 1.1.

7
broke no new ground in the Chief of the Defence Staff’s foreword.14 It
seems that the capstone publication of British doctrine no longer serves
the function of laying the conceptual foundation for all of British military
doctrine by setting out what it is, what is its purpose and who it is for.

Looking outside the realm of the military doctrine community,

definitions of military doctrine are sparser. Writing in the 1930s, Col JFC
Fuller in his book The Foundations of the Science of War, believed that
‘the central idea of an army is known as its doctrine’.15 Trevor N.
Dupuy’s International Military and Defence Encyclopedia Vol. 2 states
that ‘in the military, doctrine is . . . the basis for both academic study and
field exercises; and is, in some cases, the military’s forecast of future
activities and events. Its most critical application is how forces will fight
in combat operations’.16 More recently, Michael Codner argued that
‘doctrine provides the intellectual structure for the practitioners, military
commanders at every level and their staffs and subordinates, to think
sensibly about the application of military force and to be guided by sound
reasoning’.17 Making matters more confusing is the idea advanced by Jim
Storr that doctrine can be both explicit (written down and published) and
implicit (received wisdom on the way things are done). While defining
explicit doctrine in a formal process that results in a published military
doctrine presents challenges enough, the informality of an implicit body
of doctrine makes cohesion and a common understanding a difficult to
measure and haphazard process. Nevertheless Storr concludes that
‘doctrine should contain a body of thought that is authoritative, explicit,

14
British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, Third Edition August 2008,
p. iii.
15
Col JFC Fuller,The Foundations of the Science of War, (London: Hutchinson and Co. LTD.,
19??), p. 254.
16
Trevor N. Dupuy (ed)., International Military and Defence Encyclopedia Vol. 2, (Washington
D.C.: Brassey’s, 1993), p. 773.
17
Codner, ‘Purple Prose and Purple Passion’, p. 37.

8
coherent, relevant, practical and teachable’.18 Finally, Colin S. Gray has
defined military doctrine as ‘guidance, mandatory or discretionary, on
what is believed officially to be contemporary best military practice’.19
Gray’s definition captures the ephemeral quality of doctrine and the
varying degree in which armed forces impose it at all levels.

Hitherto ‘Military doctrine’ has been used as a general descriptor

for the entire body of doctrine. Not all definitions of military doctrine,
however, assign such a broad meaning. Indeed the 1989 Design for
Military Operations described ‘military doctrine’ as being the ‘highest
level of doctrine’ with a purpose of establishing ‘the framework of
understanding of the approach to warfare in order to provide the
foundation of practical application’.20 Design for Military Operations
went on to emphasize that military doctrine was to address the questions
of ‘what is the nature of war’ and ‘how does it [the Army] succeed in
such a war’.21 Soviet thinking on military doctrine also defined it as being
at the highest level in their doctrinal hierarchy. The Soviet Dictionary of
Basic Military Terms published in translation defined military doctrine
(Voyennaya Doktrina) as being:

A nation’s officially accepted system of scientifically founded views

on the nature of modern wars and the use of the armed forces in
them, and also on the requirements arising from these views
regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for
war.22

18
Jim Storr, The Human Face of War, (London: Continuum, 2009), p. 189.
19
Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, p.18.
20
Design for Military Operations, p. 3.
21
Ibid.
22
Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, (Washington D.C., U.S. Government
Printing Office, nd), p. 37.

9
Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts edited by Marshall V.D.
Sokolovsky also stressed how military doctrine looked ahead to predict
the nature of future war:

Military doctrine is an expression of the accepted views of a state

regarding the political evaluation of future war, the state attitude
toward war, the definition of the nature of future war, preparation
of the country for war in respect to the economy and morale, the
problems of forming and training the armed forces, as well as
methods of warfare. Consequently, military doctrine also includes
the accepted views on the fundamental nature of war.23

The narrower definitions of military doctrine place far more emphasis on

understanding the nature of war at present and attempting to predict it in
the future. As a consequence, military doctrine has the highly speculative
role of determining how armed forces will be prepared to fight and
prevail in the future. This aspect will be explored in part in the
subsequent sections of the paper.

