No.

Case Title Topic Doctrine Background

1 Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA A. General Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character."
25 (1992) Provisions The same provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-
affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to
be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by
stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or
criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief.

2 Pp v. Turco 337scra714 A. General While the certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records (under Section 44, Rule 130, Accused-appellant argues that no actual proof was presented that the rape actually
(2000) Provisions Rules of Court) constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must first be established as an happened since the medico-legal officer who prepared the medical certificate was
expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. not presented in court to explain the same.

We place emphasis on the distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules (Section 3, Rule 128, Rules of Court) or is admissible as evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the
competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence, admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and examining physician.
law.

On the other hand, the weight to be given to such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided
in Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court.

Thus, while evidence may be admissible, it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have
evidentiary weight may be inadmissible because a special rule forbids its reception.

B. Admissibility of Evidence - Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.
1. Relevancy
Relevancy; collateral matters. – Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or
improbability of the fact in issue.

3 Bautista v. Aparece, 51 Relevancy Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter probable in an action. With these criteria in mind, the mere fact that the public document was executed
OG 805 (1954) before the guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or
And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in issue as determine by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, incompetent to the main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document,
considered together with the other evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the
while competent evidence is one that ‘s not excluded by law in a particular case. Court that the portions of land in question really belong to defendant Aparece.
4 Lopez v. Heesen, 365 Relevancy It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses are permitted Appellant appears to concede that the number of rifles manufactured with the
P.2d 448 (1961) to testify to the primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. modified leaf safety device, and the fact that other companies manufacture guns
with the same design, is relevant as tending to show that the design is proper.
And it is also true that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their opinions upon the ultimate facts which the Appellant also seems to concede that the reputation of Fabrique Nationale of
jury are to decide, because that would supplant their judgment and usurp their province. Belgium may be relevant to the issue.

But such a statement is not to be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important qualifications, and never Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of
was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth in the investigation of questions of fact. Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51,
and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt
Besides, the tendency of modern decisions is not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the investigation of such Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have
questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a certain discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the
ultimate facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it plainly appears that the testimony had no issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe, and
legitimate bearing upon the questions at issue and was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors. *454 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.

5 State of Missouri v. Ball, Relevancy Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Ball's person as having come from the jewelry store so that in The appellant objects, however, in his motion for a new trial that a police officer was
339 S.W2d 783 (1960) fact they were not admissible in evidence , the charge here was that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and permitted to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from his
$140 in cash from the cash register. There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of person. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and
$140. irrelevant, neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this
case
Here nineteen days had elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of the $258.02 and in all these
circumstances "The mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged
as taken, because in general all money of the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the
same as the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable." Wigmore,

In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Ball's possession at the time of his arrest came from or
had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden
affluence , the evidence was not in fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it did not tend to prove the
offense for which the appellant was on trial the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.
2. Competence
Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules.

A. a. Constitutional rules of exclusion

1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.cralaw

Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

2) Art. III, Sec. 12

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel,
he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.cralaw

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to the rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

3) Art. III, Sec. 17

Art. III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
b. Statutory rules of exclusion
1) NIRC, §201, as amended by RA 8424
SEC. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. - An instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be stamped and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof
or any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.

No notary public or other office authorized to administer oaths shall add this jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps are affixed thereto and cancelled.

2) General Banking Act of 2000, RA 8791, §55.1 (b)

SECTION 55. Prohibited Transactions.
Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction, disclose to any unauthorized person any information relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the bank belonging to private individuals, corporations, or any other entity: Provided, That with respect to bank
deposits, the provisions of existing laws shall prevail;

3) RA 1405: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

Section 2. 1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely
confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of
duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.

The following are the exceptions to the bank secrecy law:

1. Written permission or consent in writing by the depositor;

2. In cases of impeachment;

3. Upon order of the court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials;

4. Upon order of the court in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation;
RA 4200: Wire-tapping

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word
secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether
complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer,
(1) who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion,
conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses against
national security:

Provided, That such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing:
(1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is about to be committed:
Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts
of sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed;
(2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and
(3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such evidence.

The order granted or issued shall specify:

(1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and
its location;
(2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words;
(3) the offense or offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and
(4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest.
6 RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF Anti wiretapping We disagree. Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable
APPEALS G.R. No. 93833 Sec 1 of Antiwiretapping law provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation
September 28, 1995 private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely
whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than
communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the those involved in the communication.
qualifier "any".
In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either a violation of R.A. 4200.9
by the parties themselves or by third persons.
Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a said act
private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be professed."

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes
from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of
sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
"process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)" These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

7 Gaanan v. IAC, 145 Anti wiretapping The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and
SCRA 112 (1986) intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate accused Laconico was private in nature;
installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or
arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200;
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone
of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore,
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached
and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should
by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely both face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them
presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.
8 Salcedo Ortañez v. CA, Anti wiretapping The subject cassette tapes are declared inadmissible in evidence. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
235 SCRA 111 (1994) alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication,
and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 4200 are
as follows:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap
any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken
word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described.

Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence
the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

C. What Need NOT be Proved:

1. Judicial notice
a. Mandatory (Rule 129 §1)

Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
1. existence and territorial extent of states,
2. their political history,
3. forms of government and
4. symbols of nationality,
5.the law of nations,
6.the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals,
7.the political constitution and history of the Philippines,
8. the official acts of legislative,
9. executive and judicial departments of the National Government of the Philippines,
10. the laws of nature,
11. the measure of time,
12. and the geographical divisions.
9 Sermonia v. CA, 233 Mandatory - This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by
SCRA 155 (1994) judicial notice notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. The fifteen-year
previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still prescriptive period commences to run from the day on which the crime is
a married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage. discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents.

In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been
the place where the said property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was
said property can easily be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or the duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, 7 such fact of
authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender is not registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice to the
known to be still a married person.chanrobles law library whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive
notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or run on the day the marriage contract was registered.
property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be
applied in the case at bar.

b. Discretionary (Rule 129 §2)

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are
(1) of public knowledge, or
(2) are capable to unquestionable demonstration, or
(3) ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the pre-trial and the trial, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, shall hear the parties on the propriety of taking judicial notice of any matter.

Before judgement or on appeal, the court, motu proprio or upon motion, may take judicial notice of any matter and shall hear the parties thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
10 City of Manila v. Garcia, Judicial notice, 3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of that It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within
19 scra 413 (1967) GR when hearing property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades its power, to make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here.
L26053 necessary has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public Defendants' remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory
purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount. stance. Not having done so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this
purpose.4
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that
they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit
land. They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken —
and maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction". because the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The
reason being that the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to
take judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.6
And, Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation
of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of additional building" of the
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
11 Baguio v. Vda. de Judicial notice, Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the
Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 when hearing nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K.
(1971) L28100 necessary notice of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether
lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action
Justice Moran is relevant. is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such
previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge
Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or whether Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.
or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."
12 Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 Judicial notice, In the first place, as a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of Appellant next points out that the lower court should not have dismissed his first
SCRA 549 (1965) L17885 when hearing the contents of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that petition for annulment because no "parole" evidence need be taken to support it,
necessary both cases may have been tried or are actually pending before the same judge. the matters therein alleged being parts of the records of L.R.C. No. 144, G.L.R.O. No.
1025, and L.R.C. 173, G.L.R.O. No. 1474, which were well within the judicial notice
Secondly, if appellant had really wanted the court to take judicial notice of such records, he should have presented the proper request or and cognizance of the said court.
manifestation to that effect instead of sending, by counsel, a telegraphic motion for postponement of hearing, which the court
correctly denied.

Finally, the point raised by counsel is now academic, as no appeal was taken from the order dismissing his first petition, and said order
had long become final when the complaint in the present action was filed.
13 Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, Judicial notice, This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty
167 SCRA 736 (1988) when hearing foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact . bound to prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been
L55960 necessary taken by this Court in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove
that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be
considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the
subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with
Chinese law was duly proven.

Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice of the law of China on marriage in the
aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng
marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84)
years later.
14 Tabuena v. CA 196 SCRA Judicial notice, As a general rule "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent
650 (1991) GR 85423 when hearing the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into
necessary both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before the same judge. Nevertheless, it applied the exception that: account evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the
Rules of Court.
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original
record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party,
reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when
the original record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when,

(1)"in the absence of objection,"
(2) "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or
(3) "at the request or with the consent of the parties,"
(4) the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and
(6)"admitted as part of the record of the case then pending."

These conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case
No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken
up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

15 People v. Godoy, 250 Judicial notice, The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the presumptio hominis that a young Filipina will not charge a person with rape if it is
SCRA 676 (1995) when hearing not true. In the process, however, it totally disregarded the more paramount constitutional presumption that an accused is deemed
115908-09 necessary innocent until proven otherwise.

