IDR EasternEuropeCaucasus 2015 PDF
IDR EasternEuropeCaucasus 2015 PDF
Caucasus and
Central Asia
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distribution. The terms and conditions are
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Energy Policies
Beyond IEA Countries
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY
The International Energy Agency (IEA), an autonomous agency, was established in November 1974.
Its primary mandate was – and is – two-fold: to promote energy security amongst its member
countries through collective response to physical disruptions in oil supply, and provide authoritative
research and analysis on ways to ensure reliable, affordable and clean energy for its 29 member
countries and beyond. The IEA carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among
its member countries, each of which is obliged to hold oil stocks equivalent to 90 days of its net imports.
The Agency’s aims include the following objectives:
n Secure member countries’ access to reliable and ample supplies of all forms of energy; in particular,
through maintaining effective emergency response capabilities in case of oil supply disruptions.
n Promote sustainable energy policies that spur economic growth and environmental protection
in a global context – particularly in terms of reducing greenhouse-gas emissions that contribute
to climate change.
n Improve transparency of international markets through collection and analysis of
energy data.
n Support global collaboration on energy technology to secure future energy supplies
and mitigate their environmental impact, including through improved energy
efficiency and development and deployment of low-carbon technologies.
n Find solutions to global energy challenges through engagement and
dialogue with non-member countries, industry, international
organisations and other stakeholders.
IEA member countries:
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy Secure Sustainable Together
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak Republic
© OECD/IEA, 2015 Spain
International Energy Agency Sweden
9 rue de la Fédération Switzerland
75739 Paris Cedex 15, France
Turkey
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United Kingdom
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is subject to specific restrictions
that limit its use and distribution. The European Commission
The terms and conditions are also participates in
available online at www.iea.org/t&c/ the work of the IEA.
Eastern Europe,
Caucasus and
Central Asia
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Energy Policies
Beyond IEA Countries
Foreword: International Energy Agency Executive Director
2
Foreword: European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
Johannes Hahn
Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
European Commission
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Table of contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD: IEA EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR ......................................................................................................2
ARMENIA ..............................................................................................................................31
5
Table of contents
AZERBAIJAN..........................................................................................................................63
6
Table of contents
BELARUS ...............................................................................................................................91
GEORGIA ............................................................................................................................127
7
Table of contents
KAZAKHSTAN ......................................................................................................................161
8
Table of contents
KYRGYZSTAN ......................................................................................................................203
9
Table of contents
MOLDOVA ..........................................................................................................................237
TAJIKISTAN .........................................................................................................................267
10
Table of contents
Key policies...............................................................................................................................276
Investment ...............................................................................................................................278
Assessment ..............................................................................................................................279
Recommendations ...................................................................................................................281
11
Table of contents
UKRAINE .............................................................................................................................331
12
Table of contents
UZBEKISTAN .......................................................................................................................379
References ...............................................................................................................................411
13
Table of contents
ANNEXES ............................................................................................................................413
FIGURES
ES.1 Map of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA) ........................................18
1.1.1 Map of Armenia .............................................................................................................32
1.1.2 TPES, Armenia, 1990-2012 ............................................................................................35
1.1.3 Electricity generation by source, Armenia, 1990-2012 .................................................35
1.1.4 TFC by sector, Armenia, 1990-2012...............................................................................36
1.1.5 Energy intensity in Armenia and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012 ......................37
1.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Armenia and other EECCA countries, 2012....37
1.2.1 Armenian natural gas infrastructure .............................................................................49
2.1.1 Map of Azerbaijan .........................................................................................................64
2.1.2 Energy production by source, Azerbaijan, 1990-2012 ..................................................66
2.1.3 TPES, Azerbaijan, 1990-2012 .........................................................................................67
2.1.4 Electricity generation by source, Azerbaijan, 1990-2012 ..............................................67
2.1.5 TFC by sector, Azerbaijan, 1990-2012 ...........................................................................68
2.1.6 Energy intensity in Azerbaijan and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012 ...................69
2.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Azerbaijan
and other EECCA countries, 2012 ..................................................................................69
2.2.1 Black Sea and Caspian Sea natural gas infrastructure ...................................................79
3.1.1 Map of Belarus...............................................................................................................92
3.1.2 TPES, Belarus, 1990-2012 .............................................................................................. 95
3.1.3 Electricity generation by source, Belarus, 1990-2012 ...................................................95
3.1.4 Total final consumption by sector, Belarus, 1990-2012 ................................................96
3.1.5 Energy intensity in Belarus and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012 ........................97
3.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Belarus and other EECCA countries, 2012 ....97
3.2.1 Electricity network, Belarus .........................................................................................108
3.2.2 Gas pipeline network, Belarus .....................................................................................110
3.2.3 Oil transit pipelines through Belarus ...........................................................................112
4.1.1 Map of Georgia ............................................................................................................128
4.1.2 TPES, Georgia, 1990-2012............................................................................................130
4.1.3 Electricity generation by source, Georgia, 1990-2012 ................................................131
4.1.4 TFC by sector, Georgia, 1990-2012..............................................................................132
4.1.5 Energy intensity in Georgia and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012 ............133
4.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Georgia
and other EECCA countries, 2012 ................................................................................133
4.2.1 Georgian electricity and gas network ..........................................................................143
© OECD/IEA, 2015
14
Table of contents
15
Table of contents
10.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Ukraine and other EECCA countries, 2012 ...340
10.2.1 Electricity infrastructure of Ukraine.............................................................................357
10.2.2 Natural gas infrastructure of Ukraine ..........................................................................358
10.2.3 Oil pipeline system of Ukraine .....................................................................................360
11.1.1 Map of Uzbekistan .......................................................................................................380
11.1.2 Energy production by source, Uzbekistan, 1990-2012 ................................................382
11.1.3 TPES, Uzbekistan, 1990-2012 .......................................................................................383
11.1.4 Electricity generation by source, Uzbekistan, 1990-2012............................................383
11.1.5 TFC by sector, Uzbekistan, 1990-2012 .........................................................................385
11.1.6 Energy intensity in Uzbekistan and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012 .......385
11.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Uzbekistan
and other EECCA countries, 2012 ................................................................................386
TABLES
1.2.1 Estimated renewable energy potential, Armenia, 2014 ...............................................45
1.2.2 Installed generation capacity and ownership structure, Armenia, January 2014 ........47
1.2.3 Main power grid interconnections, Armenia, 2014 ......................................................48
2.2.1 Installed generation capacity by type, Azerbaijan, 2012 ..............................................77
2.2.2 Electricity transmission and distribution network, Azerbaijan, 2012 ...........................77
2.2.3 Electricity losses in transmission and distribution networks, Azerbaijan, 2013 ...........80
2.4.1 Planned renewable energy projects, Azerbaijan, 2014 ................................................84
3.1.1 Key energy strategy targets to 2020, Belarus .............................................................101
3.1.2 Major investment projects in the electricity sector, Belarus ......................................103
3.2.1 Interconnector capacity and length, Belarus ..............................................................110
3.3.1 Electricity and heat tariffs, Belarus, 1 December 2014...............................................116
3.3.2 Natural gas tariffs, Belarus, 1 December 2014 ...........................................................116
3.3.3 Recovery of electricity and heat costs from the residential sector, Belarus ..............116
5.2.1 Technical characteristics of gas pipelines, Kazakhstan, 2013 .....................................186
6.2.1 Forecast generating capacity by 2025, Kyrgyzstan .....................................................220
6.3.1 Electricity tariff breakdown and planned increases, USD/kWh, Kyrgyzstan, November 2014 ..225
6.3.2 Heat tariff breakdown and planned increases, USD/Gcal, Kyrgyzstan, November 2014 ....225
7.2.1 Interconnections between Moldova, Ukraine and Romania ......................................252
7.2.2 Gas interconnections between Moldova, Ukraine and Romania ...............................254
10.1.1 Heat production and supply by heat-only plants in urban and rural areas,
Ukraine, 2011 (million Gcal) ........................................................................................339
10.2.1 Main oil pipeline characteristics, Ukraine ...................................................................362
11.2.1 Generation capacity, Uzbekistan, 2012 ......................................................................396
11.4.1 Estimated technical potential for renewable energy resources, Uzbekistan .............405
BOXES
ES.1 Potential for saving energy in district heating ..............................................................27
5.2.1 Kashagan: Giant Caspian Sea Oilfield ..........................................................................182
10.1.1 NaftoGaz reform .........................................................................................................344
10.2.1 Policies and measures addressing the 2014 energy crisis situation, Ukraine .............364
© OECD/IEA, 2015
A.1 IEA-led Peer Reviews of INOGATE Partner Countries’ energy policy developments..451
16
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
© OECD/IEA, 2015
18
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
Minsk RUSSIA
Executive summary and key recommendations
RUSSIA
BELARUS
Astana
Kiev
POLAND
UKRAINE
MOLDOVA K A Z A K H S T A N
Chisinau
ROMANIA ARAL
SEA
Figure ES.1 Map of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia (EECCA)
BL ACK SEA
BULGARIA CASPIAN Bishkek
GEORGIA SEA
Tbilisi UZBEKISTAN KYRGYZSTAN
Yerevan AZERBAIJAN Tashkent
ARMENIA Baku
TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN CHINA
TURKEY
GREECE
Ashgabat Dushanbe (People’s Republic of)
SYRIAN
ARAB
REP.
LEBANON
IRAQ AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
EGYPT ISRAEL PAKISTAN
LIBYA JORDAN INDIA
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Executive summary and key recommendations
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
the most illustrative examples is the Central Asian Power Grid, which was built to serve
19
Executive summary and key recommendations
all five republics in the region and continued functioning after independence, overlooking
the new economic and political realities. The former barter-exchange arrangements for
operating hydro plants in irrigation mode were no longer economically feasible for
countries upstream in the Syr Darya and Amu Darya river basins. Replacement fuels,
offered at world market prices, were not feasible options for economically depressed
hydro-rich countries, which opted to develop their own natural potential for further growth
and prosperity. These developments prompted further political tension in the region and
resulted in the Central Asian economies isolating their energy systems, moving away
from a regional market set-up by consolidating their domestic power transmission systems
in a bid to maintain higher levels of energy supply security. Non-payments and disconnections
from the regional system gradually challenged routine operations in the Central Asian
Power Grid and caused system disturbances across the region.
Malfunctions in the previously centrally governed system operations at national level also
became apparent from the outset. Energy systems became largely disordered in an attempt
to nationalise previously commonly held assets. The energy companies were split into two
segments: decision-making authorities that became the basis for energy ministries, and
commercial operators, which were initially set up as vertically integrated national energy
companies. In the region – with the exception of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan – national energy (electricity and natural gas) companies have undergone
numerous waves of restructuring, commercialisation and/or privatisation procedures in
an attempt to legally and/or commercially unbundle the energy sectors.
As a result, the national electricity generation and distribution companies in Armenia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Ukraine have been privatised and sold to
national or international investors in a bid to safeguard system operability, whereas
transmission systems largely remained state-owned commercial operators. As for the natural
gas sector, in almost all import-dependent countries the majority of supply, transmission
and distribution assets slowly relapsed to the ownership of a single supplier, Russia,
which gradually regained the previously owned systems as debt payments for unpaid gas
supply across the region. In the case of the transit pipelines, Russia set up majority-
owned joint ventures for transit/cross-boundary pipelines with most of the transit pipeline
asset-owning countries. Only newly built oil and gas export pipelines fall outside this
established pattern and therefore have different ownership structures.
Pricing policies have moved from the ministries of economy either to sector ministries or
to the dedicated regulatory agencies. These developments, in countries like Armenia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova and Ukraine, resulted in independent regulatory agencies
in the mid to late 90s, with more elaborated market structures, market rules and tariff-
setting methodologies. These early developments, however, did not provide enough footing
for these newly established institutions to strengthen the development of energy markets.
In the mid to late 2000s (2006-08), a similar pattern was observed in all these countries,
where governments interference in directly engaging with the electricity companies
jeopardised the independence of the regulators, which were left to merely approve the
tariffs dictated by direct contracts between the government and the energy companies.
Recently, however, governments have been revising tariff structures, methodologies and
set-ups in an attempt to relinquish their direct arrangements with energy companies and
restore the independence of the regulatory authorities.
In countries where the government continues to set energy prices, at least one form of
energy is subsidised. Pricing structures kept below cost-recovery level therefore do not
© OECD/IEA, 2015
attract investment to the sector, which in most cases is further encumbered with aged
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Executive summary and key recommendations
infrastructure in urgent need of upgrades and/or new, efficient system instalments. The
energy subsidies, coupled with heavy public sector indebtedness in most of these economies,
resulted in the energy sector inability to generate adequate financial resources to maintain
aged infrastructure at the necessary technical standards; most upgrade programmes are
carried out as part of government-guaranteed long-term loans from international financial
institutions. These practices further prevented energy system self-sufficiency, instead
leaving many at the edge of collapse. Urgent and severe structural changes and reforms
are required for the robust restructuring and revitalisation of the sector.
New developments in the upstream oil and gas sector in hydrocarbon producing countries,
mainly in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, are clear exceptions from these practices. In these
countries, the interests of the world’s major oil and gas companies have resulted in
foreign investment in both exploration and production, and in the construction of new
transport infrastructure.
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Executive summary and key recommendations
22
Executive summary and key recommendations
Energy consumption in the region is moderate and growing, as standards of living and
economic growth improve after the post-Soviet trauma and the more recent global financial
crisis. Government policies on energy consumption and the energy mix determine the
volumes available for export and energy export policies. The primary energy mix is unlikely
to change drastically in the near to long term as little progress has been achieved towards
more sustainable energy use. However, some countries in the region have set ambitious goals
for renewable energy and primary source diversification, principally Kazakhstan with its goal
of having a 50% share of alternative and renewable sources in its primary energy mix by
2050, while Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are aiming at their declared energy
efficiency and renewable targets for 2020. Azerbaijan has achieved a significant decrease in
energy intensity in all sectors of its economy thanks to the replacement of oil with natural gas
and the installation of new energy-efficient technologies in electricity production. Meanwhile,
those countries party to the Russian-led Customs Union are increasingly considering installing
new,1 or expanding existing,2 nuclear capacity to enhance their primary energy mix.
The region is conveniently located for the world’s largest and fastest-growing energy
markets to its west, east and south. Past developments in the region’s energy exports
have favoured exporting energy resources from the western shores of the Caspian Sea
and of the Black Sea region to markets in the West, while the eastern part of the Caspian
Sea is expanding its exports to East and Southeast Asia.
Recent developments in Ukraine, including the reduction of Russian gas deliveries to Europe
via Ukraine, have created a renewed interest and momentum for Central Asian gas
deliveries to European markets through various potential Southern Corridor “projects of
common interest” (PCI), initially considered to come on board at a later stage, beyond
2020. The advantages of Turkmen gas deliveries to Europe have been long anticipated, the
multiple benefits of which include the potential for sizeable gas deliveries to European markets
as well as a potentially different pricing structure, should construction of the transport
infrastructure be developed as an open-access independent business venture, non-
contingent to upstream investments with clear and transparent capacity booking mechanisms.
Another noteworthy development, observed initially in Uzbekistan and later in Turkmenistan,
is the advanced growth of a downstream petroleum sector where natural gas is used as
a direct feedstock for fertiliser and petrochemical ventures, end-product exports aimed
at the fastest growing Asian markets. These developments are likely to lead to more
direct foreign investment in the region, further aiding regional development and growth.
ENERGY SECURITY
Energy resource-rich countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia are
emerging as important contributors to global energy supplies and to world energy security.
The region has significantly expanded its oil and gas exports to international markets since
the early 1990s, and Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and, to a lesser extent, Uzbekistan
all have the potential to increase hydrocarbon production, while the region’s hydropower
export potential is largely untapped. Increases in output are encouraged by an increasing
range of export routes and markets, first for oil and more recently for gas, reducing reliance
on export routes through Russia. Central Asian oil and gas exports to China are delivered by
multiple pipelines, while exports to markets in the south (Afghanistan, Pakistan and India)
as well as to the west, towards European markets, are currently under consideration.
2. Armenia.
23
Executive summary and key recommendations
(straw, wood or coal) for open-fire cooking. Countries with traditional biomass potential
24
Executive summary and key recommendations
are developing forest cadastres and management systems to prevent the degradation of
local biomass resources.
The use of other renewables for energy similarly suffers from inaccurate accounting. This
makes it difficult to assess the need for the decentralised deployment of renewable
energy technologies, which in many cases could be a way to alleviate energy poverty and
to support the provision of (or access to) modern energy infrastructure.
Although levels of electrification and access are high, the energy infrastructure itself is
aging and requires a high level of maintenance, modernisation or rehabilitation throughout
the energy supply chain. The large capital investments required are particularly difficult
to mobilise under the current pricing and regulatory structures in countries where prices
remain below cost recovery levels. Fixed energy infrastructures, including centralised district
heating systems and natural gas and power transmission and distribution networks, are
most at risk: lack of investments resulting in further inefficiencies and loss of capacity
over time could put energy security in further jeopardy.
MARKET CONVERGENCE
The energy policy reviews have demonstrated that the homogeneity often implied among
the countries in these regions does not exist in practice. In assessing the regional markets,
the review teams observed inverted trends over the two decades of disconnecting from the
previously existing regional markets and securing self-sufficiency of domestic energy networks
to the extent possible. The trends for each country are dictated by political situation, type
of centralised/decentralised economy, and political and economic ties to neighbouring
countries. Many countries in the region have little or no co-operation with their immediate
neighbours, which has forced them to either internalise their markets or consider
harmonising with previously unexplored markets (like Europe, China or the Middle East).
Regional support and co-operation is primarily observed in newly developed energy export
infrastructures, which also include transit countries by offering them energy offtakes at a
discounted price. Earlier developments in Kazakh and Azeri oil and gas exports to world
energy markets have shown exceptional regional co-operation and solidarity. The Baku-
Supsa, Baku-Ceyhan and South Caucasus pipelines have provided the way for Caspian
resources to reach the world energy markets. Equally remarkable regional co-operation has
been observed in moving energy resources of the Caspian from its eastern shores to the
Chinese markets. The unprecedented speed in developing an oil and gas export infrastructure
from Central Asia to China has dismantled longstanding prejudices over the region’s ability
to negotiate feasible and mutually beneficial large energy infrastructure projects. This
extensive oil and gas export infrastructure to China now encompasses all the countries of
Central Asia, offering record export openings to producer countries and offtake potential
to the transit countries in the region, in addition to generous economic and social benefits.
Electricity, heat and gas providers in almost all the countries are state-owned, vertically
integrated companies dating back to the Soviet era. The transition to a liberal market has
been a slow one even for countries with strong policy decisions favouring a free market
(e.g. Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia), mainly due to legislative hurdles, poor capacity
building and financing problems. Other countries (mainly in Central Asia) have expressed
little interest in market convergence and are mostly concerned with tariff subsidies and
energy affordability. Energy regulation is most often conducted by the ministries and, as
such, consumer protection and tariff methodology are not independently reviewed.
Transparency is also weak, with most end-users and investors unaware of the tariff
© OECD/IEA, 2015
25
Executive summary and key recommendations
Overall, the progression to a free market and market-set pricing in the region is still in an
early stage, with the exception of the few countries which have signed the EU Accession
Agreement and are likely to work towards integration into the EU market.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The reviewed region remains highly energy-intensive, reflecting continued gross inefficiency
in energy use, as well as climatic and structural economic factors. There is considerable
potential for energy savings in all sectors, particularly in district heating, electricity
generation and networks, and industry and buildings. If the region were to use energy as
efficiently as OECD countries do, primary energy consumption in the Caspian region as a
whole would be cut by one-half. How quickly this energy efficiency potential might be
exploited hinges largely on government policies, especially on energy pricing (most countries
subsidise at least one form of energy), market reform and improved access to financing
for energy projects.
With rising energy consumption, governments need to place more emphasis on energy
efficiency improvements to benefit from the large untapped potential for improved
energy security and economic growth. It is essential that energy efficiency strategies be
well integrated into the broader policy framework of economic development. Energy
efficiency strategies and related action plans need to ensure a stable source of financing,
but energy pricing across the region remains a barrier to investment.
There is a tendency to focus on lower energy intensity targets across the reviewed
regions. Energy efficiency targets should be aligned with energy efficiency gains potential,
based on solid statistical data on both the supply and demand sides at a sufficient level
of disaggregation and modelling. To develop effective policies and to establish baselines
for tracking progress, energy supply- and demand-side data should be established and
maintained, covering all the sectors and subsectors of the economy.
Energy efficiency governance remains vague in almost all the reviewed countries; a clear
definition of the role of local governments in energy efficiency policy implementation is
therefore of prime importance. The placement of a dedicated public authority in charge
of energy efficiency policies and measures, with licence to oversee the implementation
of those policies, could ensure that energy efficiency is a strategic priority and could
provide greater co-ordination.
There is also an obvious gap in energy efficiency governance in the transport sector, as it
is difficult to establish a government department to oversee energy efficiency policies
and measures in this sector. Vehicle markets in these regions are rapidly growing and are
often dominated by imported second-hand cars, with a sizeable share being large-engine
and fuel-inefficient vehicles. The exceptions to this trend are Uzbekistan, which has well-
developed vehicle production, supplying local and neighbouring markets, and Azerbaijan,
which has put in place strict fuel efficiency standards that prohibit the use of old and
inefficient vehicles. A number of other countries are in the process of implementing
higher fuel efficiency standards, resulting in the replacement of dated vehicle fleets from
these markets.
Considerable progress in promoting renewable energy in the reviewed regions has been
observed. Most countries have put in place detailed strategies and financial support
mechanisms (including green tariffs in some cases), and have relaxed investment procedures
for renewable energy development. However, these measures did not prove sufficient to
© OECD/IEA, 2015
reach the expected level of renewable technology deployment. One common barrier to
26
Executive summary and key recommendations
INVESTMENT CLIMATE
Investment attraction has been the key focus of governments in the region since gaining
their independence. One of the most successful changes in national legislation has been
to liberalise fiscal structures to attract much-needed investment. While initially based on
© OECD/IEA, 2015
27
Executive summary and key recommendations
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations, shared to different degrees with the reviewed countries, include
advice to governments to:
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Executive summary and key recommendations
Energy security
Enhance energy security by increasing both conventional and unconventional production
outputs, utilising renewable energy potential and maximising energy efficiency gains;
upgrade the energy infrastructure and diversify supplies via interconnections with
neighbouring markets.
Modernise the energy supply chain. Encourage investments in infrastructure necessary
to improve the sector performance and efficiency of the energy supply chain. Ensure
an attractive business climate, a competitive and fair regulatory framework and
market-price incentives to mobilise necessary investments.
Develop emergency response mechanisms for oil, gas and electricity supply shortages,
with clear indication of the priorities for demand restraint management and
authorities in charge for overseeing the process. Consider compulsory alternative fuel
storage buildups for import dependent countries for the length of the most critical
supply shortage periods.
Market convergence
Continue developing an efficient energy market model and support it with an adequate
legal and regulatory regime. Review regional market setups as new interconnections
develop, and adapt market rules (in line with EU legislation where applicable) to
enhance system interoperability and to remove regulatory and trade barriers.
With the objective of fostering regional integration of the energy markets and
interconnection, actively discuss the setup of a regional market with neighbouring
countries and at international level to improve energy security and overcome isolation
of the national energy markets.
In the context of the new market design, strengthen the competencies and the
independence of the national regulatory authority and reinforce its role in safeguarding
consumer interests, e.g. by creating a consumer board at the regulator and implementing
quality of supply regulation with a focus on natural gas distribution.
Develop a comprehensive tariff methodology for electricity and heat tariffs. (Where
applicable) consider the gradual phase-out of subsidies over a set medium-term
period, with a view to reaching fully cost-reflective tariffs that also allow for planned
capital investment. The phase-out of tariff subsidies should be done on the basis of
affordability, in conjunction with well elaborated social schemes, targeting support
for the most vulnerable customers only until the phase-out is complete.
Sustainable development
Introduce a balanced regulatory framework for promoting renewable energy sector
development; assess and work towards removing barriers to renewable energy
© OECD/IEA, 2015
29
Executive summary and key recommendations
Investment attraction
Maintain and/or enhance open, stable, predictable, fair and transparent investment
frameworks, with clear procurement rules and procedures and well-defined steps to
facilitate investment undertakings and boost effective access to markets. Consider
creation of a One-Stop-Shop public entity for managing all investment related affairs.
Encourage and mobilise the investments in infrastructure necessary to improve the
performance and efficiency of the energy supply chain. This will require an attractive
business climate, a competitive and fair regulatory framework, and market price
incentives. Strengthening the rule of law and improving transparency as well as
implementing the Energy Community Treaty provisions will further promote investments.
Continue the application of the latest technologies for enhanced oil and gas recovery,
opening up new fields for oil and gas exploration and production, assess the
country’s shale oil and gas potential, and encourage foreign direct investments in
country’s upstream oil and gas sectors. © OECD/IEA, 2015
30
© OECD/IEA, 2015
ARMENIA
32
Armenia
GEORGIA GEORGIA
Tashir
Alaverdi
Ashotsk
Figure 1.1.1 Map of Armenia
Stepanavan
Ijevan
Spitak
Gumri Vanatzor Dilijan
Artik
Maralik Aparan
Hrazdan Sevan
Anipemza
Talin Charentsavan
Lake
A RArzni
M E N Gavar
IA Sevan
Abovyan
Sotk AZERBAIJAN
Yerevan
Garni Vardenis
Martuni
Margara Masis
Artashat
Ararat Jermuk
Karki Yeghegnadzor
TURKEY
Vayk
Angeghakot
Goris
Sisian
AZERBAIJAN
(NAKHCHYVAN Dastakert
Autonomous
Republic) Kapan
IRAN
IRAN
Meghri
0 100 km
1.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
1.1. General energy policy Armenia
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
33
Armenia 1.1. General energy policy
Electricity is traded with Georgia, though the volumes are low since their networks are
not synchronised. Energy interconnections with Azerbaijan and Turkey are inactive due
to political impasses.
Prompted by a severe electricity supply crisis in the mid-1990s, Armenia has revamped
its energy sector over the past 20 years. Parts of the sector have been privatised, some
companies have been restructured, most households are now gasified and cost-reflective
tariffs have been introduced. This has led to ample investment in capacity and networks,
which has improved reliability considerably. A significant portion of the investment was
from the donor community upon which Armenia still relies for support.
Today the energy policy focus is on development of indigenous energy sources, mainly
renewables, and replacement of a nuclear reactor that supplies nearly a third of all
electricity. While there is ample opportunity for energy efficiency improvement, it is not
a focus of current policy.
Armenia’s regional policy focuses on strengthening its position and broadening market
integration. The European Union and Armenia completed negotiations regarding the
Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) in
July 2013; soon after, however, their implementation was suspended as Armenia has
expressed strong interest in joining the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
(EC, 2014). Armenia became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in January 2015,
along with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, with Kyrgyzstan expected to join in May 2015.
Armenia has been an observer in the Energy Community since 2011 and a member of
the Eastern Partnership since 2009.
SUPPLY
Over the last decade, total primary energy supply (TPES)1 in Armenia increased by 58.3%
to 3 million tonnes of oil-equivalent (Mtoe) in 2012 (Figure 1.1.2).
The growth trend was interrupted during the recession, with a 13.1% dip in 2009 and one
of 4.9% in 2010. Natural gas is the main source of energy in Armenia, mainly imported
from Russia. It accounted for 64.9% of TPES 2012, expanding from 46.6% in 2002. Gas
imports have increased by 120% since 2002. Oil accounted for 12% of TPES in 2012. Oil
supply increased by 33.2% over the ten years to 2012, which is a slower rate of growth
compared to TPES. As such, the share of oil in TPES has contracted from 14.7% in 2002.
The production level at Armenia’s one nuclear power plant has remained unchanged; as
such, its 20% share in TPES in 2012 is down from 32% in 2002.
Hydropower, at 6.7% of TPES, has also lost some of its share of TPES, down from 7.6% in
2002. Although hydro power production has increased by 40% over the decade to 2012,
its growth has been slower than that of TPES. Biofuels and wind power, as well as coal,
contribute only a very small amount to TPES.
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock
changes. This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining)
© OECD/IEA, 2015
or in final use.
34
1.1. General energy policy Armenia
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation was 8 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, an increase for a third
consecutive year from 5.7 TWh in 2009, up almost 46% since 2002. Electricity capacity
has also grown over the same period, by around 30% to reach 4.1 gigawatts (GW),
growing mainly in combustible fuel capacity.
Electricity supply has experienced some volatility over the past decade, with a few years
of slow decline followed by a year or two of a surge in production. Natural gas fuels 42% of
electricity production while hydro and nuclear power each account for 29% (Figure 1.1.3).
Heat generation is less than 0.1 petajoules (PJ), down from 14.7 PJ in 1990 as district
heating systems are phased out. They have been replaced by natural gas, with more
than 90% of households having connections.
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Oil use in electricity generation ceased in 1996.
** Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Armenia 1.1. General energy policy
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 of energy was 2.1 Mtoe in 2012. Since 2002, TFC has
grown at a faster rate than TPES, indicating that more fuels are used directly in final
consumption, such as transport, rather than for electricity or heat generation.
The residential sector accounts for the largest proportion of TFC at 31% in 2012, up from
25% in 2002 (Figure 1.1.4). Energy demand in the transport sector was 25% of TFC and
about 23% in the commercial and public services sector in 2012, both of which have
increased significantly over the decade. The industry sector accounted for 38% of energy
demand in 2002, but grew by only 7% in the period to 2012 to account for 21% of TFC.
Natural gas is used across all end-use sectors and in power generation, accounting for
about 62% of TFC in 2012. About 21% of TFC is electricity to supply households, businesses
and industry. Oil, at 17% of TFC, is used in transport, industry and business.
4 Commercial**
Mtoe
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing and forestry.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
2. TFC is the final consumption by end-users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
36
1.1. General energy policy Armenia
ENERGY INTENSITY
Armenia’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.15 tonnes
of oil-equivalent (toe) per USD 1 000 GDP PPP (toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP) in 2012. This is
the fourth-lowest intensity compared with other EECCA countries, higher than Azerbaijan,
Tajikistan and Georgia. Since 2002, the level of energy intensity in Armenia has declined
by 18.6% (Figure 1.1.5).
Figure 1.1.5 Energy intensity in Armenia and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.9 Armenia
0.8 Kyrgyzstan
0.7 Azerbaijan
0.6 Georgia
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5 Tajikistan
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy in Armenia accounts for 7% of TPES and is primarily hydropower
(6.7%). Biofuels account for 0.3% while wind power accounts for less than 0.01%.
Hydropower has increased at a slower rate than overall TPES over the decade while
energy from biofuels has declined by 13%. As such, the share of renewables in TPES
declined from 8% in 2002. Armenia ranks fourth among EECCA countries in the share of
renewables in TPES, behind Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, which have plentiful
hydro resources (Figure 1.1.6).
Figure 1.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Armenia and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Armenia 1.1. General energy policy
MARKET STRUCTURE
Electricity
Armenia’s electricity market operates under the “single buyer” model and includes six
large generation companies (private and state-owned), more than 180 small power
producers, and one transmission system operator (TSO). Electricity generation and
transmission operations are unbundled.
There is no competitive wholesale electricity market. The one distribution system operator
(DSO) has exclusive rights to buy electricity from the generators at regulated prices and
to sell to final consumers. Closed Joint Stock Company (CJSC) Power System Operator,
the state-owned TSO, is financially and legally unbundled. CJSC Settlement Centre, also
state-owned, provides control and metering services at the wholesale level. CJSC High-
Voltage Electricity Network is the state owner and operator of the transmission network.
Owned by Open Joint Stock Company (OJSC) Inter-RAO UES, Electricity Network of
Armenia (CJSC ENA) is the only retailer in the country.
The government is planning to soon build a high-voltage interconnection with Georgia to
export excess electricity. This could lead to market opening and more competition. As of
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1.1. General energy policy Armenia
the end of 2014, the interconnection feasibility study had been completed and the
construction is planned to begin in 2015, but there have been no concrete steps to open
the power market.
Power generation from renewable sources is supported through purchasing power
agreements (PPAs) with feed-in tariffs. The PPAs are mandatory for 15 years at feed-in
tariffs specific to each technology and are reviewed annually by the regulator. PPAs
currently apply to 260 megawatts (MW) of small hydro plants and 2.6 MW of wind capacity.
Natural gas
The natural gas sector is owned and operated by one vertically integrated operator,
Gazprom Armenia (previously ArmRusGazprom). Since January 2014, it is fully owned by
Russia’s Gazprom which purchased the remaining 20% from the Armenian government.
No unbundling or market opening is envisaged.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources (MENR) is responsible for the development
and implementation of energy policy. It develops relevant primary and secondary legislation
and investment plans for state-owned enterprises.
The State Nuclear Safety Regulatory Committee is the regulator for nuclear energy.
The Ministry of Nature Protection oversees the conservation and protection of natural
resources and is responsible for environmental impact assessments. It serves as
the designated national authority for projects under the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism.
The Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC) is independent with main responsibilities
for tariff methodology and review, licensing procedures and import/export regulation.
PSRC also regulates water, waste, telecommunications and rail transport.
The Energy Saving and Renewable Energy Fund (R2E2) is responsible for the implementation
of renewable energy projects. Armenia does not have a dedicated agency for renewable
energy policies.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Armenia’s primary energy legislation is the Law on Energy (2001) which includes
provisions for market rules and ownership structure, among other aspects. The Law on
Energy Saving and Renewable Energy (2004) defines the policy principles for renewables
and energy savings, and efficiency licensing and tariffs are regulated mainly by the laws
of the Public Services Regulatory Commission, Licensing and Energy.
Amendments to the Law on Energy were adopted in mid-2013 to attract investment by
reducing licensing requirements and administrative burdens. Changes include the easing of
construction licences for some energy facilities (including facilities for energy own-use) and
the removal of regulations on solar photovoltaic (PV) installations with capacity up to 150 kW.
The Law on the Construction of New Nuclear (2009) provides for the construction of a
nuclear unit with a capacity of 1 000 MW and for the decommissioning of the operating
nuclear plant. In 2012, for electricity supply security reasons, unit 2 of the nuclear plant
(built in 1976) was given authorisation for a ten-year extension of service to 2026,
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Armenia 1.1. General energy policy
KEY POLICIES
Armenia is reliant on imports of natural gas and oil for most of its energy needs, which
poses supply risks and dependence on a single supplier. The Armenian government
considers energy security and the development of indigenous sources to be of prime
importance for the energy sector: the development of renewables and efficiency measures
are seen as key. To satisfy expected demand growth while increasing reliability, the
government is focusing on increasing capacity and promoting domestic energy sources.
In 2013, the government developed a National Energy Security Concept that outlines
strategies for fuel diversification mainly through renewables and nuclear power, building
fuel reserves and increasing power generation capacity. In 2014, the government approved
the Schedule of Activities for 2014-20 for the implementation of the security concept.
The security concept complements previous energy sector development strategies as
part of the 2005 Context for Economic Development to 2025, including the National
Program on Energy Saving and Renewable Energy (2007) and the Action Plan of the
MENR (2007).
The above-mentioned strategies and action plans are the main energy policy documents.
They set out targets and objectives for the energy sector, in line with the following principles:
Make full use of the economically and environmentally sound potential of renewables
and energy efficiency across the whole economy.
Develop nuclear power for electricity supply.
Integrate Armenia into regional energy markets and participate in regional projects.
Diversify supply routes of primary energy resources.
In 2014, the government developed the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Program Investment
Plan. It is an update of the Renewable Energy Road Map that was developed in 2011. It
includes comprehensive analyses of renewable energy potential, cost-benefit and the
viability of specific technologies. It also sets targets and objectives for renewables to
2025, including a plan for financing. The investment plan describes the first geothermal
and solar PV projects, which are expected to be developed by the government and serve
as examples for other investors. Nuclear energy accounts for nearly a third of the
electricity supply and is of strategic importance. The existing reactor is old but has been
given an extension of service life to 2026. The government is planning to build a new
reactor of about 1 000 MW by then, if financing is secured.
The government has an ambitious target to increase the amount of renewables in the
power generation mix from 7% in 2012 to 26% by 2025. The approach includes small
hydro, wind power, solar PV and geothermal, but excludes biofuels. In order to reach
this target, Armenia would need to have 677 MW of new renewable energy capacity
installed by 2025. Estimated capacity additions are 397 MW of small hydro, 100 MW of
wind and geothermal, and 80 MW of solar PV.
Energy efficiency measures in Armenia are outdated and based on the National Plan of
Measures for Enhancement of Energy Efficiency which was elaborated for the period
2001-13. The R2E2 was established during this period. The government plans to extend the
programme to 2020, including setting targets for improving energy efficiency for all sectors.
Regulatory reform has supported achievements in the power sector since the mid-1990s.
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1.1. General energy policy Armenia
attracted substantial private sector investment. As a result, reliability, service quality and
the efficiency of sector operations have improved.
In recent years, however, the increasing costs of electricity service and the government’s
concerns about affordability led to a tariff structure departing from a cost-recovery
approach. The government has taken steps to maintain affordable rates; however, some
measures have hurt the financial performance of the sector. A World Bank study
estimates that that the average residential electricity tariffs are 13% below cost (World
Bank, 2013). As the state owns and operates the majority of the power sector, prolonged
subsidies and inadequate cost recovery could hinder investment and weaken private
sector interest. This is a particular concern since substantial investment is needed to
replace ageing generation capacity.
Strengthening regional integration is also a key component of Armenia’s energy policy.
Currently there are political disagreements with two neighbours. Plus, the electricity
interconnection with Georgia is not fully functional due to asynchronous systems and
the connection with Iran is operating under limited conditions. Armenia plans to increase
electricity production and sell more to Georgia and Iran during the summer months,
while relying on electricity imports if necessary in the winter. In order to synchronise
systems and to provide electricity at competitive prices, Armenia will have to open its
electricity market, which is relatively closed.
INVESTMENT
The investment climate in Armenia has improved substantially since the mid-1990s as
institutions were restructured and the centralised economic structure moved in a more
market-oriented manner. This attracted donor and private sector investment. Today many
parts of the economy have been privatised. This has been supported by a reduction in
perceived corruption and stronger ties with the European Union and the United States.
However, Armenia is still perceived to be corrupt and run by a number of powerful
individuals. This, along with administration burdens and a weak legislative framework, still
poses a challenge for investors. In April 2014, the Investment Plan for Armenia outlined
steps to remove barriers to entry and to attract investment, particularly for renewables.
It proposes:
further streamlining of licensing and registration processes
extending purchasing power agreements to 25 years for solar and geothermal
projects and 20 years for wind projects
improving resource assessments
providing concession loans.
Over the decade to 2014, investment in Armenia’s energy sector has been mainly in
rehabilitation and the modernisation of aged gas and electricity infrastructure. This
included substation upgrading and network improvements that have improved efficiency
and reduced losses in the electricity network. Gazprom Armenia has increased residential
gas connections from 21% in 2002 to 95% of all households in 2011. Gazprom Armenia
invested in an efficient gas unit at the Hrazdan-5 plant, which began operations in 2013.
Investment in small hydropower plants has been the main development in the renewables
sector with more than 260 MW of capacity additions by 2014. The Kreditanstalt für
Wiederaufbau (KfW) bank, a German government-owned development bank, provided
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Armenia 1.1. General energy policy
In 2010, the KfW bank granted a USD 22 million loan for existing small hydropower
plants and those under construction. In 2012, under the second stage of the Support to
Renewable Energy programme, KfW bank approved the refinancing of 26 small hydro
power plants with installed capacity of 62.4 MW. In November 2012, the Central Bank of
Armenia and the KfW bank signed a credit agreement for USD 50 million for the third
stage of the same credit programme. The agreement would provide financing for
different renewable energy technologies’ development (hydro, wind, solar, etc).
Armenia’s investment requirements in the period to 2025 include the development of
677 MW of renewable energy capacity, construction of a 1 000 MW nuclear reactor and
400 kilovolt (kV) interconnections with Iran and Georgia, as well as the upkeep of the
network. Its Investment Plan proposes government investment in a geothermal and a
solar PV project. The government, with financing assistance from donors, is funding the
service life extension to 2026 for the existing nuclear plant, but financing for the planned
new nuclear plant has not been secured.
The construction of a 400 kV line to Iran began in 2013 and is expected to be operational
by late 2015 or early 2016. The project also implies the construction of a power substation
Noravan of 400/220 kV in the Syunik region of Armenia. It is funded by the Export
Development Bank of Iran. Armenia is obliged to supply electricity to Iran in lieu of loan
payments for 15 years, after which it will become the owner and operator of the line.
A feasibility study, financed by KfW, has been completed for construction of a 400 kV line
to Georgia. Construction is due to begin in 2015 and will take three to four years to complete.
ASSESSMENT
Armenia’s economy, including the energy sector, has exhibited healthy growth over the past
decade, driven by reforms and targeted policies which have attracted foreign investment
and funding from donor communities. Investment in the energy sector has been of primary
importance for security of supply, notably in the modernisation and the rehabilitation of
ageing infrastructure and increasing energy independence through developments of
small hydropower plants and the refurbishment of the aged nuclear power plant.
Strategic focus has also been placed on improving regional integration with neighbouring
countries and diversifying supply routes. A gas/electricity barter trade between Iran and
Armenia has been established and a new high-voltage interconnection is under construction.
Another interconnection with Georgia is in the advance planning stage with construction
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1.1. General energy policy Armenia
expected to begin in 2015. Armenia has excess electricity capacity particularly during the
summer months, so new interconnections could increase exports if existing regulatory
barriers are reduced. Armenia will also have higher export capabilities by 2026 when
additional nuclear capacity comes on line.
Investment in renewable energy could bring less dependence on imports to improve
security of supply and provide new markets. However, the government is hesitant to
invest significantly in renewable technologies to keep energy costs from rising. Investment
in small hydropower has been plentiful in the past decade, developing 260 MW of
capacity. However, this relatively rapid growth has raised environmental concerns that
may curb further small hydro developments. The government is evaluating the resource
potential for geothermal and solar developments.
Armenia has significant potential to improve the efficiency of energy use in buildings and
heating, as well as the water supply and industry sectors. While some measures have
been promoted, energy audits and implementation remain inadequate. Relevant public
authorities have responsibility for energy efficiency, but there is no co-ordination for
developing and implementing efficiency measures. There is not an official authority
responsible for the development of energy efficiency policy. Some efficiency-related
measures are included in the R2E2, but its primary focus is on renewables. Armenia lacks
a structure to design, implement and monitor energy efficiency policies and measures.
Efficiency improvements could also be spurred by economic signals through tariffs. For
example, current tariffs for natural gas decline at higher consumption levels, thereby reducing
the incentive to make energy use more efficient. The government should consider revising
the tariff structure and level to encourage energy savings and more efficient consumption.
The government lacks a comprehensive long-term energy sector vision and the required
investment strategy for the period to 2030 and beyond. While the Investment Plan for
Armenia assesses the potential for renewables, it does not include efficiency potential in
its scenario analysis and long-term assessments have not been done. A robust assessment
of future energy markets, economic trends and demographic changes in Armenia and
neighbouring countries is also missing. In order to maintain high levels of foreign
investment, the government should ensure its energy policy strategies are thorough and
look beyond the short term. The framework conditions need to attract investors. The
proposed amendments to the Law on Energy, such as to reduce the burden of foreign
investment, need to be considered in the light of a long-term energy investment policy.
In addition, the development of sound energy statistics will be a key factor in setting
energy policy priorities and measuring progress. The government should continue to
improve their statistical database and methodology, while developing the capacity to
analyse the data and prepare various scenarios for the energy system.
RECOMMENDATIONS
43
Armenia 1.1. General energy policy
integration and adapt the licensing procedures and feed-in tariffs for renewables in
accordance with the Scaling-up Renewable Energy Program Investment Plan for Armenia.
Consider further elaborating the Energy Security Concept by developing various
energy scenarios for the period to 2030 with an outlook to 2050 on the basis of a
robust assessment of energy supply and demand trends, including the effective
development of renewable resources and energy efficiency measures. The scenarios
can help to inform the direction and implementation of the energy strategy and
guide its monitoring and updating.
Continue progress on interconnections with neighbouring countries to support regional
integration of energy markets and, at an international level, to overcome isolation of
the domestic energy market. Review the market model as new interconnections
develop and ensure adaptation of balanced market rules in line with EU legislation
and Customs Union to remove regulatory and trade barriers.
Maximise efficiency gains by developing an energy efficiency plan with legislative
measures to encourage energy savings across the economy, importantly in buildings
and transport sectors. Introduce supportive tariff structures to incentivise energy savings
and strengthen building codes for both new construction and renovations. Adopt
adequate practices to collect demand-side data. Develop energy efficiency indicators
in order to design sound policies and measure progress.
Strengthen local and regional initiatives for energy savings, for better awareness of
efficient practices and the use of renewables for electricity and heating.
Take the lead in developing and implementing energy efficiency policies and measures.
One approach may be to elevate the role of the R2E2 to the level of a government
agency and furnish it with an adequate authority for intergovernmental co-ordination
and policy implementation.
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1.2. Energy security Armenia
Armenia has no proven reserves of natural gas or oil. It has only modest hard coal
deposits of 154 million tonnes (Mt), resources of 163 Mt and further potential of 317 Mt
(BGR, 2013). There are six known coal fields and some oil shale deposits. The economic
viability of mining these deposits has not been determined. Currently there is no production
of coal or oil shale (GENI, 2014).
Armenia has significant small hydropower potential which has been the focus of
considerable development in recent years. Armenia has more than 400 rivers of at least
10 kilometres (km) in length. They are mostly small, steep mountain rivers. There is also
potential for other forms of renewables, which the government is assessing. Its estimates
are summarised in Table 1.2.1.
Landfill gas 2 20
Energy security in Armenia has greatly improved over the past 20 years following a gas and
power supply crisis in the early to mid-1990s. During the crisis, energy sector management
was dysfunctional, losses were extremely high and the collection rate was lower than
50%. This resulted in acute supply shortages. Households only got a few hours a day of
power supply. Since then, an increase in the use of natural gas for heating, investment in
new generation capacity and the network, and improved operational management has
resulted in the restoration of consistent and uninterrupted electricity and gas supply.
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Armenia 1.2. Energy security
Demand for electricity and gas is expected to continue to grow as living standards
improve and poverty is reduced. Meeting energy needs will require significant new
investment. Large portions of the electricity and gas networks date back to the Soviet era
and infrastructure modernisation is needed to maintain and improve supply reliability. In
its Energy Security Concept, the government estimates about 1 000 MW will be retired
by 2026 and new investment will be required in order to satisfy growing demand
without increasing import reliance. The proposed new 1 000 MW nuclear plant accounts
for the planned new capacity, but financing has not been secured.
Renewable energy investment is a government focus for its features of sustainability and
reduced import dependence. Its target is to increase the contribution from renewables
from 7% in 2012 to 26% by 2025 with a total capacity of 397 MW of small hydro capacity,
100 MW each from wind and geothermal and 80 MW of solar PV. In 2014, small hydro
capacity was about 260 MW, signalling that government targets are ambitious and
significant investment is required. In 2014, some 140 MW of small hydro were planned
or under construction, according to the Armenian government.
Regional integration and diversity of supply is progressing with a 400 kV interconnection
with Iran under construction. The feasibility study has been completed and construction
is planned for a high-voltage interconnection with Georgia. The interconnections will
strengthen regional integration, expand the market, improve supply reliability and could
serve as an additional source of electricity in case of shortages.
ELECTRICITY
Installed generation capacity is 4 147.2 MW. Available capacity is lower due to the age
and condition of plants: some 50% of capacity is more than 40 years old. The Yerevan
thermal power plant was retired in 2010 and the government plans to retire the oldest
units at the Hrazdan plant by 2017. Power system assets need to be replaced and
modernised in the upcoming 10 to 20 years, requiring significant investment. Table 1.2.2
shows the installed generation capacity and ownership as of 1 January 2014.
Base load electricity is produced from the 407 MW Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant. The
plant was scheduled for retirement by 2016, but its life has been extended by ten years
due to insufficient replacement capacity. Approximately USD 300 million is required to
keep the reactor operating until 2026 and rehabilitation is underway. The government
plans to build a new 1 000 MW nuclear plant as a replacement; however, financing
remains a challenge and no concrete progress has been made to date.
Output from thermal power plants covers peak periods and base load power when the
nuclear plant is offline for maintenance. Some units of the Hrazdan-5 and all units of the
Yerevan combined-cycle gas turbine plants generate electricity for export under the gas-
for-electricity barter agreement with Iran.
Hydropower from the Hrazdan River and other dams, including small hydro, is a stable
component of Armenia’s electricity system and provides daily load regulation with installed
capacity of 1 200 MW. Installed capacity of small hydropower plants is 260 MW, and
164 MW of new capacity are licensed for construction. In 2014, hydro capacity of 140 MW
was under construction or in advanced planning stages.
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1.2. Energy security Armenia
The Megri hydropower, with a capacity of 130 MW, is under construction and is expected
to be operational by 2020. The plant is being contracted and financed by Iran and after
15 years of operation by Iran the plant will be transferred to Armenian ownership.
Wind power, at 2.6 MW, is a relative newcomer in the power supply system.
Table 1.2.2 Installed generation capacity and ownership structure, Armenia, January 2014
Dzora Private 26
Total 4 147.2
Note: MENR = Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.
Source: MENR.
Armenia is interconnected to Georgia with a 65 km, 220 kV line and 54.8 km of 110 kV
lines. A 400 kV line is planned to commence a three- to four-year construction period in
2015. The interconnection with Iran is more than 80 km of 220 kV lines. A high-voltage
400 kV line to Iran is under construction and expected to be operational by early 2016.
Table 1.2.3 shows the existing and planned interconnections. Armenia also has idle
connections to Azerbaijan and Turkey.
Armenia’s electricity network is mostly old and inefficient. Significant investment in
rehabilitation is needed. Improvements in grid infrastructure are carried out as part of
government-authorised programmes supported through loans from international donors
and investment programmes of individual utilities as approved by the PSRC. The electricity
network reconstruction programme was partially complete by 2012 with donor support,
but further progress has been suspended due to lack of financing.
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Armenia 1.2. Energy security
Source: MENR.
NATURAL GAS
The gas transmission network includes 1 863 km of pipelines and a connection to Russia
through Georgia and one to Iran (Figure 1.2.2). The pipeline from Russia dates back to
the Soviet era. The pipeline to Iran was built in 2009 with a capacity of 2.3 bcm to barter
gas imports from Iran for electricity exports from Armenia. An existing pipeline to
Azerbaijan is not in operation.
The gas distribution network includes 10 483 km of high-, medium- and low-pressure gas
pipelines. It is connected to about 640 000 households. Gazprom Armenia has carried
out large gasification projects in the past decade worth approximately USD 120 million,
boosting the residential connection rate from 20% in 2002 to 95% by 2011. It rehabilitated
the Abovyan underground gas storage facility, almost doubling its capacity to 135 million
cubic metres (mcm) in 2012. Gazprom Armenia has also invested USD 215 million to install
a new gas unit to the Hrazdan-5 power station, which began operations in March 2013.
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Today energy system reliability in Armenia is considered to be adequate. Since an energy
supply crisis during the early to mid-1990s, investment in electricity and gas infrastructure,
gasification of the residential sector and operational improvements have led to a significant
decline in outages and losses.
Network losses in both the gas and electricity sectors are in line with international
standards. In the gas sector, transmission losses were 4.2% and distribution system losses
2.3% in 2013. Losses are kept relatively low due to installations of modern metering
devices and a SCADA system. In 2013, electricity transmission losses amounted to 1.8%
while distribution losses were about 13%. Since 2003, CJSC ENA has installed Automated
Metering and Data Acquisition Systems in the 110/35 kV portions of the network to
improve operation and monitoring.
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© OECD/IEA, 2015
Tashir
Alaverdi
Ashotsk
Stepanavan
Ijevan
Spitak
Gumri Vanatzor Dilijan
Gas pipelines
Artik
Aparan 1 000 mm pipeline
Maralik
Hrazdan Sevan 700 mm pipeline
Figure 1.2.1 Armenian natural gas infrastructure
Anipemza
Talin ARMENIA Charentsavan 500 mm pipeline
Gavar
Lake 500 mm
Arzni
Sevan
Abovyan AZERBAIJAN proposed pipeline
Sotk
700 mm pipeline
Garni
Yerevan Vardenis Armenia-Iran
Martuni
Margara Masis
Other
Artashat
Underground
Ararat Jermuk storage
Karki Yeghegnadzor
TURKEY
Vayk
Angeghakot
Goris
Sisian
AZERBAIJAN
Dastakert
(NAKHCHYVAN
Autonomous
Republic) Kapan
Meghri
0 100 km
IRAN
49
Armenia
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Armenia 1.2. Energy security
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Emergency response capabilities related to nuclear power have received increased focus
across the globe since the Fukushima accident in Japan in 2011. Armenia is a party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, has an Additional Protocol with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and has ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In 2011, the
IAEA inspected the Metsamor nuclear power station for operational safety, deeming the
plant acceptable (IAEA, 2014).
Armenia is also working closely with the United States in the management of its nuclear
safety measures. In September 2013, the US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
conducted two emergency response training sessions in Armenia, with 28 participants
from the relevant authorities, civil protection agencies and other specialised parties
(NNSA, 2013). NNSA also provides direct emergency management assistance to Armenia,
among other countries.
In May 2013, Armenia signed an agreement with Belarus on information exchange and
co-operation in nuclear safety and radiation protection. Armenia will assist Belarus with
operation of its first nuclear power plant, which is expected to be operational by the end
of the decade (NTI, 2014).
According to an Energy Charter report (2008), oil product storage infrastructure in Armenia
is adequate in capacity as requirements are far higher than annual consumption. It can
store up to 1.2 Mt of light products and 0.9 Mt of fuel oil. However, most depots do not
comply with modern standards, and many need repairs. The Abovyan underground gas
storage facility was upgraded recently and its capacity was doubled to 135 mcm in 2012.
Armenia is under no international obligation to hold oil stocks. Its oil stock requirements are
legislated by old Soviet laws, and most of the time the availability of oil stocks is based on
the financial situation in the country, rather than strong implementation of the legislation.
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50
1.3. Market convergence Armenia
ELECTRICITY
Armenia’s electricity market operates under the “single buyer” model and includes six large
generation companies (private and state-owned), more than 180 small power producers
and one TSO. Generation and transmission operations are unbundled.
There is no competitive wholesale electricity market. The one DSO has exclusive rights to
buy electricity from the generators at regulated prices and to sell to final consumers.
The Power System Operator, state-owned, is the TSO and is financially and legally
unbundled. At the wholesale level, state-owned CJSC Settlement Centre provides control
and metering services. CJSC High-Voltage Electricity Network is the state owner and
operator of the transmission network. CJSC Electricity Network of Armenia (CJSC ENA) is
the only retailer in the country and is owned by OJSC Inter-RAO UES.
NATURAL GAS
The natural gas sector is owned and operated by one vertically integrated operator,
Gazprom Armenia (previously ArmRusGazprom). Since January 2014, it has been fully
owned by Gazprom, which purchased the remaining 20% from the Armenian government.
No unbundling or market opening is envisaged.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The PSRC is independent with main responsibilities for tariff methodology and
review, licensing and import/export regulation. The PSRC also regulates water, waste,
telecommunications and rail transport. Energy companies may have more than one licence,
but the Law on Energy provides for certain limitations on the size of shareholdings.
Tariffs
Electricity and natural gas tariffs are regulated by the PSRC on a cost-plus basis that
allows a set rate of return for the operators after accounting for fixed and variable costs.
Government policy on tariffs is cost recovery. In recent years, however, the increasing
cost of electricity service and the government’s concern about affordability have led to a
departure from cost-recovery tariffs, and subsidies and below-cost pricing have increased
(World Bank, 2013).
The tariff-setting procedure is fully transparent. An operator applies for a tariff review
on the PSRC official website, which is then subject to consultation with consumer
protection organisations and other interested parties. The PSRC reviews the matter and
makes its decisions available on its website. The PSRC is expected to take a decision
within 80 working days from the date of application for most operators, and 25 working
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51
Armenia 1.3. Market convergence
The tariff structure for payments to electricity generators has two components (energy
and capacity) if they participate in the balancing market controlled by the power system
operator. For other generators a one-part tariff is applied. The gas supply system uses a
single tariff structure.
At the retail level, electricity rates for residential consumers increased about 40% from 2009
to 2014 and natural gas rates went up by 164% from 2005 to 2013. In 2014, the import
gas price was reduced from USD 270 per 1 000 cubic metres (m3) to USD 189 per 1 000 m3
under the purchase agreement for Gazprom Armenia; however the gas price for end-
consumers continued to increase. The PSRC gas tariffs set in mid-2013 was 0.38 USD/m3
for consumption less than 10 000 m3 per month and 0.277 USD/m3 for consumption
above 10 000 m3 per month.
According to the Energy Regulators Regional Association, electricity tariffs in the first half
of 2014, including taxes:3
0.11 USD/kWh for residential
0.083 USD/kWh for non-residential.
Electricity rates have a time-of-day element for consumers are fitted with meters. Table 1.3.1
shows the breakdown of the current electricity tariffs (excluding taxes).
The introduction of an Automated Metering and Data Acquisition System (AMDAS) and
computerised customer billing system has significantly improved collection rates over
the last decade. In 2013, collection rates were 96% for electricity and about 94% for gas.
Source: MENR.
Feed-in tariffs
Provided by the Law on Energy, electricity generated by small hydropower plants and
other renewables are afforded feed-in tariffs for a period of 15 years from their licence
date (Table 1.3.2). The tariffs are specified on an annual basis to take account of exchange
rate fluctuations of the Armenian dram to a foreign currency (USD or EUR). Feed-in tariffs
were introduced in 2007 and since then 260 MW of small hydropower and 2.6 MW
of wind power have come on line. Table 1.3.2 shows feed-in tariffs for various
renewables generation.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3. www.erranet.org.
52
1.3. Market convergence Armenia
Wind 0.08
Biomass 0.09
Technical rules
Armenia uses state standards for technical applications. They are harmonised with the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the International Electro-technical
Commission (IEC) and the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN). With a
government resolution in 2012, Armenia was on the path to harmonise its standards
with those of the European Union. The National Institute of Standards worked out an
action plan for 2013-15, including a schedule of harmonisation up to 2020. Recently,
however, the Armenian government took a decision to join the Customs Union with
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan by the end of 2015. This is likely to result in a different
set of standards for harmonisation.
ELECTRICITY
Government policy to enhance energy security in the power sector is to strengthen
regional integration and increase trade flows. Armenia could increase exports of electricity
to Georgia during the spring and summer periods when hydro generation is high. Electricity
during the summer months could serve the Turkish market via Georgia, as Georgia often
has surplus electricity during the summer. Alternatively, Georgia could supply Armenia
with low-cost electricity from hydropower when markets are favourable. If the new
nuclear plant is realised around 2026, it may offer further opportunities to increase
trade. More electricity trade would lead to market opening and more competition in the
Armenian electricity sector.
Armenia’s electricity network is connected to Georgia with 110 kV and 220 kV lines.
Connections with Iran are 220 kV lines. In both cases 400 kV lines are under construction
or significantly advanced in planning. Interconnections to Azerbaijan and Turkey exist,
but are not active. In the long term, Armenia is planning active involvement in the
development of a Black Sea power ring and the creation of north-south synchronised
operation relations (Russia-Georgia-Armenia-Iran and others).
Currently, the trading of electricity is limited. Georgia and Armenia have asynchronous
systems and the market in Armenia is mostly closed, which restricts trade. Electricity
trade with Iran is based on a barter agreement whereby much of the imported gas from
Iran is used in power generation at the Yerevan power plant which in turn exports power
to Iran. By March 2014, Iran had bartered around 0.9 bcm of gas for 1.14 TWh of
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53
Armenia 1.3. Market convergence
The governments of Armenia and Georgia are co-operating to build a 400 kV interconnection.
In 2012, the utilities in Armenia and Georgia signed an agreement for parallel operation
of the power systems, including the organisation of operational-dispatch management and
a contract for power supply in emergency situations. A feasibility study was completed in
2013. Construction is due to begin in 2015.
Collaboration with Iran on electricity market integration is focused on the full realisation
of the existing interconnection via a 220 kV transmission line and a new 400 kV line. The
construction of the line began in 2013 and is expected to be in operation in 2016.
NATURAL GAS
Nearly all gas consumed in Armenia is imported from Russia, via a pipeline that transits
through Georgia. Metering of the gas supply is carried out on Georgian territory. The
control of the gas imports is done on Armenian territory. The National Agency of
Georgia, responsible for standards, technical regulations and measurements, carries out
annual metrological control and supervision of gas metering.
In January 2014, Russia’s Gazprom purchased the remaining 20% of ArmRusGaz, through
a deal in which ArmRusGaz’s debts to Gazprom were forgiven and the price of gas was
reduced from USD 270 per 1 000 m3 to USD 189 per 1 000 m3 (Gevorgyan, 2014). The
price remained at USD 189 per 1 000 m3 at the end of 2014.
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54
1.4. Sustainable development Armenia
fast-tracking small projects for licensing, and extending the term of power purchasing
55
Armenia 1.4. Sustainable development
agreements to 25 years for solar and geothermal, and 20 years for wind. If achieved,
these changes could attract more investment in renewables; however, implementation
may be challenging as the required changes are substantial.
The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources is responsible for energy policy. Policy
implementation for renewables and energy efficiency is carried out by the Energy Saving
and Renewable Energy Fund (R2E2). Since its establishment in 2004, the Fund has
contributed to removing barriers for renewable energy investment and improving the
country’s investment climate with support from the World Bank, Global Environmental
Fund (GEF), European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and local governments.
The R2E2 will continue to play a significant role in the implementation of policies over the
next two decades, particularly in terms of selecting projects and facilitating financing,
grants and other incentives.
At an international level, Armenia is active in a number of sustainable energy initiatives.
Armenia participated in the Rio+20 Assessment Reports in 2012 which analysed the
status and the main barriers to a transition to a “green economy”. Armenia joined the
Sustainable Energy for All initiative of the UN Secretary General in 2012 and presented a
report on the country's needs in this area.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Energy efficiency potential in Armenia is high. The potential for energy efficiency was last
evaluated by the government in 2007. The National Programme on Energy Savings and
Renewable Energy (the Energy Savings Programme) estimates sector energy efficiency
potential as follows:
Industry: 164.5 Mtoe (75.4 Mtoe - natural gas; 89.1 Mtoe - power consumption),
with sub-sector energy savings of:
5% mining
23% chemicals
35%-40% food production
Transport: 7 Mtoe
Residential: 402 kilotonnes of oil-equivalent
Water supply and irrigation: 15%
Optimisation of lighting: 475 GWh over ten years.
Energy efficiency in natural gas use is expected to largely come from modernisation of
gas-fired power generation. For example, the new combined-cycle gas turbine at the
Yerevan thermal power plant is expected to save 265 mcm of gas per year, while the
retrofitting of the Hrazdan TPP unit 5 will save 223 mcm per year.
The R2E2 started implementation of the Energy Saving Programme in 2012 with support
from the World Bank. The total cost of the Energy Saving Programme is estimated at
USD 10.7 million.
In the framework of the World Bank loans, the National Plan of Measures for Enhancement
of Energy Efficiency was elaborated for the period 2011-13. It identified primary measures
for energy efficiency in five sectors, including a set of 20 horizontal and departmental
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56
1.4. Sustainable development Armenia
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Priorities and objectives for environmental protection and the rational use of natural
resources are contained in four main laws: Ambient Air (1994); Environmental Impact
Assessment (1994); Environmental Fee Rates (2000); and Environmental Inspectorate (2005).
Environmental impact assessments are required for specific projects under the Law on
Expert Testing of Environmental Impacts (1995). Information on public hearings is published
on the Ministry of Nature Protection website.
The legislative framework for the organisation of energy audits is set out under the Law
on Energy Savings and Renewable Energy (2004) and the Regulation on Conducting Energy
Audits (2006). The government is currently developing a methodology for conducting
energy audits of buildings. Energy audits are voluntary.
An Energy Audit Institute is being developed by the government. Training and development
of energy auditors is supported by technical assistance from international organisations,
e.g. UNDP, GEF and INOGATE Programme.
One of the existing environmental concerns in Armenia is the rapid development of
small hydro power. The construction of 260 MW of capacity has outpaced monitoring
and compliance tools and careful planning will be required in the future to reach near
400 MW of capacity by 2025 (as planned).
CLIMATE CHANGE
57
Armenia 1.4. Sustainable development
Armenia ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 as a non-Annex I Party and has implemented
a number of clean development mechanism (CDM) projects. The energy sector accounts
for 93% of СО2 equivalent emissions according to Armenia’s national communications to
the UNFCCC. As part of the UNFCCC Copenhagen Accord in 2009, the Ministry of Nature
Protection prepared a list of priority climate change mitigation measures:
investment in renewable energy
modernisation of thermal power plants
energy efficiency improvements
reduction of fugitive emissions of methane from gas distribution and gas supply systems
development of electrical transport and increased share of natural gas as engine fuel
reduction of methane emissions from solid municipal waste
restoration of degraded forests, reforestation, reduced logging volumes, and conservation.
Armenia’s energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) totalled 5.4 Mt in 2012. This
is a quarter of the level of emissions during 1990, mainly due to a strong decline after
the breakup of the Soviet Union. In Armenia, the power generation sector accounts for
26.3% of energy-related CO2 emissions, followed by transport (23.8%), households (21.3%),
commercial and other services (16.1%) and manufacturing (12.5%).
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58
1.5. Investment attraction Armenia
The investment climate in Armenia has improved substantially from a period of significant
economic turmoil during the early to mid-1990s. It continues to improve in order to
attract foreign investment.
The government has restructured the economy over the past 15 years, moving from a
centralised structure towards a more market-oriented one. The economy is now largely
privatised and has attracted private investment. Similarly, a reduction in perceived corruption
and stronger ties with the European Union and the United States has led to more global
exposure and interest from abroad. Armenia has a highly educated population, particularly
in the sciences, which makes it attractive for foreign investors (DOS, 2013).
Nonetheless, concerns over persistent corruption, high administrative burdens and weak
legislative frameworks remain a challenge for maintaining a favourable investment climate.
Dominant local business people control many sectors of the economy and have close
ties with the government. This has led to instances of unfair tendering processes and
preferential treatment in the past.
In 2011, Armenia became the first EECCA country to accede to the World Trade
Organization’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). This should provide positive
signals regarding the country’s level of openness and transparency (DOS, 2013).
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Armenia was ranked
45th among 189 countries in 2014. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index
means the regulatory environment is conducive to starting and operating a local firm.
This index averages the country's rankings on ten topics, comprised of a variety of
indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. Armenia is ranked second among the EECCA
countries, just after Georgia.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International
that measures the level of perceived corruption in a public system, Armenia ranked 94th
among 175 countries in 2014, with a score of 37. This is a relatively high score with
regards to perceived corruption, as a score of 100 represents no corruption. Perceived
corruption has decreased substantially over the past ten years. From 2012 to 2013,
Armenia has improved its rank from 105th to 94th, with the score increasing from 34 to 36.
The rank remained unchanged during 2014.
The government has instituted several reforms in recent years to promote investment,
particularly in renewable energy. Amendments to the Law on Energy adopted in 2013
simplify licensing requirements and administrative processes, such as easing construction
licensing procedures for energy facilities and removing regulations for solar PV with
capacity up to 150 kW. The Turnover Tax Law came into effect in 2013 and modifies the
tax regime in some areas, by replacing VAT and profit tax. Small hydropower plants with
annual sales revenue that does not exceed about 58 million drams (USD 134 000) pay a
turnover tax of 3.5% of revenue. If revenues are above that level, then the VAT, at a
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59
Armenia 1.5. Investment attraction
In order to continue to attract investment for renewable energy projects and to remove
barriers to entry, the government is planning to continue to streamline processes for
licensing and registration; to extend purchase power agreements to 25 years for solar and
geothermal, and 20 years for wind projects; to improve resource assessments; and to
provide concessional loans. These are set out in the Investment Plan for Armenia (April 2014).
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
Armenia’s energy development concerns lie mainly in attracting investment for renewables
generation and in construction of a new nuclear reactor. The 2014 Investment Plan
includes an assessment of potential projects, estimates costs and proposes changes to
the framework to improve the investment climate.
Prior to the 2014 Plan, the investment strategy for the energy sector was part of the
Strategy of Development of the Energy Sector in the Context of Development of the
Economy (2005) and its supporting action plan. As part of the energy strategy, investments
are mainly carried out as a result of state programmes authorised by the government,
supported through loans from international donor organisations and the investment
programmes of individual utilities as approved by the PSRC. The main focus has been on
rehabilitation, modernisation and attraction of foreign direct investment for hydropower plants.
The R2E2 was established in 2004 to implement the renewable energy programme and
create an enabling environment for private investors. The R2E2 is financed by donors
and local governments to provide concessional loans for appropriate renewables and
energy efficiency projects.
Basic provisions regulating foreign investments are set in the Law on Foreign Investment
(1994) and the Law on Privatisation (1997). These laws state that foreign investors have
the same rights as local enterprises. In practice, however, most privatisation of large
assets was not competitive and transparent (DOS, 2013).
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The 2014 Investment Plan is the main strategic document outlining the future of renewable
energy investment. In the plan, the government has identified geothermal energy and
solar PV technologies as areas in which it would like to increase investment.
Proposed investment includes developing the Karkar geothermal site in the southeast with
estimated potential of 28.5 MW. Government funding may be used for exploratory drilling
to prove the resource, with other investment for the development stage if the field is deemed
technically and economically viable. The government also proposes to develop 40 to 50 MW
of utility-scale solar PV. Initial studies indicate that the area in the vicinity of Lake Sevan
has some of the highest potential in Armenia. More site-specific assessment is needed to
define opportunities. Such a project would require donor funding or private investment.
The strategy is that government support for demonstration projects and successful
outcomes will make private sector funding more likely. The government expects that
initial government and donor financing will contribute to lower costs and subsequent
tariffs from the initial utility-scale solar facilities.
In investment planning for generation assets other than renewables, Armenia is looking
for support for nuclear power. The existing nuclear plant is old and its life is being
extended with donor financing. The government is planning for a new 1 000 MW nuclear
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60
References Armenia
References
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Resources
2013, Reserves, Resources, Availability, Tables, BGR, Hannover, Germany.
DOS (US Department of State) (2013), 2013 Investment Climate Statement – Armenia, DOS
website, www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204593.htm (accessed 16 December 2014).
Energy Charter (2008), Armenia: Follow-up Review of the Investment Climate and Market
Structure in the Energy Sector of Armenia, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels.
EC (European Commission) (2014), “Trade: countries and regions: Armenia”, EC website,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/armenia (accessed
15 December 2014).
GENI (Global Energy Network Institute) (2014), An Energy Overview of the Republic of Armenia,
GENI website, www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/national_energy_grid/ armenia/
EnergyOverviewofArmenia.shtml (accessed 15 December 2014).
Gevorgyan Tigran (2014), “Russian Energy Giant Captures Armenian Market”, Press Release, IWPR
website, https://iwpr.net/global-voices/russian-energy-giant-captures-armenian-market, 14 January.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) (2014), Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Armenia,
accessed 15 December 2014, www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/cnpp2014cd/
countryprofiles/Armenia/Armenia.htm.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
NNSA (US National Nuclear Security Administration) (2013), “NNSA conducts two emergency
response training courses in Armenia”, press release, 3 September 2013, NNSA website, accessed
15 December 2014, www.nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/ armeniairapter.
NTI (The Nuclear Threat Initiative) (2014), “Armenia overview”, NTI website, accessed
15 December 2014, www.nti.org/country-profiles/armenia/.
Republic of Armenia (2014), Scaling-up Renewable Energy Program Investment Plan for Armenia,
Yerevan.
Republic of Armenia (2011), “Commercialization of research and development in Armenia”, State
Committee of Science presentation, www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/ppt_presentations/
2011/SubRegCapBuild_Chisinau/Asatryan.pdf.
World Bank (2014), “Armenia Overview”, World Bank website, accessed 1 May 2014,
www.worldbank.org/en/country/armenia/overview.
World Bank (2013), Republic of Armenia: Power Sector Tariff Study, World Bank, Washington, D.C.,
www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/06/27/
000333037_20130627161449/Rendered/PDF/ACS48450WP0P120cial0use0only0900ACS.pdf.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
61
© OECD/IEA, 2015
© OECD/IEA, 2015
AZERBAIJAN
64
Azerbaijan
GEORGIA RUSSIA
Figure 2.1.1 Map of Azerbaijan
Pirallakhi Is.
Baki (Baku)
AZERBAIJAN Chilov Is.
ARMENIA
CASPIAN
SEA
TURKEY
AZERBAIJAN
(Nakhchyvan
Autonomous
Republic)
Nakhichivan
IRAN 0 100 km
2.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
2.1. General energy policy Azerbaijan
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
and drafting a Law on Renewable Energy that is expected to accelerate the deployment
65
Azerbaijan 2.1. General energy policy
SUPPLY
Azerbaijan is a major energy producer with rich deposits of oil and natural gas. Oil
reserves ranked 20th in the world in 2012, at 952 million tonnes (Mt). Natural gas reserves
were estimated at 952 billion cubic metres (bcm) in 2012, about 0.4% of global reserves
(BGR, 2013). Additional 150-300 bcm are estimated at the Absheron field in the Caspian
Sea, discovered in 2012.
In 2012, Azerbaijan produced 58 Mt of oil equivalent (Mtoe), about five times more than
domestic demand. Oil production was 43.6 Mtoe and natural gas was 14.8 Mtoe. Since
2002, gas production has increased by 256% and oil production by 183%. Oil production
reached a peak in 2010 and has been on a declining trend since (Figure 2.1.2). Azerbaijan
also produces modest amounts of energy from hydro (0.3%) and biofuels (0.2%). There is
a negligible amount of wind power.
Crude oil production was 43.5 Mtoe in 2013 while natural gas production amounted to
18.3 bcm. Natural gas production was 3.5% higher compared to 2012 while crude oil
production remained unchanged.
30
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 in Azerbaijan was 13.7 Mtoe in 2012 (Figure 2.1.3).
TPES increased by more than 18% over the ten years from 2002. Azerbaijan’s TPES is made
up of mainly natural gas (66%) and oil (34%). Hydro accounts for 1% and biofuels for 0.7%.
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
66
2.1. General energy policy Azerbaijan
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation in Azerbaijan totalled 23 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, 23% higher than
in 2002. Natural gas accounts for 90% of generation, hydro (8%) and oil (2%) (Figure 2.1.4).
25 Natural gas
Hydro
20
15
TWh
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Over the past decade, the use of natural gas in power generation has nearly doubled to
almost 21 TWh while the use of oil has nearly been eliminated. Gas-fired generation
capacity in Azerbaijan increased by 46% from 2005 to 6.3 GW in 2012 (85% of total
generation capacity). Hydro generation is subject to seasonal and water volume variations.
67
Azerbaijan 2.1. General energy policy
other countries in the region. Azerbaijan used to import gas from the Russian Federation,
but it became a net exporter of natural gas in 2007 following the start-up of the Shah
Deniz field. Natural gas exports increased from 1.5 Mtoe in 2007 to 5.5 Mtoe in 2012.
Azerbaijan trades electricity with Russia, Turkey and Georgia. Trade volumes are low. In
2012, exports amounted to 0.7 TWh while imports were 0.1 TWh.
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 amounted to almost 8 Mtoe in 2012, which is 13% higher
than in 2002 (Figure 2.1.5). Energy demand in Azerbaijan has been increasing, albeit with
some variation. Energy demand is increasing in the transport sector, where it rose 110% in
the decade from 2002, and also in the commercial sector where demand expanded 65%
over the period. The transport sector share of TFC was 15% in 2002 and increased to 28%
by 2012, while the commercial sector share grew from 9% to 13% over the same period.
10 Commercial**
Mtoe
8
6
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing and forestry.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Conversely, energy demand in the residential and industry sectors declined. The residential
sector’s share of TFC fell from 42% in 2002 to 35% in 2012, while industry’s share fell
from 34% to 23.3% over the same period.
Natural gas and oil account for more than 83% of TFC: about 43% is gas demand for
power generation and the residential sector, and 40% is oil for use in transport. Electricity
represents 17% of TFC. Heat and biofuels play a small role in energy consumption
in Azerbaijan.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Azerbaijan’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.10 tonnes
of oil equivalent (toe) per USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012. This ratio is the lowest in
comparison with other EECCA countries, mainly due to its higher GDP (Figure 2.1.6).
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
68
2.1. General energy policy Azerbaijan
Since 2002, energy intensity in Azerbaijan has declined by 65%, down from 0.3 toe/
USD 1 000 GDP PPP. Energy intensity has been declining since the mid-1990s due to
strong economic growth and TPES which is growing at a comparatively slower rate.
Figure 2.1.6 Energy intensity in Azerbaijan and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
1.2 Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
1.0
Ukraine
0.8 Azerbaijan
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
Kazakhstan
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy in Azerbaijan accounted for about 2% of TPES in 2012, from hydro
and biofuels (Figure 2.1.7). Wind power is only in the early stages of development. The
country has the third-lowest share of renewables in TPES among EECCA countries,
behind Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.
Energy from biofuels, used mainly in the residential sector, has increased substantially
over the past decade. Hydropower production is subject to seasonal and water volume
variations, for instance with a share of 2.6% in TPES in 2010 and 1% in 2012.
Figure 2.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Azerbaijan and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Statistics of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Azerbaijan 2.1. General energy policy
MARKET STRUCTURE
The market structure in electricity as well as in the oil and gas sectors in Azerbaijan is
one of vertically integrated state-owned monopolies.
AzerEnergy is the vertically integrated monopoly in the electricity sector and is involved
in electricity generation, transmission, distribution and retail. It serves most of the country,
while BakiElektrikshebeke is the state-owned distribution system operator (DSO) in Baku.