What this tour of definitions reveals is that no single definition of

military doctrine considered so far captures its many constituent parts.
The art of writing good military doctrine, as Michael Codner suggests, ‘is
essentially a simplifying process’.24 With simplification, however, one
can take the risk of losing nuance underpinned by military doctrine’s
many facets and its broader and narrower interpretations. By taking the

23
Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky (ed.), Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts, (London:
Pall Mall Press, 1963), pp. 41-42.
24
Ibid.

10
many elements appearing in the definitions above, military doctrine can
be summarized as providing:

Fundamental principles regarding the application of force

Military thought for guidance rather than prescription in action

Cohesion in military thought and action (at the most basic level
through common ‘tactics, techniques, and procedures’)

Knowledge to be reflected in training and imparted in
education

A framework for understanding the nature/character of conflict
(past, present and future)

A holistic military approach whereby the understanding of the
nature/character of conflict shapes the application of force

Inherent Tensions in Doctrine

From the definitions of the previous section one can extrapolate

some inherent tensions or ‘contradictions’ endemic to military doctrine
when trying to formulate it, disseminate it or apply it. How these inherent
tensions are resolved shapes the utility and relevance of military doctrine
to its users.
The tensions revolve around three key problems. The first is the tension
between the role of military doctrine to impart cohesion on the approach
of armed forces and the ability of commanders to enjoy the freedom to be
creative, adapt and exercise their own judgement tailored to the
circumstances that confront them. In short what degree of conformity to
the tenets of doctrine should be imposed and to what degree should a
commander exercise initiative? The second tension is between the

11
differing doctrinal needs of those exercising command at different levels
of war. How can doctrine be written to meet the needs both of the Chief
Defence Staff and the platoon commander and still maintain an overall
cohesion in the application of fundamental principles? The third tension
is how to mix, in a balanced fashion, the past, present and future
understandings of the nature/character of war. Placing too much emphasis
on either the past, present or future nature/character of war carries
profound risks in the formulation of military doctrine. Where then is the
balance of influences?

Initiative or Conformity?

Military doctrine undoubtedly exists to provide cohesion in the

application of military force. For any branch of the armed forces, a
common approach that includes principles as well as common ‘tactics,
techniques, and procedures’ seems a sine qua non to success on the
battlefield. The character of war, however, is always changing.
Adversaries devise new and effective approaches to war fighting and
developments in technology can render established methods ineffective.
This tension between the need for cohesion and initiative was the issue
regarding doctrine that exercised JFC Fuller most in his The Foundations
of the Science of War. The principal danger, in Fuller’s view, lay in
making military doctrine too prescriptive:

In itself, the danger of a doctrine is that it is apt to ossify into a

dogma, and be seized upon by mental emasculates who lack virility
of judgement, and who are only too grateful to rest assured that
their actions, however inept, find justification in a book, which, if
they think at all, is in their opinion, written in order to exonerate

12
 them from doing so. In the past many armies have been destroyed
by internal discord, and some have been destroyed by the weapons
of their antagonists, but the majority have perished through
adhering to dogmas springing from their past successes – that is,
self-destruction or suicide through inertia of mind.25

Historically, Fuller’s concerns have some justification as the

British Army’s attachment to and application of doctrine does reflect the
presence of ‘mental emasculates’ and ‘inertia in mind’. During the
Second World War David French has argued that the British Army took
an excessively ‘laissez faire attitude’ toward the dissemination of
doctrine and the degree to which it could be ‘interpreted in practice’.
Moreover, French maintains that it led to ‘the lack of a universal
interpretation of the practical meaning of its doctrine’.26 Evidence of
French’s analysis can be found in the memoirs of Gen Sir David Fraser, a
Guards armoured officer in the Second World War. Reflecting on his
experiences in training in UK pre-Normandy operations, Fraser wrote:

Any failures in concepts lay in the command of the British Army

itself, which then, as earlier and later, was not at its best in matters
of operational and tactical doctrine. There was an insufficient core
of doctrine – general doctrine, not specifically mechanized –
deriving from history as well as current experience. The result (in
tactical matters) was a sense of an Army clutching at the latest
reports from the only active theatre in which the British were
engaged, the Western Desert, and drawing hasty lessons as if they

25
Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, p. 254.
26
David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany
1919-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 279.