16 BPI-Family Savings Judicial notice, Petitioner also calls the attention of this Court, as it had done before the CTA, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case No.
Bank, Inc. vs. Court of when hearing 4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that "petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable
Appeals, G.R. No. necessary year 1990 . . .’’ 18 Respondent, however, urges this Court not to take judicial notice of the said case. 19
122480, April 12, 2000
As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending
before the same judge." 20

Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for
Review filed before this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent.
Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial notice
thereof.chanrobles.com : virtuallawlibrary

To our mind, respondents’ reasoning underscores the weakness of their case. For if they had really believed that petitioner is not entitled
to a tax refund, they could have easily proved that it did not suffer any loss in 1990. Indeed, it is noteworthy that respondents opted not
to assail the fact appearing therein — that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990 — in the same way that it refused to controvert the same
fact established by petitioner’s other documentary exhibits.
2. Judicial admissions

Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. (2a)

17 LUCIDO V. CALUPITAN Judicial admissions Many of the cases holding that pleadings inadmissible as admissions were based on the theory that most of the allegations were merely Any doubt, however, as to the character of this transaction is removed by the
(G.R. No. L-8200 March pleader's matter -- fiction stated by counsel and sanctioned by the courts. The whole modern tendency is to reject this view and to treat agreement entered into between Lucido and calupitan on the same day. In this
17, 1914) pleadings as statements of the real issues in the cause and hence as admissions of the parties, having weight according to the document it is distinctly stipulated that the right to redeem the property is preserved
circumstances of each case. But some of the authorities still hold that if the pleading is not signed by the party there should be some to Lucido, to be exercised after the expiration of three years. The right to repurchase
proof that he has authorized it. must necessary imply a former ownership of the property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
On the same principles where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held admissible, but in such
case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in evidence. Further indication that Calupitan himself considered this transaction as a sale with
the right to conventional redemption is to be found in his original answer to the
Jones on evidence says, among others, that where amended pleadings have been filed, allegations in the original pleadings are held complaint. This original answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the
admissible, but in such case the original pleadings can have no effect, unless formally offered in evidence. objection of the defendant. Its admission was proper, especially in view of the fact
that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was the time acting as his own attorney.
In this case, the original answer was introduced in evidence by the plaintiff over the objection of the defendant. Its admission was
proper, especially in view of the fact that it was signed by Calupitan himself, who was the time acting as his own attorney. In this In this original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale
original answer it was expressly stated that the transaction was one of sale with the right to repurchase governed by the provisions of with the right to repurchase governed by the provisions of articles 1507 et seq. of
articles 1507 et seq. of the Civil Code. the Civil Code

18 Macaria Torres vs. Judicial admissions The amended complaint takes place of the original. Therefore, the admissions made in the original pleading, superseded by the Paragraph 3 of the original complaint states:
Court of Appeals amended complaint will be considered extrajudicial admission that must be alleged and proven in court
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest
No. The Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any further of kins of Margarita Torres, who died in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931.
function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record.
However, Santillan et. al amended the complaint, the underlined portion was
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original deleted so that the statement simply read:
complaint lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission,
the admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who
by extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. died at Tanza, Cavite, on December 20, 1931.

Macaria claimed to be a co-owner of the lot, being one of Margarita’s daughters. She
instituted an action for partition of the lot, alleging that said lot was the conjugal
property of Margarita and Leon, and that she is their legitimated child. The
statement in the original complaint for ejectment, according to petitioner, is an
admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her
participation in the disputed property.
19 BITONG V. CA, 292 Judicial admissions When taken in its totality, the Amended Answer to the Amended Petition, or even the Answer to the Amended Petition alone, clearly More so, the affirmative defenses of private respondents directly refute the
SCRA 503 (1998) GR raises an issue as to the legal personality of petitioner to file the complaint. Every alleged admission is taken as an entirety of the fact representation of petitioner that she is a true and genuine stockholder of Mr. & Ms.
123553 which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy its effect on the other side. The reason for this is, by stating unequivocally that petitioner is not the true party to the case but JAKA
where part of a statement of a party is used against him as an admission, the court should weigh any other portion connected with the which continues to be the true stockholder of Mr. & Ms. In fact, one of the reliefs
statement, which tends to neutralize or explain the portion which is against interest. which private respondents prayed for was the dismissal of the petition on the
ground that petitioner did not have the legal interest to initiate and prosecute the
In other words, while the admission is admissible in evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole statement and same.
others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit. Although acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot
be contradicted, however, evidence aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through palpable mistake. The
rule is always in favor of liberality in construction of pleadings so that the real matter in dispute may be submitted to the judgment of
the court.

D. Object and Documentary Evidence

1. Object Evidence
Section 1. Object as evidence. — Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.

A. Rule on DNA Evidence (A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC)

Sec. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:

(1) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(2) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(3) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(4) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(5) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA testing.

This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced.

Sec. 6. Post-conviction DNA Testing. – Post-conviction DNA testing may be available, without need of prior court order, to the prosecution or any person convicted by final and executory judgment provided that
(a) a biological sample exists,
(b) such sample is relevant to the case, and
(c) the testing would probably result in the reversal or modification of the judgment of conviction.
Sec. 9. of DNA Testing Results. – In evaluating the results of DNA testing, the court shall consider the following:

(1) The evaluation of the weight of matching DNA evidence or the relevance of mismatching DNA evidence;
(2) The results of the DNA testing in the light of the totality of the other evidence presented in the case; and that
(3) DNA results that exclude the putative parent from paternity shall be conclusive proof of non-paternity.
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA testing shall be considered as corroborative evidence.
If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity.

Sec. 10. Post-conviction DNA Testing – Remedy if the Results Are Favorable to the Convict. – The convict or the prosecution may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of origin if the results of the post-conviction DNA testing are favorable to the convict. In the
case the court, after due hearing finds the petition to be meritorious, if shall reverse or modify the judgment of conviction and order the release of the convict, unless continued detention is justified for a lawful cause.
A similar petition may be filed either in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, or with any member of said courts, which may conduct a hearing thereon or remand the petition to the court of origin and issue the appropriate orders.

20 People of the DNA Testing Against self-incrimination Yes. The Court affords much respect and credibility to the testimonies of the
Philippines v. Joel Yatar, In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the DNA tests were witnesses absent any showing that some fact or circumstance of weight and
G.R. No. 150224, May conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the influence has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted.
19, 2004 Constitution. The trial court latter is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against
self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply Furthermore, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution proves
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object beyond doubt that the accused committed the crime. The requirements to
determine the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence were complied with as follows:
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted (1) there is more than one circumstance;
to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is (2) facts on which the inferences are derived are proven; and
proscribed is the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused under duress. (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as there is no testimonial
compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the The DNA evidence presented strengthens the conviction by circumstantial evidence.
accused without the presence of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused may be
compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of which he is accused.

Ex-post facto law

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground that resort
thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the admissibility,
relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question
of law, DNA profiling requires a factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
21 Writ Of Habeas Corpus DNA Testing Writ of habeas corpus No. The most criterion for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, is that the
For Reynaldo De Villa, The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal issuing the process or individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
GR No. 1588802 (Nov. judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual’s liberty is restrained via
17, 2004) acting squarely within their jurisdiction. The reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals: a habeas some the legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing.
corpus petition reaches the body, but not the record of the case. A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be revised,
modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings. In the recent case of Feria v. CA, it was held that review of judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in a very
For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to reexamine specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding,
the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of
present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail. a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or innocence. SC ruled (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. excess.
Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported This court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error,
rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt. and should not be thus used.

Newly-discovered evidence A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not meet the the following requisites are met:
criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial;
and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trail
even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
Petitioner-relator’s claim that he was “unaware” of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and
this court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of (d) that the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change
petitioner’s counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding upon petitioner. the judgment.
22 Herrera v. Alba, G.R. DNA Testing In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father
No. 148220 (2005) (1) how the samples were collected, is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a
(2) how they were handled, traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
(3) the possibility of contamination of the samples, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
(4) the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, between the putative father and child.
(5) whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests. A prima faciecase exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the
putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the
It is not enough to state that the child’s DNA profile matches that of the putative father. A complete match between the DNA profile of burden forward and shift it to the putative father.
the child and the DNA profile of the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. Trial courts should require at least 99.9% as a
minimum value of the Probability of Paternity (“W”) prior to a paternity inclusion. There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative
father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either
DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than physical absence or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother
99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception.
is refutable presumption of paternity.
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate.
The child's legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by
law.

Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered
as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a
paternity proceeding. However, although likeness is a function of heredity, there is
no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not
look like his biological father.19 This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the
trier of fact.

23 Agustin v. CA, G.R. No. DNA testing Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. The right
162571, June 15, 2005 against self-incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

24 People of the DNA Testing Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable
Philippines v. Rufino presumption of paternity. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other
Umanito, G.R. No. evidence
172607, April 16, 2009
Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section
3, Rules of Court).

The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence
considering that the accused did not object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-
markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
25 Lucas v. Lucas, G.R. No. DNA Testing - Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet,
190710, June 6, 2011 prima facie case been presented by petitioner.

*Herrera vs Alba case had been misapplied in this case.

The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to
face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage
of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.

The CA’s observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a party’s
evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.

Clearly then, it was also not the right time to discuss the lack of a prima facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA
testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the RTC. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing.
25 DNA Testing As such, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing.This is to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits.

Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to
establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first
present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding of the
test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was
imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. SC agrees to this and find that, as a preliminary matter, before
the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity during the hearing.

2. Documentary Evidence

Sec 2. Documentary evidence - Documents as evidence consist of writings, recordings, photographs or any material containing letters, words, sounds, number, figures, symbols, or their equivalent, or other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents.
Photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray films, motion pictures or videos.

- writings,
-recordings,
-photographs or
-any material containing letters, words, sounds, number, figures, symbols, or their equivalent, or
-other modes of written expression offered as proof of their contents.

Photographs include still pictures, drawings, stored images, x-ray films, motion pictures or videos.
26 People v. Bardaje, 99 Object evidence - *Medical examination shows no external injuries
SCRA 388 (1980) L29271 Physical evidence The medical findings showed that "no evidence of external injuries was found around the vulva or any part of the body" of Marcelina,
which the court finds strange because she was allegedly "dragged" slapped" into unconsciousness, "wrestled" with, and criminally
abused.

Physical evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together.

*Old laceration shows amorous relationship

The “old healed laceration” in the hymen, according to the testimony of the physician, would have occurred two weeks or even 1 month
before. This shows that Marcelina and Adelino had amorous relationship.

*Highly improbable and contrary to human experience

Marcelina’s admission that she was taken to a small one-room hut shared with a woman and two children and where she was ravished
seems to be highly improbable. Her charge, therefore, that she was ravished in that same room is highly improbable and contrary to
human experience.

27 Sison v. People, 250 Object evidence - The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its production Application
SCRA 58 (1995) 108280- Photographs and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its
83 representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their
the crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. admissibility for lack of proper identification.

The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the testimony Joselito and Gerry used the pictures as their defence
of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas,
accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used them to prove that his
exactness and accuracy. clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in
the mauling of the victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant Joselito
We rule that the use of these photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits.
of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine all
the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by counsel for any
of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a
continuing objection to their admissibility.
28 Adamczuk v. Holloway, Object evidence- As a general rule, a photograph may be put in evidence if relevant to the issue and if verified. It must be verified by the taker. The
13 A.2d 2 (1940) Photographs verification is dependent upon the competency of its verifying witness so that the trial court could decide on its admissibility.

"The map or photograph must first, to be admissible, be made a part of some qualified person's testimony. Someone must stand forth
as its testimonial sponsor; in other words, it must be verified.

There is nothing anomalous or exceptional in this requirement of verification; it is simply the exaction of those testimonial qualities which
are required equally of all witnesses; the application merely takes a different form." But “there is also a rule giving the trial judge
discretion to reject a picture on the ground that the evidence is cumulative or that the photograph is unnecessary” saying that there are
matters that are “peculiarly for the trial judge to pass upon in the exercise of his discretion."

In this case, the court finds the photograph unnecessary and its exclusion from case does not tantamount to a reversible error. It is
because the jury had their way of knowing the condition of the place through several other photographs showing the intersection. They
also had this expert testimony from an engineer as regards the objects that could possibly obstruct the view of the drivers and the
road’s curvature

29 State v. Tatum, 360 P. Object evidence - Yes. It should be noted that this court has for many years encouraged the admission and use of demonstrative evidence, including
2d 754 (1961) photographs photographs.

In this case, witness Pentecost testified that she recognized the background shown in the picture as that of the food store, and, as
mentioned previously, she also testified as to the store's standard procedure of "regiscoping" each individual who cashed a check at the
store. Phillip Dale testified at length concerning the Regiscope process. The testimony of these two witnesses taken together amounted
to a sufficient authentication to warrant the admission of the photograph (both the print and the negative) into evidence.

In the Court’s opinion, the Regiscope exhibits, coupled with the other evidence produced by the state, sufficed to establish a prima facie
case of first-degree forgery.

The fact that Dale was not a professional photographer and may have not understood all of the technical details of the process, did not,
from an evidentiary standpoint, disqualify him from expressing an opinion in his testimony as to the possibility of altering a given
Regiscope print.

This court has many times held that the question of whether or not a witness is qualified to express an expert opinion lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. In view of witness Dale's testimony that he personally had developed "four to five hundred thousand"
individual Regiscope films, we hardly think that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard.
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. NO. 01-7-01-SC)
RULE 4
Best Evidence Rule

SECTION 1. Original of an Electronic Document. — An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.

SECTION 2. Copies as equivalent of the originals. — When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same time with identical contents, or is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by mechanical or
electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduces the original, such copies or
duplicates shall be regarded as the equivalent of the original. Notwithstanding the foregoing, copies or duplicates shall not be admissible to the same extent as the original if:
(a) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original; or
(b) in the circumstances it would be unjust or inequitable to admit the copy in lieu of the original.

RULE 5
Authentication of Electronic Documents
SECTION 1. Burden of proving authenticity. — The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.

SECTION 2. Manner of authentication. — Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the Judge.

SECTION 3. Proof of electronically notarized document. — A document electronically notarized in accordance with the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be considered as a public document and proved as a notarial document under the Rules of Court.

SECTION 3. Disputable presumptions relating to electronic signatures. — Upon the authentication of an electronic signature, it shall be presumed that:
(a) The electronic signature is that of the person to whom it correlates;
(b) The electronic signature was affixed by that person with the intention of authenticating or approving the electronic document to which it is related or to indicate such person's consent to the transaction embodied therein; and
(c) The methods or processes utilized to affix or verify the electronic signature operated without error or fault.

SECTION 4. Disputable presumptions relating to digital signatures. — Upon the authentication of a digital signature, it shall be presumed, in addition to those mentioned in the immediately preceding section, that:
(a) The information contained in a certificate is correct;
(b) The digital signature was created during the operational period of a certificate;
(c) No cause exists to render a certificate invalid or revocable;
(d) The message associated with a digital signature has not been altered from the time it was signed, and,
(e) A certificate had been issued by the certification authority indicated therein.

RULE 11
Audio, Photographic, Video, and Ephemeral Evidence
SECTION 1. Audio, video and similar evidence. — Audio, photographic and video evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown, presented or displayed to the court and shall be identi􀀶ed, explained or authenticated by the person who
made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the accuracy thereof.

SECTION 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. — Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent
evidence may be admitted. A recording of the telephone conversation or ephemeral electronic communication shall be covered by the immediately preceding section.
If the foregoing communications are recorded or embodied in an electronic document, then the provisions of Rule 5 shall apply.
30 PEOPLE V. ENOJAS, G.R. Rules on Electronic Text messages are to be proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. It has
NO. 204894, MARCH 10, Evidence been provided under Rule 11, Section 2:
2014
Section 2. Ephemeral electronic communications. – Ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. In the absence or unavailability of such witnesses, other competent
evidence may be admitted.

In this case, PO3 Cambi, posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge of
such messages and was competent to testify on them.

31 National Power Corp. v. Rules on Electronic An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written Petitioner insists that, contrary to the rulings of both the trial court and the appellate
Codilla, G.R. No. Evidence expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be court, the photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute
170491, April 4, 2007 proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes electronic evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as
digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or defined under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited
electronic document. to information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as
produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, included in the section’s catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable by
similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic sight or other means".
document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an
electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as
the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the
imagination can a person’s signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted,
stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an
electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous.

Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
32 MCC Industrial Sales v. Rules on Electronic R.A. No. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document for WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID FAX TRANSMISSIONS ARE WITHIN THE COVERAGE OF
Ssangyong Corp., G.R. Evidence evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the R.A. NO. 8792
No. 170633, October rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules.
17, 2007 An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable No. Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an
by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the
Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such as a fax transmission not
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
under the Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document." POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere
photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to
The construction of the term "electronic data message,"excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.
the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses.

Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based. A facsimile machine is a device that can send or
receive pictures and text over a telephone line. A fax machine is essentially an image scanner, a modem and a computer printer
combined into a highly specialized package. The scanner converts the content of a physical document into a digital image, the modem
sends the image data over a phone line, and the printer at the other end makes a duplicate of the original document.

33 Aznar v. Citibank, G.R. Rules on Electronic Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on
No. 164273, March 28, Evidence its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence the computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature
2007 of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker. purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the words
"Sorry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl Mario." It
Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read: is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated in the print-
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. – The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the out and was the one who printed the same. The handwritten annotation signed by a
burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule. certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who printed the same and only
Section 2. Manner of authentication. – Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the entrant, required by the provision
authenticity must be proved by any of the following means: above mentioned, was therefore not established. Neither did petitioner establish in
(a) By evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same; what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi make the entries, or whether the
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for entries were made in the performance of their duty in the ordinary or regular
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or course of business or duty.
(c) By other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge.

The Warning Cancellation Bulletins showed that said Citibank preferred mastercard had never been placed in a ‘hot list’ or the same was
blacklisted, let alone the fact that all the credit cards which had been cancelled by the defendant bank were all contained, reported and
listed in said Warning Cancellation Bulletin which were issued and released on a regular basis.