There are a few independent power producers that have access to the transmission
network but they account for less than 1% of electricity generation.
In the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the Nakhchivan Energy Authority is the state-owned
transmission system operator (TSO) and the DSO, which also carries out dispatch operations.
The State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) carries out all activities in the oil
and gas sectors. SOCAR is also a part of the Azerbaijan International Oil Company (AIOC),
a consortium of major oil producing companies that operate in Azerbaijan. The consortium
also includes BP, Chevron, Devon Energy, Statoil, Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO),
Amerada Hess, ExxonMobi, Inpex and Itochu.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Industry and Energy is in charge of state policy and regulation in the energy
and industry sectors. The ministry has control of fully and partly state-owned enterprises.
The Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources is in charge of policy and regulation for
environmental protection, including monitoring the extraction of natural resources and
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2.1. General energy policy Azerbaijan
The Tariff Council is the implementing body across all regulated entities in the economy
for prices, service fees and collections.
The State Agency on Alternative and Renewable Energy Resources (SAARES) is an
independent agency and the principal regulatory institution for alternative and renewable
energy resources. It is tasked with the assessment of sustainable energy potential and shaping
relevant policies, including tariffs for renewable technologies. It is also responsible for
the elaboration and enforcement of relevant procedures such as permits to construct
renewable power generation facilities. SAARES was established in 2009. It was made
independent from the ministry in 2013 and includes an entity that is developing renewable
energy projects. SAARES also prepares energy efficiency policy initiatives in the area of
renewables, but its statute does not cover energy efficiency, which is formally assigned
to the Ministry of Industry and Energy.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The main body of legislation for the energy sector in Azerbaijan was drafted in the mid-
to late-1990s and includes laws related to resource development, oil, gas, electricity,
heat, and price regulation. Secondary legislation includes the 2005 Rules of the Use of
Electricity and the 2011 Rules of the Use of Natural Gas. A draft Law on Renewable
Energy was presented to the government in 2014 and was under consideration by the
end of the year.
During 2013, the government approved new laws on electricity, gas supply and network
rules. These were prepared in 2010 as part of the European Union-funded Twinning
Programme on legal and structural reform of the energy sector in Azerbaijan, with
assistance from the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi).
KEY POLICIES
The main energy policy is set out in the 2004 State Programme on the Development of
the Fuel-Energy Complex in Azerbaijan for 2005-2015. The programme was developed to
support oil and gas developments and to ensure energy supply security. As part of the
programme in recent years, Azerbaijan has invested in capacity building, rehabilitation
and natural gas extraction, reducing electricity shortages and improving energy supply
security. Since 2005, electricity production capacity has increased by 1.5 gigawatts (GW),
electricity and gas losses have been reduced and the country has become a net exporter
of gas due to the opening of the Shah Deniz field. There are plans for further field
exploitations and capacity building.
Renewable energy has become a focus of energy policy in recent years. Azerbaijan has
significant untapped renewable energy potential in wind, solar, small hydro, biomass
and geothermal. A presidential decree in 2011 called for a new State Strategy on the Use
of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources in Azerbaijan for 2012-2020, which was
still under consideration by the government by the end of 2014. The new programme
(20/20/20) proposes a legal framework to achieve by 2020 goals to:
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 20% below 1990 levels
produce 20% of electricity from renewables
increase energy efficiency by 20%.
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Azerbaijan 2.1. General energy policy
A Law on Renewable Energy was drafted in 2014 and was under consideration by
the government by the end of the year. It includes a feed-in tariff for renewables and
other incentives.
Energy efficiency is the responsibility of the Ministry of Industry and Energy. There are
no specific policies or incentive schemes for efficiency at present.
Azerbaijan became a member of the International Renewable Energy Agency in 2009.
Azerbaijan is a non-Annex I country in the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and it ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2000. The State Commission
on Climate Change was established in 1997. Azerbaijan has been in negotiations to
accede to the World Trade Organization since 1997.
INVESTMENT
ELECTRICITY
The electricity sector has seen notable investment in new gas-fired generation over the
past decade, with capacity increasing by 1.5 GW since 2005. In 2013, 780 megawatts
(MW) of new capacity came on line with the commissioning of the Janub power plant in
Shirvan. The construction of the Shimal-2 power plant is ongoing and is expected to add
another 400 MW by 2015.
The state-owned utility AzerEnergy invests in maintenance and rehabilitation according
to its annual and long-term programmes. Currently it is rehabilitating distribution lines
across the country. It is considering implementation of a smart meter programme.
AzerEnergy is continuing negotiations with Russia and Georgia on the improvement of
synchronisation of their power systems and increased electricity trade.
The government is participating in the Black Sea Regional Transmission Planning Project,
with support from the US Agency for International Development and the United States
Energy Association (USEA), to strengthen the regional electricity market conditions and
interconnections. In 2009, the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Power Bridge (AGT) project
was established by a Memorandum of Understanding among the TSOs of the three
countries (AzerEnergy, GSE [Georgia] and TEIAS [Turkey]). The line from Azerbaijan to
Georgia was completed in December 2013, while the energy bridge is expected to
become operational by 2015. According to project specifications, 1 200 MW capacity per
year are expected to be exported to Turkey (Azernews, 2014).
In order to reach its 9.7% share of renewables target by 2020, the government has
approximately 335 MW of renewable investment in planning. These include 210 MW of
wind farms, 50 MW of biogas and 75 MW of solar power projects.
plans for the first output of about 4 bcm/year from the phase II development to be
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2.1. General energy policy Azerbaijan
ASSESSMENT
The energy sector plays an important role in Azerbaijan’s economy, as it is a large producer
and exporter of oil and gas. Developments in both have led to robust economic growth
over the past decade. Investment from international companies has led to higher government
revenues which have been re-invested in the energy sector, including new generation
capacity, network extensions and rehabilitation, and modernisation of systems. This investment
has resulted in improvements in electricity shortages and overall energy supply security.
Challenges remain as Azerbaijan’s energy policy is based on the State Programme on the
Development of the Fuel-Energy Complex to 2015 and a strategy beyond then has not
been elaborated. The government is considering an alternative energy and renewables
development path to 2020. It has the ambitious 20/20/20 goals, yet it has not set out a
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Azerbaijan 2.1. General energy policy
In order to align overall energy policy objectives, including renewables, energy efficiency
and fossil fuel production, a comprehensive long-term view is needed along with appropriate
analytical tools to assess the possible mechanisms and instruments to achieve the 20/20/20
goals. The outlook should include supply and demand scenarios under various economic
conditions, and potential returns to 2030 and 2050.
Commendably, Azerbaijan has established SAARES as an independent agency with a
mandate for alternative and renewable energy policies and programmes, such as drafting
a new law on renewables. The draft Law on Renewables includes incentive schemes for
renewable energy development, such as a feed-in tariff. Incentives are needed to attract
the foreign investment required to develop renewables in Azerbaijan, as their costs are
higher than those of traditional fuels. At the same time, the government needs to work
towards opening the power market and establishing grid codes to facilitate access for
new producers.
Electricity demand will continue to increase with economic growth and a rising standard
of living. The network infrastructure is old and bottlenecks in the national transmission
system cause shortages and reduce system reliability. Azerbaijan needs to continue to
invest in the modernisation of its electricity networks and in expansion of regional
interconnections. Investment in construction, maintenance and rehabilitation of the
power grid should be prioritised in the energy strategy and its implementation.
To attract the necessary investment for renewable energy developments and network
rehabilitation, the government should establish an independent regulator for the whole
energy sector, which sets tariffs that reflect the full cost of supply in the context of
affordable rates for vulnerable consumers. An independent and stable regulator can
improve the investment environment to attract needed foreign investment.
Azerbaijan has improved the energy intensity of its economy over the past two decades,
yet more progress in demand-side management is needed. For example, the uniform
electricity tariff structure does not differentiate between peak and off-peak demand
periods and so limits demand-side measures.
There is no energy efficiency strategy to influence energy demand and to promote
energy savings in Azerbaijan. A stronger focus on energy efficiency in key sectors would
enhance the performance of the country’s economy and underpin more sustainable use
of its resources. Developing and implementing an effective energy efficiency strategy
would help Azerbaijan to explore the cost-effectiveness of different measures and to co-
ordinate efforts across different sectors. The strategy should set out the necessary
measures to achieve the 2020 target, such as minimum performance standards and
other incentives and/or regulations to promote the more efficient use of energy.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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2.1. General energy policy Azerbaijan
Promptly adopt the appropriate legal framework, including the draft Law on Renewables
and secondary legislation, to put into place the necessary incentives and policies to reach
the 2020 targets for renewables, energy efficiency gains and GHG emissions reductions.
Expedite structural energy policy reforms to move towards competitive markets,
particularly in electricity. Ensure transparent and non-discriminatory access to the
grid and set out long-term and cost-effective support mechanisms for renewables,
while ensuring investment in the modernisation and expansion of the networks,
quality of supply and consumer choice of suppliers.
In this context, set up an independent regulatory authority to safeguard business and
consumer interests. Strengthen consumer protection by introducing quality of service
regulation, transparency and public consultation in tariff-setting and monitoring of
price developments.
Develop an effective energy efficiency strategy to encourage energy savings in all
sectors. Assign clear responsibilities for energy efficiency at the government level and
continuously improve efficiency data collection and monitoring. In addition, make progress
on raising the efficiency of exploration and production and minimising gas flaring.
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Azerbaijan 2.2. Energy security
Azerbaijan is rich in oil and natural gas deposits. In 2012, oil reserves were 952 Mt,
ranking 20th and accounting for 0.4% of global reserves. Oil resources were 1 245 Mt
with remaining potential estimated at 2 197 Mt (BGR, 2013). Oil is produced both onshore
and offshore in the Caspian Sea, with offshore production accounting for about one-
quarter of the total (Azerbaijan.az, 2014).
Azerbaijan held an estimated 991 bcm of natural gas proven reserves, with reserves of 2 000 bcm
and remaining potential of 3 518 bcm in 2012 (BGR, 2013). An additional 150-300 bcm of
reserves are estimated at the Absheron field in the Caspian Sea, discovered in 2012.
According to the operator, BP, the Shah Deniz gas field is one of the world’s largest and
holds more than 1 000 bcm. While Azerbaijan is not as large a player in gas on a global
scale as it is in oil, gas extraction is expected to continue to contribute significantly to the
economy over the coming decades.
Other large fields include (with estimated reserves, some of which are proven): Umid
(200 bcm), Babek (400 bcm), Azeri-Chirag-Deepwater Guneshli (ACG) (300 bcm), Nakhichevan
(300 bcm), and Shafag-Asiman (200-500 bcm).
Overall hydropower potential in Azerbaijan is 40 gigawatt hours (GWh) (Verdiyev, 2012).
The technically feasible potential is 16 GWh, 5 GWh of which is small hydropower.
The energy mix is heavily concentrated on fossil fuels, with oil and gas accounting for
more than 98% of total supply in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is well-endowed in oil and gas
resources, so the security of supply of these fuels is not of immediate concern. However,
reliance on fossil fuels adds to GHG emissions and exposure to fuel price fluctuations.
Ageing natural gas networks have been significantly modernised with new compressor
stations and ancillary infrastructure. Distribution system losses and quality of gas supply
remain a concern.
Electricity generation is dominated by natural gas at about 90%, while hydro amounts to
8%. Azerbaijan has improved the security of its electricity supply over the past decade
with major investment in modernising generation and strengthening the west-east
transmission system. Construction of gas-fired generation capacity has mitigated the
electricity shortages that used to be common, as will a number of hydropower projects
underway. Resource-related income has boosted the growth of the middle class, and
consequently the demand for electricity such that further capacity additions are needed.
The government has targets to increase the share of renewable energy sources in the
energy mix and to reduce GHG emissions by 2020. In 2011, the president signed a decree
to prepare a new State Strategy on the Use of Alternative and Renewable Energy
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2.2. Energy security Azerbaijan
The new programme is expected to determine the key directions for the production of
electricity and heat from renewables. To date, renewable energy focus has been on
small hydro and wind power with more than 300 MW of new renewables capacity in the
planning or development stage. Commendably, Azerbaijan is advanced on metering of
household and industry consumption.
ELECTRICITY
Azerbaijan has a total installed capacity of 7.4 GW: 3.5 GW of oil-fired generation; 2.4 GW
gas-fired; 1.1 GW hydro; and 0.3 GW of multi-fuel (Table 2.2.1). The power network
includes 63 high-voltage substations and more than 4 100 km of lines (Table 2.2.2). Most
of the substations have been operating for more than 60 years (EIA, 2014).
Multi-fuel 300
Hydro 1 063
Total 7 366
Source: EIA (2014), “Azerbaijan overview”, EIA website, www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=AJ (accessed 16 December 2014).
550 kV 2 529 1
330 kV 13 1 207 6
220 kV 19 1 226 9
Source: EIA (2014), “Azerbaijan overview”, EIA website, www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=AJ (accessed 16 December 2014).
The electricity sector has seen notable investment in new gas-fired generation capacity over
the past decade, with capacity increasing by 1.5 GW since 2005. In 2013, 780 MW of new
capacity entered into operation with the commissioning of the Janub power plant in Shirvan
city. The construction of the Shimal-2 power plant is ongoing and will add another 400 MW.
OIL
There are three crude oil export pipelines in Azerbaijan.
About 80% of the oil is exported through the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline which
© OECD/IEA, 2015
began operations in 2006 and has a capacity of 1 million barrels per day (bbl/d). The BTC
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Azerbaijan 2.2. Energy security
NATURAL GAS
Azerbaijan became a net exporter of natural gas in 2007 with the start-up of the huge
Shah Deniz natural gas and condensate field; before then it imported gas from Russia.
Azerbaijan has two main gas export pipelines. The largest is the South Caucasus Pipeline
(SCP) which transports gas from the Shah Deniz field paralleling the route of the BTC
crude oil pipeline from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey. The SCP is 691 km in
length (443 km in Azerbaijan and 250 km in Georgia), 42 inches in diameter and has a
capacity of 7 bcm.
The second export route is the Gazi-Magomed-Mozdok Pipeline. Prior to 2007, this pipeline
transported natural gas from Russia to Azerbaijan, but an agreement between SOCAR and
Gazprom allowed the pipeline flow to be reversed. Gas exports to Russia began in 2010.
The pipeline is approximately 240 km long and has a capacity of 1 bcm/year (EIA, 2014).
Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) is a 1 850 km pipeline that will transport gas from
Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz 2 field to Turkey and onto European customers via the connection
to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The construction of TANAP began in March 2015 in
Turkey. The first gas is expected to flow in 2018 and the pipeline is expected to reach
capacity of 16 bcm/y by 2022, 23 bcm/y by 2024 and 31 bcm/y by 2028. In March 2013,
a Shareholder Agreement for the pipeline was signed in Ankara, with shares of 58% for
Southern Gas Corridor Closed Joint Stock Company (SGC), 30% for BOTAS and 12% for BP
(SOCAR, 2015).
Shah Deniz 2 is expected to produce around 4 bcm per year of natural gas in its first year
of production (end-2018) with volumes increasing up to 12 bcm per year in 2019, making
it one of the largest gas development projects in the world. Shah Deniz I is producing
around 9 bm per year at present. The Shah Deniz consortium plans to reach the
designed project capacity of 16 bcm by 2020. Transportation of additional Shah Deniz
gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe will require enhancement of the existing pipelines
and development of new infrastructure.
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78
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Gas pipelines
Karachaganak Existing
Planned/
UKRAINE Kiev proposed/under
construction
To Slovak Rep. and Natural gas field
Western Europe
KAZAKHSTAN
Volgograd LNG import terminals
MOLDOVA
Existing
Chisinau
Astrakhan
ROMANIA Odessa
Constanta Novorossiysk
UZBEKISTAN
White Aqtau Caspian
Stream Dzhubga Tuaspe
Coastal
Figure 2.2.1 Black Sea and Caspian Sea natural gas infrastructure
BULGARIA Pipeline
Grozny
Burgas B L AC K S E A
GEORGIA C ASPIAN SEA
am
Bl
Supsa Tbilisi
Stre ue
Alexandroupolis Istanbul Batumi TURKMENISTAN
Samsun
Marmara-
Ereglisi Baku Turkmenbashi
TANAP ARMENIA
Trans-Caspian
Erzurum Yerevan AZERBAIJAN Shah
Ankara deniz
Aliaga
AZ
Izmir TURKEY Tabriz
Neka
Az
ar
Tehran
3
79
Azerbaijan
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Azerbaijan 2.2. Energy security
The AGRI LNG project stems from the four countries signing the Baku Declaration in
2010. It led to the creation of the AGRI LNG Project Company, owned by the four states.
In November 2012, the feasibility study was completed. The project is expected to cost
EUR 4.5 billion with a projected capacity of 8 bcm, with completion by the end of the
decade (AGRI, 2014).
Azerbaijan has two existing underground gas storage facilities, Kalmaz and Garadag,
both located at Garadag. Gas is supplied from the Gazi-Mammad-Baku pipeline. Total
design storage capacity is around 3.5 bcm: Kalmaz (1.5 bcm) and Garadag (2 bcm).
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Azerbaijan’s electricity generation is mainly located in the west, but the centres of consumption
are in the east and south. The importance of west-east transmission network has been a
focus for the government. The production and consumption centres are connected by two
transmission lines. Transmission losses and bottlenecks were high. In 2008, the Asian
Development Bank approved a USD 160 million loan to rehabilitate the transmission lines.
Power system reliability in Azerbaijan is hampered by ageing infrastructure and under-
investment. Recent maintenance and rehabilitation programmes, however, are delivering
improvements through the progressive installation of SCADA systems and rehabilitation
of high-voltage substations. The state-owned utility, AzerEnergy, is implementing annual
and five-year investment programmes which include:
rehabilitation and improvement of all regional distribution grids
installation of pre-paid meter systems
dispatch control and information systems
installation of SCADA systems
improved training and development.
Table 2.2.3 Electricity losses in transmission and distribution networks, Azerbaijan, 2013
Network %
Transmission 4.2
Distribution 13.9
Source: AzerEnergy.
Investment in the natural gas sector, rehabilitation programmes and the installation of
smart metering devices have significantly reduced losses and cut outages. Losses have been
reduced from 14% in 2012 to 8% in 2013, with the aim to further cut them to 3% in 2014.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
The Ministry of Emergency Situations, established in 2005, is responsible for emergency response
mechanisms in all sectors of the economy. Its mandate includes natural and man-made disasters
and fire, as well as emergency situations with power system incidents, utility systems,
hydropower facilities, oil and gas production and processing facilities, main pipelines and
others. It provides policy measures in the fields of civil defence, rescue and restoration works.
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2.3. Market convergence Azerbaijan
ELECTRICITY
There is no competition in the electricity market in Azerbaijan. It is dominated by a
number of state-owned vertically integrated monopolies. AzerEnergy, the largest electricity
provider, owns and operates the majority of generation assets including gas- and oil-
fired and hydro plants, and operates as the TSO, DSO and retailer. AzerEnergy supplies
electricity to most of the country, except for electricity distribution in Baku, which is
operated by BakiElektrikshebeke.
In the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, the Nakhchivan Energy Authority is the state-
owned TSO and DSO and carries out dispatch operations. Existing legislation envisages
unbundling in the electricity sector in the future. Presently, however, there are no
implementation measures on the horizon.
The Law on the Power Industry (1998) sets out some provisions for third-party access.
AzerEnergy can purchase electricity from other producers, and other entities can buy
electricity from AzerEnergy (or other state companies) and sell it to final consumers.
Alternatively, independent generators or industries can supply electricity to consumers
on their own grids or through the state transmission system. These account for around
1% of electricity generation.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Azerbaijan does not have an independent energy regulator. Licensing procedures are regulated
by the Ministry of Industry and Energy, while tariffs are determined and set by the Tariff
Council. The Council is chaired by the Minister of Economic Development and has 12 members.
Tariffs
The Tariff Council establishes the tariff methodology, reviews the levels proposed by regulated
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companies (including but not limited to energy), and proposes changes to the legal framework
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Azerbaijan 2.3. Market convergence
Technical rules
The standards of the former Soviet Union (GOST standards) are still in use in both the
electricity and gas sectors in Azerbaijan, including a number of national standards. The
State Committee on Standardisation, Metrology and Patents represents Azerbaijan in
international and regional standardisation organisations, notably in:
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO): member
the European Committee for Standardization (CEN): affiliate
the Codex Alimentarius: member and national contact point
the Interstate Council for Standardization, Metrology and Certification of the
Commonwealth of Independent States/Eurasian Interstate Council for Standardization,
Metrology and Certification (EASC).
The reform agenda includes adoption of a national plan for converting mandatory
standards to technical regulations and voluntary standards, a draft law on technical
regulations, and draft laws on standardisation and accreditation.
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2.3. Market convergence Azerbaijan
This process of Azerbaijan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession involves significant
reforms in its trade policies. One of the key areas is standards and technical regulations.
In particular, Azerbaijan needs to ensure its compliance with the requirements of the WTO
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement. Azerbaijan is in the process of reforming its
standards and technical regulations to ensure harmonisation with the TBT Agreement.
Oil and gas pipelines connect Azerbaijan with its neighbours, and European and world
markets. The BTC oil pipeline, which connects Azerbaijan with Turkey via Georgia, began
operations in 2005, and since then the level of regional integration has increased
considerably as oil exports have more than doubled. Azerbaijan also exports oil via a Russian
port on the Black Sea and maintains close trade relations with the Russian Federation. The
South Caucasus Pipeline, whose route parallels that of the BTC, also began operations in
2006 and has contributed to stronger relations with both Turkey and Georgia.
Regional energy co-operation takes place within the framework of the Baku Initiative,
which is a political dialogue launched by a ministerial conference in Baku in 2004. It is
aimed at enhancing energy and transport co-operation between the European Union
and the littoral states of the Black and Caspian seas and their neighbouring countries. In
the field of energy, it was followed in 2006 by the adoption of the Energy Ministerial
Declaration, which included a roadmap for the four priorities in the fields: energy
market convergence; energy security; sustainable energy development; and attracting
investment. Azerbaijan regularly participates in the Eastern Partnership and its energy
security platform.
Bilateral co-operation between the European Union and Azerbaijan takes place in the
context of the European Neighbourhood Policy, in line with the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement, which includes energy. The European Union and Azerbaijan launched
negotiations in 2010 on a future Association Agreement, which would include energy
security provisions.
The AGRI LNG project is of strategic importance to the Southern Corridor, as well as to
Europe. It is expected to diversify the gas supply to Eastern Europe through LNG transport
from the Caspian Sea via the Black Sea. With an estimated cost of EUR 4.5 billion and
projected capacity of 8 bcm, it is expected to be completed by 2020 (AGRI, 2014).
In late 2011, the European Union began negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
on the development of the Trans-Caspian pipeline, which would turn Azerbaijan into a
transit country for Turkmen gas to Turkey and the European Union. Negotiations are
ongoing; however, support for the projects is lacking from surrounding countries.
The government of Azerbaijan is participating in the Black Sea Regional Transmission
Planning Project, with the support from USAID and USEA, aimed at strengthening regional
electricity market conditions and interconnections. In April 2009, the AGT project was
established by a Memorandum of Understanding among the TSOs of the three countries,
namely AzerEnergy, GSE (Georgia) and TEIAS (Turkey). The line from Azerbaijan to Georgia
was completed in December 2013, while the energy bridge is expected to become
operational by 2015. According to project specifications, 1 200 MW/year of exports to
Turkey are expected (Azernews, 2014).
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Azerbaijan 2.4. Sustainable development
Renewable energy accounts for less than 2% of TPES, although its share in power
generation is 8%. Azerbaijan has 1 063 MW of installed hydropower capacity with facilities
ranging in size from 5 MW to 418 MW. Overall hydropower output varies with seasons
and water volumes. The government has a target to increase the share of renewables in
electricity to 20% by 2020, and is currently developing a national programme to address
this objective. Additionally, the government has set a 2020 target of 9.7% share of
renewables in total energy consumption (up from 2.6% in 2011). A number of renewable
energy projects are planned (Table 2.4.1).
Hovsan biogas 50 92
A 2004 national programme for alternative and renewable energy for the period 2005 to
2013 had seen little implementation by 2009. The government then established SAARES
(under the Ministry of Industry and Energy) to accelerate the implementation of the
programme. In June 2012, SAARES was abolished and replaced by the State Company on
Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources, only to be reinstated again in February 2013
as an independent agency.
A new State Strategy on the Use of Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources in
Azerbaijan for 2012-2020 is currently under consideration. The draft strategy (20/20/20)
proposes a legal framework to achieve by 2020 goals to:
reduce GHG emissions by at least 20% below 1990 levels
produce 20% of electricity from renewables
increase energy efficiency by 20%.
A draft Law on Renewable Energy includes incentives aimed at attracting private investment.
Proposed incentives include a feed-in tariff for renewable energy generation and tax
breaks for equipment imports.
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2.4. Sustainable development Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan has renewable energy potential in wind, solar, small hydro, biomass and
geothermal resources. According to SAARES, the estimated potential for wind power is
2.4 GWh/year and small hydro 5 GWh/year. Estimates for the potential from other
renewable energy sources have not been made.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
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Azerbaijan 2.4. Sustainable development
CLIMATE CHANGE
Azerbaijan joined the UNFCCC in 1995 and has been a member of the Kyoto Protocol
since 2000 as a non-Annex I country. The State Commission on Climate Change was
established in 1997.
According to a 2005 presidential decree, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources
is the Designated National Authority for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
under the Kyoto Protocol. To date, 17 CDM project proposals in Azerbaijan have been
registered and four projects are under validation.
Azerbaijan’s energy-related emissions of CO2 totalled 29.3 Mt in 2012. This is 46.8%
lower compared to 1990, mainly due to a strong decline after the breakup of the Soviet
Union. In Azerbaijan, the power generation sector accounts for 39.9% of energy-related
CO2 emissions, followed by transport (21.8%), households (16.5%), manufacturing (8.8%),
other energy industries (7.9%) and commercial and other services (5%).
GAS FLARING
According to the Carbon Limits (CL) report on Associated Petroleum Gas (APG) (2013),
APG utilisation in Azerbaijan is relatively high by international standards.
SOCAR operates a number of fields with considerable APG venting, including Shallow
Water Guneshli, Neft Dashliari and Palchiiq Pilpiassi. SOCAR’s collection and use of APG
with small compressors is 375 million cubic metres (mcm)/year. Since oil production
peaked in 2010, flaring has ranged 500-700 mcm/year, with the gas utilisation rate at
around 94%. The ACG field has the largest production of APG, estimated at around
12 bcm with 60% re-injected, 25% used in domestic consumption or exports and 15%
used as fuels at the installations or flared (CL, 2013).
Azerbaijan has cut almost 50% of its gas flaring since it joined the Global Gas Flaring
Reduction (GGFR) partnership in 2010. SOCAR identified existing gas flaring sources with
the assistance of the GGFR partnership between 2008 and 2010. The company prepared
the Associated Gas Recovery Plan (AGRP) and the working group on AGRP was established
under the Ministry of Industry and Energy. The AGRP was developed jointly with the
Ministries of Ecology and Natural Resources, and gas and electricity operators.
SOCAR has also prepared a strategy on zero emissions through flared APG. The relevant
project is in the validation stage and aims to reduce gas flaring in the offshore area of
Oil Stones.
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2.5. Investment attraction Azerbaijan
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The laws on Investment Activity, Investment Funds and Foreign Investments set the legal
framework for investment in Azerbaijan. Under the Law on Foreign Investments, foreign
investors have the same rights as local investors and may, additionally, be granted
preferential rights.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3. www.eiti.az/en/doc/14.
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Azerbaijan 2.5. Investment attraction
The legislative framework also covers international agreements for which Azerbaijan is
a party. This includes the New York and Washington Conventions, and 45 bilateral
investment and 44 double taxation treaties. Azerbaijan has signed agreements with a
number of countries on the promotion and reciprocal protection of investments.
In 2010 the government overhauled its tax framework, leading to lower taxes and higher
earnings for individuals and businesses. Double taxation on income and property was
eliminated, corporate earnings tax was reduced from 22% to 20%, the rate of value-
added tax was reduced from 20% to 18% and the highest progressive income tax rate
was reduced from 35% to 25%. Effective from 2014, all taxes, other than land tax, were
removed for agricultural producers.
The government passed a new law regarding the establishment of Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) in 2010, which allows for preferential tax and customs conditions for the
zones. The creation of SEZs is subject to presidential approval and is open to domestic
and foreign investors.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
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88
References Azerbaijan
References
AGRI (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania-Hungary Interconnector) (2014), AGRI website,
www.agrilng.com (accessed 14 December 2014).
Azerbaijan.az (2014), “Geological structure”, Azerbaijan.net website, http://azerbaijan.az/portal/
Nature/Geostructure/geostructure_e.html (accessed 16 December 2014).
Azernews (2014), “Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Energy Bridge to strengthen energy security:
Minister”, press release, 4 June, www.azernews.az/business/67704.html.
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013) Energy Resources
2013, Reserves, Resources, Availability, Tables, BGR, Hannover, Germany.
Bloomberg (2014), “Total expects Absheron first gas delayed to 2021”, Bloomberg, 3 June,
www.bloomberg.com.
CL (Carbon Limits) (2013), Associated Petroleum Gas Flaring Study for Russia, Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, Final Report for European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, CL, Oslo.
EIA (US Energy Information Administration) (2014), “Azerbaijan overview”, EIA website,
www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=AJ (accessed 16 December 2014).
Energy Charter (2013), In-Depth Review of the Energy Efficiency Policy of Azerbaijan, Energy
Charter Secretariat, Brussels.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2015), Medium-term Oil Market Report, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Natural Gas Europe (2014), “Total investment in Shah Deniz gas field at $11.4 billion”, Natural Gas
Europe, 19 November, www.naturalgaseurope.com.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) (2013), “Azerbaijan monitoring
report, third round of monitoring”, Anti-corruption Network for Eastern Europe and Central Asia,
Istanbul Anti-corruption Action Plan, OECD, Paris.
SOCAR (2015), “TANAP Shareholder Agreement signed in Ankara”, press release, 16 March,
SOCAR website, www.socar.az.
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) (2011), “UNESCO
assisting Azerbaijan in reviewing its STI strategy”, press release, 24 March, www.unesco.org/new/
en/natural-sciences/science-technology/single-view-sc-policy/news/unesco_pledges_to_assist_
azerbaijan_in_review_of_strategy_for_science_and_technology/#.VJBlnfnIbcy.
Verdiyev, Rafig (2012), National Water Strategy of Azerbaijan Republic, the Republic of Azerbaijan
and EU Water Initiative, presentation, Geneva, 2 July, www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/
water/npd/Pres_Rafig_Final.pdf.
World Bank (2014), Azerbaijan Overview, World Bank website, www.worldbank.org/en/country/
azerbaijan/overview (accessed 16 December 2014).
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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© OECD/IEA, 2015
© OECD/IEA, 2015
BELARUS
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Belarus
LATVIA
Figure 3.1.1 Map of Belarus
B A LT I C
SEA
LITHUANIA
RUSSIA
RUSSIA
Minsk
BELARUS
POLAND
0 100 km UKRAINE
3.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3.1. General energy policy Belarus
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
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Belarus 3.1. General energy policy
The main priority of energy policy and strategy in Belarus is to provide a reliable and
sustainable energy supply for the national economy, while reducing dependence on energy
imports and improving the financial stability of the sector. The government is looking at
diversifying fuels in its power generation sector, including more coal and renewables. It
has introduced a green feed-in tariff to attract more investment in renewables.
The government is also improving energy efficiency in electricity and heat production
and is in the process of phasing out subsidies for electricity, heat and gas, which is
expected to improve the attractiveness of the energy sector for private investment and
make it more market-focused.
While energy policy has direction, the government lacks strong legislation and
implementation tools. There is no long-term policy planning and/or analysis of different
scenarios, and legislation on electricity and heat doesn’t exist. At the end of 2014, the
government was considering new legislation on electricity which may include provisions
for future unbundling. The legislation is still under consideration only.
Belarus participates in the Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan Customs Union which evolved into
the Russia–Belarus–Kazakhstan Common Economic Space (CES) in 2012, run by the Eurasian
Economic Commission (EEC) to which Belarus is party. The CES aims to remove barriers
to the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour among its members. Belarus
is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), operational since January 2015, along
with Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia, with Kyrgyzstan expected to join in May 2015.
Belarus also participates in the European Commission’s Eastern Partnership programmes.
This is in addition to its bilateral relations and work performed as part of the Baku
Initiative, which provides for political dialogue between the European Union and the
countries of the Caspian and Black Sea littoral states and their neighbouring countries.
Belarus is involved in the implementation of a number of interstate and international
treaties in the field of energy, including participation in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) Agreement on the co-ordination of interstate relations in the power sector,
and the treaty on the parallel operation of power systems of the CIS.
SUPPLY
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 in Belarus was 30.5 million tonnes of oil-equivalent
(Mtoe) in 2012 (Figure 3.1.2). Energy supply has been on the rise, increasing by 21.2%
since 2002, with a dip during the 2009 global turmoil.
Natural gas and oil are the main fuels in the Belarus energy mix, representing more than
90% of TPES in 2012. Natural gas accounts for 55.5% and oil for 34.6% of TPES, shares
which have not changed much over the last decade. Biofuels and waste accounted for 5.3%
of TPES in 2012, up from 3.9% in 2002. Peat accounts for 1.5% of TPES, while coal, hydro and
wind provide negligible amounts. Belarus produces less than one-fifth of its energy needs,
with total energy production of 4.1 Mtoe in 2012. The mix includes fossil fuels and
renewable energy sources. Belarus produced 1.7 million tonnes (Mt) of crude oil in 2012,
which represented 40.5% of total production, while biofuels and waste represented 39.1%.
Other fuels include peat (15.8%), natural gas (4.4%), hydro (0.1%) and some wind.
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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3.1. General energy policy Belarus
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation was 30.8 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, 16.4% higher than in 2002
(Figure 3.1.3). Nearly all electricity, over 96%, comes from natural gas, the remainder from
oil (2.6%), biofuels and waste (0.4%), hydro (0.2%) and peat (0.1%). Reliance on natural gas
in electricity has increased over the last decade, due to a decline in oil use in generation.
However, during the 2009 global turmoil and shortages in supply from Russia, electricity from
gas dropped to 81.7% of total generation with oil use up to 17.9%. Since then, gas use has
returned to usual levels. Hydropower output has increased over the period, but remains negligible.
Total electricity generation capacity was 9.2 gigawatts (GW) in 2012, which is an increase
of 17.4% compared to 2002. More than 99% of generation is gas-fired.
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Belarus 3.1. General energy policy
made up of crude oil (48.6%), natural gas (39.3%) and oil products (9.9%). Exports of
17.6 Mtoe were mainly oil products (87.9%) and crude oil (9.6%).
Crude oil imports amounted to 21.3 Mtoe in 2013 and came from Russia. Imports of oil
products were marginal at 68 kilotonnes in 2013, as they were 6.7 Mtoe the year before
(three times higher than the average yearly imports). Oil product imports came from
Russia (78%), the United Arab Emirates (4.4%) and other countries from Central Asia and
the Middle East. Exports of crude oil were destined for Germany, while oil product
export destinations were more diverse, including neighbours (mainly to Ukraine), Baltic
countries, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Italy.
Gas imports were 20.3 billion cubic metres (bcm) and originated from Russia. Gas
imports have increased by 15.3% compared to 2002.
Belarus is interconnected with Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Lithuania for electricity
trade and is a net importer. In 2012, Belarus imported 10.4 TWh and exported 2.8 TWh.
Over the ten years since 2002, imports have increased by 3.2% but exports have
dropped by 20% as both Lithuania and Ukraine have significantly increased their exports.
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 of energy was 23 Mtoe in 2012, made up of the industry
sector (44.4%), residential (23%), transport (17.7%) and services sector (14.9%) (Figure 3.1.4).
The industry sector has dominated energy use for decades, although since 2002 the
strongest growth rate, 67.6% over the period, has been in the transport sector. Industrial
energy use grew by 29% and in the commercial sector by 25%, while in the residential
sector it contracted by a modest 0.7%.
Industry uses oil, natural gas, electricity and heat. There has been an increase in the
consumption of biofuels and waste, but they account for only around 2% of industry
sector TFC. In the residential and services sectors, electricity and heat are the main
sources of energy, while natural gas and oil account for about 30%. Biofuels and waste
are also increasingly used in these sectors, and represent 10% of energy consumption.
15
10
5
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing and forestry.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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3.1. General energy policy Belarus
The transport sector is mainly fuelled by oil products (88.3%). Natural gas (7.5%) and
electricity (3.7%) also play a role in transport. A tiny amount (0.2%) of biofuels and waste
are used in transport.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Belarus’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.21 tonnes of oil
equivalent (toe) per USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012. This ratio is the fifth-lowest in comparison
with EECCA countries, close to the EECCA average of 0.23 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP. Since 2002,
energy intensity in Belarus has declined by 39%, down from 0.35 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP.
Energy intensity has been declining since the mid-1990s due to strong economic growth
and TPES which is growing at a comparatively slower rate.
Figure 3.1.5 Energy intensity in Belarus and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.9 Armenia
0.8 Belarus
0.7 Ukraine
0.6 Moldova
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5 Kazakhstan
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy in Belarus accounted for 5.3% of TPES in 2012, which is mid-range
among the EECCA countries (Figure 3.1.6).
Figure 3.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Belarus and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Statistics of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Belarus 3.1. General energy policy
In Belarus, nearly all the renewable energy is from biofuels and waste, with small
amounts of hydro and wind power. Wind turbines were installed in 2006 and capacity
has not increased since then. Energy from biofuels and waste has increased by 64.1%
since 2002, which is faster than the 21.2% growth in TPES. As such, renewable energy
has increased its share of the energy mix over the past decade, up from 4% in 2002.
MARKET STRUCTURE
3. www.belstat.gov.by.
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3.1. General energy policy Belarus
The natural gas distribution infrastructure is owned by the state, along with responsibilities
for technical services, tariffs, and upgrade and maintenance programmes. The distribution
network is operated by the State Production Concern of Fuel and Gasification BelTopGaz
(BelTopGaz) which is managed by the Ministry of Energy. BelTopGaz includes seven
distribution companies which serve Minsk and six other regions.
The petrochemical sector of Belarus is operated by enterprises and organisations of the
Belarusian State Concern for Oil and Chemistry BelNeftekhim (BelNeftekhim), which reports
directly to the Council of Ministers. BelNeftekhim includes more than 80 companies and
organisations which carry out oil exploration and production, transportation, refining
and retailing, as well as the production of a wide range of chemical and petrochemical
products. The Mozyr oil refinery is owned by several Russian companies.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Energy is responsible for the fuel and energy sector of Belarus. It
manages the vertically integrated state-owned natural gas supplier, BelTopGaz, and the
vertically integrated state-owned electricity producer, supplier and retailer, BelEnergo.
This ministry also oversees the State Institute for Management of Construction of Nuclear
Power Plants and other state-owned organisations operating in the energy sector. It is
responsible for the implementation of the new State Programme on the Development of
the Electricity System of Belarus for the Period to 2016.
State regulation of the energy sector, including energy efficiency and renewable energy,
is carried out through decrees, directives of the president, government decisions and the
Ministry of Economy. Other relevant ministries and departments are active participants.
The Department of Energy of the State Standardisation Committee is responsible for the
development and implementation of national energy efficiency and renewable energy policies.
It also monitors and ensures state control over rational use of fuel, electricity and heat.
The National Statistical Committee is responsible for administering the laws on national
data services. It collects, processes and publishes national statistics, including energy
data. The Statistical Committee is responsible for preparation of energy balances, which
it does in close co-operation with the Ministry of Energy and energy enterprises.
Local councils, executive authorities and administrative bodies implement state energy
policy. There are a number of public and non-governmental organisations active in the
field of energy efficiency, renewable energy and environmental protection in Belarus.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal structure in Belarus differs from that of other EECCA countries. The highest legal
act in Belarus is its constitution. Under this are decisions, decrees and orders of the head
of state, followed by constitutional laws and other legal acts, decrees of the Cabinet of
Ministers and other sectoral ministerial acts. In theory, this means that the head of state
can override legislation that has been adopted by parliament. This rule is a fundamental
barrier to long-term investment and serious consideration needs to be given to making
national legislation more predictable and stable for both domestic and foreign investors.
The main body of legislation governing the Belarus energy sector includes:
the Law on Gas Supply (2003)
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Belarus 3.1. General energy policy
the Law on Renewable and Non-traditional Sources of Energy (2011), which includes
regulations concerning electricity and heat
the Law on Energy Savings (2014).
The government approved the Law on Energy Savings in December 2014. The law stipulates
energy efficiency technology implementation and energy-efficient equipment requirements.
There is no law on electricity in Belarus. The government is considering drafting a law
that may address electricity sector unbundling. There are also no laws on heat or gas,
and no proposals in that regard are under consideration.
In May 2014, a Law on Urban Electricity Transmission was approved, legislating electricity
network development and rehabilitation. In August 2014, a new Decree on Grid Connection
was approved, allowing access to smaller private generators.
KEY POLICIES
Energy policy in Belarus is based on a number of policy decisions made over the past decade,
including the Concept of Energy Security to 2020 (2007), the Development Strategy of
Energy Potential to 2020, the State Programme for Electricity Sector Development to 2016
(2013), and the Concept of Development of Heat Supply to 2020 (2010), among others.
Energy policies and measures in the programmes are synchronised with the major
objectives set in the Concept of Energy Security and the Development Strategy for Energy
Potential (the energy strategy). These include: the diversification of domestic fuels and
imports; energy efficiency improvements in power generation; improved reliability; and
the reduction of cross-subsidies. Some of the key policy decisions are listed below:
Reduce the use of natural gas as the primary fuel for the production of electricity
and heat.
Increase use of indigenous fuels (oil, gas, biomass, peat, lignite and oil shale).
Construct new electricity generation plants, including 2.3 GW nuclear power and
two hydro plants (Western Dvina and Neman).
Renovate existing gas-fired power stations into combined-cycle gas-fired turbines
(CCGT) and renovate combined heat and power (CHP) plants.
Construct two new district heating facilities and decommission aged plants.
Develop 330 kilovolt (kV) grids.
Install advanced automatic control and power supply management systems.
Decentralise power and heat services by developing CHP plants in industrial enterprises
in small towns to improve reliability and efficiency at the local level.
Develop power system interconnections with neighbouring countries.
Rehabilitate and expand the gas network and gas transmission infrastructure.
Continue exploring oil fields and introduce new technologies to slow down oil
resource depletion.
Expand oil refinery capacity and introduce new oil products.
Table 3.1.1 shows the main targets to 2020 in comparison to 2009.
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3.1. General energy policy Belarus
The strategy is also focused on improving the management of the energy sector while
maintaining centralised operational control of all elements of the energy sector; establishing
conditions for non-discriminatory access to electricity networks while ensuring reliability
of supply and power quality for consumers; and improving the energy sector’s legal and
regulatory framework in order to develop nuclear power and to possibly improve market
conditions. Additional objectives include the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
and increased funding for research and development (R&D).
The State Programme of Electricity Sector Development to 2016 was developed in 2012
and adopted in October 2013.4 It was developed in conjunction with the State Programme
of Construction of Energy Sources on Local Fuels for 2010-15, the National Programme
on the Development of Indigenous and Renewable Energy Sources for 2011-15, and the
National Programme on Energy Savings for 2011-15.
Policies for district heating are in the Concept of Development of Heat Supply to 2020.
Adopted in 2010, it outlines the planned development of district heating systems, tariff
policy, district organisations and consumer relations, systems management, regulatory
framework, demonopolisation and the formation of market relations.
The energy strategy includes plans for the development and rehabilitation of the gas
network. These include the construction of new transmission pipelines in the Gomel,
Mogilev and Brest regions, the construction of gas networks to large end users and new
households, building liquefied natural gas facilities and expanding gas storage capacity
from around 1 bcm to 4.5-5 bcm by 2020.
Peat development is carried out under the State Programme for Peat for 2008-20. The
government plans to increase peat production from around 3 Mt in 2010 to 4.1 Mt by
2015, for the production of fuel briquettes to be used in boiler houses and mini-CHP plants.
Oil complex development plans include the introduction of new technologies to improve
productivity of extraction and slow down resource depletion, as well as the development
of new oil fields. Belarus is also planning to rehabilitate existing oil refining facilities and
develop new competitive products.
The National Programme on Energy Savings for 2011-15 (legislated by the new Law on
Energy Savings) and the National Programme for the Development of Local and Renewable
Energy Sources for 2011-15 were adopted in 2011, aimed at developing plans and
measures for energy efficiency improvements in supply and demand, as well as incentives
for biomass and other renewable source development, including a green tariff. One of
the major outlined tools to promote energy savings includes increasing energy tariffs.
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Belarus 3.1. General energy policy
With regards to tariff policy, the government of Belarus is progressively removing cross-
subsidies on electricity and heat tariffs to recover the cost of investment and to curb
excessive energy consumption. Modification of tariffs is in two phases: first 2012 to 2014,
then 2015 and after. The reform is expected to result in separate tariffs for generation,
transmission and distribution, as well as a new methodology for industrial rates.
This includes the elimination of preferential tariffs for industrial customers, which occurred
in 2012, and an annual increase in the price, based on nominal growth in the average
salary.5 During 2014, the average salary rose by 5.8% and so did the price of electricity,
heat and gas (for lowest consumption bands only).
The climate change policy is under the State Programme of Measures to Mitigate the
Effects of Climate Change for 2013-20, approved by the Council of Ministers in 2013. It sets
a target to reduce GHG emissions by 8% in 2020 from 1990 levels, about 10 million tonnes
of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO2-eq). Measures to achieve this objective include
energy efficiency improvements, increases in forest areas, restoration of peat lands and
improved legal and regulatory approaches. The necessary measures are estimated to
cost USD 10.2 million.
A number of other government programmes were developed during 2010-11 to assist in
the implementation of the above-mentioned concepts and strategies. These focus on
the medium term, 2011-15, and include:
the State Programme for the Construction of Energy Sources with Local Fuels for
2010-15 (2010)
the Programme for the Construction of Energy Sources (Biogas) for 2010-15 (2010)
the State Programme for the Construction of Hydropower Stations for 2011-15 (2010)
the State Programme of Social-and Economic Development for 2011-15 (2010).
INVESTMENT
5. www.tarify.by.
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3.1. General energy policy Belarus
Reconstruction of the 330 kV Smorgon – Ross – Minsk CHP Unit 4 2018 341
Planned projects to 2016 include two combined-cycle power plants at the Lukoml and
Byaroza power plants of 400 megawatts (MW) each; rehabilitation of a power plant at
Borisov to upgrade to a 65 MW combined-cycle plant; addition of 21 MW at the Polotsk
hydropower plant; and new electricity generation sources in Luninets and Barani using
indigenous fuels.
Construction of the first nuclear power plant in Belarus began in 2013 at Ostrovets with
Russian financing. A number of reactors are expected to come on line from 2016 to 2020.
Investment to modernise and expand the electricity network is also needed in order to
integrate new generation capacity, rehabilitate the ageing network and improve reliability
of supply. The government expects that its measures will reduce total network losses by
up to two percentage points from 2010 levels (around 11%).
The main areas in which investment is needed to improve the heat networks are energy
efficiency improvements in heat plants, control automation and metering, as set out in
the Concept of Development of Heat Supply to 2020. To modernise necessary assets and
increase industrial and residential customer connections, the networks require annual
replacement of 100-120 km of supply pipelines and 550-660 km of distribution pipelines.
Modernisation of heat networks is expected to reduce losses by 2 percentage points
from 2010 levels (or by 8% in total).
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Belarus 3.1. General energy policy
ASSESSMENT
The energy sector in Belarus is mostly in the hands of the state and the president holds
exclusive rights to decisions made about and within the sector. The government believes
that such centralised power makes the energy industry more stable and secure and
helps to build investor confidence.
Hence Belarus is looking to attract foreign investment and is making its market more
suitable for potential investors. In 2014, the World Bank’s Doing Business Report ranked
Belarus 57th out of 189 countries for the ease of doing business, only behind Georgia and
Armenia among EECCA countries. Belarus adopted the Investment Code in 2001 which
sets a legal framework for foreign investment. In terms of international instruments that
afford legal protection to investors, Belarus is a party to the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (1965), the Convention
Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (1985) and the Energy Charter
Treaty (1994).
However, centralised power and the ability of the president to supersede all legislation is
also a deterrent for certain investors and puts long-term commitments at risk of sudden
change. To attract more foreign investors to finance future projects, the government will
need to strengthen its legislation and offer more security for long-term agreements, by
making national legislation fixed and more predictable.
Energy legislation in Belarus is weak, albeit improving. As summarised in the “legal
framework” section, the main body of legislation for energy covers gas supply, energy
savings and renewable sources. However, there is no law specific to the electricity sector
or heat in Belarus. The government is considering a possible future law on electricity that
may include electricity sector unbundling. The Review Team commends the government
for starting a dialogue and considering restructuring in the energy sector, and encourages
further efforts to advance the necessary legislation on electricity and heat.
Another area of insufficient attention to date is renewables and energy efficiency
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3.1. General energy policy Belarus
reducing GHG emissions, increasing the share of renewables in its energy mix and
reducing energy consumption. However, the existing policies are for the medium term
only and there is no specific implementing agency to monitor and track progress. The
country also lacks strong incentives for foreign investment in the renewables sector as
well as incentives for energy savings. The country should also consider establishing an
independent energy regulator in the near future.
Green feed-in tariffs exist; however, other supporting mechanisms for renewable energy
developments are not straightforward. This includes lack of understanding on responsibilities
for connections to the grid, and no clear and transparent rules for third-party access. To
increase the attractiveness of its renewable energy sector for foreign investors, clear and
transparent rules and legislation are needed, without the possibility of sudden change to
tariffs and other agreements.
The government subsidises electricity, heat and gas tariffs for all types of consumers at
present, but it is slowly phasing these out. At present, the electricity sector is unprofitable
and requires government subsidies and budget expenditure to maintain it. This has caused
a lack of investment in existing infrastructure and ageing networks, leading to higher
losses and lower efficiency. The government is slowly raising tariffs and phasing out
subsidies in order to investment in networks and reduce losses, and to allow for new
electricity generation capacity, necessary for the growing energy demand in Belarus. The
Review Team commends the government for its decision to phase out subsidies, and
recommends that the phase-out be done in a way that sends a strong signal to investors
without impairing the most vulnerable customers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Belarus 3.2. Energy security
OIL SHALE
Oil shale is a large but undeveloped energy resource in Belarus. 8.8 billion tonnes of oil
shale are estimated, with up to 3.6 billion tonnes of recoverable reserves, all concentrated
within the Pripyat Shale Basin. About 30% of the Luban and Turovskoe fields have been
explored. Probable resources are estimated at 1 223 Mt at Luban and 2 684 Mt in Turovskoe.
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3.2. Energy security Belarus
107
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Belarus
B A LT I C
SEA
LITHUANIA
RUSSIA
Figure 3.2.1 Electricity network, Belarus
Power lines
RUSSIA
750 kV
330 kV
220 kV
Minsk Proposed
Power substations
750 kV
330 kV
BELARUS
220 kV
Other
Power plant
Nuclear power
POLAND plant
0 100 km UKRAINE
3.2. Energy security
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3.2. Energy security Belarus
109
110
Belarus
B A LT I C
SEA
LITHUANIA
RUSSIA
Gas pipelines
Figure 3.2.2 Gas pipeline network , Belarus
RUSSIA
Main pipeline
Yamal-Europe
main pipeline
Other
Minsk Compressor
station
Compressor
station
(Yamal-Europe)
BELARUS Underground
storage
POLAND
0 100 km UKRAINE
3.2. Energy security
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3.2. Energy security Belarus
Grodno-Alytus 330 75
Ross-Bialystok 220 99
Poland
PS-PS 2 Brest-Vul’vska-Dobrin’ska 110 ..
111
112
Belarus
SWEDEN Almelyevsk
ESTONIA
R U S S I A
Ventspils
RK
LATVIA
MA
Samara
N
DE
Figure 3.2.3 Oil transit pipelines through Belarus
LITHUANIA
RUSSIA
Rostock Gdansk Bryansk
BELARUS
KAZAKHSTAN
Mazyr
POLAND
GERMANY
CZECH U K R A I N E
REPUBLIC
Brody
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC CASPIAN
SEA
MO
AUSTRIA LDO
SWITZ.
VA
HUNGARY
SLOVENIA
CROATIA ROMANIA
ITALY
BOSNIA GEORGIA
AND SERBIA BL ACK SEA AZER.
HERZEGOVINA ARM
Oil pipeline
3.2. Energy security
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3.2. Energy security Belarus
There are seven main gas pipelines operated by Gazprom TransGaz (owned by Russia’s
Gazprom) which transit natural gas through Belarus. The portions in Belarus have a total
length of 2 500 km (Figure 3.2.2). The pipelines include the Torzhok-Minsk-Ivatsevichi
(1 220 million metre [mm] diameter); two Ivatsevichy-Dolina pipelines (1 220 mm each);
Kobrin-Brest-state border pipeline (1 020 mm); Minsk-Vilnius pipeline (1 220 mm); Torzhok-
Dolyna pipeline (1 420 mm); and Volkovysk-state border pipeline (273 mm). Gazprom
Transgaz Belarus also operates the main gas pipeline Yamal-Europe, with a diameter of
1420 mm and length of 575 km, owned by Gazprom. There is storage at the Osipovichi,
Pribugskoe and Mozyr underground sites and seven gas metering stations.
Oil fields in Belarus are being depleted and the government is working on exploring new
fields as well as introducing technology for decreasing the present rate of depletion.
Belarus also refines oil into oil products. The Naftan refinery has a capacity of 1.6 Mt and
the Mozyr refinery has a capacity of 3 Mt. The government is planning to rehabilitate the
two plants under the energy strategy to 2020.
The oil storage capacity of BelNeftekhim, the state-owned petrochemicals entity, is 1.4 mcm.
Construction of additional oil storage capacity at Joint Stock Company (JSC) Naftan, a
large oil refinery and petrochemical complex, and at Gmeltransoil Druzhba will increase
the overall capacity to 1.7 mcm by 2020.
The oil pipeline system in Belarus includes the transit route for Russian oil to Latvia, the
Slovak Republic, Germany and Poland. The northern part includes 1 068 km of high-
pressure line with diameters from 720 mm to 1 020 mm. The southern part is 656 km
long with diameters from 530 mm to 1 020 mm.
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Generally, Belarus does not experience significant electricity or heat supply shortages or
power outages. The level of system reliability is stable, with losses decreasing slowly
over time through network improvements.
Losses in the electricity transmission and distribution network were just under 10% in
2012, and fell slightly in 2013. Improvements envisaged in the 2013 energy strategy
programme are expected to lower lines losses two percentage points by 2016. Losses in
the heat sector are undisclosed; however, the heat sector rehabilitation programme is
expected to also reduce losses by 2 percentage points by 2020, or 8% in total.
In the gas sector, the average transmission pipeline loss is about 0.5%, and is 0.2% in the
distribution network.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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Belarus 3.3. Market convergence
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Belarus does not have a single independent energy regulatory authority. The Ministry of
Economy is responsible for the regulation of electricity and heat tariffs for industrial
© OECD/IEA, 2015
customers, independent suppliers and all categories other than residential, based on the
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3.3. Market convergence Belarus
2011 Decree on Price Tariffs. Residential energy tariffs are regulated by the Council of
Ministers. Regional executive committees and the Minsk City Executive Committee are
responsible for regulation of heat tariffs for those which are not already covered by the
Council of Ministers.
In view of progressive reform, the government is planning to develop a body of legislation
governing the ownership structure of the electricity and heat industry, state involvement in
electricity and heat tariff settings, and the basic principles of the formation and functioning
of the wholesale electricity market, including the laws on electricity and heat supply.
Belarus simplified grid connection through the new Decree on Grid Connection (August 2014).
The Decree allows for the connection of small private generators.
Regulatory functions in the gas sector are within the power of the president.
Tariffs
Electricity, heat and gas tariffs are based on a cost recovery approach, though the
methodology is not disclosed to the public. Tariffs are adopted by resolution of the
Cabinet of Ministers and are subsidised for end-users. There is no obligation to publish
annual reports or information about various tariff structures, although end-use consumer
tariffs are available in the public domain.
Case-by-case feed-in tariffs are available for specific categories of consumers, such as
strategic investors with large-scale industrial projects or industrial plants of strategic
importance. Each case is considered separately and a relevant presidential decree is issued.
The price of imported gas is determined by contract between Gazprom and the Ministry
of Energy. The state regulates the price of liquefied natural gas, tariffs for gas and oil
transmission and distribution, and petroleum product prices. After consultation with the
relevant companies, the Ministry of Economy approves the tariffs in a special document,
which sets out the tariffs, costs and mark-ups.
Residential electricity tariffs are differentiated by consumption bands and peak and
off-peak time periods. Other consumer categories have the choice of a single or a
differentiated tariff. Gas prices for final consumers depend on import prices and costs of
transport. Natural gas meters are installed for all industrial and domestic consumers.
Heat tariffs vary according to consumer category and by area.
The State Programme of Energy Sector Development to 2016 aims to reform tariffs to
create incentives for energy savings without heavy government subsidies. Modification
of tariffs is in two phases: first in 2012 to 2014, then 2015 and after. The reform is
expected to result in separate tariffs for generation, transmission and distribution, as
well as a new methodology for industrial rates.
Before the transition to the second stage of tariff reform, the government has reduced
cross-subsidies in the electricity and heat sector. This includes the elimination of preferential
tariffs for industrial customers, which occurred in 2012, and an annual increase in the
price, based on nominal growth in the average salary. During 2014, the average salary
rose by 5.8% and so did the price of electricity, heat and gas (for lowest consumption
bands only). Tables 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 summarise the tariffs in Belarus, including different
consumption bands.
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Belarus 3.3. Market convergence
Source: www.tarify.by.
Households with central heating and individual gas meters Cm 0.21 0.21
Source: www.tarify.by.
Table 3.3.3 Recovery of electricity and heat costs from the residential sector, Belarus
In 2012, the level of cost recovery was 32.3% for electricity and 17.2% for heat. The
government is expecting electricity tariffs to be fully cost reflective by 2015 through tariff
increases, while heat recovery rates will increase to 30% over the same period (Table 3.3.3).
Green tariff
A green tariff for renewables was authorised by a Ministry of Economy decision in 2011,
on the basis of the Law on Renewable Energy Sources. The feed-in tariffs is set for
installations (industrial customers) with a capacity up to 750 kilowatts (kW) for a period
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116
3.3. Market convergence Belarus
All persons legally in Belarus (national or foreign) can benefit from the tariff, except for
installations belonging to BelEnergo group. The correction rates for plants commissioned
from August 2011 onwards are as follows:
wind, hydro, biomass, biogas and geothermal installations:
first 10 years: 1.3
next 10 years: 0.85
solar installations:
first 10 years: 3
next 10 years: 0.85.
Third-party access
Legislation permits foreign investors to own new power plants, and guarantees connection
of independent power producers to the state power grid and the purchase of their
output. In recent years, the number of independent electricity producers (mini-CHP and
small and mini-hydro power plants [HPPs]) has been increasing, but still represents a
negligible share of total electricity supply (Energy Charter, 2013).
There are no provisions for third-party access in the natural gas sector.
Technical rules
The energy sector in Belarus still uses GOST standards.6 However, the State Standard of
Belarus aligns with EU standards. Public construction authorities are directly involved in the
development of national industry codes, which usually meet the standards of the European
Committee for Standardisation/European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
(CEN/CENELEC) and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).
Belarus is a member of the ISO, and is an affiliate member of CEN/CENELEC. Belarus
is also a member of the Organisation of the Euro-Asian Cooperation of National
Metrological Institutions (COOMET) and is an active member of the Eurasian Council for
Standardisation (EASC).
6. Gosudarstvennyy Standart (State Standards) under the USSR. GOST standards continue to be used by the 12 member
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117
Belarus 3.3. Market convergence
ELECTRICITY
Transit of electricity via the power grid of Belarus is carried out within the framework of
the Common Economic Space which includes Belarus, the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.
The framework includes a 2010 pricing and tariff policy. Electricity transit from the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries is governed by the Agreement on
Electricity Transit within the CIS (2000).
NATURAL GAS
Belarus transits gas from Russia to Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and Russia’s Kaliningrad
region (via Lithuania). Gazprom-TransGaz operates the Yamal-Europe transmission pipeline
which provides gas to Germany and is owned by Gazprom. However, Gazprom-TransGaz
does not participate in the work of the European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Gas to prepare the Ten-Year Network Development Plans for Transmission
Systems and Network Codes.
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118
3.4. Sustainable development Belarus
Renewable energy developments are governed by the Law on Renewable Energy Sources
(2011) and the National Programme for Renewable Energy Development for 2011-15.
Under the programme, the government has developed feed-in tariffs and guaranteed
connection for renewable power producers in order to attract private investment. Other
measures include stimulation of investment activity, such as the creation of an inviting
environment for national and foreign investors and the establishment of tax and other
benefits for producers of electricity from renewable energy.
To increase the use of fuel wood, peat and other domestic fuels, the government
approved the State Programme for the Construction of Energy Sources on Local Fuels in
2010-15. This programme plans for the construction of 23.6 MW of capacity and 769.7 MWh
of thermal output from domestic sources. This will lead to savings of 0.96-1.12 bcm per
year in natural gas consumption by 2016.
Other renewable developments include 162 MW of wind turbines by 2016, with the
possibility of up to 300 MW if funding is secured. This includes the Vitsebsk and Hrodna
regions (60 MW) and the Mogilev region (50 MW). Up to 102 MW of hydropower
capacity is expected in the period to 2016.
In 2010, the Soligorsk district commissioned a solar installation with heat output of 160 kW.
A similar installation is planned at the Lake National Bank of Belarus. Construction of the
first geothermal installations with a heat output of 1-1.5 MW will be on the outskirts of
Brest in southwest Belarus.
Also in 2010, the government introduced a programme to support the development of
biogas power plants fuelled by agricultural and industrial waste. In 2012, 8.2 MW of
biogas electricity generation capacity was installed.
There were 277 active renewable energy installations — biogas, solar, geothermal, biomass,
hydro and wind — with a total capacity of 397 MW in September 2013 according to a
government inventory. Maximum output from these facilities is 519 GWh/year of electricity
and 2.7 million Gcal/year of heat.
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Belarus 3.4. Sustainable development
Two geothermal fields, the Podlesse basin (Brest region) and the Pripyat trough (Gomel
region), have been investigated. The government will continue to assess the geothermal
potential of Belarus.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
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3.4. Sustainable development Belarus
The International Energy Centre was inaugurated in Minsk in 2010 to attract domestic
and foreign investment for long-term energy efficiency projects in Belarus. The Centre
takes an active part in designing national, departmental and regional energy efficiency
programmes and contributes to identifying potential project activities.
Public awareness of energy efficiency in Belarus is relatively high as information is
regularly shared through media campaigns, information sessions, publications, educational
seminars and other information dissemination approaches. In 2012, more than 110 events
(conferences, seminars and exhibitions) were held for the promotion of energy efficiency
and renewable energy.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The national environmental policy provides for the gradual restructuring of energy
production and a higher technological level of production, resource conservation, use of
low-waste and non-waste technologies, reduction of emissions and discharges of pollutants
into the environment, recycling and processing of waste, and the elimination of the
negative effects of economic activity. Environmental improvements are to be achieved with
new technologies, construction, modernisation of existing infrastructure and organisations,
and environmental standards and regulation.
Renewable energy installations are exempt from value-added tax on imported goods
and land taxes. Mandatory energy audits are required under the Law on Energy Saving. A
government decree in 2006 established the procedure for conducting energy audits.7
Energy audits must be independent and are approved by the relevant national governments
and other authorities at regional and local levels. They are also approved by the EED
at least once every five years. The EED is required to carry out energy audits on
government buildings.
A number of energy projects have been subjected to environmental impact assessments
and received favourable evaluations:
feasibility study for Zelva coal plant 600 MW
construction of nuclear power plant
construction of Nemnovskaya hydro facility
construction of Mozyrskaya combined heat and power plant fuelled with indigenous fuels
construction of 400 MW CCGT plant at Bereza
construction of 400 MW CCGT plant at Lukoml.
Other main investment projects that have received favourable environmental reviews
include: Lukoml’skaâ and Berezovskaya Gres CCGTs, Grodno CHP 2, Mozyr CHP, Minsk
CHP 3, reconstruction of Borisov, reconstruction of Mogilev, Mogilev CHP 1, and Grodno,
Polotsk and Vitebsk HPPs.
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Belarus 3.4. Sustainable development
CLIMATE CHANGE
© OECD/IEA, 2015
8. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/developed/belarus.html.
122
3.5. Investment attraction Belarus
The Consultative Council for Foreign Investments headed by the prime minister plays an
important role in creating a favourable investment climate in Belarus. The Council includes
officials from government organisations, international agencies and foreign investors
operating in Belarus. The National Investment and Privatisation Agency was established
in 2010 and is authorised to represent interests of the Republic of Belarus on the issues
related to attracting investment; it acts as a “one-stop shop” for foreign investors. In
2012, the government approved a National Strategy for Attracting Foreign Direct Investment
by 2015. Its objective is to increase the level of investment confidence in Belarus. It aims
to increase the share of foreign investment in fixed assets to at least 21% by 2015
(Belarus Digest, 2012).
The government has announced measures to reduce bureaucracy and red tape.
Nevertheless, bureaucratic procedures, including those for licenses and permits, are
neither sufficiently streamlined nor transparent and red tape remains a problem. The
2012 strategy on attracting foreign investment aims to remove some of the burden.
The government launched a privatisation programme in 2008 and committed to privatise
some of the small and medium-sized enterprises; assets of the main energy sectors were
not included. All major privatisation projects require presidential approval and are not
transparent. Nevertheless, some of the subsidiaries of the larger state-owned companies
were open to private investment or partnership. Over the period 2011 to 2013, the
government was planning to sell 168 small and medium-sized enterprises. However, by
January 2012 only 38 companies had been sold (Belarus Digest, 2012).
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Belarus was ranked
57th among 189 countries in 2014. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index
means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the start-up and operation of a
local firm. This index averages the country's rankings on ten topics, made up of a variety
of indicators, giving equal weight to each.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International,
which measures the level of perceived corruption in public systems, Belarus ranked
119th among 175 countries in 2014, with a score of 31. This is a relatively high score for
perceived corruption in the country, as a score of 100 represents no corruption.
Belarus signed and ratified the Civil Law Convention on Corruption in 2005, the UN
Anticorruption Convention in 2004, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and the
UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime in 2003. Belarus was ratified as
a member of the UN Convention against Corruption in 2005. It has not signed the
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development Anti-Bribery convention.
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Belarus 3.5. Investment attraction
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
Belarus adopted an Investment Code in 2001, which is the basis for regulating national
and foreign investments. The Investment Code protects the property rights of local and
foreign investors and promotes favourable conditions for their activity. Foreign investors
enjoy additional guarantees within the framework of bilateral agreements of Belarus
with other countries. The basis for promoting economic development of the regions of
Belarus and encouraging foreign investments is a 2008 presidential decree.9
Belarus is a signatory to numerous international investment agreements. The countries
of the Eurasian Economic Commission are in negotiations on agreements of investment
and free movement of capital in the three countries. In 2015, Belarus is expected to
officially become a member of the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, alongside
Kazakhstan and likely Armenia.
Belarus has signed about 60 bilateral agreements related to investment promotion, which
are reciprocal guarantees of favourable investment conditions, investment protection
against nationalisation and expropriation, free transfer abroad of investment income, as
well as the right to challenge the decisions of public authorities in respect of its
investment in national and international courts.
National legislation also provides for the possibility of concluding an investment agreement
with Belarus, which allows the investor additional legal safeguards to protect their
capital and additional benefits in the implementation of the investment project.
Institutional reforms are expected after adoption of the Law on Electricity which is still
pending. If adopted, the law might include provisions for the creation of market conditions
and details of the necessary institutional framework.
Belarus has simplified its property registration procedures and created a one-stop shop
for registration. It introduced a broad administrative simplification programme that set
strict deadlines for registration and computerised records. As a result, the time required
to register property in Belarus was cut from 231 days to just 3 days in 2010.
Belarus has a two-tier national and local tax system. Tax liabilities depend on the form of
ownership, size of the company and location of the enterprise. Tax credits are available
to businesses located in special tax zones, high-tech parks and specified rural areas.
In 2011-12, the tax code was amended to provide for electronic filing of tax returns and
to simplify registration of legal entities and individuals. The government is working on
further improvements to simplify the tax system and set practical conditions to improve
the collection of taxes and fees.
The banking sector comprises over 30 banks. These include representative offices of
foreign banks (i.e. Russia, Lithuania, Latvia and Germany) as well as representative offices
of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank.
Foreign capital is present in the statutory funds of 25 banks, 8 of which are 100% based
on foreign capital.
Belarus is a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID). It is also a member of the New York Convention of 1958 on the
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3.5. Investment attraction Belarus
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. The government may accept
binding international arbitration of investment disputes between foreign investors and
the state. There have been no such cases to date.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The Law on State Planning and Programmes of Social and Economic Development (1998)
defines the mechanisms for investment strategies and planning. Short (one-year),
medium (five-year) and long-term (15-year) plans are drafted at national and regional
levels. They are frequently complemented by specific sectoral plans adopted at the
regional level and consistent with the broader national and regional plans.
The most significant documents governing the energy sector are the Concept of Energy
Security to 2020 (2007) and the Development Strategy of Energy Potential to 2020
(2010). These documents define the medium-term priorities of national energy sector
development through the improvement of energy efficiency, wider use of domestic
energy resources including renewables, diversification of key energy resource supplies,
and improvement of pricing and tariff policy and the regulatory framework. They also
cover the priorities of electricity and gas sector developments. Implementation of the
planned measures in the electricity sector will require USD 4.8 billion, including funding
from international financial institutions.
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125
Belarus References
References
Belarus Digest (2012), “New privatisation plans: Belarusian authorities prefer western investors to
Russian”, press release, 15 February, Ostrogorski Centre.
BelEnergo (2014), company website, www.energo.by (accessed 12 February 2014).
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Resources
2013, Reserves, Resources, Availability, Tables, BGR, Hannover, Germany.
Energy Charter (2013), In-Depth Review of the Energy Efficiency Policy of Belarus, Energy Charter
Secretariat, Brussels.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
126
© OECD/IEA, 2015
GEORGIA
128
Georgia
R U S S I A
ABKHAZETI
B L A C K
S E A
GEORGIA
AJARA Tbilisi
0 100 km T U R K E Y ARMENIA
AZERBAIJAN
4.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
4.1. General energy policy Georgia
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Georgia (Georgian: Sakartvelo) is located in the southern Caucasus region, at the crossroads
of Western Asia and Eastern Europe. It is bounded on the west by the Black Sea, to the
north by Russia, to the south by Turkey and Armenia, and to the southeast by Azerbaijan.
Located on the shortest route between Europe and Asia, Georgia’s transport system is a key
link in the historic “Silk Road.” The capital and largest city is Tbilisi. Georgia covers a territory
of 69 700 square kilometres and its population is almost 5 million. Georgia is a unitary,
semi-presidential republic, with the government elected through a representative democracy.
Georgia’s overall economic policy has been focused on creating a liberalised economic
environment with minimal state interference, deregulation, privatisation, reduced and
simplified licensing and taxation and free trade. Georgia has pursued a westward-leaning
political, economic and foreign policy, and signed the Association Agreement, including the
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), with the European Union in June 2014.
The Association Agreement was ratified by the European Parliament in December 2014.
Georgia achieved robust economic growth between 2003 and 2014, averaging 6%
annually, following structural reforms that stimulated capital inflows and investment.
The reforms helped improve the business environment, strengthened public finances,
upgraded infrastructure facilities and liberalised trade. Growth was also supported by
increased foreign direct investments (FDI) and was driven by capital accumulation and
sound use of excess capacity rather than by net job creation, with productivity gains
concentrated mainly in the non-tradable sectors. Gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita increased from USD 920 in 2003 to USD 3 600 in 2013 (in current prices).
The World Bank’s projection for Georgia’s annual economic growth is 5.5% on average
over the medium term, dependent on greater policy certainty, improved market access,
and on strong structural reform implementation and attaining benefits from the DCFTA
and Association Agreement with the European Union. With improved market access, net
FDI is likely to amount to 6.3% of GDP on average, while the national savings rate should
increase to 20.5% of GDP by 2017 (World Bank, 2015).
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Georgia 4.1. General energy policy
Georgia has a developed, stable and reliable energy sector, which has been largely
unbundled since the mid-90s. Its primary energy source is hydropower, of which only
12% is utilised at present. The government is focused on securing private investments
for the construction of new hydropower stations and diversifying fossil fuel supply
sources and routes, but further efforts are required to improve efficiency in domestic
energy use and utilisation of ample renewable energy potential.
Georgia has been a signatory to the Energy Charter Treaty since 1995, a member of the World
Trade Organization since 2000, an observer to the Energy Community Georgia was in the
process of joining the Energy Community as a full-fledged member at the end of 2014.
SUPPLY
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 was 3.7 million tonnes of oil-equivalent (Mtoe) in
Georgia in 2012. Energy supply has increased by 45.7% compared to 2002, growing every
year since, apart from in 2008 when TPES declined by 10.1% (Figure 4.1.2). Energy per
capita was 1.04 tonnes of oil-equivalent (toe) in 2012, also up by 48.2% since 2002.
Natural gas is the main fuel in Georgia’s energy mix, accounting for 44.5% of TPES in 2012.
The supply of natural gas has increased at a faster rate than overall energy supply, growing
by 142.6% since 2002. Demand from the residential and commercial sectors has driven this
growth. Oil, including oil products, is also a significant fuel in Georgia, and it represents 27.1%
of TPES. The supply of oil has increased by 76% since 2002, mainly driven by growing demand
from the commercial and industrial sectors. The supply of coal has had a resurgence in the
past five years, with its share in the energy mix increasing from 0.5% in 2002 to 2.9% in 2012.
6 Hydro
Solar*
4
Geothermal*
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Georgia has plentiful hydro resources, which power more than three-quarters of its
electricity requirements. Hydropower represents 16.8% of TPES, and the supply of energy
from hydro has increased by 6.7% since 2002. Biofuels and waste are the next largest source
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
130
4.1. General energy policy Georgia
of renewable energy, with a share of 8.3% in TPES. However, energy from biofuels and waste
has declined by 52.5% since 2002. Geothermal exploration has existed since 2000, and in 2012
it accounted for 0.3% of energy supply. Electricity net imports account for 0.2% of TPES.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation in Georgia was 9.7 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012. Electricity supply
has been increasing since the mid-1990s, with 33.6% growth since 2002. However,
generation declined by 4.9% in 2012, for the first time since 2004 (Figure 4.1.3).
6
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Electricity mainly comes from hydro (74.5% of the total in 2012), with the remainder
from natural gas (25.5%). The use of oil in electricity generation ceased in 2012, after
decades of steady decline. Generation from natural gas, however, has grown by 437%
since 2002, with hydro increasing at a moderate pace of 6.7% over the ten years. Natural
gas accounted for 6.3% of generation in 2002, while hydro supplied 93% of electricity,
with the remainder from oil. Exact gas-fired electricity generation capacity is not
available, while hydropower capacity is estimated at 2.7 gigawatts (GW).
Heat generation in Georgia came from geothermal in 2012 and was 36 terajoules (TJ). Since
2010, only geothermal has been used for heat generation and output has dropped considerably.
non-specified countries.
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Georgia 4.1. General energy policy
DEMAND
Demand for energy in Georgia has experienced solid growth over the past decade,
increasing by 56.8%. Total final consumption (TFC)2 was 3.2 Mtoe in 2012, up from
2 Mtoe in 2002. Energy demand is highest from the residential sector, which accounts
for 33.2% of TFC. However, growth from residential was the slowest of all sectors, up by
only 3.2% since 2002. Households represented 50% of TFC in 2002 (Figure 4.1.4).
The overall growth in demand has been driven by a boom in industry and transport
consumption. Industry accounts for 27.5% of TFC and transport for 27.3%. Demand from the
industry sector increased by 172.6% since 2002, increasing its share in TFC from 15.8%.
Transport consumption was 94.4% higher in 2012 compared to 2002, also growing from
22% of TFC.
The commercial sector (including public services, other services, agriculture, fishing and
forestry) represents 12% of TFC, a share that has remained relatively unchanged since
2002. Demand in the commercial sector has increased by 60% over the ten years.
4
3
2
1
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing, forestry and non-specified consumption.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Georgia’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.14 toe/
USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012. This level of intensity was the third lowest of all EECCA
countries, higher than Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. Since 2002, Georgia’s energy intensity
has declined by 22.4%, down from 0.18 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP. Georgia’s real GDP
(USD GDP PPP at 2005 prices) increased by 88% over the ten years to 2012, while TPES
grew by 45.7% over the same period (Figure 4.1.5).
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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4.1. General energy policy Georgia
Figure 4.1.5 Energy intensity in Georgia and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.8 Kyrgyzstan
0.7 Ukraine
0.6 Azerbaijan
Georgia
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5
Tajikistan
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy in Georgia accounts for 25.3% of TPES, made up of hydro (16.8%),
biofuels and waste (8.3%) and geothermal (0.3%). Solar energy production began in
2012, albeit output is low (Figure 4.1.6).
Hydro is a source of around 75% of electricity generation, while biofuels and waste are mainly
used in households for heating and cooking purposes. Geothermal is used in heat generation.
Over the past decade, the share of renewables in the energy mix has contracted from
48.6%, mainly due to a drop in consumption of biofuels (as households switch to natural
gas). While hydropower has increased by 6.7% since 2002, energy from biofuels and waste
has fallen by 52.5%. Energy from geothermal has grown by 10.2% over the same period.