13
 must have universal application. They often didn’t. It was a
confusing time for those responsible for tactical leadership.27

Fuller’s impulse to stress the importance of giving those in

command the freedom to make their own judgements and interpret
doctrine certainly fits the historical zeitgeist of the British Army. Whether
the balance between imparting cohesion and allowing initiative was right
is doubtful as the problem in the British army has been the lassitude in
disseminating and applying doctrine. Fuller understood that a balance
between cohesion and freedom in interpretation was necessary:

We here obtain a dual conception of doctrine. In the first case,

doctrine must be looked upon as a fixed method of procedure, so
that, when an order is issued, all may understand it, and unity of
action result. In the second case doctrine must be looked upon as
power to formulate a correct judgement of circumstances and to
devise a course of procedure which fits conditions.28

The determining factor in finding the correct balance between the

role of doctrine in fostering cohesion and the requirement for
commanders to exercise independence in judgement is found in military
education. An army needs to trust the ability of officers employing
doctrine to have the good judgement of knowing when and in what ways
they can depart from the rigours of the doctrine. The capacity of officers
to do this is based on the cultivation of intellectual curiosity and ability in
the system of officer education. For the British Army this has been the

27
Gen Sir David Fraser, Wars and Shadows, (London: Allen Lane, 2002), pp. 170-171.
28
Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War, p. 254.

14
enduring challenge despite a tradition in its doctrine of ‘stating principles
rather than defining a prescriptive dogma’.29

Utility at all levels of war?

Commanders operating at the different levels of war have different

needs from doctrine creating a tension in the content between the
theoretical and the proscriptive. The requirements of the Chief of the
Defence Staff or a ‘two star’ holding theatre command are different in
practice from those of the platoon commander. For those individuals in
command at the strategic or operational levels, the principles embedded
in doctrine are the critical analytical tools of the trade. At these levels,
doctrine ‘can educate and advise the commander’ but not ‘prescribe the
particulars of action’.30 For the platoon commander, the tactical level of
doctrine is more about ‘tactics, techniques, and procedures’ which are
less of a guide than a drill to be applied when in contact with the enemy.
The critical factor that integrates the different levels of war in military
doctrine is the core concepts that provide the unifying conceptual thread.
At whatever level, there must be the establishment of a common
understanding of what particular core concepts mean and the way in
which they can be employed. In effect a kind of military shorthand. What
falls out from the role of core concepts is the importance of the writing
exercise in defining clearly and effectively so that a common
understanding is achieved in the doctrine.

In order to illustrate the importance of clarity in articulating core

concepts in doctrine, the concept of agility provides a useful example.
29
David French, Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British
People c1870-2000, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 69-73, p. 345.
30
Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, p. 79.

15
This concept entered the doctrinal lexicon in the United States military in
the early 1980s. The first definition of the concept is taken from US
Army doctrine Operations FM 100-5 1993:

Agility is the ability of friendly forces to react faster than the enemy
and is a prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. It is as
much a mental as a physical quality.31

The second definition is from taken from the 2008 version of British
Defence Doctrine that describes the principles of war:

Flexibility

220. Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new

circumstances – comprises agility, responsiveness, resilience,
acuity and adaptability.

221. Flexibility has both mental and physical dimensions. To lead

to success, it needs to be associated with an organization and
culture that encourages people to think creatively, and to be
resourceful and imaginative, especially in the face of adversity or
the unexpected. Agility is the physical and structural ability that
allows forces to adjust rapidly and decisively, especially when
operating in complex situations or in the face of new or
unforeseen circumstances. Responsiveness is a measure of not
only speed of action and reaction, but also how quickly a
commander seizes (or regains) the initiative. Resilience is the
degree to which people and their equipment remain effective under
31
FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1993, p. 2.7.