Warning Cancellation Bulletins

The first reason is that the due execution and authentication of these Warning Cancellation Bulletins (or WCB) have been duly
established and identified by defendant’s own witness, Dennis Flores, one of the bank’s officers, who is the head of its credit card
department, and, therefore, competent to testify on the said bulletins as having been issued by the defendant bank showing that
plaintiff’s preferred master credit card was never blacklisted or placed in the Bank’s ‘hot list’.

Commercial Documents
34 Garvida v. Sales, Jr., 338 Rules on Electronic Filing a pleading by facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, much less by the Rules of Court. A
Phil. 484 - Evidence facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the
original, there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and was originally signed by
the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

The uncertainty of the authenticity of a facsimile pleading should have restrained the COMELEC en banc from acting on the petition and
issuing the questioned order. The COMELEC en banc should have waited until it received the petition filed by registered mail

E. Original Document Rule

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, writing, photograph or other record, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice, or the original cannot be obtained by local judicial processes or procedures;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
(3) When the original is not closely-related to a controlling issue.

Sec. 4. Original of document. —

(a) An original of a document is the document itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it. An original of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom. If data is stored in a computer or similar device, any print out
or other output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately, is an original.

(b) A duplicate is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent
techniques which accurately reproduce the original.

(c) A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless

1. genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original
2. in the circumstances, it is unjust or inequitable to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.

35 People v. Tandoy, 192 Original Document The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether
SCRA 28 (1990) 80505 Rule or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.

Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its
contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the
original.

Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant
because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually
sold by the accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a
fatal omission.
36 Air France v. Original Document Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence.
Carrascoso, 18 SCRA Rule
155 (1966) L21438 On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his testimony, see plaintiff's
Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony .

Air France tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although Carrascoso paid for, and
was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-
1" belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.

37 Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d Original Document *Best evidence rule is limited to writings to be proved not the statements Does the best evidence rule require official transcripts to be the only source of
800 (1948) Rule evidence as to what a person said during a trial or hearing?
In federal courts, the best evidence rule is limited to cases where the contents of a writing are to be proved. Perjurious statements may
be proved by others who heard them, or by notes recorded in shorthand, or by other means and not exclusively by an official transcript.

In this case, there was no attempt to prove the contents of a writing. The issue was what the defendant had said, not what the
transcript contained. The transcript made from shorthand notes of his testimony was, to be sure, evidence of what he had said, but it
was not the only admissible evidence concerning it. The witness' testimony was equally competent, and was admissible whether given
before or after the transcript was received in evidence.

 
38 People v. Tan, 105 Phil. Original Document Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of the admissibility of duplicate originals, as follows: Yes, duplicates are admissible even without accounting first for the loss of the
1242 (1959) L14257 Rule "SEC. 386… the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact p. 616. A originals.
"duplicate sales slip’
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so
"SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. — Where letters are produced by mechanical means and, concurrently with the original, duplicate are that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the
produced, as by placing carbon paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface at the same time, all are duplicate originals, party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
and any one of them may be introduced in evidence without accounting for the nonproduction of the other. signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the
surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
"SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such
these have been held to be as much primary evidence as the originals. All of the sheet so written on are regarded as duplicate originals without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.’ (Moran, 1952 ed., p. 444.)
and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.
39 Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 Original Document Original Document Rule requires the production of an original document instead of a copy. The contents of Seiler's work are at issue. There can be no proof of "substantial
F.2d 1504 (1986) Rule similarity" and thus of copyright infringement unless Seiler's works are juxtaposed
The Court held that Seiler's drawings were "writings" within the meaning of Rule; they consist not of "letters, words, or numbers" but of with Lucas' and their contents compared. Since the contents are material and must
"their equivalent." Writings and recordings are "letters, words, or numbers, or their equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, be proved, Seiler must either produce the original or show that it is unavailable
printing, photo stating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation." through no fault of his own.

Rules expressed that to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is The facts of this case implicate the very concerns that justify the best evidence rule.
required, except as otherwise provided in the rules or by act of Congress. In proving the terms of a writing, where the terms are Seiler alleges infringement by “The Empire Strikes Back”, but he can produce no
material, the original writing must be produced unless it is shown to be unavailable for some reason other than the serious fault of the documentary evidence of any originals existing before the release of the movie. His
proponent. secondary evidence does not consist of true copies or exact duplicates but of
"reconstructions" made after “The Empire Strikes Back”. In short, Seiler claims that
the movie infringed his originals, yet he has no proof of those originals.

Seiler's claim depends on the content of the originals, and the rule would exclude
reconstituted proof of the originals' content. Under the circumstances here, no
"reconstruction" can substitute for the original.

40 US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. Original Document The mere exhibition of a copy of an unauthenticated private document could not legally produce the effect of suspending the sale of This case concerns the falsity of a document alleged to have been written on a date
522 (1910) 5791 Rule the said land, inasmuch as such copy is not sufficient proof of the right of the intervener and opponent, being a mere copy of a private prior to the one when it actually was presented, which instrument simulates the sale
document whose legality has not been proven. of a parcel of land by its owner to a third party, with the intent to defraud the
creditor
41 Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil Original Document "The general rule is that the complaint or information for libel must set out the particular defamatory words as published, and a WON an information charging a libel published in an unofficial; language without
905 (1931) 35366 Rule statement of their substance and effect is usually considered insufficient." including a copy of the libelous article (only the translation into Spanish) is valid.
05aug31 But this general rule does not exclude certain exceptions, such as, cases where the libel is published in a non-official language. "When
the defamation has been published in a foreign tongue, it is proper, and in general, necessary, to set out the communication as it was
originally made, with an exact translation into English; and if from the translation no cause of action appears, it is immaterial that the
foreign words were actionable. In some jurisdictions, however, under the influence of the liberality of laws on practice, it is held
unnecessary to set out the communication in the foreign language in which it is alleged to have been published, so long as the foreign
publication is alleged, with an English translation attached.

If the libelous article had been published in one of our official languages, English or Spanish, it would have been necessary to follow the
general rule; but since the article in question was published in the Pampango dialect, it is sufficient to insert a Spanish translation in the
information. The justice of this exception to the general rule becomes more evident if we consider a libelous article published, for
instance, in Moro or Chinese, who use characters different from our own.

The second question refers to the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are
applicable to cases of libel or slander.

The evidence must be relevant and not hearsay. This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best
evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly where the libelous article was published, and its
2. SECONDARY EVIDENCE

Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. — If the document is in the custody or under the control of adverse party, he or she must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.

Sec. 7. Summaries. - When the contents of documents, records, photographs, or numerous accounts are voluminous and cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the fact sought to be established is only the general result of the whole, the contents of such
evidence may be presented in the form of a chart, summary or calculation.

The originals shall be available for examination or copying, or both, by the adverse party at a reasonable time and place. The court may order that they be produced in court.

Sec. 8. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. — When the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.

Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not bound to offer it. — A party who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not obliged to offer it as evidence.

41 Municipality of Victorias Secondary evidence Under the Best Evidence Rule when the original writing is lost or otherwise unavailable: Yes, the secondary evidence presented by the municipality is sufficient to
v. CA, 149scra32 substantiate its claim that it acquired the disputed land.
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a It is undisputed that the Municipality failed to present the Deed of Sale to prove its
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. (Rule 130, Rules of Court). purchase of the land in question which is included in the TCT in the name of
Leuenberger.
In lieu of a Deed of Sale, the municipality presented a certificate issued by the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records Management
in Manila, of a page of the 1934 Notarial Register of Vicente Aragon. It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an authentic document clearly
corroborated and supported by: (a) the testimony of the municipal councilor of
The entries in the notarial register clearly show: Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, who negotiated the sale; (b) the testimony of Emilio
(a) the nature of the instrument. — a deed of sale; Cuesta, the municipal treasurer of said municipality, since 1932 up to the date of trial
(b) the subject of the sale — two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 140-A and 140-B; on September 14, 1964, who personally paid the amount of P750.00 to Felipe
(c) the parties of the contract — the vendor Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching in her capacity as Administrator in Civil Case No. 5116 of the Leuenberger as consideration of the Contract of Sale; (c) Certificate of Settlement "as
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and the vendee, Vicente B. Ananosa, Municipal Mayor of Victorias; evidence of said payment;" (d) Tax Declaration No. 429, which was cancelled and
(d) the consideration P750.00; was substituted by Tax Declaration No. 3600 covering the portion of the property
(e) the names of the witnesses Esteban Jalandoni and Gregoria Elizado; and the date of the sale on July 9, 1934. unsold; and (e) Tax Declaration No. 3601 in the name of the Municipal Government
of Victorias covering the portion occupied as cemetery.

The above-mentioned testimonies and documentary evidence sufficiently identify

the land sold by the predecessors-in-interest of Leuenberger. To insist on the
technical description of the land in dispute would be to sacrifice substance to form
which would undoubtedly result in manifest injustice to the municipality.
40 de Vera v Aguilar, Secondary evidence No. Secondary evidence such as the Xeroxed copy of the deed of sale could only be introduced when the proponent has established the In this case, preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts that the notary
218scra602 (1993) former existence of the instrument and established that it was actually lost or destroyed. In this case, the loss or destruction of the public- Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures appearing in the
original deed of sale was not satisfactorily established, thus the secondary evidence is not admissible. deed of sale to be that of the spouses and witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela.
Hence, the petitioners have sufficiently established the existence and execution of
Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court on Secondary Evidence states: When the original writing has been the document. The law is clear that the execution of the document may be
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may established
be proved by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. -by the person or persons who executed it,
-by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged,
The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may be changed if necessary in the -or by any person who was present and saw it executed or who,
discretion of the court. -after its execution, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
-by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the
However, while the due execution of the document has been established, the petitioners failed to prove the loss or destruction of the execution thereof.
instrument.