Georgia has the third-highest share of renewables in TPES among EECCA countries, behind
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both of which are endowed with plentiful hydro resources.
Figure 4.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Georgia and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Energy Agency (IEA) for Georgia and other EECCA countries, based on IEA methodology.
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Georgia 4.1. General energy policy
The National Statistics Office of Georgia (GeoStat) is responsible for administering the laws
on national data services, and collects, processes and publishes national statistics data,
including energy data. GeoStat is responsible for the preparation of energy balances, which
it does in close co-operation with the Ministry of Energy. In collecting energy data, GeoStat
and the Ministry of Energy collaborate with the Georgian State Electric system (GSE), the
Georgian Electricity System Commercial Operator (ESCO) and the Georgian Oil and Gas
Corporation (GOGC) for the collection of information on balances on electricity and gas.
Statistics data in Georgia is open and in the public domain. GeoStat publishes monthly,
quarterly and annual data on its website,3 disseminates it widely to large number of public
and private bodies, both nationally and internationally, and employees the latest applications
for smart phones for easier and convenient reference. In 2014, GeoStat published an
aggregated energy balance for 2013 in full compliance with international standards.4
GeoStat co-operates with a large number of international statistics bodies, regularly
submitting statistics data under their international obligations. GeoStat regularly submits
annual energy data to the International Energy Agency (IEA) and other multinational
statistics bodies, including UNSTAT and EUROSTAT. In February 2013, GeoStat, the Ministry
of Energy and the INOGATE Technical Secretariat signed a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) on statistical co-operation. The main purpose of this MOU is to formally adopt the
National Energy Statistics Action Plan for Georgia (ESAP), with the goal of developing
institutional frameworks for energy statistics and to harmonise them with international
standards, and to improve the methodologies applied in data collection and compilation
of energy statistics, energy balances, energy prices and energy efficiency indicators.
MARKET STRUCTURE
3. www.geostat.ge.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
4. www.geostat.ge/index.php?action=wnews&npid=350&lang=eng.
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4.1. General energy policy Georgia
north. Although all three TSOs provide a transmission service, only GSE has a dispatch
licence. GSE’s operations include ESCO and the dispatch centre.
Three distribution system operators (DSOs) operate in Georgia:
Energo-Pro Georgia – owned by Energo-Pro (Czech)
Telasi – owned by Inter-RAO (Russian)
Kakheti Energy Distribution – owned by Akhema Group (Lithuanian).
Small HPPs (under 13 megawatts [MW]) have the right to supply electricity to end users.
In January 2014, the Georgian government approved a new Georgian Electricity Market
Model 2015 (referred to as “GEMM 2015”), aimed at boosting hydropower generation to
allow increased electricity exports to Turkey and eventually other European markets. The
electricity market model and electricity trade mechanism will be implemented progressively
from 2015 to encourage private sector investment in hydropower generation, allowing
the country to boost its exports.
The model is based on EU electricity markets. Key market developments include: cross-
border transmission capacity rights for Georgian exports to Turkey; regional competitive
electricity markets; and electricity transit from Azerbaijan to Turkey and on to south-
eastern Europe. The model includes spot power trading and rules for non-discriminatory
market access. The eventual goal is for Georgian hydropower producers to have access
to European buyers that have varying obligations to purchase electricity from renewable
sources. The government has adopted six-monthly Action Plans for the progressive
implementation of GEMM 2015.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Energy governs the energy sector and is in charge of national energy policy
development and implementation. The Ministry of Energy also manages national energy
companies and the privatisation of energy assets. Other responsibilities include energy efficiency
policy developments and energy research, development and deployment (RD&D) policies.
The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Protection governs sustainable
resource development and environmental protection, and develops national policies and
strategies on environmental and natural resource protection.
The Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission (GNERC or the
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Georgia 4.1. General energy policy
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The Law on Electricity and Natural Gas (1997) is the principal energy legislation in Georgia.
This law incorporates some EU principles, after numerous amendments since 2006. Amendments
include the establishment of the responsibilities of an independent energy regulatory
authority, wholesale electricity market rules, third-party access for electricity and gas networks,
unbundling of generation, transmission, distribution and retail activities, among others.
Secondary legislation comprises different statutory acts such as government resolutions,
ministers’ orders and GNERC’s resolutions. Secondary legislation includes the Electricity
Supply and Consumption Rules and the Electricity (Capacity) Market Rules (2006, amended
in 2010) that outline electricity and natural gas tariff methodology, and retail market and
power supply market conditions.
The latest amendments to the Law on Electricity and Natural Gas are the market rules
for GEMM 2015, providing a legal framework for the electricity sector’s new structure.
The Electricity (Capacity) Market Rules will be replaced with new market rules in order to
implement the new market model, legislating the change in the roles of, and the
commercial and financial relations between, ESCO and GSE (Delphia et al., 2012).
Four working groups and subgroups have been created to work on cross-border trading
rule development, amendments to energy legislation, amendments to the Grid Code and
the development of new Market Rules. Members of these groups are from the Ministry
of Energy, USAID, GSE and ESCO, as well as other Georgian and foreign experts.
The government was in the process of drafting a Law on Renewables at the end of 2014,
albeit no legislative proposals for energy efficiency were being considered.
KEY POLICIES
the country’s energy sector, among other priorities. Energy sector developments focus on
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4.1. General energy policy Georgia
enhancing energy security and increasing self-sufficiency. Key energy sector directions
include market liberalisation, strengthening private sector participation and competition,
developing indigenous energy sources (mainly hydro) and increasing energy efficiency. The
strategy stresses the importance of moving to the new GEMM 2015 and a new Electricity
Trading Mechanism (ETM) both internally and in neighbouring markets. The ETM is a
basic trading platform for making competitively priced sales across international borders.
GEMM and the ETM are designed to advance national electricity sector policies. The key
objective (and a fundamental policy) is to ensure that the potential benefits resulting
from Georgia’s geographic location and natural resources run directly to electricity
consumers and electricity sector investors.
Specific energy policy is under discussion with the government at present. In 2013, the
government launched a process of developing medium- to long-term energy policy with a
strategy to 2030, supported by USAID’s Hydro Power and Energy Planning Project. Under the
project, the government prepared a draft policy and presented it to the government for
consultation in July 2014. Following the consultation process between the ministry and
national energy companies, the government initiated wider public discussions on 25 July 2014.5
The key national energy policy directions provided in this draft, expected to serve as the
basis of an energy strategy for Georgia from 2015 to 2030, include:
diversification of supply sources and optimal exploration of local energy resources
utilisation of Georgia’s renewable energy resources
gradual approximation, and later harmonisation, of Georgia’s legislative and regulatory
framework with the EU’s Energy acquis
improvement of the energy market and the ETM
strengthening of Georgia’s importance as a transit route in the region
creation of a regional platform for the generation and trade of clean energy
development and implementation of an integrated approach to energy efficiency
adherence to the highest environmental protection standards when implementing
energy projects
improved service quality and protection of consumer interests.
Development of Georgia’s Energy Strategy to 2030 will require the government’s strong
commitment in forming an accurate strategic outlook for reaching the maximum yield from
developing countries’ ample renewable energy resources, for maximising energy efficiency
gains potential, for reaching energy security intentions and for utilising its export potential.
Until the adoption of the new energy policy, the energy sector in Georgia will continue
to be guided by the Main Directions of State Policy in the Power Sector, dating back to
2006. Key policy directions have not changed significantly since 2006. The Georgian
government continues to attribute strategic importance to improving self-sufficiency,
reducing import dependency, expanding its electricity export capacity and utilising its
energy transit potential. As such, construction of new large HPPs and new transmission
lines remain its top priority. It is also continuing co-operation with neighbouring countries
to develop regional energy markets, and co-operation in international projects aimed at
transportation of Caspian energy resources to the EU markets.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
5. www.energy.gov.ge/show%20news%20mediacenter.php?lang=eng&id=306.
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Georgia 4.1. General energy policy
The State Programme for Renewable Energy 2008, for the construction of new renewable
energy plants and particularly HPPs, has been in force since 2008. The programme
regulates and supports the construction of new renewables projects with less than
100 MW capacity. The programme allows the government to offer purchase agreements
to investors in renewable energy, with a deregulated price and guaranteed purchases
during the three winter months. Additionally, Georgia launched an investment programme
and carried out intensive road shows to attract potential investors in small and medium
HPP development, both locally and internationally. The government reduced regulations
for small and medium-sized HPPs and built a new high-voltage electricity transmission
line to Turkey to facilitate growth in electricity exports. Some 17 HPPs with 630 MW of
capacity were under construction at the end of 2014.
Several IFIs have also been active in the support of energy efficiency and renewables’
development in Georgia, funding a variety of activities including pilot projects, policy
analysis, rehabilitation works and training.
Georgia has been a signatory to the Kyoto protocol since 1999 and has potential to attract
investment to renewable energy and energy efficiency projects through the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). However, despite of the development of a few CDM projects there is
very little evidence of its active political support. According to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Georgia has 11 CDM projects under consideration,
10 projects under validation and 3 registered or pending registration. The main barriers to
the implementation of CDM projects, identified by the Second National Communication of
the UNFCCC in 2009, were weak market infrastructure, the inaccessibility of data to construct
baseline scenarios, and small CDM potential. Additionally, despite its international commitment
under the Kyoto Protocol, the government has not assessed national emissions and air
pollution and has no plans in place for sustainable development up to 2020 and 2030.
On 8 May 2014, the government adopted the National Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan 2014-20, for the implementation of obligations of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), ratified in April 1994. By joining the CBD, the government committed to
conserving biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of native resources.
The first action plan was adopted in 2002, aimed at more effective and coherent implementation
of the three objectives of the Convention. The original goal was to achieve declared
commitments by 2010. The current action plan will take effective and urgent action to halt
the loss of biodiversity and to ensure that by 2020 ecosystems are resilient and continue to
provide essential life-sustaining services to forestry ecosystems, meadows, wetlands and lakes,
the Black Sea and glaciers, and regulate the flow of water into the country’s river systems.
Georgia is also party to other global biodiversity-related conventions such as the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, the Convention on
Migratory Species (CMS) and the UNESCO World Heritage Convention.
INVESTMENT
Total foreign direct investments in Georgia’s energy sector amounted to USD 923 million
in 2014.6 Investment has increased compared to USD 658 million in 2006; however, it is
lower compared to USD 1.5 billion on average during 2006-08.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
6. http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=140&lang=eng.
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4.1. General energy policy Georgia
In the electricity sector, regional projects of strategic interest include the 500 kV/400 kV
connection line to Turkey and the 400 kV Electricity Transmission Line project between
Georgia and Armenia. The Black Sea Energy Transmission System was completed in 2013
at the cost of approximately EUR 159 million, financed by the European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the
German Reconstruction Credit Bank (KfW).7
The State Programme for Renewable Energy was adopted in 2008, under which investor
incentives for small to medium-sized HPPs included: deregulated prices; the possibility of
export without a license for nine months a year; low taxes; and eased bureaucracy in
licensing/permitting. However, the prices on the internal Georgian market are too low
(especially in spring-summer when there is an oversupply of cheap electricity from the
existing hydro plants) to make sales to the local market profitable. Therefore, most HPPs
under construction are linked to export markets. In order to secure electricity during the
winter months, the government introduced an obligation for all new HPPs with capacity
over 13 MW to sell electricity on the internal domestic market during the three winter
months – either to ESCO or through bilateral contracts.
Gas sector projects of strategic interest for Georgia include Caspian gas transportation
projects, transiting through Georgia, including projects of common interest aimed at
developing integrated EU energy markets and the construction of the underground gas
storage in Samgori. Developments for expansion of the South Caucasus pipeline (SCP)
are underway to allow an additional 16 bcm/y of gas transportation from Shah Deniz 2.8
ASSESSMENT
Georgia has vast renewable energy potential beyond existing capacity. Hydropower and
biomass account for around 25% of TPES at present. Hydropower meets 100% of
Georgian electricity demand in the summer months, while during the winter months the
country is dependent on natural gas imports (due to low water availability). Existing
hydropower capacity is estimated at only 12% of the total potential. Wind potential is
estimated at 1 500 MW and solar potential at 108 MW. However, official government
assessments have not been fully carried out. Solar power is currently used mainly by
households with solar-powered boilers/hot water systems.
In 2008, the government adopted a State Programme for Renewable Energy for
investment attraction in HPPs. The programme included deregulated prices for new
HPPs, the possibility to export electricity without a licence for nine months a year, lower
taxes and other incentives. However, market prices in Georgia were too low (especially
in spring-summer when there is an oversupply of cheap electricity from the existing
hydro plants) to make investment in new HPPs feasible.
7. http://energotrans.com.ge/?p=458&lang=en.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
8. www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/Shahdeniz/SDstage2.html.
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Georgia 4.1. General energy policy
Georgia is also thought to have sizeable oil and gas deposits and has been developing
moderate amounts of oil for over a century.
Over the past few years, Georgia has made strong progress in enhancing the security of
its electricity supply. The rehabilitation of electricity networks and hydropower stations
has improved electricity supply reliability. A new interconnection to Turkey was completed
by end-2013 and discussions are ongoing for increasing electricity exports to Armenia
and Azerbaijan via Turkey. Georgia has a comfortable supply of adequate electricity for
most of the year, and even in the winter thanks to thermal power plants providing up to
a quarter of electricity during the wintertime. In the future, Georgia aims to export its rich
hydropower generation, in particular to Turkey, and to become a major transit corridor
for the electricity supply of the region. Commendably, the World Bank’s assessment for
“ease of doing business” ranked Georgia 15th out of 185 economies in 2014.
However, Georgia has not explored its sustainable energy potential in full, particularly in
the area of energy efficiency in supply as well as in buildings, industry and the transport
sector. While the government is preparing a draft law on renewables, there are no
legislative proposals for energy efficiency. Energy efficiency potential is thought to be
significant, as losses in the natural gas distribution networks are high in comparison to
average European levels while aged infrastructure in buildings and the industry sector
contribute to efficiency losses. Commendably, Georgia’s household and industry consumption
is metered. This provides the country with a good basis for developing demand-side
policies and energy efficiency.
Georgia 2020 is the latest economic policy, developed in 2014, and it includes an overall
energy sector direction to 2020. The country should not miss the opportunity to develop a
specific energy policy in line with the country’s medium- to long-term economic outlook
under Georgia 2020. The draft energy policy, drafted by the USAID-funded Hydro Power and
Energy Planning Project and presented to the government in July 2014, is indeed a step
forward. However, development of a comprehensive Energy Strategy of Georgia from 2015
to 2030 requires high-level government commitment in elaborating the key theses of the
draft strategy further, in consultation with all energy stakeholders. The new energy policy
should include an analysis of a wide variety of scenarios and the use of different energy
resources, with a focus on maximising renewable energy and energy efficiency gains while
providing affordable and secure energy, in line with national and international commitments.
The new energy policy should also allow for the implementation of the new market model,
GEMM 2015, approved in 2014. Under this model, new market rules will bring Georgia
more in line with the EU market and progressively lead to the development of a regional
market model that will harmonise electricity trade. A harmonised market will facilitate
higher electricity exports from Georgia to Turkey, and to European markets via Turkey.
Once the policy is finalised, the government should prepare the necessary legal framework
for its implementation in a timely manner. This includes rules for the new electricity
market, in line with EU market rules, including rules for cross-border trade. Market rules
should also allow for renewable energy integration, as well as provide incentives for
energy efficiency schemes.
GNERC has been the independent energy regulator in Georgia since 1997. However, in
2006, amid energy supply security concerns and poor electricity supply quality, the
government created a market model on the basis of bilateral agreements between the
government and energy companies. Effectively, these bilateral contracts override the
© OECD/IEA, 2015
regulated sector. While the state-driven approach was successful in reducing electricity
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4.1. General energy policy Georgia
prices, modernising electricity grids and enhancing access to electricity supplies, the future
priorities should focus on strengthening the role of the energy regulatory authority. The
energy regulation institutional framework should include tariff setting and reviews, and
provide energy incentives while protecting consumer interests. The legal framework
should ensure that the regulator has the competences necessary to regulate the market
and allow consumers free choice of their gas and electricity suppliers. The regulator’s
expertise, commitment and work at regional co-operation, such as through the successful
co-operation under the EU twinning programme with international and EU regulators,
can ensure stable governance for all market players.
The review team commends the Georgian government on the development of energy
statistics and harmonisation with IEA and international standards. The government should
continue to improve energy data and use the available information in energy policy
analysis and development. Data-based analysis is necessary for medium- and long-term
supply and demand projections, key strategic decision making and demand-side management.
Georgia has no clear policy for energy RD&D beyond hydropower. Assessing cost-
effectiveness and the potential of different renewable energy technologies (other than
hydropower) as well as oil and gas production enhancements (both onshore and offshore
in the Black Sea) could bring clear and tangible benefits to the country’s economic
growth. Energy policy should consider encouraging investments beyond hydropower in
the upstream oil and gas sector, with the intention to develop the country’s indigenous
resources for domestic consumption to ease oil and gas import dependency.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The government of Georgia should:
Develop a long-term comprehensive energy strategy in line with the national Socio-
Economic Development Strategy to 2020. Such a strategy is best developed for the
period up to 2030, with an outlook to 2050, in close consultation with all stakeholders
and society at large. It should be based on a wide variety of scenario analyses,
focused on maximising renewable energy and energy efficiency gains potential, and
be aligned with national and international commitments to secure its sustainability.
Continue development of a long-term stable regulatory framework for the new
electricity market model, including market rules for cross-border electricity trade and
regional market integration, renewable support schemes, and incentives for maximising
energy efficiency gains potential. Continue alignment of these rules to the EU market
model, while considering the multilateral regional context.
In the context of the new market design, strengthen the competences and the
independence of the national regulatory authority and reinforce its role to safeguard
consumer interests, e.g. by creating a consumer board at the regulator and implementing
quality of supply regulation with a focus on natural gas distribution.
Maximise the use of energy data for energy policy setting and tracking progress.
Continue improvements to the collection, compilation and use of energy data and
encourage development of energy efficiency indicators as a tool for demand-side
management and long-term energy policy planning.
Explore the possibility of creating an analytical centre aimed at gathering experienced
national experts for energy market and policy analysis, necessary for developing
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Georgia 4.2. Energy security
Hydro resources are one of Georgia’s most important natural riches with 26 000 rivers.
Around 300 rivers are significant in terms of energy production, with total annual
potential capacity equivalent to 15 000 MW and a production potential of 50 TWh.
Currently, only 12% are utilised for hydropower.
Georgia has an estimated wind potential of 4 TWh (1 500 MW). According to wind
energy potential, the territory of Georgia is divided into high, mean and low speed zones
where the wind speed fluctuates from 2.5 metres per second (m/s) up to 9 m/s. The most
favourable places for wind farms are identified, including the whole territory of Georgia.
Solar energy potential in Georgia is high, with annual solar radiation ranging from 250 up to
280 days, amounting to approximately 1 900-2 200 hours. The total solar energy potential
is evaluated at 108 MW. A large number of solar water boiling systems have been put in
place by households in rural areas, where solar energy warms water up to 40-50°C.
Georgia has estimated stocks of geothermal waters equal to 200-250 million cubic
metres (mcm) annually. Geothermal water temperature ranges from 30°C up to 110°C,
and the total debit is 160 000 cubic metres (m3) per day and night. There are well bores
with water temperatures of 85°C. More than the 80% of geothermal deposits are located
in western Georgia and the Zugdidi–Tsaishi geothermal field. The comparatively low
temperature of the geothermal waters does not allow for generating electricity.
Crude oil economically viable reserves were estimated at 5 million tonnes (Mt) in 2012,
with resources of 50 Mt. Natural gas reserves were estimated at 8 bcm with 102 bcm
resources. Hard coal reserves were 201 Mt in the same year, with 700 Mt of hard coal
resources (BGR, 2013).
Georgia is a net oil and gas importer and relies heavily on imports of natural gas, oil
products, hard coal and biofuels in order to meet most of its energy needs. The share of
net imports has increased from 47% in 2002 to 77% of TPES in 2012, in order to meet
robust energy demand. Starting from 2009, Georgia imports around 88% of its natural
gas and more than 45% of its oil from Azerbaijan, diversifying its import sources from
Russia. Gas imports are highest during winter months, for heating, and when
hydropower capacity for electricity generation falls.
Georgia exports excess electricity from hydropower and is interconnected with Russia,
Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. The volumes of trade are relatively minor at present;
however, over the past decade electricity exports have increased by more than fourfold
while imports have remained relatively consistent. Georgia launched an aggressive
programme for promoting hydropower generation and expects to increase electricity
trade with Turkey in the coming years. It is also in discussions with both Armenia and
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4.2. Energy security Georgia
Due to the substantial increase of domestic energy demand and the seasonal nature of
hydropower generation, the Georgian government is exploring all avenues for diversifying
its supply sources for oil and natural gas, as well as aggressively promoting further
developments in the country’s hydropower capacity. It also closely co-operates with
neighbouring economies on the development of energy transit projects via Georgia in a
bid to secure additional natural gas supply sources.
Electricity generation
HPPs provide around 75% of Georgia’s electricity, with natural gas combustion generating
the remaining 25%. The recently rehabilitated 1 300 MW Enguri large hydro facility is the
backbone of the country’s electricity generation system. A number of medium and small
hydro facilities, totalling approximately 1 540 MW, also provide domestic power, either
on a regular basis or seasonally. The main objective for the long-term policy of the
country has been to satisfy the country’s overall demand for electricity with domestic
hydro resources. Besides tendering a number of new large HPPs, the Ministry of Energy
has sought foreign investments for the development of new small and medium HPPs.
The Georgian government plans to facilitate further development of new renewable
sources. There is significant potential in Georgia to develop micro hydropower plants.
With this in mind, under the Electricity Supply and Consumption Rules, GNERC ensured
free access of micro power plants to the network. It has also established fixed tariffs for
the purchase of electricity produced by micro power plants.9
Total identified potential for hydro energy development amounts to 2 400 MW. Small
and medium hydro potential is 985 MW, while large projects account for the remainder. In
addition, the Ministry of Energy has already signed memorandums with private investors
for construction and ownership of 2 213 MW, and for RD&D of approximately 350 MW.
The USAID-funded programme Hydro Investment Promotion Project (HIPP) has studied the
Tskhenistskali and Enguri river basins for potential hydro projects. HIPP has identified
19 projects with a total capacity of 489 MW. By November 2014, 17 HPPs (630 MW
capacity) were under construction, 13 projects were in advanced planning stages and an
additional 1 310 MW were at the research stage (Caucasian Business Week, 2014).
9. Electricity Supply and Consumption Rules, GNEWRG Resolution #20, Article 25. 18/09/2008.
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Georgia
ABKHAZETI
Power lines
Existing 500 kV
Planned 500 kV
Figure 4.2.1 Georgian electricity and gas network
Existing 400 kV
Planned 400 kV
Existing 330 kV
B L A C K
Existing 220 kV
S E A
Planned 220 kV
G E O R G I A Selected 110 kV
Tbilisi Power substations
AJARA
Existing 500 kV
Planned 500 kV
Existing 220 kV
Planned 220 kV
Power plants
Existing thermal
Planned thermal
Existing hydro
T U R K E Y AZERBAIJAN >100 MW
Planned hydro
>100 MW
ARMENIA
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
4.2. Energy security Georgia
In 2008, GSE (TSO) developed a rehabilitation plan that sets out the strategic targets for
the company for the next 15 years (up to 2023). An intensive maintenance programme
was launched in 2010 by GSE, under which 14 substations and 3 service centres were
refurbished. The supporting fleet of vehicles was also renewed. Specialists have undergone
training that included study tours.
Telasi is the electricity distribution and supply company that serves the Tbilisi region in
Georgia. Telasi is seeking a loan of up to EUR 25 million from IFIs to finance its investment
needs. The main purpose of these investments is to improve the quality and reliability of
supply and reduce losses in the distribution network.
To secure a sustainable energy supply and reliable energy production in the country, the
renovation of the large HPP Enguri is one of the main priorities. Rehabilitation works on
Unit 1 and Unit 5 have been completed.
The USAID-funded Georgian Power and Gas Infrastructure Project (PGI) is also underway.
The project includes the rehabilitation of Senaki 1-2 transmission lines and relevant
substations. The project will increase the security of Georgia’s power supply and increase
clean energy exports through more a reliable transmission network in Georgia.
The ADB-funded Regional Power Transmission Enhancement Project is working on the
construction of the new 220/110 kV substation Khorga, with 220 kV and 110 kV line bays
and associated equipment.
Georgia is interconnected with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. Cross-border
infrastructure includes:
with Russia: 500 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV lines; 980 MW capacity
with Azerbaijan: 330 kV and 500 kV lines; 1 100 MW capacity
with Armenia: 220 kV lines; 180 MW capacity
with Turkey: 400 kV and 220 kV lines; 820 MW capacity
In December 2013, the Black Sea Transmission Network (BSTN) Project, connecting
Georgia and Turkey via the Black Sea, was commissioned. The project includes 700 MW
back-to-back plant capacity, the 500 kV transmission line Vardzia and Zekari, the 400 kV
interconnection line Meskheti and the 500/400/220 kV substation Akhaltsikhe.
Another project of strategic interest is a 400 kV connection with Armenia that is expected
to begin construction in 2015. Other prospective projects include:
by 2017 to Turkey: 200 kV line and 220/110 kV substation (Batumi-Muratli) with
350 MW capacity
by 2017 to Turkey: 400 kV line (Akhlatsikhe-Tortum) with 350 MW capacity
by 2017 to Armenia: 500/400 kV line (Marneuli - Alaverdi – Hrazdan) with 1 050 MW
capacity
by 2018-19 to Russia: 500 kV line (Ksani-Mosdok) with 850 MW capacity.
In rural areas, the DSOs Energo-Pro and Kakheti Distribution Company are carrying out
re-metering projects, installing individual meters in household and industry in line with
EU standards. The industry sector has been metered, while 90% of household meters
were installed by end-2014. The remainder is to be installed by 2015.
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Georgia 4.2. Energy security
There are two operational thermal energy generators in Georgia, Mtkvari Energy and
G-Power. Total capacity is approximately 410 MW, with 300 MW of Mtkvari Energy and
110 MW of G–Power. G-Power units were built in 2006 with the latest technologies and
an expected lifetime of 25 years. A new combined cycle thermal power plant, Gardabani,
is currently under construction and will have 230 MW when built by the end of 2015.
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
System reliability in both natural gas and electricity systems is improving. According to
the Ministry of Energy there have been no major outages over the past few years, thanks
to the rehabilitation and refurbishment of gas and electricity networks.
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10. www.gogc.ge/en/page/ugs-project.
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4.2. Energy security Georgia
Outages and losses are reported to the GNERC as part of the licence obligations.
Electricity transmission network losses are around 2% and outages are rare. The collection
rate is nearly 100% and there are no commercial losses. The level of technical losses in the
gas sector is about 0.5% in the transmission network. Detection of losses is performed
using Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and during regular field visits.
Equipment for loss detection includes some advanced leak detection technologies and
leakage metering equipment.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Emergency response is defined and regulated under the Law on the State of Emergency
(2005). However, there is no declared strategy on emergency stock holdings or fuel
switching mechanisms for energy supply disruptions.
The government is considering holding minimal strategic gas reserves and has called for
tenders for underground gas storage development in Samgori in 2014. The government
estimates the minimal strategic reserve for gas at approximately 120 mcm. The imbalance
between seasonal supply and consumption of gas was 150 mcm in 2014 and is projected
to increase to a 170 mcm winter deficit and a 300 mcm summer surplus by 2020. The
solution is to develop underground gas storage to overcome the recurring winter deficit,
estimated at approximately 200 mcm by 2030.
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Georgia 4.3. Market convergence
Holdings B.V. (Inter-RAO), 24.5% is state-owned and 0.4% belongs to other shareholders.
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4.3. Market convergence Georgia
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
GNERC is the independent energy regulatory authority in Georgia, established in 1997.
GNERC is a legal entity with the capacity to regulate the energy sector independent from
the Ministry of Energy and is funded through fees paid by licensees and other energy
sector players.
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Georgia 4.3. Market convergence
GNERC grants, amends and revokes licences for electricity generation, transmission,
dispatch and distribution, as well as for natural gas transportation and distribution services.
It regulates consumer tariffs for electricity generation, transmission, dispatch, distribution,
transition, import and retail. It has authority to resolve disputes among licensees, importers,
exporters, and suppliers and consumers, and monitors sanctions within the electricity
and natural gas sectors according to the licence terms. It also approves procedures for
billing, reporting and fee-paying services in the electricity and gas sectors. It is in power
to give priority to and motivate local hydro, renewable, alternative and natural gas
resources to ensure sustainable electricity generation, transmission, dispatch, distribution,
import, export and supply, as well as natural gas import, transportation, distribution and,
in certain cases, delivery and supply.
GNERC issues normative administrative legal acts – Resolutions. It approves operational
rules and procedures, procedures for dispute resolution, regulatory fee amounts and its
calculation methodology, licensing rules, supply and consumption rules, tariff methodology,
tariffs and normative losses.
The exception to GNERC’s regulation are small to medium-sized HPPs developed since
2008. These power plants have bilateral contracts with the government at deregulated
prices, as per the State Programme on Renewable Energy 2008.
The Strengthening Capacities of the GNERC in Updating Incentive Based Electricity Tariff
Methodology was launched in October 2012. The project includes the aligning of EU
principles to the methods of receiving and analysing technical/financial information
provided by companies in Georgia.
Tariffs
In the electricity sector, tariffs for generation, dispatch, transmission, distribution and
consumption are defined by regulatory resolutions (developed jointly by the GNERC and
private stakeholders) on the basis of a published tariff methodology.
Generation tariffs differ depending on the size and ownership of the power plants as follows:
Tariffs for all newly constructed power plants (after August 2008) and for HPPs under
13 MW are deregulated. In general, an investor is free to choose the market and the price
at which to sell the power generated at the new plant. Electricity export is also deregulated.
The investor needs to find a buyer and conclude a direct power purchase agreement.
Generation tariffs for Enguri/Vardnili HPP, which is the largest HPP in Georgia, are
regulated by GNERC, currently at USD 0.0007/kWh.
Tariff caps are set for the rest of the power plants, including gas-fired.
Electricity TSO and DSO tariffs are regulated by the GNERC. The companies are entitled
to submit a tariff application. GNERC introduced a new methodology for the calculation
of distribution tariffs under the European Union-funded Twinning in 2013. The new
methodology was used to calculate tariffs for Energo-Pro Georgia from 1 September 2014
and for Kakheti Energy Distribution from 1 January 2015. A memorandum with Telasi
expires in 2025; however, the new tariffs may be determined earlier, depending on
legislative changes. The new tariffs will likely increase the overall price of electricity, as
they include provisions for necessary investment projects (Commersant.ge, 2014).
Gas tariffs and tariff methodologies are approved by GNERC. Tariffs for supply to the
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wholesale market and for consumers connected to the network after 2007 are deregulated.
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4.3. Market convergence Georgia
Retail tariffs are also regulated and set by GNERC. According to the Energy Regulators
Regional Association (ERRA),11 average prices, including taxes, for electricity and gas paid
by households in the first half of 2014 were:
electricity: USD 0.083/kilowatt hour (kWh)
gas: USD 7.9/gigajoule (GJ).
Prices paid by industrial customers, according to ERRA, were:
electricity: USD 0.091/kWh
gas: USD 13.1/GJ.
The tariff methodology for end-user prices is based on the principle of full cost recovery
for production and supply. Depending on the customer category, the tariff methodology
provides for seasonal, peak load, block and long-term pre-set tariffs as well as tariff caps.
Electricity service costs are recovered from each category of customer in proportion to
the costs of serving that category.
In the gas sector, the methodology is based on the principle of recovery of justified costs
for natural gas supply, transportation and distribution, taking into account the interests
of financial stability and improvement of the investment environment. Allowable costs
of supply, transportation and distribution services include expenses related to gross
revenue, taxes and returns.
In the electricity sector, individual meters in line with EU standards have been rolled out
to 90% of households and all industrial customers. The remaining 10% to households will
be rolled out by end-2015. In the gas sector, all consumers are metered, and GOGC has
installed and implemented an advanced metering and monitoring system for the gas network.
Electricity collection rates are more than 95%, while gas collection rate are more than 90%.
Feed-in tariff
Small HPPs (below 13 MW) are allowed to sell output to ESCO or directly to consumers.
ESCO offers small HPPs a feed-in tariff during the winter months (September-April);
however, no feed-in tariff is offered during the summer months. As such, HPPs often
have difficulties selling electricity to the market due to a capacity surplus and limited
export options, and close their plants (spill water) during this period.
Technical rules
On 1 April 2009, GNERC approved the Instruction for the Monitoring of Commercial
Quality Indicators of the Service by Electricity Distribution Licensee, with the aim of
establishing commercial quality standards of electricity distribution. On 5 July 2012, the
Commercial Quality Rules to Electricity Distribution Licensee Service were adopted, which
divided services into eight categories and provided standard and binding implementation
characters. In the case of non-compliance of standards by a distribution licensee,
customers are allowed to receive compensation to elevate efforts protecting consumer
rights. In the preparation of these regulations, GNERC took into consideration the best
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11. www.erranet.org.
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Georgia 4.3. Market convergence
examples in international practice. Also in 2012, GNERC co-operated with USAID within
the Hydropower Investment Promotion Project to harmonise regulatory frameworks with
the principles of the Third Package.12
GOST standards are still dominant in the electricity and gas sectors and Georgia is
progressively harmonising them to EU standards through the Technical Committee on
Standards, created in January 2013.
ELECTRICITY
Georgia is interconnected with the electricity systems of Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and
Turkey. ESCO has the authority to trade electricity with neighbouring countries in order
to balance the needs of the Georgian market. Regional agreements are made in the form of
bilateral agreements and involve the signing of MoUs. The TSO ensures operations with
the individual neighbouring countries and signs relevant agreements on technical issues.
As part of the development of GEMM 2015, the Ministry of Energy is committed to
designing and implementing a cross-border ETM. The ETM is a basic platform that will
assist in providing cross-border transmission capacity rights. The ETM will also enable
neighbouring counties such as Azerbaijan to transit power through Georgia and into
Turkey and further to European markets. GEMM 2015 and the development of the ETM
will be carried out in phases, starting in 2015.
On 20 January 2012, an agreement on cross-border electricity trade via the Akhaltsikhe-
Borcka interconnection line was signed between Georgia and Turkey. The agreement sets
out trade rules in a competitive market as well as identifies the terms needed to govern
the operation of interconnection facilities for electricity imports and exports on the line.
In 2009, the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Power Bridge (AGT) project was established by
an MoU among the TSOs of the three countries (AzerEnergy [Azerbaijan], and GSE and
TEIAS [Turkey]). The line from Azerbaijan to Georgia was completed in December 2013,
while the energy bridge is expected to become operational by 2015. According to project
specifications, 1 200 MW of capacity per year are expected to be exported to Turkey
(Azernews, 2014).
NATURAL GAS
Georgia is connected by pipeline to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkey. Georgia
imports natural gas from Azerbaijan and Russia and transits gas to Turkey and Armenia.
Cross-border agreements are bilateral, with suppliers in neighbouring countries. Georgia
is also focused on developments in the transit of gas from the Caspian Sea to European
markets, in order to diversify its imports and collect transit revenue.
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4.4. Sustainable development Georgia
The government developed the State Programme for Renewable Energy 2008, intended
to boost investments in renewable energy and maximise the benefits of its vast
renewable energy potential. As part of the programme, the government established the
Georgian Energy Development Fund (GEDF) to facilitate investment in renewables. The
core activities of the GEDF are the identification of potential HPP development sites, the
development of jointly funded projects with private investors, and project investment
promotion and support for investors. The fund was working on several projects at the
end of 2014, including the Tsablari HPP (15 MW) and the Akhasopeli HPP (2.5 MW).
The government has also carried out an aggressive campaign aimed at attracting
investment in hydropower developments. The campaign includes incentives such as tax
breaks, looser administration requirements, and compulsory sales to the grid and deregulated
prices for plants under 13 MW or built since 2008. The government enters into bilateral
contracts with the new producers, namely ten-year power purchase agreements, at
case-by-case tariffs.
Georgian legislation does not provide for feed-in tariffs for all types of renewables. Feed-
in tariffs are available only for small-scale power plants with capacity under 0.1 MW.
Renewable energy potential is described above in “Resource Endowment”, under
section 4.2, Energy Security.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
and Environment Partnership (E5P) for Eastern Partnership countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
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Georgia 4.4. Sustainable development
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine), which aims at pooling funding for supporting
energy efficiency projects. The E5P includes IFI loans and grants. Georgia joined the E5P
in October 2013. The international donor community is expected to provide more than
EUR 60 million to enable projects under the E5P Fund.
Recent implemented energy efficiency projects include:
Energy Saving Initiative in the Building Sector in Eastern Europe and the Central
Asian Countries during 2010-13
Capacity Building Model for Ukraine and Georgia: Model Solution for Eastern
Partnership and Central Asian Countries during 2012-14
Energy Performance Assessment and Review of Energy Efficiency Management
Systems at Joint Stock Company (JSC) SANTE GMT Milk Products during 2012
Energy Sector Analysis (Oil and Gas Pipelines) during 2012
The New Applied Technology Efficiency and Lighting Initiative (NATELI II), implemented
by Winrock International Georgia and supported by USAID during 2011-13.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
CLIMATE CHANGE
Georgia has been a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol since 1999 and has the potential to
attract investment to renewable energy and energy efficiency projects through clean
development mechanisms (CDMs). Since 2003, the Ministry of Environmental Protection
and Natural Resources of Georgia has been the Designated National Authority (DNA) for
Kyoto Protocol purposes. According to the UNFCCC, Georgia has 11 CDM projects under
consideration, 10 projects under validation and 3 registered or pending registration. To
date, Georgia has had 53 138 CERs (Certified Emission Reduction credits) issued.
the Low Emission Development field, aimed at developing strategies of economic priorities
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4.4. Sustainable development Georgia
155
Georgia 4.5. Investment attraction
Georgia’s privatisation entered a new stage in 1999. Privatisation is governed by the Law
on Privatisation of State Property (1997). Amendments to this law in 1999 introduced
auctions for public assets without a floor price, which greatly simplified the privatisation
process. At the same time, the government developed a new privatisation strategy which
focused on large-scale enterprises and included nearly all infrastructure companies. The
Ministry of Economic Development is the privatisation authority responsible for privatisation
and management of state property.
Georgia has undertaken a number of profound institutional reforms aimed at modernising
the economy and improving the business climate. After the Law on Issuance of Licences
and Permits (2005), the number of activities subject to licensing was reduced from 909
to 159. A one-stop shop was created for licence applications so that businesses can
submit all documents in one place. Georgia also undertook a far-reaching reform of the
labour market to curb black-market jobs and high unemployment. The new Labour Code
was adopted in 2006. This law eases restrictions on the duration of term contracts and
the number of overtime hours, and discards the premium required for overtime work.
To enhance Georgia’s investment and business climate, the government has dramatically
overhauled its tax system since 2004. By implementing a liberal reform agenda, Georgia
has simplified its processes and has reduced the number of taxes from 21 in 2004 to 6 in
2014. The government adopted a new Tax Code in 2010 simplifying the taxation system.
Internationally accepted methods and practices are in place, and Double Tax Agreements
are fully in line with OECD standards.
For investors interested in relocating their industrial operations to Georgia, there are
three tax-free zones available (Free Industrial Zone, Free Warehouse Enterprise and
International Finance Company).
The banking sector remains relatively stable, though it went through a challenging phase
during the 2008 armed conflict and the global financial crisis. The sector is open to
foreign banks and several are operating in Georgia.
According to the law on promotion and guarantees of investment-related activities, any
dispute arising out of, or in connection with, investment activity between the Georgian
government and a foreign investor shall be resolved by the courts of Georgia, unless
otherwise agreed between the parties. However, the most commonly favoured tribunal
is the International Centre of Settlement of Investment Disputes, the decisions of which
are final and legally binding on the parties, and are easily enforceable through the 1958
New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
which Georgia joined on 2 June 1994.
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Georgia was ranked
15th among 189 countries in 2014, higher than other EECCA countries. A high ranking on
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the ease of doing business index means the regulatory environment is more conducive
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4.5. Investment attraction Georgia
to the starting and operation of a local firm. This index averages the country's rankings
on ten topics, made up of a variety of indicators, giving equal weight to each topic.
Georgia has the highest ranking among EECCA countries.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International,
which measures the level of perceived corruption in the public system, Georgia ranked
52nd among 175 countries in 2014, with a score of 50. This is the highest score among
EECCA countries (a score of 100 represents no corruption). Georgia has seen a drastic fall
in perceived corruption of tax officials over the past decade. The country acceded to the
UN Convention against Corruption on 4 November 2008, but is not yet a signatory. It has
not signed the OECD Anti-Bribery convention.
As a member to the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, the arbitration procedures for energy-
related investments, trade and transit apply.
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The cornerstone of the legislative framework is the Law on Investment Promotion and
Guarantees (1996). Promoting investment is considered to be a primary goal of the state
economic policy. Georgian legislation provides for the protection of investors and their
assets through domestic regulations, as well as through a number of bilateral investment
agreements and international treaties.
Georgia has one of the most liberal labour codes in the world. According to the Heritage
Foundation, Georgia’s ranking on the Labour Freedom Index was 99.9.
The legal framework has been strengthened with a new Law on Public Procurement
(2006) and the Law on Conflict of Interest and Corruption (2007). Accountability
mechanisms, such as the Chamber of Control and the Ombudsman, also help promote
transparency and integrity in public service.
Total foreign direct investments in Georgia’s energy sector amounted to USD 923 million
in 2014.13 Investment has increased compared to USD 658 million in 2006; however, it is
lower compared to USD 1.5 billion on average during 2006-08.
In the electricity sector, regional projects of strategic interest are those that are already
being implemented or considered, such as the 500 kV/400 kV connection line to Turkey
and the 400 kV Electricity Transmission Line project between Georgia and Armenia. The
Black Sea Energy Transmission System was completed in 2013 at the cost of EUR 159 million
with loans from the EBRD, the EIB and the KFW.14
To attract investment to the renewable energy sector, the government has carried out
an aggressive investment campaign both locally and internationally. The campaign was
developed to increase awareness of the sector through road shows. The following
incentives were offered to potential investors under the campaign:
deregulated tariffs without caps
the possibility to sell carbon credits
HPPs of up to 13 MW have the exceptional right to sell electricity to any retail customers
13. http://geostat.ge/index.php?action=page&p_id=140&lang=eng.
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14. http://energotrans.com.ge/?p=458&lang=en.
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Georgia 4.5. Investment attraction
INVESTMENT PLANNING
Provisions of the charter of the Georgian National Investment Agency (GNIA) involve
principles of the strategy for attracting foreign direct investments to Georgia. The
strategy itself is to be developed in co-ordination with other governmental bodies.
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158
References Georgia
References
AGRI (Azerbaijan–Georgia–Romania Interconnector) (2014), website, www.agrilng.com (accessed
14 December 2014).
Azernews (2014), “Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Energy Bridge to strengthen energy security:
Minister”, press release, 4 June, www.azernews.az/business/67704.html.
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Resources
2013, Reserves, Resources, Availability, Tables, BGR, Hannover, Germany.
Caucasian Business Week (2014), “Georgia to develop energy market new model by the end of the
year”, Caucasian Business Week, 25 November, http://cbw.ge.
Commersant.ge (2014), “Premier Garibashvili pledges no electricity price hikes”, Commersant.ge,
16 July, http://commersant.ge.
Delphia, J. et al. (2012), Georgian Electricity Market Model 2015 and Electricity Trading
Mechanisms (Draft), USAID Hydropower Investment Promotion Project, April, UNAID.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Ministry of Energy (2014), “In 2015 polyethylene bags will be replaced with biodegradable bags”,
press release, 27 December, Government of Georgia, http://moe.gov.ge.
Saqnakhshiri (2012), Corporate Overview: 2012 Year, Saqnakhshiri (GIG Group) Ltd, Tbilisi.
World Bank (2015), Georgia Overview, World Bank website, www.worldbank.org/en/country/
georgia/overview (accessed 15 January 2015).
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KAZAKHSTAN
162
Kazakhstan
0 500 km
R U S S I A
R U S S I A
Figure 5.1.1 Map of Kazakhstan
NORTH KAZAKHSTAN
QOSTANAY PAVLODAR
Astana
AQMOLA
WEST KAZAK HSTAN
- EAST KAZAKHSTAN
ATYRAU
AQ T Ö B E
K A Z A K H S TQ AAR A G
NH A N DY
-
MANGGHYSTAU ARAL
SEA A L M AT Y
QYZYLORDA ZHAMBYL
CASPIAN
SEA SOUTH
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN CHINA
AZERBAIJAN KYRGYZSTAN (People’s Republic of)
TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
5.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
The Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) lies in the north of Central Asia and is bordered
by the Russian Federation (Russia) to the north, China to the east, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan to the south, and the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan to the west. Kazakhstan’s
land area is 2 717 300 km2 with almost 1 894 km of coastline on the Caspian Sea. The
capital is Astana and the country is home to 17.2 million people.1
Kazakhstan is among the world’s top ten fastest-growing economies, according to the
International Monetary Fund. The country has experienced strong growth over the past
two decades, mainly through resource development and export-orientated policies. Real
gross domestic product (GDP), measured in US dollars (USD) with purchasing power
parity (PPP) has increased at an average annual rate of 10% per year from 2002 to reach
USD 321.9 billion in 2012. GDP growth was 5% in 2012 and 6% in 2013, based on strong
domestic demand and increased private investment, while the government contribution
was negligible. Exports decreased in 2013 due to a weaker export demand for oil, metals
and wheat, while imports were up (World Bank, 2014a).
With the global economic downturn from 2008, Kazakhstan’s GDP growth slowed and a
sharp fall in oil and commodity prices pushed the country into recession. Since then,
rising commodity prices and the expansion of the oil industry have boosted the
economy, though the country remains vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations. Most
non-resource sectors of the economy, however, continue to suffer from low productivity
and competitiveness (World Bank, 2014b).
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1. www.stat.gov.kz.
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Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
Kazakhstan is endowed with significant oil, gas and coal resources and is a major energy
producer in Central Asia. It produced 83.1 million tonnes (Mt) of crude oil in 2013. About
half of the production is from two giant fields: Tengiz and Karachaganak. The Kashagan
field is set to play a major role in Kazakhstan's oil production in the coming years.
Natural gas production is lagging due to lack of domestic gas networks linking the
western producing region with the eastern consuming region, as well as the lack of
export pipeline infrastructure. However, over the last decade, increasing natural gas
production has both boosted oil recovery, as a significant volume of natural gas is re-
injected into oil reservoirs, and decreased Kazakhstan's reliance on gas imports.
Kazakhstan is a Caspian Sea littoral state, but the legal status of the Caspian area
remains unresolved. Its lack of access to a seaport makes the country dependent mainly
on pipelines to transport its hydrocarbons to world markets. It is also a transit country
for pipeline exports from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
The vast majority of power generation is from coal-fired power plants, concentrated in
the north near the coal producing regions. Renewables have started to make a small
contribution to the electricity generation mix.
Announced in December 2012, the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy calls for widespread
economic, social and political reforms to position the country among the top 30 global
economies by 2050. Its three key goals are: to define new markets and sources of
economic growth; to create a favourable investment climate; and to develop effective
private sector and public-private partnerships. The Ministry of National Economy was
launched in early 2013 to promote social and economic development.
The government has made steps towards developing a targeted energy policy in the past
couple of years. The Concept for Transition of Kazakhstan to Green Economy (Green
Economy Concept) was approved in May 2013.2 Under the concept, the government plans
to maximise hydrocarbon resource management while observing ecological standards. The
overall goal is to increase the use of renewable and alternative energy and to reduce the
energy intensity of the economy. In December 2014 the government approved the Concept
of Gas Sector Development to 2030.3 This concept defines the progressive reform and
integrated development of the gas sector in Kazakhstan for the period up to the year 2030.
Kazakhstan’s environmental concerns are mounting, largely related to past nuclear,
military, industrial and other activities as well as water scarcity (World Bank, 2014b).
Some of these problems are common across Central Asia. Kazakhstan pioneered a
multilateral, cross-sectoral and voluntary Green Bridge Partnership Programme in 2010.4
The programme was set up to foster technology transfers, knowledge sharing and
investment support in green initiatives across Central Asia and beyond. In Central Asia,
the programme is concentrated on issues related to energy and water linkages. The
Kazakh government approved a comprehensive Water Management Programme in
December 2013, with measures and implementation mechanisms for a sustainable
water consumption strategy.
164
5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has strong bilateral ties with the European Union. In 2006, the European
Union and Kazakhstan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Co-operation
in the Field of Energy. In January 2015, the European Union and Kazakhstan initialled an
Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that will strengthen political and
economic ties between the two. Once signed and implemented, the Agreement will lead
to an increase in trade and investment flows (EEAS, 2015). Regional energy co-operation
between Kazakhstan and the European Union also takes place in the framework of the
Baku Initiative, which provides for political dialogue between the European Union and
the littoral states of the Black and Caspian seas and their neighbouring countries.
Kazakhstan signed a Customs Union Agreement with Russia and Belarus in January 2010.
The agreement evolved into the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan common economic space
(CES) in 2012, run by the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) that Kazakhstan is also
party to. The CES removes barriers to free movement of goods, services, capital and
labour among its members. Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EEU), operational since January 2015, along with Russia, Belarus and Armenia. Kyrgyzstan
is expected to join the EEU in May 2015. Kazakhstan is also pursuing accession to the
World Trade Organization. Negotiations on trade agreements and conditions with the
European Union are ongoing (World Bank, 2014b).
SUPPLY
Kazakhstan is rich in fossil fuel resources and is one of the largest energy producers in
Central Asia. The country is ranked 8th highest with regard to crude oil resources and
12th highest with regard to crude oil reserves (BGR, 2013). Natural gas reserves are
18th highest in the world.
Total energy production in 2012 was 164.4 million tonnes of oil-equivalent (Mtoe), an
increase of 80.4% since 2002, and it has been on the rise over the last 15 years
(Figure 5.1.2).
80 Wind*
60
40
20
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014a), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA.
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165
Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
Oil is Kazakhstan’s most significant fuel, accounting for almost half of energy produced,
at 82.6 Mtoe in 2012. In 2013, crude oil production was 83.1 Mtoe. Crude oil production
increased about 74% since 2002 as investment in infrastructure enabled more drilling
and transport was improved.
Similarly, natural gas production has tripled from about 10.7 billion cubic metres (bcm)
in 2002 to 33 bcm in 2013. The share of total production was 17.3% in 2012. While coal
production has increased 62% over the decade to 2012, its share of total energy
production at about 32% has contracted slightly. Renewable energy sources ─ hydro and
biofuels ─ contribute less than 1% of energy production.
Total primary energy supply (TPES)5 was 74.9 Mtoe in 2012, about half the energy
produced, while the rest was exported. Fuel shares in TPES are: coal 50.6%; natural gas
31.1%; oil about 17.2%; and less than 1% renewables. TPES rose by 88.4% over the
decade to 2012, growing at a slightly faster rate than energy production (Figure 5.1.3).
40
Hydro*
30
Wind*
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014a), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation was 91.2 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, 5.3% higher than the previous
year and up more than 56% since 2002 (Figure 5.1.4). Electricity supply has been on an
upward trend since 2000, contracting by 2% only in 2009 during the economic recession.
Coal is the main fuel for power generation, as it is readily available and economical. Coal
use accounted for about 69% of power generation in 2002 and 76% in 2012. Other
sources in the power generation mix in 2012 were 14.7% from natural gas, 8.4% from
hydro and 0.8% from oil. Natural gas has significantly increased its share in electricity
generation from about 11% in 2002, hydropower production is variable and wind power
entered the mix in 2012 with 3 gigawatt hours (GWh) output.
Heat generation was 418 petajoules (PJ) in 2012, an increase of almost 26% since 2002.
Coal accounts for more than 98% of heat production and oil for 1%. This is a change from
the mid-1990s when heat production was about equally split between coal and oil.
5. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
40
30
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014a), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
DEMAND
Demand for energy has more than doubled over the past decade. Total final
consumption (TFC)7 was 41.7 Mtoe in 2012. TFC had contracted by 2.7% compared to
the year prior; however, it was 105.3% higher compared to 2002 (Figure 5.1.5).
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
Industry is the largest consuming sector, representing 55.3% of TFC in 2012, up about 110%
since 2002. Next is the residential sector, accounting for 16.7% of TFC in 2012, up from 11.7%
in 2002 and showing the strongest sector growth over the decade. The commercial/public
service sectors and transport accounted for 13.9% and 12.6%% of TFC in 2012, respectively, with
strong growth since 2002 levels but at a slower rate than the industry and residential sectors.
Coal and oil products are the most widely used fuels and together account for 62.4% of
TFC. Coal, 39.1% of TFC, is mainly consumed in industry. Oil is used in all sectors. Natural
gas and biofuels contribute to TFC, but the majority of natural gas is used in the power
generation and transformation sectors.
30
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture, fishing and forestry.
Source: IEA (2014a), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Kazakhstan’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.23 tonnes
of oil equivalent (toe) per USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012 (Figure 5.1.6). This is a medium level
of intensity compared with other EECCA countries. Since 2002, energy intensity in Kazakhstan
has improved by 6.1%, which is the lowest rate of decline among the partner countries.
While Kazakhstan had an increase of 100% in real GDP (USD PPP at 2005 prices) in the ten
years, the increase in TPES was more than 80%, more than in other countries in the region.
Figure 5.1.6 Energy intensity in Kazakhstan and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.9 Turkmenistan
0.8 Belarus
0.7 Ukraine
0.6 Azerbaijan
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5 Kazakhstan
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy, mostly hydro and biofuels, contributes about 1% of total energy supply
in Kazakhstan, down from a 2% share in 2002 since fossil fuel production boomed over the
decade. Hydropower accounted for 8.4% of electricity generation in 2012 and 0.8% of
TPES. Biofuels, at 0.1% of TPES, are mainly consumed in the residential and commercial
sectors. Wind power is just entering the energy mix. Kazakhstan has the second-lowest
share of renewables among EECCA countries, behind Turkmenistan (Figure 5.1.7).
Figure 5.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Kazakhstan and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014a), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY STATISTICS
The figures in this report are official energy statistics and balances of the International
Energy Agency (IEA) for Kazakhstan and other EECCA countries, based on IEA methodology.
The Committee on Statistics at the Ministry of National Economy was founded in 1998. In
2010, the Law on State Statistics expanded on the committee’s responsibilities. The committee
develops the methodology on statistics and collects, analyses and publishes the data.8
The Committee on Statistics works according to Strategic Plans developed by the
government, with the current plan active for 2014-18.9 The Strategic Plan includes
measures to improve data quality with three main objectives:
to provide qualitative indicators for all sectors of the economy
to develop and launch an e-Statistics integrated information system
to improve statistics dissemination and quality.
The Committee on Statistics is also implementing a number of other projects around the
improvement of country statistics. The KAZSTAT 2012-16 project with the World Bank
has been operational since 2012 and its focus is the overall enhancement of national
statistics. The Joint Work Plan with international partners such as the Federal Statistical
Office of Germany (Destatis) has been operational since 2013. The Joint Work Plan
8. www.eng.stat.kz.
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Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
MARKET STRUCTURE
Electricity
Kazakhstan is the most advanced country in Central Asia in terms of power sector reforms.
Privatisation began in 1996 and all large power plants have been either privatised or
transferred to investors under concessionary agreements. Kazakhstan’s electricity sector
is legally and financially unbundled.
State-owned Samruk-Energy is one of the largest energy companies in Kazakhstan. Samruk-
Energy operates in power generation, transmission and distribution and coal mining, as
well as in the rehabilitation, expansion and construction of power facilities. Samruk-Energy
is managed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna.
The transmission system remains state-owned under the Kazakhstan Electricity Grid
Operating Company (KEGOC). KEGOC is the state-wide transmission system operator
(TSO), and the largely privatised distribution sector is run by 21 regional electricity
distribution companies (REKs).
The unified power system (UPS) of Kazakhstan operates in parallel with Russia’s power
system and the Central Asia Power Grid. Kazakhstan’s UPS is conditionally divided into
three zones:
Northern Zone (Akmola, Aktobe, Kostanay, Pavlodar, North Kazakhstan, East Kazakhstan,
Karaganda regions)
Southern Zone (Almaty, Zhambyl, Kyzylorda, south Kazakhstan regions)
Western Zone (Atyrau, west Kazakhstan, Mangystau regions).
There is a two-tier electricity market: wholesale and retail. The wholesale market is
primarily made up of bilateral contracts (88%) with the remainder traded on short-term,
medium-term and long-term spot transactions (World Bank, 2014a). The wholesale market
also has balancing mechanism.
Daily schedules of wholesale market activity are prepared and the dispatch of day-ahead
load management is performed according to this schedule. Distribution system operators
(DSOs) work with the regional control centres for dispatch to retail customers. Kazakhstan
Operator of the Electricity Market (KOREM) administers the day-ahead market, develops
preliminary dispatch schedules and implements supply/demand balances.
The retail market is competitive and has approximately 45 operators.
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10. http://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1300001540.
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
Coal
Samruk-Energy is the largest producer and trader of coal in Kazakhstan and accounts for
around 37% of total gross production volumes. Bogatyr Access Komir accounts for 35%
of Kazakhstan’s coal output. The company is a subsidiary of Access Industries Incorporated
(a US company). Bogatyr Access Komir develops northern Kazakhstan’s Bogatyr and
Severny coal fields and is Kazakhstan’s largest exporter to Russia. Russian firms are also
stakeholders in Kazakhstan’s coal industry.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Energy was established In August 2014 as the lead ministry for energy
policy and governance. The Ministry was created following a merger of functions of the
former Ministry of Oil and Gas, the Ministry of Industry and New Technologies and the
Ministry of Environmental Protection and Water Resources.
The Committee for Regulation of Natural Monopolies and Protection of Competition
(CRNMPC) at the Ministry of National Economy, the regulator, is responsible for tariff
setting and competition matters and its board is appointed by the prime minister.
CRNMPC is financed from the state budget.
The Committee on Statistics at the Ministry of National Economy is responsible for
statistics methodology, data gathering, processing and dissemination, and implementing
relevant policy measures. The committee is responsible for developing the national
energy balance in close co-operation with relevant ministries.
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The Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna11 is a state-run holding company for the
management of Kazakhstan’s state assets. Samruk-Kazyna was established by a merger
of two joint-stock companies, Kazyna Sustainable Development Fund and Kazakhstan
Holding for the Management of State Assets Samruk.12 The fund is a shareholder of almost
all national development institutes and national companies. It incorporates all investment
and innovative development institutions (the Bank for Development of Kazakhstan, the
Investment Fund of Kazakhstan, the National Innovation Fund, the Damu Fund and
KazInvest, among others). It also holds interests in the major banks (BTA Bank, Alliance
Bank, Temirbank) and the national companies KazMunayGas, KEGOC, Samruk Energy,
KOREM, KazAtomProm, the National Mining Company Tau-Ken Samruk, the National
Company Kazakhstan Engineering, the Kazakh Research Institute of Energy (named after
the academic Chokin) and others.
The National Fund is a state-run fund that comprises financial assets accumulated in
Kazakhstan’s government account with the National Bank of Kazakhstan. The National
Fund accumulates the major part of oil revenues. The fund was one of the first to be
established in the post-Soviet period.13 It was set up to work towards stable social and
economic growth; financial resource accumulation for future generations; reduced
exposure to adverse external impacts; and decreased exposure of the economy to
volatile commodity prices.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Key legal acts governing the power sector are a presidential decree in 1995 establishing
the current structure of the electricity market, and the Programme of Privatisation and
Restructuring of the Power Sector in 1996.14
The Law on Gas and Gas Supply was developed to reflect international practices in gas
exploration and supply. The law came into force in January 2012. It sets national
objectives to expand gas supply and attract investment for the development of the
necessary infrastructure.
The Law on Electricity was developed in 2009 and amended in 2011 and 2012. It defines:
responsibilities of the regulatory authority; separation of wholesale and retail electricity
markets and their operations; consumer choice of supplier; and non-interference into
activities of generation, transmission and distribution.
Kazakhstan has well-elaborated legislation in the field of renewable energy and energy
efficiency. In 2013, the Law on Supporting the Use of Renewable Energy Sources was
approved, including feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy which came into force in
2014. In the previous year, the government approved the Law on Energy Saving and
Energy Efficiency, providing a comprehensive legal, regulatory, and institutional framework
for energy efficiency measures.
The Law on Subsoil Resources and Subsoil Use (2010) defines the rules for subsoil use and
operations. The legislation is intended to stimulate subsoil users to search for local suppliers
and contractors. It also prohibits gas flaring unless the Ministry of Oil and Gas grants a permit.
Gas flaring restrictions and regulation are also defined in the Law on Gas and Gas Supply.
11. http://sk.kz.
12. Decree of the President No. 669, 13 October 2008.
13. Decree of the President No. 402, 23 August 2000.
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
KEY POLICIES
The government launched the Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy in 2012, which defines the
course for long-term economic development. In May 2013, the Green Economy Concept
was adopted, setting an ambitious target of reaching 50% of alternative and renewable
energy in the energy mix by 2050. The government plans to achieve this by phasing
out ageing infrastructure, increasing the use of alternative fuels (such as natural gas,
nuclear and renewables), installing efficient energy technologies and complying with
high ecological standards.
The Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy includes social, economic and political reforms with the
aim of placing Kazakhstan in the top 30 global economies by 2050. Economic growth is
to be achieved through reaching new export markets, improving the investment climate
and further developing the private sector as well as public-private partnerships. The
Ministry of National Economy was launched in early 2013 to promote social and
economic development (Kazakhstan Embassy, 2014).
Under the Green Economy Concept the government plans to optimise hydrocarbon
exploration while observing ecological standards. The concept sets a target of 50% of
Kazakhstan’s energy consumption to come from alternative and renewable sources by
2050. Other targets include:
generating 50% of power from renewable sources by 2050
reducing energy intensity (per unit of GDP) by 10% by 2015 and by 25% by 2020,
from 2008 levels
resolving drinking water supply restrictions by 2020 and agricultural water supply by 2040
increasing agricultural land productivity by a factor of 1.5 by 2020.
Under the Green Economy Concept, the government estimates that the transition to a
green economy will boost GDP by 3%, add more than 500 000 jobs, develop new
industries and raise living standards. Overall investment required for the transition is
estimated at about 1% of GDP per year (USD 3-4 billion).
The Ministry of Energy inaugurated the Green Academy in mid-2013 to elaborate
developments under the Green Economy Concept and related strategic approaches.
Feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy were introduced in June 2014, under a new Law
15. http://cis-legislation.com/search.fwx?countryid=5.
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Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
on Supporting the Use of Renewable Energy Sources and with support from the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
The Action Plan for the Development of Alternative and Renewable Energy for 2013-20
was adopted in January 2013. Under the plan, 31 renewable energy projects are proposed
with a capacity of 1 040 MW, including a wind farm of 13-793 W capacity, solar
photovoltaic (PV) installations of 77 MW and a 170 MW hydropower plant. At the start
of 2013, the country had 27 proposed renewable energy projects including wind, solar,
biogas and small hydro.
A key initiative in renewable energy is the Programme of Wind Power Development to
2030 that defines wind power development as one of the priority directions. The
programme was prepared in conjunction with the UN Development Programme – Wind
Power Market Development Initiative. The goal is to develop wind power to generate
900 GWh by 2015 and 5 TWh by 2024, within the framework of the concept of
Kazakhstan’s transfer to sustainable development for 2007–24, and the strategy of
industrial and innovative development of Kazakhstan for 2003–15, where the aim is the
preservation of natural resources and the environment (Energy Charter, 2013).
Other state-run programmes that take renewable energy into consideration include the
State Programme for Accelerated Industrial and Innovative Development for 2010–14 and
the Programme of Electricity Sector Development for 2010–14 (Energy Charter, 2013).
Kazakhstan’s energy demand is growing due to strong economic growth and rising living
standards. As such, supply sufficiency concerns are mounting. The government has been
expanding generation capacity from various fuel sources, through new investment and
modernisation of existing capacity. This includes the construction of a 2 640 megawatt (MW)
coal-fired power plant at Balkhash Lake. To bolster a weak investment climate for power
generation, in 2009 the government established a premium tariff for electricity generators
for returns to be used in infrastructure modernisation. The tariff will expire in 2015.
In December 2014, the government approved the Concept of Gas Sector Development
to 2030.17 This concept defines the approach to progressive reform and development of
Kazakhstan’s gas sector for the period up to the year 2030. Legislative changes were
made in December 2014 to strengthen the sector’s legal framework and define rules on
production sharing agreements.
Kazakhstan’s environment has been affected by past military nuclear testing programmes
and industrial and mining activities, as well as land degradation, desertification and
water scarcity. Some of these problems affect the entire Central Asia region. In response,
Kazakhstan pioneered a multilateral, cross-sectoral and voluntary Green Bridge Partnership
Programme. In Central Asia, the programme addresses issues related to energy and
water linkages. Kazakhstan’s dependency on trans-boundary river inflows, inefficient
irrigation systems for water-intensive crops and a decrease of sustainable water supply
are mounting concerns. Water deficits of 14 bcm by 2030 and 20 bcm by 2050 are
expected in the Central Asia region, with serious impacts on the Balkhash-Alakol and
Aral-Syrdarya basins.
To streamline water and energy governance, in 2013 the Ministry of Environmental
Protection was reorganised into the Ministry of Environment and Water Resources18 and
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
in 2014 the reorganised ministry merged with the newly created Ministry of Energy. The
government approved a comprehensive Water Management Programme in December 2013,
with concrete measures and mechanisms to implement a sustainable water use strategy.
Kazakhstan ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2009 and it participates in a number of climate
change regional and international forums. Kazakhstan will host Expo 2017 Future Energy
as a showcase to demonstrate the latest energy technologies and to raise awareness of
sustainable development.
INVESTMENT
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Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
In the power sector, the government is planning to undertake the large-scale modernisation
of existing facilities and to construct new ones during 2015-30. Under the current Action
Plan for Development of Electric Power Industry, the government is expected to
continue to invest in the electricity network and generation infrastructure, with plans to
2030. The plan lists the facilities that need to be constructed, renovated or expanded by
2015 and outlines the measures for implementation. Current projects include:
extension and reconstruction of Ekibastuzskaya state district power plant-2 coal
plant, including implementation of power generating unit No. 3, 600 MW
modernisation of the national power grid, Stage II (replacement of power equipment
at 55 substations)
construction of Balkhash thermal power plant, 1 320 MW, with the two units
expected to come on line in 2017 and 2018; project cost: USD 2.3 billion
construction of Alma 500 kilovolt (kV) substation with connection to the national
power grid by 500 kV and 220 kV lines.
Kazakhstan’s power sector requires considerable rehabilitation and upgrading to improve
the efficiency of energy production and use. The ongoing programme for Modernisation
of the National Electric Grid aims to upgrade the substations and infrastructure of the
national grid, and ensure the efficiency and security of its operations. Phase one was
completed over the period 2000 to 2009 and was financed by international financial
institutions (IFIs) (USD 185 million) and the Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company
(USD 134 million).
The project, now in its second phase with a horizon of 2016, will install modern high-
voltage equipment, automation and relay protection facilities, a dispatch control system,
monitoring and data processing and energy management systems, an automated
metering system and a digital telecommunication network. This phase will complete the
switch to automatic systems. The second phase covers the period 2010-14 and is
financed by IFIs (USD 300 million).
Adopted in August 2013, the government’s Energy Efficiency 2020 Programme aims to
reduce energy consumption by 10% by 2015. The programme is expected to cost around
USD 7.5 billion and will require private investment as well as budget funding.
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
more co-operation is needed with the private sector. Companies play a limited role in
the generation of knowledge in Kazakhstan (UNECE, 2012). RD&D expenditure in the oil
and gas sectors is stagnant, since companies generally import technology.
ASSESSMENT
Kazakhstan has a rapidly growing economy and significant energy resources. With the
largest proven oil reserves in the Caspian Sea basin (40 billion barrels, 3.2% of the
world’s total), Kazakhstan is emerging as a leading oil producer and is set to become the
second-largest non-OPEC supplier to global oil markets by 2020. Kazakhstan has 2 trillion
cubic metres (tcm) of proven gas reserves, mainly gas associated with oil production.
Natural gas production is likely to increase substantially in the period to 2030, particularly
with the initiation of production at the giant offshore Kashagan field. Kazakhstan has
abundant coal reserves in the northern part of the country, whereas large potential for
wind, solar and small hydro are concentrated in the south. Kazakhstan is the world’s
largest producer of uranium, currently providing 35% of the global supply.
Kazakhstan’s domestic energy mix is dominated by coal, which is mainly used for power
generation and accounts for 48% of total primary energy demand, followed by natural
gas at 31%. The country ranks among the most energy-intensive economies in the world,
reflecting abundant supplies of affordable thermal energy that are used in inefficient
infrastructure remaining from the Soviet era. For instance, coal, which accounts for more
than 80% of electricity generation, is mostly combusted in power plants that are more
than 50 to 60 years old. Production of oil, gas and coal also contribute to the high energy
intensity, as does the heating of low-efficiency commercial properties and dwellings.
Reducing the energy intensity of the economy is a government objective, and it has a
target of a 25% decline by 2030.
The government launched Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy in December 2012, which defines the
course for long-term economic development. In May 2013, the Green Economy Concept
was adopted, setting an ambitious target of reaching 50% of alternative and renewable
energy in its energy mix by 2050. The government plans to achieve this by replacing
ageing infrastructure, increasing the use of alternative fuels (such as natural gas, nuclear
and renewables), installing efficient energy technologies and complying with high ecological
standards. All relevant government entities were tasked to elaborate on the Green Energy
Concept and to prepare proposals for measures to achieve the targets. Key energy
associations were asked to contribute as well. The review team commends the initiative.
The current development of key strategic directions for the medium and long terms also
comes at a time when Kazakhstan’s electricity sector is at a crossroads. With ageing
infrastructure, rising consumption, and efficiency and renewable energy targets, the
burden on power suppliers is growing. To address these demands, the government
introduced an interim tariff structure in 2009 that allows generators to charge a premium
to be used to modernise their assets. This tariff will expire in 2015.
Authorities are currently working on a new model for capacity markets, which has to be
functional from 2016. Significant upgrades of existing power stations, and building new
capacity and grid infrastructure, are required to ensure a sound electricity system and to
meet established targets. This will necessitate substantial investment.
Efficiency gains and demand-management efforts require incentive schemes and enhanced
awareness. Therefore, careful consideration of various scenarios and selection of the
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Kazakhstan 5.1. General energy policy
most cost-effective and socially acceptable models for strategic development in the
power sector are instrumental to move towards the Green Economy Concept goals. Key
opportunities for transitioning to a “green economy” include maximising Kazakhstan’s
vast potential for energy efficiency gains, encouraging the large-scale deployment of
renewable energy technologies and promoting industrial technology improvements. The
government estimates that the inefficient use of resources in every sector equates to a
loss of USD 4-8 billion to the economy each year and could amount to USD 14 billion by
2030. Estimated current energy savings potential is USD 3-4 billion/year and could reach
USD 6-10 billion/year by 2030.
The review team commends the government of Kazakhstan for developing concepts for
fuel switching and stimulating the uptake of renewable energy technologies. It encourages
further consideration and analysis of multiple scenarios for energy sector development,
including those based on various fuel mix options. Such a comprehensive analysis of multiple
scenarios can improve the strategic actions to transition to a sustainable energy future.
Kazakhstan’s energy statistics are adequate in some areas. However, sufficient reporting
and transparency are needed in areas related to the energy sector where reliable statistics
are lacking. In order to provide a basis for more accurate analysis of the energy sector
and more informed policy decisions, the review team strongly suggests that additional
statistics be developed, reported and regularly updated.
The government recognises the need for modernisation and expansion of the power
generation and network enterprises. As the tariff supplement for generators is being
phased out next year, the capacity market will become functional in 2016. This will provide
the main signals for investment in electricity projects. This calls for effective market
structures, reasonable tariffs and return on investment in order to attract the required
financing. As this substantial investment will ultimately be covered by consumers,
strategies and projects need to be conceived and executed in a transparent and socially
acceptable manner, and to advance the transition to sustainable development.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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5.1. General energy policy Kazakhstan
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Kazakhstan 5.2. Energy security
180
© OECD/IEA, 2015
0 200 km
Kenkiyak
K A Z A K H S T A N
Figure 5.2.1 North Caspian oil fields
Atyrau
Kashagan
Sources: IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA, Paris; IEA analysis.
(potential)
ARAL
Filanovskoye
RUSSIA Korchagin KC
S
T SEA
Khvalynskoye
Aktau
U Z B E K I S T A N
Makhachkala
CASPIAN (Kuryk)
Tsentralnoye SEA
GEORGIA
Tbilisi
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN T U R K M E N I S T A N
Existing regional gas pipeline Planned oil pipeline Tanker terminal Refinery Selected field
181
Kazakhstan
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Kazakhstan 5.2. Energy security
For a long time, Karachaganak was the last major oil and gas project without the
participation of Kazakhstan. In 2012, KMG NC JSC became one of the participants in the
project by acquisition of 10% interest from its current shareholders. In 2013, about
17 bcm of gas were extracted from the Karachaganak field, of which 49% was reinjected
(IEA, 2014b).
Significant possible additions to gas production in the medium term include the third
phase of Karachaganak, though the development consortium has yet to agree on financing
the next steps and it is uncertain whether the gas produced would be used for re-
injection or marketed. Nostrum Oil and Gas, the Kazakhstan oil and gas company formerly
named Zhaikmunai, is likely to contribute around 50 thousand barrels per day (kb/d) of
gas condensate and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by 2017 from new processing facilities
at the Chinarevskoye gas field.
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5.2. Energy security Kazakhstan
There are 47 coal deposits, of which 5 coal-mining fields and 14 deposits are under
operation. 72% of the total coal production is concentrated at three giant sections of
Ekibastuz, at four other sections (Borly, Shubarkol, Kushoky and Saryadyr) and at Karaganda
Oblast mines. Coal mining is also developing in the sections of Aktobe, Almaty, East
Kazakhstan (Karazhyra mine) and South Kazakhstan Oblasts in order to ensure the regional
needs in coal.
In 2000-13, the increase of coal reserves was amounted to only 115 Mt at the cumulative
production amounting to 1 141 Mt. According to British Petroleum estimates, Kazakhstan’s
coal will be exhausted in approximately 293 years.
URANIUM
Kazakhstan has the third-largest deposits of uranium in the world, behind Australia and
Canada. Total reserves were 279 kilotonnes (kt) in 2012, resources are much higher at
1 455 kt and potential is 1 934 kt. In 2012, Kazakhstan was the top global producer, with
21.3 kt or 36.5% of total uranium production, followed by Canada (9 kt) and Australia
(7 kt) (BGR, 2013).
HYDRO
Hydropower resources are spread throughout the country. There are three major
districts: the Irtysh River basin with its main tributaries (Bukhtarma, Uba, Ulba, Kurchum,
Kardzhil), the southeast zone with the Ili River basin; and the southern basins of Syrdaria,
Talas and Churivers (NURIS, 2013).
Kazakhstan has significant fossil fuel resources and is a net exporter of energy and
energy products. For natural gas, the reserves are in the west, the population centres
are in the north, east and south, and the domestic pipeline system is under-developed.
The lack of infrastructure means that Kazakhstan relies on gas imports to meet domestic
demand. So, the security of gas supply depends somewhat on resource availability, and
on the political and economic relations among the neighbouring countries with which it
is interconnected. For example, in 2010, there was a partial outage of natural gas in
Aktau, the country’s main seaport on the Caspian Sea, due to an unexpected interruption
of the natural gas supply from Turkmenistan, coinciding with the repair of an alternative
transportation gas pipeline.
It is a government objective to develop a domestic natural gas system that would connect
the producing and consuming centres and reduce reliance on imports. Of 14 regions in
Kazakhstan, 5 are not connected to the gas pipeline system. It is a long-term goal to
connect these regions, but the current availability of relatively low-cost LPG and coal render
it uneconomic. In 2014, the government approved the Concept of Gas Sector Development
to 2030 aimed at increasing domestic supply and developing gas infrastructure. The
government is planning a Beyneu–Bozoy–Shymkent gas transmission pipeline to bring
gas from the west to demand centres in the south to reduce dependence on supplies
from Uzbekistan.
Energy security in Kazakhstan is also a matter of reliability. Today’s gas and electricity
transmission and distribution networks were mostly built during the Soviet era and are in
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Kazakhstan 5.2. Energy security
need of replacement, refurbishment and expansion. Their present condition has resulted
in higher than average outages, particularly in the gas sector. For numerous gas companies
in the south, compressor losses can be as high as 30%. Investment in rehabilitation and
modernisation would improve the efficiency of supply and reduce the risk of shortages.
Kazakhstan is experiencing strong economic performance and a rising standard of living
for its population that is expected to considerably increase energy demand in the coming
years. This poses a challenge for the government to ensure that energy needs can be
meet in a reliable, affordable and sustainable manner. In order to meet growing demand,
the government has been expanding generation capacity from various fuel sources,
through new investment and modernisation of existing capacity. This includes the
construction of a 2 640 MW coal-fired power plant at Balkhash Lake.
Kazakhstan’s primary energy mix is dominated by coal, natural gas and oil, with a less
than 1% contribution from renewable energy sources. However, the potential for
renewable energy is substantial, particularly for small hydro, wind and solar. Investment
in renewables and energy efficiency measures will help Kazakhstan to reduce the carbon
intensity of its economy, diversify its energy mix and strengthen the security of supply.