16
 arduous conditions or in the face of hostile action. Acuity is
sharpness of thought, characterized by intellectual and analytical
rigour, enabling intuitive understanding of complex and changing
circumstances. Adaptability embraces the need to learn quickly, to
adjust to changes in a dynamic situation, and to amend plans that
in the light of experience seem unlikely to lead to a suitable
outcome.32

The two definitions of agility on the surface bear considerable

similarity. The origins of the concept Agility reside in the late Cold War
period. From the US Army definition of the concept a number of
important points can drawn out. Agility was seen in the context of
‘manoeuvre’ (air land battle) and stressed speed of decision and action.
More importantly the US Army doctrine saw Agility resting on three
characteristics: ‘mental’, ‘organizational’ and ‘physical’. Furthermore, the
British definition sees the purpose of ‘agility’ as adjusting to ‘complex
situations’ and ‘unforeseen circumstances’ rather than relating it to the
problem of holding the initiative over the enemy. Each of the definitions
of the concept of Agility is a product of its times and shaped by the
prevalent character of the security environment. Indeed, Agility as a
concept is not really extent in current US Army doctrine while its
presence in British doctrine is on the ascendency.33

However, fashionable or unfashionable a concept is in military

doctrine, the clarity of its definition will determine its usefulness. In
comparing the two definitions given above of Agility, it can be argued

32
British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, Third Edition August 2008,
pp. 2-5-2-6.
33
FM 3-0 Operations, Department of the Army, February 2008, Appendix D, Rescinded Army
Definitions, p. D-6.

17
that the US definition is more understandable across the levels of war. Its
purpose is to ‘react faster than the enemy’ in order to hold the ‘initiative’.
Moreover it indicates agility ‘is as much a mental as a physical quality’.
For either the theatre commander or the officer in command of a platoon,
the concept offers clarity of purpose. In contrast, the British Defence
Doctrine 2008 definition of ‘agility’ appears as a component of another
concept in the principles of war - - flexibility. The British definition
includes ‘physical and structural’ agility but curiously does not include
mental agility which is treated under - - ‘acuity’ (keenness of perception)
- - a separate component of the principle of flexibility. The more complex
and yet vague British formulation of the concept of agility looks more
like the product of an abstract theological debate rather than a coherent
and clear understanding of an idea as a basis of action. Carefully crafting
definitions of key concepts is the most essential prerequisite to insuring
that doctrine across the levels of war has unifying conceptual threads.

Past, Present or Future?

Carl von Clausewitz in his On War endeavoured to identify

principles that underpinned armed conflict as a human activity in his
period of history. The Prussian military philosopher, however, also
recognised that war is a ‘true chameleon’.34 The metaphor of the
chameleon, a creature able to change its colour to blend into its
environment is an appropriate one for indicating that war is in fact a
constantly changing phenomenon. Clausewitz recognised this when he
wrote that ‘every age had its own kind of war, its own limiting

34
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, eds. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), p. 89.

18
conditions, and its own peculiar preconceptions’.35 The challenge for each
generation of military doctrine writers therefore is to visit anew the
complexities of war, seeking to identify that which is unchanging in the
nature of war and to come to grips with the changing character of war.
Setting out a view of the character of conflict is something fundamental
to the construction of any military doctrine. This is usually done in
capstone, or highest level doctrine or as a separate study to provide the
necessary understanding of the character of conflict in order to determine
its impact on the doctrinal principles shaping the employment of armed
forces. Military doctrine, however, invariably has simultaneously to
examine the character of conflict by taking into account the enduring
features of the past, understanding the present and predicting the future.
Finding the correct balance is the source of inherent tension.

British military doctrine has grappled with the problem of

understanding the character of conflict with increasing uncertainty the
closer one moved to the present. The British Army’s Field Service
Regulations (FSR) vol. II 1924 reflected a comprehension of the nature of
conflict that was well understood: ‘The instructions laid down herein
cover a war of the first magnitude, but can be modified in their
application to other forms of warfare’.36 The only other form of warfare
countenanced in the FSR 1924 was ‘in underdeveloped and semi-
civilized countries’.37 Moving to the present sees a view of the character
of conflict that is more complex and less focused as set out by the
Strategic Trends Programme in the Development Concepts and Doctrine

35
Ibid, p, 593.
36
Field Service Regulations Vol. II, Operations 1924, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 1924), p. 1.
37
Ibid., p. 212.