In this case, the Supreme Court agrees that the original deed of sale was not lost or destroyed. It concluded that the petitioners just
failed to ask the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for one reason or
another should have called the Register of Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to do. The loss or destruction of
the original of the document in question has not, therefore, been established. Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible.

42 Vda. de Corpus v. Secondary evidence The record of the present case will bear that its existence was convincingly proven not only by the testimony of Heraclea Vda. De Corpus, The plaintiff declared that the original deed of sale signed by defendant Tiburcia was
Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 the surviving widow, and by the environmental facts disclosed by the evidence, but also by the disinterested testimony of Pablo Albeza. lost during the war.
O.G. 8262 (1963) After proper proof of the due execution & delivery of the instrument & its loss or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its
contents by any person who signed the document, or who read it.

As to the second issue, it is not necessary, in order to admit evidence of the contents of a lost instrument, that the witness should be able
to testify with verbal accuracy to its contents; it is sufficient if they are able to state it in substance. Witnesses cannot be expected to
recite the content word for word. It is enough if intelligent witnesses have read the paper & can state substantially its contents & import
with reasonable accuracy. Thus, it was held sufficient if the witness can recollect and testify to facts showing the presence of essential
elements of a contract, namely; consent, subject matter, consideration and form in certain instances.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs are more than enough to satisfy the statutory requirements as to execution
and subsequent loss of the deed of sale as well as to its content
 
43 Compañia Maritima v. Secondary evidence What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence
Allied Free Workers proof of the original records, books of accounts, reports or the like" because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other
Union, 77 SCRA 24 documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss-of time and the
(1977) L28999 That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or fact sought to be established from them is oth the general result of the whole", the
impossibility attending the production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence by the court. original writings need not be produced

That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the
records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established.

It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts
should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the company, of the
summary may be tested on cross-examination.

44 Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Secondary evidence Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. 22, which are photostatic copies of ledger entries and
Ferrer, 25scra845 the custody of the adverse party, thus: vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and transactions
(1968) L23893 29oct68 (1) opponent's possession of the original; with those made in the name of the Corporation, are very illuminating evidence.
(2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that no
(3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely
(4) failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court. photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the originals
themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it
Villarama has practically admitted the second and fourth requisites. As to the third, he admitted their previous existence in the files of was the most likely possessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen from
the Corporation and also that he had seen some of them. the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able to produce the alleged
photostat copies thereof.
Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, the originals
were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no longer in possession of the same. However, it is not necessary for a party
seeking to introduce secondary evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is enough that the
circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party
entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession.

Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a
copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exceptions to the best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court." The originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation
admits such loss. Viewed upon this light, there can be no doubt as to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22.
45 Michael & Co., Inc. v. Secondary evidence As will be seen in this section, the writing itself must be produced unless it has been lost or destroyed in which case, before its contents
Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 may be proved by other evidence, it must be shown by the party offering secondary evidence that:
(1915) 10824 24dec15 1.) that the document was duly executed and delivered, where delivery is necessary, and;
2.) that it has been lost or destroyed.

Proof of execution or delivery of the document

The execution or delivery of the document maybe established by the person or persons,
-who executed it,
-by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or
-by any person who was present and saw it executed and delivered or
-who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the signatures; or
-by a person to whom the parties to the instruments have previously confessed the execution thereof.

After proper proof of the due execution and delivery and its loss or destruction, oral evidence maybe given of its contents by any person
who signed the document, or who read it, or heard it read knowing, or it being proved from other sources, that the document so read
was the one in question. Such evidence may also be given by any person who was present when the contents of the document was being
talked over between the parties thereto to such an extent as to give him reasonably full information as to its contents; or the contents
maybe proved by any person to whom the parties to the instrument have confessed or stated the contents thereof; or by a copy thereof;
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document.

Proof of the destruction/loss of the instrument

The destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact.

The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or pares of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
Court that the document was indeed lost.
G. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
1. Rule 130 §10

Sec. 10. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he or she puts in issue in a verified pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The term "agreement" includes wills.

2. Art. 1403 and 1405 Civil Code (Statute of Frauds)

Unenforceable Contracts (n)

Article 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum, thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a
sufficient memorandum;
(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
( f ) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of giving consent to a contract.

Article 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefit under them.

46 Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 Parol Evidence Rule Parol evidence rule does not apply to receipts because it is not on agreement. It is proof only of delivery of money. Furthermore, the The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced their
(1990) 79962 parole evidence bars only evidence as to the terms, it does not bar evidence as to statement of facts. The receipt of money is merely a agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and memorial
statement of fact. of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have
been waived or abandoned. 2
Receipt is not an agreement.
A receipt — i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one party to the other, of the manual custody of money or other personality — The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is
will in general fall without the line of the rule; i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive memorial, and the facts may be shown irrespective
predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement,
of the terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is merely a written admission of a transaction independently existing, and,but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to
like other admissions, is not conclusive. the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from the private respondent
the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended by the parties to
Parol evidence bars only evidence as to the terms, not statement of facts. be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not
A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can
may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and
"there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the
the writing." private respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is
not covered by the parol evidence rule.
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the
distinct act of payment made by the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw"
contract does not make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I,
particularly with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount was received.
47 Pioneer Savings & Loan Parol Evidence Rule Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a They could have incorporated in the deed of sale (if such was the intention or
Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA valid instrument. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the agreement of the parties) a stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration
740 (1993) 105419 purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless of the vehicle in Santos' name were conditioned on the failure of his relatives to
27sep93 there has been fraud or mistake. recover their time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No such stipulation was
incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright and unconditional transfer of
ownership of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.

48 Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 Parol Evidence Rule Since the answer alleged that the contract did not express the true intention of the parties, it has therefore been put in issue in the
SCRA 219 (1962) L18077 pleadings. The same way therefore be subject of parole evidence.
29sep62
It is argued that the court a quo erred in allowing presentation of parole evidence to prove that a conteporaneous oral agreement was
also reached between parties relative to the construction of the roads for same is in violation of our rule which provides that when the
terms of an agreement had been reduced to writing it is to be considered as containing all that has been agreed upon and that no
evidence other than the terms there can be admitted between the parties (Section 22, Rule 123).

This rule, however, only holds true if there is allegation that the agreement does not express the intent of the parties. If there is and this
claim is in issue in the pleadings, the same may be the subject parole evidence (Idem.). The fact that such failure has been put in issue in
this case is patent in the answer wherein defendant has specifically pleaded that the contract of sale in question does not express the
true intent of the parties with regard to the construction of the roads.

49 Canuto v. Mariano, 37 Parol Evidence Rule The contention that the plaintiff should not be permitted to alter, vary, or contradict the terms of the written instrument by the
Phil. 840 (1918) 11346 introduction of oral evidence is manifestly untenable under the circumstances of the case.
21mar
The rule forbidding the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence to alter, vary, or contradict a written instrument does not apply so as to
prohibit the establishment by parol of an agreement between the parties to a writing, entered into subsequent to the time when the
written instrument was executed, notwithstanding such agreement may have the effect of adding to, changing, modifying, or even
altogether abrogating the contract of the parties as evidenced by the writing; for the parol evidence does not in any way deny that the
original agreement of the parties was that which the writing purports to express, but merely goes to show that the parties have exercised
their right to change or abrogate the same, or to make a new and independent contract.

It makes no difference how soon after the execution of the written contract the parol one was made. If it was in fact subsequent and is
otherwise unobjectionable it may be proved and enforced.

50 Yu Tek & Co. v. Parol Evidence Rule There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to be raised by the defendant. Parties are presumed to have
Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the
(1915) 9935 01feb meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions
which are not mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.

Our conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to the contract by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights
of the parties must be determined by the writing itself.
51 Land Settlement & Parol Evidence Rule When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition
Development Corp. v. precedent, such may be established by parol evidence.
Garcia Plantation, 7
SCRA 750 (1963) L17820 This is not varying the terms of the written contract by extrinsic agreement, for the simple reason that there is no contract in existence;
24apr there is nothing to which to apply the excluding rule ... This rule does not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a
supposed contract never became effective by reason of the failure of some collateral condition or stipulation. The rule excluding parol
evidence to vary or contradict a writing, does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence, to show prior or
contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not
the written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement.