Samruk-Green-Energy, a subsidiary of state-owned Samruk-Energy, is undertaking wind
power projects that will bring up to 300 MW of wind power by 2018.19
Kazakhstan has large uranium reserves and is the world’s biggest uranium producer. The
country's only nuclear power plant was decommissioned in 2001. Although plans have
long existed to build additional nuclear power plants, there has been little progress.
Electricity
Installed generation capacity in 2012 was 20.6 gigawatts (GW), an increase from 19.1 GW
in 2010 based on refurbishment and new build. There are 71 power stations, including
5 hydropower plants. Coal-fired plants account for about 85% of the capacity. Combined
heat and power (CHP) plants account for 38% of generation capacity. In recent years,
wind and solar PV have entered the power generation mix. The one nuclear power plant was
closed in 2001. The total length of transmission power lines is approximately 24 000 km,
including 310 km of 0.4 kV to 1 150 kV lines.
Power plants are grouped in three categories: national, industrial and regional. National
power plants include the largest coal-fired units (such as the Ekibastuz state district
power plant [SDPP]), as well as all large HPPs. Industrial power plants include gas-turbine
power plants (GTPP) and CHPs for autonomous electricity generation. Regional power
plants are mainly CHPs for districting heating in certain towns/regions.
The government has a plan and has outlined the measures for the facilities that need to
be constructed, renovated or expanded by 2015. From 2010 to 2011, the expansion of
the Atyrau CHP by 75 MW and restoration of Unit 2 at Aksu SDPP were completed.
Projects in the works include the restoration of Unit 8 at Ekibastuz SDPP-1 and the
replacement of power equipment at 55 substations of the national power grid.
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5.2. Energy security Kazakhstan
In the electricity sector, the government is planning to construct new facilities during
2015-30. Under the current Action Plan for Development of Electric Power Industry, the
government is expected to continue to invest in the electricity network and generation
infrastructure. Current projects include:
construction of a gas turbine power station, 87 MW, at Akshabulak field to use gas
that had been flared
construction of the Balkhash thermal power plant, 1 320 MW, began in 2012 with
the two units expected to come on line in 2017 and 2018 with estimated project
costs of USD 2.3 billion
installation of a third unit at Ekibastuz state district power plant-2 to add 600 MW
capacity expected to be operational in 2014
construction of the Alma 500 kV substation with connection to the national power
grid by 500 kV and 220 kV lines.
In terms of renewable energy, Samruk-Green-Energy, a subsidiary of state-owned Samruk-
Energy, is undertaking wind power projects that will bring up to 300 MW of wind power
by 2018.20
Kazakhstan’s UPS is connected and harmonised with Russia’s electricity network and the
Central Asia Power Grid (with Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan).
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan disconnected from the Central Asia Power Grid in 2003
and 2009, respectively. This reduced trade volumes considerably.
KEGOC is obliged to ensure maintenance and operational availability of the electricity
network. Although there is no comprehensive maintenance strategy in place, the TSO
implements a centralised maintenance programme to fulfil its wholesale contracts.
The TSO and the DSOs have annual maintenance programmes, which are fully financed
by the electricity companies, with an implementation rate in the range of 98-100%. The
technical level of staff to implement the maintenance programmes is adequate, as are
budgets for regular training programmes.
The ongoing programme for power grid modernisation is set up to upgrade the
substations and infrastructure of the national grid, and ensure the efficiency and security
of its operations. Phase one was completed during 2000-09 and was financed by IFIs
(USD 185 million) and KEGOC (USD 134 million).
The project, now in its second phase with a horizon of 2016, will install modern high-
voltage equipment, automation and relay protection facilities, a dispatch control system,
monitoring and data processing and energy management systems, an automated metering
system and a digital telecommunication network. This phase will complete the switch to
automatic systems.
Monitoring of preventive maintenance is carried out by the Committee of Nuclear and
Power Supervision and Control within the Ministry of Energy. The committee is expected
to implement a uniform approach to the monitoring and control of the power sector,
including preventive maintenance, and is considering establishment of a three-year preventive
maintenance planning programme. GosEnergoNadzor, a state agency, carries out infrastructure
inspections and can report insufficient maintenance to the Ministry of Energy.
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Kazakhstan 5.2. Energy security
District heating
According to the Committee on Statistics, the total length of the two-pipe heat networks
is 11 700 km, including 3 800 km (32.6%) in communal property and 7 900 km (67.4%) in
private enterprises. A total of 23 300 meters are installed. All large and small cities and
settlements are provided with extensive district heating networks at various levels of
centralisation as follows: group level – heat supply of a group of buildings; district level –
heat supply of a district in a settlement; city level – heat supply of several districts; and
inter-city level – heat supply of several cities. Detached individual houses and cottages
are supplied with heat by autonomous boiler houses using coal, gas and diesel fuel.
The heat supply in large cities such as Almaty and Astana is provided by CHPs, and large
district boiler houses are in communal properties or in the properties of major companies.
In addition to these sources, there are many enterprises owned by various organisations
which supply heat to small cities, settlements and districts of large cities. These organisations,
which have their own heat sources, include the Ministry of Defence, JSC National Company
Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, and a number of large enterprises being local economic mainstays.
These organisations transfer a part of their heat supply systems to the ownership of local
executive bodies or establish independent legal entities for heat generation and distribution.
The district heating network is aged and some 63% needs replacement and repair. Heat
losses are close to 20%. Metering is also low, with less than half of consumers being
metered. As such, efficiency losses are difficult to measure.
NATURAL GAS
The natural gas system in Kazakhstan is primarily a transit route for exports from Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistan to Russia and China. The network consists of 11 900 km of pipeline,
22 compressor stations, and 3 underground storage facilities. The main pipelines are: the
Central Asia-Centre pipeline – transit from Turkmenistan to Russia; Bukhara-Ural pipeline –
transit from Uzbekistan to Russia (now largely idle); the Tashkent-Almaty pipeline –
imports gas from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan's main southern population centres; and the
Central Asia-China pipeline (Table 5.2.1).
The national gas transmission and distribution pipeline system distributes gas to consumers
in 9 of its 14 regions and provides connection to about 57% of the population. Yet, the
domestic natural gas distribution network is two distinct systems: one in the west that
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5.2. Energy security Kazakhstan
services the gas production fields, and one in the south which mainly delivers imported
natural gas to the consuming regions. The absence of a network that connects the gas
producing regions to the main industrial area between Almaty and Shymkent has
hampered the development of the country's natural gas resources. Southern Kazakhstan
receives much of its natural gas supply from Uzbekistan via the Tashkent-Shymkent-
Bishkek-Almaty pipeline even as the country exports gas from its northwest region.
The maintenance strategy for gas assets is the responsibility of the gas companies. All
gas TSOs and DSOs have medium-term maintenance programmes, which generally are
fully funded and implemented. The technical level of staff to implement the maintenance
programmes is adequate, though budgets for regular training programmes of maintenance
staff are not sufficient. Regional divisions of the Committee of Emergency Situations can
also be involved in gas network maintenance.
Representative current gas infrastructure projects include:
Central Asia–Centre transmission pipeline rehabilitation
Shymkent town gas distribution system rehabilitation
Makat Compressor Station rehabilitation and seven new gas turbines
Bozoy, Poltoratskoye and Akyrtobe underground gas storage facilities’ rehabilitation.
The government is considering construction of the Beyneu–Bozoy–Shymkent gas transmission
pipeline, which would provide gas from the west to the southern regions of the country
to reduce gas imports from Uzbekistan. The pipeline would connect with all main gas
transmission pipelines. Construction of Bozoi–Shymkent gas pipeline and the first stage
of the Beyneu–Bozoy–Shymkent pipeline started in southern Kazakhstan in 2013.
The Pre-Caspian gas pipeline (40 bcm capacity) is a planned project among the governments
of Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, ratified in 2009. The expected length of the
pipeline is 1 217 km, envisaged to have 30 bcm of gas from Turkmenistan and 10 bcm
from Kazakhstan. Its implementation, however, has been suspended for an indefinite
time, pending the co-ordinated actions of the Russian and Turkmenistan parties.
The government is also promoting the construction of the Beineu-Bozoi-Akbulak gas
transmission pipeline, which is intended to connect Kazakhstan's demand centres with its
supply, and allow more exports to China. The pipeline is expected to be completed by end 2015.
OIL
Since its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan has invested substantially in new
developments and upgrades of existing oil and gas infrastructure to expand its export
capacity. Kazakhstan exports about 80–90% of its liquid hydrocarbon production.
When the pipeline system was developed as part of the Soviet system, the aim was to
transport oil to Russia. Over time, Kazakhstan has been able to reduce its dependence
on Russia's infrastructure by using Trans-Caspian tankers and rail, and by building a
pipeline to China. Still, a majority of its exports have to be shipped via Russia's pipelines
(EIA, 2015). Kazakhstan has an extensive rail network, which it increasingly uses to
transport liquid fuels for both domestic consumption and export.
The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) oil pipeline, in operation since 2001, is 1 510 km
in length and connects the Tengiz field with the Yuzhnaya Ozerevka terminal to the
Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. It is being expanded to increase capacity to
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187
188
Kazakhstan
Omsk
Novossibirsk
RUSSIA
Samara RUSSIA
Pavlodar
Orenburg
Orsk Astana
Karachaganak
Karaganda
Figure 5.2.2 Central Asia oil pipeline network
Aktobe
Atasu
MONGOLIA
K A Z A K H S T A N
Sources: IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA, Paris; IEA analysis.
Volgograd Kenkiyak
RUSSIA Atyrau
Kumkol
Karakoin
Kashagan
Tengiz
ARAL
SEA
Aktau Almaty
Makhachkala
(Kuryk) UZBEKISTAN Bishkek
GEORGIA CASPIAN
Supsa Shymkent
SEA
Batumi Tbilisi KYRGYZSTAN
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN Tashkent
Yerevan Baku CHINA
Turkmenbashi (People’s Republic of)
Bukhara
AZ TURKMENISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
Ashgabat Chardzhou Dushanbe
Existing regional gas pipeline Planned oil pipeline Tanker terminal Refinery Selected field
5.2. Energy security
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
5.2. Energy security Kazakhstan
Atyrau-Samara is Kazakhstan's other major oil export pipeline. It connects the Uzen field
and Atyrau refinery to Samara to link with Russia's Transneft system, which provides
Kazakhstan with a connection to world markets via the Black Sea. The 1 380 km line was
upgraded in 2009 and has an annual capacity of 15 Mt.
The Kazakhstan-China 2 228 km long oil pipeline runs from the Atyrau port in northwest
Kazakhstan to Alashankou in China, and has a capacity of about 20 Mt. The pipeline is
currently being expanded to increase its capacity, at least partly to transport Kashagan oil.
The two main ports used for oil exports are Aktau and Semey. Aktau is located on the
Caspian Sea and has a loading capacity of 12 Mt of oil and oil products. Aktau also has
three oil storage facilities: JSC KazTransOil (8.5 Mt); Artis Overseas S.A. Kazakhstan (1.1 Mt);
and Terminalex (2.4 Mt). The Semey port is located on the Irtish River in the northeast, and
in summer months, ship traffic can travel to the Arctic Ocean and connect to the rail network.
Further development of Kazakhstan’s rich oil and gas resources for domestic and export
purposes will require new supporting infrastructure. Development of new oil fields,
including the Kashagan field, requires significant expansion of export capacity. Kazakhstan
is promoting the KCTS, which includes the construction of an 823 km-long onshore
pipeline from Eskene in western Kazakhstan to Kuryk on the Caspian Sea near Aktau,
where a new oil terminal is to be built. This system would also include a maritime link to
Baku, Azerbaijan, where the crude oil would be put into an expanded Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline to Turkey. The total cost of the KCTS is estimated at USD 4 billion. Other
proposals include the construction of the Trans-Caspian oil pipeline, which would
provide a western export route for both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan (EIA, 2015).
COAL
Karaganda coal basin, whose development was launched as far back as 1930, has long
been Kazakhstan’s main coal supplier. It still produces up to 50 Mt annually. Ekibastuz
coal deposits are 200 km to the northeast of Karaganda and are among the largest in
Kazakhstan. In 2013, 63.9% of coal was mined in the Pavlodar Oblast and 27.9% in the
Karaganda Oblast. Coal will continue to play a significant role in the energy sector. To
meet coal needs, mining is projected to increase up to 160 Mt in 2015.
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Electricity system reliability is stable, with total transmission losses at approximately 7%.
Outages are rare. Losses and outages are reported to the CRNMPC by the TSO and
DSOs. Losses in the districting heating network are higher due to aged infrastructure –
approximately 20%.
Gas network losses are significantly above established standards. Losses and outages are
reported by KazTransGas to the CRNMPC. Gas use for internal needs and losses are as
high as 30% in some compressors in many natural gas operations in the southern region.
The Zhambyl region (oblast) in the south has registered several incidents of atmospheric
gas releases related to the extremely poor condition of pipelines.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
In 2010, there was a partial outage of natural gas in Aktau, the country’s main seaport
on the Caspian Sea, due to an unexpected interruption of the natural gas supply from
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Kazakhstan 5.2. Energy security
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5.3. Market convergence Kazakhstan
ELECTRICITY
Kazakhstan’s electricity sector was legally and financially unbundled in 1995-96. Progressive
privatisation was approved in 1996.
The electricity sector was divided into competitive and monopoly segments. The Kazakhstan
Committee for Regulation of Natural Monopolies and Competition Defence effects
management in the natural monopoly segment and on the state regulation of sales
prices for consumers in the retail market. The transmission and distribution of electricity
has been attributed to the state’s monopoly segment. Electricity transmission services
were included in natural monopoly activities and are provided at charges established by the
regulator. The generation of electricity and services provided by specialised enterprises
were attributed to the competitive segment.
The electricity market structure in Kazakhstan is composed of a wholesale market, in
which about 88% of transactions are through bilateral contracts, while a central spot
market accounts for about 12% of electricity sales and balancing is on a real-time basis.
The retail market has regulated tariffs.
To date, Kazakhstan has established an open two-tier competitive market of electricity:
wholesale and retail.
The wholesale electricity market is made up of:
Bilateral contracts - 88% of trade.
Spot trade on short-term, medium-term and long-term bases. The spot market is
operated by KOREM and accounts for 12% of trade.
The real-time balancing market.
The ancillary services market.
Daily schedules of wholesale market activity are prepared and the dispatch of day-ahead
load management is performed according to this schedule. DSOs work with the regional
control centres for dispatch to retail customers. State-owned KOREM administers the
day-ahead market, develops preliminary dispatch schedules and implements actual supply/
demand balances.
Kazakhstan’s electricity generation is carried out mainly by private enterprises. The electricity
TSO is the state-owned KEGOC. Regional distribution companies (REK) (21 companies)
act as DSOs. The retail market is competitive, with approximately 45 companies. Samruk-
Energy is the largest state-owned energy company in Kazakhstan.21 The company is
involved in power production, transmission, distribution and sales through its many
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21. www.samruk-energy.kz.
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Kazakhstan 5.3. Market convergence
subsidiaries. It also produces and trades coal. Total installed capacity of power plants
owned and operated by Samruk-Energy is 9.7 GW, with 69 285 km of transmission and
distribution lines. The company accounts for 37% of gross coal extraction volume in
Kazakhstan. Samruk-Energy is managed by the Sovereign Wealth Fund Samruk-Kazyna.
The Samruk-Kazyna fund and the government developed the Comprehensive Privatisation
Plan for 2014-16 in January 2014. In April 2014, the government approved the list of
the companies to be privatised. The plan was to privatise 106 companies managed by
the fund.
NATURAL GAS
KazTransGas, an affiliate of the fully state-owned enterprise KazMunaiGas, is a vertically
integrated TSO/DSO holding company. Its subsidiary, Intergas Central Asia, is the TSO.
Kazakhstan has 14 regions, and 9 are connected to the gas network to serve about 57%
of the population. Another subsidiary, KazTransGas Aima, is the DSO in six regions. In
other gasified regions, a number of companies act as DSOs and some have more than
one DSO. Some DSOs are private, while others are state-owned. Gas transmission and
distribution system operators are independent legal entities with their own financial and
accounting systems, and are operationally independent.
OIL
State-owned KazMunayGa (KMG) is an integrated national oil and gas company
implementing national policy on oil and gas sector developments and is involved in oil
and gas exploration, production, refining, transportation, distribution and servicing. The
company also establishes management systems for subsoil use.
Tengizchevroil (TCO) is a joint venture between Chevron (50%), ExxonMobil (25%),
KazMunayGas (20%) and LukArco (5%). TCO was created to develop the super-giant
Tengiz oilfield in the Atyrau region and is Kazakhstan’s largest producer and marketer of
oil and gas.
According to the Ministry of Oil and Gas, the following PSAs have been signed in
Kazakhstan: Tengizchevroil LLP (TCO); Kazakhstan branch of Karachaganak Petroleum
Operating B.V. (KPO); NCOC; Zhaikmunai JV; Maersk Oil Kazakhstan Gesellschaft mit
beschränkter Haftung (GmbH); Potential Oil LLP; Kurmangazy Petroleum LLP; KazMunaiGas
NC JSC; Tyub-Karagan Operating Company B.V.; Maersk Oil Kazakhstan GmbH (Temir);
Sagiz Petroleum Company LLP; Precaspian Petroleum Company LLP; Branch of Saigak
Kazakhstan B.V.; and Branch of Caspi Meruerty Operating Company B.V. Licence areas
are specified in the Subsoil Use Contracts, and therefore PSAs are transferrable.
In 2013, there were 203 hydrocarbon contracts: 61 hydrocarbon exploration contracts,
56 hydrocarbon production contracts and 73 combined hydrocarbon exploration and
production contracts which are implemented on the basis of PSAs, and 13 contracts with
Tengizchevroil LLP.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The CRNMPC, under the Ministry of National Economy, is responsible for tariff setting and
overseeing competition. The CRNMPC is funded from the state budget and its board is
appointed by the prime minister. Its decisions are not contested by the government. It
regulates natural monopolies, including transmission and distribution, as well as all other
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5.3. Market convergence Kazakhstan
Tariffs
The CRNMPC regulates transmission, distribution and retail tariffs for electricity and
natural gas. Wholesale electricity prices are determined by bilateral contracts and the spot
market. In January 2009, the Law on Electricity came into effect, which sets a pricing
regime for generators within the framework of tariff caps approved by the government
up to 2015. To change the price caps, generators have to conclude an agreement with
the relevant ministry that entails specific investment obligations. Transmission and
distribution tariffs are regulated on the basis of cost. In 2013, the average household
electricity retail price, including taxes, was USD 0.046/kilowatt hour (kWh).
Natural gas tariffs are calculated taking into account the gas price and the transmission
and distribution network costs. Retail tariffs differ for the various customer categories.
Gas prices are regulated only for major suppliers, which according to a 2012 law have
preferential rights to buy gas from producers in order to serve domestic supply. This
regulated price includes production and transmission costs, plus a 10% margin. In 2013,
the average household gas price, including taxes, was USD 1.43/gigajoule (GJ).
In December 2014, the government introduced rules and procedures for retail pricing
mechanisms for oil products, which set price margins (upper cap) and tax to be levied on
prices outside of these margins.22
Household retail prices in Kazakhstan are considered to be among the lowest in the
world due to government subsidies. Regulated retail tariffs are not fully cost reflective
and do not always account for the cost of modernisation. As a result, much of the
distribution sector is stagnant and unable to replace obsolete infrastructure.
In the electricity sector, third-party access to the transmission and distribution networks
is allowed based on licensing and safety requirements. Generation, transmission and
distribution activities require licences from the relevant ministry or the CRNMPC. Retail
has no licensing requirements.
In the gas sector, access to the gas transmission system is allowed. Limitations are
imposed only in case of breach-of-contract obligations, when gas does not meet the
required specifications, or in case of lack of available capacity and/or respective agreements
on natural gas supply.
Feed-in tariffs
To address slow investment in energy infrastructure in times of growing demand, the
government introduced an interim tariff structure in 2009 that allows all electricity
generators to charge a premium to be used to modernise their assets. This tariff will
expire in 2015, after which time the new capacity model will take effect.
Also, in 2013, under the new Law on Supporting the Use of Renewable Energy Sources,
feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy were proposed. In December 2013, feed-in
tariffs of EUR 0.145/kWh for solar projects and USD 0.095/kWh for wind projects were
proposed, as well as 15-year purchasing power agreements (PPAs). The feed-in tariffs
entered into force June 2014 (Renewable Market Watch, 2014).
© OECD/IEA, 2015
22. http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=71660.
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Kazakhstan 5.3. Market convergence
Technical rules
The Law on Technical Regulation provides the legislative framework for the adoption of
international standards. Kazakhstan is a member of the International Standards Organization
(ISO) and the Eurasian Standardisation Council (EASC). It applies ISO technical standard 67
for materials, equipment and offshore structures for petroleum, petrochemical and natural
gas industries. The National TC 49 based on the Kazakh Institute of Oil and Gas also
deals with gas standards. Kazakhstan is not affiliated with the European Committee for
Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation
(CENELEC). There is no special technical committee for standardisation in the electricity
sector in Kazakhstan that mirrors the CENELEC technical committee as a platform for
common standards.
National gas and electricity codes of practice are within the competence of the Committee
on Construction, Housing, and Communal Services and Land Management of the Ministry
of National Economy.23
The principal stakeholders involved in the standardisation process are the Ministry of Oil
and Gas, the Kazakh Institute for Standardization and the Kazakh Institute of Oil and Gas.
Standards for oil products adopted in 2010 include: safety requirements for gasoline,
diesel and fuel oil; safety requirements for lubricants and specialty fluids for motor
vehicles; and safety requirements for additives to gasoline.
ELECTRICITY
Kazakhstan’s UPS is interconnected and harmonised with the Russian electricity system
and the Central Asian Power Grid. The Central Asian Power Grid includes Turkmenistan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan disconnected
from the grid in 2003 and 2009, respectively, and Uzbekistan’s disconnection cut off
Tajikistan as well. This disconnection reduced traded volumes considerably. Kazakhstan’s
electricity trade volumes are negligible.
The majority of cross-border electricity trading in Central Asia is conducted in accordance
with inter-governmental agreements. These provide a framework from which bilateral
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5.3. Market convergence Kazakhstan
agreements are negotiated. In the past, the energy supplies under these agreements
were bartered against delivery of fossil fuel. This practice has been largely abolished in
recent years and the parties have adopted a strictly monetary method of payment.
NATURAL GAS
Kazakhstan imports natural gas from Uzbekistan for industrial and household consumers
in the South Kazakhstan oblast (region), and from Turkmenistan for consumers in the
Mangystau oblast during periodic repairs of the Okarem-Beyneu transmission pipeline.
Kazakhstan exports its own natural gas to Russia only. Kazakhstan transits natural gas
from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to China through the Kazakh section of the Central
Asia-China pipeline. The establishment of co-operation with China is an important step
to help diversify Kazakhstan’s gas export and transit potential.
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Kazakhstan 5.4. Sustainable development
The Council for Sustainable Development is the advisory body on sustainable development,
assisting the government in national policy development. There is not a specific agency
responsible for the implementation of renewable and energy efficiency programmes and
measures. The Committee on Renewable Energy Sources was established in 2011 stemming
from a co-operation memorandum for renewable energy source development between
the UNDP and the Kazakhstan Electricity Association. The main purpose of the committee
is to promote state and private renewable energy development, raise the level of
association of non-governmental organisations, advocate for the reduction of environmental
pollution and ensure energy policy implementation in Kazakhstan.24
Renewable energy represents around 1% of the energy mix in Kazakhstan and 9% of
electricity output. Renewable potential is much higher, estimated at more than 1 000 TWh
per year, including wind potential at 1 300 TWh (not all viable), biomass at 35 TWh of
electricity and 44 gigacalories (Gcal) of heat, solar at 30 Bt of reference fuel equivalent,
and hydropower potential at 170 TWh (62 TWh technically feasible) (Energy Charter,
2013). In a 2010 economic development plan, the government set a target of 3% of
alternative energy sources in the energy mix by 2020.
In May 2013, the government adopted the Green Economy Concept, setting an ambitious
target of 50% alternative and renewable energy in the energy mix by 2050. The Action
Plan for the Development of Alternative and Renewable Energy for 2013-20 was adopted
in January 2013. Under the plan, 31 renewable energy projects are proposed with a
capacity of 1 040 MW, including a wind farm of 13-793 MW capacity, solar PV installations
of 77 MW capacity and a 170 MW hydropower plant. At the start of 2013, Kazakhstan
had 27 proposed renewable energy projects, including wind, solar, biogas and small
hydro. Feed-in tariffs for wind and solar energy were instituted in 2014, under the Law
on Supporting the Use of Renewable Energy Sources and with support from the EBRD.
The Programme of Wind Power Development to 2030 was prepared in conjunction with
the UN Development Programme – Wind Power Market Development Initiative. The
goal is to develop wind power to generate 900 GWh by 2015 and 5 TWh by 2024. Other
national plans that include a renewable energy component are the Programme for
Accelerated Industrial and Innovative Development for 2010–14, and the Programme of
Electricity Sector Development for 2010–14 that foresees wind power contributing about
1% of the total energy consumption by 2015 (Energy Charter, 2013). Samruk-Green-
Energy, a subsidiary of state-owned Samruk-Energy, is undertaking wind and solar PV power
projects. The first phase of a wind project that may be expanded to 300 MW will bring
45 MW on line before the end of 2014 and will supply green electricity to Expo 2017
Future Energy. Three wind power plants (60-300 MW) are expected to be launched in
the Almaty area in the period from 2014 to 2018; two of them will be located in the
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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5.4. Sustainable development Kazakhstan
Shelek corridor and another in the Djungar Gates area. In December 2013, Samruk-Green-
Energy launched the Kapchagai solar PV station with an installed capacity of 2 MW.25
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
The Law on Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency, in effect since January 2012, provides a
legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for energy efficiency and savings measures.
In August 2013, the ambitious Energy Efficiency Program 2020 was approved, targeting a
10% reduction in energy intensity (of the economy) by 2015 and a 25% reduction by
2020. The programme incorporates 78 activities with an estimated cost of USD 7.6 billion.
Most of the funding is expected to come from investment funds and enterprises
(Kazinform, 2013).
Measures include approval of some 3 000 energy standards and energy efficiency
categories for buildings and household appliances. Sixteen regional and five sectoral
energy saving plans will be undertaken. More than 11 700 entities were listed in the State
Energy Registry. More than 2 000 industries will have to undergo energy audits before
July 2015. Three energy centres, which will demonstrate and promote efficient technologies,
are being built in the cities of Almaty, Aktobe and Astana, the Kazakh capital.
A 2011-20 programme concerned with housing and communal services is undertaking
the thermal renovation of houses. During 2014-16, improvements to 892 boilers with
capacity from 1 – 100 Gcal/hour are expected to reduce their heat consumption by 30%
(Kazinform, 2013).
Two large-scale efficiency projects are ongoing. The 2007-13 Efficiency Improvement
Municipal District Heating Systems project has an overall budget of USD 7.8 million and
is co-financed by international donors and private sector investment. The 2010-15
Energy Efficient Design and Construction of Residential Buildings has an overall budget of
USD 32.5 million, of which USD 4.6 million is co-financed by international donors.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Kazakhstan’s environment has been affected by past military nuclear testing programmes
and industrial and mining activities, and is characterised by land degradation, desertification
and water scarcity. Similar problems apply to the entire Central Asia region. In 2010,
Kazakhstan established the Green Bridge Partnership Programme, concentrating on
sustainable development in the region and beyond. In Central Asia, the programme
addresses issues related to energy and water linkages.
Kazakhstan has ratified more than twenty international environmental treaties. They
provide a basis for the national environmental regulatory framework, which includes a
package of national laws, presidential decrees and government resolutions.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Kazakhstan’s total greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were 283.6 Mt in 2012, more than
20% below 1990 levels. Around 85% of the GHG emissions in 2012 are from the energy
sector (UNFCCC, 2014). Energy-related CO2 emissions totalled 225.8 Mt in 2012 in Kazakhstan,
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25. www.samruk-green.kz.
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Kazakhstan 5.4. Sustainable development
which is 5% lower compared to 1990. The power generation sector accounts for 37.7%
of emissions, followed by manufacturing (27.6%), refining and other energy industries
(17.6%), transport (6.4%), residential (5.5%) and the commercial and public services
sector (5.1%).
Kazakhstan signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2009. As an Annex B country it did
not have an emissions target for the first commitment period. The government has
declared its intent to become an Annex I country.
Under the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, Kazakhstan proposed to reduce emissions to 15%
below 1990 levels by 2020. Kazakhstan has also proposed a 2050 target of 25% based on
1992 levels. It submitted a provisional 90% target for the second commitment period,
meaning that Kazakhstan’s average annual GHG emissions during the period 2013-20
would not be more than 90% of 1990 levels.
In 2011, the emissions trading scheme (ETS) (cap and trade mechanism) for Kazakhstan
was approved. In 2013, 55% of total GHG emissions were covered under the ETS. The
cap in 2013 was 147 million tonnes of carbon dioxide-equivalent (MtCO2-eq). During the
second and the third phases (2014-15 and 2016-20) the cap will decrease linearly to the
2020 target. The first two phases included free allowances, while auctioning may be
introduced in phase three.26
GAS FLARING
Kazakhstan participates in the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction Initiative. As
part of its commitment under the Global Gas Flaring Reduction, the country had set an
ambitious target to eliminate gas flaring by 2012, except for technologically inevitable
combustion.
Anti-flaring legislation was passed in 2010, specifying that gas that would normally be
flared should be used as raw material for the production of petrochemicals, and that
licences for oil production will be issued only to companies that agree to capture and use
by-product gas. Companies have made efforts and the volume of gas flared was reduced
by almost half in the period 2005-09. Based on the information provided by subsoil
users, the Ministry of Oil and Gas reported lower volumes of associated gas combustion,
from 3.3 bcm in 2006 to around 1 bcm in 2012.
The World Bank, however, reports an increase of gas flaring in Kazakhstan – a 24%
increase, from 3.8 bcm in 2010 to 4.7 bcm in 2011. The 2011 data is collected through
the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s satellite detectors with the
visible infrared imaging radiometer suite. The data show a worldwide increase of
associated gas combustion volumes, from 138 bcm in 2010 to 140 bcm in 2011. The
major part of this increase is from the United States, Russia, Kazakhstan and Venezuela.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
26. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/developed/kazakhstan.html.
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5.5. Investment attraction Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan has made extensive efforts towards a full market economy, allowing privatisation
and decentralisation, and the introduction of markets in most sectors. According to the
National Bank of Kazakhstan, a favourable business environment and political stability
have contributed to a significant inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) over the past
decade, up from USD 4.6 billion in 2001 to USD 20 billion in 2011. Most investments in
the energy sector were in hydrocarbon production: more than USD 30 billion in the oil and
gas sector since 1993. The main investors in Kazakhstan’s economy are the Netherlands,
the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Russian Federation and China
(Energy Charter, 2013).
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Kazakhstan was
ranked 77th among 189 countries in 2014. A high ranking on the ease of doing business
index means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the start-up and operation
of a firm. This index averages the country's rankings on ten topics, made up of a variety
of indicators with equal weight. Kazakhstan’s ranking is the third-highest among EECCA
countries, behind Georgia and Belarus.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index prepared by Transparency International,
which measures the level of perceived corruption in the public system, Kazakhstan was
ranked 126th among 175 countries in 2014 with a score of 29. This is a poor score with
regards to perceived corruption in the country, as a score of 100 represents no
corruption. Its ranking is comparable of that of the Russian Federation.
Kazakhstan became a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
in 2013 when the EITI Board found it compliant with the requirements. The country will
be evaluated again in 2016 on the matters of transparency and an adequate process to
ensure regular disclosure of natural resource revenues. Maintaining compliance will require
that Kazakhstan meet all requirements in the recently revised EITI Standard (EITI, 2013).
Kazakhstan is also a member of a number of international treaties, including the Customs
Union, the Energy Charter Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol, and is actively seeking to
become a member of the World Trade Organization. Participation in these agreements
creates certain expectations for the government, and contributes to a favourable
investment climate.
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The privatisation process is governed by a 1995 presidential decree, the 1999 Programme
of Privatisation and Management of State Property, and a number of other government
decrees and resolutions of the Blue Chip Privatisation Programme. The authority for
privatisation in Kazakhstan is the Committee on State Property and Privatisation under
the Ministry of Finance. By 2001, Kazakhstan had privatised thousands of enterprises;
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Kazakhstan 5.5. Investment attraction
nevertheless, many large, important enterprises are still owned by the state. According to
the Statistical Office, less than half of the large and very large enterprises are fully privatised.
Four major legislative acts govern foreign investment in Kazakhstan. They provide for
non-expropriation, currency convertibility, guarantees of legal stability, transparent government
procurement and incentives in certain priority sectors. These are the Law on Investment
(2003), the Customs Code and the Customs Union Code (2010), the Law on Government
Procurement (2007) and the Tax Code (2008).
These four laws provide that investment disputes with state bodies can be settled by
negotiation in Kazakhstani courts or through international arbitration. Other dispute
resolutions can be addressed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
thus restricting recourse to international arbitration in favour of the Kazakhstani judicial
system. In December 2004, Kazakhstan adopted a law on international arbitration. The
law appears to give broad authority for judicial review of arbitral awards in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has been a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes since 2001.
The Tax Code adopted in 2008 lowered corporate income and value-added taxes (VAT),
replaced royalty payments with a mineral extraction tax, and introduced excess profits
and rent taxes on the export of crude oil and natural gas. It applies taxes universally and
allows only a limited number of exemptions. The code applies an international model of
taxation, based on the principles of equity, economic neutrality and simplicity.
The corporate income tax rate was reduced from 30% to 20% in 2006. VAT was reduced
gradually from 16% in 2006 to 12% in 2009, where it remains. Kazakhstan reintroduced
export duties on oil products in mid-2010. Duty on crude oil was set at USD 20/tonne
and was increased to USD 40/tonne as of 1 January 2011. This tax is in addition to the
mineral extraction tax and the rent tax.
The 2007 Law on Licensing establishes the legal framework and requires the relevant
agency to issue a licence within one month of a company's submission of all required
documents. The law simplified procedural requirements for issuing licences, reduced the
number of licensed activities from 426 to 349 and introduced a mechanism to help
prevent the extension of this list. Experts estimate that overall licensing for the period
2004-09 was reduced threefold. However, licensing remains problematic, particularly for
small and medium-sized enterprises. There are pending proposals to reduce the
complexity of issuing licences, including those in the oil and gas sector.
Kazakhstan's efforts to create a sound financial system and stable macroeconomic
framework have been notable among the former Soviet republics. Of course, Kazakhstan,
like most of the world, has been affected by the financial crisis of recent years. In
October 2008, the government announced stabilisation plans that included the purchase of
25% ownership of Kazakhstan’s four largest private banks, thereby injecting an additional
USD 4 billion into the domestic banking system. International donor organisations and local
analysts generally agree that the situation in the banking sector improved significantly.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The annual amount of investment required to implement the Green Economy Concept
from now until 2050 will be, on average, USD 3-4 billion per year. Investments are
expected to peak from 2020 to 2024, equating to 1.8% of GDP, while the average over
the period to 2050 is estimated at about 1% of GDP. Most if this investment is expected
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The bulk of the investment – about three-quarters of the USD 90 billion – will be
directed to natural gas infrastructure, renewables and energy efficiency. Measures to
develop the green economy aspects of agriculture, water and waste management will be
less demanding in terms of financing.
Established in 2003, the Investment Fund of Kazakhstan (IFK) is to contribute to the
implementation of the strategy by attracting investment to promising enterprises. The
IFK participates in financing projects targeted at the expansion, reconstruction, and
technical upgrade of both existing and newly established enterprises.
The 2013 budget included 46 investment projects in natural gas. This direction is to help
achieve the objectives of the 2012 Law on Gas and Gas Supply, including increasing the
share of gas in the energy balance, expanding its availability, ensuring reliability of
supply to all consumers, and enhancing energy and environmental security.
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Kazakhstan References
References
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Study 2013,
Reserves, Resources, Availability, BGR, Hannover.
EIA (US Energy Information Agency) (2015), Kazakhstan Country Analysis, www.eia.gov/countries/
cab.cfm?fips=KZ (accessed 3 February 2015).
EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative) (2013), “Kazakhstan accepted as ‘EITI
Compliant’”, 17 October, eiti.org.
Energy Charter Secretariat (2013), Investment Climate and Market Structure Review in the Energy
Sector of Kazakhstan, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels.
EEAS (European External Action Service) (2015), “EU and Kazakhstan initial Enhanced Partnership
and Cooperation Agreement”, press release, EEAS, 20 January, http://eeas.europa.eu.
EIA (United States Energy Information) (2015), Overview: Kazakhstan, EIA website, January,
www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=KZ.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014a), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IEA (2014b), Medium-Term Gas Market Report, OECD /IEA, Paris.
IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Kazakhstan Embassy (2014), “‘Kazakhstan-2050’ strategy: New political course of the established
state”, press release, Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the United States, Washington,
DC, www.kazakhembus.com/content/kazakhstan-2050-strategy.
Kazinform (2013), “Kazakh government adopts Energy Efficiency 2020 Program”, 27 August,
Kazinform, www.inform.kz.
NURIS (Nazarbayev University Research and Innovation System) (2013), “Climate change domestic
mitigation policies in Kazakhstan: A technical economic evaluation”, presentation at IEA-ETSAP
workshop, Paris, 18 June.
Renewable Market Watch (2014), “Kazakhstan solar and wind power markets. New feed-in tariffs and
very good opportunities for 2014”, Renewable Market Watch, http://renewablemarketwatch.com.
Reuters (2014), “Kazakhstan sticks to 2014 oil output plan despite Tengiz fall”, 20 December,
Reuters, uk.reuters.com.
UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) (2012), Innovation Performance Review
Kazakhstan, UNECE, New York.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2014), “GHG country
profile: Kazakhstan”, UNFCCC website, http://unfccc.int (accessed 17 December 2014).
World Bank (2014a), Kazakhstan Partnership Program Snapshot, World Bank Group, Astana.
World Bank (2014b), Kazakhstan Overview, World Bank website, www.worldbank.org (accessed
15 December 2014).
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KYRGYZSTAN
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Kyrgyzstan
K A Z A K H S T A N
Figure 6.1.1 Map of Kyrgyzstan
Bishkek
K Y R G Y Z S T A N
UZBEKISTAN
CHINA
(People’s Republic of)
T A J I K I S T A N
0 100 km
6.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
6.1. General energy policy Kyrgyzstan
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
1. www.indexmundi.com/kyrgyzstan/economy_profile.html.
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
The energy sector represents about 4% of GDP and 16% of industrial production.
Hydropower accounts for two-thirds of energy production. Kyrgyzstan produces coal and
some oil and gas, but most hydrocarbons are imported. Kyrgyzstan is reliant on imports
of oil and gas for more than half of its energy needs, particularly during the winter
months when hydropower production is low. As such, regional integration with
neighbouring countries is important.
Kyrgyzstan is part of the Central Asian Power Grid, connecting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan; however, electricity trade in the grid has fallen
substantially since 2009 when Uzbekistan disconnected its supplies. New integration plans
include the CASA 1 000 project (Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade
Project), which is planning to connect Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as electricity-exporting
countries to supply electricity to Afghanistan and Iran. The project is in the advanced
stages of planning and could be operational by 2020, provided security issues are cleared.
Suffering from lack of investment, Kyrgyzstan’s energy sector is characterised by old
infrastructure and high losses. They system operates at approximately 50% of its full
capacity. The significant deterioration of energy assets and poor sector development
result from heavy subsidies, particularly for electricity consumption, which drains resources
for system maintenance and investment. Kyrgyzstan sold its natural gas network to
Gazprom for USD 1 in 2013, due to its inability to finance the necessary rehabilitation. It
is expected that Gazprom will invest USD 600 million in the gas system over 25 years.
Current energy policy focuses on improving energy security through the development of
indigenous energy sources (mainly hydro and coal) as well as the rehabilitation and
expansion of transmission and distribution networks. Sustainable energy development
and energy efficiency improvements are also a priority.
Kyrgyzstan has strengthened ties with the Russian Federation (Russia) and China in the
energy sector over the past few years. China and Russia are financing a number of key
development projects currently underway. Kyrgyzstan signed the accession treaty for
the newly established Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in December 2014 and
is expected to become a member in May 2015.
SUPPLY
Total primary energy supply (TPES)2 in Kyrgyzstan was 4.1 million tonnes of oil-equivalent
(Mtoe) in 2012. Energy supply increased by 20% in 2011 and a further 25% in 2012, after
a decade of subdued growth, mainly due to a 60% increase in oil imports over the same
period (Figure 6.1.2). In 2012, coal production increased by 40% compared to 2011, to
1 million tonnes (Mt) of brown coal and 0.2 Mt of hard coal, which also contributed to
the strong increase in TPES. Coal production is estimated to have increased to 1.5 Mt by
end-2014 (Times of Central Asia, 2014).
Over the ten years since 2002, TPES has increased by 70.6% in total. This is mostly due to an
increase in the supply of oil and coal, despite a fall in natural gas supply. The supply of oil
increased five-fold over the ten years, while the coal supply doubled. Conversely, the natural
gas supply declined by 52%. Hydropower production also grew by 38.4% over the same period.
2. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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6.1. General energy policy Kyrgyzstan
Oil accounted for 40% of TPES in 2012. Hydro was about 30% and coal around 25%.
Natural gas provided more than 8% of TPES, with other fuels contributing negligible
amounts. Oil has been the dominant fuel in Kyrgyzstan’s energy mix since 2007 and
imports have significantly increased over the last decade. Prior to 2007, hydropower was
the largest source and natural gas accounted for more than a quarter of TPES.
Kyrgyzstan produced 1.7 Mtoe in 2012, about 42% of its TPES, an increase of more than
51% from 2002. In 2012, hydro accounted for 70% of domestic energy production, coal
for 24% and oil for 4.5%. Over the decade, hydropower production increased 38% and
coal by 147% due to investment in new mines. Oil production increased by just under
4%, while natural gas production declined by 3.7%.
4
Hydro
3
2
1
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation in Kyrgyzstan was 15.2 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, about 27%
higher than in 2002 (Figure 6.1.3). Hydropower supplies more than 93% of electricity,
but the seasonality of water availability can mean volatility in output. Coal accounts for
about 5% of power generation, oil for 1% and gas for 0.5%.
8
6
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
Heat production was 13.5 petajoules (PJ) in 2012, with 85% from coal and 15% from gas.
While heat generation increased 76% over the decade, the fuel mix has changed notably
from 71% gas and 29% coal in 2002.
DEMAND
Transport is the largest consuming sector in Kyrgyzstan and it accounts for 37.6% of total
final consumption (TFC).3 The residential sector accounts for 21.1%, while industry and
the commercial sector make up 19.5% and 9.1%, respectively. Approximately 13% of TFC
data for Kyrgyzstan is unspecified with regards to a sector (Figure 6.1.4).
3
2
1
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Note: Reporting on residential consumption changed in 2007.
* Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing, forestry and non-specified consumption.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
3. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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6.1. General energy policy Kyrgyzstan
TFC was 3.5 Mtoe in 2012 and has doubled compared to 2002, growing at a faster rate
than TPES. This indicates that demand from the above-mentioned sectors has been
stronger in comparison to demand from electricity generation. This is particularly true
for the transport sector, which increased consumption by 387% over the same period.
The transport sector is fuelled by oil, and this increase coincides with an increase in oil
products imports.
Oil dominated 44.9% of TFC in 2012. Oil is used in transport and to a certain extent in
industry and power generation. Electricity represented 23.4% of TFC in 2012, consumed
in households and the commercial sector (including agriculture). Coal accounted for
18.6% of TFC, used primarily in industry for localised electricity generation. Biofuels and
waste, and gas, accounted for 7% and 6% of TFC, respectively, and both are mainly
consumed in households.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Kyrgyzstan’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.29 tonnes
of oil-equivalent per USD 1 000 of GDP PPP (toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP) in 2012. This is the
fourth-highest level of intensity among the EECCA countries (Figure 6.1.5).
Figure 6.1.5 Energy intensity in Kyrgyzstan and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.9 Armenia
0.8 Kyrgyzstan
0.7 Moldova
0.6 Georgia
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5 Tajikistan
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Energy intensity in Kyrgyzstan has increased by 14.4% since 2002. The increase is unlike
other EECCA countries, which have reduced their energy intensity over the same period.
Much of the increase in the energy intensity in Kyrgyzstan has been since 2007 due to a
surge in coal product and oil imports.
RENEWABLES
Hydropower is the main source of renewable energy in Kyrgyzstan. It accounts for 29.5%
of TPES, 70% of all energy produced in the country and 93.5% of electricity generation.
Kyrgyzstan ranks second-highest with regard to the share of renewables in TPES among
EECCA countries, behind Tajikistan. Biofuels and waste are also in the energy mix, however
negligible at 0.1% of TPES (Figure 6.1.6).
Hydro production was 38.4% higher in 2012 compared to 2002. This is a slower rate of
growth compared to TPES and so the share of renewables in TPES has decreased from
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
36.5% in 2002. In electricity generation, however, hydro has increased a share of the
total, from 85.9% in 2002 to 93.5% in 2012, as electricity generation from natural gas has
nearly diminished.
Figure 6.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Kyrgyzstan and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
MARKET STRUCTURE
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6.1. General energy policy Kyrgyzstan
generation, transmission and distribution. While legally unbundled, the companies in effect
are still operated by the State Property Fund under the Ministry of Energy and Industry.
State-owned Electric Power Plants (EPP) Joint Stock Company (JSC) is the largest electricity
generator. National Electric Grid Company (NESK) JSC is the state-owned transmission
system operator (TSO) which operates the national transmission system and the national
dispatch service.
The distribution and retail functions of the power sector are still bundled, and distribution
system operators (DSOs) are obligated to provide retail service in their territories. There
are four electricity DSOs in Kyrgyzstan and one district heating DSO. The existing market
is based on bilateral contracts between generators and network operators with regulated
retail tariffs. Without competitive prices, there is little incentive for the TSO and the
DSOs to improve efficiencies.
According to the government, the KyrgyzEnergo restructuring failed to improve electricity
supply conditions and had deleterious effects on the sector’s financial condition. Weak
regulatory frameworks and the inability to increase tariffs are responsible.
Under the Rehabilitation of the Energy Sector 2013-2014 project supported by the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), the Ministry of Energy and Industry announced in September 2014
plans for the development of a Financial Settlements Center for Electricity. The settlement
centre would be a new independent institution that will process all energy sales and
distribute cash flow based on volumes and set tariffs. It is unclear when the settlement
centre would become operational.
In the national energy strategy to 2025, the government states plans to introduce a fully
liberalised and competitive electricity market model. The market mechanisms are
intended to stimulate competition for a more cost-effective electricity supply as well as
competition in the retail market. However, no changes to the existing market structure
have been made to date.
Coal
The coal sector in Kyrgyzstan is managed by a state-owned enterprise, named KyrgyzKomur,
which acts an umbrella organisation for 23 smaller private coal companies. Seven other
companies engage in seasonal coal production during the autumn-winter periods.
KyrgyzKomur was established in August 2012.
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Energy and Industry manages and regulates the energy sector. It is
responsible for energy policy and strategy development as well as energy-related
legislation. Within the Ministry, the State Property Fund manages the state-owned
electricity sector companies.
The State Department of Regulation of Fuel and Energy was established in 2009 and is
run by the Ministry of Energy and Industry, funded from the state budget. It was the
single energy regulator until September 2012, with tariff-setting and licensing functions.
From September 2012, the functions of “anti-monopoly regulation” in the field of energy
were transferred to the anti-monopoly authority. Under the new rules, all monopolies
(including most of the energy sector enterprises) are obliged to negotiate tariffs with the
anti-monopoly authority. It is assumed that the companies then apply to the other
regulator for the setting of the tariff.
The Scientific Technical Centre for Energy develops normative and legislative acts. It is
engaged in research on energy efficiency, renewables including small hydropower and
other research.
The Centre on the Problems of Using Renewable Energy Resources (CPURER) develops
strategies for the development of renewables. The Association of Renewable Energy
Resources works with CPURER on a programme to develop renewables.
The Directorate for Small and Medium-size Power Facilities was created in 2008 to
develop small and medium-sized hydro power plants. It is responsible for facilitating
their development.
In 2012, the State Agency for Environmental Protection and Forestry and the Coordinating
Commission on Climate Change (KKPIK) were instituted, with responsibility for environmental
protection and climate change policies.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Kyrgyzstan’s primary energy legislation is based on the following laws: Energy (1996);
Electricity (1996); Energy Savings (1998); Special Status of the Toktogul Cascade of
Hydropower Station and National High-Voltage Grid (2002); and Renewable Energy
(2008). The oil and gas sector is legislated through the Law on Oil and Gas (2004). The
Law on Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency in Buildings was adopted in 2013 to
legislate implementation of energy efficiency policies.
Changes to energy policy and strategy during 2012 and 2013 have led to a number of
amendments to existing laws. In addition, draft laws related to the energy market and
the natural gas market have been developed, but not adopted.
Secondary legislation adopted includes the National Energy Grid Rules (2012) and the
Rules of Supply and Use of Natural Gas (2012). In March 2014, the Rules of Using Heat
were approved by the government.
KEY POLICIES
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
Khumri – Kabul transmission line connecting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran.
An agreement was signed between the countries in 2012 to build the transmission
network, and by the end of 2014 the countries had agreed on tariffs. Security issues in
Afghanistan and securing financing remain the largest hurdles at present. The project is
expected to cost the Kyrgyz government around USD 200 million (approximately a fifth
of the total cost).
Other regional participation includes integration of water and energy resources and their
regulation, and sharing water facilities as well as oil and gas pipelines. The Kyrgyz
government therefore needs to develop an external energy policy for the challenges
involved in the development of an electricity market, and to legislate the necessary
changes to the national policy.
The government is also planning to reform the coal sector. Priorities include its
privatisation and increasing competition. The government plans to phase out financial
support to the sector and to attract private investment. As coal is currently the most
cost-effective and readily available fuel, the government is planning to increase production
in existing fields from 450 kilotonnes (kt) in 2010 to 3 Mt by 2025. In 2012, coal
production was 1.1 Mt. The main objectives of coal sector reform are to:
privatise the coal sector and create a competitive coal market
improve working and safety conditions
improve socio-economic and ecological conditions in coal mining regions.
In the oil and gas sector, policies look to improve the fiscal regime of minerals management
and to attract investment to develop new oil and gas fields. Further, they aim to foster
competition in domestic oil supply with fair conditions for all market participants. Gazprom
Kyrgyzstan, in co-operation with Gazprom, is developing a gas distribution policy to 2030.
Kyrgyzstan ratified the Kyoto Protocol in February 2005. A number of Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) projects have been identified, but not registered yet. In October 2013,
the government adopted the Priorities for Adaptation to Climate Change up to 2017
programme, aimed at developing adaptation measures in water, agriculture, health,
environmental emergencies, forestry and biodiversity. The respective ministries are expected
to submit sectoral adaptation programmes by November 2014. The Programme for
Adaptation to Climate Change for 2011-2015 and the implementation plan had been
developed by the Ministry of Health, within the World Health Organization framework.
INVESTMENT
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6.1. General energy policy Kyrgyzstan
ASSESSMENT
The review team commends the Kyrgyz government for adopting the overall National
Energy Programme for Developing the Fuel and Energy Complex for 2008-10 with an
Outlook to 2025. This medium-term development programme spells out the government’s
vision for maintaining energy security, increasing domestic production and promoting
sustainable development. However, six years since its adoption, very little of the policy
has been implemented.
The rationale for lack of progress is the issue of social acceptability of energy pricing for
electricity and heat at levels that reflect their true costs. It appears that both the
government and the consumers assume heat and power to be a public good, which
should be provided free. Electricity and heat tariffs therefore remain heavily subsidised.
The same notion, however, is not true for other energy commodities such as petroleum,
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
Subsidy reform is highly politicised. This is the case even though the government and the
energy industry sector acknowledge that the subsidies are inefficient and often benefit
consumers that are capable of paying a market price for electricity and heat. The team
observed unanimity across the sector players that implementation of energy policy
objectives and securing the required investments cannot be achieved without moving
towards more cost-reflective tariffs. Yet, there is a striking reluctance on the part of the
government to alter the established tariff structure due to concerns of social unrest.
The review team therefore suggests that the government implement its medium-term
tariff-increase policy and continue to increase prices until they are cost-reflective. The
objective is to phase out the inefficient power and heat consumer subsidies, while taking
into account a detailed social impact/security assessment. Tariffs should reflect the
actual cost of the production and delivery of the energy, while providing suitable means
for protecting the most vulnerable in the society.
To implement tariff restructuring in the most effective manner, the government should
replace the existing energy strategy with an outlook to 2025, with a new energy strategy
to the medium-term 2020 and with an outlook to 2050. The new strategy should include
a detailed overall assessment of the energy sector, including the use of energy data,
together with a comprehensive social impact analysis.
Reforming subsidies and restructuring the tariff system to reflect cost of service could
provide sources of investment for the much-neglected energy infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan.
The implementation of the heat and electricity tariff restructuring under the extended
2020 strategy would allow for the necessary investment in ageing infrastructure. The
greatest challenges lie in improving reliability of supply and the quality of service, while
ensuring an energy mix which allows for switching between fuels when necessary. While
precise measurements of transmission and distribution losses in electricity, heat and natural
gas are not available, they are considered to be between 10% and 50%. These very high loss
levels can be improved through the modernisation of networks and systems. Kyrgyzstan,
much like its neighbouring countries, is overwhelmed with ageing infrastructure across
the whole energy sector. The present state of the energy infrastructure reduces its
reliability and causes outages. Investments in efficiency improvements in generation and
networks are also fundamental to improve performance in a cost-effective manner.
A new strategy should also include a detailed analysis of possible new developments in
the domestic energy sector with a focus on efficiency improvements, indigenous resource
production and alternative fuel options. The potential in Kyrgyzstan for efficiency gains
in both energy demand and supply is unclear and should be assessed. It should also
include an analysis of the full potential for renewable and alternative energy sources,
including a clear understanding of associated cost and available incentives/subsidies.
Kyrgyzstan should evaluate its indigenous coal potential for use in combined heat and
power generation and, if economical, it should develop it in a sustainable manner with
clean coal technologies.
As district heating is one of least efficient energy systems in the country due to ageing
infrastructure, it is important that the government consider restructuring the sector with
more use of alternative fuels and efficient technologies. This includes the use of co-
generation boilers, installation of individual meters and the replacement of ageing
pipeline networks. Restructuring district heating should be done in tandem with the
modernisation and expansion of the electricity system, with the cost of both approaches
reflected in consumer tariffs.
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6.1. General energy policy Kyrgyzstan
As part of the implementation of its national strategy (existing and new ones), it is
important to establish an energy regulatory authority that is independent and free from
any political influence. A regulatory authority should have responsibility for overseeing
the energy sector’s functioning and the planned market, setting price controls and
protecting consumers. Consumers should also be represented in order to protect
consumer rights.
Since electricity, heat and natural gas tariff increases are necessary to rehabilitate the
energy supply and delivery system and to bring on new facilities to improve reliability,
efficiency and quality of energy supply, consumers need to gain a better understanding
of the real costs of electricity and value it as a commodity. The review team commends
the government for its education and outreach initiative to better inform the public
through various media channels. This will help gain social acceptance of reasonable tariff
increases accompanied by improvements in service.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Kyrgyzstan 6.1. General energy policy
Consider incentive schemes for energy efficiency improvements on both demand and
supply sides. In demand management, this includes rehabilitation of older buildings
and setting strict new building standards. On the supply side, energy efficiency
improvements include incentives on investment in modern technologies and
automated systems, rehabilitation of infrastructure and investment in grid access for
new renewable generation.
Establish an energy efficiency and renewable energy agency to implement the
energy efficiency and renewable energy policies and measures.
Raise public awareness on the real cost of electricity and the possible increase in
tariffs, and on energy savings and energy efficiency gains which can help to offset
electricity price increases, to combat public sensitivity on the issue of tariffs.
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6.2. Energy security Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan holds marginal oil and gas resources and substantial coal resources.
Recoverable oil reserves are estimated at 5 Mt, with 10 Mt of resources. Gas reserves
are estimated at 6 bcm and 20 bcm of resources. Hard coal reserves amount to 971 Mt,
with 27 528 Mt of resources. Kyrgyzstan ranks fifteenth-highest in the world regarding
hard coal resources (BGR, 2013). According to government estimates, coal reserves are
much larger, at 6 400 Mt, including 5 400 Mt brown coal and 1 000 Mt hard coal.
Most oil and gas deposits that have been exploited for more than 70 years have
produced approximately 70% of economically viable capacity. Newer oil wells from 1992
have a depreciation of 30%. The production of oil and gas has declined compared to the
early 1990s due to depleting resources and aged equipment. In the future, the
government plans to exploit new wells, with potential recognised in the Ferghana Valley,
the Alai Valley, the Naryn basin, the Issyk-Kul basin and the East of the Chuy basin.
Kyrgyzstan's coal resources are much higher than its reserves, as the majority is difficult
to exploit. The country has approximately 70 coal deposits. However, the government is
planning to increase coal mining considerably, from 450 kt in 2010 to 3 Mt in 2025. In
2012, coal production was 1.1 Mt. The growth will come from a 30% increase in the
existing mines in Kara-Keche, Besh-Burhan, Žergalan, Sulukta and Tash-Kumyr.
The hydropower potential of the rivers in Kyrgyzstan is approximately ten times more
than what is currently utilised.
Kyrgyzstan’s energy system is highly challenged and faces supply security threats. The
network is old and inefficient with high loss rates. Similarly, electricity production is
subject to the seasonal and weather-dependent nature of its hydro-based system.
Electricity reliability is lower during the winter months due to less water inflows and high
demand. As well, the demand centres are in the north, while more than 80% of hydro
capacity is in the south. Old transmission connections are a further handicap.
Electricity supply is also constrained by regional water-energy trade-offs. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian countries bartered for the exchange of
fuel, electricity and water resources, which led to disagreements among countries that
did not cease until 2003. Nonetheless, lengthy annual negotiations are still common on
seasonal water flows, electricity export quantities and prices, and winter fuel prices.
The government is mainly focused on diversifying energy sources and increasing domestic
production, mainly for hydropower. In addition, a number of rehabilitation projects for existing
thermal power plants are under consideration. According to the National Sustainable
Development Strategy for 2013-2017, measures to improve the security of supply include:
reconstruction of the Bishkek TEC-1 plant to increase capacity to 400 megawatts (MW)
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Kyrgyzstan 6.2. Energy security
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6.2. Energy security Kyrgyzstan
the Rehabilitation of the Energy Sector 2013-2014 project for the rehabilitation of the
electricity network, with a loan from the ADB. Project costs of USD 62 million are to be
financed with USD 55 million from the ADB (a grant of USD 40 million and a loan of
USD 15 million) and USD 7 billion from the government.
Power plant Construction period 2010 2015 2020 2025 Total end capacity (MW)
The Project Strengthening of Power in Bishkek and Osh was also approved in 2012,
including the rehabilitation of the Bishkek CHP. The expected cost of USD 28 million is to be
fully financed by the Islamic Development Bank with a three-year implementation period.
A 500 kV Obi-Garm-Sangtuda-Kunduz-Puli Khumri-Kabul transmission line is planned under
the CASA 1 000 project. CASA 1 000 represents a 1 200 km high-voltage power line grid
connecting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The project was approved in 2012
by all member countries and will likely begin construction in the next five years. The two
exporting countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will generate foreign exchange earnings as a
result of the export of surplus summer electricity. The project will also provide the connection
of power between the two countries, which will improve the reliability of the high-voltage
electricity transmission network in the region. For Afghanistan, the project will provide a source
of additional net summer electricity that can be used to meet domestic needs and/or be
re-exported to Pakistan. Afghanistan is also guaranteed a significant income from the transit
of electricity. For Pakistan, the lack of electricity is a major constraint to economic growth.
Talks began during 2013 for the construction of an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan.
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Kyrgyzstan 6.2. Energy security
COAL
The government plans to significantly increase coal mining from 450 kt in 2010 to 3 Mt
by 2025 with a 30% increase from existing mines. During 2012, coal production totalled
1.1 Mt. If production from the Kara-Keche coal mine is increased, this will ensure enough
coal for the proposed construction of the Kara-Kečinskoj TPP to supply base load power in
the north. Another coal-fired plant is proposed for Kara-Kečinskuû with a 1.2 GW capacity
that would require at least 2.5 Mt of coal per year. The government is looking for
investors to undertake the Kara-Kečinskuû project and is in talks with Chinese investors.
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Electricity, heat and natural gas system reliability in Kyrgyzstan is poor. Outages during
the winter months (due to low water flow) are common and the highly inefficient
transmission and distribution systems strain to meet demand during particularly cold
winters. Plus, energy theft is common.
Much of the poor reliability is due to insufficient investment stemming from highly
subsidised tariffs that do not cover the costs of operation. Financing is needed to
refurbish and replace ageing equipment and infrastructure. Typically 30% of annual
rehabilitation programmes cannot be implemented for lack of financing. There is no
comprehensive preventive maintenance strategy in place.
In the electricity sector, technical losses in the transmission system are around 6-7% and
about 15-17% in the distribution grids. Theft accounts for 8%. These losses amount to
about 30% total loss in the electricity network. In the heat sector, losses are up to 25%
due to aged infrastructure, with some parts of the network experiencing losses up to
45%. In the gas sector, actual losses are around 20% while the allowable level is 10% for
gas distribution and 1.5% for transmission networks.
Kyrgyzstan has no effective system of reporting losses and outages. The INOGATE
Programme’s ‘Enhancement of Environmental Protection Measures in the Oil and Gas
Industry of Central Asia’ (EPMOGI) project prepared proposals for such a system.
However, they have not been adopted due to lack of funding.
The importance of enhancing the security and reliability of the grid-based portions of the
energy sector is reflected in the energy policies envisaged by the National Energy
Programme and Strategy for Fuel and Energy Sector Development 2010-2025. Yet
because of the lack of financing, the government efforts can only manage the slow
rehabilitation of existing infrastructure that can be supported by marginal tariff increases,
equivalent to a few kilometres of line rehabilitation per year.
Some remedial measures that have been put in place in the past few years with donor
support include programmes for raising public awareness and installing electricity meters
with pre-paid smart cards.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Emergency response policy for energy supply is part of wider national emergency
procedures, managed by other public authorities outside of the Ministry of Energy.
Under the legal requirements, industrial users are required to have a backup fuel
(usually diesel) in the case of power and gas supply stoppages.
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6.3. Market convergence Kyrgyzstan
been announced.
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Kyrgyzstan 6.3. Market convergence
COAL
The coal industry includes 23 private coal companies under the management of the
state-owned enterprise KyrgyzKomur. Another seven smaller companies engage in seasonal
coal production.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Energy regulation in Kyrgyzstan is split between two agencies: the State Department of
Regulation of the Fuel and Energy Complex, and the anti-monopoly authority. It is not
clear which authority holds which responsibilities, and they frequently overlap.
Established in 2009, the State Department of Regulation of Fuel and Energy is run by the
Ministry of Energy and Industry with state budget funding. It was the single energy regulator
until September 2012 with tariff-setting and licensing functions. From September 2012,
the functions of “anti-monopoly regulation” for the energy sector were transferred to
the anti-monopoly authority. Under the new rules, all monopolies (including most of the
energy enterprises) are obliged to negotiate tariffs with the anti-monopoly authority.
Presumably, companies then apply to the other regulator for tariff-setting.
Tariffs
The tariff policy is developed by the Ministry of Energy and Industry, while the
methodology for electricity tariffs is established by the Ministry of Finance. All tariffs are
set by the regulator on an annual basis, after they have been agreed with the anti-
monopoly authority (only for monopolies in the energy sector). Gazprom Kyrgyzstan
negotiates gas distribution prices with the State Department of Fuel and Energy Complex.
Electricity and heat tariffs in Kyrgyzstan are below cost and subsidised by the government.
While the government understands the implications of years of operating at a loss, there
are no concrete plans to increase the tariffs to a cost-recovery level due to concerns of
public resistance and heightened social tensions. According to the Energy Regulators
Regional Association, in the first half of 2014 the average residential electricity tariff was
0.023 USD/kWh while the non-residential average was 0.012 USD/kWh.4
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6.3. Market convergence Kyrgyzstan
Gas prices decreased during 2014 to 0.17 USD/cubic metre (m3) in October 2014 (down
from 0.27 USD/m3 in 2013) as the import price fell from USD 224 per 1 000 m3 to
USD 165 per 1 000 m3 during the year.
Under the Medium-term Development Programme for 2012-14 and the new Medium-
term Development Programme for 2014-17, the medium-term tariff strategy aims to
increase tariffs to cost-reflective levels progressively, while providing energy affordability
for the most vulnerable customers. However, tariff increases have not been implemented
in full from the first programme and the government is planning to increase electricity
tariffs by 20% per year to 2017 for residential consumers and by 7% per year for commercial
and industrial customers. Heat tariffs will follow a similar pattern, with 20% annual increases
for residential customers and 8% annual increases for commercial and industrial customers.
The donor community is also consulting the government on another possible cost-
reflective methodology for tariffs. Table 6.3.1 indicates the new electricity tariff policy
from November 2014, while Table 6.3.2 indicates heat tariffs.
Table 6.3.1 Electricity tariff breakdown and planned increases, USD/kWh, Kyrgyzstan, November 2014
Consumer groups June 2014 1 July 2014 1 April 2015 1 April 2016 1 April 2017
Subscribers with 1-phase input 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.017 0.02
% change 4% 7% 7% 7%
% change 4% 7% 7% 7%
% change 4% 7% 7% 7%
% change 4% 7% 7% 7%
Table 6.3.2 Heat tariff breakdown and planned increases, USD/Gcal, Kyrgyzstan, November 2014
Consumer groups 1 July 2014 1 April 2015 1 April 2016 1 April 2017
2 2
Residential (32m per person + 14m per additional person) 15.3 19 22.9 27
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Kyrgyzstan 6.3. Market convergence
In the electricity sector, 100% of industrial and household consumers are supplied with
three-phase meters. Current efforts of international donors are directed towards the supply
of hardware and software systems for better billing, collection systems, management of
arrears and associated training and business advisory services to the four distribution
companies. Presently only about 5% of customers have smart meters.
In district heating, however, only around 10% of customers are metered. Bishkek heat
network operator BishkekTeploSet is in the process of installing meters to its customers.
The Rules on Using Heat (March 2014) establish a strict payment deadline for district
heating no later than 10 days from the receipt of an invoice. Full rehabilitation of the
heating system, providing access to heat to all customers and employing fully cost-
recovery tariffs for heat supply is envisaged only by 2050.
In the gas sector, all household and commercial customers are metered.
The collection rate for electricity and gas tariffs was 97.7% at the end of 2012. However,
a major problem for Gazprom Kyrgyzstan was the collection of substantial arrears
accumulated by industrial, residential and commercial customers for the natural gas
consumed in preceding years. This debt was assumed by Gazprom with the sale of KyrgyzGaz.
Tariffs for all consumer categories are published while the relevant methodologies are
not made public.
The Law on Renewable Energy, amended in 2012, provides for feed-in tariffs for
individual renewable energy technologies. The tariffs cover investment costs for up to
eight years. However, secondary laws that define the tariff methodology remain under
development, so a feed-in tariff is not yet in place.
In November 2014, the government introduced new rules for the regulation of coal prices,
which were unregulated in the past. Under the new legislation, prices would be regulated
for a period up to 90 days.5 The anti-monopoly authority would regulate the prices. This
decision comes after the prices increased by USD 112.89 per tonne to USD 191.04 per
tonne in the Batken region during September 2014 (Central Asia Online, 2014).
Technical rules
Within the Law on the Basis of Technical Regulation, the government approved the
Program of Development of Technical Regulations for 2012-13 and the implementation
programme. Technical rules in electricity include technical standards for electricity safety
and electromagnetic compatibility. Further drafts of technical rules for electricity
installation safety and operations safety have been prepared and submitted to relevant
public authorities for their consideration and approval.
In the gas sector, the National Institute of Standards and Metrology (NISM) provides the
normative framework for standards and other harmonisation deliverables.
The principal stakeholders involved in the standardisation process include the Ministry of
Energy and Industry, the NISM and the gas and electricity companies. National gas and
electricity codes of practice are within the competence of the State Construction Authority.
Kyrgyzstan is a correspondent member of the ISO (International Standards Organisation) but
not an affiliate of CEN/CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation).
Kyrgyzstan is also a member of COOMET (Euro-Asian Cooperation of National Metrological
Institutions) and an active member of EASC (EuroAsian Council for Standardisation).
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6.3. Market convergence Kyrgyzstan
ELECTRICITY
Kyrgyzstan’s electricity grid is interconnected with the Central Asia Power Grid (Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). However, since Turkmenistan’s disconnection
from the grid in 2003 and particularly since Uzbekistan’s disconnection in 2009, trade
volumes in the system have fallen substantially. Uzbekistan accounted for approximately
half of the electricity supply to the interconnected grid. While volumes of trade are
much lower, Kyrgyzstan still has cross-border electricity trade with Kazakhstan, Russia
(export), Uzbekistan (export and import) and Tajikistan (import for the first time in 2013).
Under the framework of the Central Asia Power Grid, Kyrgyzstan’s hydropower system
was designed not only to produce electricity, but also to provide major ancillary services,
frequency regulation and operating reserves. However, due to the political situation this
system is currently not in operation.
Regional integration is one of the major energy policy directions in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan
supports the reinstatement of the Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Kazakhstan exchange
to improve integration and reduce the burden and inefficiency of bilateral contracts with
each of the three countries. Agreements have been drawn up in the past, including the
Concept of the Efficient Use of Water and Energy Resources in Central Asia for EurAsEC
Member States6 from August 2006, but none have been fruitful, mainly due to political
friction between some member states.
During 2014, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan agreed to increase electricity imports from
Kazakhstan to Kyrgyzstan during the winter of 2014-15, for the exchange of the water
required to generate the imported electricity. Kyrgyzstan is increasing electricity imports
from Kazakhstan to deal with potential shortages in the winter months and to cover for
the lack of gas after Uzbekistan stopped gas exports to Kyrgyzstan in the first half of
2014 (Oil Price, 2014).
The most relevant proposal for regional integration for Tajikistan is the CASA 1 000
project, a high-voltage power line connecting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. A feasibility study was approved in 2012, tariffs were agreed between parties
in 2014 and the project will likely start construction in the next few years. Kyrgyzstan
and Tajikistan, the two exporting countries, will generate foreign exchange earnings for
the export of surplus summer electricity. Afghanistan will import electricity during the
summer months when its shortages are most prominent, and transit some electricity to
Pakistan, which also requires more electricity in the summer.
GAS
Kyrgyzstan imports gas from Kazakhstan (75%) and Uzbekistan (25%). Imports are
carried out through bilateral contracts. Kyrgyzstan also provides for the transit of Uzbek
gas to southern Kazakhstan by a transit pipeline (operated by KyrKazGaz). However, in
the first half of 2014, Uzbekistan ceased gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan over contract
disagreements (Oil Price, 2014).
During 2014, Kyrgyzstan approved the feasibility study for a new gas pipeline to transit
gas from Turkmenistan to China via Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Line D of the Central Asia-
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Kyrgyzstan 6.3. Market convergence
China gas pipeline network. Construction of Tajikistan’s share of the pipeline began in 2014
and the construction of Kyrgyzstan’s share is expected in the near future. Kyrgyzstan will
become a transit country for approximately 25-30 bcm of gas per year and collect gas
transit revenues. This will also potentially open the market for diverse sources of gas
imports, depending on contract agreements with the suppliers and purchasers.
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6.4. Sustainable development Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan has large untapped renewable energy potential. The existing renewable
energy developments are large hydropower plants, which account for about 30% of total
energy supply. However, the country has more opportunities to develop decentralised
renewable energy technologies, primarily small hydropower stations on rivers in the
mountains. At present, only 10% of hydropower potential is developed. In 2013, there
was approximately 40 MW of small hydro capacity.
Development of small hydropower plants is one of the top priorities of the Kyrgyz
government. The government hopes to reduce reliance on imported fuels through an
increase in indigenous production, and to reduce emissions. Small decentralised power
plants are more economically viable and practical in the dispersed mountainous and rural
areas. Started in 2010, the UNDP/GEF (Global Environment Facility) project Development
of Small Hydropower Stations is underway and expects to develop about 20 MW of small
hydro capacity.
Other viable options for renewable energy development in Kyrgyzstan include heat
supply through solar energy and biogas, and electricity from wind and solar power.
There are no existing projects using these technologies.
The National Energy Programme and the Strategy for Fuel and Energy Sector Development
(covering the period 2010-25) are the key policies for sustainable energy development.
The strategy calls for the rapid expansion of renewables, especially hydro, as a priority for
energy sector development. It foresees the construction of around 100 small hydroelectric
plants with a total capacity of about 180 MW.
The strategy also foresees two large hydro projects at Kambarata and Upper Naryn,
totalling more than 2.5 GW. This would substantially increase the national generation
capacity. The Kamarhati 2 (360 MW) and the Upper Naryn (237 MW) are currently under
construction and are expected to be operational by 2019. In 2012, an agreement was
signed between the government and Russia on the construction of the Upper Naryn
hydropower stations and Kambarata 1 with a capacity of 1.9 GW.
The Law on Renewable Energy was adopted at the end of 2008, as was the Programme
for Development of Small and Medium Energy until 2012. The feed-in tariff was
introduced in 2012 and the Law on Renewable Energy was amended. However, there are
no secondary laws for the implementation of the feed-in tariff and it has therefore not
yet been implemented.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Both the energy supply and demand sides in Kyrgyzstan offer many opportunities for
efficiency improvements. The infrastructure is old, worn and highly inefficient, with losses
up to 30%. As well, the household and commercial building stocks were constructed
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Kyrgyzstan 6.4. Sustainable development
during the Soviet era with few efficiency standards. Energy savings potential in buildings
is estimated at 15% at least, while modernisation and rehabilitation in the energy system
can lead to 25% savings.
The Law on Energy Savings is the main legislation related to energy efficiency, along with
its Programme on Energy Saving for 2008-2010. The programme was meant to create a
legislative and institutional backbone for efficiency measures, along with a tariff policy
that includes their cost. However, due to public tensions over tariff increases, the
programme has not been implemented.
In March 2013, a Law on Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency in Buildings was
adopted. A State Programme on Energy Savings up to 2015 was also developed, but not
approved. By the end of 2014, a draft Programme of Energy Efficiency to 2017, including
energy efficiency policies and measures, was presented to the government for approval.
Under the National Strategy for Sustainable Development for 2013-2017, the government
plans to:
improve regulation and encourage energy savings
increase involvement of the state, local authorities and non-governmental organisations
in energy savings and energy efficiency in buildings
promote the use of energy-efficient technologies in buildings.
There is not a specific agency responsible for energy efficiency and renewables. The
Ministry of Energy and Industry assumes the functions of monitoring and implementing
energy efficiency and renewables policy. There were plans for restructuring and the
creation of a new department dealing with energy efficiency and renewables, but there
has been no progress.
The State Inspection on Energy and Gas is responsible for energy consumption control. A
research laboratory on energy savings, energy efficiency and renewable energy in the
Kyrgyz Scientific and Technical Centre (Ministry of Energy and Industry) carries out energy
audits and certifications/labelling, and develops measures to implement the energy saving
and renewable energy legislation. However, no formal certification or training mechanisms
for energy audits exist. In 2011, the INOGATE Programme project Support to Energy
Market Integration and Sustainable Energy in the NIS (SEMISE) developed a business plan
for an institute in Bishkek to establish the feasibility of an energy auditor training centre.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The Law on Environmental Protection, the Law on Ecological Expertise and the Law on
Common Technical Regulations to Ensure Environmental Security represent the legislative
backbone for environmental protection in Kyrgyzstan. They regulate environmental
impact assessments and the process of environmental appraisal.
Environment impact assessments are required for all stages of new developments. In
2013, the feasibility of the Upper Naryn hydro project was approved and construction
was expected to start in 2014. However, the level of the environmental assessment of
transmission lines and substations is considered weak. Measures for the protection of
nature in the construction of power lines are almost non-existent.
Kyrgyzstan charges a fee for pollution. The methodology for pollution fees was approved
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6.4. Sustainable development Kyrgyzstan
In the oil, gas and coal extraction industries, the level of environmental protection is
considered weak due to insufficient regulation and legislation. Concern is also rising over
the planned increase in coal mining and the sustainability of the sector.
In 2012, the government formed the Coordinating Commission on Climate Change (KKPIK)
responsible for issues of environmental protection. The KKPIK developed the State
Agency on Environment Protection and Forestry, responsible for the implementation of
the commitments under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, aimed at stabilising greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.
At present, two projects have been approved and committed in the sphere of environmental
protection and climate change:
sustainable management of mountain forests and land management in the context
of climate change - GEF/FAO for USD 5.5 million
water supply, sustainable climate in Kyrgyzstan - EBRD/GEF for USD 5.5 million.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Kyrgyzstan ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, though it is not an Annex I or Annex II
country and does not have a specific commitment under the Protocol.
The UNDP/GEF project Assistance to the Kyrgyz Republic in the Preparation of the Third
National Communication under the UNFCCC is assisting the government in collecting the
right information and fostering co-operation between the relevant ministries. During
2013, workshops focused on the creation of a GHG inventory, a national programme to
reduce emissions in the transport, construction and energy sectors, and mitigation measures.
Energy-related emissions of CO2 in Kyrgyzstan totalled 9.5 Mt in 2012, a level that is
57.6% lower compared to 1990. The transport sector accounts for 40.9% of energy-
related CO2 emissions, followed by commercial services (including agriculture) (20.8%),
power generation (19.3%), manufacturing (16%), households (2.7%) and other energy
industries (0.1%).