19
Centre (DCDC) of the UK Ministry of Defence in a recent publication
entitled Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) that looks ahead to 2029:

Future Conflict will be increasingly hybrid in character. This is not

a code for insurgency or stabilisation, it is about a change in the
mindset of our adversaries, who are aiming to exploit our
weaknesses using a wide variety of high-end and low-end
asymmetric techniques. These forms of conflict are transcending
our conventional understanding of what equates to irregular and
regular activity; the “conflict paradigm” has shifted and we must
adapt our approaches if we are to succeed.38

The FCOC went on to emphasize that: 'In future conflict smart

adversaries will present us with hybrid threats (combining conventional,
irregular and high-end asymmetric threats) in the same time and space'.39

The idea of ‘hybrid war’, like so many influences on British

doctrinal thinking originates across the Atlantic. In the United States, two
US Marine Corps officers, Lt Gen James N. Mattis and Lt Col Frank
Hoffman in 2005 produced an influential article in the Proceedings
journal arguing that the future will be characterised by ‘hybrid war’.40
Hoffman has since written extensively on the idea of hybrid war
including a paper for the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies entitled
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. In this study,
Hoffman defined hybrid war in the following way:

38
Future Character of Conflict, Strategic Trends Programme, DCDC, nd, p. 1.
39
Ibid., p. 13.
40
Lt Gen James N. Mattis and Lt Col Frank Hoffman, ‘Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid
Wars’, Proceedings, November 2005, p. 19.

20
 Hybrid wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-
state actors. Hybrid wars incorporate a range of different modes of
warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and
formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and
coercion, and criminal disorder.41

Hoffman’s definition suggests revolutionary change in the character of

conflict. Have Hoffman and the other exponents of hybrid war identified
something new, a revolution in how wars are fought? The term ‘hybrid’
has been used before to describe the complex and multifaceted character
of war. Thomas R. Mockaitas in his 1995 book British
Counterinsurgency in the Post Imperial Era described the 1960s
Confrontation with Indonesia as a ‘hybrid war, combining low-intensity
conventional engagements with insurgency’.42 What is more, Mockaitas
went on to offer the following observation regarding the problem of
hybridity in war:

Hybrid war demonstrates the extreme fluidity of categories such as

“low”, “mid” and “high” intensity when applied to modern war.
The conflict spectrum operates within individual wars as well as
separating them from each other.43

When tested against the historical pattern of armed conflict, the

idea of hybridity is nothing new either in terms of how wars have been

41 st
Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21 Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, (Arlington,
Virginia: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 2007), p. 14. Accessed at web
address:
http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf,
9 December 2010.
42
Thomas R. Mockaitas, British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 16.
43
Ibid., p. 38.

21
fought or thinking over the decades on the character of conflict. In the
1930s Mao Tse-Tung described his revolutionary war in a way that was
recognisably hybrid. The ‘people’s guerrillas’ and the main
(conventional) forces of the People’s Liberation Army were likened to a
‘man’s right arm and left arm’. The two forms of warfare being
indispensible to the success of the other.44 During the Second World War,
the Allies fought in a hybrid fashion arraying conventional forces against
the Axis powers while employing organisations such as the Special
Operations Executive (SOE) to organise resistance, conduct sabotage and
attacks on enemy personnel in occupied Europe.45

In a similar vein, analysis on the problem of hybridity in war

punctuated Cold War debates on the character of war. In 1958, Raymond
Aron described the hybrid nature of war as ‘polymorphous violence’.46
Andrew Mack coined the phrase ‘asymmetric’ warfare in the 1970s and at
the end of the 1980s Frank Kitson described hybridity as the ‘ladder of
warfare’.47 Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a string of ideas
expressing in different ways the problem of hybridity in war: ‘compound
wars’, ‘three block war’, ‘beyond limits warfare’, ‘fourth generation
warfare’ ‘war amongst the peoples’.48 All these post Cold War concepts
seek, to a greater or lesser degree, to capture the complex and

44
Quoted from ‘Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War’, December 1936 in:
Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, (Peking: 1966), p.90.
45
M.R.D. Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive 1940-46, (London: BBC, 1984) and
SOE Syllabus: Lessons in Ungentlemanly Warfare in World War II, (Richmond, Surrey: The
National Archive, 2001).
46
Raymond Aron, On War: Atomic Weapons and Global Diplomacy, (London: Secker and
Warburg, 1958), p. 57.
47
Andrew Mack, ‘Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars’, World Politics, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 175-
200 and Frank Kitson, Warfare as a Whole, (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), p. 2.
48
Thomas Huber, Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot, (Fort Leavenworth: 1996); Gen. Charles
C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’, Marines Magazine,
(January 1999); Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: 1999);
William S. Lind, Keith Nightengale, John Schmitt, and Gary I. Wilson, ‘The Changing Face of
War: Into Fourth Generation Warfare’, Marine Corps Gazette, (November 2001); and, Rupert
Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of war in the Modern World, (London: Allen Lane, 2005).