52 Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Parol Evidence Rule Where an indorser claims that his name was forged, it is clear that parol evidence is admissible to prove that fact, and, if he proves it, it is The case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies or
Phil. 640 (1914) 8844 a complete defense, the fact being that the indorser never made any such contract, that no such relation ever existed between him and contradicts the terms of the contract of indorsement admittedly existing. The
16dec the indorsee, and that there was no consideration whatever to sustain such a contract. In the case before us we have a condition evidence was not offered for that purpose.
somewhat similar. While the indorser does not claim that his name was forged, he does claim that it was obtained from him in a
manner which, between the parties themselves, renders, the contract as completely inoperative as if it had been forged. The purpose was to show that no contract of indorsement ever existed; that the
minds of the parties never met on the terms of such contract; that they never
Parol evidence was admissible for the purpose named. mutually agreed to enter into such a contract; and that there never existed a
consideration upon which such an agreement could be founded. The evidence was
not offered to vary, alter, modify, or contradict the terms of an agreement which it is
admitted existed between the parties, but to deny that there ever existed any
agreement whatever; to wipe out all apparent relations between the parties, and
not to vary, alter or contradict the terms of a relation admittedly existing; in other
words, the purpose of the parol evidence was to demonstrate, not that the indorser
did not intend to make the particular indorsement which he did make; not that he
did not intend to make the indorsement in the terms made; but, rather, to deny the
reality of any indorsement; that a relation of any kind whatever was created or
existed between him and the indorsee by reason of the writing on the back of the
instrument; that no consideration ever passed to sustain an indorsement of any kind
whatsoever.

53 PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. Parol Evidence Rule The verbal assurances given by the respondent to the employees of the bank that he was ready to refund the amount if the check should If, therefore, the supposed assurances that the drawer had funds and that the
756 (1952) L4388 13aug be dishonored by the drawee bank is a collateral agreement, separate and distinct from the indorsement, by virtue of which petitioner respondent herein would refund the amount of the check if the drawer had no
herein was induced to cash the check, and, therefore, admissible as an exception that the parol evidence rule. funds, were the considerations or reasons that induced the branch agency of the
petitioners to go out of its ordinary practice of not cashing out of town checks and
accept the check and to pay its face value, the same would be provable by parol,
provided, of course, that the assurances or inducements offered would not vary,
alter, or destroy the obligations attached by law to the indorsement.
54 Woodhouse v. Halili, Parol Evidence Rule The act or statement of the plaintiff was not sought to be introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how he
93Phil526 (1953) L4811 induced the defendant to enter into it — to prove the representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the
31jul other party's consent thereto. These are expressly excluded from the parol evidence rule.

The issue of fact is: Did plaintiff represent to defendant that he had an exclusive franchise? Certainly, his acts or statements prior to the
agreement are essential and relevant to the determination of said issue. The act or statement of the plaintiff was not sought to be
introduced to change or alter the terms of the agreement, but to prove how he induced the defendant to enter into it — to prove the
representations or inducements, or fraud, with which or by which he secured the other party's consent thereto. These are expressly
excluded from the parol evidence rule.

Fraud and false representation are an incident to the creation of a jural act, not to its integration, and are not governed by the rules on
integration. Were parties prohibited from proving said representations or inducements, on the ground that the agreement had already
been entered into, it would be impossible to prove misrepresentation or fraud. Furthermore, the parol evidence rule expressly allows
the evidence to be introduced when the validity of an instrument is put in issue by the pleadings ,as in this case.

55 Robles v. Lizarraga Parol Evidence Rule CONTRACTS; EVIDENCE; ORAL CONTRACT INCONSISTENT WITH WRITTEN CONTRACT; COLLATERAL AGREEMENT. — The rule excluding
Hermanos, 50Phil387 parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or
(1927) 26173 13jul contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not
the written agreement contains reference to such collateral agreement.

In the case before us the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to the defendant only such interests in certain properties as had come
to the conveyors by inheritance. Nothing is said concerning the rights in the hacienda which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or
concerning the things that he had placed thereon by way of improvement or had acquired by purchase. The verbal contract which the
plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main contract of conveyance, and evidence of such verbal
contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated.

The rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to vary a written contract appears to have more
particular reference to the obligation expressed in the written agreement, and the rule has never been interpreted as being applicable
to matters of consideration or inducement.

In the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it is a collateral to the
written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters.

56 Lechugas v. CA, Parol Evidence Rule The parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where at
143scra335 (1986) least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the
L39972 06aug instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.

The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the
parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The
dispute over what was actually sold is between petitioner and the private respondents.
57 Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA Parol Evidence Rule Parol evidence rule does not require that the agreement be a public document and it need not be in any particular form or signed by the Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the promissory note "is not a
578 (1996) 96405 26jun parties. public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but . . . a mere commercial paper
which does not bear the signature of . . . attesting witnesses," parol evidence may
As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic "overcome" the contents of the promissory note.9 The first paragraph of the parol
evidence. evidence rule 10 states:

When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as

containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.

Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document

58 Ortañez v. CA Parol Evidence Rule Private respondents' oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, Private respondents’ oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party
266scra561 23Jan97 depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could be notoriously who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human
unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform language. Examing the deeds of sale, we cannot even make an inference memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. Spoken words could
that the sale was subject to any condition... Merely alleging that the contract is subject to conditions does not put the exception in be notoriously unreliable unlike a written contract which speaks of a uniform
issue in the pleadings. language.

Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, "it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the
contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake." terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to
No such fraud or mistake exists in this case contain all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted
other than the contents thereof. Considering that the written deeds of sale were
the only repository of the truth, whatever is not found in said instruments must
have been waived and abandoned by the parties. Examining the deeds of sale, we
cannot even make an inference that the sale was subject to any condition. As a
contract, it is the law between the parties.
H. Interpretation of Documents
1. Rule 130 §11-20
4. INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS

Sec. 11. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning. — The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended otherwise.

Sec. 12. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.

Sec. 13. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular provisions. — In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a
particular intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it.

Sec. 14. Interpretation according to circumstances. — For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those who language he is to interpret.

Sec. 15. Peculiar signification of terms. — The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and
understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly.

Sec. 16. Written words control printed. — When an instrument consists partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former controls the latter.

Sec. 17. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain writings. — When the characters in which an instrument is written are difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or
who understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of the language.

Sec. 18. Of Two constructions, which preferred. — When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made.

Sec. 19. Construction in favor of natural right. — When an instrument is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)

Sec. 20. Interpretation according to usage. —An instrument may be construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
2. Art. 1370-1379 of the Civil Code
CHAPTER 5
Interpretation of Contracts
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former. (1281)

Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. (1282)

Article 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. (1283)

Article 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it effectual. (1284)

Article 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly. (1285)

Article 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract. (1286)

Article 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established. (1287)

Article 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. (1288)

Article 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the
doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.

If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a way that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of the parties, the contract shall be null and void. (1289)

Article 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of contracts. (n)
59 Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. Interpretation of Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them. It is argued here that the court erred in its construction of the contract. We are of
588 (1914) Contracts They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority of the law need no interpretation or construction. They the opinion that the contention is sound. The intention of parties to a contract must
require only application, and if there were more application and less construction, there would be more stability in the law, and more be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It is to be
people would know what the law is." presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain English.
Interpretation and construction should by the instruments last resorted to by a court
In the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used by the parties
only nine months. Whatever the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract should last a year and it was is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and, if used, result in
their judgment and conviction that their purposes would not be subversed in any less time. What reason can give for refusing to follow making a contract for the parties.
the plain words of the men who made the contract? We see none.
60 Capital Insurance v. Interpretation of Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00
Sadang, 21 SCRA 1183 Contracts bond," and that "the moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to them." The
(1967) trial court found the said testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous,
the doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the
parties as explained by defendants-appellees.

The trial court correctly held said defendants-appellants liable only for the sum of P300.00.
Rule 130 §21: Qualifications of Witnesses
1. Personal Knowledge
Rule 130 §22

Sec. 21. Witnesses; their qualifications. — All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make their known perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be ground for disqualification.

Under Section 20 of Rule 130, except as provided by the law and the rules, the following factors do not, as a general
rule, constitute a disqualification of a witness:
(a) religious belief;
(b) political belief;
(c) interest in the outcome of the case; or
(d) conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law (Example: those who have been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony are disqualified from being witnesses to a will). (Art. 821, Civil Code of the Philippines). As a consequence, these
persons may not also testify as witnesses in the probate of a will where the subject of the testimony is the very fact of execution of the will in their presence.

Sec 22. Testimony confined to personal knowledge. - A witness can testify only to those facts which he or she knows of his or her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his or her own perception.

61 Arjonillo v. Pagulayan, Qualifications of Despite claiming knowledge of the terms and conditions of the sale, perusal of the deed of absolute sale revealed that Dr. Valdepanas CA found that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving their allegation
GR. No. 196074, Oct. 4, witness was neither a party nor a witness to the transaction. It is noticeable that Dr. Valdepan_as merely repeated statements he heard from Cue that the properties in dispute form part of the estate of Cue. It was also found that
2017 and Chua Bun Gui. When asked if he was present whenever Cue paid Chua Bun Gui, he did not give a categorical answer but simply the testimonies of their witnesses could be considered as mere hearsay because
claimed that he knew about it personally. More importantly, proponent offered the testimony to prove "that the lot in question was they did not have personal knowledge of the circumstances attending the execution
purchased by the late A velardo Cue and not by the defendant, Demetria Pagulayan, although the Deed of Sale was in the name of the of the deed of sale in favor of Pagulayan and the consequent issuance of TCT No. T-
said defendant Demetria Pagulaya 35506 in her name.