In October 2013, the government approved the Priorities for Adaptation to Climate
Change to 2017 for the implementation of measures in water, agriculture, health,
environmental emergencies, forests and biodiversity. The State Agency on Environment
Protection and Forestry was expected to prepare sectoral programmes for adaptation to
climate change on priority basis by November 2014. The Programme for Adaptation to
Climate Change for 2011-2015 was developed in 2011 for the health sector in line with
World Health Organization protocol.
Kyrgyzstan is participating in the Agreement of Mayors programme, an EU initiative to
bring together local, regional and national authorities to achieve voluntary commitments
to reduce CO2 emissions by at least 20% by 2020 by improving energy efficiency and
introducing renewables. At present, mayors of the cities of Osh and Talas are participating,
with the mayor of Tokmok likely to join.
Since 2012, the government has signed and ratified a memorandum of understanding
with the Danish government on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Under the
memorandum, the Danish environmental protection agency, jointly with the city of
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Bishkek, has developed a project design document for the capture of methane from a
landfill but, due to an insufficient amount of methane in the landfill, the project was
terminated. The State Agency on Environmental Protection and Forestry has participated
in the planning and preparation of possible CDM projects, but no projects have been
registered to date.
In December 2013, the KKPIK approved a Programme on the Modernisation of Small
Boiler-houses, which aims to increase the energy efficiency of the heat supply of small
coal-fired boilers by 34% by 2020. The programme is expected to be listed with the
UNFCCC register of affordable actions by developing countries to reduce GHG emissions.
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6.5. Investment attraction Kyrgyzstan
Policy as well as the Programme and Action Plan on Countering Corruption for
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Kyrgyzstan 6.5. Investment attraction
2012-2014 and the Measure to Counter Corruption Offences in the Country. These
measures have contributed to an improvement in the level of corruption and the overall
investment climate in the country.
Since March 2011, Kyrgyzstan has also been compliant under the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative (EITI).
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The general legislative framework for privatisation of state property is based on the Law
on General Principles of De-nationalisation, Privatisation and Entrepreneurial Activities
(1991) and the Law on De-nationalisation and Privatisation of State Property (1994).
Secondary legislation has been adopted; however, privatisation levels are low.
In 2001, the government established the Investment Promotion Centre (IPC) under the
State Committee on State Property and Direct Investments, which acts as a one-stop
shop to assist foreign investors.
According to the Law on Foreign Investments (1997), foreign investors and foreign
investments have equal right with local investors. A Law on Investments (2003) also
stipulates fair and equal treatment for all investors and protection of their investments.
The law regulates legal relationships between investors and governmental bodies,
allowing investors to resolve disputes that may arise through international arbitration.
However, the implementation of these laws has been inconsistent in some cases.
Under the national programme to 2025, the government is planning to implement a
number of projects to increase electricity generation, build transmission lines and
rehabilitate existing networks. Total necessary investment is valued at USD 13 billion.
Some investments from Russia and China have been secured for the development of
hydropower plants and transmission lines.
Line D of the Central Asia-China pipeline will cross about 225 km of Kyrgyzstan’s territory
and require investment of about USD 1.4 billion. This will turn Kyrgyzstan into a gas
transit country (about 25-30 bcm per year) and provide transit revenues that could be
invested in energy projects.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
While the government does not have a specific strategy or plan for attracting investment,
the National Energy Programme 2010-25 includes some investment targets. In the
period 2011 to 2025, investment is required for the construction of the Kambarata 1
hydropower plant (HPP) (USD 1.9 billion), the Upper Naryn HPP (USD 200 million), the
Jillan-Arykskih HPP (USD 220 million) and the Kara-Kečinskoj TPP (USD 1.1 billion). Investment
from Russia has been secured for the construction of the hydro plants, while talks are in
progress with China for the construction of the TPP.
Planned investment for networks is around USD 335 million, including the construction
of two 500/220 kV substations (finished), the 500 kV Datka-Kemin line from north to
south (USD 50 million; under construction) and a 220 kV line to Afghanistan (USD 55 million).
The Rehabilitation of the Energy Sector 2013-14 project supported by the ADB is estimated
to cost a further USD 62 million, including USD 55 million from the ADB (a grant of
USD 40 million and a loan of USD 15 million) and USD 7 billion to be financed by
© OECD/IEA, 2015
the government.
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6.5. Investment attraction Kyrgyzstan
The funding for the CASA 1 000 project is expected to be around USD 1 billion and
includes funding for the construction of the assets of the four members of the project.
Financing needs per country, according to calculations by SNC Lavalin, are: USD 300 million
for Afghanistan, USD 270 million for Tajikistan, USD 200 million for Kyrgyzstan and
USD 200 million for Pakistan.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
235
Kyrgzystan References
References
ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2014), “Proposed policy-based grant for Subprogram 3 Kyrgyz
Republic: Investment climate improvement program”, Report and Recommendation of the
President to the Board of Directors, Project 41544, ADB.
BGR (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Resources 2013,
Reserves, Resources, Availability, Tables, BGR, Hannover, Germany.
Central Asia Online (2014), “Kyrgyzstan ready to impose coal price controls”, 1 December, Central
Asia Online, http://centralasiaonline.com.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Oil Price (2014), “Kyrgyzstan faces catastrophic energy crisis”, 10 August, Oil Price,
http://oilprice.com.
Times of Central Asia (2014), “Kyrgyzstan ramping up coal production”, Times of Central Asia,
27 December, www.timesca.com.
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236
© OECD/IEA, 2015
MOLDOVA
Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
0 50 km
U K R A I N E
M O L D O V A
Chisinau
R O M A N I A
BL ACK
SEA
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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7.1. General energy policy Moldova
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
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Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
The government also plans to diversify the energy mix with more renewable energy
resource development. This will require significant investment in the medium and long
term, and developments will depend on the ability to attract funds.
Moldova signed an Association Agreement with the European Union on 27 June 2014. It
has been a member of the Energy Community since 2010 and has until December 2017
to make its legislation conform to the EU acquis communautaire, i.e. core EU energy
legislation related to electricity, oil, gas, environment, competition, renewables, efficiency
and statistics. Moldova also plans to fully synchronise its electricity network to the
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) by 2020
in order to connect to the European electricity market.
Regional energy co-operation with Caspian and Black Sea countries and the European
Union takes place in the framework of the Baku Initiative, which aims to facilitate the
progressive integration of the energy markets of the region into the EU market as well as the
transportation of the extensive Caspian oil and gas resources towards Europe. Moldova
also participates in the Eastern Partnership, an initiative of the European Union governing its
relationship with the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, and Ukraine;
its purpose is to provide a venue for discussions on trade, economic strategy, travel
agreements, and its energy security platform. Bilateral co-operation between the European
Union and Moldova takes place in the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy in
line with the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, including energy co-operation.
SUPPLY
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 in Moldova was 3.3 million tonnes of oil equivalent
(Mtoe) in 2012 (Figure 7.1.2). TPES has increased 5.8% since 2002.
Moldova’s energy mix is dominated by natural gas at 68.4% of TPES and oil at almost
22.7%. Along with coal at 3.3%, fossil fuels account for 94.4% of TPES. Biofuels contribute
2.6% and hydro 0.7% to TPES. Electricity imports account for about 2%.
Hydro*
4
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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7.1. General energy policy Moldova
In the decade 2002 to 2012, demand for oil in Moldova increased at a faster rate than
natural gas. Total supply of oil was about 39% higher in 2012 compared with 2002, while
the supply of natural gas increased by 3.7%. As a percentage of TPES, oil has increased
from 23% in 2002, while natural gas has contracted from about 70%.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation in Moldova amounted to 5.8 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2012.
Electricity production has been stable, increasing by a marginal 0.2% in the decade to
2012. Natural gas accounts for 95.1% of power generation, hydro for 4.6% with the
remainder from oil. Coal use in electricity generation ceased in 2004 (Figure 7.1.3).
Electricity generation capacity in Moldova was 421 megawatts (MW) in 2013, with a
slight decline from 450 MW in 2007 due to aged infrastructure.
Heat generation in Moldova has experienced strong growth increasing by 66% from
2002 to reach 10.9 petajoules (PJ) in 2012. Natural gas is used for more than 94% of heat
generation, oil for 3.7%, biofuels for 1.5% and less than 1% from coal.
8
6
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Coal use in electricity generation ceased in 2004.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 was 2.3 Mtoe in 2012, almost 21% higher than in 2002
mainly due to 13% surges in 2004 and 2010 (Figure 7.1.4).
Accounting for 39.2% of TFC in 2012, the residential sector is the largest consuming sector.
Consumption in other sectors in 2012 was 30.5% in industry, 15.7% in transport and 14.6%
in commercial/services. Over the past decade, there has been a strong increase in energy
use in the residential and transport sectors, while demand in industry experienced slower
growth and the commercial sector declined by 22%. The residential and commercial
sectors mainly consume natural gas, electricity and oil. The transport sector is reliant on
oil and some electricity, while TFC in industry is mostly natural gas and electricity.
2. TFC is the final consumption by end-users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
3
2
1
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing and forestry.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Moldova’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.25 tonnes
of oil equivalent (toe) per USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012. This is a near median level
compared with other EECCA countries, behind Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan (Figure 7.1.5). Since 2002, the level of energy intensity has declined by almost
31%, down from 0.36 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP. Moldova’s real GDP (USD GDP PPP at
2005 prices) increased by 52% over the ten years to 2012, while TPES grew by about 6%.
Overall energy intensity has been declining since the mid-1990s.
Figure 7.1.5 Energy intensity in Moldova and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.8 Belarus
0.7 Kyrgyzstan
0.6 Ukraine
Moldova
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5
Georgia
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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7.1. General energy policy Moldova
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy accounts for 3.3% of TPES in Moldova, made up of biofuels at 2.6%,
mainly used in heating, and hydro at 0.7% for electricity generation. The country has a
median level in the renewables share of TPES compared with EECCA countries, behind
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Armenia (Figure 7.1.6). This share has remained
relatively unchanged over the past decade.
Figure 7.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Moldova and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
MARKET STRUCTURE
The current market structure features partial unbundling and privatisation in electricity
generation, and in natural gas and electricity transmission and distribution system
operators. This market restructuring is an ongoing process in Moldova, in accordance with
the provisions of the third energy package3 and EU directives. Most recently, in 2014 the
National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) drafted the first Rules of Electricity Markets.
In the electricity sector, the transmission system operator (TSO) and distribution system
operators (DSOs) are legally unbundled. DSOs also act as retailers of last resort. There
are 12 retail companies. However, according to the government, the level of competition
in the electricity market is only 10% for the category of 110 kV and 35 kV customers. A
World Bank study is assessing feasible options for a competitive electricity market model
in Moldova and the smooth transition into the ENTSO-E network via Romania.
MoldElectrica is the state-owned TSO and also the central dispatcher for the Transnistria
region. There are three DSOs on the right bank of the Dniester River, including RED Nord
(state-owned), RED Nord-Vest (state-owned) and RED Union Fenosa which covers two-
thirds of the country (privately owned). During 2013, RED Nord and RED Nord-Vest were
made legally available for privatisation. Electricity distribution in the Transnistria region
is carried out by two DSOs, RED Est and RED Sud-Est, both of which operate under the
Transnistrian authorities.
The wholesale electricity market is made up of bilateral contracts between producers
and suppliers. There are six electricity generation operators in Moldova, four on the right
bank of the Dniester River and two in the Transnistrian region.
Moldova’s power system is interconnected with Ukraine and the two systems operate in
parallel. Energocom, as state-owned company, acts as a single buyer, at non-regulated
prices, for imported electricity from Ukraine. Energocom sells to RED Nord and RED
Nord-Vest, or directly to eligible customers (Energy Community, 2014a).
Moldova’s heat supply and district heating companies are currently being restructured.
The restructuring includes the merger of the two operators of combined heat and power
plant (CHP)-1 and CHP-2, and Termocom, the state-owned company which owns and
operates the district heating network in Chisinau, the capital city. Overwhelming debt
and inefficient operators have necessitated consolidation and streamlining of operations.
In the gas sector, the majority of the functions, including transmission, distribution and
retail, are performed by the vertically integrated MoldovaGaz. MoldovaGaz was the only gas
TSO, through its subsidiary MoldovaTransGaz, until January 2015 when VestMoldTransGaz
received a transmission licence. The main gas DSOs in Moldova are 11 of MoldovaGaz’s
subsidiaries, and 11 smaller DSOs cover less than 2% of gas distribution. Tiraspoltransgaz,
also a subsidiary of MoldovaGaz, is the TSO, DSO and retailer in the region of Transnistria
(Energy Community, 2014b).
MoldovaGaz is owned by Gazprom (50%), the Moldovan government (36.6%) and the
Transnistria administration (13.4%). The company is legally unbundled while the DSOs
3. In 2007, the European Commission adopted a third package of legislation for an open single market for gas and electricity.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Market proposals include provisions such as the ability for consumers to choose between different suppliers and all suppliers.
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7.1. General energy policy Moldova
are only financially unbundled, and the process is ongoing. By 2020, MoldovaGaz is
expected to be fully unbundled under EU directives.
Imminent deadlines for market restructuring include the separation of supply, distribution
and retail activities of electricity and gas DSOs by 1 January 2015. This includes the
unbundling of MoldovaGaz’s 12 subsidiary DSOs; MoldovaGaz would remain in ownership
of the companies. By the end of January 2015, it was undisclosed whether unbundling
had taken place.
VestMoldTransGaz is a state-owned company that will operate Moldova’s section of the
new Ungheni-Iasi gas interconnector pipeline. The company was created in June 2014
and received a TSO licence in January 2015. Energocom, a state-owned company that
acts as a single buyer of imports, will purchase the gas and sell it to VestMoldTransGaz.
Gas distribution will be carried out by MoldovaGaz.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Ministry of Economy is in charge of developing and implementing energy policy in
Moldova. Its main relevant tasks include the development of strategies and state policies
such as the Energy Strategy 2030.
The Ministry of Regional Development and Construction is in charge of establishing,
monitoring and evaluating the national priorities for regional development, including the
promotion of renewable energy and energy efficiency. The Ministry participates in trans-
frontier/neighbouring co-operation projects in international programmes. It also participates
in the development and construction of publically financed projects, including renewables
and efficiency projects.
The Ministry of Environment is responsible for developing environmental and natural
resource management policies and strategies. The Ministry is responsible for the
implementation of international environment treaties.
The National Agency for Energy Regulation (ANRE) is an independent regulator in the
energy sector. Its main responsibilities include licences, tariff setting and regulation.
The Energy Efficiency Agency (EEA) is the implementing agency under the national
energy efficiency and renewable energy programmes.
The Energy Efficiency Fund (EEF) was established in 2012 to promote investment in
energy savings and renewable energy projects, in accordance with the existing government
programmes.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The legal framework of Moldova’s energy sector was largely developed in 2009 under
the EU energy acquis communautaire, as an obligation of the Energy Community accession
in 2010. The primary legislation includes the Law on Energy (1998), the Law on Electricity
(2009), the Law on Natural Gas (2009) and the Law on Petroleum Products (2001).
Harmonisation of legislation is continuing with a number of amendments to the laws,
and new laws approved in 2013 and 2014.
Energy Package, were approved by the parliament in March and July 2014, respectively.
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Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
The amendments focus on ensuring stable supplies of electricity and gas to final
consumers by implementing the EU Directives no. 2005/89/EC and no. 2004/67/EC.
Pending amendments to the Law on Petroleum Products include changes to ease the
barriers of entry to new market participants.
Also, the Law on Heat and Cogeneration Promotion was approved by the parliament in
May 2014 in accordance with international standards and EU directives. The new law is
expected to define the responsibilities of dwelling-owners’ associations, consumers and
suppliers, and to introduce a binomial tariff for heat.
Secondary legislation was partially harmonised under the Legal Acts Harmonisation Plan
for the Energy Sector.
In October 2014, ANRE adopted the Decision on the Approval of the Technological
Consumption and Technical Losses of Electricity Distribution Networks, no. 698. During
2014, ANRE developed a draft methodology on price calculation for petroleum products;
draft amendments to the methodology on calculations; approval and use of electricity
tariffs from renewable energy sources and biofuels; draft methodology on calculation,
approval and adjustment of tariffs for distribution service of electricity and regulated
tariffs of electricity supply; and draft Rules of Electricity Markets. In previous years, ANRE
also approved regulation of customer choice in retail electricity and Rules on Electricity
Supply and Consumption.
KEY POLICIES
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7.1. General energy policy Moldova
contract was signed with the European Union for EUR 7.1 million of funding for a
feasibility study on the connection of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s power systems to ENTSO-E.
Moldova introduced the updated National Energy Strategy (NES) 2030 in February 2013.
It sets objectives for the energy sector by 2020 with an outlook to 2030. Moldova’s
energy targets are closely aligned to the requirements under the Energy Community
Treaty. The NES exceeds them in some cases: for instance, under the treaty there is a
binding target of 17% of renewables in TFC, whereas the NES sets a 20% goal. The NES
main targets, all for 2020, are:
20% renewable energy sources in TFC
10% biofuels in transport
10% renewables in electricity generation
reduce energy intensity by 10%
reduce losses in transmission and distribution networks by 11% in electricity, 39% in
natural gas and 5% for heat
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 25% from the 1990 level
reduce energy consumption in buildings by 20% from the 2009 level
rehabilitate 10% of building stock.
Complementing the NES are the National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) 2013-2015
and the National Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP) 2013-2020, both of which were
approved in 2013. The NEEAP was designed in accordance with Moldova’s commitments
under the Energy Community Treaty to reduce TFC in all sectors by 1.8% per year in the
period 2013-15 from 2009 levels. The NREAP is linked with the EU directive on the
promotion of renewable energy.
INVESTMENT
Moldova requires sizeable investment as it reforms its energy sector and aligns with the
European market. This is a significant challenge for the government, which has indicated
in the energy strategy that it will search for external funding for the needed investment
in electricity, gas and district heating. This includes financing from international finance
institutions (IFIs), grants, the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) and private
investment. Part of the renewables and efficiency developments, however, are being
funded from the state budget through the EEF.
Investment needs in the electricity sector are mainly for additional generation capacity,
including a new combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant by 2020, new lines and the
rehabilitation of old networks. In the gas sector, the construction of the Ungheni-lasi gas
interconnector pipeline was completed in August 2014 at the cost of around EUR 26 million
(Natural Gas Europe, 2014). Plans for a 100 km extension to Chisianu by end-2016 exist
without a full understanding of the total cost at present.
As of mid-2014, the integration into ENTSO-E by 2020 was at the feasibility study phase.
Rehabilitation of MoldElectrica’s network and systems is expected to require more than
EUR 50 million. The network will also require high-voltage line extensions to Romania. A
feasibility study was completed for a 400 kV Balti-Suceava line, but further development
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Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
The NES 2030 includes an 800 MW increase in generation capacity by 2020. The increase
will include an additional 1 050 MW which will be offset by the decommissioning of the
Chisinau CHP-1 (66 MW) and CHP-2 (240 MW) plants. Approximately 650 MW will come
from a new CCGT power plant and will require EUR 620 million of investment. The
remaining 400 MW is planned to be renewables-based and will also require substantial
investment. New investment in renewable energy is slow at this stage because of a lack
of investor confidence about possible returns due to inconsistent and unclear tariff
methodologies and a lack of support mechanisms.
Moldova, Armenia and Georgia joined the Eastern Europe Energy Efficiency and Environment
Partnership (E5P) in October 2013 to promote support of energy efficiency and emissions
reductions. The international donor community is expected to provide more than EUR
60 million to enable projects under the E5P Fund.
ASSESSMENT
The review team commends the government of Moldova on developing NES 2030; on
measures taken to reform energy policy in line with the Energy Community Treaty and
the EU acquis communautaire; and on the effort put into adapting its national legislation
and supporting programmes.
Moldova is committed to pursuing the changes to its policy necessary to secure energy
supply, diversify energy sources, promote sustainable development and increase market
competition. To bring the policy changes into the legal framework, the government has
approved amendments to the existing legislation, with a number awaiting approval by the
parliament. During 2014, the government passed crucial legislation including amendments
to the Law on Electricity, the Law on Natural Gas and the Law on Heat, in accordance
with EU directives. The Law on Renewable Energy and the Law on Energy Efficiency have
been drafted and are yet to be approved. The government also approved its first
building code late in 2014 and drafted the Rules of Electricity Markets.
Timely development of the secondary legislation and other required mechanisms is
crucial to reaching the objectives set out in the strategy. The government should rapidly
develop rules and implementing mechanisms for its policies and to attract needed investment.
During 2014, the Ungheni-lasi gas interconnector pipeline was completed and commissioned,
and is expected to become operational in 2015. The pipeline covers around 10 km of
Moldovan territory; however, by end-2016 the government plans to extend it by 100 km
to Chisinau. Once extended and at full capacity, the pipeline could supply approximately
a third of Moldova’s gas needs. This will significantly diversify Moldova’s gas imports and
contribute to a more stable energy supply. However, it remains crucial for Moldova to
have sound emergency response mechanisms for supply shocks should they occur with
gas transiting Ukraine.
The renewable energy sector is of strategic importance for Moldova as it promises
sustainable domestic energy production and helps to reduce GHG emissions. In the near term,
© OECD/IEA, 2015
the government should develop strong incentives for investment in the renewable energy
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7.1. General energy policy Moldova
sector given the ambitious target of 20% and the legally binding of target of 17% by 2020.
Priority should be given to the timely adoption of a feed-in tariff based on a comprehensive
cost-benefit analysis and provide acceptable returns for international investors.
In order to attract the necessary investment in the energy sector, the government should
consider a variety of approaches. This includes the promotion of concrete policies, a
strong level of communication between the government and businesses on changes to
energy policy, and adoption of all the necessary legislation to make the policy stable and
increase investor confidence. Awareness needs to be raised among both the local and
international investment communities and a forum should exist where interested parties
can be heard.
Moldova has high potential for both supply and demand-side energy efficiency
improvements. The energy supply infrastructure is old and losses are moderately high
(although improving), while energy consumption in buildings and industry is inefficient.
The government has created the EEF for the distribution of funds to the most cost-
effective and competitive energy efficiency projects, and to the Moldovan Residential
Energy Efficiency Financing Facility (MoREEFF).
While the EEF and MoREEFF are effective in promoting energy efficiency, public awareness
of the benefits of energy savings and the availability of incentives for energy efficiency
improvements is insufficient. In order for households, businesses and industry to be able to
fully reap the benefits of the existing incentives and self-initiate participation in energy
savings, more should be done to raise awareness. This is particularly true for households in
multi-residential buildings where co-operation on the retrofit of common areas is critical.
Public awareness can be raised through a variety of media campaigns and education.
The review team commends the government of Moldova on developments in the field of
energy statistics and data collection. It has shown significant interest in improving
energy data collection/reporting. As well, it moved to the IEA format of energy balances
in 2013. The National Bureau of Statistics is currently working on expanding its surveys
and data collection to improve the electricity consumption and prices data. Collection of
accurate end-use data will allow Moldova to develop energy efficiency indicators, which
will help policy makers to design sound efficiency policies and monitor progress.
To increase transparency in the energy sector and to provide the information needed to
underpin investment and other analyses, the government should continue to collect
meaningful data, particularly from industry and relative to both energy consumption and
efficiency levels. As Moldova is moving to an open energy market model, the improved
quality and quantity of energy statistics are crucial to build investor confidence and
energy sector transparency.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Moldova 7.1. General energy policy
Develop feed-in tariffs which will promote renewable energy development and
attract private investment. The tariff methodology should be comprehensive and
entail a detailed analysis of all costs associated with the investment specific to
Moldova and to each technology.
Improve investment opportunities by encouraging a stable and predictable regime
through effective policies, well-developed and binding targets, strong incentives and
implementation measures. This will enable market-driven investment in state-of-art
energy technologies and development projects to provide improved energy security.
Improve awareness of energy saving opportunities and efficiency measures through
a variety of targeted information campaigns, particularly in terms of access to
incentives available for businesses and households. Better awareness of the benefits
of energy savings will increase demand for energy efficiency projects and facilitate
co-operation between households in multi-residential buildings.
Continue to develop improved energy statistics and the collection of accurate data
relative to consumption, renewable energy production and energy efficiency indicators.
Statistics should comply with international standards and provide a comprehensive
energy database that would allow for systematic monitoring and for increasing
transparency to the industry and potential investors.
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7.2. Energy security Moldova
ELECTRICITY
The electricity network is made up of 4 402 km of transmission and 56 430 km of
distribution lines and supplies 1.3 million consumers. The network is made up of 400 kV,
330 kV, 110 kV, 35 kV, 6-10 kV and 0.4 kV lines; interconnections are shown in
Table 7.2.1. Moldova’s power system operates in parallel with the system in Ukraine.
However, the Moldovan system does not operate in parallel to Romania’s network,
which is part of ENTSO-E. Instead, the two systems operate in island mode.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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Moldova 7.2. Energy security
For Moldova to connect to ENTSO-E by 2020, the cross-border network with Romania
will need to be extended by two 400 kV interconnection networks (Suceava-Balti and
Straseni-Ungheni-Iasi) and a 110 kV line (Falciu-Gotesti). In addition, existing lines and
substations will need to be rehabilitated and modernised as the network is old and
inefficient. Some rehabilitation of the network is ongoing, mainly through support from
international financial institutions.
330 7 505
Interconnections with Ukraine
110 11 272
400 1 59
Interconnections with Romania (operating in island mode)
110 3 37
Electricity generation capacity in Moldova is approximately 350 MW, of which CHP-1 and
CHP-2 account for 300 MW. The government is planning to increase the generation
capacity by 1 050 MW by 2020 while decommissioning the aged CHPs. New capacity will
include a 650 MW CCGT plant in Chisinau and 400 MW of renewable-based generation.
The government is unable to finance these projects and will require substantial private
investment for them to be developed.
The district heating sector is being restructured and the two operators are being
merged. The government is in negotiations with the World Bank on a USD 40 million
loan under the District Heating Efficiency Improvement Project for the rehabilitation of
networks under a new district heating company when the merger is finalised.
NATURAL GAS
In 2012, natural gas transmission and distribution systems served almost 650 000 households
and 12 000 businesses through pipelines that totalled 23 685 km (Figure 7.2.1).
Approximately 600 km of pipelines are transit transmission pipelines. MoldovaGaz’s
subsidiaries operate more than 98% of the distribution network. MoldovaGaz owns the
portion of the pipelines that are in Moldova, on the right side of the river (Table 7.2.2).
In August 2014, the Ungheni-Iasi gas pipeline from Romania was completed, 43 km long
with a potential capacity of 1.5 bcm. The pipeline runs 10 km on Moldovan territory. The
government is currently making plans to build a 100 km extension of the pipeline to
Chisinau by end-2016.
In 2013, MoldovaGaz built 70 km of pipelines and reconstructed 27 km of mains and
4.4 km of distribution pipelines.
During the period 2008-12, MoldovaGaz built 2 420 km of gas pipelines, including 148 km
of mains, 216 km of medium-pressure pipelines and 2 055 km of distribution pipelines in
284 communities to serve 23 200 customers. Natural gas is supplied to 40 communities.
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7.2. Energy security Moldova
0 50 km
U K R A I N E
Ribnijta-Kotovsk
Balti
˘ 330 kV 2 x 300 kV
Suceava 400 kV
Straseni 330 kV
Chisinau
˘ 330 kV
Chişinau
R O M A N I A
CERSM-Artsyz
330 kV
U K R A I N E
Vulcaneşti 400 kV
BL ACK
SEA
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Moldova 7.2. Energy security
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The reliability of Moldova’s electricity and gas supply systems is moderate. Gas supply
shocks have occurred in the past through disputes between the supplier and the transit
country (Russia and Ukraine). Domestic disputes are uncommon.
However, Moldova’s energy infrastructure is old and efficiency is compromised, reducing
supply reliability. The TSOs and DSOs are responsible for annual maintenance programmes
which aim at reducing losses. The cost of the maintenance programmes is reflected in
the tariffs approved by ANRE. One of ANRE’s key goals is to authorise programmes which
will result in system reliability improvements at a cost that is reasonable for consumers.
The National Program on Energy Efficiency 2011-2020 has targets to reduce losses in the
transmission and distribution networks by 2020 by 11% for electricity, by 39% for natural
gas and by 5% for heat. These targets would significantly improve the reliability and
efficiency of the systems, particularly in gas.
The electricity sector has strong incentives to reduce losses to align with the quality of
supply in the European Union. Losses in the distribution network have been reduced
since the installation of the automated SCADA system, which is part of the integration
into ENTSO-E. In the electricity sector, transmission losses were 2.8% in 2012 while the
distribution losses were just below 12%. Outages were infrequent during the year.
In the gas sector in 2013, transmission losses were 0.18% and distribution losses
amounted to 5%. Since 2008, MoldovaGaz has carried out an annual investment programme
that aims to provide reliable gas supply to communities with safe and sustainable use of
the gas network. The district heating sector in Moldova is the most inefficient, with
losses of approximately 20%. The restructuring of the heat sector is expected to result in
streamlining of processes and investment in the network which will help improve
reliability over time.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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7.2. Energy security Moldova
255
Moldova 7.3. Market convergence
NATURAL GAS
In the gas sector, the majority of the functions, including transmission, distribution and
retail, are performed by the vertically integrated MoldovaGaz. MoldovaGaz was the only gas
TSO, through its subsidiary MoldovaTransGaz, until January 2015 when VestMoldTransGaz
received a transmission licence. The main gas DSOs in Moldova are 11 of MoldovaGaz’s
subsidiaries, and 11 smaller DSOs cover less than 2% of gas distribution. Tiraspoltransgaz,
also a subsidiary of MoldovaGaz, is the TSO, DSO and the retailer in the region of
Transnistria (Energy Community, 2014c).
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7.3. Market convergence Moldova
MoldovaGaz is owned by Gazprom (50%), the Moldovan government (36.6%) and the
Transnistria administration (13.4%). MoldovaGaz is legally unbundled while the DSOs are
only financially unbundled. The unbundling process is ongoing, with distribution activities
expected to be unbundled during 2015, while MoldovaGaz will remain the owner. By
2020, MoldovaGaz is expected to be fully unbundled under the EU directives.
VestMoldTransGaz is a state-owned company that will operate Moldova’s section of the
new Ungheni-Iasi gas interconnector pipeline. The company was created in June 2014
and received a TSO licence in January 2015. Energocom, a state-owned company that
acts as a single buyer of imports, will purchase the gas and sell it to VestMoldTransGaz.
Gas distribution will be carried out by MoldovaGaz.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
ANRE is the independent energy regulator in Moldova. ANRE is responsible for the
electricity, gas and heat sectors. Its main tasks include licensing and tariff setting.
Tariffs
ANRE regulates and approves electricity, gas and heat tariffs in Moldova. Tariff
methodologies vary across the DSOs. Tariffs are based on specific technical characteristics
of each distribution network and the number of customers per kilometre of line.
One exception is Energocom, a state-owned monopoly for electricity imports, which supplies
electricity directly to a cement factory at unregulated prices (Energy Community, 2014a).
Companies present ANRE with annual tariff calculations for the next year based on an
approved methodology between ANRE and the company. Tariff calculations include planned
operational costs and capital investment for new lines, modernisation, rehabilitation and
loss reductions. ANRE then reviews the tariff proposal and sets the appropriate tariff.
Tariffs and methodologies are transparent and are published on ANRE’s website.4
ANRE organises public hearings before tariff approvals to ensure transparency of the
approval process.
Regulated electricity tariffs include the costs of metering and investment in SCADA, which
has been completed in the electricity sector. Individual meters have been installed for all
end users. In 2013, the collection rate was 99% on the right bank of the Dniester River.
In the gas sector, all industrial and commercial customers are metered while 93% of
households have individual meters. The remaining households are metered through a
common meter for multi-residential properties. MoldovaGaz is progressively switching
all consumers to individual meters. The collection rate was 96% in 2013 on the right
bank of the Dniester River.
According to the Energy Regulators Regional Association5, the average household
electricity and natural gas prices in the first half of 2014, including taxes, were:
electricity: USD 0.12/kilowatt hour (kWh)
natural gas: USD 13.9/gigajoule (GJ).
4. www.anre.md.
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5. www.erranet.org.
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Moldova 7.3. Market convergence
In September 2012, ANRE approved a new methodology for district heat tariffs to attract
investment to the sector. The district heating network in Moldova is considered to be
highly inefficient and requires significant funding for the rehabilitation and modernisation
of existing systems as well as new development.
Under the new Law on Heat, ANRE will be able to issue licences and set tariffs for new
entrants in the district heating sector. Tariffs are expected to include weighted average
cost of capital calculations as a mechanism to stimulate investment. The law is awaiting
parliamentary approval.
During 2014, ANRE drafted the methodology for petroleum product prices, electricity tariffs
for electricity from renewables and new electricity distribution and transmission tariffs.
Technical rules
Moldova is well on its way to streamlining electricity and gas standards and harmonising
with those of the European Union. The National Standardisation Body develops an
annual National Standardisation Programme which includes EU and international standards
to be adopted in that year. In the period 2011-13, 689 EU standards were adopted while
478 conflicting standards were removed.
Moldova is a member of the International Standards Organisation (ISO), the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the European Committee of Standardisation (CEN) and
the Euro-Asian Council for Standardisation (EASC). In April 2014, it became an affiliate
member of CENELEC and an observer of the European Telecommunications Standards
Institute (ETSI).
In 2014, standards in the field of gas numbered 1 304:
689 European standards (EN, HD, CLC)
80 international standards (ISO, IEC)
497 GOST standards
38 other standards.
ELECTRICITY
The electricity system of Moldova operates synchronously with the Ukrainian electricity
system. The two systems are interconnected by 14 lines of 110 kV and 7 lines of 330 kV.
Energocom, a state-owned Moldovan company, is the single buyer for imported electricity
from Ukraine at unregulated prices. The imported electricity is normally sold to RED
Nord and RED Nord-Vest or to eligible customers (Energy Community, 2014a).
Moldova is interconnected with Romania, but the two systems do not operate in
parallel. The power system of Romania is part of ENTSO-E and Moldova is currently
working towards full synchronisation with the network by 2020. At present, the two
power systems operate in island mode. There are two islands, one for the 110 kV
interconnection lines and another for the 400 kV interconnection lines.
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7.3. Market convergence Moldova
NATURAL GAS
Moldova is connected to the Ukrainian gas transportation system that transits all gas
imports from Russia to Moldova through a bilateral contract. Moldova also transits gas
to Romania, destined for European markets, Turkey and the Balkans.
The construction of the Ungheni-lasi interconnector gas pipeline to Romania was completed
in August 2014 and the pipeline is expected to become operational during 2015. At first,
the pipeline will serve only 3% of the population as it only extends to Ungheni. However,
government plans include an extension to the pipeline to Chisinau by end-2016, which would
maximise its 1.5 bcm capacity to provide up to a third of total gas supply in Moldova.
Moldova’s share of the pipeline will be operated by the state-owned VestMoldTransGaz
that received a TSO licence in January 2015. The company was created in June 2014 and
received a TSO licence in January 2015. Energocom, a state-owned company that acts as
a single buyer of imports, will purchase the gas and sell it to VestMoldTransGaz and
MoldovaGaz. Gas purchases will be on bilateral contracts.
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Moldova 7.4. Sustainable development
6. www.renewablefacts.com/country/moldova/hydro.
260
7.4. Sustainable development Moldova
the government will need to send effective signals to investors in terms of favourable
tariffs and other incentives.
The Moldovan Sustainable Energy Financing Facility (MoSEFF) is a funding mechanism
for renewable and efficiency projects. It was established in 2009 with support from the
INOGATE Programme.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Moldova has high potential for both supply and demand-side energy efficiency improvements.
The energy supply infrastructure is old. Lack of investment has led to inefficiencies with
moderately high supply losses (although improving), and end-use consumption in
buildings and industry is inefficient. Old building stock and lack of metering in multi-
residential blocks contribute. As set out in the NES 2030, the government aims to
increase energy savings and reduce the energy intensity of the economy.
Energy efficiency has been made a priority in regional development plans in Moldova. A
number of IFIs are participating in energy efficiency improvement projects, mainly in
public buildings such as schools and hospitals. The IFIs are planning further efficiency
projects that are aligned with the national targets.
Moldova, Armenia and Georgia joined the E5P in October 2013 to promote energy
efficiency and emissions reductions. The international donor community is expected to
provide more than EUR 60 million to enable projects under the E5P Fund.
The energy efficiency strategy of Moldova is outlined in the NEEAP 2013-2015 and the
National Program on Energy Efficiency for 2011-2020. The Ministry of Energy has also
drafted amendments to the Law on Energy Efficiency (2010) to include the latest targets
and measures. The draft law was pending parliamentary approval as of mid-2014. In
February 2013, Moldova submitted the first National Energy Efficiency Plan 2010-2018
to the Energy Community.
Moldova's national objectives for 2020 for energy efficiency include:
reducing energy intensity by 10%
reducing losses in transmission and distribution networks by 11% in electricity, 39%
in gas and 5% in heat
reducing energy consumption in buildings by 20%
renovating 10% of public buildings.
The EEA is responsible for the approval and implementation of efficiency and renewable
energy projects, as well as for taking measures for the national targets to be achieved. In
2013, the Unified Information Centre for investors in renewable energy and energy
efficiency was created within the EEA. The agency is considering a number of projects. In
2012, the government created the MoREEFF and the EEF. The MoREEFF provides loans
and investment incentives for household efficiency projects with local participating
banks. The EEF provides funds to cost-effective and competitive energy efficiency projects.
The EEF provides funding, EUR 10 million allocated in 2014 and EUR 5 million for 2015, on
a first-come, first-served basis for efficiency and renewable projects which provide more
than 60% energy savings. So far, it only covers refurbishment of public buildings, though
there is a plan to open the funding to commercial properties in the near term. Six projects
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are underway and ten are in the pipeline for consideration out of 90 proposed projects.
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Moldova 7.4. Sustainable development
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
CLIMATE CHANGE
The NES stipulates a target to reduce GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 from the 1990
level. GHG emissions were 70% lower in 2010 than in 1990 (UNFCCC, 2014). Moldova does
not have specific policies aimed at GHG emissions reductions, although its renewables and
efficiency policies can deliver reductions in comparison to a business-as-usual scenario.
Moldova ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2005. A Designated National Authority (DNA) for
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was established, and as of mid-2014, nine
CDM projects had been registered. The DNA is the Climate Change Office in the Ministry
of Environment. It is responsible for the elaboration, promotion and implementation of
national policy on climate change. The priorities are to reduce GHG emissions and to
adapt to changing climate conditions.
Moldova submitted a pledge of "no less than 25% from base year (1990)" reduction to
2020 "through implementation of global economic mechanisms" under the Copenhagen
Accord and acknowledged under the Cancun Agreements. The pledge was made in
January 2010, and by November 2013 the country was deemed “inadequate” in its
ability to meet the pledge, as emissions are expected to rise by 2020.7
GHG emissions in Moldova were 13.3 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent
(MtCO2-eq) in 2010 (the last year data is available), which is 74.9% lower than in 1990.
GHG emissions in Moldova have been increasing since the late 1990s along with
economic growth and increased demand for energy. Energy-related emissions of CO2
totalled 7.6 Mt in 2012, representing approximately 57% of total GHG emissions in 2012.
In Moldova, the power generation sector accounts for 46.6% of energy-related CO2
emissions, followed by households (19.6%), transport (13.9%), manufacturing (13.4%)
and the commercial and services sector (6.5%).
© OECD/IEA, 2015
7. http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/moldova.html.
262
7.5. Investment attraction Moldova
The investment climate in Moldova has received a boost in recent years through co-
operation with the European Union and decisive government actions aimed at attracting
private investment. The government is strengthening energy legislation to further align
its energy sector with that of the European Union and, in this regard, it receives strong
support from donor communities. The government is also working to reduce barriers to
business development and private investment in the country’s economy. For instance, in
late 2013 a law was approved that includes a number of favourable provisions for
business and investors, including tax breaks and deductions.8 The changes are expected
to ease the tax burden on existing and new investors, and attract more capital.
Nonetheless, challenges persist. Moldova’s economy is highly reliant on remittances
from nationals working outside the country, which adds to an unstable economic
environment. The country is considered one of the poorest in Europe – making it a big
challenge to attract foreign investment. In addition, Moldova’s bureaucratic burden is
high and the country is perceived to be corrupt.
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Moldova was ranked
63rd among 189 countries in 2014. This is an improvement compared to 2013, when it
was ranked 78th. The index measures how conducive the regulatory environment is to
starting and operating a local firm. Moldova’s ranking is similar to that of Romania.
Moldova has improved its ranking in recent years through an easing in credit availability,
investment protection and simplified tax procedures.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International,
Moldova was ranked 103rd among 175 countries in 2014, with a score of 35 out of 100
(where 100 represents no corruption). This score has remained relatively unchanged
over the past five years. The government has introduced a National Anti-corruption
Strategy for 2011-2015 (2011) in order to fight corruption.
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
Moldova began the privatisation of public enterprises in 1994 and the process is
ongoing. During 2007, the parliament passed a privatisation law with an aim to increase
the economic efficiency of the process. In the energy sector, private companies do exist,
but the state has the overwhelming majority share in the market. In 2013, the state-
owned DSOs, RED Nord and RED Nord-Vest, were made available for privatisation and
were not yet sold at the end of 2014.
The principal laws affecting foreign investment in Moldova have been adopted in the last
10 to 15 years. In 2010, national legislation was developed to provide more favourable
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Moldova 7.5. Investment attraction
conditions to attract investment, including the development of business parks and a law on
public-private partnerships. In 2013, the government created an Integrated Information
Centre with the EEA for investors in renewables and energy efficiency, to facilitate co-
operation between investors, central and local public authorities. There are, however,
few direct incentives for foreign investment.
Starting in 2006, regulatory reform was undertaken by the government in order to
reduce the administrative burden, remove obsolete regulations and fight corruption. As
a result, all regulation and governmental decisions related to business activity are
published in a business registry to increase transparency. In 2012, the Law on State
Control was adopted to streamline procedures of state controls over businesses.
The government has also introduced regulatory impact assessments for all draft laws and
acts relevant to business activity. The government vetted 100 laws to reduce payments
to regulatory and control bodies, and to streamline business licensing procedures and
economic controls.
In December 2013, the government approved a programme to facilitate planning,
implementation and management of state-funded capital investments. The programme
establishes working groups for public capital investments and the regulation of the
working group activities, as well as the capital investment projects. This programme is
expected to assist in removing corruption in public spending and increasing the
effectiveness of state-funded investment.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The Strategy for Attraction of Investment and Promotion of Exports for 2006-2015 is the
principal state policy on investment attraction. The NES 2030 is also a tool for investment
planning, as it outlines the funding necessary for the realisation of government policies
and binding agreements in the energy sector.
The government is currently developing a strategy for investment attraction for 2020-30.
In the energy sector, the funding needed is significant and a targeted approach will be
required to gain investor interest. The NES indicates that external funding is critical for
the necessary investment in electricity, gas and district heating to 2020. This includes
financing from IFIs, grants, the ENPI and private investment. There is some funding for
renewable and energy efficiency projects through the state-funded EEF.
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264
References Moldova
References
Braga, D. (2011), “The dynamic of using river energy from Republic of Moldova territory”,
http://aerapa.conference.ubbcluj.ro/2011/PDF/dianabraga.pdf.
Energy Community (2014a), “Moldova areas of work: Electricity”, Energy Community,
www.energy-community.org (accessed 23 June 2014).
Energy Community (2014b), “Moldova areas of work: Gas”, Energy Community, www.energy-
community.org (accessed 23 June 2014).
Energy Community (2014c), “Annual implementation report”, Energy Community, Vienna.
Energy Community (2013), Study on the Implementation of the New Regulation (EU) 994/2010
Concerning Measures to Safeguard Security of Gas Supply in the Energy Community, September,
Energy Community, Vienna.
EC (European Commission) (2009), “Gas dispute: EU activates civil protection mechanism in gas
deprived Moldova during crisis”, Press release, EC, 12 January, Brussels.
ENPI (European Union Neighbourhood Policy Initiative) (2012), “Energy Community: Parties agree
to establish minimum oil stocks”, Press release, ENPI Info Centre, 23 November.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Natural Gas Europe (2014), “The Fairytale That Wasn’t: The Iasi-Ungheni Gas Interconnector”,
Natural Gas Europe, 18 November, www.naturalgaseurope.com.
UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) (2004), “Country review: Capacity
building needs assessment for the implementation of the UNECE strategic environmental
assessment protocol. Republic of Moldova”, draft report, UNECE, www.unece.org/fileadmin/
DAM/env/eia/documents/SEA_CBNA/RepublicofMoldova_needs_en.pdf.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2014), “GHG emission
profiles”, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/ghg_profiles/items/3954.php
(accessed 23 June 2014).
World Bank (2014), “Moldova overview”, World Bank website,
www.worldbank.org/en/country/moldova/overview (accessed 7 July 2014).
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265
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© OECD/IEA, 2015
TAJIKISTAN
268
Tajikistan
KAZAKHSTAN
UZBEKISTAN
Figure 8.1.1 Map of Tajikistan
UZBEKISTAN K Y R G Y Z S T A N
CHINA
T A J I K I S T A N (People’s Republic of)
Dushanbe
0 100 km AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
8.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
8.1. General energy policy Tajikistan
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
269
Tajikistan 8.1. General energy policy
SUPPLY
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 in Tajikistan was 2.3 million tonnes of oil-equivalent
(Mtoe) in 2012. The energy supply has increased by 6.5% since 2002, despite a contraction
during the global financial crisis in 2008-09 (Figure 8.1.2).
Hydropower is the main source of energy in Tajikistan. It accounted for 64% of TPES in
2012. Oil and coal represented 24.8% and 8% of TPES, respectively, while the remainder
was accounted for by natural gas (5.2%). Over the past decade, gas supply in Tajikistan has
declined by 72.2% while the supply of oil has increased by 78.7%. Coal use has surged
over the same period, with the coal supply increased 100 times from negligible levels in
2002 to 0.2 Mtoe in 2012. Hydropower has increased by 11.4% from 2002 to 2012.
Around 74% of Tajikistan’s energy supply is produced in the country, namely 1.7 Mtoe in 2012.
Around 87% of total production is from hydro. The remainder comes from coal (10.7%),
oil (1.8%) and natural gas (0.5%). Energy production has increased by 22.9% since 2002,
which is a faster rate of growth than that of TPES. Coal production has boomed and is
expected to continue to grow as Tajik industry switches from other fuels to coal use. The
production of oil has increased by 87.5% while natural gas production declined by 64.9%.
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
270
8.1. General energy policy Tajikistan
5 Coal
4 Natural gas
Hydro
3
Mtoe
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation in Tajikistan totalled 17 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, which is 10.9%
higher compared to 2002 (Figure 8.1.3). The electricity supply has experienced volatility
from one year to the next, with average generation of 16.6 TWh over the ten years from
2002 to 2012. Since the mid-1990s, the peak in electricity generation was 17.5 TWh in
2007, after which generation plateaued for four years before a 4.5% increase in 2012.
Nearly all electricity is from hydropower, with only 0.4% from natural gas in 2012.
Tajikistan produced around 0.4 petajoules (PJ) of heat in 2012, which is 88.1% lower
compared to ten years ago. Heat was produced from natural gas before gas supplies
from Uzbekistan were cut off in 2013. Since then, heat has been generated from coal in
smaller volumes. Total heat supply in Tajikistan has been declining since 1990.
8
6
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
natural gas (15%), while Tajikistan’s main export is electricity (70%), followed by oil
271
Tajikistan 8.1. General energy policy
products (23%). Tajikistan used to import gas from Uzbekistan, but Uzbekistan stopped
delivering gas to Tajikistan in 2013.
Tajikistan exports electricity to Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s trade with
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan ceased in 2009 when Uzbekistan cut off its connection to the
Central Asia Power Grid. From 2009 to 2012, electricity trade volumes have fallen from
4 TWh for both imports and exports, to negligible imports and exports of 0.1 TWh in
2012. However, trade has been increasing since the interconnector to Afghanistan
became operational in 2012, with electricity exports increasing to 1.3 TWh in 2014
(according to the Tajik government).
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 of energy was 2 Mtoe in 2012. TFC has increased by
13.5% since 2002, with some annual volatility (Figure 8.1.4). Around 58% of TFC is
electricity, while oil accounts for 27.3%. Coal, natural gas and heat represent 9.2%, 4.8%
and 0.5% of TFC, respectively. Final consumption of natural gas and heat has contracted
by 56.7% and 88.1%, respectively, over the ten years to 2012. Conversely, the use of coal
and oil has increased by 992.2% and 78.6%, respectively. Demand for electricity has
increased by a moderate 2.1% over the same period.
Industry is the largest consuming sector and accounts for 26.7% of TFC, followed by
agriculture at 16.1%, residential at 11.2%, transport at 5.4% and commercial and public
services at 4.1%. However, the data include non-specified consumption, which is significant
at 36.6%. Non-specified consumption includes all fuel use not elsewhere specified in data
collection. Non-specified consumption is most likely in rural areas.
The industry sector (mainly the aluminium industry), agriculture and the residential
sectors are the main consumers of electricity, and coal, gas and oil are mainly consumed
in commercial services and transport.
3.5 Residential
3.0
Commercial**
2.5
Mtoe
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Note: Reporting on residential consumption changed in 2005.
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing, forestry and non-specified consumption.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
272
8.1. General energy policy Tajikistan
ENERGY INTENSITY
Tajikistan’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.14 toe/
USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012 (Figure 8.1.5). This is the second-lowest level of intensity
among the EECCA countries, higher than Azerbaijan only. Since 2002, energy intensity in
Tajikistan has declined by 48.7%, down from 0.27 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP. Real GDP
growth in Tajikistan was faster than the relatively subdued growth in TPES over the ten
years, leading to a decline in energy intensity of the economy.
Figure 8.1.5 Energy intensity in Tajikistan and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
0.9 Armenia
0.8 Kyrgyzstan
0.7 Moldova
0.6 Georgia
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
0.5 Tajikistan
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy in Tajikistan is in the form of hydropower, which accounts for 64.1%
of TPES, 86.9% of energy produced and 99% of electricity generation. Tajikistan has the
highest share of renewables in TPES among EECCA countries, followed by Kyrgyzstan’s
similar energy mix. Hydropower generation has increased by 11.4% since 2002, increasing
its share in TPES from 61.3% in 2002 to 64.1% in 2012 (Figure 8.1.6).
Figure 8.1.6 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Tajikistan and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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Tajikistan 8.1. General energy policy
MARKET STRUCTURE
Electricity
The electricity sector is mostly owned and operated by Barqi Tojic, a vertically integrated
state-owned company that is the main electricity generator, the transmission system
operator (TSO), the distribution system operator (DSO), the retailer and the dispatch unit.
The company is financially and legally unbundled from the government. Over the past
decade, the government has considered restructuring it to improve management,
reduce inefficiencies and reduce high indebtedness. In August 2011, the government
signed the Approval on the Restructuring Plan of the Individual Open Joint Stock Holding
Company Barqi Tojik for 2011-18, with a grant from the ADB in conjunction with a grant
for the rehabilitation of the transmission network. Under the restructuring plan, the
government expects to separate the generation, transmission and distribution (and
© OECD/IEA, 2015
3. www.stat.tj.
274
8.1. General energy policy Tajikistan
retail) functions of Barqi Tojik by 2018. By the end of 2014, the government and the
donor community were still in negotiations over the possible approaches and conditions
of the planned restructuring.
There are a number of independent power producers, mainly in the small HPP sector.
Sangtuda HPP 1 (670 MW) is 75% owned and operated by a Russian company, while
Sangtuda HPP 2 is owned and operated by Iranian companies (under a 12-year agreement).
Approximately two-thirds of small hydropower plants are privately owned and operated.
Electricity distribution in the autonomous Gorno-Badakshan region is carried out by
Pamir Energy, a private-public partnership established in 2002.
Coal
Some 18 private enterprises or private-public partnerships operate the 14 coal deposits
in Tajikistan. Coal production is regulated and prices are approved by the Antimonopoly
Commission, based on yearly submissions on work. The sector is expected to develop
over the next decade as demand for coal in Tajikistan increases through fuel switching in
industry, and because of the availability of resources.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Energy policy is approved by the president and the government of Tajikistan following
consultations with the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources, the Ministry of Economic
Development and Trade, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and other
ministries. The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources is responsible for implementing
energy policy, including licensing and regulation of renewable energy sources. The
ministry was restructured in 2013 from the Ministry of Energy and Industry.
Tariff approvals are the responsibility of the Antimonopoly Committee, under the
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Primary energy legislation of Tajikistan consists of the Law on Energy (2000), the Law on
Renewable Energy Sources (2010) and the newly adopted Law on Energy Efficiency and
Energy Saving (2013) which replaced the Law on Energy Saving from 2002. Other primary
laws include the Concession Law (2011), the Law on Hydro-technical Installation Safety
(2010) and the Law on Foreign Investment (2007).
The Law on Energy stipulates that the government or government agencies are the
principal agents for the management of the energy sector. It also legislates the
monitoring of energy companies, consumer rights, tariff setting and the establishment of
a government authority for the approval of concession agreements over energy facilities,
including concessions to foreign investors.
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The Law on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving provides the legislative framework for
the introduction of energy-efficient appliances and technologies. It has provisions for
mandatory energy audits and requirements for buildings and household appliances, among
other aspects. It stipulates methods for the establishment of the National Fund for
Renewable Energy Sources, Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency (Energy Charter, 2013).
The Law on Renewable Energy Sources introduced incentives for investment in the
renewable sector, including rules for obligatory purchases by Barqi Tojik, and set out the
methodology for green tariffs for small HPP operators.
The Law on Concessions and the Law on Foreign Investment include provisions for third-
party access in the electricity sector under specific investor conditions.
The legislative framework for the gas and oil sector is under the Law on Licensing Certain
Types of Activities (2005), Law on Subsoil (1994) and the Resolution of the Government
of Tajikistan, the Order of Competition on the Use of Mineral Resources (March 2013)
(UNECE, 2013). A draft Law on Gas, in accordance with EU principles, was developed in
2013. The draft law was still awaiting government approval at the end of 2014.
Secondary legislation in Tajikistan has been updated over the past five years, albeit only
partially, with the introduction of new laws on renewable energy and energy efficiency.
The by-laws are weak in terms of clear and transparent rules on third-party access, tariff
methodology and structure (including green tariffs), and all secondary legislation regarding
the new Law on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving. Recent by-laws introduced over
that past five years include:
approval of Measures for Implementation of Priority Projects in the Energy Sector
for 2010-2015 (May 2010)
approval of the Rules of Attraction, Use, Coordination and Monitoring of External
Assistance (August 2010)
approval of the Programme for Efficient Use of Power Resources and Energy for
2012-2016 (November 2011)
Tariffs for Electricity and Heat (March 2012)
approval of the Draft Agreement Between the Ministry of Energy and Industry and
the International Finance Corporation of the Presentation of Financial Advisory Services
(September 2012)
State Program of Investment Grants and Capital Construction for 2013-2015
(November 2012)
formation of the Supervisory Council on the Implementation and Monitoring Progress
of the Restructuring of the Open Joint Stock Holding Company Barqi Tojik (May 2012).
KEY POLICIES
Energy policy in Tajikistan primarily aims to ease the annual seasonal winter shortages and
provide non-interrupting access to energy to its population. The approach to the crisis
has varied over the decades, depending on the political situation in the country and
relationships with its neighbours. At present, the government plans to diversifying energy
sources (including the introduction of non-hydro renewable energy), rehabilitate and modernise
existing energy infrastructure, improve energy savings and increase regional integration.
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The electricity interconnection to the Central Asia Power Grid via Uzbekistan was cut off
in 2009 and the gas pipeline from Uzbekistan was cut off in 2013. This threatened energy
security in Tajikistan even further, forcing the government to internalise its energy policy
and start thinking about developing domestic energy resources while considering co-
operation with other neighbours.
The government is still working under the Concept of Development of the Fuel and
Energy Complex for 2003-15, which is relevant but expires soon. It lacks medium- to
long-term policy in the sector, including a detailed economic analysis of available resources,
possible scenarios and attainable targets. The following are the main aspects of its vision
for the energy sector:
increase tariffs to reduce fiscal deficit and to improve investment attractiveness in
the energy sector
continue developing the market for electricity exports to Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan
and Iran
improve governance and transparency in the energy sector
develop incentives for investment in natural gas exploration, coal production and
the restoration of thermal power plants
develop a long-term programme of development of the energy sector to 2020,
which will identify possible priority use of electricity for domestic purposes.
Tariff increases have been passed over the past few years; however, they still remain
among the lowest in the region. The government will continue to raise tariffs to reach
cost-reflective levels over time, but it is unclear how long this will take.
The government has been easing legislative and bureaucratic requirements for investors
in order to increase attractiveness in all parts of the sector, and has introduced green
tariffs for small HPPs and an obligation of purchase from Barqi Tojic. This has resulted in
a surge in construction of small HPPs since 2007, with capacity reaching more than
130 MW and above the projected level. Demand for small HPPs continues in Tajikistan;
however, only marginal developments have been made in solar and wind power.
In the electricity sector, the largest projects at present are the construction of Rogun
HPP on the Vakhsh River and the construction of a 500 kV transmission line connecting
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran, CASA 1 000 project (Central Asia South Asia
Electricity Transmission and Trade Project) . When operational, the Rogun station would
produce 3 600 gigawatts (GW) at peak capacity and would entirely eliminate winter
shortages. The project was deemed feasible by a World Bank study in 2014 and will mostly
likely go ahead if financing is secured. Once the first units come on line, Tajikistan will
more than double its electricity output and increase electricity exports to Afghanistan,
some of which will be sold on to Iran and Pakistan. The security issue in Afghanistan and
securing financing for the transmission line remain the largest hurdles at present.
The production of coal in Tajikistan has boomed over the past decade (albeit from very low
levels) and will continue to grow as the government rehabilitates thermal power plants
and builds new coal-fired generation. Additionally, the government has encouraged
industry to switch from natural gas and oil to coal use (where possible), which has
resulted in strong demand for coal production in the country and high production growth
rates year-on-year.
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Tajikistan will have access to gas from Turkmenistan from 2016 via the Line D pipeline of
the Central Asia-China pipeline system that began construction in 2014. This will
diminish the need to develop its own gas resources at first. Over time, the country may
consider developing its resources and exporting via this pipeline. According to the Tajik
government, a number of private investors have shown interest in developing oil and gas
production in the country in the past few years.
INVESTMENT
The investment climate in Tajikistan is improving, albeit slowly. The country is one of the
poorest in the region and domestic investment is weak while foreign interest is mainly from
other countries in the region with political interest and/or ties to Tajikistan (namely Russia,
China and Iran). This is especially true in the energy sector, where these three countries
have been the main source of investment over the past ten years. Energy investment
over the past ten years totalled USD 2.5 billion, including public and private investment.
The government is interested in attracting significantly more private investment over the
next decade, looking for funding for the Rogun HPP and other necessary and large
projects planned before 2020. It has eased the legislative and bureaucratic requirements
for all investors since 2007, with the introduction of the Law on Investment and subsequent
supporting legislation. It also created four economic free zones, where investors are
exempt from certain categories of taxes and customs duties.
Most recently, in 2014 the construction of the gas pipeline Line D of the Central Asia-
China pipeline system began, which will transit gas from Turkmenistan to China. The
construction of the 425 km pipeline will cost around USD 6.2 billion in Tajikistan and will
be financed by China. The first gas is expected to flow in 2016, which will allow for gas
supplies to Tajikistan, and eventually it could allow for Tajikistan gas exports to China
depending on contract agreements.
Oil and gas exploration in Tajikistan is still in the early stages of development. The main
exploration project underway is conducted by CNPC, Total and Tethys Petroleum who
finalised an agreement in June 2013 to develop oil and gas deposits in the Bokhtar field
in the east of the Amu Daryia basin. Under the agreement, CNPC and Total hold 33.335%
stakes each in the project and Tethys holds a 33.33% stake.
The construction continuation of Rogun HPP is valued at over USD 2 billion. Construction
began in the 1980s during the Soviet era, but has been suspended for decades. The
project was deemed feasible in 2014 by a World Bank study and is currently awaiting
financing. It would be built in four phases over a decade.
Once the Rogun HPP is built and Tajikistan more than doubles its electricity output, it is
planning to increase electricity exports to Afghanistan, some of which will be transited to
Iran and Pakistan. This is part of the CASA 1 000 project, namely the development of a
500 kV Obi-Garm – Sangtuda – Kunduz – Puli Khumri – Kabul transmission line connecting
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Iran. An agreement was signed among the
countries in 2012 and by the end of 2014 the countries had agreed on tariffs. Security
issues in Afghanistan and securing financing remain the largest hurdles at present. The
project is expected to cost the Tajik government around USD 270 million (approximately
a quarter of the total cost), while other governments will finance the remainder. Some
funding may be provided by the World Bank and other financial institutions.
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The government is also committed to the USD 122 million transmission rehabilitation
project financed by the ADB until 2018, including the construction of two new transmission
lines, an upgrade to the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system and the
reconstruction of a substation. A number of other network rehabilitation projects are
currently going on around the country, mainly financed by the donor community.
Investment in small HPPs by domestic and foreign investors has been the most successful
RES project in Tajikistan, adding more than 130 MW of capacity in less than five years. The
project is USD 13.9 million in value and is continuing to date, albeit already exceeding
original capacity targets. During 2014, Sangtuda HPP 2 (210 MW) was put into operation,
as was the first unit of the coal-fired CHP Dushanbe-2 plant (100 MW). An additional
300 MW of the Dushanbe CHP is expected to become operational by end-2017.
ASSESSMENT
The energy sector in Tajikistan is under supply stress at present with most of the country
experiencing significant supply shortages during autumn/winter, with no power and/or
heat for up to 70% of the time when conditions are extreme. Tajikistan has been
disconnected from the Central Asian Power Grid since 2009 and gas supplies from
Uzbekistan ceased in 2013, forcing the country to internalise its energy policy and
putting more pressure on the existing system. This comes at a time of growing
population and industrialisation of the country, with demand growth of approximately
2.5 TWh per year according to the Tajik government.
The government is committed to solving the energy crisis and considers that investing in
Tajikistan’s energy sector is key to alleviating energy poverty and raising the country’s
living standard. The review team commends the government of Tajikistan for its current
energy policy directions: to provide non-interrupting access to energy to its population as
its prime objective; diversification of energy sources and the development of renewable
energy; the rehabilitation and modernisation of existing energy infrastructure to increase
its efficiency and reduce losses; and the development of regional energy markets.
Tajikistan has abundant hydropower reserves, with a technically feasible electricity
generation potential of 317 TWh/y, which makes it the eighth-largest country for
hydropower potential and one of the top countries for per-capita production worldwide.
This potential remains largely untapped; to date the country uses about 5% of its
available hydropower potential.
Tajikistan also has around 400 million tonnes (Mt) of proved coal reserves, 2 Mt of oil
reserves and 6 bcm of natural gas reserves. With 280-330 sunny days a year, Tajikistan’s
solar potential is about 25 TWh/y. These resources are largely untapped, as energy
policy to date has shown little interest in developing hydrocarbon production and
renewable sources, and has focused on hydropower production.
This is set to change over the next decade as the government looks to diversify its energy
sources. Coal production has already increased from negligible levels a decade ago, and
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it will grow substantially in the medium term as fuel switching in industry and power
generation increases demand. In the long term, development of natural gas and oil
resources is also envisaged. During 2014, 100 MW of coal-fired CHP capacity came on
line and 300 MW more is expected by end-2017. Given the push for more fossil fuel use
in the sector in the future, it is important that hydrocarbon developments include clean
technologies, at the most reasonable costs for investors, including upgrades to existing
thermal plants.
As a sound foundation for supporting energy policy developments, the review team
believes that the government of Tajikistan should develop a comprehensive strategy for
the medium and long term (from 2020 to 2050), including consideration for all energy
sectors and both supply and demand measures. On the supply side, the government
should focus on increasing energy independence, looking into ways of expanding its
energy mix and diversifying the electricity and heat generation sector. The review team
suggests that the government commission a geological survey to re-evaluate the country’s
oil, gas and coal reserves and assess its solar, wind and geothermal potential. Including
thermal and renewable sources in the energy mix would improve the reliability of supply,
especially in winter, as those sources are more available at times when hydropower is not.
The energy efficiency potential of the country is vast, with Tajik research and academic
institutions’ estimates of up to 40% potential. The review team commends the government
for its efforts to undertake measures for energy efficiency, such as the planned
rehabilitation of the aluminium manufacturer TALCO that consumes 40% of electricity supply.
However, large energy savings potential remains in both the industrial and buildings sectors.
Maximising gains in energy efficiency and demand management is crucial to resolving
the energy crisis. The government should assess the potential for energy savings in all
sectors of the economy and set up a legal and institutional framework for demand-side
management. It should set up an independent institution with the sole purpose of
assessing energy efficiency potential, developing and implementing energy policies on
energy efficiency, and attracting the required investment and expertise. Energy efficiency
policies and measures require detailed analysis of energy-use data, and should be
monitored through the use of energy efficiency indicators, developed through a national
statistics database.
Energy savings in electricity, heat and gas supply are also high. Energy infrastructure in
Tajikistan is aged, with more than 60% of capacity needing rehabilitation before 2020. The
network is inefficient, with losses among the highest in the region. The government has
accepted a grant from the ADB for the rehabilitation of the transmission network by 2018,
under the condition of Barqi Tojik restructuring. Barqi Tojik is operationally ineffective
and highly indebted, adding inefficiencies to the sector. The review team recommends
that the government outsource the restructuring of Barqi Tojik in order to get the most
objective and effective reorganisation of the company before considering unbundling.
Winter supply shortages are frequent and due to low hydropower capacity during the
winter months, without enough capacity from other fuels to cover those months. The
construction of the Rogun HPP would allow for increased capacity during the winter
months and expanded electricity in the summer months. The government should continue
to seek financing for the efficient and timely continuation of Rogun HPP’s construction.
The government should also consider developing a detailed emergency response plan as
soon as possible, and compulsory fuel storage possibilities to secure an uninterrupted
energy supply during the winter months until Rogun is constructed.
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An important aspect of electricity supply to all households is the ability to supply the
most vulnerable customers at affordable prices. The subsidies for electricity usage should
be reconsidered so that they are aimed at the most needy customers only, freeing up
capital normally spent on subsidising those who can afford it. The additional funds from
rearranging subsidies should be spent in the most efficient way possible through
measures for curbing demand in the industrial sector, subsidising the emergency stocks
for winter, and educating the public on energy savings.
Existing electricity, heat and gas tariffs are some of the lowest in region, and the
government has begun progressively bringing them to a cost-reflective level. Prices have
increased by 40% over the past two years, but they remain very low. In the medium and
long term, the government should develop a comprehensive transparent methodology
for electricity and gas tariffs to account for real expenditure in energy supply and allow
for future investment. The move to fully cost-reflective tariffs should continue to be a
progressive one, in order to gain public acceptance and change in the way electricity is
viewed, from a “free public good” to a commodity.
The government of Tajikistan has introduced key primary legislation and amendments in
the past few years, to promote the stable development of the energy sector. This
includes RES legislation, a key requirement for the introduction of more renewable
sources in the energy mix. The review team encourages the government to continue
such important legislative steps, including legislation on taxes, customs and land codes.
For the primary legislation to be adopted as swiftly as possible, detailed secondary
legislation and implementation plans should be developed, to ensure a predictable,
stable and transparent environment for investors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Continue to develop the Rogun HPP in an environmentally sound and timely manner
to increase winter electricity capacity in the medium term and allow for greater
electricity exports in the mid- to long term. Continue to foster regional co-operation
with neighbouring countries for the development of CASA 1 000 and the realisation
of electricity export markets.
Consider an option for tendering the management contract for Barqi Tojik as part of
the restructuring programme to ensure the timely and efficient internal reorganisation
of the company before taking further steps in unbundling.
Establish a government entity in charge of assessing energy efficiency potential;
develop energy efficiency policies and measures; and attract the required investment
and expertise to implement the policies. Develop energy efficiency indicators to
monitor progress.
Ensure coherence with the key legislation, including tax, customs and land codes, in
further developing the policies and measures for the renewable energy sector. Develop
detailed secondary legislation and implementation plans to ensure a predictable,
stable and transparent environment for investors.
Ensure the application of clean coal technologies, at the most reasonable cost, in
upgrading existing and developing new thermal plants.
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FOSSIL FUELS
Tajikistan has modest fossil fuel resources and is reliant on imports for most of its
hydrocarbon energy needs.
Tajikistan has proven reserves of 2 Mt and resources of 60 Mt (BGR, 2013). Most of the
resources are located in the northern part of the country in the Leninobod Soghd Region.
Natural gas reserves are estimated at 6 bcm with resources of 100 bcm (BGR, 2013). The
Khoja Sartez field in the southern Khatlon Region and the Qizil Tumshuq deposit in the
Kolkhozobod District of the southern Khatlon Region are currently in operation.
Hard coal deposits in Tajikistan are estimated at 375 Mt with 3.7 billion tonnes of
resources (BGR, 2013). Coal is available in almost all regions of the country, but many of
the deposits are located in remote mountainous areas.
HYDROPOWER
According to the Tajik government, Tajikistan's river system accounts for an estimated
4% of the world's hydropower resources. Tajikistan only uses a small portion of its
hydropower potential at present. Its technical potential is 317 gigawatt hours (GWh) of
electricity per year while the current generation is around 16 GWh (around 5% of the
potential) (Republic of Tajikistan, 2014).
Amu Daryia is the major river system in Tajikistan with hydropower potential. Its major
tributaries within Tajikistan include the Panj River along the southern border of Tajikistan
with Afghanistan, the Gunt and Bartango rivers in the eastern part of the country, the
Syr Daryia and Zarafshan rivers in the north and the Kafirnigan and Vakhsh rivers in
central and western Tajikistan. Of these, the Vakhsh River is the most important in terms
of hydropower potential.
Energy security in Tajikistan is in a state of a crisis and is therefore of great concern for
the government. The country relies on hydropower for nearly all of its electricity needs,
but it is volatile from one season to the next – electricity is in surplus in summer months
and in shortfall in the winter months. The existing electricity generation capacity does
not suffice for winter months and many customers are subject to severe outages, having
electricity only a few hours a day. There are also remote parts of the country that have
no electricity or heating.
Electricity shortages have existed since independence and the system is under increasing
pressure as demand continues to increase. The main response to winter shortages has
been the introduction of consumption limitations. These affect mainly rural residents
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The government also implemented an Energy Emergency Mitigation Action Plan (EEMAP)
from 2008 to 2010, making sure that thermal and heat energy supplies were readily
available, preparations for the following two winters were carried out and focusing on
medium- and long-term policies aimed at improving energy security. During EEMAP, the
government invested in new generating capacity, transformers, switchgear, cables, and
the prevention of excessive water withdrawal from the Nurek reservoir. As a result,
electricity shortages decreased from 5 GWh in the 2006-07 autumn-winter period to
1.6 GWh in autumn-winter 2011-12. However, challenges remain and significant additional
capacity is needed to eliminate the shortages entirely.
Additional energy security risks come from aged infrastructure and the fact that most
existing generation facilities are reaching the end of their life cycle. Approximately 60%
of existing hydropower plants should be rehabilitated by 2020 and close to 80 percent
by 2030 in order to maintain existing capacity (Fields et al., 2013). The government is
mainly working with the donor community to secure projects and funding for these
large-scale rehabilitations.
In addition, deterioration in regional co-operation has worsened energy security in Tajikistan.
The electricity interconnection to Uzbekistan and to the Central Asia Power Grid was cut
off in 2009 and a gas pipeline from Uzbekistan was cut off in 2013. The country has had
to reduce its reliance on gas imports to supplement winter electricity shortages.
Under these conditions, the government’s approach to improved energy security focuses
on the development of domestic energy resources (including large hydro), improving
transmission and distribution networks, and strengthening regional integration with
other neighbouring countries.
The construction of the Rogun reservoir on the Vakhsh River is the main government
project at present. If built, the Rogun HPP would have the capacity of 3.6 GW and would
produce enough electricity to eradicate winter shortages. Construction of the plant began
in the 1980s but was interrupted by political instability. Since then, only maintenance
activities have been performed and the continuation of the construction is dependent
on assessment studies. The World Bank is financing an assessment study for the project
and in September 2014 it published a final report which deemed the project as feasible
under certain safety conditions.4
The government is also planning to develop energy sources other than largo hydro to
diversify the fuels in electricity generation and reduce volatility. Barqi Tojic is constructing
a new coal-fired power plant, Dushanbe-2, with Chinese foreign investors, 100 MW of
which was constructed in 2014 and another 300 MW is planned by end-2017. Small
hydro development has experienced the most success at present, with over 130 MW of
capacity built by the end of 2014. Other plans include the conversion of heat generation
plants from gas to coal and the rehabilitation of existing thermal power plants in order
to improve efficiency.
Regional co-operation is also of grave importance, and the government is turning its
focus to its southern neighbours. Once Rogun HPP is constructed, there would be
enough electricity for domestic consumption and export to Afghanistan and Pakistan in
the summer months, as specified under the CASA 1 000 project. If both projects go
ahead, Tajikistan is expected to significantly increase regional co-operation and diversify
its export markets.
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4. www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/brief/final-reports-related-to-the-proposed-rogun-hpp.
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8.2. Energy security Tajikistan
Electricity generation
Tajikistan has about 5.2 GW of electricity generation capacity, 94% of which is hydro.
The remainder is 318 MW (6%) in thermal power plant capacity (Republic of Tajikistan,
2014). However, during winter months the system’s capacity is reduced to 2.3 GW,
which is 1.2 GW less than the peak demand of 3.5 GW (Fields et al., 2013).
The majority of Tajikistan's hydropower is produced by the hydro stations on the Vakhsh
River, with a total capacity of about 3.8 GW, producing 14 GWh annually. The largest of
these is the Nurek hydroelectric facility with a capacity of 3 GW. The Nurek Dam was
constructed during the Soviet era between the years of 1961 and 1980. Tajikistan has
11 large and medium HPPs and nearly 300 small power plants (total capacity of 132 MW)
(Republic of Tajikistan, 2014).
Hydro generation capacity has expanded over the past decade, with the completion of
Sangtuda HPP 1 in 2009 and the smaller Sangtuda HPP 2 in 2014. The two power stations
added 900 MW of capacity. The government is also seeking aid from donor communities
and foreign investors to rehabilitate the oldest and largest HPPs, to maintain and
increase capacity.
Thermal power capacity in Tajikistan represents around 6% of total generation capacity.
It is mainly comprised of gas-fired CHP plants that are also used in heat generation and
central heating. Barqi Tojik is constructing a 400 MW coal-fired power station, Dushanbe 2,
in co-operation with Chinese partners. The first 100 MW were constructed during 2014
with the remainder to become operational by end-2017. Other plans include the conversion
of heat generation plants from gas to coal and the rehabilitation of existing thermal
power plants in order to improve efficiency.
District heating
District heating in Tajikistan is aged and highly inefficient, with a number of heating
stations not in operation due to age/condition. Underinvestment in the sector has resulted
in deteriorated infrastructure and a falling number of customers, with households switching
to electric or gas heating.
The main heat generation facilities have 1.3 GW of capacity, and a transmission and distribution
network of 125 km of heat supply mains and 414 km of other piping (Fields et al., 2012).
District heating is available and operational only in Dushanbe. Dushanbe district heating
system comprises a CHP plant and a number of large and small boiler houses (several of
which are not operational due to age and condition).
The Yavan CHP plant used to provide heating for the Yavan urban area; however, the
CHP plant is no longer operational.
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Another 500 kV Obi-Garm – Sangtuda – Kunduz - Puli Khumri – Kabul transmission line is
planned, under the CASA 1 000 project. CASA 1 000 involves a high-voltage power line
grid connecting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, with a length of 1 200 km
(around 585 km will connect Tajikistan and Afghanistan). The project was approved in
2012 by all member countries and construction will likely begin in the next five years.
The two exporting countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, will generate foreign exchange
earnings as a result of the export of surplus summer electricity. The project will also
provide the connection of power between the two countries, which will improve the
reliability of the high-voltage electricity transmission network in the region. For Afghanistan
the project will provide a source of additional net summer electricity that can be used to
meet domestic needs and/or for re-export to Pakistan. Afghanistan is also guaranteed a
significant income from the transit of electricity. For Pakistan, the lack of electricity is a
major constraint to economic growth.
Options are also being considered for construction of a 500 kV Khudjant –Shymkent
(Kazakhstan) transmission line and a 500 kV Khudjant – Datka (Kyrgyzstan) transmission
line connecting the country to South Kazakhstan and the Urals (Russia). Further proposed
transmission lines are the 750 kV Obi-Garm – Khorog – Vakhan Corridor (Afghanistan) –
Peshawar (Pakistan) (650 km in length), the 500 kV Obi-Garm – Sangtuda – Kunduz –
Herat (Afghanistan) – Mashkhad (Iran) (1 100 km), the 500 kV Obi-Garm – Jirgatal – Sary
Tash (Kyrgizstan) – Ulugchay (China) (550 km), and a 500 kV line from Tajikistan to
Turkmenistan via Afghanistan.
In the autonomous Gorno-Badakhshan region, the distribution network is owned and
operated by Pamir Energy. The public-private partnership has rehabilitated most of the
network since 2002, reducing supply shortages and outages to minimal levels, and has
constructed a transmission line to Afghanistan, which supplies electricity to a number of
villages across the border.5
The ADB has granted Tajikistan USD 122 million for the modernisation and rehabilitation
of its transmission system for 2010-15. The grant includes the construction of two new
220 kV transmission lines and the rehabilitation of substations. It also includes investment
in the SCADA system and a network control centre. Conditional on the grant is the
progressive restructuring of Barqi Tojik.