22
multifaceted - - ‘hybrid’ - - character of war. Of all the post Cold War
studies, the monograph entitled Unrestricted Warfare produced by two
Colonels of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army offered the most
thorough and rigorous analysis of the hybrid character of war in the
contemporary setting.49

What this discussion leads to is that there is really nothing

particularly new about the hybrid nature of war and, in fact, the problem
of hybridity has long been the subject of study and analysis. Indeed, all
wars are hybrid and it is only the characteristics of hybridity that change
over time. For British doctrine, the implications of this historical analysis
are enormous. At the very least it suggests an overdependence on
American thinking and, more importantly, it indicates that the past,
present and future in understanding the character of conflict is not in
balance. This imbalance may in fact be part of the modus operandi of the
British doctrine producing community. British Defence Doctrine second
edition 2001 explicitly set out a balance between past, present and future
in the construction of doctrine: ‘It is not, therefore, about the past nor is it
about the medium or longer term future. It is about today and the
immediate future’.50 This official view points to a myopic approach that
is fixated on the present and future character of conflict. There is an
inherent tension between past, present and future when grappling with the
problem understanding the character of conflict and where to place the
emphasis. However, unless past conflicts are well understood, how can
the changing characteristics of war be identified? ‘HA [historical
analysis] has allowed us’, argued Storr, ‘to see what is actually important

49
Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare.
50
British Defence Doctrine, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 0-01, Second Edition October
2001, p. 1.1.

23
and to what extent’.51 In trying to understand the ‘true chameleon’,
doctrine requires a historical context of the character of conflict if it is to
make any sense of the present and future.

Conclusions

As stated at the opening of this paper, military doctrine has a

fundamental importance in how armed forces think, what experience is
carried forward, how they currently fight, train and adapt to changing
operational conditions and look to the future. The purpose of doctrine is
to provide a cohesive body of thinking to approach the business of war.
Establishing a cohesive body of thinking is the central challenge of
military doctrine.

This paper has set out to explore the obstacles to military doctrine
embodying cohesive thinking by first considering the problem of defining
‘military doctrine’. The issue of defining key doctrinal concepts was also
considered in relation to some of the inherent tensions in doctrine when
trying to formulate it, disseminate it or apply it. Whether considering the
meaning of ‘military doctrine’ itself, or subsidiary but core concepts, the
establishment of a common understanding of what they mean and the
way in which they can be employed is critical. For this to succeed, careful
analysis has to reject vacuous jargon and adopt clear, concise and easily
understood language that is underpinned by sound thinking. Moreover,
definitions have to be consistently defined throughout the corpus of
military doctrine.

51
Storr, The Human Face of War, pp. 202-203.

24
 The second issue in relation to cohesive thought in military
doctrine that was examined centred on the inherent tensions or
‘contradictions’ in doctrine. Three ‘tensions’ were considered: the role of
doctrine imparting cohesion versus the need for commanders to exercise
independent judgement; the differing requirements of doctrine at each
level of war; and, finally, the tension between past, present and future in
doctrine’s need to understand the character of war. The resolution of the
tension between imparting cohesion versus commander’s initiative is very
much dependent on the capacity of officers to be trusted to understand
doctrine and make sound independent judgements when conditions
dictate that they depart from it. Regarding the tension between doctrinal
cohesion versus differing command requirements, its resolution is
dependent on careful articulation of core comments as discussed above.
The final tension between past, present and future in understanding the
character of conflict requires more than just looking at fashionable
theories of war but must be grounded firmly in the reality of historical
analysis. It must be recognised, however, that the inherent tensions in
military doctrine when trying to formulate it, disseminate it or apply will
be enduring problems. The resolution of these tensions will determine the
success or failure of doctrine as a guide to best operational practice.

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