Xxx A witness can only testify on facts within his personal knowledge. This is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial They also tried to prove that contrary to what appears in the deed of sale, the actual
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. Unless the testimony falls under any of the recognized exceptions, hearsay transaction transpired between Chua Bun Gui and Cue. But Chua Bun Gui did not
evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given credence for it has no probative value. testify during the trial. Neither his wife nor any witness to the sale was presented.
Instead, Arjonillo and her co-heirs presented the testimony of Dr. Valdepanas who,
as earlier noted, is the nephew of Spouses Chua and has a clinic adjacent to the
property under scrutiny. The subject of his testimony, however, is not of matters he
himself knows; thus, it should be disregarded for being hearsay.

People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA Qualifications of The question involved herein is purely one of evidence. There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to, may not be
944 (14aug1965) L- witness admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the
20986 facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely
to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.

In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer, as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing more than to
establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bano the names of those who conspired with him to commit the
offense charged, without claiming that Puesca's statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano would be competent and admissible
evidence to show that the persons so named really conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question
propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however,
that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons named really and actually conspired with Puesca
and later took part in the commission of the offense.

62
 People v. Gaddi, 170 Qualifications of Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule [Section 30,
SCRA 649 (27feb1989) witness Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court] which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from
74065 other persons but not as to those facts which he "knows of his own knowledge: that is, which are derived from his own perception."
Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding the statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to
establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.

Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no
violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, he was testifying
to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed Augusta Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellant's statement.

63
Leake v. Hagert, 175 Qualifications of Edward Gross testified that Allen Leake's son told him, with reference to the small rear light on the tractor, that the red lens had been out
N.W.2d 675 (1970) witness for some time. Gross's testimony concerning the statement of Allen Leake's son was hearsay. (Gross has no personal knowledge of the
64 truth of the son’s statement.
2. MARITAL DISQUALIFICATIONS

a. Rule 130 §23: Marital Disqualification Rule

Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, the husband or the wife cannot testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants.

Thus, During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse
Exceptions:
in a civil case by one spouse against the other spouse, or
in a criminal case for a crime committed by one spouse against:
- the other spouse or;
- the other spouse’s direct descendants or ascendants

Ordoño v. Daquigan, 62 Marital The wife can therefore testify against her husband in such a case for rape against her daughter because it is considered a crime against
SCRA 270 (1975) L- Disqualification the wife. When an offense directly attacks, or directly impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the marital
39012 jan31 Rule disqualification rule.
65
People v. Castañeda, 88 Marital The wife can testify against the husband in a case for falsification of the wife’s signature (marital consent) in public documents to sell
SCRA 562 (1979) L- Disqualification share of wife in conjugal property because it is a crime committed by the husband against the wife.
46306 feb27 Rule
66
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 Marital Wife who is a co-defendant of her husband in a case of collusive fraud, where their interests are not separate, cannot be examined as a
SCRA 1166 (1968) L- Disqualification hostile witness by the adverse party. The reason for the privilege of husband and wife not to testify against each other is the natural
25643 jun27 Rule repugnance in every fair-minded person to compel a wife or husband to be the means of the other's condemnation and to subjecting the
culprit to the humiliation of being condemned by the words of his intimate life partner.
67
 People v. Francisco, 78 Marital When the husband imputes crime against wife, he waives the marital disqualification rule. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling the other spouse as a witness
Phil. 694 (1947) L-568 Disqualification for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to cross-examination in the usual
jul16 Rule manner. It is well-established that where an accused introduces his wife as a
Where the marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which witness in his behalf, the state is entitled to question her as to all matters germane
may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case identity of interests disappears and the and pertinent to her testimony on direct examination.
68 consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is non-existent.
J. Privileged Communications
1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 §24 (a)
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:

(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;
People v. Carlos, 47 Privileged The numerical weight of authority is, however, to the effect that where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes Exhibit L, a letter written to the defendant by his wife and siezed by the police in
Phil. 626 (1925) L22948 Communications - into the hands of a third party, whether legally or not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either of the spouses, the searching his effects on the day of his arrest. It is dated May 25, 1924, two days
17mar Marital privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication, if otherwise competent, becomes admissible. (28 R.C.L., 530 and authorities before the commission of the crime and shows that the writer feared that the
Communications there cited.) defendant contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased.

The letter was written by the wife of the defendant and if she had testified at the trial the letter might have been admissible to impeach Counsel for the defendant argues vigorously that the letter was a privileged
her testimony, but she was not put on the witness-stand and the letter was therefore not offered for that purpose. communication and therefore not admissible in evidence.

If the defendant either by answer or otherwise had indicated his assent to the statements contained in the letter it might also have been
admissible, but such is not the case here; the fact that he had the letter in his possession is no indication of acquiescence or assent on
his part. The letter is therefore nothing but pure hearsay and its admission in evidence violates the constitutional right of the defendant
in a criminal case to be confronted with the witnesses for the prosecution and have the opportunity to cross-examine them. In this
respect there can be no difference between an ordinary communication and one originally privileged.

The question is radically different from that of the admissibility of testimony of a third party as to a conversation between a husband
and wife overheard by the witness. Testimony of that character is admissible on the ground that it relates to a conversation in which
both spouses took part and on the further ground that where the defendant has the opportunity to answer a statement made to him by
his spouse and fails to do so, his silence implies assent. That cannot apply where the statement is contained in an unanswered letter.

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2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 §24 (b)
(b) An attorney or person reasonably believed by the client to be licensed to engage in the practice of law cannot, without the consent of the client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him or her, or his or her advice given thereon in the course of, or
with a view to, professional employment, nor can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk, or other persons assisting the attorney be examined, without the consent of the client and his or her employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in
such capacity, except in the following cases:

b. Note: Exceptions to the Privilege

(1) Furtherance of crime or fraud. If the services or advice of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud;

(ii) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a comuunication relevant to an issue between parties who claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate or by intervivos transaction;

(iii) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to his or her client, or by the client to his or her lawyer;

(iv) Document attested by the lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or

(v) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a layer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action between any of the clients, unless they have
expressly agreed otherwise.
Uy Chico v. Union Life, Attorney-Client A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in any court, It is manifest that the objection to the testimony of the plaintiff's attorney as to his
29 Phil. 163 (1915) L- Privilege without the consent of his client, given in open court, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or authority to compromise was properly overruled. The testimony was to the effect
9231 06jan for the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters. that when the attorney delivered the policies to the administrator, he understood
that there was a compromise to be effected, and that when he informed the
It is evident that a communication made by a client to his attorney for the express purpose of its being communicated to a third person is plaintiff of the surrender of the policies for that purpose the plaintiff made no
essentially inconsistent with the confidential relation. When the attorney has faithfully carried out his instructions by delivering the objection whatever. The evidence is sufficient to show that the plaintiff acquiesced
communication to the third person for whom it was intended and the latter acts upon it, it cannot, by any reasoning whatever, be in the compromise settlement of the policies. Having agreed to the compromise, he
classified in a legal sense as a privileged communication between the attorney and his client. It is plain that such a communication, after cannot now disavow it and maintain an action for the recovery of their face value.
reaching the party for whom it was intended at least, is a communication between the client and a third person, and that the attorney
simply occupies the role of intermediary or agent.
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 Regala v. Attorney-Client SC upheld the right of petitioners to refuse disclosure of names of their clients under the pain of breach of fiduciary relationship with
Sandiganbayan, 262 Privilege their client.
SCRA 124 (1996)
105938 20sep The question now arises whether or not this duty may be asserted in refusing to disclose the name of petitioners' client(s) in the case at
bar. Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant case, the answer must be in the affirmative.

As a general rule, a lawyer MAY NOT INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE BECAUSE:

1. The court has the right to know that the client whose privilege is sought to be protected is flesh and blood.
2. Privilege begins to exist only after the atty-client relationship has been established.
3.Privilege generally pertains to be the subject matter of the relationship.
4. With due process consideration, the opposing party should know his adversary.

EXCEPTION: LAWYERS MAY INVOKE THE PRIVILEGE WHEN:

1. Strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s
advice.
2. Disclosure would open to civil liability of client. (present in this case)
3. Government lawyers have no case against the lawyer’s client unless by revealing the client’s name it would provide them the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime. (present in this case)
4. Relevant to the subject matter of the legal problem on which client seeks legal assistance. (present in this case)
5. Nature of atty-client relationship has been previously disclosed and it is the identity which is intended to be confidential.

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Barton v. Leyte Asphalt Attorney-Client EVIDENCE; PRIVILEGE OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; LOSS OF PRIVILEGE. — The privilege which protects communications between attorney
and Mineral Oil Co., 46 Privilege and client does not extend to a copy of a letter written by the client to his attorney which comes to the hands of the adverse party.
Phil. 938 (1924) L-21237 Where the authenticity of such a document is admitted, the court will take no notice of the manner in which it was obtained.
22mar
We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the privilege which protects
communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the hands of the adverse party. And it
makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to
his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of
a third party, and reaches the adversary, it is admissible in evidence.