Barqi Tojik is responsible for annual investment in the modernisation, rehabilitation and
development of the electricity network. This includes preventive repairs to prepare the
systems for the autumn-winter period and to reduce shortages. According to the
government, the annual preventive measures have reduced the winter shortages from
5 GWh in the 2006-07 autumn-winter period (when the crisis was at its worst) to
1.6 GWh in autumn-winter 2011-12.
NATURAL GAS
The gas network is divided into two separate systems. In the north, pipelines total
609 km in length; however, those connected to Uzbekistan were cut off at the border in
2013. Only one pipeline is in use. The southern system includes 412 km of pipelines.
In September 2014, the governments of Tajikistan and China began the construction of
the Line D gas pipeline, part of the Central Asia-China pipeline system, which will transit
gas from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to China. The overall
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capacity of exports to China will be 85 bcm (including all four lines). Line D will be about
1 000 km long with 425 km to be built in Tajikistan. The Chinese government will finance
the project (Eurasianet, 2014).
TajikTransGas, the TSO, is responsible for maintaining the transmission pipelines and
implements an annual maintenance programme. DSOs are responsible for maintenance
of the distribution pipelines. There are no specific medium-/long-term maintenance
programmes for the gas sector.
Oil and gas exploration in Tajikistan is still in the early stages of development. In
June 2013, CNPC, Total and Tethys Petroleum finalised an agreement to develop oil and gas
deposits in the Bokhtar field in the east of the Amu Daryia basin. Under the agreement,
CNPC and Total hold 33.335% stakes each in the project and Tethys holds a 33.33%
stake. Once developed, the gas would be mainly destined for Chinese markets.
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
System reliability in the electricity sector is very poor, with frequent shortages, outages
and high losses. Shortages and outages are mainly in the winter months, while losses are
high all year round due to aged and inefficient infrastructure. According to the government,
total transmission, distribution and commercial losses are estimated at around 15%
(with transmission losses at approximately 4%), a level which has declined slowly from
around 20% in the mid-2000s.
The World Bank has financed a project to reduce transmission losses to 12% by 2020,
with an interim target of 15% by 2016. The 2013 World Bank report indicates that
improvements are minor and that efforts should be accelerated to meet those targets
(Fields et al., 2013).
The ADB project on the rehabilitation and modernisation of the transmission network is
expected to result in loss improvements after 2015. Another project is in the Sughd
region, for 2011-14, with funding from the EIB, EBRD, EC and Barqi Tojik. The project
includes the reconstruction of the Kayrakkum HPP, rehabilitation of the Khojent district
distribution network and part of the Bobojon Gufarov distribution network, and the
purchase and installation of electronic meters for those regions.
Technical and commercial losses are near 17% in the gas sector, which is considered very
high by international standards. Most of these losses are in the distribution pipelines.
Transmission pipeline losses have now been reduced to close to zero as TajikTransGas
has implemented a Loss Reduction Programme for the gas sector. This project has
embraced the installation of bulk and individual gas meters to almost all customers.
Further project activities have included the introduction of international accounting
standards and installation of modern billing systems.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Tajikistan, like its neighbours, has emergency response mechanisms that date back to
the Soviet era. Obligatory levels of oil stocks are included under the old legislation, which
may or may not be kept by Barqi Tojic, mainly for financial reasons.
However, unlike its neighbours, Tajikistan has significant electricity shortages that are
ongoing and will take time to eliminate. The government is responding by including
emergency mitigation in energy policies and focusing investment in electricity generation
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Tajikistan 8.2. Energy security
and increasing efficiency. The government developed the EEMAP, with the help of the
World Bank, in response to the 2007-08 energy crisis when shortages were around
5 GWh, in order to increase electricity and heat generation at thermal stations through
oil supply, and to improve network equipment in preventing excessive water withdrawal
from the Nurek reservoir (World Bank, 2010).
The government has since revised the EEMAP to incorporate new challenges brought on
by the cut-off from Uzbekistan and the Central Asia Power Grid in 2009. New measures
include the construction of the transmission line connecting the north and south
electricity networks, construction of Sangtuda-1 and the rehabilitation of the Nurek
hydro reservoir. Other measures which are still in slow progress include efforts to reduce
losses and to reduce demand by improving energy efficiency and using energy-saving
technologies (World Bank, 2010).
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Tajikistan 8.3. Market convergence
The gas sector is state-owned and -operated, through a TSO company and 11 regional
DSOs, which are also retailers. TajikTransGas is the gas importer and TSO and it operates
the central dispatch. The DSOs have been financially unbundled from TajikTransGas since
2009, and are in state ownership.
The natural gas sector in Tajikistan was cut off from its main import source, Uzbekistan,
in 2013. As such, no gas was imported during 2014, with domestic production accounting
for around 2% of demand. It is unclear, due to the political situation at present, if and
when imports from Uzbekistan will recommence.
The government is planning to privatise the gas sector by selling the DSOs. No
companies have been sold to date. Part of the reason for lack of interest is the lack of
rules on third-party access.
COAL
Coal production in Tajikistan has increased substantially over the past decade, and
approximately 18 private enterprises operate at 14 coal deposits in Tajikistan. The level
of coal production and investment in the sector is expected to continue to increase as
industries in Tajikistan are switching from other fuels to coal, with the support and
encouragement of the Ministry of Energy and Water Resources.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
Regulation of the energy sector is the responsibility of a number of ministries and an
independent regulator does not exist. The Ministry of Energy and Water Resources is
responsible for the implementation of energy policies (including renewables) and
licensing, as well as technical and safety standards, while the Antimonopoly Committee,
established in 2010 under the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, is responsible
for tariff structure and regulation of monopolistic behaviour.
Tariffs
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8.3. Market convergence Tajikistan
public and municipal consumers, electric transport and sports facilities: USD 0.0223/kWh
water wells and pumping stations: USD 0.0004/kWh.
The summer and winter electricity tariffs for TALCO Tajik Aluminium Company were increased
to USD 0.014/kWh and USD 0.0220/kWh, respectively (increasing by 40% from 2010).
The tariff structure/methodology is based on Barqi Tojik’s cost of generation, transmission
and distribution of electricity and heat, as well as allowing for a profit margin. Allowances
for bringing tariffs to a cost-reflective level are included in these calculations. Barqi
Tojik’s Planning Department determines the cost requirements and submits proposed
electricity and heat tariffs to the Antimonopoly Committee for approval. The committee
considers the proposed tariffs and submits its decision to the government for approval.
After approval by the government, Barqi Tojik informs the public through media outlets
of the revision of electricity and heat tariffs.
In some cases of public-private partnerships, such as the Pamir Energy partnership in
the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakshan, tariffs are established by a government
memorandum. According to this memorandum, the tariffs charged by Pamir Energy
exceed Barqi Tojik’s tariffs.
According to the Law on Energy, all electricity produced by small hydropower stations
and other renewable energy sources are under compulsory purchase agreements with
agreed tariffs, as is the case with Pamir Energy.
Technical rules
Technical rules in Tajikistan are based on the Soviet-era GOST standards in the electricity,
heat and gas sectors. The government is considering adopting more European CENELEC
standards in electricity and gas to standardise rules across the region. However,
implementation is a challenge due to the lack of financial and capacity-building resources.
Tajikistan is a corresponding member of the International Standards Organisation (ISO),
the Euro-Asian Cooperation of National Metrological Institutions (COOMET) and of the
Euro-Asian Council for Standardisation (EASC).
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Tajikistan 8.3. Market convergence
ELECTRICITY
Tajikistan trades electricity only with Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan. Tajikistan began
exporting electricity to Afghanistan in 2013 and exports grew to 1.4 TWh in 2014.
The connection to Uzbekistan and the Central Asia Power Grid was cut off in 2009.
Before the cut-off, imports and exports were at a similar level, at around 25-30% of
Tajikistan’s generation. During 2009-12, exports fell to below 5% of generation and
imports were below 1% of demand. Electricity trade declined significantly as Kyrgyzstan
is not equipped to supply Tajikistan with large volumes of electricity during the winter
months when it also experiences electricity shortages.
The most relevant proposal for regional integration for Tajikistan is the CASA 1 000
project, a high-voltage power line connecting Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The feasibility study was approved in 2012 and construction will likely start in
the next few years. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two exporting countries, will generate
foreign exchange earnings for the export of surplus summer electricity. Afghanistan will
import electricity during the summer months when its shortages are most prominent,
and transit some electricity to Pakistan, which also requires more electricity in the summer.
In 2014, Tajik and Pakistani authorities agreed on an electricity tariff of USD 0.05/kWh,
which is more than double the current residential electricity tariff in Tajikistan (Tribune,
2014). Afghanistan and Pakistan also agreed on the tariff in October 2014, which will
likely help move the project along. However, challenges remain with regard to security of
construction in Afghanistan.
NATURAL GAS
In the gas sector, Tajikistan was almost fully dependent (98%) on imports from Uzbekistan
which ceased in 2013. The remainder is domestically produced, albeit volumes are low
and insufficient to cover winter shortages.
Construction of the Line D pipeline of the Central Asia-China pipeline system began in
September 2014 with the first gas expected to flow in 2016. This will allow Tajikistan to
increase gas imports while also earning revenue from gas transit. The price contract with
China is confidential, and the pipeline construction in Tajikistan is financed by the
Chinese state-owned CNPC (Eurasianet, 2014).
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8.4. Sustainable development Tajikistan
Tajikistan is endowed with plentiful water resources and it relies on hydropower for
most of its energy needs. The development of small hydro has increased in the past few
years, reaching 132 MW of capacity by the end of 2013. This is a result of the
implementation of the government programme on the construction of small hydro,
which began in 2009. The programme originally aimed for the construction of 189 small
HPPs by 2020. It was a great success with investors, with nearly 300 constructed by
2013. Many of the small hydro plants are in private ownership or joint ownership with
the government. The government envisages up to 3 GW of small hydro capacity over
time, particularly for small, remote regions of the country.
Non-hydropower renewable energy sources are undeveloped in Tajikistan. The main
reason for lack of investment in solar, wind, biofuels and geothermal is the perceived
high cost of these technologies, as well as no strong government incentives or policy
decisions to promote other renewables.
The main policy for renewable energy development is set out in the Law on Renewable
Energy Sources (2010) and the above-mentioned programme for small hydro development.
The Law on Renewable Energy Sources stipulates the rules for the connection to the
grid, tariff setting and certain preferential treatment for private investors (including tax
breaks). The government offers the guarantee of purchase for electricity from new
renewable energy sources; however, connection to the grid and third-party access rules
are unclear and challenging at times.
Solar energy has the highest potential in Tajikistan of all non-hydro renewable sources,
due to the country’s large number of sunny days, estimated at 25 TWh/y. Wind potential
is small, mainly in mountainous regions of the country. Electricity from biomass potential is
estimated at 2 TWh/y, while geothermal potential is estimated at 45 TWh/y (Reegle, 2014).
The earliest programme on renewable energy was introduced in 2007, the Programme
on the Use of Renewable Energy for 2007-2015. The purpose of the programme was to
assess different renewable energy technologies and implement changes in the electricity
and heat sectors. Besides growth in small hydropower, no other renewable energy
technologies have been developed in Tajikistan to date.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
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Tajikistan 8.4. Sustainable development
Nonetheless, given the existing energy crisis, energy efficiency and demand management
measures are paramount. A reduction in the concentration of demand would decrease
the need for winter restrictions and slow the trend in population and income-driven
demand growth.
A new Law on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving was adopted in September 2013. The
law sets out the legal and institutional framework for energy efficiency in Tajikistan, and
provides for the introduction of energy-efficient appliances and technologies. It has
provisions for mandatory energy audits and requirements for buildings and household
appliances, among other aspects. It also stipulates methods for the establishment of the
National Fund for Renewable Energy Sources, Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency
(Energy Charter, 2013). Secondary legislation and mechanisms for the implementation of
the new law are still under consideration.
One of the major energy efficiency projects for Tajikistan that is expected to significantly
reduce demand is the recommended Energy Efficiency Action Plan for TALCO, based on
an audit completed by the World Bank. The project includes measures for savings of
1 155 GWh of electricity and 197 GWh of natural gas per year, translating to a 20% cut in
electricity and natural gas compared to 2013, or 37% lower than average consumption in
2009-11. This would reduce demand on the grid by 132 MW (Fields et al., 2013).
The government has agreed to implement the project as recommended by the World
Bank, in a period of four years.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
According to the UNECE report on green development in Tajikistan, the country’s natural
resources are showing signs of climate change, including erosion of forest soil from
extreme weather changes, deteriorating water quality from melting glacial areas and
loss of biodiversity, among others. Including unsustainable resource depletion by local
communities, the cost of environmental degradation is an estimated 10% of Tajikistan’s
GDP (UNECE, 2013).
One of the government’s priorities is environmental protection, and it has adopted a
number of action plans and programmes in the past decade (UNECE, 2013):
National Environmental Action Plan, adopted in 2006
State Forestry Development Programme for 2006–15
State Ecological Programmes for 1998–08 and 2009–19.
The government has also developed the Environmental Protection Fund, which is
operated under the Committee for Environmental Protection, Environmental Protection
Activities. The committee implements environmental protection laws and management
of preservation, restoration and regeneration of forests, sustainable use of flora and
fauna, control of protected areas and natural monuments, water resources and air, and
compliance with environmental safety standards (Energy Charter, 2013).
With the fast development of the coal industry, and potential gas extraction in the
future, the focus of environmental policy will be on monitoring the environmental
impact in the main areas of production and processing of energy resources, as well as
solving the problem of the rational use of water resources of the country.
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8.4. Sustainable development Tajikistan
The Ministry for Environment monitors electricity generation for compliance with
environmental standards (including CO2 emissions). TajikStandart, following support
from the EPMOGI project under the INOGATE Programme, has adopted a set of
environmental management standards.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Tajikistan ratified the Kyoto Protocol on 21 October 2008 and prepared the second
National Communication for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change in 2008. In 2009, the government approved the establishment of the Interagency
Council for the implementation of Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs) as well as
the procedure for selection and approval of CDM projects. As of April 2011, several CDM
projects have been proposed and are under consideration for registration, while one on
hydropower generation has been validated.
Energy-related CO2 emissions totalled 2.8 Mt in 2012 in Tajikistan, which is 75% lower
compared to 1990. The commercial and public services sector (including agriculture)
accounts for 87.3% of emissions, followed by transport at 11%. The power generation
sector accounts for only 1.7%.
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Tajikistan 8.5. Investment attraction
Although the Tajik government invites foreign investment, the level of private interest
has been minimal and the investment climate remains challenging. The president has
made numerous public calls for increased foreign investment, particularly in the hydropower
sector. However, government administration is yet to implement the key reforms and
regulations necessary to create an attractive business climate.
Investment opportunities are often most favourable for governments/private companies
with existing ties with the country and those able to understand and manoeuvre within
the burdensome bureaucracy. Unsurprisingly, the most investment to date in the energy
sector has been from Russia, China and Iran, countries that are dominant in the region
and/or have strong political ties with Tajikistan. The donor community has also played a
role, while domestic investment is stagnant due to lack of financing and the high
perceived level of corruption.
To move its economy forward and create a more favourable investment climate over
time, the government has taken the first necessary steps and has made progress in
reducing some of the bureaucratic burden and opening the market for a more diverse
range of investors.
The key change in investment policy was the introduction of a new Law on Investment in
2007. The law stipulate rules for the privatisation of companies and sales to foreign
investors, including rights for land ownership and business relationships with local companies/
authorities. The Consultative Council on Improvement of Investment Climate was also
established in 2007 to facilitate public-private dialogue and joint development recommendations
to improve the business environment and investment climate in the country.
Tajikistan ratified the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, also known as the New York Convention, in October 2012. Following this decision,
the State Program on Improvement of Investment Attractiveness in Mineral Resources
for 2012-2015 was adopted. Tajikistan was also approved as a candidate for the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative in February 2013 (Republic of Tajikistan, 2014).
A number of legislative acts were adopted in support of the Law on Investment in the
five years after, including the Law on Privatisation of State Property, the Law on Production
Sharing Agreements, the Law on Concessions, the Law on Free Economic Zones, the Law
on Credit History, and the Law on Public-private Partnership.
Through this legislative pact, the government has significantly increased investment
incentives for domestic and foreign parties. These incentives include a waiver on taxation
on initial investment and VAT-free import of equipment and supplies. The government
has also introduced the “one-stop-shop” principle for business registration, reduced the
required number of licences and permits and reduced the number of inspections and
audits, with additional incentives for investors in priority areas of the economy, including
exceptions from a large number of taxes for hydropower plant construction and exports
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Under the Law on Free Economic Zones, four free economic zones (FEZs) were established:
Sughd, Panj, Danghara and Iskashim. These zones free any economic activity from
customs and import duties, export duties, taxation and labour restrictions. They are
designed to attract investment for specific industries, including hydropower projects,
manufacturing and the cotton industry. According to the government, economic activity
from foreigners has increased in all regions but Panj (Republic of Tajikistan, 2014).
Tajikistan’s regulatory system has also been growing more transparent. The Ministry of
Justice registers all laws and ensures they are not in conflict with each other. All laws and
normative acts are published and available in print and electronic formats from the
Ministry of Finance, which also provides an update service. A recent law provides that
new legislation cannot prejudice commercial enterprises and agreements set up under
earlier conditions. Nonetheless, most laws are lacking in detail and the development of
secondary legislation is necessary to improve clarity and transparency.
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Tajikistan was ranked
166th among 189 countries in 2014. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index
means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the start-up and operation of a
local firm. This index averages the country's rankings on ten topics, made up of a variety
of indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. Tajikistan has the lowest rating among
EECCA countries.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International,
which measures the level of perceived corruption in the public system, Tajikistan ranks
152nd among 175 countries in 2014, with a score of 23. This is a relatively high score with
regards to perceived corruption in the country, as a score of 100 represents no corruption.
Tajikistan acceded to the UN Convention against Corruption on 25 September 2006, but
is not yet a signatory. It has not signed the OECD Anti-Bribery convention.
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The investment framework has been updated substantially over the past decade, as the
government’s policy is to attract more domestic and foreign investment. However, the
implementation of current policies and legislation remains challenging due to the high
level of perceived corruption in the country and treatment of investors with strong
political ties and interests.
Financial support from the donor community remains high in the country, and many
projects in the energy sector are financed by the government with aid from donors.
During 2002-12, public investment projects with financial support from donors and
international financial institutions totalled USD 2.13 billion, of which USD 1.614 billion
was in loans; USD 371.5 million in grants; and USD 147 million came from the government
(Republic of Tajikistan, 2014). Energy investment totalled USD 882 million over the same
period (40% of all investment), USD 5.5 million of which was financed by Barqi Tojik.
Foreign direct investment since independence to 2013 amounted to USD 2.3 billion. This
includes investment from: Russia – USD 827.1 million (36.4%), China – USD 319.9 million
(14.1%), Iran – USD 302.4 million (13.3%) and the United Kingdom – USD 210.5 million
(9.3%) (Republic of Tajikistan, 2014).
The major investment projects in the energy sector over the medium term include the
Rogun HPP and the 500 kV Obi-Garm – Sangtuda – Kunduz ─ Puli Khumri – Kabul
transmission line under the CASA 1 000 project. Line D of the Central Asia-China gas
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Tajikistan 8.5. Investment attraction
Construction of the Rogun HPP is estimated at more than USD 2 billion, to be conducted
in four stages. The plant has been deemed feasible by a study conducted by the World
Bank; however, attracting funding remains a challenge for the government.
The funding for the CASA 1 000 project is expected to be around USD 1 billion and
includes funding for the construction of the assets of the four members of the project.
Financing needs per country, according to calculations by SNC Lavalin are: USD 300 million
for Afghanistan, USD 270 million for Tajikistan, USD 200 million for Kyrgyzstan, and
USD 200 million for Pakistan.
Construction of the Line D pipeline of the Central Asia-China pipeline system will attract
approximately USD 6.2 billion from CNPC by the end of 2016.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The government prepares and approves two-year investment, construction and grant
programmes. In 2013, the programme for 2014-16 was approved, including plans for the
implementation of 120 investment projects, with 39 projects worth USD 1.3 billion
already implemented (Republic of Tajikistan, 2014).
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References Tajikistan
References
BGR (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Study 2013:
Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources, Federal Institute for Geosciences and
Natural Resources, Hannover, Germany.
Energy Charter (2013), In-depth Energy Efficiency Review: Tajikistan, Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels.
Eurasianet (2014), “Tajikistan, China break ground for landmark gas pipeline”, press release,
14 September, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69976.
Fields, D. et al. (2013), Tajikistan’s Winter Energy Crisis, Electricity Supply and Demand
Alternatives, World Bank, Washington, DC, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/
handle/10986/15795/796160PUB0REPL00Box377374B00PUBLIC0.pdf?sequence=1.
Fields, D. et al. (2012), Tajikistan’s Winter Energy Crisis: Electricity Supply and Demand
Alternatives, World Bank, Washington, DC, www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/
document/TAJ-winter-energy-27112012-Eng.pdf.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Reegle (2014), website, http://www.reegle.info/policy-and-regulatory-overviews/TJ (accessed
19 December 2014).
Republic of Tajikistan (2014), Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://mfa.tj/en/energy-
sector/the-energy-sector-of-rt.html (accessed 15 November 2014).
Tribune (2014), “CASA-1000 project: Pakistan, Tajikistan agree on electricity tariff”, press release,
24 June, http://tribune.com.pk/story/726016/casa-1000-project-pakistan-tajikistan-agree-on-
electricity-tariff/.
UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) (2013), Promoting Green Innovation
Policy Assessment and Recommendations, Tajikistan, UNECE.
World Bank (2014), Tajikistan Overview, World Bank website,
www.worldbank.org/en/country/tajikistan/overview (accessed 10 November 2014).
World Bank (2010), Project Paper on a Proposed Additional Grant in the Amount of SDR 9.9 million
(US$15.0 million equivalent) to the Republic of Tajikistan for the Energy Emergency Recovery
Assistance Project, Report No: 52889-TJ, World Bank, www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2010/04/29/000333037_20100429234536/Rendered/PDF/528890P
JPR0P121nly10IDAR20101011411.pdf.
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TURKMENISTAN
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Turkmenistan
KAZAKHSTAN
KAZAKHSTAN
U Z B E K I S T A N
Figure 9.1.1 Map of Turkmenistan
CASPIAN
SEA T U R K M E N I S T A N
Ashgabat
I R A N
AFGHANISTAN
0 200 km
9.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
9.1. General energy policy Turkmenistan
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Turkmenistan is located on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea. It is bordered by Iran to
the south, Afghanistan to the southeast, and Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to the north. The
country occupies 492 200 km2, 80% of which is desert, with a population of 5.1 million.
Turkmenistan has five administrative provinces: Akhal, Balkan, Dashoguz, Lebap and
Mary. The capital is Ashgabat, the largest and most populous city in Turkmenistan.
Turkmenistan gained its independence from the Soviet Union on 27 October 1991 and
declared “permanent neutrality”, which was formally recognised by the United Nations
in 1995. Turkmenistan’s economy is also largely independent and has been so since the
beginning of the country’s independence.
Turkmenistan is one of the largest gas resource holder in the Caspian region and has the
fourth-largest total offshore and onshore gas reserves in the world, behind Iran, Russia,
and Qatar. Turkmenistan also holds significant volumes of recoverable oil. Turkmenistan’s
economy depends heavily on gas, oil and petrochemical production and export and, to a
lesser degree, on cotton and textiles. Around 85% of total exports are gas and oil. The
private sector is underdeveloped, with the government in control of most of the
economy and some private businesses in food processing, consumer trade, and service
sectors. Foreign investment in the gas and oil sector is through production sharing
agreements (PSAs) with the Turkmen government.
Turkmenistan’s real GDP was growing at 9.8% on average from 2002 to 2012, which
placed Turkmenistan’s economy among the fastest growing in the world. As a result, the
country gained an upper middle-income status in 2012, with a real GDP per capita of
USD 11 100 (World Bank, 2014). Strong economic growth has led to investment in
physical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure. The government is continuing to
invest in the oil and gas sector, including a large project to modernise and expand the
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electricity and heat sector by 2020. According to the current Oil and Gas Development
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Turkmenistan 9.1. General energy policy
Plan to 2030, gas production will increase fourfold to 250 billion cubic metres (bcm) by
2030, with oil production expected to be ten times higher at 110 million tonnes (Mt).
The energy sector is nearly fully subsidised, with free electricity, heat and gas up to a
certain level of consumption. The subsidies were brought in after independence and
have been guaranteed until 2030. However, the government is taking steps to reduce
subsidies before 2030 in order to curb domestic demand and allow for export growth.
A Memorandum of Understanding and Co-operation in the field of Energy between the
European Union and Turkmenistan was signed in May 2008. Regional energy co-operation
between Turkmenistan and the European Union takes place within the framework of the
Baku Initiative, which provides for political dialogue between the European Union and the
countries of the littoral states of the Black and Caspian seas and their neighbouring countries.
SUPPLY
Turkmenistan is ranked fourth-largest in the wold with regard to natural gas reserves,
estimated at 10 000 bcm in 2012. Crude oil reserves are estimated 204 Mt (BGR, 2013).
Turkmenistan’s natural gas and crude oil production totalled 68 million tonnes of oil-equivalent
(Mtoe) in 2012. Energy production grew steadily from 2000 to 2008, before a 40% slump
in 2009 during the global financial crisis. Since 2009, production has recovered to 2008
levels (Figure 9.1.2). Gas production increased by around 20% during 2013-14.
30
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Natural gas production accounted for 82.6% of total production in 2012. In 2013, gas
production was 76.1 bcm. This is 41.5% higher compared to 2002 and 7.3% higher than
in 2008, before the slump. Production fell 46% to 38.3 bcm in 2009, albeit with a
moderate recovery. Gas production grew by 10% during 2013 and is estimated to have
increased by a further 10% in 2014.
Crude oil production represented 17.4% of total production in 2012, at 11.8 Mtoe. This is
21.9% higher compared to 2002 and 10.2% higher than in 2008. During 2009, crude oil
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9.1. General energy policy Turkmenistan
until 1999 when it ceased. Turkmenistan also produces oil products in local refineries,
with a total refinery output of 8.1 Mtoe in 2012. Refinery output was 29% higher in 2012
compared to 2002, without a decline in production during 2009.
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 was 25.6 Mtoe in 2012, which accounts for 37.6% of
energy produced. The majority of domestically produced natural gas, crude oil and oil
products are exported. TPES accounts for the energy supplied for domestic purposes,
and it has shown an upward trend since the mid-1990s. TPES has increased by 61.7%
since 2002, growing at a faster rate than energy production. During 2009, TPES declined
by 12.3%, albeit recovering by 14.1% in 2010 and continuing to grow since (Figure 9.1.3).
15
Mtoe
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Two fuels supply all of Turkmenistan’s energy needs: natural gas (77% of TPES) and oil
(23.9%). Electricity net imports are negative as Turkmenistan is a net exporter of electricity,
and they account for -0.9% of TPES. Over the ten years since 2002, the natural gas supply
has grown at a faster rate than the supply of oil: natural gas has increased by 70.3%
while oil supply has increased by 41.1%. As such, the share of natural gas in TPES is up
from 73.1% in 2002. Electricity net exports have nearly tripled since 2002; however, they
remain a negligible share of TPES.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation in Turkmenistan reached 17.8 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012.
Electricity supply was 65.9% higher in 2012 compared to 2002 (Figure 9.1.4). Despite a
decline in energy production and TPES during 2008, electricity generation grew by a
moderate 1.1%. All electricity is generated from natural gas since marginal hydropower
generation ceased in 1999.
Heat generation was 8.6 petajoules (PJ) in 2012, also fuelled exclusively by gas. Heat
generation has experienced the same level of growth as that of electricity generation
since 2002.
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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Turkmenistan 9.1. General energy policy
8
6
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 was 16.8 Mtoe in 2012. Energy demand is dominated by
the commercial and public services sector, which accounts for 41.3% of that total. Transport
and industry account for 16.2% and 13.7% respectively, while agriculture and the
residential sector are marginal consumers at 1.6% and 1.1%, respectively (Figure 9.1.5).
However, the data include non-specified consumption, which is significant at 26%.3 The
above-mentioned sectoral breakdown is only for specified consumption. Non-specified
consumption is most likely in rural areas.
Energy consumption has increased by 71.9% over the ten years since 2002. Demand
from the commercial services sector grew by 124.6% and its energy comes from gas.
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
3. Non-specified consumption includes all fuel use not elsewhere specified, as well as consumption in categories for which
© OECD/IEA, 2015
figures have not been provided. Military fuel use for all mobile and stationary consumption is included here.
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9.1. General energy policy Turkmenistan
Industry demand increased by 137.1% over the same period and its main fuels are oil
products (44.5%), natural gas (40.9%) and electricity (14.7%). The transport sector has
experienced the slowest growth in energy consumption, increasing by 19.2% since 2002.
Natural gas is the main fuel used in transport in Turkmenistan (53%), followed by oil
products (46.3%) and some electricity (0.7%).
Agriculture and residential sectors consumed mainly electricity, while heat consumption
is non-specified in the data.
8 Agriculture
6 Non-specified**
4
2
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Commercial includes commercial and public services.
** Non-specified includes all consumption not elsewhere specified, as well as consumption in categories for which figures have not been provided.
Military fuel use for all mobile and stationary consumption is included here.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Turkmenistan’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was
0.45 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012. This is the highest intensity compared to other
EECCA countries (Figure 9.1.6). Since 2002, energy intensity in Turkmenistan has declined
by 36.8%, down from 0.7 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP. Real GDP growth was 156% over the
same period, while TPES increased by 61.7%.
Figure 9.1.6 Energy intensity in Turkmenistan and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
1.2 Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
1.0
Ukraine
0.8 Azerbaijan
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
Kazakhstan
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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Turkmenistan 9.1. General energy policy
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy in Turkmenistan is considered to be zero at the moment; this is below
any other EECCA Country (Figure 9.1.7). However, data on biomass consumption by
household for heating are not accurately captured and could be misrepresented.
Figure 9.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Turkmenistan and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
MARKET STRUCTURE
The Turkmen government owns and operates the energy sector.
Vertically integrated state-owned company TurkmenEnergo operates the electricity sector,
while the Ministry of Energy manages the sector.
The Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources manages the oil and gas
industry, while:
TurkmenGeologia develops gas and oil deposits.
TurkmenNeft produces crude oil.
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9.1. General energy policy Turkmenistan
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Turkmenistan’s energy sector is governed by the executive branch of the government and
the Cabinet of Ministers, with a number of ministries responsible for policy implementation
and sector management.
The Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources is responsible for oil and
gas deposit development, oil and gas production, transportation and export.
The State Agency for the Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources is within the
Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources. Established in 2007, the Agency
is responsible for licencing, PSA negotiations and agreements. The Agency also establishes
the gas transit tariff.
The Ministry of Energy is responsible for electricity generation, transmission, distribution
and retail. The Ministry is also responsible for alternative and renewable energy developments.
The Ministry of National Security is responsible for emergency response, including the
emergency stock holding obligations.
The Ministry of Finance, among other responsibilities, is responsible for energy tariff
methodology and setting.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Turkmenistan’s primary energy legislation has been recently revived, with most legislation
passed in the couple of years to end-2014. The passing of more than 60 bills over this
period demonstrates the government’s current desire to develop the economy and
attract private investment. However, with the primary legislation passed only recently,
the secondary legislation still needs to be developed and policies implemented.
During 2014, the government passed crucial energy legislation – the Law on Subsoil, the
Law on Consumer Rights, the Law on Environmental Assessment and the Law on
Electricity – among 30 new legislations. New energy bills in 2013 and 2012 include the
Law on Certification (2013), the Law on Denationalisation and Privatisation of State Property
(2013), the Law on Hydrocarbon Gas and Gas Supply (2013), the Law on Automobile
Transport (2013), the Law on Statistics (2012) and the Law on Standardisation (2012),
among others.4
The Law on Hydrocarbon Resources (2008) (amended in 2013) is the legislation behind
the development of the hydrocarbon extraction industry to date, including the PSAs. The
State Agency for the Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources is the implementing
body of this law.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
4. http://cis-legislation.com.
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Turkmenistan 9.1. General energy policy
The Law on Foreign Investment (2008) (amended in 2013) is the primary legislation for
the improvement of the investment climate and foreign investment incentives.
Turkmenistan has no renewable energy or energy efficiency legislation at present.
KEY POLICIES
Energy policy in Turkmenistan is centred on gas and oil industry development, the
diversification of export routes and increasing foreign investment in the sector. This is a
change from previous policies since the country’s independence, when the economy was
extremely closed. Turkmenistan’s economy remains centred and closed, tightly controlled
by the government and lacking competition. However, the government is opening parts
of the energy sector to private investors to boost economic growth.
With this in mind, the government adopted the Oil and Gas Development Plan to 2030 in
2006 and the National Programme for Socio-Economic Development to 2030 in 2011.
Projects of strategic interest include the Turkmenistan - Afghanistan - Pakistan - India
(TAPI) pipeline, which is in the advanced planning stage and awaiting finance. Discussions
with the European Commission and the Caspian Development Corporation on the Trans-
Caspian gas pipeline are also active, albeit challenging due to disputes over Caspian Sea
regulation. The Central Asia-China pipeline network is already functioning and expanding,
with line D talks in progress. In 2013, Turkmenistan and Turkey agreed on connecting
Turkmen gas supplies to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP).
Turkmenistan is investing in gas and oil processing, planning to substantially increase its
oil product production and exports. In 2013, Turkmenistan began a USD 2 billion project
to build a new port on the Caspian Sea designed for oil product exports. A number of
other projects and agreements have been signed with foreign investors and the
Turkmenbashi oil refineries complex is currently undergoing an expansion project.
While oil and gas sector development has been rapid and profitable, the electricity and
heat supply sector has suffered from lack of investment over the past 20 years. Outages
are common, particularly during the winter months, and the infrastructure is aged and
inefficient, with high losses.
The government’s objectives in the electricity and heat sector include meeting growing
domestic demand, improving poor system reliability and increasing electricity exports,
while providing free or affordable prices.
Turkmenistan’s electricity generation is run on natural gas (with the exception of a few
small hydro plants), and achieving efficiency improvements in generation would allow for
more gas exports. For the same gas-savings reason, as well as to reduce greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions, the government is also starting to express plans to develop renewables
and implement energy efficiency measures. However, the dialogue on renewable energy
is only beginning in Turkmenistan and no policies have been developed. At the end of
2014 the government was in the process of developing an energy efficiency policy and
the Law on Energy Savings. The policy is expected to include measures for improving fuel
efficiency in power stations through modernisation and rehabilitation, and increase municipal
and industrial energy efficiency along with energy efficiency in buildings (EBRD, 2014).
In 2013 the government adopted the Power Sector Development Programme to 2020 for
building new electricity generation capacity, modernising and rehabilitating existing
infrastructure and expanding the electricity export network. The programme includes
© OECD/IEA, 2015
investment plans of USD 5 billion for 14 new gas-fired units, the conversion of gas turbines
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9.1. General energy policy Turkmenistan
to combined-cycle turbines, 24 000 new distribution and transmission lines, including new
export routes, and combined heat and power (CHP) plant and network rehabilitation. The
programme is expected to double electricity production, save 1.5 bcm of gas per year
and reduced GHG emissions by 3 Mt per year. It will be carried out in two stages, with
the first stage running until end-2016. The first stage includes eight new gas-fired power
plants in Akhal, Mary and Lebap provinces, existing generation rehabilitation in Seydi,
Balkanabat and Abadan, and transmission network expansion. The second stage to 2020
includes six new gas-fired plants and switching to combined-cycle plants (Shumskaya, 2013).
Turkmenistan’s energy prices are among the lowest in the world. All end users receive
free electricity, gas and gasoline up to a certain level of consumption. Electricity is free
up to 25 kWh per person per month, gas is free up to 50 m3 per person per month and
gasoline is free up to 120 litres per vehicle per month. Prices paid over the free threshold
are also considered to be very low, averaging to negligible annual costs. Heat and water
are also provided for free. Gas, oil and electricity exports, however, are priced based on
bilateral agreements between the government and the buyers.
Energy price subsidies were brought in soon after the country’s independence and were
extended to 2030 by the new president in 2006. However, growing energy demand,
inefficient resource allocation and mounting government debt have put pressure on the
government to reduce subsidies and change its policy. The free-consumption threshold
was reduced from 35 kWh per person per month to 25 kWh per person per month in
2013 while the price of gas over 50 m3 per person per month was inflated by a factor of
seven during 2014. The government has started installing gas meters to track consumption,
as most properties are not metered at present. Free vehicle fuel was also abolished for
trucks and buses in 2012.
The Turkmen government recognises climate change and GHG emissions reductions to be
of national importance. Turkmenistan ratified the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1995 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 as a non-Annex I
Party. In 2012, the country submitted its National Strategy on Climate Change to 2030 to the
UNFCCC, developed with assistance from UN Development Programme (UNDP). As part of
the strategy, Turkmenistan created an emissions inventory that was used in identifying
key emission reduction projects. However, no projects have been realised to date.
INVESTMENT
Since independence, Turkmenistan’s energy sector investment has been mostly in the
upstream oil and gas extraction through PSAs between the Turkmen government and
foreign investors. The government restricts foreign investment to offshore projects only,
with the exception of the Bagtyiarlyk onshore natural gas project with China (EIA, 2012).
The oil and gas sector investment inflow and oil and gas export revenues have driven
Turkmenistan’s economic growth over the past two decades.
The investment climate in Turkmenistan is still closed, government-controlled and suitable
for companies or other governments with strong ties to the Turkmen government. While
the Turkmen government is easing its administrative and regulatory foreign investment
burdens through new legislation and favourable conditions, the perceived level of corruption
is high and the investment climate is challenging. Over the last decade, Turkmenistan
has improved relations with foreign partners interested in the country’s upstream and
midstream developments; however, it requires amplified efforts to ensure sound, predictable
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Turkmenistan 9.1. General energy policy
Major future energy infrastructure projects include the development of the TAPI gas
pipeline, projected to cost USD 8-10 billion; and the potential Trans-Caspian gas pipeline,
with an estimated cost of USD 5 billion. Both projects are still seeking investors;
however, the TAPI pipeline is in the advanced stages of planning, and construction would
begin in 2015 if financing is secured. Ongoing investment projects in the gas sector
include the modernisation and rehabilitation of gas facilities and the gas network, and
new gas and oil processing facilities.
Turkmenistan has started the construction of a USD 3.4 billion petrochemical complex to
produce polypropylene and polyethylene, processing 5 bcm/year of gas, and a USD 1.7 billion
gas-to-liquids plant that will transform gas at 1.7 bcm/year. Both will be financed by
Japanese investors.
TurkmenEnergo is also investing in the electricity and heat network, as well as in
generation capacity rehabilitation, modernisation and expansion to combat the high
incidence of outages and losses, and cater for growing demand. The ongoing project is
expected to cost around USD 5 billion by 2030 and increase capacity by 800 MW with up
to 24 000 km of additional 500 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV lines. This includes additional
export infrastructure to Iran and Afghanistan.
ASSESSMENT
Turkmenistan has abundant hydrocarbon reserves and is among the world’s largest energy
producers. The oil and gas sector is the largest in the national economy and drives
economic growth by maximising income from energy exports. It is also a guarantee for
the country’s economic independence and national energy security. In the last decade,
Turkmenistan undertook substantial modernisation of the energy infrastructure and
construction of additional gas transmission systems, capable of transportation of larger
volumes of gas to neighbouring markets.
The government’s focus over the last decade has been the diversification of energy
export markets and the creation of a reliable and stable system for energy-related
investments encouraging the Turkmen gas flows to international markets. Since 2009,
Turkmenistan has been exporting gas to China via the Central Asia-China pipeline and
exports to Iran have increased through a second Turkmenistan-Iran pipeline. The country
has modernised the gas transmission system, including export pipelines, the gas
distribution network, control stations and underground gas storage, which has allowed
for a steady increase of gas production and export volumes.
By 2030, the Oil and Gas Complex Plan envisages gas and oil production to grow by four
and ten times compared to 2011, respectively. The government is looking for investors
to participate in the sector and develop alternative gas and oil routes, including the TAPI
pipeline and the Trans-Caspian pipeline for the European markets.
Turkmenistan’s electricity and heat system, however, has been underdeveloped over the
© OECD/IEA, 2015
past two decades and has incurred regular shortages and efficiency losses. The infrastructure
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9.1. General energy policy Turkmenistan
is aged and inefficient, while there is increasing pressure from growing domestic
electricity demand and demand for electricity exports. The Power Sector Development
Programme to 2020 includes plans for significant investment in the electricity and heat
sector, with the focus on increasing generation capacity and expanding interconnections
with Iran and Afghanistan. As part of the programme, existing networks will also be
rehabilitated, modernised and expanded to accommodate growing demand.
There is large number of public bodies governing the energy sector; however, there is
limited co-ordination among these entities. The energy policy is set by individual ministries
and public authorities, without clear co-ordination, assessing the entire potential of the
country. Demand for natural gas is growing from domestic and foreign markets, and in
order to create a complete picture of supply and demand management the government
needs to see the full picture across all sub-sectors. This could be achieved through strong
co-operation among the ministries or through the streamlining of responsibilities of the
energy sector into a single ministry. Additionally, energy data and statistics should be
shared and transparent to all ministries and the public to improve policy-making decisions
and increase investor consciousness and confidence.
Turkmenistan is one of the most energy-intensive economies in the region, and free public
access to commodities discourages energy savings by end users. Demand management is
a new concept in the country’ energy policy, and at the end of 2014 the government was
in the process of developing an energy efficiency policy and the Law on Energy Savings.
The policy is expected to include measures for improving fuel efficiency in power
stations through modernisation and rehabilitation, and increase municipal and industrial
energy efficiency along with energy efficiency in buildings. The government should approve
both supply- and demand-side policies, and pass the primary and secondary legislation
promptly to start implementing measures necessary to curb growing demand and distribute
gas supplies more effectively to export markets.
Energy tariffs are nearly fully subsidised, with free electricity, gas and heat up to a certain
level of consumption. The tariffs charged above the free threshold to eligible customers
are still far from cost recovery levels. The financial burden of subsidies on the Turkmen
government is growing due to increased population and rising energy demand, while the
lost cost to consumers is discouraging energy savings and resulting in inefficient gas
consumption. Phasing out subsidies and increasing energy tariffs to cost recovery levels
over time would curb demand growth and increase funds available for infrastructure
investment and implementation of energy efficiency measures. The government began
cutting back subsidies in 2012 despite prolonging them to 2030 in 2006; however, prices
remain among the lowest in the world.
Turkmenistan has ample solar and wind potential, and recent government policies envisage
developing alternative sources of energy (renewable energy in this case) in a bid to free up
more natural gas for export markets, reduce GHG emissions and diversify the domestic supply.
However, renewable energy policy targets have not been set nor have investor incentives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
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Turkmenistan 9.1. General energy policy
Develop robust energy-saving and energy efficiency policies to curb domestic demand
growth and allow for increased exports and the diversification of export routes. Encourage
the deployment of advanced energy-efficient technologies in all sectors of the economy.
Continue to phase out energy subsidies while protecting the most vulnerable end users.
Develop clear, transparent and reliable mechanisms for encouraging renewable
energy investments.
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9.2. Energy security Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan is rich in gas and to a lesser extent in oil. The country has 10 000 bcm of
estimated economically-viable gas reserves, with 15 000 bcm of gas resources. The reserves
place the country as fourth-largest in the world behind Russia, Iran and Qatar in 2012.
Crude oil reserves are more modest at 204 Mt in 2012, with 1 700 Mt of crude oil
resources, which are below the global top 20 (BGR, 2013).
According to TurkmenGeologia, there are 38 oilfields and 153 gas fields, including
142 onshore gas fields and 11 offshore gas fields in the Caspian Sea. Turkmenistan has
several of the world’s largest gas fields, including the Amu Daryia basin in the southeast,
the Murgab basin and the South Caspian basin in the west.
According to the EIA (2012), the Dauletabad field, located in the Amu Darya basin, is one
of the largest and oldest gas-producing fields, with estimated reserves of 1 700 bcm.
Yearly production covers annual domestic demand; however, production is declining.
The giant Galkynysh field (also known as South Yolotan) in the Murgab Basin was
discovered in 2006, with potential reserves up to 13 000 bcm (not all economically
viable), which would make it the second-largest field in the world. The field became
operational in 2013.
Turkmenistan oil output is concentrated in western areas and offshore in the Caspian
Sea, in some disputed areas without agreement between Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan
(EIA, 2012).
Turkmenistan’s solar energy potential is vast due to 300 sunny days per year. Wind
power potential is also high, with a possible capacity of up to 500 gigawatts (GW) in the
long term. This would rival the country’s fossil fuel potential in electricity generation
(UNECE, 2013). However, renewable energy remains undeveloped due to the accessibility
of plentiful fossil fuel resources.
Energy security in Turkmenistan is constant, as the country utilises plentiful gas resources
for most of its energy needs. All electricity supply, heating and industry consumption is
sourced from natural gas. Transport is reliant on oil products which are also refined locally.
However, Turkmenistan’s reliance on mainly one energy source exposes its sector to
potential supply interruptions in the future as regional demand grows and gas supplies
diminish. A lack of sustainable energy policies and renewable energy sources contributes
to the potential supply problems in a time of growing demand and inefficient production.
Additionally, highly subsidised energy prices reduce the incentive for efficient energy
use, resulting in the unnecessary consumption of gas which could have been exported.
Turkmenistan is a gas and oil net exporter, and export volumes are set to grow
considerably over the medium and long term as demand in China, and potentially
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Turkmenistan 9.2. Energy security
Europe, grows. To multiply export volumes while satisfying growing domestic demand,
the country is slowly starting to reduce tariff subsidies and restrict local consumption to
reduce the supply-shortages risk while increasing sales to the lucrative export market.
Turkmenistan’s electricity supply is considered to be reliable, albeit inefficient due to
aged infrastructure. The country, however, has the capacity for its domestic supply and
around 20% exports. Turkmenistan cut off the connection to the Central Asia Power Grid
in 2003; however, it continues to export electricity to Iran and Afghanistan. With export
potential, Turkmenistan is planning the construction of two 400 kV high-voltage lines
(Mary-Mashhad and Balkanabat-Gonbad) from Turkmenistan to Iran, with the possibility
of an additional 500 kV line to Afghanistan.
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9.2. Energy security Turkmenistan
systems. Electricity is exported to Iran via a 220 kV line from Balkanabat (Turkmenistan)
to Gonbat (Iran), and to Afghanistan via two 220 kV transmission lines: the Imamnazar
(Turkmenistan) - Andkhoy (Afghanistan) - Shibirgan (Afghanistan) line and the Serkhetabat
(Turkmenistan) to Turgundi (Afghanistan) line.
An additional 220 kV line from Serkhetabat (Turkmenistan) to Herat (Afghanistan) is
expected to be commissioned in 2015, while a 200 kV Serakhs (Turkmenistan) to Mashad
(Iran) line was also under construction by the end of 2014 (Government of Turkmenistan,
2015). Other interconnection plans include two 400 kV overhead transmission lines to
Iran, the Mary-Mashad and the Balkanabad-Aliabad.
The district heating network in Ashgabat had approximately 31 km of transmission lines,
150 km of distribution lines, eight central heating plants and 110 boiler houses in 2010.
The network is inefficient with high losses, as infrastructure is aged due to significant
underinvestment. It was built mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, with inefficient technology
by today’s standards and low levels of automation. Energy-saving potential is estimated
at 40-50% for both domestic hot water and the heating supply system (Zomov and Behnke,
2010). Under the Power Sector Development Programme to 2020, the government is
also rehabilitating heating plants and planning to construct CHP plants.
NATURAL GAS
Turkmenistan’s gas pipeline network constitutes around 7 500 km. Major existing gas
pipelines are: Central Asia-Center (CAC) pipeline (Turkmenistan-Russia via Uzbekistan
and Kazakhstan); the Bukhara-Urals pipeline (Turkmenistan-Russia), the Korpeje-Kurtkui
pipeline (Turkmenistan-Iran); the Dauletabad-Khangiran pipeline (Turkmenistan-Iran);
the Central Asia-China pipeline system (Turkmenistan-China); and the East-West pipeline
(under construction).
The CAC gas pipeline system runs from Turkmenistan, via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to
Russia and is 5 000 km in length. The pipeline’s capacity is 80 bcm, with sales of around
11 bcm per year as the pipeline is in poor condition.
The Bukhara-Urals pipeline also runs from Turkmenistan to Russia via Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. The pipeline was mothballed, however, and reopened in 2011 due to the
poor condition and lack of capacity of the CAC pipeline. It also functions at only a quarter
of its capacity at 5 bcm (EIA, 2012).
The Korpeje–Kordkuy pipeline is approximately 200 km long and runs from the Korpeje
field in western Turkmenistan to Kordkuy in Iran, with a capacity of 8 bcm. The Dauletabad-
Khangiran line is the second gas export pipeline from Turkmenistan to Iran, with a
capacity of 12 bcm. The pipeline became operational in 2010 (EIA, 2012).
The Central Asia-China pipeline system, which became operational in 2009, includes dual
parallel lines, lines A and B, each running for 1 833 km, starting at Gedaim on the border
of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, through central Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan,
and ending at Horgos in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The construction of
line A started in July 2008 and became operational in December 2009. Line B became
operational in 2010 and the total capacity of 30 bcm was reached in 2011.
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317
318
Turkmenistan
0 800 km RUSSIA
Orenburg
Astana
Orsk
Karachaganak
K A Z A K H S T A N
Atyrau
Figure 9.2.1 Central Asia gas pipeline network
RUSSIA
Kashagan Beineu
Tengiz
Sources: IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA, Paris; IEA analysis.
ARAL
SEA
Caspian
CASPIAN Coastal Almaty
SEA Pipeline
SCP UZBEKISTAN Bishkek
GEORGIA Shymkent
Tbilisi expansion
KYRGYZSTAN
ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN Tashkent
Yerevan Baku
Turkmenbashi
Trans-
AZ TURKMENISTAN TAJIKISTAN Central Asia-China D
Erzerum Caspian
Ashgabat Dushanbe
Tabriz CHINA
TURKEY (People’s Republic of)
th
S Yolotan
Neka
IRAQ Tehran Dauletabad
PAKISTAN
Kabul
IRAN AFGHANISTAN Islamabad
Baghdad
Existing regional gas pipeline Planned regional gas pipeline Planned national gas pipeline Major field
9.2. Energy security
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
9.2. Energy security Turkmenistan
The construction of another parallel line, line C, started in March 2012, with a planned
capacity of 25 bcm. Gas transmission partially commenced in 2014 and will reach 25 bcm
by December 2015, increasing the total Central Asia-China pipeline capacity to 55 bcm.
During 2013 and 2014, negotiations were being drawn up for line D of the Central
Asia-China pipeline system, which would not be parallel but rather transport gas from
Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Tajikistan part of the
pipeline began construction in 2014, with the pipeline expected to be operational by 2016
with 25 bcm capacity, increasing the overall pipeline system capacity to 80 bcm by 2020.
The East-West pipeline connects Turkmenistan’s southeast gas fields to the Caspian Sea.
Construction began in 2010 and the pipeline is expected to come on line in 2015 with a
capacity of 30 bcm (EIA, 2012).
Turkmenistan is committed to diversifying gas exports and is actively involved in the
development of the south-east route of the TAPI. The TAPI gas pipeline (1 735 km) is
expected to have an annual capacity of 33 bcm and would supply energy to the hungry
markets of Pakistan and India, with potential offtake to Afghanistan. During 2013 and
2014, the Turkmen government signed supply/purchase contracts with the other participating
governments and a feasibility study was completed. In November 2014, the TAPI Ltd.
enterprise was registered, with the four governments as shareholders, and by the end of
2014 the start of construction of the pipeline was expected in 2015. However, delays are
likely due to security threats in Afghanistan.
The government is also involved in active discussions with the European Commission and
the Caspian Development Corporation on promoting the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline,
aiming to export Turkmen gas to Turkey and to Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia and
Turkey. Previous attempts to export Turkmen gas to Europe, taking place in the late 1990s,
were not successful; however, the interest and commitment of the government to
explore the European market seems higher now than before. In May 2013, Turkmenistan
and Turkey agreed on connecting Turkmen gas supplies to the TANAP.
The government is investing some of the gas revenue, in co-operation with foreign
investors, into modernising and rehabilitating its gas facilities and network. Projects are
underway for the technological modernisation and rehabilitation of compressor stations.
Other gas development plans include the construction of new gas processing facilities
with the latest technologies, with funding from foreign investors.
Turkmenistan has started the construction of a USD 3.4 billion petrochemical complex to
produce polypropylene and polyethylene, processing 5 bcm/year of gas, and a USD 1.7 billion
gas-to-liquids plant which will transform gas at a rate of 1.7 bcm/year. Both will be
financed by Japanese investors.
OIL
Turkmenistan’s oil pipeline network is 1 501 km long, according to official government
data. Turkmenistan’s crude oil and oil product exports are much smaller than those of gas.
The only cross-border pipeline runs from Uzbekistan’s Chardhzou refinery to Turkmenistan.
Some crude oil is exported across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and Russia (EIA, 2012).
Turkmenistan has two major refineries, the Seidi (Chardhzou) and Turkmenbashi, with a
combined total capacity of 237 000 barrels per day (bbl/d). The government is planning
to expand its oil refinery sector, to increase capacity up to 600 000 bbl/d by 2030 (EIA,
© OECD/IEA, 2015
2012), with partial funding from foreign investors. During 2013, up to USD 800 million
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Turkmenistan 9.2. Energy security
was secured in future oil refining projects, and the Turkmenbashi refinery began an
expansion project (Hasanov, 2014b). Increased oil refinery output is expected on the
back of oil production expansion, with plans for more than 1.3 million bbl/d in offshore
and onshore crude oil production by 2030.
In 2013, Turkmenistan launched a USD 2 billion project to build a new port on the
Caspian Sea to boost exports. The port is designed to export oil products, liquefied gas and
textiles. Turkmenistan has two liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) plants, while Turkmenbashi
also produces LPG. The two plants are located at the Naip gas condensate field, with
capacities of 15 000 tonnes and 65 000 tonnes of LPG per year. Turkmenbashi has a
capacity of around 220 000 tonnes of LPG per year (CL, 2013).
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Electricity and heat system reliability is poor after decades of underinvestment and the
use of inefficient technologies. Outages are frequent in certain areas of the country and
technical losses in generation, transmission and distribution are estimated to be significant
(ADB, 2013). Heat losses were estimated at approximately 25% in 2010 (Zomov and Behnke,
2010). Technical losses are also significant in natural gas transmission and distribution.
Losses also occur in gas metering stations, some of which are not modernised.
As a result of poor system reliability, the government approved a power system renovation
project in 2012, to be implemented in Ashgabat first, involving the rehabilitation and
modernisation of 60 substations and power lines by 2020, costing around USD 10 million
(Rakhmatov, 2012). The programme is underway and is expected to result in improved
reliability by 2020; however, financing can be difficult if the government keeps prices
free or extremely low.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Turkmenistan has emergency response mechanisms that date back to the Soviet era.
These include obligatory levels of oil stocks under the old legislation, which may or may
not be kept by TurkmenEnergo, mainly for financial reasons. The government also has
the right to request that locally produced oil products be prioritised for the purpose of
relieving the emergency.
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9.3. Market convergence Turkmenistan
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There is no independent energy regulatory authority in Turkmenistan. The State Agency
for the Management and Use of Hydrocarbon Resources is the energy regulator, under
© OECD/IEA, 2015
the control of the Ministry of Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources.
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Turkmenistan 9.3. Market convergence
Tariffs
Energy tariffs in Turkmenistan are often referred to as the lowest in the world. Most of
the population receives free electricity, up to 25 kWh per person per month, while
consumption over that amount is USD 0.00323 per kWh. Up to 50 m3 of gas per person
per month is provided for free, while consumption over that threshold is priced at
USD 0.007 per m3, for all categories of consumers. Gasoline is also free up to 120 litres per
car per month. Subsidies were brought in after the country’s independence, with the aim
of gradual phase-out by 2015. However, in 2006 the subsidies were extended to 2030.
In August 2014, the president announced a new gas price applicable to consumption
over 50 m3 per person per month, which was a six-fold increase. The price rose from
USD 0.0012 per m3 in 2013 to USD 0.007 per m3 in 2014, likely to mostly affect rural
consumers because of gas heating and gas consumption in agriculture. Consumption up
to 50 m3 per person per month remains free.
The price rise comes after a number of government attempts to increase prices in order
to curb consumption and increase energy revenues. As both domestic demand and
export demand are growing, the government’s intention is to curb domestic demand in
both electricity and gas to liberate more gas for export (as all electricity is generated
from gas). In 2013, it reduced the free monthly quotas for electricity by 10 kW to 25 kW
per person. The government is also installing gas meters to track consumption, to
encourage consumers to reduce demand and to allow for future price increases.
Until March 2012, all motor vehicle owners were eligible for 120 litres of free gasoline
per month. Since March 2012, according to a government decision, free gasoline only
applies to car owners, excluding trucks and buses. Energy prices and pricing systems are
transparent to the extent that they are publically available and are published by order of
the government.
In the electricity sector, meters have been installed for all end users. These meters are in
line with EU standards, and obtaining a meter is the responsibility of the consumer. In
the gas sector, the government has only started metering domestic consumption. Industrial
consumers and export lines have installed gas meters.
Technical rules
Currently only the old Soviet GOSTs and local Turkmen standards are in use. A
programme on the development of standards until the year 2030 was adopted in 2009
and the government has expressed its intention to harmonise electricity and gas standards
with those of the European Union; however, this process is only just beginning. Four
standards, which were developed by the project on harmonisation of oil and gas standards
under the INOGATE Programme, are now being considered. In the electricity sector, the
process has not yet begun.
The process of adapting standards can be initiated by any local organisation or company
by proposing the draft standards to the state agency TurkmenStandartlary, which is
under the Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan. TurkmenStandartlary is responsible for
adoption of these standards. Bilateral agreements on standards exist among organisations
in different industries.
Turkmenistan is a correspondent member of the ISO (International Standards Organisation)
however it is not a member of the CEN (European Committee for Standardisation), or of
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9.3. Market convergence Turkmenistan
ELECTRICITY
Turkmenistan is interconnected with Iran and Afghanistan, and cross-border trade is
based on bilateral agreements and is initiated at the high government level. Exports to
both countries are increasing, as Turkmenistan has increased its export infrastructure
and continues to do so with ongoing projects.
Turkmenistan also has an agreement with the Turkish government for exports transiting
through Iran. In 2014, an agreement was reached between Turkmenistan, Iran and
Turkey to double electricity exports in the medium term.5
Turkmenistan disconnected from the Central Asia Power Grid in 2003, which comprised
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.
NATURAL GAS
Turkmenistan exports gas to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, China and Iran. Gas export
prices are negotiated on bilateral terms. The government is committed to expanding
exports and diversifying export routes in order to increase revenue. The TAPI pipeline is
in advanced stages of development, with construction expected to begin in 2015 if
security risks are lifted. Interest in the Southern Corridor and exporting gas across the
Caspian Sea is also strong.
OIL
Oil export prices are negotiated on bilateral terms; however, oil exports are low. Dragon Oil
had an oil-swap deal with Iran from 1998 until 2010, under which Dragon Oil transferred
crude oil from Turkmenistan to Iranian refineries in exchange for equal volumes
exported from the Persian Gulf. In 2010, the deal ceased due to sanctions on Iran with
the exports diverted to Azerbaijan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (EIA, 2012).
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Turkmenistan 9.4. Sustainable development
Turkmenistan’s renewable energy sector is undeveloped, with only a very small share of
hydropower in electricity generation, despite its vast solar and wind power potential.
The free supply of electricity, heat and gas to all consumers discourages investment in
more expensive renewable energy sources. The development of renewables has traditionally
been in the shadow of hydrocarbon development.
In recent years, Turkmenistan has opened the dialogue on reforming its economy and
developing a more sustainable and diversified energy sector. The president has indicated
that alternative energy sources (meaning renewable energy sources in this case) will play
a significant role in the future economic development of the country. The reason for
developing renewables in Turkmenistan is two-fold: the government is aiming to reduce
GHG emissions and also to free up more gas for exports. As part of its National Strategy
on Climate Change adopted in 2012, energy efficiency measures and the development of
alternative energy sources are key government priorities.
However, none of the existing government strategies include targeted renewable energy
policy measures and there are no incentives for renewable power generation in
Turkmenistan. Without these measures, the level of investment in renewables is likely to
be sluggish. Existing plans include an increase in hydropower capacity, with plans for
57 MW of small hydropower plant construction (UNIDO and ICSHP, 2013).
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
no binding targets or policy implementation measures have been set. The government
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9.4. Sustainable development Turkmenistan
adopted the National Strategy on Climate Change in 2012 including measures for energy
savings. At the end of 2014 the government was in the process of developing an energy
efficiency policy and the Law on Energy Savings. The policy is expected to include
measures for improving fuel efficiency in power stations through modernisation and
rehabilitation, and increase municipal and industrial energy efficiency along with energy
efficiency in buildings (EBRD, 2014).
The government began its programme of modernisation and rehabilitation of electricity
and heat generation and distribution infrastructure in 2012, as part of its Power Sector
Development Programme to 2020. The programme is expected to increase capacity by
1.5 GW by 2020, reduce gas consumption by 1.5 bcm per year, and reduce emissions by
3 Mt. While the energy efficiency of the electricity and heat sector is expected to
improve by 2020, the overall level of consumption of gas, electricity and heat will
continue to grow due to growing living standards and rising population.
Demand-side management is a new concept in Turkmenistan. All sectors of the economy
receive electricity, heat and gas for free, or at very low prices after a certain level of
consumption. While electricity consumption is metered, the government only began the
installation of gas meters in 2012. Consumers are unaware of their level of consumption
and have no incentives to curb demand. The price subsidies have been in place since
the country’s independence and are expected to remain until 2030. These conditions
will lead to strong demand growth by 2030, putting additional pressure on aged and
inefficient networks.
During 2013 and 2014, the government adjusted down the allowed free consumption of
electricity per person per month from 35 kWh to 25 kWh and increased the price of gas
over 50 m3 per person per month from USD 0.0012 per m3 to USD 0.007 per m3. While
the measures are of significant magnitude, the effect on demand has been minimal to
date. The rural population is expected to carry the largest burden of the price increase
for gas consumption in the coming years, without significant possibility to adjust its
consumption level.
Turkmenistan also has an outdated building code with low energy efficiency standards.
During the past decade, the building stock has increased by 50%, yet the building
standards have not changed. The increase in the number of dwellings was part of the
National Programme for Reshaping the Living Conditions of the Population in Villages,
Towns, Cities and District Centres to the year 2020 and was to be undertaken according
to the National Strategy for Socio-Economic Development of Turkmenistan to the year
2030. However, according to the UNDP, which works on a number of energy efficiency
pilot projects in Turkmenistan, the energy performance of new and older buildings is not
assessed (UNECE, 2013).
The UNDP is currently working with the government on developing new building codes
for different types of dwellings, developing national standards for energy efficiency and
increasing energy audits. At present, no legal requirements for energy audits are in
place, nor are there any formal standards or certification procedures at present.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
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Turkmenistan 9.4. Sustainable development
strong legislation since independence has resulted in the wasteful use of resources and a
lack of public understanding of environmental issues and protection costs and measures.
Turkmenistan’s environment-related programmes began after 2000. The National Environmental
Action Plan for 2002-2010 was the first implementation plan for environmental strategies.
However, the programme largely failed to implement changes and to manage environmental
concerns in all sectors of the economy. Turkmenistan’s inspections, reporting procedures
and compliance assessments are still irregular, without strict criteria, and in many cases
ineffective based on the comparison criteria used. Environmental assessments and audits
are not required by law and are ambiguous in the current legislation, while pollution fees
and fines are too low to provide pollution abatement incentives (UNECE, 2012).
Environmental protection is closely linked to climate change concerns and policies regarding
GHG emissions. The government approved the National Strategy on Climate Change in
2012 and has in conjunction introduced the Law on Environmental Assessments,
approved in December 2014. The law is expected to strengthen the role and outcomes
of environmental assessments and increase public awareness and responsibilities over
environmental costs in all sectors of the economy. However, the effect of the law will
depend on the development of secondary legislation and implementing measures. Prior
to December 2014, the Law on Hydrocarbon Resources provided legal measures for
environmental protection.
In March 2013, the president issued a decree requiring individuals or companies performing
environmentally hazardous activities to obtain ecological insurance policies with the
Ministry of Nature Protection. The insurance premium revenues would be used in
environmental protection projects (Annayev, 2013).
Turkmenistan’s international involvement in the sphere of the environment includes
11 international environmental treaties. The new Law on Environmental Assessment
stipulates Turkmenistan’s international treaty obligations, including co-operation with
Azerbaijan, Russia, Iran and Kazakhstan. Previous to this legislation, Turkmenistan was
largely non-compliant with its multilateral agreements.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Turkmenistan ratified the UNFCCC in 1995 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 as a non-
Annex I Party.
In 2012, the country submitted its National Strategy on Climate Change to the UNFCCC,
developed with assistance from the UNDP. As part of the strategy, Turkmenistan created
an emissions inventory that was used in identifying key emission reduction projects.
Climate change and reducing GHG emission are increasingly recognised as facts of
national importance; however, the national strategic framework lacks integrated climate
change mitigation or adaptation measures.6 The UNDP continues to work with the
government on the strengthening of climate change policy and legislation, in order to
implement the action plan on GHG emissions reduction.
Energy-related CO2 emissions totalled 63.8 Mt in 2012 in Turkmenistan, which is 43.5%
higher compared to 1990. The commercial and public services sector (including agriculture)
accounts for 44% of emissions, followed by power generation (28.3%), transport (10.9%),
manufacturing (8.6%) and refining (8.3%).
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9.4. Sustainable development Turkmenistan
A Designated National Authority for the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) was
established in May 2009 by presidential resolution at the Office of Climate Change
within the Ministry of Nature Protection and with the assistance of the UNDP. To date,
no CDM project has been registered or even validated.
GAS FLARING
Gas flaring, or the burning of associated petroleum gas (APG) is one of Turkmenistan’s
main environmental concerns. However, reliable statistics on APG do not exist, nor does
a strong legislative framework for its regulation (UNECE, 2012). The State Agency for
Managing and Using Hydrocarbon Resources, under the Ministry of Oil and Gas, is in
charge of environmental regulation in the oil and gas sector, including gas flaring.
According to a Climate Limits report (2013), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration estimates gas flaring at around 1 bcm/year in Turkmenistan since 2005, from
satellite images. Around 57% of flaring is non-associated gas from gas or condensate
fields. Most of the flares are at fields developed before 1990. The development of the
large South Yolotan field may lead to additional flaring over the years.
The gas extraction sector is mainly operated by the purchasing agreements between the
government and the private sector. Dragon Oil, one of the largest operators in gas
extraction, is estimated to have contributed 0.4 bcm of flared gas in 2010 from its
operations in Turkmenistan. The company is implementing procedures to reduce its gas
flaring, including developing a gas treatment plant and transporting unprocessed gas
onshore for processing (CL, 2013).
Details of individual company projects are largely unknown. However, Turkmenistan is
raising awareness of the need to reduce gas flaring, particularly in light of significant
future developments in the Caspian Sea. During 2014, Turkmenistan hosted a conference
on the topic of APG reduction (Hasanov, 2014c).
Turkmenistan does not participate in the World Bank Global Gas Flaring Reduction
Initiative and the Global Gas Flaring Reduction Public-private Partnership.
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Turkmenistan 9.5. Investment attraction
Turkmenistan’s economy is closed and the investment climate is tailored specifically to each
sector. The oil and gas extraction industry is more welcoming to foreign investors, while the
remainder of the energy sector is tightly controlled by the government without plans for
privatisation. Privatisation is welcome in some other sectors of the economy, particularly in
the services and trade sector. The Law on Privatisation was passed in 1992 with the aim of
privatising industry and services. However, most enterprises are still in government hands.
Turkmenistan’s constitution gives full rights to the president to make any decisions
regarding Turkmenistan’s economic or political system. The president appoints and
dismisses judges without parliamentary review, forms the central election commission,
and has the right to issue edicts that are mandatory. The president is also often involved
in commercial decision-making, particularly with regard to large oil and gas projects.
The president’s level of involvement in commercial decisions and the high level
of corruption in other layers of the economy pose a barrier for many investors.
Turkmenistan’s investors face other challenges, including weak rule of law, inconsistent
regulatory practices, unfamiliarity with international business norms, strict controls of
foreign exchange flows, weak intellectual property protection and poor transparency.7
However, Turkmenistan’s gas exploration potential proves an attractive opportunity and
numerous large international energy companies have operations in the country, possible
only through strong relationships with the government. Companies include China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Dragon Oil, Gazprom and Petronas.
The government is planning to expand its oil and gas upstream industry, opening the
sector to other potential partners and particularly trying to attract large oil and gas majors
from the United States. As such, part of its National Programme for Socio-Economic
Development to 2030 and the Power Sector Development Programme to 2020 includes
plans for investor incentives such as free economic zones and investor protection. In
2013, the government approved the Law on Denationalisation and Privatisation of State
Property (2013), and the Law on Counteraction of Corruption was approved in 2014.
In May 2010 the government adopted the National Programme for Socio-Economic
Development of Turkmenistan for 2010-2030. The programme envisages diversification of
the economy, increased competition and market and institutional reforms. In November 2012
the president approved a privatisation programme covering the period 2013-16, accompanied
by a list of mostly medium-sized enterprises that were available for privatisation. The
energy sector was not included on the list (EBRD, 2013). However, little progress has been
made and Turkmenistan remains one of the most closed economies in the region and globally.
Turkmenistan is not listed in the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator. It is
the only country of the EECCA countries without a rating.
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9.5. Investment attraction Turkmenistan
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The investment framework in the energy sector is mainly focused on the development of
the oil and gas extraction industry, including the supporting infrastructure. The government
is interested in attracting foreign investors for production partnerships rather than self-
financing. Major future infrastructure projects include the development of the TAPI gas
pipeline, projected to cost around USD 8-10 billion; and the potential Trans-Caspian gas
pipeline, with an estimated cost of USD 5 billion. Both projects are still seeking investors,
although the TAPI pipeline is in the advanced stages of planning and construction will begin
in 2015 if financing is secured. Ongoing projects in the petrochemical complex include around
USD 5.2 billion in polypropylene and polyethylene plants, financed by Japanese investors.
Ongoing investment projects in the gas sector include the modernisation and rehabilitation
of gas facilities and the gas network. New gas processing facilities with the latest
technologies are in planning with investment from the private sector. The government
is also looking to develop its refining industry with foreign investment funds. The
Turkmenbashi oil processing plant underwent expansion at the end of December 2014,
and additional refineries are planned in the mid-term.
TurkmenEnergo is also investing in the electricity and heat network, as well as in
generation capacity rehabilitation, modernisation and expansion to combat frequent
outages and losses and to cater to growing demand. The ongoing project is expected to
cost around USD 5 billion by 2030 and increase capacity by 800 MW with up to
24 000 km of additional 500 kV, 220 kV and 110 kV lines. This includes additional export
infrastructure to Iran and Afghanistan.
Renewable energy developments and investment in energy efficiency are very small-
scale and only in early stages of development.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
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Turkmenistan References
References
ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2013), Energy Outlook for Asia and the Pacific, ADB.
Annayev, Dzhumaguly (2013), “Turkmenistan develops environmental strategy”, Central Asia
Online, 8 April, http://centralasiaonline.com.
BGR (Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Study 2013:
Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources, Federal Institute for Geosciences and
Natural Resources, Hannover, Germany.
CL (Carbon Limits) (2013), Associated Petroleum Gas Flaring Study for Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan, Final Report for European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, CL, Oslo.
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) (2014), Strategy for Turkmenistan,
EBRD, London.
EBRD (2013), Transition Report 2013, EBRD, London.
EBRD (2010), EBRD Energy Sector Investment, Final Report, EBRD, London.
EIA (US Energy Information Administration) (2012), “Turkmenistan”, Country Analysis Briefs, EIA,
Washington, DC.
Hasanov, Huseyn (2014a), “Turkmenistan plans to increase electricity export”, Trend, 20 September,
http://en.trend.az.
Hasanov, Huseyn (2014b), “Turkmenistan signs major oil refinery contracts”, Trend, 29 November,
http://en.trend.az.
Hasanov, Huseyn (2014c), “Associated gas flaring reduction conference underway in Turkmenistan”,
Trend, 11 September, http://en.trend.az.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IEA (2010), World Energy Outlook, OECD/IEA,Paris.
Rakhmatov, Sabir (2012), “Turkmenistan to tackle power supply problems”, Central Asia Online,
8 August, http://centralasiaonline.com.
Shumskaya, Elita (2013), “Power industry of Turkmenistan – guidelines of development”, Press
release, Institute of Strategic Planning and Economic Development of Turkmenistan, 5 May.
Government of Turkmenistan (2015), “An Independent Import Strategy”, Press release of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Turkmenistan, www.turkmenistan.ru/en/node/3475.
UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) (2013), Assessment of Clean
Infrastructure in Turkmenistan, United Nations, New York.
UNECE (2012), Environmental Performance Reviews: Turkmenistan, Highlights, United Nations,
New York.
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization) and ICSHP (International Center on
Small Hydro Power) (2013), World Small Hydropower Development Report 2013: Turkmenistan,
UNIDO and ICSHP.
World Bank (2014), Partnership Programme Snapshot – Turkmenistan, World Bank, Washington, DC.
Zomov, A. and R. Behnke (2010), Energy Efficiency Challenges in Heating Supply System of
Turkmenistan and Potential Solutions, proceedings of the Tenth International Conference for
Enhanced Building Operations, Kuwait, 26-28 October.
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UKRAINE
332
Ukraine
B E L A R U S
RUSSIA
Figure 10.1.1 Map of Ukraine
P O L A N D
Kiev
SLOVAK
REPUBLIC
U K R A I N E
HUNGARY
MOLDOVA
RUSSIA
R O M A N I A CRIMEA
(Autonomous
Republic)
BL ACK SEA
0 300 km
10.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
Ukraine has a population of 45.6 million and is the second-largest country by area in Europe
at 603 628 square kilometres (km2). It is located at the crossroads of the European
Union, the Russian Federation, and Black Sea and Caspian regions. Ukraine holds abundant
mineral resources, including oil, natural gas and coal, as well as a large hydro and biomass
potential. With its population and strong energy consumption, it is one of Europe’s
largest energy markets. It also remains the largest transit country for natural gas in the
world and plays a key role for Russian gas deliveries to European markets.
Ukraine experienced a long period of very strong economic growth in 2001-07, driven by
low gas prices, a strong national currency (the hryvnia [UAH]), and high foreign steel
demand and prices. Ukraine’s economy remained open and export-oriented, and it
joined the World Trade Organization in 2008.
Nominal GDP was UAH 1 455 billion in 2013 (USD 181.8 billion in 2013 in current USD). Per
capita GDP was USD 3 900 (in current USD) in 2013 according to the World Bank. Steel
accounts for about 40% of total exports, while other key exports are fertiliser and grain. The
share of machinery and manufacturing in total exports is decreasing, as is that of steel.
Russia and the European Union are the country’s key trade partners, the latter increasingly
becoming the key export destination (25% in 2013) and the former’s share in exports
declining, from 29% in 2011 to 24% in 2013. The country is heavily reliant on oil products
and gas imports. Variations in the hryvnia/dollar exchange rate, access to export markets,
in particular Russia’s, external construction activity in Asia or the Middle East, agriculture,
and energy supply and price trends have a substantial impact on its domestic economy.
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Ukraine 10.1. General energy policy
However, Ukraine has undergone two severe economic crises in the past five years. Due to
this exposure to foreign markets, Ukraine has been severely affected by the global economic
and financial crises since autumn 2008. Ukraine fell into a deep recession in 2009, with real
GDP down by 14.8% and industrial output collapsing almost 22%. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) offered support to Ukraine and agreed to a USD 16.4 billion Stand-by Arrangement
in November 2008 to stabilise the banking system and mitigate the impact of the collapse
in output. In total, approximately USD 11 billion was released by the IMF under the arrangement,
as well as approximately USD 3.4 billion under a second Stand-by Arrangement that was agreed
in mid-2010. Ukraine’s real GDP recovered by 4.2% during 2010 and a further 5.2% in 2011.
Ukraine entered another recession in mid-2012, with GDP growth falling to 0% in 2013
and an estimated -6.9%recession in 2014. Driven by factors such as insufficient capital
investment, lower steel demand, high energy import prices, lack of structural reforms and
corruption, the economy never recovered from the 2009 crisis. Following month-long
street protests in Kiev, a change in power occurred in March 2014, which was followed
by the loss of control over the Autonomous Republic Crimea (Crimea) and the start of a
military conflict in Ukraine’s eastern regions with severe casualties, significant damages
to infrastructure and considerable economic losses. This has resulted in a strong hryvnia
depreciation (from UAH 8/USD 1 in December 2013 to UAH 23/USD 1 in mid-March 2015),
far lower budget revenues, and a 10% fall in industrial output in 2014. Following a
commercial dispute with Gazprom, Russian gas imports were halted in June 2014, with
some imports from Russia resuming in November/December of 2014 as part of an EU-
brokered winter package agreement valid until 31 March 2015. Coal production and
transportation have been severely disrupted in the Donbass region, while electricity
generation in combined heat and power (CHP) plants have also been disrupted, especially
in the conflict regions. In 2014, the Ukrainian government benefited from another IMF
Stand-by Arrangement and the disbursement of two financial tranches of USD 3.6 billion
and USD 1.4 billion. The government of Ukraine agreed with the IMF to conduct structural
reforms to stabilise its economy and bring it back to a sustainable growth path. In
addition to this, strong financial support has been provided by the European Union,
World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and by several
countries on a bilateral level. For example, the European Union agreed to a Macro-
Financial Assistance (MFA) programme for Ukraine, which is worth EUR 1.61 billion in
total and is conditioned by public finance management and anti-corruption, trade and
taxation, energy sector reforms (including provisions for increased and separated social
subsidies for the most vulnerable households), and financial sector reforms.
In March 2015, IMF and Ukraine concluded a new Extended Arrangement over USD 17.5 billion,
cancelling the previous Stand-By Arrangement. The parties agreed on policies for strengthening
public finances, advancing structural reforms and securing financial stability (IMF, 2015).
Ukraine co-operates with the European Union under the Eastern Partnership umbrella,
which aims to create the conditions to accelerate political association and deepen
economic integration between the European Union and the Eastern Neighbourhood
countries, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
Ukraine became an observer to the Energy Community Treaty in November 2006. Since then,
it applied for full membership and committed to implementing the acquis communautaire
on energy, namely the legislative frameworks for the electricity and gas sectors and in the
areas of renewable energy, competition and environment. Ukraine became a member of
the Energy Community Treaty in September 2010 and started adopting and implementing
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
The Ukrainian government in 2014 signed and ratified an Association Agreement with
the European Union; however, entry into force of the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union was postponed until
31 December 2015. In the meantime, Ukraine enjoys preferential access to the EU
market, which has led to higher exports to the European Union.
SUPPLY
Ukraine is well-endowed with indigenous energy resources, from which 85.4 million tonnes
of oil-equivalent (Mtoe) were produced in 2012 (Figure 10.1.2). It is a major coal producer,
and ranked 10th in the world in 2012 (BGR, 2013). Coal production of 40.1 Mtoe was 47%
of all energy production in 2012. Yet Ukraine’s coal is of poor quality and a large part of the
production, located in the Donbass region, was subsidised. Other energy sources produced
in 2012 include nuclear (27.7% of total), natural gas (18%), oil (4%), biofuels and waste (2%),
hydro (1.1%) and peat (0.1%). Solar and wind energy are produced at negligible levels.
Following the conflict in the Donbass region, coal production and supply were severely
disrupted. In 2014, according to preliminary data from the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy,
there was a 22.4% decline in the production of raw coal to 64.9 million tonnes (Mt).
Coking coal output fell by 32.1% in the same year to 16.1 Mt, while production of power-
generating coal declined by 18.5% to 48.8 Mt.
In the years 2002-12 (latest official data available), energy production in Ukraine grew by
11.3%. Coal production grew at a similar rate, and its share of total production has
remained relatively unchanged. Nuclear energy and hydropower also grew over these
ten years, while oil, peat and natural gas production fell due to depleting resources.
Production of biofuels and waste and wind power experienced a boom during the
decade, although they still represent a small share of production.
Ukraine’s total primary energy supply (TPES)1 was 122.7 Mtoe in 2012. TPES decreased
by 7.5% in the two years after 2010 and was 9.5% lower in 2012 compared with 2002
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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(Figure 10.1.3). Energy supply contracted by 15% during the economic recession in 2009
and has not fully recovered since.
Natural gas dominates Ukraine’s energy mix at 35.1% of TPES in 2012, down from 45.3%
in 2002. The role of natural gas decreased further in 2013 and 2014, following the
economic downturn and policy measures to reduce gas consumption. Coal accounted for
34.7% in 2012, compared with 27.7% in 2002. Other contributors to TPES in 2012 included:
nuclear at 19.3%; oil 9.5%; biofuels and waste 1.4%; and marginal amounts from hydro,
wind, solar and peat. However, the share of renewable energy in the primary energy mix
may be slightly higher, as reliable data on heat production from renewables is difficult to
collect and official statistics may underestimate biomass consumption.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation was 198.4 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012, up from a low of 173.6 TWh
in 2009 (Figure 10.1.4). Other than the 2009 economic recession, electricity generation
has taken an upward trend since 2002. Nuclear energy is the main source of electricity in
Ukraine, accounting for 45.4%, a share largely unchanged since 2002. Coal accounts for
40.5% of total electricity generation, up from 31.5% in 2002. Demand for coal in electricity
generation increased 47.2% from 2002 while oil use fell by 34% and natural gas by 47.7%.
Hydro accounted for 5.3% of electricity generation in 2012. Other renewables contribute
negligible levels. Wind power was introduced in 1998, biofuels and waste for electricity
production in 2008, and solar in 2010. The use of biofuels and waste has fallen by 50%
since its introduction, while solar and wind power are developing at a fast rate.
Heat production was 599.4 petajoules (PJ) in 2012, a 5.4% increase from the low during
the recession, yet 22.9% lower than 2002. Heat production has experienced a downward
trend since 1990. Natural gas accounts for 81.1% of heat production and coal for 15.1%.
Other sources of heat production include biofuels and waste (1.7%), nuclear (1.1%), oil
(0.8%) and peat (0.2%). As the use of biofuels is often not completely measured, it is
expected that biofuels and waste play a larger role in heat generation than indicated.
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
150 Hydro
Wind*
100
Solar*
50
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
imports are mainly from Russia (70.2%) and the United States (22.4%).
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Ukraine is an electricity net exporter, with exports of 9.9 TWh in 2013 and marginal
imports. Main exports in 2013 were to Hungary (43.2%), Belarus (31.3%), Moldova
(14.6%) and Poland (10%).
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 was 73.1 Mtoe in 2012 (Figure 10.1.5). TFC was 2.3%
lower in 2012 compared with ten years prior, largely due to a 19% drop during the 2009
recession, without a full recovery since.
Industry is the largest energy-consuming sector at 31 Mtoe in 2012, representing 42.3%
of TFC. This share is down from 47.3% in 2002 with depressed industry activity during the
recession and a slow recovery. Households accounted for 32.1% of TFC in 2012. Residential
energy demand decreased 2.4% in the period from 2002. Conversely, energy demand in
transport increased by 0.5% and in the commercial sector by 79.5% since 2002. In 2012,
transport accounted for 15.7%, and the commercial sector for 9.9% of TFC.
It is noteworthy that gas consumption has been decreasing in past years to unprecedented
low levels. Total gas consumption was 49.5 bcm in 2013, down from 77.6 bcm in 2005,
marking a 36.2% decline. That decrease continued in 2014 to reach a historical low of
42.4 bcm (-7.8% year-on-year).This results primarily from lower industrial gas consumption
due to the economic slowdown and recession periods, as well as higher import costs, gas
savings policies, and the loss of control over parts of the country.
60
40
20
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing and forestry.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
HEAT
Total thermal energy demand in Ukraine is about 130 to 140 million gigacalories per year
(Gcal/year). In 2011, total thermal heat supplied by district heating companies amounted
to 147 million Gcal, with 97.5 million Gcal produced by heat-only plants in urban and rural
areas and mostly supplied to residential users (Table 10.1.1). In 2011, district heating
systems’ installed capacity was 162 million Gcal/year, with 120 million Gcal/year in heat-only
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
plants located in urban and rural areas. Heat losses amounted to 13.5 million Gcal in 2011
(Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Housing, 2011). District heating
accounts for a large share of total primary energy use in Ukraine. Its main fuel is natural
gas, using about 9 bcm per year, which corresponds to almost 50% of Ukraine’s domestic
production of natural gas or 23% of total imports in 2011. Several initiatives are underway
to convert some district heating systems to use renewable sources for fuel.
Table 10.1.1 Heat production and supply by heat-only plants in urban and rural areas, Ukraine, 2011
(million Gcal)
ENERGY INTENSITY
Ukraine’s economy remains one of the most energy intensive in the region, despite
progress in energy efficiency in the industry sector and the closure of some of the most
energy-intensive industries in the 1990s. Ukraine’s energy intensity, i.e. the ratio of TPES
to real GDP, was 0.36 tonnes of oil-equivalent (toe) per USD 1 000 (in PPP terms) in
2012. This ranks Ukraine as the third most energy-intensive among EECCA countries,
behind Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Figure 10.1.6).
While Ukraine’s energy intensity situation improved notably during the 2000s when GDP
growth was 1.5 times higher than energy demand, the broad energy intensity indicator
has deteriorated in recent years. However, the TPES to GDP ratio may be more favourable
if the value of the shadow economy is taken into account. Ukraine’s Ministry of Economy
estimates that value creation not represented in official data was 34% of GDP in 2012
(Interfax Ukraine, 2012).
Figure 10.1.6 Energy intensity in Ukraine and selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
1.2 Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
1.0
Belarus
0.8 Ukraine
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
Kazakhstan
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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Ukraine 10.1. General energy policy
RENEWABLES
Renewable energy accounts for 2.2% of TPES, comprised of biofuels and waste at 1.4%
and hydro at 0.7%. Wind and solar power generation are in early stages of development
and contribute negligible amounts to TPES.
In the period since 2002, the hydropower share of TPES has increased slightly while the
share of biofuels and waste has increased substantially from a small base. Ukraine has
the fifth-lowest share of renewables in TPES among EECCA countries (Figure 10.1.7).
Figure 10.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Ukraine and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY STATISTICS
The State Statistical Service of Ukraine (Ukrstat) is an entity responsible for publishing
country’s official statistics data. On the energy side, it is actively engaged in working with a
number of international agencies on improving energy data and it has started producing
energy balances using IEA methodology from 2010, with the assistance of the IEA.
Ukraine has comprehensive data on energy supply and trade, but additional efforts are
required for streamlining demand-side data and collecting additional consumption and
renewable energy use data. Maintaining or enhancing energy data collection capabilities
rests within the State Statistical Service; however, greater commitment from the government
is required to undertake necessary data surveys to enable data collection and processing.
The government also lacks the analytical segment required for data analysis to enable
data-based informed policy decisions by decision makers and to track progress.
The figures and charts presented in this report are based on the Ukrainian energy
balance, based on IEA methodology (Annex A).
MARKET STRUCTURE
Electricity
Ukraine’s electricity sector is comprised of separate generation, wholesale market, transmission
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system operation and distribution entities. The distribution and retail elements are bundled.
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
The wholesale electricity market (WEM), created in 1996, is operated by the state-
owned company Energorynok as a sole wholesale trader under a single buyer model
since 2000. It also acts as a settlement centre for all payments. Wholesale prices and
tariffs are calculated as weight average wholesale price and set by the National Energy
and Communal Services Commission (NECSC). All market players (with the exception of
small electricity generation companies) are legally bound to become members of the
WEM; at the end of 2014, the WEM had over 370 members.
UkrEnergo, the Ukrainian National Electricity Company, is a state entity which owns and
operates United Energy System of Ukraine (UES), including transmission networks and
interconnections with neighbouring countries. UkrEnergo also provides technical and
information support to Energorynok.
The electricity sector has experienced several stages of reform. It was mostly unbundled
and partially privatised in the 1990s while state-owned assets were consolidated in
2004. Most thermal generation plants have been partially or fully privatised, with the
private company DTEK controlling the bulk of the market. In 1995 regional distribution
and retail companies (oblenergos) were created, one for each administrative region. Since
then there have been several rounds of privatisations. By 2014, several oblenergos were
privately owned by domestic or foreign investors. Ukrenergoatom is the state-owned
operator of nuclear power plants.
Heat
Ukraine has around 900 local heat supply companies, called TeploKomunEnerhos (TKEs),
that operate heat plants (mostly boilers) and district heating networks. TKEs are mainly
owned and managed by local governments. The TKEs supply heat to final consumers.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Municipal service companies, known as ZheKs, handle billing and collection in most cases.
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Ukraine 10.1. General energy policy
More than 8 000 enterprises produce heat in Ukraine. CHP plants account for about 22%
of all heat production. Out of about 250 CHP plants, five are very large and 200 are small
industrial facilities. CHP plants are fuelled by natural gas (76% to 80%), fuel oil (8% to 15%)
and coal (5% to 6%). NaftoGaz holds shares in large CHP plants as well as smaller CHP plants
that are typically controlled by regional electricity distribution companies or industrial customers.
Heat-only plants account for about 60% of heat production. There are over 35 000 heat-
only boiler facilities, about 60% of which are in urban areas and 40% in rural areas. About
85% of installed capacity is located in urban areas. The majority, about 64%, use natural gas
and about 30% use coal, and most have a production capacity lower than 3 Gcal/year. A
very marginal amount of heat is produced by nuclear power plants (0.01%). Individual
units at the household level represent about 10% of total heat generated.
Coal
Ukraine is endowed with large coal resources and most mines are located in the Donbass
region. Ukraine has about 300 mines, of which a large number of profitable mines were
privatised, the predominant majority by DTEK. The remaining mines, requiring subsidisation,
remain in the ownership of state-controlled companies. The largest mining region of
Ukraine is in its east, which has been severely affected by the recent political instability.
Moreover, there are hundreds of illegal, often smaller mines which are in operation
mainly in the eastern regions.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
The Cabinet of Ministers, the ultimate decision-making body, is the institution responsible
for policy co-ordination and the oversight of state energy companies. Energy policy is
high on its political agenda, with the parliament and the president also involved in the
decision-making process. The following are the main national-level institutions with
energy policy responsibilities:
The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry is responsible for most energy supply
policies and for co-ordinating energy policy across government and providing advice
to parliament.
The Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources is responsible for licensing and
production sharing agreements for hydrocarbon development and for climate change
policy. The co-ordination and implementation of all climate policy-related measures
defined by this ministry falls under the responsibility of the State Agency for Energy
Efficiency and Energy Saving.
The State Environmental Investment Agency of Ukraine has overall responsibility for
the implementation of the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC Convention.
The Ministry of Finance is responsible for taxation relevant to the energy sector.
The Ministry of Economy and Trade Development has the lead for energy efficiency
policies, but responsibilities for implementation are shared among numerous ministries
and agencies.
The State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving (SAEE), under the Ministry
of Economy and Trade Development, is the central governmental body responsible
for advancing energy efficiency and renewable energy developments and promoting
the deployment of energy efficient and renewable energy technologies.
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Ukraine has a large body of legislation relevant to energy, which is currently being
streamlined to support urgently needed energy sector reforms and to liberalise electricity,
natural gas and heat markets in the country, in compliance with the Energy Community
Treaty membership undertakings. The progress of legislative changes, however, has been
slow and halted by numerous changes in governmental structures and political instability.
The 1997 Law on Electricity Industry was amended by a new Law on Operating Principles
of the Electricity Market, adopted in October 2013, aimed at liberalising the WEM. These
changes provide a legal framework, dealing with regulatory oversight, management and
development of infrastructure, licensing, and operations of companies in the transmission,
distribution and supply under-regulated prices. It also deals with security of system operation,
allocation of cross-border transmission capacity and development of the network. The Law
on the Electricity Market aims at progressively switch from the single buyer model to liquid
bilateral trading and establish a day-ahead market by 2017. It also introduces balancing
procedures, third-party access and rules for cross-border transmission capacities, and the
establishment of an electronic auctioning platform. It also introduces a system of cross-
subsidies between different types of generation in order to subsidise households, renewables
and CHP plants. This system works through the establishment of an Allocation Fund.
The natural gas sector is regulated by a number of laws, including the Law on Principles
of Functioning of the Natural Gas Market, the Law on Oil and Gas, the Law on Pipeline
Transport, the Law on State Regulation in Energy and the Law on Natural Monopolies.
The Law on Principles of Functioning of the Natural Gas Market was adopted in 2010 to
align Ukrainian legislation with EC Directive 2003/55. It requires further revisions and the
development of a set of secondary legislation for full alignment of Ukraine’s gas market
legislation and regulations with the EU’s Second Energy Package. The law provides the basis
for opening the gas market, with consumer choice of gas supplier, starting with industrial
customers from 1 January 2012, public institutions and organisations from 1 January 2013,
the heat industry from 1 January 2014, and was extended to all categories of consumers,
including residential, from 1 January 2015. The regulatory framework for third-party
access to the Gas Transportation System was adopted in April 2012.
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Ukraine 10.1. General energy policy
The reform of NaftoGaz and its network of companies, in line with Ukraine’s Energy
Community commitments and EU Directive 2003/55/EC, has made progress as the Law
on Pipeline Transport has been amended to establish an independent transmission system
operator (TSO). This includes the unbundling of gas transportation, storage, production
and distribution activities, and ensuring the financial viability and greater transparency of
the company and its subsidiaries. The TSO must be unbundled legally and functionally and
have independent management, financial autonomy and ownership of the dispatching
functions; this was still unclear at the time of writing. Legal and functional unbundling of
the oblgazes (initially proposed by 2015) were not put in place at the time of writing.
A new draft Gas Law, transposing the Third Energy Package was prepared with the
assistance of the Energy Community Secretariat and presented to the government for
© OECD/IEA, 2015
further discussion in April 2014. The proposed draft details procedures for the functional
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
5. Decree by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On the National Renewable Energy Action Plan through 2020” # 902–p from
© OECD/IEA, 2015
1 October 2014.
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KEY POLICIES
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
6. http://tek.rbc.ua/ukr/kabmin-vydelit-440-mln-grn-na-kompensatsiyu-investitsiy-v-stroitelstvo-08102014123400.
7. Action Plan for Regulatory Support to the Implementation of the Energy Efficient Heat Consumption Policy and Modernisation
© OECD/IEA, 2015
of the Heat Supply Sector (Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers No. 588, 30 July 2012).
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Ukraine 10.1. General energy policy
8. www.president.gov.ua/en/news/32046.html.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
9. http://solydarnist.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/the_coalition_agreement_1.pdf.
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INVESTMENT
The Updated Energy Strategy to 2030, published in 2013, sets out the scale of the investment
challenge in broad terms for the energy sector. It estimates that over the period 2012-30
Ukraine needs to invest UAH 1 700 billion (in 2010 prices), at a rate of about UAH 90 billion
per year. This amount is split among the energy sectors: electricity and heat – UAH 720 billion;
oil and gas – UAH 510 billion; nuclear power – UAH 390 billion; and coal – UAH 80 billion.
This amount represents a significant financial challenge that will require foreign and
private investment, as well as a strategic reallocation of budget support measures.
Energy efficiency improvements will require significant investment across all sectors. The
2010 Energy Efficiency Programme for 2010-2015 foresees investment needs of USD 43 billion
for the five-year period. It is estimated that the state budget will only be able to cover a
small amount of these energy investments; other sources of financing are needed. In
2012, UAH 502 million was allocated in the state budget for energy efficiency measures.
Private investment, both domestic and foreign, or in the form of private-public partnership
arrangements, is thus essential.
There is considerable donor support for the implementation of energy efficiency measures
in Ukraine. In 2012, it was estimated that UAH 324.8 million of EU budget support is
earmarked for energy efficiency projects in Ukraine.10 A number of international financing
institutions (IFIs) such as EBRD, the World Bank and Global Climate Partnership Fund are
active in Ukraine.
Moreover, the upstream oil and gas segments, the district heating segment, and the electricity
generation and transmission segment will require large investments in the coming years.
10. State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Savings, www.saee.gov.ua/en/archives/4275 (accessed 24 March 2012).
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Ukraine 10.1. General energy policy
a National Training Centre for Energoatom Personnel, which is partially funded by the
European Union (EUR 14 million, representing one-third of the cost of the project). The centre,
opened in late 2012, will provide training in nuclear maintenance, management and safety.
There are a number of research programmes related to energy technology development
under various academic institutions and universities, but state funding in energy technology
R&D remains scarce and more efforts both in professional training and research segments
of R&D are required.
ASSESSMENT
making the implementation process more effective. Support for this deep reform
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
process is vital and can only be secured if there is full accountability, transparency and a
focus on clear and tangible outcomes. It is also essential to seize the massive potential
and willingness offered by the non-governmental sector and the international community
for helping the government to rapidly advance its policy planning and implementation
and address the country’s risks and potential threats.
Ukraine needs to transform its energy sector into a more efficient, secure and sustainable
energy system. This review has observed a number of energy sector challenges that limit
Ukraine’s economic and social development and energy security.
High energy intensity and poor efficiency: Energy-intensive industries are crippled by
ageing capital stock throughout the energy supply chain. District heating systems that
supply half of the heat used in industry and space heating to some 55% of households
are in dire need of refurbishment and need a tariff system that is consumption-based
and fully cost-reflective. The building stock is of poor quality. Attracting investments
to modernise assets and improve energy efficiency is a key challenge.
Declining production of domestic natural gas resources: Ukraine’s domestic oil and
gas production is stagnating, if not declining, whereas the country has untapped
conventional and unconventional gas resources. The country has the potential to meet
its gas consumption with domestic production by 2030. Yet without comprehensive
reforms and foreign investment, it will not be able to increase domestic gas production
and significantly increase Ukraine’s security of energy supply.
Energy security at stake: Ukraine’s gas import dependency and severely affected
coal production and disrupted transportation remain key contributors to rising energy
security concerns. Contributing factors to this include: commercial disputes with Gazprom
over prices, debts and take-or-pay and ship-or-pay obligations; lower transit volumes;
and commercial and economic challenges to sustain high levels of reverse flow imports.
Gas shortages are severely affecting centralised heat production, while coal shortages
heavily impact electricity generation capabilities and stability of grids, especially in times
of peak demand. Rising energy import costs and a remaining strong dependency on
gas imports lead to additional energy security challenges; due to depreciation of the
hryvnia, oil and gas import costs labelled in US dollars have increased by over 50% in
2013 dollar terms. These are nonetheless expected to decrease again following the
fall in oil prices. Moreover, although huge improvement was achieved over past years,
Ukraine still needs to import about 50% of its gas consumption. This is a particular
challenge given that gas imports have to be pre-paid and that domestic regulated
price levels have not been sufficiently increased to match these rising import costs.
Energy consumption subsidies: The high level of public expenditure to subsidise gas,
heat and electricity consumption is unsustainable, especially since budget subsidies
increased to a record level in 2014 following the hryvnia’s depreciation, rising import
costs and insufficient increases in regulated tariffs. NaftoGaz is not economically viable
and, overall, energy sector companies have insufficient incentives for investment. The
challenge is to mobilise political and public support to move to market-based prices
in a socially acceptable manner that supports the most vulnerable consumers while
providing full transparency and accountability for the utilisation of the revenues.
Another related challenge is to foster trust from consumers that higher energy bills can
be offset by lower consumption and that payments are used in a transparent manner.
Market and regulatory framework: Ukraine’s oil, gas and electricity providers are
© OECD/IEA, 2015
dominated by state entities. Current energy markets are designed to maintain their
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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10.1. General energy policy Ukraine
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Ukraine 10.2. Energy security
Ukraine has a century-long history of oil and gas production and holds substantial
hydrocarbon reserves, conventional and unconventional, estimated at 9 billion tonnes of
oil-equivalent (Btoe). Natural gas reserve estimates are at 5.4 trillion cubic metres (tcm),
with proven reserves of 1.1 tcm of natural gas, more than 400 Mt of gas condensate and
850 Mt of oil reserves. Following the loss of control over Crimea, natural gas reserves
would need to be revised downwards because waters off the shore of Crimea, no longer
accessible to Ukraine, hold significant gas resources.
Hydrocarbon resources in Ukraine are concentrated in three regions: the Carpathian
region in the west; the Dnipro-Donetsk region in the east; and the Black Sea-Azov Sea
region in the south (Figure 10.2.1). The Dnipro-Donetsk region accounts for 80% of
proven reserves and approximately 90% of gas production. The Carpathian region has
13% of proven reserves and accounts for 6% of production. The remaining 6% of proven
reserves are located in the southern region, where production is conducted both onshore
and offshore in the shallow shelf of the Black and Azov seas. The aggregate production in
this region is 5% of Ukraine’s total oil and gas production.
Ukraine has considerable unconventional gas potential in the form of coalbed methane
in the main coal mining areas of eastern Ukraine and in two shale gas basins: a portion of
the Lublin Basin, which extends into Poland, and the Dnieper-Donets Basin in the east.
Coalbed methane resources are estimated at close to 3 tcm, and technically recoverable
shale gas resources at 1.2 tcm.11 The Ukrainian section of the Lublin Basin is large and
reportedly has a higher average total organic content than the Polish section and lower
average depth. The Dnieper-Donets Basin, which provides most of Ukraine’s conventional
oil, gas and coal production, also has high organic content, but is deeper. However, due
the armed conflict in the Donbass region and challenging economic and geological
situations, the future shale gas developments led by Shell in the east and Chevron in the
west appear to be uncertain.
Ukraine is endowed with abundant coal reserves, which account for more than 90% of
the country’s fossil fuel reserves. They include the full range of coal types, from anthracite
to lignite, including thermal and coking coal. Reserves of anthracite and bituminous coal
are estimated to be about 32 gigatonnes (Gt), with 49 Gt of resources, ranking Ukraine
sixth in the world for hard coal reserves, after the United States, China, Russia, Australia
and South Africa. Reserves of sub-bituminous coal and lignite are estimated to be about
2 Gt (15th in global ranking of lignite reserves) with another 5 Gt of resources. Government
estimates are 117 Gt of hard coal reserves (including sub-bituminous) and 8.6 Gt of
lignite. Recoverable reserves at existing mines are estimated by the government at more
than 6 Gt, around 75 years of peak production levels.
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10.2. Energy security Ukraine
Most coal in Ukraine is located in the Donbass region (Donetsk Coal Basin) in eastern
Ukraine in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and Dnipropetrovsk. There are two other
smaller basins, the Lviv-Volyn Coal Basin in western Ukraine (this basin continues into
Poland) and the Dnieper Coal Basin, a lignite basin in central Ukraine. Intensive mining
for more than a century in the Donetsk region has exhausted the best deposits.
Ukraine has substantial renewable energy potential, including significant biomass resources
and waste management potential, which remains largely untapped.
Ukraine’s energy security was seriously challenged in 2014, following prolonged gas price
negotiation standstills with Russia, military actions in the eastern part of the country and
the loss of control over Crimea. Ukraine is facing possible natural gas, coal and electricity
supply shortfalls, and disruption risks in the short to medium term. It urgently requires
sound policies and measures to overcome this crisis.
Coal production in the Donbass basin has been severely halted. Damage caused by
military action to the coal mining and energy-intensive industries in this region is
immense, leaving a large number of flooded mines and severely destroyed energy and
transport infrastructure, and subsequent logistical problems. Coal supplies from the
Donbass region to the central parts of Ukraine or to the thermal power plants almost
entirely stalled from mid-2014 due to discontinued rail operations and damaged or
destroyed roads and bridges. These developments pose a major level of irreversible
damage for the coal and industry sectors, and its impact on the country’s energy and
economic outlook remains to be fully assessed. Facing these challenges, the government
has been working on several options, including coal imports from South Africa and
Russia; imports of mazout from Belarus and increased fuel switchability at key flexible
power plants; electricity imports from Russia; and organised electricity supply cut-offs to
key city areas, administrative districts and regions.
Ukraine is actively seeking to reduce its gas import dependency and to diversify its supply
sources and routes. The government has put in place numerous emergency measures for
reducing gas demand, increasing domestic gas production and expanding reverse flow
import capacities from more competitive supplies from European markets. There is large
scope to further develop domestic gas resources, of which estimates for natural gas
production are 27-30 bcm by 2025. However, UkrGazVydobuvaniya would require substantial
investment capacity to stabilise and possibly increase its own production (as about 75%
of its current fields are being depleted) using capital-intensive modern technology and
equipment. Therefore, changes to the current price structure for domestically produced
gas (currently set at UAH 419/thousand cubic metres (kcm), substantially lower than the
price on imported gas) is paramount to enable the required investments. Such pricing
changes were being implemented in early 2015 as part of the agreement with the IMF
and should enable UkrGazVydobuvaniya to invest in new drilling rigs. The regulated price
for gas produced by UkrGazVydobuvaniya was increased to to UAH 1 590/kcm.
In the area of nuclear fuel supplies, traditionally provided by the Russian company TVEL,
Energoatom has signed contracts with Westinghouse for the supply of fuel assemblies for
some Ukrainian nuclear power reactors as a part of the nuclear fuel supply diversification
policy. At the same time, co-operation with TVEL is continuing.
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Ukraine 10.2. Energy security
Ukraine remains a key transit country and an important player for European energy security,
and in turn benefits from substantial transit revenues. Having the largest gas transit
infrastructure in the world, Ukraine currently transits about 75-85 bcm per year of Russian
gas to European markets, while a record low level of 60 bcm was observed in 2014. However,
Ukraine’s role in the transit of Russian gas to Europe is down from about 120 bcm in the
mid-2000s and is challenged by several factors, including stagnating demand in Europe
and Gazprom’s effective strategy to diversify its export routes. In consequence, Gazprom
has reduced the role of Ukraine from over 65% of total Russian gas exports to Europe by
2007 to below 50% in 2014. Gazprom in particular is rerouting part of its supplies to its
German, French and Belgian customers away from Ukraine via Nord Stream. In addition,
Gazprom’s purchase of 100% of Gazprom-TransGaz, the gas transmission company in
Belarus, at the end of 2011 should also give the Russian supplier additional incentive to
load the Belorussian Yamal or the Northern Lights routes, as transportation costs would
be lower. The Slovakian TSO, Eustream, is planning for reduced volumes of Russian gas in
transit, as is the Czech system operator. If the proposed South Stream pipeline materialises,
be it in its initial version or reconfigurated through Turkey, with two lines of 31.5 bcm or
three or four lines totalling a maximum capacity of 63 bcm/year, Russian gas volumes in
transit through Ukraine are likely to be further significantly reduced. This would create
serious challenges to the economic and technical operation of the system as it is today.
Investment in the reconfiguration of the entire gas transmission system would be
required to enable Ukraine to handle much lower gas transit volumes and continue
supplying all regions of Ukraine in an efficient manner. The current Gazprom-NaftoGaz
gas transit contract terminates on 31 December 2019.
ELECTRICITY
The length of the transmission network of 220 kilovolt (kV) to 750 kV lines is more than
22 000 km. The distribution networks are more than 1 million kilometres in length. Total
installed generation capacity was 56 GW in 2013, 64% of which was thermal power
plants, 25% nuclear and 10% hydro. The remainder, offset by some hydro storage plants,
is accounted for by solar, wind and other small generators.
Most of the thermal plants burn coal. A portion of the thermal capacity, about 5.4 GW,
burns gas or oil and is used in times of peak demand. Four nuclear plants with 15 units
account for 13.8 GW of installed capacity. Several large run-of-the-river and pumped
storage hydropower stations with capacity of 5.6 GW along the Dnieper and the Dniester
rivers play an important role in the operation of the electricity system due to a lack of
flexibility in old thermal plants (IMEPower, 2008).
Ukraine’s electricity sector is in need of large investments to modernise the generation
capacity, in particular hydro and thermal power plants, to remove bottlenecks in high-
voltage transmission capacity, and to reduce losses in distribution systems.
In the hydro sector, the World Bank is playing a long-standing role to support the
modernisation and expansion of Ukraine’s large hydro capacity. UkrHydroEnergo, which
manages the Ukrainian power grid, is increasing the safety and efficiency of its hydroelectric
plants as well as their capacity. The state-owned company operates nine hydroelectric
stations on the Dnieper and Dniester rivers with a total capacity of 3 900 MW.
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RUSSIA
Dobrotvirsk Chernobyl
P O L A N D
Rivne
Kyiv PS/Kyiv
Kiev Nuclear installations
Zmiiv
Khmelnitski Kyiv 6 VVER-440
Burshtynsk
Tripillia Kaniv VVER-1 000
SLOVAK RBMK-1 000 (under
Figure 10.2.1 Electricity infrastructure of Ukraine
REPUBLIC U K R A I N E decommissioning)
Kremenchuk
Research reactor
Dniestr Dniprodzerzhinsk Pridniprovsk Slaviansk Luhansk
Ladyzhynsk Uranium mining
HUNGARY and processing
Uglegorsk
Kryvyi Rih Dniprovsk Power plants
Zuyiv
Kurakhivsk
Thermal plant
South Ukraine Zaporizhzhya
Hydro plant
MOLDOVA Starobeshevo
Zaporizhia
Power lines
Kakhivka 750 kV
220 kV to 500 kV
RUSSIA
R O M A N I A
CRIMEA Crimea
(Autonomous
Republic)
Sebastopol
BL ACK SEA
BULGARIA 0 300 km
357
Ukraine
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Ukraine 10.2. Energy security
DISTRICT HEATING
Ukraine has 33 122 km of heat transmission and distribution networks. Transmission pipes
constitute about 3 500 km (pipes with diameter 125 millimetres [mm] to 1 400 mm).
Distribution pipelines (diameter 50 mm to 800 mm) are owned by municipalities and
constitute about 20 800 km. In addition, industrial pipeline networks are about 12 400 km.12
District heating systems in Ukraine are characterised by excessive capacity, and inefficient
and outdated technologies: the capital stock is in a critical state, with most assets close
to or beyond the end of their design life. Energy losses are considerable – hence much
gas is wasted – and operating costs are high, largely due to inadequate maintenance.
Due to overcapacity, lack of maintenance and insufficient investment in system upgrades,
losses are considerable. Most boilers have low efficiency factors, resulting in heat losses
of 10% to 15%. While there is insufficient metering to calculate accurately, losses in the
distribution network, mainly due to leaks and lack of pipe insulation, are estimated in
the range of 17%, but could be considerably higher. Leaks also lead to the need to add
additional water more frequently, which constitutes an extra cost for the heat supplier.
In modern networks of comparable size, losses are typically less than 10%. Breakdowns are
frequent in Ukraine’s district heating systems and are estimated to exceed 1.6 breakdowns
per km of network in operation, which is approximately ten times higher than in well-
maintained modern systems. In addition, up to 70% of delivered heat is lost in the end-
use phase because of insufficient building insulation and the inability to adjust heat
delivery to consumer requirements.
NATURAL GAS
When gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine inherited a gas
transportation system with unique characteristics, such as a dense network of multiple primary
and secondary pipelines coupled with major storage facilities which enable the diversion
of gas flows through other pipelines should an accident or failure occur (Figure 10.2.2).
The system encompasses a total 38 600 km of pipelines, with 22 200 km of main transmission
pipelines and 16 400 km of distribution pipelines. It is powered by 72 compressor stations,
with a total capacity of 5 443 MW. The gas transportation system can transport up to
80 bcm/year for domestic gas consumption from indigenous and imported sources and
can transit up to 142.5 bcm/year of gas from Russia and Belarus to European countries.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
12. Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Housing of Ukraine, statistical data, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine.
358
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Source: NaftoGaz.
10.2. Energy security
B E L A R U S
RUSSIA
P O L A N D
Underground
gas storage
Compressor station
HUNGARY
U K R A I N E Gas field
Metering station
MOLDOVA
RUSSIA
R O M A N I A
CRIMEA
(Autonomous
Republic)
BL ACK SEA
BULGARIA 0 300 km
359
Ukraine
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Ukraine 10.2. Energy security
Ukraine’s gas transportation system has the second-largest storage capacity in Europe,
after Russia. Storage plays a key role for the secure and stable operation of domestic
supply operations, as well as a critical role for the operation of the gas transit system. The
13 underground gas storage facilities have a total working capacity of 30.9 bcm/year.
UkrTransGaz operates 12 of them while Chornomorneftegaz operates the facility in Crimea.
Ukraine holds sizeable untapped reserves of unconventional oil and gas. The government
has pursued vigorous legislative changes to amend existing regulations to make these reserves
attractive for investors. For example, it has streamlined production sharing agreements.
In June 2012, it offered tenders for the Oleska and Yuzivska blocks and the Foros and
Skifska areas of the Black Sea shelf under this regime, allowing for the exploration and
production of natural gas, shale gas, tight gas, coalbed methane, crude oil and oil and gas
condensates for a 50-year period. In August 2012, the government selected ExxonMobil
and Royal Dutch Shell to lead development of the Skifska deep-water natural gas field
offshore in the Black Sea, together with Romania’s OMV Petron and NJSC Nadra Ukrayny.
No bids were submitted for the development of the Foros field. The Oleska block, located
in the western part of Ukraine, covers an area of 6 324 km2. The minimum investments
required at the exploration stage of this field are estimated to be USD 163 million, and for
the commercial production stage USD 3.13 billion. Offshore projects have been halted due
to the loss of control over Crimea. The Yuzivska block is in the eastern part of Ukraine with
an area of 7 886 km2. The minimum investments required during the exploration stage are
estimated at USD 200 million and for the commercial production stage, USD 3.7 billion.
The Foros and Skifska areas are oil and gas fields on the Black Sea shelf, near the
Ukrainian-Romanian border and Crimea respectively. Estimated recoverable gas reserves
are 3 bcm/year to 4 bcm/year at Skifska and 2-3 bcm/year at Foros. Tenders for these
fields were announced in 2012 and Production Sharing Agreements signed in 2013. Due
to events in Crimea, all these offshore projects have no prospect for being continued.
OIL
Ukraine’s main oil transportation system consists of 4 767 km of pipelines with a diameter
of up to 1 220 mm, 51 pump stations and 11 tank farms of 79 tanks with a cumulative
rated capacity of about 1 million cubic metres (mcm) (Table 10.2.1). Pumping stations
have 176 units with a capacity of up to 12 500 mcm/hour and electric drive capacity of
356.5 MW. The throughput capacity is 114 Mt/year at the inlet and 56.3 Mt/year at the
outlet. About 65% of the pipelines are between 30 and 40 years old: 27% over 40 years;
6% between 20 and 30 years; and only 2% between 10 and 20 years. In addition, there
are about 4 625 km of smaller oil product pipelines, mostly privately owned, though
their technical stage of operation is unclear.
Ukraine has seven refineries with a design capacity of 50.4 Mt/year, which is about four
times larger than Ukraine’s oil product market. Information on refinery product yields is
poor, for example gasoline production as a share of crude oil intake. In 2014, only one
large refinery was operational and in activity, the Krementchouk refinery.
Ukraine has three maritime oil terminals: Pivdenny, Feodossia and Yuzhnyi. The Pivdenny
terminal is equipped with tanks that can store up to 200 000 m3 of oil. The terminal can
receive large oil tankers with a maximum deadweight of 150 000 tonnes and maximum
draught of 12.5 m. The Pivdenny port is designed to accept and discharge crude oil,
which is transported by trunk pipelines. Oil terminal capacity is 25.5 Mt/year of crude oil
and oil products.
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B E L A R U S
From
Mazyr RUSSIA
P O L A N D
Oil pipeline
SLOVAK under development
REPUBLIC U K R A I N E Pumping station
Oil refinery
Oil terminal
HUNGARY Output
Input
MOLDOVA
Odesa RUSSIA
R O M A N I A
CRIMEA
(Autonomous
Republic)
BL ACK SEA
BULGARIA 0 300 km
Sources: UkrTansNafta; Razumkov Centre (2007), National Security and Defence, No. 4 (88), Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kiev.
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Ukraine
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Ukraine 10.2. Energy security
The Eurasian Oil Transportation Corridor (EAOTC) project has been under consideration for
about a decade on the basis of the Odessa-Brody oil pipeline and its proposed extension to
Plotsk (about 371 km) and Gdansk to supply Polish refineries. The direct-mode use of the
Odessa-Brody pipeline has revived this concept and Sarmatia, a Polish registered pipeline
company, was designated to develop the extension. Sarmatia has gathered five shareholders
to form a project consortium: Azerbaijan’s SOCAR, the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation,
Lithuania’s Klaipedos Nafta, Poland’s PERN Przyjazn S.A. and Ukraine’s Ukrtransnafta.
Sources: Gonchar, M., A. Duleba and M. Oleksandr (2007), Ukraine and Slovakia in a Post-Crisis Architecture of European Energy Security, Research Center
of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava, Slovak Republic; RC SFPA (2011), Prospects for Transport of Hydrocarbons and Bilateral Co-operation,
RC SFPA, Bratislava; Razumkov Centre (2007), National Security and Defence, No. 4 (88), Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies, Kiev.
CROSS-BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE
Electricity
Ukraine’s electricity network is fully integrated and interconnected with other neighbours
in the region and runs in a parallel regime with the Russian system. The exception is
Burshtyn Island in the western part of the country, which is synchronised with the
Central European grids and facilitates direct exports to Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.
Gas
The gas transmission system has many large entry points on the Russian-Ukrainian border,
allowing both Russian transit gas and gas shipped for domestic consumption to be dispatched
to Ukraine’s eastern regions. Gas is then added in the transit pipelines from Ukraine’s
storage sites to the remaining gas shipped from east to west to make up for the gas taken
out for domestic supply. Storage facilities hold both gas from domestic production and
imported from Russia. Domestic and imported gas is injected into Ukraine’s storage facilities
between approximately 15 April to 15 October, and is withdrawn during the winter
months. During winter peak times, Ukraine’s five storage sites at the western border can
supply up to 40% of daily transit volumes. On average during this period, Ukraine imports
about 120-130 mcm/day, produces about 55 mcm/day from its own fields, extracts between
85 mcm and 100 mcm/day from storage, with peak capacity of about 140 mcm/day.
Oil
Russian and Kazakh companies can transit crude oil through Ukraine via three pipelines:
© OECD/IEA, 2015
the southern branch of the Druzhba pipeline, which enters Ukraine from Belarus
362
10.2. Energy security Ukraine
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Outages in Ukraine’s electricity sector were rare, mainly taking place in rural areas as a
result of unfavourable weather conditions and/or deteriorated distribution grids. In recent
years Ukraine’s TSO and regional distribution system operators have taken measures,
such as the construction of reserve lines and switching to ring connection schemes, to
eliminate electricity outages for end users.
Electricity transmission and distribution losses are around 13%on average, but have
reached nearly 20% in some years. Losses in generation, transmission and distribution
are expected to increase absent sufficient and timely investments. Each licensee reports
to the National Electricity and Communal Services Regulatory Commission on losses and
outages on a regular basis. Quality-of-service standards related to outages have not yet
been developed by the regulator.
Natural gas transmission line losses have been estimated to be in the range of 2% to 3% of
total transmission volumes. Losses on UkrTransGaz’s main pipelines are in a range of 0.2%,
which is a very good record. Technical losses in the electricity sector amount to 12%. Losses
in the gas sector are assessed at 2.3% of the total. Reporting on losses and outages is done by
NaftoGaz to the regulator and to the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry on a regular basis.
Data on losses can vary considerably. For instance, network district heat losses on average
are 15%, but losses of 50% have been noted. District heating systems in Ukraine are
characterised by excessive capacity, and inefficient and outdated technologies: the capital
stock is in a critical state, with most assets close to or beyond the end of their design lifetime.
Energy losses are considerable and operating costs are high, largely due to inadequate
maintenance. About 13 bcm of natural gas was consumed for heat production in 2013, of
which almost 9 bcm was for district heating systems, including 1.9 bcm used by Kyivenergo,
a major CHP plant. Owing to insufficient investment needed to modernise the district systems
and improve end-use energy efficiency, more than half of the input fuel is wasted, which
corresponds to a value of about USD 2 billion at a gas import price of USD 400/tcm. Heat losses
amounted to 13.5 million gigacalories (Gcal) in 2011. Gas consumption by district heating
systems was down to 7 bcm in 2014 due to severe heat supply restrictions and savings measures.
Currently, out of 175 000 buildings only 48 000 are equipped with water meters, 8 500
for heat supplies and only 31% of buildings have heat regulators. There is a need to install
220 000 meters, including 115 178 cold water meters (UAH 3 500 each), 31 006 hot
water meters (UAH 12 000 each) and 72 120 for heat (UAH 40 000 each). Total costs are
estimated at UAH 3.8 billion, plus the costs for 14 000 kindergartens, 20 000 schools and
6 000 hospitals. These costs are to be covered by local governments.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
Emergency response policies and measures in Ukraine had been dealt with by the Ministry
of Emergency Situations until the country commited under the Energy Community
Treaty to build up a minimum reserve of crude oil and petroleum products 2020. This
commitment is in line with EU Directive 2009/119/EC. Ukraine’s downstream oil sector is
fully liberalised and the government has no right to interfere with the oil businesses. It
cannot distribute oil products produced by the refineries, which are marketed at their
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Ukraine 10.2. Energy security
owners’ discretion. Ukraine is reported to have only small oil stocks, the levels of which
are a state secret, and there is no oil emergency supply legislation in place that would
regulate the use of strategic oil stocks in the case of supply disruptions. At present, stocks
are managed by Derzhkomreserv, the State Committee of Material Reserve.
Recent developments in Ukraine, which prompted multiple layers of energy supply
disruptions, triggered the establishment of a Crisis Management Group under the prime
minister’s office to address electricity and gas supply emergency preparedness, preparation
of emergency scenarios, the definition of interruptible consumers and the realisation of
stress tests under different scenarios.
Box 10.2.1 Policies and measures addressing the 2014 energy crisis situation, Ukraine
Policies and measures taken by the government for reducing gas consumption and
fostering electricity supply security during the winter of 2014-15 include:
gas supply limitations to industrial gas consumers, and district heating and power
plants to achieve 30% reduction in consumption, based on consumption levels
during the 2013-14 heating season
10% reduction in supplies to households
reduction of average district heating temperature by 2°C for households, to 18°C
hot water cuts and temporary electricity cuts in parts of some major cities
lower electricity exports from Burshtyn Island
preparations for switching from coal to mazout for some power plants, and
mandatory building up of 20 days’ mazout storage at thermal power plants (compared
with 45 days in Soviet times), and related imports of mazout
coal imports from South Africa and Russia to offset disruptions of gas and from
domestic coal production in the Donbass region
interruptible reverse flow gas imports via Poland, Hungary and Slovakia; maximise
reverse flow import capacities where possible
preparation for tariff optimisation to reflect changes in economic conditions of
electricity and heat generation
preparation of support measures and incentives to encourage households to switch
to electric accumulative individual boilers
setting targets to improve the energy efficiency of the economy by 10% by 2020,
compared with 2010
preparations for tendering 60 gas fields for operation
efforts for reducing gas consumption by the district heating sector in supporting
switching to alternative sources of energy, in particular biomass
preparations for mandatory heat, hot and cold water metering: Minregionstroy
prepared a draft law, “On commercial metering of heat energy, water and drainage
of communal services”, which states that from 1 January 2016, central water can
only be supplied if meters are installed, and from 1 January 2017 mandatory
metering for heat and hot water supplies also be installed.
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10.3. Market convergence Ukraine
DISTRICT HEATING
Ukraine has about 17.5 million households, of which about 43% (7.5 million households)
are connected to district heating networks. The remaining households have individual
heat supply systems, such as individual gas and electric boilers. Additional heat is produced
by autonomous and individual boilers for 25% of households and the rest by stoves.
The Law on Heat Supply (2005) and several other legislative and policy documents envisage
competition in the heat market and provide consumer choice of supply (where possible).
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Ukraine 10.3. Market convergence
The law provides for equal access to heat transmission lines and requires district heating
operators to purchase heat from other sources, based on competitive bidding organised
by local authorities. If a heat transmission company also owns heat generation assets, by
law it must participate in the bidding process. It is not clear, however, whether the
competitive process is being implemented in practice. International experience shows that
this type of competition can stimulate more efficient production performance.
13. Cabinet of Ministers Resolution on Restructuring of Subsidiary Companies of the NJSC NaftoGaz (No. 360-p, June 2012).
14. Offshore Fog, Krimov, Energobiznes, 15 May 2012.
15. Interfax Ukraine, 7 February 2012.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
16. Law on the Principles for Functioning of the Natural Gas Market.
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10.3. Market convergence Ukraine
COAL
Ownership patterns are changing as Ukraine restructures its coal sector. DTEK, the
biggest private coal producer, obtained the concession of Sverdlovanthracite, a state-
owned company with five mines and three preparation plants, and Rovenkianthracite,
another state-owned company with six mines and three preparation plants. DTEK controls
around 50% of total coal production, while production at public mines is about one-third.
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
As of December 2014, Ukraine still lacked an independent regulator capable of fulfilling
its duties in line with Energy Treaty requirements. This includes its independent financing
(not from the state budget, as is currently the case), sufficient staffing and salaries
(currently limited), and lack of political interferences (in setting tariffs, for example), as
well as capacities to enforce competition, carry out investigations, and issue and collect
penalties. The regulator should be able to set full cost-recovery tariffs, especially for the
public sector; set the gas transmission tariff for transit flows and align it with internal
transmission; ensure fair and non-discriminatory access to pipelines and storage; and
effectively regulate the TSO. Nevertheless, the regulator until recently had a fairly
transparent and clear website, but not in English.
Two regulatory commissions, in charge of energy (National Energy Regulatory Commission)
and communal services (National Commission for the Regulation of Municipal Services
Markets), were merged into the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and
Public Utilities (NKREKP) in August 2014. The new regulatory body has been in charge of
regulation of both energy and communal services.17 It is responsible for the economic
regulation of the market and for its transparent, predictable, non-discriminatory and
efficient functioning. The Commission is subordinate to the Ukrainian president, who
appoints its head and is accountable to parliament.
The Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry is responsible for regulating the downstream oil
sector and gathering statistics. It also establishes a price range, known as a “corridor”,
for oil products in which retailers set their prices. Although the market determines the
price, and the government has no direct price-setting role, there is a view within the
industry that setting prices outside the corridor may draw the attention of the Anti-
Monopoly Committee or the state tax administration. Tariffs for international transit are
set in intergovernmental agreements.
The former State Nuclear Regulatory Committee was renamed the State Nuclear Regulatory
Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) in 2010. This body has regulatory responsibility for the
operation of nuclear power plants and two research reactors; decommissioning of
the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Units 1 to 3) and construction of the New Safe
Confinement for Chernobyl Unit 4; two spent fuel storage facilities and one under
construction at Chernobyl; radioactive waste storage facilities; uranium mining; radioactive
material transportation; and production and use of ionising radiation sources. The SNRIU
also informs the public about the safety of the country’s nuclear installations through its
website and public consultation meetings.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
17. The authority was reorganised in 2011 and was previously called the National Electricity Regulatory Commission.
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Ukraine 10.3. Market convergence
Tariffs
According to the Energy Regulators Regional Association,18 average residential prices in
2012, including taxes, for electricity and gas were:
electricity: EUR 0.02 per kilowatt hour (KWh)
natural gas: EUR 2.1 per gigajoule.
The average residential payment for heat in Ukraine was EUR 24.4/Gcal/month including
VAT in 2013 and had remained largely unchanged since 2010.
Ukraine’s Power Industry Law sets a feed-in tariff, known as the “green tariff”, for
electricity produced using RES, excluding hydropower plants with capacity over 10 MW
and biogas plants. The procedures for setting the feed-in tariff were established in
2009.19 The government guarantees that the green tariff support scheme will apply to
power plants which are fully commissioned in the period to 2030. The feed-in tariff rates
decline progressively by 10% after 2014, 20% after 2020, and 30% after 2024 for new
plants or those significantly upgraded.
In early 2015, the National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities
decreased green tariffs at which Energorynok buys renewable electricity. It was reduced
on 31 January 2015 by 20% for solar power stations, and by 10% for other RES. On
27 February 2015, it was decreased by further 55% for solar power stations and 50% for
all other alternative energy generation.
Regulated gas tariffs were increased in 2015. The National Commission for State Regulation
of Energy and Public Utilities increased the gas tariff for heat supply companies by
2.2 times to UAH 2 934.30/kcm. This is an important step that should reduce the deficit of
NaftoGaz. However, heat tariffs remain to be adjusted to reduce the vast indebtedness
of district heating companies.
Gas tariffs for households are expected to increase by 280% from April 2015 for
consumption up to 2 500 m3/year, with compensation for most vulnerable customer
through social programmes. This should enable NaftoGaz’ upstream companies invest
into field maintenance and new drilling rigs and maintain current production levels in
the medium term. Gas sold to district heating companies at regulated tariffs has already
triggered a 67% raise in tariffs.
The National Commission for State Regulation of Energy and Public Utilities has also
approved a five-stage increase in the electricity price for households. Household prices
are expected to grow by 3.5 times from April 2017, reaching UAH 122.83/kWh.
Third-party access
In the electricity sector, Ukraine has not yet implemented a fully transparent system of
third-party access to the transmission and distribution networks, which can be applied
objectively and without discrimination between system users in accordance with the EU
principles for energy markets. Private companies can enter the electricity market as
generators and distribution system operators.
18. The Energy Regulators Regional Association is a voluntary organisation comprised of independent energy regulatory bodies
primarily from the Central European and Eurasian region, with affiliates from Africa, Asia, the Middle East and the United States.
19. Resolution of the National Energy Regulatory Commission on Approval of Procedures for Setting, Re-Setting and Repealing
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10.3. Market convergence Ukraine
In the gas sector, a 2012 resolution addresses third-party access to the gas transmission
system.20 It is a major step forward, but leaves open a number of key questions and
potential problems of compatibility with the EU acquis communautaire (Directives 1775/2005
and 715/2009). These include provisions pertaining to non-discriminatory access to
pipelines (the resolution gives priority to public sector supplies), pipeline capacity allocation
mechanisms, physical balance and security measures, and the transparency of information,
registration and capacity booking. Further, it is unclear where dispatch functions will be
placed and how they will be controlled.
Access to other portions of the energy sector include a joint venture or consortium with
a state-owned company that holds a special permit or joint activity agreement, commonly
referred to as a farm-in agreement, and joint field operation with NaftoGaz subsidiaries or
NJSC Nadra Ukrayny. The benefits of such arrangements include access to existing licensed
areas and geological information, local knowledge and experience, and co-operation of
government authorities. Incorporated companies, in which the state holds a stake of 25%
or more, are allowed to bypass auctions for oil and gas special permits. However, a
discouraging factor for joint developments is that companies in which the state holds an
interest of 50% or more have a mandatory domestic gas supply obligation. Therefore,
gas has to be sold to NaftoGaz at a price set by the regulator that is substantially lower
than the price for imported gas.
Technical rules
Ukraine is a member of the ISO and an affiliated member of European Standardization
Organisations: the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) and the European
Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC). Ukraine is also a member of
the Euro-Asian Cooperation of National Metrological Institutions and the Euroasian
Council for Standardisation (EASC).
EU electricity equipment suppliers who have adopted voluntary standards may be the
only entities in Ukraine that satisfy the term “EU compliant standards”. At the government
level, the development of new technical standards in the electricity sector is underway.
Ukraine has attempted to harmonise its standards with EU technical specifications for
transformers and transmission lines, but the process was halted for budgetary reasons
and very few documents were formally adopted.
ELECTRICITY
Ukraine’s electricity network is fully integrated and interconnected with other neighbours
in the region. The exception is Burshtyn Island in the western part of the country, which
is synchronised with Central European grids and facilitates direct exports to Slovakia,
Hungary and Romania. Energoatom is leading discussions with Polish electricity companies
for possible electricity exports from the Khmelnitsiki nuclear power plants to EU countries.
NATURAL GAS
Ukraine is a significant transit route for Russian gas exports to Europe, for which Ukraine
gains substantial transit fees. Russian gas transit volumes through Ukraine have fallen
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20. Resolution on Approving the Procedure for Accessing the Unified Gas Transit System (April 2012).
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Ukraine 10.3. Market convergence
progressively since the opening of the Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey in 2006 and the
full commissioning of the Nord Stream pipeline (line 1 in 2011 and line 2 in 2012).
Ukraine transit volumes were down from 137.1 bcm in 2004 to 60 bcm in 2014.
If the proposed South Stream pipeline is built, with a capacity of 63 bcm/year, Russian
gas volumes in transit through Ukraine are likely to be further reduced. The Updated
Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2030 forecasts that South Stream will be built with a
30 bcm/year capacity (two pipelines) and transit on average 20 bcm/year by 2030.
Ukraine would then still transit about 70 bcm/year to 80 bcm/year; however, such an
assumption can no longer be considered realistic given gas market developments in
Europe and Gazprom’s drive to re-configure the South Stream project, which, if realised
according to released statements, would much further reduce volumes in transit through
Ukraine. A key issue will be to tailor the modernisation of Ukraine’s pipeline system to
the future transit flows and imports to make sure that the system will operate in an
efficient manner.
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10.4. Sustainable development Ukraine
Ukraine has made significant progress in the area of renewable energy over the last
several years. The development of RES is one of the declared priorities of the Ukrainian
government because of their potential to reduce dependence on natural gas and to
enhance energy security. Recently adopted legislation has introduced very attractive
guaranteed feed-in tariffs, known as green tariffs, as well as other fiscal incentives for
electricity produced from RES.
These policy developments have started to attract private investment. In 2011 and 2012
several major renewable energy projects were implemented, including large wind and
solar power plants, bringing the total renewable-based installed generation capacity to
more than 1 182 MW by the end of 2013 and excluding large hydro. This includes
334 MW for wind, 748 MW in solar photovoltaic (PV), 75 MW in small hydro, 17 MW in
biomass CHP plants and 11.5 MW in biogas. The installed capacity of facilities generating
heat energy from RES constitutes 520 МW (mostly through the use of biomass). Wind
deployment has further accelerated in 2014: according to the Ukrainian Wind Energy
Association, during the first half of 2014 new 126.5 MW wind capacities were added in the
country, bringing its total up to 497.6 MW (including 87.7 MW in Crimea) by 30 June 2014.
Much more wind and solar capacity is expected to come on line in the period 2013 to
2016. Despite these achievements, the share of renewable energy in TPES and in
electricity generation remains relatively low in Ukraine compared to the IEA average.
The National Renewable Energy Action Plan was adopted in October 2014 in line with
the European Community Treaty undertakings, which set specific targets and support
measures. The declared target is to achieve an 11% renewable energy share in final
energy consumption by 2020, and UAH 300 million in budget support measures have
been allocated to meet this target.
The draft Updated Energy Strategy of Ukraine to 2030 sets a renewable energy target of
10% of installed electricity generating capacity. The strategy estimates that between
11 TWh and 16 TWh of electricity will be produced from renewable and unconventional
energy sources by 2030. Adding generation for large hydropower brings the renewables
projection from 23 TWh to 28 TWh by 2030. It foresees a nearly twenty-fold increase in
biofuel production between 2010 and 2030.
In addition to the energy strategy, which is the energy sector’s general guiding policy
document, Ukraine has more specific sectoral programmes. The National Targeted Economic
Programme on Energy Efficiency and Renewable and Unconventional Energy for the
period 2010-15 sets a target to increase the share of renewable and alternative energy
in primary energy supply to 10% by 2015.21
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Ukraine 10.4. Sustainable development
As part of its accession to the Energy Community Treaty, Ukraine is expected to implement
on a voluntary basis EU directives on the promotion of electricity from RES (2001/77/EC)
and biofuels or other renewable fuels for transport (2003/30/EC). In August 2011, the
Cabinet of Ministers signed a resolution on the planned measures to meet Ukraine’s
Energy Community Treaty obligations and tasked the SAEE with the development of
proposed measures to comply with the directives.
The National Renewable Energy Action Plan was adopted in 2014 in accordance with the
Energy Community undertakings. The ambitious goals set in the National Renewable Energy
Action Plan would require about UAH 60-70 billion (USD 3.5-4.3 billion), according to the
SAEE. This sum would be needed to increase the wind energy capacity of the country up
to 2.28 GW by the year 2020 – which represents a 500% increase on the current figure of
410 MW. Solar energy would increase from 450 MW to 2 300 MW. Small hydro would
increase from 120 MW to 150 MW. Last, but not least, the installed capacity of
biomass-generated electricity is to increase 40 times, from 24 MW to 950 MW. Overall,
the plan intends to increase by more than five times the current installed capacity
(excluding large hydro), from 1 024 MW to 5 700 MW.
Ukraine has defined green tariffs in support for RES as well as a number of the following
other fiscal incentives, approved by the Cabinet of Ministers, most of which are tax-related:
exemption from corporate profit tax until 2020 on income from: production of
electricity and/or heat from biofuels; sale of electricity generated from RES; sale of
biofuels; and production and reconstruction of power plants, vehicles and agricultural
machinery that use biofuels
tax reduction of 75% for land used for renewable energy facilities
exemption from the surcharge on electricity and heat tariffs for electricity generated
from renewable sources
exemption from excise duties and VAT until 2019 for the import of equipment for
generating electricity from renewable energy provided that similar goods are not
manufactured in Ukraine
reduction of 80% in the corporate profit tax for five years for the sale of equipment
that operates on RES and/or that is used for producing alternative fuels
import duty exemption for certain types of renewable energy equipment
the list of goods that can benefit from the 80% reduction in the corporate profit tax
and the exemption from excise duty and VAT.
Ukraine’s Electricity Law of 2009 tasks the regulator to approve feed-in tariffs, known as
the green tariff, for electricity produced using RES for each generator of renewable
electricity, excluding hydropower plants with capacity over 10 MW and biogas plants.
The procedures for setting the feed-in tariff were established in 2009, defining a green
coefficient depending on capacity and type of RES.22 The Electricity Law sets minimum
feed-in tariff rates that are applicable until 1 January 2030. They are calculated on the
basis of electricity prices for retail consumers23 in January 2009, multiplied by an
22. Resolution of the National Energy Regulatory Commission on Approval of Procedures for Setting, Re-Setting and Repealing
of Green Tariff for Business Entities (No. 32), 2009.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
23. Consumers connected to distribution grids with the voltage below 35 kV.
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10.4. Sustainable development Ukraine
established coefficient.24 The premium tariff for solar and hydropower has an additional
multiplier – a peak-time coefficient.
Amendments to the Electricity Law in 2013 and in 2014 also extended this support
measure to electricity produced from biomass or animal origin, industrial and household
waste, biogas and small hydropower. Green coefficients for solar PV (the largest) were
reduced for projects commissioned after April 2013.
The regulator approves feed-in tariff rates on a case-by-case basis. Green tariffs can only
be obtained upon the completion of a power plant. The approved renewable-based
generators are shielded from EUR/UAH exchange rate fluctuations because the fixed
minimal green tariff rates are converted to euros at a fixed exchange rate of 10.86
(based on the 1 January 2009 rate). The regulator can apply the exchange rate that is
effective on the date of establishing the green tariffs only if it higher than 10.86.
In 2014, it also became allowable for households to sell electricity produced from solar
PV directly to energy suppliers via feed-in tariffs if their production is lower than 10 KWh.
Finally, the Electricity Law states that grid connection fees are to be shared 50-50
between the network operator and the applicant for connection.
However, the Energy Community Secretariat states that the legislation on the mandatory
use of local content in constructing renewable energy facilities is considered a violation
of the acquis. Moreover, there are still quite complex administrative authorisation
procedures and the regulation on the use of RES in the transportation sector still suffers
from gaps, such as an effective certification system.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
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Ukraine 10.4. Sustainable development
A National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP) has been finalised, and is still pending
approval. It is designed to identify energy efficiency investments, barriers to implementation,
and agencies responsible for implementation.
According to the Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Building, about
3 bcm/year of gas could be saved by modernisation of the district heating systems and
energy efficiency measures. This is worth USD 1.2 billion at a USD 400 per 1 000 cubic
metres (tcm) gas import price.
As part of the Energy Community Accession Protocol, Ukraine is required to align the
principles of its energy policy with those of the European Union and to achieve a reduction
of energy demand of 9% by 2020. To fulfil its commitments under the protocol, the SAEE
developed a draft plan to implement some of the EU directives on energy efficiency.
These include:
Energy End-use Efficiency and Energy Services Directive (2006/32/EC) (transposition
deadline 31 December 2011)
Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2010/31/EC) (transposition deadline
30 September 2012)
Labelling and Standard Product Information on the Consumption of Energy and
Other Resources by Energy-related Products Directive (2010/30/EC) (transposition
deadline 31 December 2012).
While deadlines have been missed, some transposition work is underway, and some
crucial tasks remain: the Law on Energy Conservation of 1994 needs to be updated to
reflect the changing energy policy objectives, the Energy Labelling Regulation of 2010
requires amendments and the draft Law on Efficient Utilisation of Fuel and Energy
Resources of 2010 has yet to be adopted. Ukraine submitted a final draft national plan to
the Energy Community Secretariat in mid-2012. According to the SAEE, there are also
plans to align policies with the European Ecodesign Directive, but the time frame has not
been established.
In April 2011, the SAEE replaced the National Agency of Ukraine on Ensuring of Efficient
Use of Energy Resources. The SAEE is tasked with the dual role of promoting energy
efficiency and renewable energy deployment. Responsibility for energy efficiency was
moved from the Cabinet of Ministers to the Ministry of Economy and Trade, which must
approve draft legislation developed by SAEE. Due to the reorganisation, there was a
standstill in much of the energy efficiency work. Currently, an evaluation of government
institutions is underway, so it is possible that agency responsibility for energy efficiency
may again be subject to change.
In 2010, the Interagency Commission on Energy Development was formed. Among other
objectives, the Commission is tasked with organising work to improve the ratios of the
national energy balance and establish positive economic conditions for attracting domestic
and foreign investors to the energy sector.
Each relevant ministry also has its own energy efficiency programme and local authorities
are developing regional energy efficiency programmes. Co-ordination related to energy
efficiency is mainly on an ad hoc basis – no formalised structure for ongoing co-ordination
and information-sharing has been established.
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10.4. Sustainable development Ukraine
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Ukraine has a large body of environmental legislation, including extensive rules, regulations
and standards in the field of efficient use of energy resources, energy conservation and
renewable energy. There are about 50 national standards, including energy efficiency
issues such as method definition, construction and analysis of energy balances, regulation
of specific consumption and loss of fuel, energy labelling of household electrical equipment,
energy auditing and management, and energy performance standards for certain types
of equipment. These standards will have to be successively aligned with EU standards in
accordance with the Energy Community Treaty.
CLIMATE CHANGE
Ukraine is an Annex I party to the UNFCCC. Under the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, Ukraine
committed to keeping its GHG emissions at the base year (1990) level during the first
commitment period, 2008-12. GHG emissions in 2012 were 401.5 million tonnes of carbon
dioxide-equivalent (MtCO2-eq), which is 57.3% lower than in 1990.
Ukraine’s energy-related emissions of CO2 totalled 281.1 Mt in 2012. This is 59.1% lower
compared to 1990, mainly due to a strong decline after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
In Ukraine, the power generation sector accounts for 46.9% of energy-related CO2 emissions,
followed by manufacturing (25.3%), households (12.5%), transport (10.7%), commercial
and other services (2.3%) and other energy sectors (2.3%).
Ukraine has made significant progress in setting up the necessary legal and institutional
frameworks and in implementing two Kyoto Protocol mechanisms: Joint Implementation
(JI) and international emissions trading of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). Ukraine is one
of the most active countries in the JI market. Ukraine still has large potential for GHG
emissions abatement. The government and industry must make more efforts to realise
this potential through power sector modernisation and energy efficiency improvements,
which also contribute to energy security.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) has significant potential in Ukraine. Coal has been
exploited for many decades, and the existence of a well-established coal industry and
technical expertise are factors that may catalyse future efforts. Current priorities related
to clean coal approaches are focused on technologies for increasing coal-fired plant
efficiency and emissions reductions rather than on CCS.
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Ukraine 10.5. Investment attraction
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The principal law on investment in Ukraine provides for equal treatment of foreign
and Ukrainian-owned businesses, with some restrictions in broadcasting and weapons
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10.5. Investment attraction Ukraine
manufacturing.25 The State Property Fund oversees the privatisation process. Privatisation
rules generally apply to both foreign and domestic investors. Few major privatisations
have been concluded since the privatisation rush of 2004.
Ukraine’s banking system has grown rapidly in recent years, mostly based on strong
foreign borrowing. There are 197 banks registered in Ukraine, including 50 with foreign
equity participation. The five largest banks control 30% of the market, representing the
lowest market concentration level in Central and Eastern Europe. Foreign banks now
account for approximately 31% of bank capital in Ukraine.
Currently there is no single institution in the Ukrainian government with the mandate to
help resolve business and investment disputes involving foreign companies. The Ukrainian
Centre for Foreign Investment Promotion, a state body commonly known as Invest Ukraine,
has attempted to take on this role but has lacked the necessary authority within the
government. In May 2010, Invest Ukraine was transferred to the management of the State
Agency of Ukraine for Investments and Development, with the objective of enabling it to
realise state investment policy in practice but without any mandate on dispute settlements.
Commercial contracts may permit parties to use international arbitration or specified
foreign courts to settle disputes. Though Ukrainian legislation recognises international
arbitration decisions, in practice such decisions can be very difficult to enforce. In early
2000, Ukraine ratified the Washington Convention, providing for use of the International
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an internationally recognised
mechanism for resolving investment disputes between investors and the government of
Ukraine. Corruption continues to be an issue in many investor disputes.
Ukraine established the legal basis for green electricity tariffs in 2008. It guarantees grid
access for renewable energy producers (small hydro up to 10 MW, wind, biomass, PV,
and geothermal). The feed-in tariffs for renewable power producers are set by NKREKP,
the national regulator. In case of significant fluctuations of the national currency against
the euro, the feed-in tariff is adjusted to reflect the changes.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The draft Updated Energy Strategy to 2030 sets out the scale of the investment challenge
in broad terms for the energy sector. It estimates that over the period 2012 -30 Ukraine needs
to invest UAH 1 700 billion (at 2010 prices), at a rate of about UAH 90 billion per year.
This amount is split among the energy sectors: electricity and heat – UAH 720 billion; oil
and gas – UAH 510 billion; nuclear power – UAH 390 billion; and coal – UAH 80 billion.
This represents a significant financial challenge that will require foreign and private
investment, as well as a strategic reallocation of budget support measures.
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Ukraine Refrences
References
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Resources
2013: Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources, BGR, Hannover, Germany.
Gonchar, M., A. Duleba and M. Oleksandr (2007), Ukraine and Slovakia in a Post-Crisis
Architecture of European Energy Security, Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy
Association, Bratislava, Slovak Republic.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
IMEPower (2008), Ukraine Thermal Power Stations Rehabilitation: Assessment of Needs, Costs and
Benefits, IMEPower, Kiev.
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (2015), “Ukraine”, IMF Country Report No. 15/69, IMF
website, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr1569.pdf.
Interfax Ukraine (2012), “Economy Ministry: Level of shadow economy in Ukraine grows by 0.4%
in the first quarter of 2012”, 21 August, Interfax Ukraine.
Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Housing of Ukraine (2011), Concept for the
Program of Modernisation and Development of Heat Supply Systems of Ukraine for the Period
2012-2022, Government of Ukraine, Kiev.
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) (2011), Report of the In-
depth Review of the Fifth National Communication of Ukraine, FCCC/IDR.5/UKR, 27 September,
UNFCCC, Bonn, Germany.
Razumkov Centre (2007), National Security and Defence, No. 4 (88), Ukrainian Centre for
Economic and Political Studies, Kiev.
RC SFPA (Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association) (2011), Prospects for Transport
of Hydrocarbons and Bilateral Co-operation, RC SFPA, Bratislava.
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378
© OECD/IEA, 2015
UZBEKISTAN
380
Uzbekistan
K A Z A K H S T A N
ARAL
Figure 11.1.1 Map of Uzbekistan
SEA
K A Z A K H S T A N
KYRGYZSTAN
U Z B E K I S T A N
Tashkent
T U R K M E N I S T A N
TAJIKISTAN
IRAN
0 250 km
AFGHANISTAN
11.1. General energy policy
This map is without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries, and to the name of any territory, city or area.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
11.1. General energy policy Uzbekistan
COUNTRY OVERVIEW
The Republic of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan) is situated in Central Asia between the Amudarya
and the Syrdarya rivers. The territory is approximately 447 400 km2 and it borders Afghanistan,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is home to 29.98 million people
and the capital is Tashkent with a population of 222 700 (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2014).
Uzbekistan is rich in natural gas resources and is the third-largest gas producer in the
region, behind Russia and Turkmenistan. The energy sector accounts for around 7% of gross
domestic product (GDP) and 25% of industrial output; energy exports (predominantly gas)
account for 25% of total commodity exports (Kochnakyan et al., 2013). Other significant
exports include gold, copper and cotton. Real GDP, measured in USD with purchasing power
parity (PPP) at 2005 prices, increased by 112% from 2002 to 2012, with a 62% increase
since 2005. The economy has been improving without a recession since the mid-1990s.
Despite energy self-sufficiency, Uzbekistan’s ageing electricity infrastructure and network
underinvestment have led to electricity shortages, poor efficiency, high losses and lack
of reliability. At the same time, growing domestic demand and growing demand for gas
and oil exports have put pressure on the country to increase production and speed up
investment in export pipelines, increasing the need for foreign direct investment. Uzbekistan
requires substantial investment to improve the efficiency of its existing infrastructure
while increasing the productivity and profitability of the natural gas and oil sectors.
The investment climate in the country has improved over the past decade through
legislative packages that benefit private investors. However, challenges remain. Investment
attraction efforts include privileges, financial incentives and guarantees for foreign investors,
including special investment zones and tax breaks. Investor challenges include bureaucratic
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Uzbekistan 11.1. General energy policy
legislation is lacking clear and transparent rules, as well as independent agencies dedicated
to regulation and consumer and business protection.
Energy sector development plays a significant role in Uzbekistan’s long-term goal to become
an industrialised middle-income economy by 2040. To reform the economy and attract the
necessary investment, the country is developing an overall state policy, Vision 2030, which
includes provisions for a transition to a market-oriented economy. Priorities for the energy
sector over the next 15-20 years include: energy efficiency improvements in the energy,
transport and agriculture sectors, decentralisation of businesses and increased competition,
economy diversification through industrialisation, and improved education, health and other
social services (World Bank, 2014). The Vision 2030 strategy, drafted by the government
with support from the donor community, was under review at the end of 2014.
SUPPLY
Uzbekistan’s energy production totalled 56.7 million tonnes of oil-equivalent (Mtoe) in
2012. Energy production grew steadily for decades before a sharp fall during the global
economic crisis in 2009 and 2010. Production declined by 12% during the two years. It
recovered by only 3.9% in 2011 before levelling off in 2012 (Figure 11.1.2).
Natural gas accounted for around 90% of total production (62.7 billion cubic metres
[bcm]). Other energy production was crude oil (5.9% of the total in 2012), coal (2.4%)
and hydro (1.7%). Biofuels and waste are produced at negligible levels.
Since 2002, the production of natural gas and coal has increased while the production of
crude oil has fallen due to depleting resources. Energy from coal has increased by 41.4%,
energy from natural gas by 7.7%, while energy from crude oil has contracted by 54.3%.
30 Hydro*
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Total primary energy supply (TPES)1 in Uzbekistan was 48.3 Mtoe in 2012. The overall
trend in energy supply over the past decade has been a declining one; TPES has
1. TPES is made up of production + imports - exports - international marine bunkers - international aviation bunkers ± stock changes.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
This equals the total supply of energy that is consumed domestically, either in transformation (for example, refining) or in final use.
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11.1. General energy policy Uzbekistan
decreased by 9.2% since 2002. This is mainly due to a slump during the global financial
crisis, as TPES fell by 13.5% in 2009-10, without a full recovery in the following two years.
Natural gas accounted for 88.7% of TPES in 2012. Oil represented 6.5% of TPES in the
same year, while the remainder was from coal (2.9%) and hydro (2%) (Figure 11.1.3).
50 Coal
40 Natural gas
Hydro
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ELECTRICITY GENERATION
Electricity generation was 52.5 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2012 (Figure 11.1.4), a marginal
increase of 0.2% from 2011 and a level of generation that is 6.5% higher compared to 2002.
Electricity generation has grown due to an increase in capacity. Total generation capacity
was 12.5 GW in 2012, increasing by 600 megawatts (MW) since 2002, mainly in gas-fired
generation capacity (EIA, 2014a).
Natural gas is the source of 73.8% of generation while hydro accounts for 21.4%. Coal
represents 4.1% while the use of oil in generation has almost diminished, accounting for
0.7% in 2012. The share of oil in generation has declined from 9.4% in 2002, replaced by
growing gas-fired generation and increasing hydropower production.
50 Coal
Natural gas
40
Hydro
30
TWh
20
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
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Uzbekistan 11.1. General energy policy
DEMAND
Total final consumption (TFC)2 was 35.5 Mtoe in 2012. Energy demand was 10.2% lower
in 2012 compared to ten years prior, falling from a peak of 39.5 Mtoe in 2002. Demand
has declined due to lower energy affordability in the country, as well as the contraction
of the industry sector. The strongest fall in demand was 16.6% during the global financial
crisis in 2009 and 2010 (Figure 11.1.5).
The residential sector is the largest consuming sector in Uzbekistan, accounting for 42%
of TFC in 2012. The industry sector accounts for 27.3%, the commercial and other
services sector for 22.1% and transport for 8.6%. The biggest decline in energy demand
over the past decade has been in transport: 21.9% lower in 2012 compared to 2002.
Consumption in industry has declined by 9.3% over the same period and by 7.8% in the
residential sector.
Natural gas is the principal fuel in final energy consumption (73.3% of TFC). Of that,
households use 53% for cooking and heating, industry uses 31%, commercial and other
services (including agriculture) use 11% and transport consumes the remaining 5%.
Demand for natural gas in final consumption has decreased by 7.8% since 2002.
Oil accounts for 8.1% of TFC, and half of its use is in transport while the other half is in
industry and residential/commercial sectors. Oil use in all sectors has declined by 38.9%
since 2002, due to declining crude oil production and declining refinery output.
2. TFC is the final consumption by end users, i.e. in the form of electricity, heat, gas, oil products, etc. TFC excludes fuels used
© OECD/IEA, 2015
in electricity and heat generation and other energy industries (transformations) such as refining.
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11.1. General energy policy Uzbekistan
The transport sector in Uzbekistan is not almost exclusively reliant on oil as is the case in
most countries. Oil accounts for 52% of energy used in transport (down from 60% in
2002), natural gas for 45% and electricity for 4%.
Electricity and heat amounted to 10.5% and 6.8% of TFC in 2012, respectively.
Approximately half the electricity use is in industry, while the other half and all heat
consumption are in the residential and commercial sectors.
25 Commercial**
Mtoe
20
15
10
5
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Note: Reporting on residential consumption changed in 1995.
* Industry includes non-energy use.