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 Orient Insurance v. Attorney-Client Does presentation of part of the letter constitute waiver to present the whole document? Yes.
Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 Privilege
(1930) 34098 17sep Is a contract for fees and other terms of employment between attorney and client privileged in nature? No.

It was stated in the court by the attorney for the plaintiff, in opposing the introduction of other portions of the letter in proof, that the
other parts were privileged, because they related to the terms of employment between attorney and client, or to the fee to be paid to
the attorney. With respect to this point it is difficult to see how a contract for fees could be considered privileged. Irrelevant it might,
under certain circumstances, certainly be, but not privileged. Of course contracts between attorneys and clients are inherently personal
and private matters, but they are a constant subject of litigation, and contracts relating to fees are essentially not of privileged nature.
Privilege primarily refers to communications from client to attorney, an idea which of course includes communications from attorney to
client relative to privileged matters.

But, even supposing that the matter contained in the letter and withheld from the inspection of the adversary was originally of a
privileged nature, the privilege was waived by the introduction in evidence of part of the letter. The provision in section 283 of the Code
of Civil Procedure making the whole of a declaration, conversation, or writing admissible when part has been given in evidence by one
party, makes no exception as to privileged matter; and the jurisprudence on the subject does not recognize any exception.

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Hickman v. Taylor, 329 Attorney-Client Memoranda, statements, and mental impressions prepared or obtained from interviews with witnesses by counsel in preparing for Defendants answered all other interrogatories, stating objective facts and giving the
U.S. 495 (1947) Privilege litigation after a claim has arisen are not within the attorney-client privilege, and are not protected from discovery on that basis. names and addresses of witnesses, but declined to summarize or set forth the
statements taken from witnesses, on the ground that they were "privileged matter
However, petitioner's request, made without purported necessity or justification, for materials that were prepared by respondents' obtained in preparation for litigation." After a hearing on objections to the
attorney in the course of legal representation fell outside of the arena of discovery and contravened public policy. interrogatories, the District Court held that the requested matters were not
privileged and decreed that they be produced and that memoranda of defendants'
counsel containing statements of fact by witnesses either be produced or submitted
to the court for determination of those portions which should be revealed to
plaintiff. Defendants and their counsel refused, and were adjudged guilty of
contempt.
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Upjohn Company v. US, Attorney-Client The communications by petitioner's employees to counsel are covered by the attorney-client privilege insofar as the responses to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) began an investigation to determine the tax
449 U.S. 383 (1981) Privilege questionnaires and any notes reflecting responses to interview questions are concerned. consequences of such payments and issued a summons pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 762
demanding production of, inter alia, the questionnaires and the memoranda and
The control group test overlooks the fact that suc.h privilege exists to protect not only the giving of professional advice to those who notes of the interviews. Petitioner refused to produce the documents on the
can act on it, but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice. grounds that they were protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
and constituted the work product of attorneys prepared in anticipation of litigation.
The control group test thus frustrates the very purpose of the attorney-client privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant
information by employees of the client corporation to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client.

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 US v. McPartlin, 595 Attorney-Client McPartlin was entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, because his statements were made in confidence to an attorney
F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) Privilege for a co-defendant for a common purpose related to both defenses. They were made in connection with the project of attempting to
discredit Benton, a project in which Ingram and McPartlin and their attorneys were jointly engaged for the benefit of both defendants.
Ingram acknowledges that communications by a client to his own lawyer remain privileged when the lawyer subsequently shares them
with co-defendants for purposes of a common defense. The common-defense rule, which is not as narrow as Ingram contends

Where a client communicates with the lawyer of the other party pursuant to a common defense, the lawyer of the other party is
deemed the lawyer of the other.

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US v. Gordon-Nikkar, Attorney-Client A communication divulged to strangers or outsiders can scarcely be considered a confidential communication between attorney and
518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. Privilege client. Therefore, this communication is not protected by the privilige.
1975)
The attorney-client does not extend to communications regarding an intended crime. The policy underlying attorney-client privilege is to
promote the administration of justice. It would be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect communications designed to
77 frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal past misdeeds.
US v. Nobles, 422 US Attorney-Client The qualified privilege derived from the attorney work product doctrine is not available to prevent disclosure of the investigative
225 (1975) Privilege report, since respondent, by electing to present the investigator as a witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his
78 testimony.
79
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 Physician-patient In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed, the following requisites should concur: During trial, Juan's counsel announced that he would present as his next witness Dr.
(1992) 91114 25sep privilege (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said counsel
(2) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (3) such person forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's
acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity; counsel opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited
(4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; from the witness is privileged since the latter had examined the Nelly in a
(5) the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient. professional capacity and had diagnosed her to be suffering from schizophrenia.

No. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he attends to the patient for curative, preventive, Juan's counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would be presented as an
or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while attending to
treat his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of the communication that is privileged. Nelly in a professional capacity. She neither revealed the illness she examined and
The mere fact of making a communication, as well as the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not treated Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the medicines she
privileged from disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." had prescribed.

Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose anything obtained in the course of her examination,
interview and treatment of the petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not refer to and
had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that
Dr. Acampado’s answers to the questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the information
obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded whatever information or knowledge she had about the
petitioner which was acquired by reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness, her
testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.

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 Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA Physician-patient Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies on a document executed by medical Edgar contends that the prohibition applies only to a physician and is not applicable
146 (1994) 108854 privilege practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and to the case at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the
14june executed the report. Plainly, this does not fall within the prohibition. privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the petitioner.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and
clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
81 report.
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3. Physician-Patient Privilege
a. Rule 130 §24

(c) A physician, psychotherapist or person reasonably believed by the patient to be authorized to practice medicine or psychotherapy cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any confidential communication made for the purpose of
diagnosis or treatment of the patient's physical, mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, between the patient and his or her physician or psychotherapist. This privilege also applies to persons, including members of the patient's family, who have
participated in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient under the direction of the physician over psychotherapist.

A psychotherapist is:
(a) A person licensed to practice medicine engaged in the diagnosis of treatment of a mental or emotional condition, or

(b) A person licensed as a psychologist by the government while similarly engaged.

US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. State secrets In the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, which states that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a The Special Prosecutor filed a motion under Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 17(c) for a subpoena
683 (1974) criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due duces tecum for the production before trial of certain tapes and documents relating
process of law." to precisely identified conversations and meetings between the President and
others. The President, claiming executive privilege, filed a motion to quash the
Although the courts will afford the utmost deference to Presidential acts, when a claim of Presidential privilege as to materials subpoena.
subpoenaed for use in a criminal trial is based, as it is here, not on the ground that military or diplomatic secrets are implicated, but
merely on the ground of a generalized interest in confidentiality, the President's generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial and the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice.

The justices reasoned that the judiciary’s interest in the “fair administration of criminal justice” outweighed President Nixon’s interest in
keeping the content of his tapes secret. One reason for this was that the only issue before the Court was whether the trial judge could
privately inspect the tapes to determine whether they were essential to a fair trial. The justices further stated that there would be cases
in which the president’s need for confidentiality would outweigh the interests of the judicial branch, such as when the secret
communication involved “military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets.”
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 Banco Filipino v. State secrets (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would
Monetary Board, 142 when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by disclosure. But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the suffer by the disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner.
SCRA 523 (1986) 70054 protection of public officers but for the protection of public interest. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any
08july disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose
The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor
nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason for their resistance to the order of
production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public officials acted
rightfully and prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing
at all that would provoke fear of disclosure

On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the
documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors
and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid and
legal justification for the petitioner's bank closure

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4. Rule 130 §24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege
A minister, priest or person reasonably believed to be so cannot, without the consent of the affected person, be examined as to any communication or confession made to or any advice given by him or her, in his or her professional character, in the course of discipline
enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs.

5. State Secrets
a. Rule 130 §24€
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during or after his or her tenure as to communications made to him or her in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure.

The communication shall remain privileged, even in the hands of a third person who may have obtained the information, provided that the original parties to the communication took reasonable precaution to protect its confidentiality.

Testimonial Privilege

Sec 25. Parental and filial privilege - No person shall be compelled to testify against his or her parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants, except when such testimoy is indispensable in a crime against that person or by one parent against the other.

Sec. 26 Privilege relating to trade secrets. - A person cannot be comepelled to testify about any trade secret, unless the non-dsclosure will conceal fraud or otherswise work injustice. When disclosure is directed, the court shall take such protective measure as the interest of
the owner of the trade secret and of the parties and the furtherance of justice may require.

People v. Publico, 7 CAR Parental and Filial It is unjust to admit in evidence against the appellant the alleged information supposedly given to Patrolman Urmatan by Publico’s wife
(2s) 703 (1972) Privilege and child for the said information is in the nature of evidence against the Publico. Insofar as the information allegedly given by the wife
is concerned, the same is covered by the evidentiary rule of exclusion that a wife cannot be examined for or against her husband
without his consent. Insofar as the supposed information allegedly given by the child is concerned, the same is covered by the
exclusionary rule of evidence that no descendant can be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and ascendants.
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