** Commercial includes commercial and public services, agriculture/fishing, forestry and non-specified consumption.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
ENERGY INTENSITY
Uzbekistan’s energy intensity, measured as the ratio of TPES to real GDP, was 0.39 toe/
USD 1 000 GDP PPP in 2012. This is the second-highest intensity compared to other
EECCA countries, behind Turkmenistan. Since 2002, energy intensity in Uzbekistan has
declined by 57%, down from 0.9 toe/USD 1 000 GDP PPP, as real GDP (USD GDP PPP at
2005 prices) has increased by 111.3% while TPES has declined (Figure 11.1.6).
Figure 11.1.6 Energy intensity in Uzbekistan and other selected EECCA countries, 1990-2012
1.2 Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
1.0
Kyrgyzstan
0.8 Azerbaijan
toe/USD 1 000 GDP PP
Kazakhstan
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.00
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
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Uzbekistan 11.1. General energy policy
RENEWABLES
Uzbekistan’s energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels, and renewable energy accounts for
2% of TPES (mainly hydro and negligible amounts of biofuels and waste). The country
has the fourth-lowest share of renewables in TPES among EECCA countries, higher than
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (Figure 11.1.7).
Energy from hydropower has increased by 81.2% since 2002, which is the strongest
increase in supply from any fuel in Uzbekistan. As such, the prominence of hydro in TPES
has increased from 1% in 2002 to 2% in 2012. Hydropower accounted for 21.4% of
electricity generation in 2012, which is double the share of 2002.
Figure 11.1.7 Renewable energy as a percentage of TPES in Uzbekistan and other EECCA countries, 2012
70% Hydro
60%
Biofuels and waste
50%
Solar*
40%
Geothermal*
30%
Wind*
20%
10%
0%
* Negligible.
Source: IEA (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
MARKET STRUCTURE
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11.1. General energy policy Uzbekistan
transmission network, the distribution network, central dispatch and electricity retail.
The company also operates all of heat production and distribution as well as coal
production. UzElektroSet (Uzbek Electricity Networks) is the single transmission system
operator (TSO) and there are 14 distribution system operators (DSOs). For power generation,
the TSO and DSOs are legally and financially unbundled. EnergoSotish is the single wholesale
electricity purchaser and supplier.
UzSuvEnergo is a state-owned company that develops and operates small hydropower
plants (HPPs) and is managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. Small HPPs
and other independent power producers account for approximately 3% of electricity generation.
Boiler houses are the main heat suppliers in Uzbekistan, accounting for 75% of heat production.
Regional and local municipalities own and operate the boiler houses. UzbekEnergo’s
combined heat and power (CHP) plants account for the remaining 25% of heat production.
The Law on Electricity (2009) stipulates rules for gradual unbundling and transitioning to
market principles. Since 2009, the government has legally and financially unbundled
transmission and distribution and privatised parts of UzbekEnergo’s companies. However,
UzbekEnergo still holds the controlling stakes in these companies and controls all sectors
of the industry. The government plans to progressively restructure UzbekEnergo and
gradually introduce market-related elements in the electricity sector.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
There is no single ministry in Uzbekistan governing the energy industry. The energy sector
governance is carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers, through its Department on Fuel and
Energy Complex. The policy decisions, made by the Cabinet of Ministers are implemented
by a large number of ministries and public authorities, including: the Ministry of Economy,
the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investment and Trade;
the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, the State Oil Products and Natural Gas
Consumption Inspection, the State Control of the Power Industry Inspection, the State
Architecture and Construction Committee, the State Antimonopoly Committee, and the
State Committee on Privatisation, Demonopolisation and Development of Competition.
The Ministry of Economy is responsible for macroeconomic planning and forecasting.
The Ministry prepares the annual Public Investment Plan (PIP) that includes a list of high-
priority projects, such as energy projects. The Ministry of Economy is also responsible for
UzbekEnergo, UzbekNefteGaz and their subsidiaries.
The Ministry of Finance is in charge of tariff-setting for electricity, heat and gas, among
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other functions.
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The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Investment and Trade is responsible for
the development of a favourable investment climate for foreign investors as well as
implementation of policy on trade.
The Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources manages water reservoirs and irrigation
canals and is responsible for UzSuvEnergo.
The State Architecture and Construction Committee is responsible for construction
licensing and drafting laws related to construction and planning.
The State Antimonopoly Committee monitors competition and customer protection in
the energy sector.
The State Committee on Privatisation, Demonopolisation and Development of Competition
is responsible for implementing economic reforms aimed at faster privatisation and
investment attraction.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
The first change from Soviet-type governance came in 2001 when the president approved
the Decree on Deepening Economic Reforms in the Energy Sector, opening the sector
for partial privatisation, foreign investment in generation assets, progressive unbundling
and deregulation.
Uzbekistan’s primary energy legislation at present comprises the Law on Gas Supply
(2012), the Law on Electricity (2009), the Law on Production Sharing Agreements (2006),
the Law on Subsoil (2002), the Law on Natural Monopolies (1999) and the Law on
Rational Energy Use (1997) (amended in 2003).
In March 2013, the president approved the Decree on Measures to Boost Alternative Energy
Sources that outlined specifications of a new bill on alternative energy. The government
drafted a Law on Alternative Energy later in 2013, which was still awaiting approval at
the end of 2014. The draft law includes investment incentives in renewable energy.
The government adopted the Law on Gas Supply in 2012, the first law specific to gas
supply. The law regulates conditions of gas supply and consumption in the country, and
bans transport of liquefied natural gas via road transport.3 Secondary legislation was to
be under consideration by the end of 2014.
The Law on Electricity defines the electricity regulation framework and private investment
incentives. The law includes provisions for on-site energy generation without licensing,
as well as connection to the grid, and establishes basic requirements for independent
operators of electricity distribution systems (Kochnakyan et al., 2013). The Cabinet of
Ministers adopted the main secondary legislation in the electricity sector, Rules for
Electricity and Heat Use, in 2009, for the implementation of financial unbundling of
electricity generation, transmission and distribution.
The Law on Rational Energy Use stipulates third-party access to the grid for independent
power producers and priority access for renewable energy plants, under certain conditions.
It also allows for tariff increases in order to fund investment in the sector. The law was
amended in 2003 to legislate the Energy Saving Programme to 2010 that was adopted by
the government in 2002.
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3. http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5905.
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The Law on Subsoil is the main mining legislation and governs exploration and development
of all subsoil resources, including oil, gas and coal. It stipulates licensing requirements and
generation conditions for mining. The Law on Production Sharing Agreements legislates
joint ventures and agreements between the government and private investors, mainly in
the oil and gas extraction sector.
The Law on Natural Monopolies legislates activities of natural and government monopolies
in the country, including hydrocarbon extraction, oil and gas transportation, and electricity
and gas transmission and distribution, among others.
KEY POLICIES
Uzbekistan’s energy policy priorities include uninterrupted reliable energy supply, greenhouse
gas (GHG) reduction, energy efficiency improvements and economic growth through oil
and gas production and export.
To achieve the mentioned goals, the government has approved the Industrial Modernisation
and Infrastructure Development Programme for 2011-15, including USD 34 billion of
investment in the energy sector. Of that, USD 5 billion is for the rehabilitation and
modernisation of the electricity sector (the Power Sector Development Programme), and
more than USD 20 billion in oil and gas exploration. Other measures taken by the
government in the past few years include reduced subsidies and periodic tariff increases,
mandated energy efficient technologies in new thermal power projects and energy-
heavy industries, as well as drafted legislation and investment incentives for renewable
energy development (World Bank, 2014).
Ongoing energy sector reforms include (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2014):
progressive deregulation and de-monopolisation of the energy sector, including
privatisation and provision of third party access to the grid
diversification of the electricity generation fuel mix, including increased coal use and
development of renewable energy sources
attracting foreign investments in rehabilitation, modernisation and expansion of power
generation assets and the network
management, operations and performance improvement of energy companies.
In the electricity sector, UzbekEnergo is carrying out a Power Sector Development
Programme for 2011–15 aimed at the rehabilitation of power generation assets and
transmission infrastructure.
Key priority areas in oil and gas exploration include: expanding production partnerships with
foreign investors and development of new fields; gas and oil production and processing
modernisation; reduction of gas flaring; legal and regulatory framework enhancement to
attract more investment; and gas generation energy efficiency (Kochnakyan et al., 2013). The
new Law on Gas Supply (2012) stipulates rules for domestic gas supply and consumption.
Uzbekistan’s energy demand is growing through solid economic growth and a rising standard
of living. The country is expected to have significant supply shortages by 2020 at the
current rate of demand growth, 3-5% per year. According to UzbekEnergo, demand will
increase from 53 TWh in 2012 to 65 TWh in 2020 if solid economic growth continues.
Similarly, demand for gas exports from neighbouring countries and China is set to grow
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over the same period, presenting an opportunity for higher government revenues.
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INVESTMENT
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ASSESSMENT
Uzbekistan is the third-largest producer of natural gas in the region, behind Russia and
Turkmenistan, and produces enough oil and coal for its needs. Natural gas accounts for nearly
90% of energy supply, and production has increased over the past 15 years. As a country
with substantial hydrocarbon resources, Uzbekistan is a net exporter of gas and oil.
However, the country faces important challenges. Electricity infrastructure is aged and
inefficient with high losses and poor reliability. Hydropower accounts for approximately
4. www.increast.eu/en/1211.php.
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5. www.press-service.uz/en/news/4873/.
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20% of generation and capacity is reduced during winter months, resulting in supply
shortage and outages. Demand is growing domestically and within the region. At the
same time, depletion of existing oil and gas fields is tightening the supply and creating
the need to explore more fields.
The government has the task of improving the reliability of its energy supply, at a
reasonable cost to consumers, while expanding its resource industry to meet growing demand.
To modernise and expand the industry, the government has approved the USD 42 billion
Industrial Modernisation and Infrastructure Development Programme for 2011-15, including
USD 34 billion of investment in the energy sector. Investment plans include the rehabilitation
and modernisation of electricity, heat and gas, energy efficient technologies in power
generation and energy-heavy industries, as well as an increase in coal and gas production.
A comprehensive medium- to long-term energy policy is needed to specify the energy
sector objectives and targets, and evaluate measures to overcome challenges. The government
should develop a target-based energy strategy that encompasses all aspects of the sector,
including different fuels and energy efficiency measures, and looks toward 2020 and
2030. The policy should include an analysis of various scenarios of Uzbekistan’s potential
development. A clear and transparent strategy can work as a strong signal to foreign
investors to secure the necessary funding for the development of the energy sector.
In order to conduct most accurate analysis of the sector, national energy statistics need
to be comprehensive, consistent and comparative. At present, the raw data collected by
the Statistics Committee are mainly only privy to government authorities, and not harmonised
to international standards. To gain more investor confidence and more business interest,
the government should expand its statistics collection processes, increase regional and
global co-operation on statistics and make data more available.
Uzbekistan’s major energy policy concern is unreliable electricity supply, due to insufficient
capacity and aged networks, in times of growing demand. UzbekEnergo has been
implementing annual programmes of rehabilitation and modernisation of generation
and transmission facilities as part of its 2011-15 investment programme. The programme
is expected to increase overall generation capacity by 2.7 GW and decrease transmission
losses. All generation facilities are expected to have the latest technologies which would
improve the efficiency of production. At the same time, the company is rolling out
electric meters to previously unmetered customers, and smart meters to one million
households and small businesses, to reduce commercial losses and improve efficiencies.
The investment programme is designed to eliminate winter shortage and allow for demand
increases on an already overloaded system. However, financing for the programme has
been slow, with approximately 50% of the funding secured by 2013. Without the full
necessary investment, Uzbekistan is likely to have worse shortages by 2020 if demand
continues to grow at the same rate as in the past decade.
Part of the reason full financing has not been secured is the low electricity and gas
tariffs. Similar to other countries in the region, tariffs are subsidised by the government
and are significantly below cost. The government has set a policy of progressive tariff
increases in order to bring tariffs to a cost-reflective level, including capital investment in the
long term. However, tariff increases have not made a large impact. Gas prices have risen at
a faster rate over the past few years, as domestic prices are up to three times lower than
export prices, yet they are still below cost. The government should remove all subsidies and
increase tariffs in the medium term to secure the necessary funding for infrastructure
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investment, while making sure that the most vulnerable end users are protected.
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11.1. General energy policy Uzbekistan
If the necessary investment in domestic electricity infrastructure and gas extraction is not
reached by 2020, Uzbekistan will need to either reduce exports of natural gas or increase
imports of electricity to meet growing demand. Given the increasing arrangements for
export of gas to China and other countries, Uzbekistan has a great need to curb demand
growth and implement energy efficiencies along the chain. The government has indicated
that there is great potential for energy efficiency improvements across all aspects of the
electricity industry, from generation to transmission, distribution and final consumption.
Energy efficiency measures in the supply chain are being implemented by UzbekEnergo
through modernisation, rehabilitation and use of new technologies. However, demand-
side management is lacking and public understanding of energy savings potential and
benefits is weak. Building standards are outdated and there are no schemes aimed at
reducing energy consumption by households and businesses. At the same time, subsidised
electricity tariffs reduce the need to save energy, and demand from consumers will
continue to grow at a rapid pace. A phase-out in tariff subsidies would reduce demand
growth, and additional funds could be redirected towards incentive schemes which will
improve energy efficiency in buildings and transport. The government should also develop
a building code for new buildings and retrofits, and establish a dedicated independent
agency for the implementation of all energy efficiency policies.
The Uzbek government is developing alternative energy resources in order to diversify
energy supplies and improve electricity reliability while increasing gas exports. Alternative
energy sources include coal as a replacement for gas, as well as renewable energy. Coal
production has been growing for a decade and is expected to increase substantially
before 2020 as gas-fired power stations are switched to coal and new coal-fired power
stations are built (as part of UzbekEnergo’s investment programme). Under the coal
development programme to 2018, the government is investing in the newest technologies
and modernising existing aged coal infrastructure, which is commendable.
In March 2013, a Decree on Measures to Encourage the Alternative Sources of Energy
was signed by the president, including wide-ranging measures to improve the use of
alternative energy and support research work in the energy sector. The draft Law on
Alternative Energy Sources was also presented to the government in 2013, but has not
yet been approved. The decree and the draft law include provisions for priority access to
the grid for renewable energy generation and other financial investment incentives. The
government should prioritise approving the Law on Alternative Energy Sources with
clear renewables targets and passing the related secondary legislation, in order to
attract investment in a timely manner.
Development of renewable energy sources has been in hydropower to date, albeit solar
energy is receiving growing attention in the country. UzbekEnergo secured funding for a
100 MW solar PV plant in 2014 and construction is expected to begin in 2015. As a
country with 300 days of sun, Uzbekistan should explore its solar energy potential
further and incorporate plans for the development of solar technology on a large scale,
as well as in off-grid remote areas.
Part of the government’s existing investment programme includes funding for R&D;
however, Uzbekistan’s technology and innovation spending is unproductive. Companies
prefer to import technologies, and intellectual property rights and the sharing of innovation
are weak. The government should develop a directed R&D plan for the energy sector,
targeting funding where it is needed the most. The oil and gas exploration sector’s
innovation spending should consider conventional and unconventional resources, in
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RECOMMENDATIONS
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11.2. Energy security Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is rich in fossil fuel deposits and is one of the main energy producers in the
region. Deposits of natural gas, hard coal and crude oil are the most significant, but it
also has substantial reserves of uranium. Data on reserves and resources are extracted
from the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) report (BGR,
2013), unless otherwise stated.
Natural gas reserves in Uzbekistan were 1 661 bcm in 2012, with resources of 1 500 bcm
and remaining potential of 3 161 bcm. This accounts for a share of 2.6% of total reserves
among the EECCA countries as well as Russia, 0.9% of total resources and 1.3% of
remaining potential. Uzbekistan holds 0.8% of global natural gas reserves and it was
ranked 50th among global natural gas producers in 2012. Uzbekistan produces natural
gas from 52 fields with 12 major deposits. These deposits are concentrated on the Uzbek
side of the Amu Darya Basin in the south-eastern region, and in the Central Ustyurt
plateau near the Aral Sea in the western region of the country (EIA, 2014b).
Hard coal reserves were 1 375 Mt in 2012, which represents 1.1% of total coal from
EECCA countries and Russia, while resources were 9 477 Mt and 0.3% of the total.
Remaining potential stands at 10 852 Mt. As a percentage of global reserves, Uzbekistan
holds 0.2% of hard coal and has the fifteenth-largest resources in the world. Coal is
mined at three deposits: Angren, Shargun and Baysun.
Crude oil reserves in Uzbekistan were 81 Mt in 2012, with resources of 400 Mt and
remaining potential of 481 Mt. Reserves account for 0.5% of the total among EECCA
countries and Russia, while the resources account for 1%. The majority of the known oil
reserves in Uzbekistan are in the Bukhara-Khiva region in the southeast of the country,
and most fields are small apart from the sizeable Kokdumalak field. Other oil- and gas-
rich areas are the Ustyurt Plateau/Aral Sea region, Southwest Gissar, Surkhan-Darya, and
the Ferghana Valley (EIA, 2014b).
Uzbekistan also has significant deposits of uranium, and is seventh among only a few
countries in the world that produce it. In the region, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Russia are
the only other producers, with Kazakhstan being the largest producer in the world.
Uzbekistan has 47 kilotonnes (kt) of reserves of uranium and 74 kt of resources, with
121 kt of remaining potential. Reserves account for 12.3% of the total of these four
countries and 2.2% of the world total reserves (seventh in the world).
Uzbekistan has significant potential for solar, as well as wind, biomass, and small and
largo hydropower. However it only utilises 0.3% of its hydro potential.
Uzbekistan is a significant energy producer, and its natural gas, coal and oil supplies are
stable. However, ageing infrastructure and underinvestment in electricity and gas systems
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have led to electricity shortages, inefficiencies, high losses and lack of reliability. Most of
the generation capacity infrastructure is 40 to 50 years old and operating 30% below
original capacity. More than 60% of the transmission network will need replacement in
the next ten years. Insufficient capacity and overloaded transmission results in regular
outages, with the most severe outages occurring in autumn-winter periods in the Fergana
valley area, in Samarkand-Bukhara and in Surhanddaryia. Some 1 000 rural communities
in Uzbekistan still have no access to electricity and are not connected to the grid.
The country is also under pressure to expand its gas export market in order to raise
revenue, including increasing gas production and investing in export pipelines. Gas
exports come at the cost of domestic demand, which is growing steadily with rising living
standards. The existing base load electricity generation infrastructure is largely gas-fired,
which means that gas is used for electricity rather than exports and the plants are
operating at lower efficiencies than they would be as peaking plants. In order to increase
exports in this time of growing domestic demand, the government has started converting
some generation units from gas to coal. This is expected to continue over time as coal
production increases and gas export infrastructure improves.
There is also a high potential for renewables (hydro, solar and wind), especially in remote
off-grid areas. The government has indicated its focus on the development of alternative
energy sources, to combat rising demand at a sustainable pace while allowing for more
exports of hydrocarbons. On 1 March 2013, a Decree on Measures to Encourage Alternative
Sources of Energy was approved. However, significant investment will be required to
develop large-scale renewable energy production over the medium to long term, and
will call for co-operation between the government and foreign investors.
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Around 20% is past its life cycle and this share is expected to increase to 40% by 2017.
Some 6% percent of 500 kV lines and 50% of 500 kV and 220 kV substations will approach
the end of their life cycle by 2025 and are highly overloaded (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
Total 12 470
Source: Kochnakyan et al. (2013), Uzbekistan Energy/Power Sector Issues Note, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ World
Bank, Washington, DC.
Since 2011, UzbekEnergo has been implementing its investment plan to 2015, expected
to increase generation capacity by 2.7 GW (thermal, combined cycle and hydro) and the
transmission network by 933.4 km. According to Kochnakyan et al. (2013), most of the
projects have secured financing; however, only 1.7 MW and 250 km of transmission lines
are under construction.
District heating reaches approximately 80% of households. Similar to electricity generation
and networks, district heating infrastructure is aged and inefficient and requires substantial
investment to reduce losses and curb growing domestic demand. Rehabilitation of the
district heating infrastructure is included in UzbekEnergo’s programmes.
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NATURAL GAS
The natural gas pipeline system in Uzbekistan is vast, including 122 000 km of high-
pressure pipeline and 14 000 km of medium- and low-pressure. Gas is exported or
transited through the following major pipelines.
The Central Asia-Centre (CAC) pipeline is an export pipeline that connects gas from
Turkmenistan through Uzbekistan, via Kazakhstan, and delivers to the Russian natural
gas system. The pipeline is approximately 5 000 km long with 100 bcm/y capacity (the
actual capacity is only half that due to poor conditions). Uzbekistan signed an agreement
with Gazprom in late 2008 for renovation of the CAC's eastern section and construction
of a new parallel pipeline, adding up to 30 bcm/y of capacity (EIA, 2014b). In the past
few years, sections of the pipeline have been rehabilitated.
The Bukhara-Urals pipeline runs from Turkmenistan through the Bukhara gas region in
Uzbekistan, via Kazakhstan to Russia. The pipeline capacity is 55 bcm/y; however, it
operates at only a quarter of its capacity. The pipeline was mothballed but has been
reopened since 2001 due to lack of capacity in the CAC pipeline (EIA, 2014b). Sections of
this pipeline have been rehabilitated in the past few years.
The Gazli-Kagan and the Gazli-Nukus pipelines connect Usturt and Buhkar-Khivin oil and
gas regions with the CAC and Bukhara-Urals pipelines. Gazli-Kagan is approximately 71 km
long, while Gazli-Nukus is 247 km. Sections of both pipelines have been rehabilitated in
the past few years.
The Central Asia-China pipeline (operated by CNPC) is an export pipeline that has been in
operation since 2009. The pipeline connects Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan. The pipeline has three lines in parallel, each with a length of 1 833 km and
capacity of 30 bcm/y. Lines A and B are operational, with line C under construction. Line
C is the largest line, with a total capacity of 25 bcm/y and a diameter of 1 219 mm,
152 mm larger than Lines A and B. Once Line C is fully completed by the end of 2015,
total capacity will be up to 55 bcm.
Line D of the Central Asia-China pipeline is also in the works. It will transport gas from
Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The inter-governmental agreement
on the construction of the line was signed in 2013, and construction began in late 2014 on
the Tajikistan leg of the line. Line D will be 1 000 km in total, with about 200 km crossing
Uzbekistan’s territory and with a capacity of 30 bcm. The Central Asia-China pipeline
system will have total capacity of 85 bcm at the completion of Line D (CNPC, 2014).
The Bukhara-Tashkent- Bishkek-Almaty pipeline is the main Uzbek-owned and -operated
pipeline, and runs from eastern Uzbekistan and northern Kyrgyzstan to southern Kazakhstan
with the capacity of 3.2 bcm/y (EIA, 2014b). The pipeline is the main source of gas for
Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan.
The Mubarek-Shurabad-Dushanbe gas pipeline connects Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The
pipeline was not in use as of December 2014, as gas supplies to Tajikistan ceased in 2013.
There are three gas storages in operation. Kodzhaabad is an underground storage with
1 bcm capacity, located in the Andijan region. Two smaller underground storages are
Bukhara and Kokand. The main gas processing plants are the Mubarek and Shurtan Gas
Processing Plants, processing 24 bcm/y and 20 bcm/y, respectively (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
The existing natural gas infrastructure in Uzbekistan is ageing and is in poor condition,
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causing capacity to fall and resulting in high losses. The older pipelines are not sufficiently
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equipped for a significant increase in exports should Uzbekistan decide to export more.
The new Central Asia-China pipeline provides more opportunities for Uzbek exports;
however, this will depend on contracts with CNPC.
Uzbekistan is researching new gas deposits and plans for the increase in gas reserves in
the Gazli and the Kashkadarya regions. This will be carried out through production
sharing agreements (PSAs) with foreign investors.
OIL
The oil infrastructure in Uzbekistan is small, as the country is self-sufficient on crude oil,
and oil product exports are carried out by rail or ground vehicles.
Uzbekistan has three oil refineries, located in Ferghana, Alty-Arik, and Bukhara, with a
total capacity of 224 000 barrels per day (bbl/d). The refineries operate below capacity
due to falling oil production.
Two pipelines exist, linking the Ferghana and Alty-Arik refineries and linking the Kazakh
Shymkent refinery to the Chardzhou refinery in north-eastern Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan's
only current option to export crude oil is to reverse an existing pipeline that brings oil
from Omsk, Russia, to Uzbek refineries (EIA, 2014c).
SYSTEM RELIABILITY
Electricity system reliability in Uzbekistan is poor. End users experience frequent shortages
and outages due to insufficient generation capacity and overloaded transmission. Problems
are acute during autumn/winter months when demand is high and water availability for
hydropower is low. The southern and western regions experience the most problems,
with outages of 2-6 hours per day during winter months (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
Energy demand in Uzbekistan is set to grow steadily over the medium to long term, as
living standards rise. It is unlikely that investment in new infrastructure will grow at the
same speed, due to lack of resources and capabilities. This will put more pressure on the
overloaded system and result in more supply shortages. Supply shortages are estimated
to reach 20% of estimated consumption by 2020 if necessary investment is delayed
(Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
Electricity Transmission and distribution losses are around 14% per year, with approximately
a quarter in transmission and the remainder in distribution. This is a relatively high level
of losses, albeit within the legally allowed 14.5%. Commercial losses account for some
6%, with total losses in the electricity system adding up to 20%.
Technical losses in the gas sector are caused by pipeline corrosion and outdated components.
A gas leakage database and statistical reporting methodology were developed by
the INOGATE Programme for UzbekNefteGaz in 2009, under the Technologies and
Methodologies for Reducing Gas Losses of the Central Asian Gas Transit System at
Central Asia project. As a result, a reporting system has been in place since. In 2011, gas
losses in the gas transmission pipelines were 1.2% and 3.7% in the distribution networks.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
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Uzbekistan 11.2. Energy security
the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery Programme in 2007 (UNDP,
2014). As such, the highest emergency risk is through natural disasters. The country is
energy self-sufficient and supply shock risks are low.
The UNDP’s Strengthening Disaster Risk Management Capacities in Uzbekistan project
assisted the Ministry of Emergency Situations to develop sustainable mechanisms for
disaster management and risk reduction. The project provided the ministry with equipment
and modern simulators as well as increased public awareness on improving earthquake
preparedness, among other initiatives (UNDP, 2014).
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COAL
Coal mining is undertaken by UzbekCoal, a subsidiary of UzbekEnergo. UzbekCoal has
nine subsidiaries in exploration, mining, operations and repair and maintenance, among
others (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
There is no independent energy regulator or one government institution dedicated to
energy regulation. The responsibilities of energy regulation are divided horizontally among
municipalities, as well as among government bodies. UzbekEnergo and UzbekNefteGaz
play a significant role in regulation of the electricity and gas sector, and are the
implementing bodies for all government decisions.
Licences are issued by the State Inspection of Control in Power Industry and the State
Inspectorate for Control of Using Oil Products and Gas. The licensing procedures are defined
by the Law on Licensing of Some Separate Activities and the Cabinet Regulation on Licensing
of Activities Related to Exploration, Processing and Sales of Oil, Gas and Gas Condensate,
Design, Construction, Operation and Repair of Main Oil, Gas and Oil Product Pipelines.
UzEnergoNadzor is in charge of technical regulation in the electricity sector.
Tariffs
The Ministry of Finance sets electricity, heat, gas, oil and coal tariffs. Cross-border
electricity tariffs are defined by inter-governmental agreements and relevant export/
import contracts between UzbekEnergo and foreign electricity companies.
Electricity, heat and gas tariff methodology takes into account operational costs plus a
profit margin that allows for future capital investment. Tariffs are drafted by UzbekEnergo
and Uzbekaneftegaz and approved by the Ministry of Finance. Tariff methodologies are
not made public.
There are 11 different types of end-user electricity tariffs, based on customer types and
consumption quantity. The average electricity tariff is USD 0.05/kilowatt hour (kWh),
without a significant increase for at least five years. The tariff is cost-reflective; however,
it is not sufficient to fund the investment needed to substantially improve supply
reliability. It is 50% lower than the estimated long-run cost of supply of USD 0.11/kWh
(Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
There are four types of end-user gas tariffs, including a breakdown of households with or
without gas meters, industrial customers and the district heating units (wholesale
consumers). Each consumer category has a range of tariffs based on the type of appliances
they use. More than 95% of households have gas meters.
The average gas tariff for households with gas meters was USD 0.075/cubic metre (m3)
as of December 2014, and USD 0.13/m3 for households without gas meters and with gas
hot water units (UzbekNefteGaz, 2014). The tariffs are subsidised and are significantly
below export prices. UzbekNefteGaz raised household and industry prices by 45% during
2013 and a further 10% in 2014 in order to reduce the gap. Even after the significant
increase, prices were still below a third of the export price to Kyrgyzstan (Eurasianet, 2013).
Technical rules
Soviet GOST and national O’z DSt standards are used in the electricity sector, with a
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11.3. Market convergence Uzbekistan
Approximately 60% of gas sector standards are GOST. Most were developed in 2008-09
and are harmonised with relevant ISO and European standards. Uzbek Standards are also
used, some of which are harmonised with ISO and GOST and adopted for use in Uzbekistan.
The new Law on Technical Regulation was adopted in Uzbekistan in 2009. The law
complies with EU principles of technical regulation. In particular, it introduces the principle
of use of voluntary standards and mandatory minimum requirements for workers’ health
and safety. In accordance to the law, the following governmental agencies are responsible
for technical regulation and standardisation: the agency Uzstandart, the Ministry of
Health, the State Committee for Nature Protection, the State Committee on Architecture
and Construction, and the Ministry of Defence.
Uzbekistan is an ISO member, a member of the Eurasian Standardization Council (EASC)
and a member of COOMET, but not an affiliate of European CEN/CENELEC.
ELECTRICITY
Uzbekistan was a part of the Central Asian Power Grid high-voltage transmission
network and the regional dispatch centre until 2009. The transmission network included
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and the infrastructure
dated back to the Soviet Union. Turkmenistan was the first to leave the network in 2003.
Both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan left the grid looking to internalise electricity supply.
Uzbekistan’s disconnection also disconnected Tajikistan from the grid.
Uzbekistan exports electricity in small volumes to Afghanistan. It imports electricity from
Kyrgyzstan under an inter-governmental agreement on irrigation that provides for the
exchange of water for electricity.
NATURAL GAS
Uzbekistan trades gas with Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan based on bilateral
agreements. Uzbekistan was also exporting gas to Tajikistan until 2013. Supplies were
cut off in 2013 because of payment issues and political disputes.
Uzbekistan is an important transit country for Turkmen gas. Gas has been transiting from
Turkmenistan to Russia since 2005 and from Turkmenistan to China since 2009.
Uzbek gas sales to Russia and an agreement on gas transit via Uzbekistan are contracted
with Gazprom until 2015, based on an agreement signed at the end of 2012. The new
agreement is an extension to the original contract for 2002-12, with agreed volumes
remaining around 7.5 bcm.
Uzbekneftagaz and China’s CNPC signed the first agreement on gas export and gas
transit from Turkmenistan in 2010. Under the agreement, China's Eximbank was to
provide USD 74 million to modernise Uzbekistan's gas distribution network to facilitate
the flows to China (EIA, 2014b). In 2014, the companies formed a joint venture which
will invest in Line D of the Central Asia Power Grid. CNPC is also involved in gas
exploration and production in Uzbekistan under PSAs with the government.
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Uzbekistan 11.4. Sustainable development
Uzbekistan’s renewable energy potential is high, yet the country only utilises partial
hydropower potential. Traditionally, it has relied on plentiful hydrocarbon resources for
most of its energy needs. In recent years, the government has raised the importance of
diversifying its energy sources to reduce climate change impact, maximise efficiencies in
energy production and free up more gas for export in times of growing domestic demand.
Hydropower generation in Uzbekistan accounts for approximately 20% of electricity
supply and only 2% of TPES. Other renewable sources include negligible amounts of
biofuels, albeit statistics on total consumption of wood and other biomass products by
households are likely incomplete. At times of electricity shortages and for remote
communities, wood is the main source of energy.
As of December 2014, the government was considering approval of a new Law on
Alternative Energy Sources that was drafted in 2013. The law includes tax and other
investment incentives for various renewable energy technologies, including renewable
technology manufacturing and import. The current legislation and regulation on renewables
is provided in the Law on Electricity (2009) which stipulates rules for renewable energy
plant construction, financing, commissioning and decommissioning. The Law on the
Rational Use of Energy (1997) (amended in 2003) stipulates third-party access to the grid
for private generators and priority access for renewable energy plants, under certain
conditions. It also allows for tariff increases to account for necessary investment.
In March 2013, the president approved a Decree on Measures to Encourage the Alternative
Sources of Energy, including measures and incentives to promote alternative energy use
and support renewable energy research. The programme has no set targets for renewables;
however, the government is working towards a non-binding target of 20% renewable
energy by 2030. The largest potential is solar energy, as the country is sunny for 300 days
per year. The potential for solar energy is up to 2 058 TWh/y (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
The Decree approves the construction of a 100 MW solar photovoltaic (PV) plan in the
Samarkand region. The solar plant would provide more than 150 gigawatt hours (GWh)
of electricity per year, with savings of 40 million cubic metres (mcm) of natural gas and
more than 200 000 tonnes of GHGs (Republic of Uzbekistan, 2014). In November 2014,
UzbekEnergo announced a tender for the construction of the USD 110 million plant, to
be funded by ADB and the Fund for Reconstruction and Development of Uzbekistan.
Other ongoing renewables projects include the construction of 15 small HPPs with a
capacity of 420 MW, under the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources’ 2008
Programme for Development of Small Hydro, for electricity supplies in rural areas.
UzbekEnergo commissioned a German consultancy in 2014 to estimate the potential of
wind power in the country.
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11.4. Sustainable development Uzbekistan
Table 11.4.1 Estimated technical potential for renewable energy resources, Uzbekistan
Resource Technical potential (GWh/y) Utilised potential (GWh/y)
Wind 4 652 0
Biomass 1 496 0
Source: Kochnakyan, A., S.K. Khosla, I. Buranov, K. Hofer, D. Hankinson and J. Finn (2013), Uzbekistan Energy/Power Sector Issues Note,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank, Washington, DC.
ENERGY EFFICIENCY
Uzbekistan is an energy-intensive country, with the level of energy supply per unit of
GDP only lower than that of Turkmenistan among EECCA countries. Energy intensity is
high due to hydrocarbon production and inefficient consumption. Energy efficiency
potential in Uzbekistan is estimated to be high, as the country’s energy infrastructure is
aged and inefficient, and demand-side management measures are weak in all sectors of
the economy. Improving efficiencies in the supply and demand sides can significantly
contribute to eradicating winter supply shortages.
According to the World Bank report (Kochnakyan et al., 2013), major energy efficiency
challenges are:
demand-side energy efficiency, particularly in industry and agriculture, the most
inefficient sectors of the economy. Industry uses outdated technologies while the
irrigation system used in agriculture is inefficient.
efficiency of gas-fired power plants, which are 40% less efficient than modern
thermal plants
efficiency of electricity networks, with losses up to 20%.
The Law on the Rational Use of Energy (1997) (amended in 2003) is the main body of
legislation regarding energy consumption. It was adopted after the European Energy
Charter Treaty was signed and the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency was
adopted. The protocol requires each party to prepare a strategy for energy conservation.
In 2002, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted an energy savings programme in accordance
with the protocol, and the legislation was amended to account for the programme.
However, Uzbekistan does not have energy efficiency targets or dedicated agencies to
implement the programme. Energy efficiency implementation is the responsibility of
UzbekEnergo through annual and five-yearly modernisation and rehabilitation investment
programmes. UzbekEnergo is also investing USD 5 billion in its infrastructure over the
five years 2011-15 under the programme for the industrial development of Uzbekistan.
This investment will improve reliability and reduce losses, but more is needed to eradicate
© OECD/IEA, 2015
winter shortages.
405
Uzbekistan 11.4. Sustainable development
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The National Sustainable Development Strategy (1997) serves as a backbone for government
strategy in the energy sector and the rest of the economy. However, the strategy is
mainly concerned with social and economic aspects of development, with little focus on
the environment (UNECE, 2010b).
The government approved the Law on Nature Conservation in 2002, including Regulations
for National Environmental Monitoring (2003) and the Environmental Monitoring Program
for 2006-2010. Uzbekistan is party to the United Nations Economic Commission for
Europe (UNECE) programme, Environment for Europe (UNDP, 2008).
In 2005, the State Committee for Nature Protection, along with UNDP and a number of
ministries, began the implementation of the Environmental Indicators for Environmental
State Assessment in Uzbekistan project. Jointly, they developed an indicator database,
with indicators based on UNECE and European Environmental Agency (EEA) criteria to
allow for national, regional and district-level analysis (UNDP, 2008).
In its review in 2008, UNDP assessed the environmental indicators and found problems
regarding water quality, unfavourable drinking water supply, soil deterioration and erosion,
increased salinity level, and air pollution in areas of industrial agglomerations and heavy
traffic. Land desertification is on the rise, and indicators show that the area of new
deserts in Central Asia is increasing.
The review also found that the Cabinet of Ministers is most concerned about
environmental protection, while local authorities pay less attention to it when making
decisions. The waste management sector and the energy sector were found to be fields
where environmental concerns are either not taken into consideration or barely so.
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11.4. Sustainable development Uzbekistan
CLIMATE CHANGE
Uzbekistan’s environment has been affected by economic and social developments over
decades, including population growth and construction, water management and energy
policies, as well as the industrialisation of the country. Evidence of climate change
includes a reduction in areas of snow, increasingly erratic climate patterns, the drying up
of the Aral Sea and higher water losses through evaporation (UNECE, 2010b).
The government is committed to reducing GHG emissions through renewable energy
development and energy efficiency measures. It also participates in the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a non-Annex I party by providing Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) projects, and in the Kyoto Protocol as a non-Annex B party.
The Kyoto Protocol was signed in November 1998, ratified in October 1999 and enforced
in February 2005. As of January 2012, 13 CDM projects were registered in the Executive
Council of the UNFCCC. These provide for an emissions reduction of 6 273 MtСО2-eq per
year. Six of the projects deal with reductions of N2O emissions, while the remainder
cover landfill gas usage and natural gas leak reduction.
Energy-related CO2 emissions totalled 111.1 Mt in 2012 in Uzbekistan, which is 80%
lower compared to 1990. The power generation sector accounts for 32.8% of emissions,
followed by manufacturing (17.5%), commercial and agriculture (9.3%), transport (7%),
other energy industries (3.4%) and households (3%).
GAS FLARING
Uzbekistan is among the top 20 in the world for gas flaring, totalling 1.8 bcm in 2011. It cost
the government an estimated USD 500 million (1.1% of GDP) in 2011 in losses or foregone
sales. Flaring losses have declined over the past decade, however (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
UzbekNefteGaz became a partner of the World Bank Group-led Global Gas Flaring
Reduction Partnership (GGFR) in June 2008. Gas flaring reduction measures in Uzbekistan
include (World Bank, 2013):
Installation of gas flaring reduction facilities at the Kokdumulak oil and gas field that
saved 5.5 bcm/y and 1.5 MtCO2-eq in emissions. UzbekNefteGaz received the 2012
GGFR Excellence Award for its progress in flaring reduction.
Development of a CDM project for the use of associated gas at Umid, Kruk, Western
Kruk, Sarikum and Yangi Darbaza oil and gas fields (Kochnakyan et al., 2013).
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407
Uzbekistan 11.5. Investment attraction
The investment climate in Uzbekistan has improved over the past decade; however,
several crucial factors still impede investment in the country.
The government has taken measures to ease the burden on potential foreign investors
by creating several special investment zones, tax breaks and customs waivers, among
other incentives. Regulation on domestic and foreign investment has improved with
stronger rules for businesses’ protection. New or amended legislation includes the Law
on Foreign Investments, the Law on Guarantees and Measures of Protection of Foreign
Investors’ Rights, the Law on Guarantees of the Freedoms of Entrepreneurial Activity
and the Law on Production Sharing Agreements.
In 2013, the government began the development of Vision 2030 with World Bank and
the UNDP, the plan for structural economic reform by 2030. Discussions included the
creation of a favourable business environment, institutional development, the reduction
of state control and budget management. The final version of reform plans was
presented to the government in May 2014, for approval that is still pending (World Bank,
2014). If accepted, the gradual economic reform is expected to improve the investment
climate and attract more foreign investment.
In 2011, the president issued a decree on the Programme of Measures to Deepen and
Extend the Reforms in the Economy for 2011-15, on Identification and Implementation
of the System of Criteria and Assessments for Formation of the Business Climate in the
country. The programme aims to modernise and diversify the business climate to stimulate
domestic and foreign investments, by attracting modern innovative technologies. The
Decree on Additional Measures for Further Reduction of Audits and Improvement of the
System of Organization of Control over Activities of Subjects of Entrepreneurship was
also issued in 2011 and the Law on Introduction of Changes and Amendments into Some
Legislative Acts in Connection with Reduction of Audits of Activities of Subjects of
Entrepreneurship came into force.
A new Tax Code was introduced in 2008 that consolidated many different normative acts
and provided for tax breaks and incentives for foreign investors. For example, companies
under PSAs in oil and gas exploration are exempt from all taxes in Uzbekistan. Preferences
also exist for joint ventures involving foreign participation that engage in oil and gas
production. Russia's Lukoil, Gazprom and China’s CNPC are among the largest investors
in PSAs and joint ventures in the oil and natural gas sector in Uzbekistan.
Despite significant efforts by the government, roadblocks to investment attraction remain
and include heavy bureaucratic procedures, perceived corruption, political preferences
and motivation, poor currency management, punitive customs laws and taxation (DOS,
2014). Additional measures are required for further improvement of the investment
climate, removal of the existing bureaucratic barriers and unlawful interference in the
activities of enterprises with foreign investments.
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11.5. Investment attraction Uzbekistan
According to the World Bank’s “ease of doing business” indicator, Uzbekistan was
ranked 141st among 189 countries in 2014. A high ranking on the ease of doing business
index means the regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and
operation of a local firm. This index averages the country's rankings on ten topics, made
up of a variety of indicators, giving equal weight to each topic. Uzbekistan has the
second lowest rating among EECCA countries, only higher than that of Tajikistan.
According to the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) prepared by Transparency International,
which measures the level of perceived corruption in the public system, Uzbekistan
ranked 166th among 175 countries in 2014, with a score of 18. This is a high score with
regard to perceived corruption, as a score of 100 represents no corruption.
Uzbekistan joined the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in July 2008 and set
up an Inter-institutional Working Group to align legislation with that of the UNCAC. Anti-
Money-Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Legislation Act was
amended in 2009, as were 16 other amendments to various laws. Uzbekistan also joined
the Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan of the Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (ACN) in March 2010 (Uzbekistan Embassy, 2014). The Uzbek
government has recognised the importance of fighting corruption; however, progress
has been slow and Uzbekistan is still perceived as corrupt.
INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK
The investment framework in the energy sector is mainly concentrated on the rehabilitation
and modernisation of ageing infrastructure and expanding generation capacity and high-
voltage line networks, as well as improving export opportunities for its hydrocarbon
industry. Additionally, the country has recently begun to focus on developing alternative
energy sources with a focus on renewables such as wind and solar. However, investment
in renewables other than hydro is lagging.
In the electricity sector, UzbekEnergo is implementing the investment programme for the
rehabilitation, modernisation and upgrading of existing infrastructure. The programme is
in accordance with the Industrial Modernisation and Infrastructure Development Program
for 2011-15 adopted in December 2010. The programme includes a Power Sector
Development plan which consists of 48 projects with a total budget of USD 5 billion.
Renewable energy investment in 400 MW of small HPPs is ongoing and funded by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources. UzbekEnergo has secured USD 110 million
for a 100 MW solar PV plant in the Samarkand region, with a loan from the ADB and funds
from the Reconstruction and Development Fund of Uzbekistan (Republic of Uzbekistan).
In November 2014, UzbekEnergo opened a tender for the construction of the plant.
At the end of 2010, Uzbekistan announced its gas development programme for the five
years to 2015. The programme called for more than USD 23 billion to cover 37 projects,
financed principally by UzbekNefteGaz with some foreign investment.
Part of the gas expansion plan includes exports to the Asia-Pacific region with special
attention to China. In 2013, Uzbeknefegaz and CNPC created a joint venture for the
production of gas, with initial production estimated at 1.5 bcm. The two companies also
collaborated to build Uzbekistan's segments of Lines A, B and C of the Central Asia-China
gas pipeline that entered into service during 2009-14, and will continue to do so on Line D
in 2015.
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Uzbekistan 11.5. Investment attraction
The coal sector is gaining importance in the country, as it is a readily available, low-cost
substitute for gas that is more lucrative when exported. Therefore, the government is
looking to significantly increase coal production over the medium term. Investment in
coal is mainly in newest technologies, in order to mine efficiently with minimal losses.
INVESTMENT PLANNING
The Ministry of Economy prepares the annual PIP which lists high-priority projects to
meet the government's strategies and objectives. The government’s public investment
programme for 2011-15 is valued at USD 42 billion. The energy sector accounts for
USD 34 billion, or 72%. This includes approximately USD 5 billion in electricity and more
than USD 20 billion in oil and gas production investment. Financing is expected to come
from the government and foreign direct investment in the joint ventures and PSAs.
According to the World Bank report (2014), the programme is currently under implementation.
© OECD/IEA, 2015
410
References Uzbekistan
References
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efficiency in Uzbekistan”, news release, 20 September, ADB website, www.adb.org/news/adb-
funds-smart-electricity-meters-boost-energy-efficiency-uzbekistan.
BGR (German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources) (2013), Energy Study 2013:
Reserves, Resources and Availability of Energy Resources, BGR, Hannover.
CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) (2014), “Flow of natural gas from Central Asia”,
CNPC website, www.cnpc.com.cn/en/FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia/
FlowofnaturalgasfromCentralAsia2.shtml (accessed 18 December 2014).
DOS (US Department of State) (2014), “2014 investment climate statement: Uzbekistan”, DOS
website, www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/index.htm.
EIA (US Energy Information Administration) (2014a), “International energy statistics”, DOE/EIA
website, www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=1&pid=1&aid=24# (accessed
16 December 2014).
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(accessed 17 December 2014).
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data.cfm?fips=uz (accessed 18 December 2014).
Eurasianet (2013), “Uzbekistan ups domestic gas tariffs again, but still fraction of export price”,
press release, www.eurasianet.org/node/67572.
IEA (International Energy Agency) (2014), Energy Balances of Non-OECD Countries, OECD/IEA, Paris.
Kochnakyan, A. et al. (2013), Uzbekistan Energy/Power Sector Issues Note, International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development/ World Bank, Washington, DC.
Reegle (2012), “Uzbekistan 2012”, Reegle website, www.reegle.info/policy-and-regulatory-
overviews/UZ (accessed 19 December 2014).
Republic of Uzbekistan (2014), “Energy resources of Uzbekistan”, Governmental portal of the
Republic of Uzbekistan, http://gov.uz/en/helpinfo/energy/10004 (accessed 17 December 2014).
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plant”, press release, 15 August, http://en.trend.az/business/energy/2303193.html.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2014), “Strengthening disaster risk
management capacities in Uzbekistan”, UNDP website,
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engthening-disaster-risk-management-capacities-in-uzbekistan.html (accessed 19 December 2014).
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National Protection of Uzbekistan, UNDP and Environmental Information System Uzbekistan,
Tashkent, aoa.ew.eea.europa.eu/tools/virtual_library/bibliography-details-each-
assessment/answer_6007963651/w_assessment-upload/index_html?as_attachment:int=1.
UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission of Europe) (2010a), “Development of renewable
power sector in Uzbekistan”, presentation, www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/energy/se/pp/eneff/
Astana_EEForum_Sep2010/d2s2_6_Zakhidov.pdf.
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UNECE (2010b), Environmental Performance Reviews: Uzbekistan, Second Review, UNECE, New
York and Geneva,
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/epr/epr_studies/uzbekistan%20II%20e.pdf.
UzbekEnergo (2014), UzbekEnergo website, www.uzbekenergo.uz/ru/about/uzbekenergo/
(accessed 17 December 2014).
Uzbekistan Embassy to the United States (2014), Anti-Corruption and Anti-Money-Laundering
Policy, website, www.uzbekistan.org/social_issues/anti_corruption (accessed 19 December 2014).
UzbekNefteGaz (2014), UzbekNefteGaz website, www.ung.uz/ru/business/tarifs (accessed
19 December 2014).
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October, www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Uzbekistan-Snapshot.pdf.
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consumption in industry”, press release, 30 April,
www.worldbank.org/en/results/2013/04/30/uzbekistan-the-economics-of-efficiency.
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Innovating Innovation Systems, Vienna, 14 May,
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© OECD/IEA, 2015
ANNEXES
© OECD/IEA, 2015
ANNEX A:
ENERGY BALANCES
© OECD/IEA, 2015
Annexes
Armenia
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
416
Annexes
Armenia
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
417
Annexes
Azerbaijan
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
418
Annexes
Azerbaijan
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
419
Annexes
Belarus
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al* Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
420
Annexes
Belarus
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al* Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh 19 - 394 3 16 3 9 - 42 1 10 5 - - 32200
Electricity plants - - 125 14712 - 42 1 - - - 14880
CHP plants 19 - 269 16927 - - - 105 - - 17320
H e a t ge ne ra t e d - T J 3743 - 7599 230679 - - - 18 2 5 8 - - 260279
CHP plants 854 - 1662 137935 - - - 2656 - - 143107
Heat plants 2889 - 5937 92744 - - - 15602 - - 117172
© OECD/IEA, 2015
421
Annexes
Georgia
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
422
Annexes
Georgia
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - 7 2297 - 7890 - - - - 10 19 4
Electricity plants - - 7 2297 - 7890 - - - - 10194
CHP plants - - - - - - - - - - -
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J - - - - - - 36 - - - 36
CHP plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Heat plants - - - - - - 36 - - - 36
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423
Annexes
Kazakhstan
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
424
Annexes
Kazakhstan
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
425
Annexes
Kyrgyzstan
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh 728 - 18 0 81 - 14 17 9 - - - - 15 16 8
Electricity plants - - - - - 14179 - - - - 14179
CHP plants 728 - 180 81 - - - - - - 989
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J 114 8 4 - - 2050 - - - - - - 13 5 3 4
CHP plants 11484 - - 2050 - - - - - - 13534
Heat plants - - - - - - - - - - -
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426
Annexes
Kyrgyzstan
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh 635 - 231 15 3 - 14 13 9 - - - - 15 15 8
Electricity plants - - - - - 14139 - - - - 14139
CHP plants 635 - 231 153 - - - - - - 1019
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J 118 0 1 - - 15 8 8 - - - - - - 13 3 8 9
CHP plants 11801 - - 1588 - - - - - - 13389
Heat plants - - - - - - - - - - -
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427
Annexes
Moldova
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
P ro ductio n - 11 - 0 - 23 - 90 - - 124
Impo rts 105 - 763 2241 - - - 0 73 - 3182
Expo rts - - -26 - - - - -1 - - -26
Intl. marine bunkers - - - - - - - - - - -
Intl. aviatio n bunkers - - -15 - - - - - - - -15
Sto ck changes 4 - 11 -0 - - - -4 - - 11
T P ES 10 9 11 734 2241 - 23 - 86 73 - 3276
Transfers - 6 -6 - - - - - - - 1
Statistical differences -0 - 6 - - - - - - - 6
Electricity plants - - - -1138 - -23 - - 422 - -740
CHP plants - - -11 -273 - - - - 77 170 -37
Heat plants -2 - -1 -87 - - - -5 - 90 -6
B last furnaces - - - - - - - - - - -
Gas wo rks - - - - - - - - - - -
Co ke/pat.fuel/B KB /P B plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Oil refineries - -17 17 - - - - - - - 0
P etro chemical plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Liquefactio n plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Other transfo rmatio n - - - - - - - - - - -
Energy industry o wn use - - - - - - - - -45 -0 -46
Lo sses - - -3 -39 - - - -0 -108 -42 -192
TFC 10 7 - 736 703 - - - 80 4 18 2 18 2262
IN D US T R Y 29 - 29 363 - - - 1 17 0 44 636
Iro n and steel - - - - - - - - 0 - 0
Chemical and petro chemical - - - 0 - - - - 3 0 4
No n-ferro us metals - - - - - - - - - - -
No n-metallic minerals 28 - 21 39 - - - - 12 0 100
Transpo rt equipment - - - - - - - - - - -
M achinery - - - 0 - - - - 4 0 5
M ining and quarrying - - 1 - - - - - 1 - 2
Fo o d and to bacco 2 - 2 15 - - - 0 29 40 88
P aper pulp and printing - - - 1 - - - - 1 1 3
Wo o d and wo o d pro ducts - - - 0 - - - 1 6 0 7
Co nstructio n - - 5 1 - - - - 1 - 7
Textile and leather - - - 0 - - - 0 3 2 6
No n-specified - - - 306 - - - - 108 - 414
T R A N SP OR T - - 348 2 - - - - 5 - 354
Do mestic aviatio n - - - - - - - - - - -
Ro ad - - 332 2 - - - - - - 333
Rail - - 14 - - - - - - - 14
P ipeline transpo rt - - - - - - - - 1 - 1
Do mestic navigatio n - - - - - - - - - - -
No n-specified - - 2 - - - - - 3 - 5
OT H ER 78 - 305 338 - - - 79 244 17 4 12 17
Residential 54 - 259 226 - - - 70 158 118 886
Co mm. and publ. services 23 - 3 109 - - - 8 72 50 265
A griculture/fo restry - - 39 3 - - - 1 4 1 48
Fishing - - - - - - - - - - -
No n-specified 1 - 3 1 - - - 0 9 4 18
N O N - E N E R G Y US E - - 54 - - - - - - - 54
in industry/transf./energy - - 46 - - - - - - - 46
o f which: chem./petro chem. - - 12 - - - - - - - 12
in transpo rt - - 6 - - - - - - - 6
in o ther - - 2 - - - - - - - 2
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - 16 5 5 17 - 269 - - - - 5802
Electricity plants - - 2 4636 - 269 - - - - 4907
CHP plants - - 14 881 - - - - - - 895
H e a t ge ne ra t e d - T J 52 - 405 10 2 6 0 - - - 15 9 - - 10 8 7 6
CHP plants - - 364 6764 - - - - - - 7128
Heat plants 52 - 41 3496 - - - 159 - - 3748
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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Annexes
Moldova
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
P ro ductio n - 13 - - - 30 - 79 - - 123
Impo rts 103 - 828 2256 - - - 0 57 - 3244
Expo rts - - -15 - - - - -0 - - -15
Intl. marine bunkers - - - - - - - - - - -
Intl. aviatio n bunkers - - -13 - - - - - - - -13
Sto ck changes -5 -1 -11 -1 - - - 3 - - -15
T P ES 98 12 788 2255 - 30 - 83 57 - 3324
Transfers - 9 -8 - - - - - - - 1
Statistical differences - - 7 - - - - -0 - 0 7
Electricity plants - - - -1104 - -30 - - 417 - -717
CHP plants - - -14 -281 - - - - 80 178 -37
Heat plants -1 - -1 -91 - - - -10 - 94 -9
B last furnaces - - - - - - - - - - -
Gas wo rks - - - - - - - - - - -
Co ke/pat.fuel/B KB /P B plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Oil refineries - -21 19 - - - - - - - -2
P etro chemical plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Liquefactio n plants - - - - - - - - - - -
Other transfo rmatio n - - - - - - - - - - -
Energy industry o wn use - - -1 - - - - - -48 -0 -49
Lo sses - - -3 -41 - - - -0 -105 -40 -189
TFC 96 - 786 739 - - - 73 403 232 2328
IN D US T R Y 33 - 9 373 - - - 1 15 9 49 624
Iro n and steel - - - - - - - - 0 - 0
Chemical and petro chemical - - - 0 - - - - 3 1 4
No n-ferro us metals - - - - - - - - - - -
No n-metallic minerals 31 - 1 43 - - - - 14 0 89
Transpo rt equipment - - - - - - - - - - -
M achinery - - - 1 - - - 0 4 0 5
M ining and quarrying - - 1 - - - - - 1 - 2
Fo o d and to bacco 2 - 2 14 - - - 0 26 43 87
P aper pulp and printing - - - 1 - - - - 1 1 3
Wo o d and wo o d pro ducts - - - 0 - - - 1 6 0 7
Co nstructio n - - 5 1 - - - - 1 0 7
Textile and leather - - - 1 - - - 0 3 2 6
No n-specified - - - 314 - - - - 100 - 414
T R A N SP OR T - - 364 2 - - - - 4 - 370
Do mestic aviatio n - - - - - - - - - - -
Ro ad - - 351 2 - - - - - - 352
Rail - - 13 - - - - - - - 13
P ipeline transpo rt - - - - - - - - 1 - 1
Do mestic navigatio n - - - - - - - - - - -
No n-specified - - - - - - - - 4 - 4
OT H ER 63 - 377 364 - - - 72 239 18 3 12 9 8
Residential 42 - 320 251 - - - 64 156 128 961
Co mm. and publ. services 17 - 5 109 - - - 6 71 48 257
A griculture/fo restry - - 42 2 - - - 1 5 1 50
Fishing - - - - - - - - - - -
No n-specified 4 - 10 2 - - - 0 8 5 30
N O N - E N E R G Y US E - - 36 0 - - - - - - 36
in industry/transf./energy - - 9 - - - - - - - 9
o f which: chem./petro chem. - - 9 - - - - - - - 9
in transpo rt - - 6 - - - - - - - 6
in o ther - - 22 0 - - - - - - 22
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - 20 5 4 14 - 352 - - - - 5786
Electricity plants - - 3 4496 - 352 - - - - 4851
CHP plants - - 17 918 - - - - - - 935
H e a t ge ne ra t e d - T J 48 - 563 10 6 3 3 - - - 15 8 - - 114 0 2
CHP plants - - 507 6952 - - - - - - 7459
Heat plants 48 - 56 3681 - - - 158 - - 3943
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Annexes
Tajikistan
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - - 74 - 16 9 0 0 - - - - 16 9 7 4
Electricity plants - - - - - 16900 - - - - 16900
CHP plants - - - 74 - - - - - - 74
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J - - - 405 - - - - - - 405
CHP plants - - - 405 - - - - - - 405
Heat plants - - - - - - - - - - -
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Annexes
Tajikistan
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - - 38 - 16 2 0 0 - - - - 16 2 3 8
Electricity plants - - - - - 16200 - - - - 16200
CHP plants - - - 38 - - - - - - 38
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J - - - 387 - - - - - - 387
CHP plants - - - 387 - - - - - - 387
Heat plants - - - - - - - - - - -
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431
Annexes
Turkmenistan
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - - 17 7 5 0 - - - - - - 17 7 5 0
Electricity plants - - - - - - - - - - -
CHP plants - - - 17750 - - - - - - 17750
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J - - - 8567 - - - - - - 8567
CHP plants - - - 8567 - - - - - - 8567
Heat plants - - - - - - - - - - -
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Annexes
Turkmenistan
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh - - - 17 2 2 0 - - - - - - 17 2 2 0
Electricity plants - - - - - - - - - - -
CHP plants - - - 17220 - - - - - - 17220
H e a t G e ne ra t e d - T J - - - 8 3 11 - - - - - - 8 3 11
CHP plants - - - 8311 - - - - - - 8311
Heat plants - - - - - - - - - - -
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Annexes
Ukraine
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al* Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
E le c t r. ge ne ra t e d - G Wh 8 0 4 18 - 535 16 0 3 9 9 0 13 7 10 4 7 9 621 13 4 - - 19 8 3 6 3
Electricity plants 77740 - 282 1794 90137 10479 621 111 - - 181164
CHP plants 2678 - 253 14245 - - - 23 - - 17199
H e a t ge ne ra t e d - T J 9 14 2 4 - 4943 486272 6805 - - 9985 - - 599429
CHP plants 52699 - 1508 137591 6805 - - 8635 - - 207238
Heat plants 38725 - 3435 348681 - - - 1350 - - 392191
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Annexes
Ukraine
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al* Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
435
Annexes
Uzbekistan
2012
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
436
Annexes
Uzbekistan
2011
Tho usand to nnes o f o il equivalent
S UP P LY A N D Co al Crude Oil Natural Nuclear Hydro Geo therm. B io fuels Electricity Heat To tal
C O N S UM P T IO N o il pro ducts Gas so lar & Waste
etc.
E le c t ric it y a nd H e a t O ut put
437
Annexes
ARMENIA
Data for Armenia are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in Former
Soviet Union.
Data provided by Armenia are mainly supply side data except for electricity. IEA secretariat
assumptions are used to estimate consumption data.
Sources 1992 to 2012:
Direct communication with National Statistical Service, Yerevan.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires on Coal, Electricity and heat,
Natural gas, Oil.
Forestry Statistics, FAO.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1990 to 1991:
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources for biofuels and Waste:
Forestry Statistics, FAO and IEA secretariat estimates.
AZERBAIJAN
Data for Azerbaijan are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
Production of natural gas for 2012 may differ from the Azerbaijan national energy
balance because natural gas used for production of electricity by the oil and gas
extraction industry is included by the IEA secretariat in the definition of natural gas
production. Breaks in time series appear for inputs and outputs of electricity, CHP and
heat plants in Azerbaijan between 2006 and 2007 due to an improved data collection
methodology in the country from 2007 onwards.
For the purpose of calculating CO2 emissions, an allocation between domestic and
international aviation consumption of jet kerosene was estimated by the IEA secretariat
for 1990-2006 based on total aviation consumption reported by Azerbaijan and the
2007 allocation.
Sources 1990 to 2012:
Direct communications with the State Committee of Statistics and the Ministry of
Economics of Azerbaijan, Baku.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, 1992 to 2012, Oil, Natural
gas, Electricity and heat, Renewables.
Sources for biofuels and waste:
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, Renewables, 2000-2012.
Before 2000: IEA secretariat estimates.
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Annexes
BELARUS
Data for Belarus are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in Former
Soviet Union.
In 2010, Belarus became a member of a Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan.
Breaks in trade time series and statistical differences appear from 2009 to 2011 as the
Customs progressively shifted from one accounting system to another.
Data on jetfuel production are confidential and included in other products.
Breaks in time series appear in gas/diesel and fuel oil between 2011 and 2012 as a result of a
new classification of industrial products (heating oil re-classified under high sulphur fuel oil).
Methane produced as a by-product during the petrochemical transformation of naphtha
was re-classified by Belarus from industrial waste to refinery gas. This may lead to breaks
in time series.
Belarus reports all inputs and outputs to CHP and heat autoproducer plants including
those corresponding to own use of heat.
Sources 1990 to 2012:
Direct communication with the National Statistical Committee of Belarus, Minsk.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, 1990 to 2011, Oil, Natural
gas, Coal, Renewables, Electricity and heat.
Sources for biofuels and waste:
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires for Renewables and IEA
secretariat estimates.
GEORGIA
Data for Georgia are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in Former
Soviet Union.
Heat production has stopped in 2011 due to the shutdown of combined heat and power plants.
Time series data from 1990 to 2012 for coal were revised due to the reclassification of
sub-bituminous coal to lignite based on newly available information.
Data on international marine bunkers for Georgia are not currently available, however
upcoming local surveys are planned and should make this information available in future years.
Sources 2008 to 2012:
Direct communication with the Energy Efficiency Centre Georgia, Tbilisi.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires. Oil, Natural gas, Coal, Electricity
and heat, Renewables, submitted by the National Statistics Office of Georgia, Tbilisi.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1990 to 2008:
Official Energy Balance of Georgia 1990-1999, 2000-2008, Ministry of Economy and
Ministry of Energy, Tbilisi.
IEA secretariat estimates.
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Annexes
KAZAKHSTAN
Data for Kazakhstan are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
As a result of important work done by the Statistical Office of Kazakhstan, the IEA
secretariat was able to switch to the Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE questionnaires as a
primary source for Kazakhstan’s 2012 data. Breaks in time series may appear between
2011 and 2012 as a result of this change.
In 2010, Kazakhstan became a member of a Customs Union with Russia and Belarus.
Breaks in trade time series appear from 2009 to 2012 as the Customs shifted from one
accounting system to another.
Natural gas production excludes re-injection but, due to data limitations, may include
gas vented or flared.
In order to be consistent with the Customs Union agreements between Russia and
Kazakhstan, natural gas production and exports include raw gas production from the
Karachaganak field (not marketable gas as per IEA definition).
Own use may include gas vented or flared.
Kazakhstan includes jet kerosene with other kerosene for confidentiality reasons. The
split between jet kerosene and other kerosene, as well as the split between domestic
and international aviation are estimated by the IEA secretariat.
Kazakhstan does not publish a breakdown between coking coal and bituminous coal.
This split is estimated by the IEA secretariat.
Sources for 2012:
Direct communication with the Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires 2012.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1993 to 2011:
Direct communication with the Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Astana.
Fuel and Energy Balance of Kazakhstan Republic, Agency on Statistics of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, Astana, various editions up to 2010.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, 1993, 1995, 1997 to 2009.
Statistical Yearbook “Kazakhstan in 2009”, Agency on Statistics of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, Astana, 2010.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1990 to 1992:
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources for Biofuels and waste:
Fuel and Energy Balance of Kazakhstan Republic, Agency on Statistics of the Republic
of Kazakhstan, Astana, various editions up to 2010.
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KYRGYZSTAN
Data for Kyrgyzstan are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
In this edition, time series data for electricity, oil products, and coal products for 2005 to
2011 were revised based on newly available information. This may lead to breaks in the
time for some products.
Sources 2007 to 2012:
Direct communication with the National Statistical Committee of Kyrgyzstan,
Bishkek.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires for 2012.
Direct communication with the Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth
of Independent States, Moscow.
The UN Energy Statistics Database.
CIS and East European Energy Databook, Eastern Bloc Research Ltd, Tolsta Chaolais,
2008 to 2013.
Natural Gas Vehicles Statistics, International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles,
online database: www.iangv.org.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1993 to 2006:
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, 1993 to 2006.
CIS and East European Energy Databook, Eastern Bloc Research Ltd, Tolsta Chaolais,
various editions up to 2007.
Asian Development Bank.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1990 to 1992:
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources for biofuels and waste:
The UN Energy Statistics Database.
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
Data for Moldova are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
Official figures on natural gas imports, natural gas inputs to power plants, electricity
production and consumption are modified by the IEA secretariat to include estimates for
supply and demand for the autonomous region of Stînga Nistrului (also known as the
Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic or Transnistria). Other energy production or consumption
from this region is not included in the Moldovan data. This may lead to breaks in the
time series for some products.
In 2013, the National Bureau of Statistics revised data submitted through Joint IEA/
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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Annexes
for Energy Statistics. This may lead to breaks in time series for some products and
differences in trends in comparison to previous editions.
Sources 2008 to 2012:
For Moldova, excluding Transnistria:
Direct communication with the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of
Moldova, Chisinau.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires on Coal, Oil Natural gas,
Electricity and heat and Renewables
For natural gas imports:
Direct communication with State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
For Transnistria electricity production:
Website of Ministry of Economic Development of Transdniestrian Moldovian
Republic, www.mepmr.org.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1992 to 2008:
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaire on Electricity and heat, 1991
to 2008.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaire on Natural gas, 1991 to 2008.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaire on Coal, 1992 to 2008.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaire on Oil, 1993 to 1998, 2001 to 2008.
Direct communication with the Ministry of Industry and Energy, July 1992.
CIS and East European Energy Databook, Eastern Bloc Research Ltd, Tolsta Chaolais,
various editions up to 2011.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources 1990 to 1991:
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources for Biofuels and waste:
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE Renewable questionnaire.
The UN Energy Statistics Database.
IEA secretariat estimates.
TAJIKISTAN
Data for Tajikistan are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
Sources 1990 to 2012:
Online statistics, Statistical Agency under the President of the Republic of Tajikistan.
Tajikistan in Figures, Statistical Agency under the President of Tajikistan, various
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editions up to 2013.
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Annexes
Energy and Communal Services in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: A Poverty and Social
Impact Assessment. UNDP Bratislava Regional Centre 2011
CIS and East European Energy Databook, Eastern Bloc Research Ltd, Tolsta Chaolais,
various editions up to 2013.
Asian Development Bank Statistics, various editions up to 2013.
Direct communication with the State Committee on Statistics, Republic of Tajikistan,
Dushanbe.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, 1991 to 2007.
Natural Gas Vehicles Statistics, International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles,
online database: www.iangv.org.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Industry of Tajikistan, Statistics, the State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of
Tajikistan, 2004.
TURKMENISTAN
Data for Turkmenistan are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
Sources up to 2012:
CIS and East European Energy Databook, Eastern Bloc Research Ltd, David Cameron
Wilson, various editions up to 2013.
Asian Development Bank online database.
Natural Gas in the World, Cedigaz, Paris, various editions up to 2013.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Direct communication with the National Institute on Statistics and Forecasting of
Turkmenistan, November 1999 and January 2001.
UKRAINE
Data for Ukraine are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in Former
Soviet Union.
The IEA secretariat and State Statistics Committee of Ukraine are working closely and
intensively on the improvement of data quality. Therefore, breaks in time series may
occur between 2007 and 2008.
The data for the stock draw and statistical difference of natural gas in 2010 are a
consequence of the accounting method chosen by the Ukrainian administration to
reflect the ruling of the Stockholm Arbitration Tribunal of March 30, 2010.
For the period 2008 to 2012 the transparency of data may be reduced because of
confidentiality issues. For instance: peat includes lignite; other kerosene includes aviation
fuels (aviation gasoline, gasoline-type jet fuel and kerosene-type jet fuel); other products
include petroleum coke.
Large statistical differences still exist for some oil products such as transport fuels and
LPG. These are due to identified reporting issues in Ukraine. The Ukraine State Statistical
© OECD/IEA, 2015
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Annexes
Information on electricity used for pumped hydro is available from 2012 only.
Charcoal production includes pyrolysis and calculated traditional methods of production
from 2008.
Due to a plant closure in 2008, a stock of lignite/peat became available, without details
about its consumption. This may lead to breaks in time series and high statistical
difference for 2008.
Official Ukrainian coal statistics refer to unwashed and unscreened coal prior to 1995.
IEA statistics normally refer to coal after washing and screening for the removal of
inorganic matter. Therefore, the IEA revised Ukrainian coal supply and demand statistics
downward to reflect levels of washed coal.
Sources 2008 to 2012:
Direct communication with the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Kiev
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaire on Coal Oil, Natural Gas,
Electricity and Heat and Renewables.
Sources 1992 to 2007:
IEA secretariat estimates.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaire on Coal Oil, Natural Gas,
Electricity and Heat and Renewables.
Direct communication with the Ministry of Statistics, the Coal Ministry, the National
Dispatching Company, 1995.
Coal: Direct communications with the State Mining University of Ukraine, 1995, 1996.
Natural gas: Direct communication with Ukrgazprom, February 1995.
Direct communication with the Ministry of Statistics of the Ukraine, July 1994.
Ukraine in 1992, Statistical Handbook, Ministry of Statistics of the Ukraine, Kiev, 1993.
Ukraine Power Demand and Supply Options, The World Bank, Washington, 1993.
Power Industry in Ukraine, Ministry of Power and Electrification, Kiev, 1994.
Energy Issues Paper, Ministry of Economy, March 1995.
Ukraine Energy Sector Statistical Review 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, The World
Bank Regional Office, Kiev, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998.
Global Energy Saving Strategy for Ukraine, Commission of the European
Communities, TACIS, Madrid, July 1995.
Sources 1990 to 1991:
IEA secretariat estimates.
Sources for Biofuels and waste:
Statistical Office in Kiev, The World Bank and IEA secretariat estimates.
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Annexes
UZBEKISTAN
Data for Uzbekistan are available starting in 1990. Prior to that, they are included in
Former Soviet Union.
Sources 1990 to 2012:
Asian Development Bank online database.
CIS and East European Energy Databook, Eastern Bloc Research Ltd, Tolsta Chaolais,
various editions up to 2012.
IEA secretariat estimates.
Direct communication with the Interstate Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth
of Independent States.
Direct communications to the IEA secretariat from the Institute of Power Engineering
and Automation, Academy of Sciences of Uzbekistan 1994, 1996, 1998 to 2003.
Joint IEA/Eurostat/UNECE annual energy questionnaires, 1995 to 1997.
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Annexes
ENERGY COOPERATION BETWEEN THE EU, THE LITTORAL STATES OF THE BLACK & CASPIAN SEAS AND THEIR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
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EE/RES action plans and measures: existence of any programme and/or action plans,
including information campaigns, and training and awareness rising on best practices,
(including measures to promote convergence with EU standards and norms).
Creation of energy agencies: information on the establishment and the operation of
energy agencies including set-up, efficient operation, training programmes and other
measures that support their efficient and independent operation.
Environmental assessments and Environmental standards: implementation of environmental
assessments, assessments of renewable sources potential by relevant industries/
institutions and environmental standards for energy utilities approaching progressively
closer to EU levels.
Energy auditing: including records on the of such audit results.
Kyoto Protocol mechanisms: development of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms (CDM,
JIP, emissions trading) and realization or planning of projects under this framework.
Gas flaring reduction: gas flaring reduction measures, as well as “methane to
market” measures.
Status Reports
Following the adoption of the Astana Road Map, the INOGATE Technical Secretariat
developed review criteria which were agreed upon by the INOGATE Partner Countries
during the country co-ordinators’ meeting held in Tbilisi in October 2010. The review
criteria include indicators for all four areas of co-operation, which were set to assess the
developments and monitor progress across the region on an annual basis. The INOGATE
Technical Secretariat has developed further questionnaires, elaborating on the agreed
criteria for an annual review cycle, referred to as “Status Reports.” The first Status
Report was prepared by the INOGATE Technical Secretariat on the basis of questionnaire
submissions from the INOGATE Partner Countries in 2011. This work was undertaken as
a desk study, with the active participation of the INOGATE Country Experts.
The INOGATE Technical Secretariat published the Status Report for the year 2011,
assessing the developments under the agreed review criteria (including the explanation
of the criteria). The publication was released in October 2012 and can be found at
http://www.inogate.org.
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ORGANISATIONS MET
Armenia
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
Ministry of Environmental Protection
Public Services Regulatory Commission
National Statistic Services
Technical Standards Laboratory, Scientific and Research Institute for Power Engineering
National Standards Institute (SARM)
National Renewables and Energy Efficiency Fund
CJSC Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA)
CJSC Power Grid Operator
CJSC High Voltage Power Grids
JSC Billing Centre
JSC Gazprom-Armenia
ARMESCO Association
TechnoEco LLC
SPARE Coordinator in Armenia/NGO Eco Club “Tapan”
Eco Team/Energy and Environment NGO
Contact-A LLC
INCRIPT LLC (IT consulting service)
European Union (EU) Delegation
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW)
German-Armenian Fund (GAF)
Azerbaijan
Ministry of Industry and Energy
Energy, Household and Water Supply Services Division, Tariff Council
Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources
Ministry of Taxes
Ministry of Economy and Industry
EU Delegation
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
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Belarus
Ministry of Energy
Ministry of Environment
State Standards Agency
SPA BelTopGaz
OJSC BelTransGaz
SPA BelEnergo
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Georgia
Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources/Ministry of Energy
Ministry of Environment
State Agency of Natural Resources
Georgian National Investment Agency
Georgian National Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission
National Statistics Office of Georgia (GEOSTAT)
Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation (GOGC)
Georgian Gas Transportation Company (GGTC)
Georgian State Electric System (GSE)
Electricity System Commercial Operator, JSC (ESCO)
Engury Hydropower Company ‘Engurhesi’
Energy Efficiency Centre
Centre for Energy Efficiency and Environmental Protection (VAP Georgia)
NGO International Center for Environmental Research
Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN)
Energy Studies, World Experience for Georgia (WEG)
The Greens Movement of Georgia/ Friends of the Earth Georgia
Georgian Society of Nature Explorers Orchis
International Financial Institutions Monitoring Programme, Green Alternative
Energy and Environment Associates
Blake Oil and Gas Company
EU Delegation
KfW
EBRD
UNDP
Kazakhstan
Ministry of Energy and New Technologies (former)
Ministry of Environmental Protection (former)
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Kyrgyzstan
Ministry of Energy and Industry
Environmental Protection Agency
Ministry of Finance
State Agency on Environment Protection and Forestry
Coordination Commission for Climate Change Issues
State Department on Tariff Regulation
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Swiss Embassy
Tetratech
UNDP
Moldova
Ministry of Economy
Ministry of Environment
Climate Change Office, Ministry of Environment
Ministry of Regional Development and Construction
National Bureau of Statistic
National Energy Regulatory Agency (ANRE)
Moldovan National Institute of Standardisation and Metrology
Energy Efficiency Agency (EEA)
Energy Efficiency Fund (EEF)
TA-SPSP Energy Project
SA MoldovaGaz
SRL MoldovaTransGaz
SE MoldElectrica
RED GasNatural Fenosa
SRL Chişinau-Gaz
Red-Nord Electrica
SA RED NORD-VEST
S.A. Horus
SRL MoldCablu
ICS Euroterm Group SRL
Yedina Kuchka
Solartech Energy
Saryly Garmagroup
NGO DINA
Sudzuker Moldova
Green Farm Ltd.
NGO Pro-Energy
NGO Gutta-Club
NGO Expert-Group
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BEMOL SRL
Petrom SA
Import Competrol
SRL Laiola
SRL Polimer Gaz Conducte
NGO Cleaner Production and Energy Efficiency Centre
NGO Gutta-Club (Republican Children and Youth Centre)
NGO Alliance for Energy Efficiency and Renewables
EU Delegation
Embassy of Sweden to Moldova
USAID Moldova
World Bank
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
UNDP
Tajikistan
Ministry of Energy and Industry/Ministry of Energy and Water Resources
Ministry of Industry and New Technologies
State Committee of Environmental Protection
State Committee on Standardisation (TajikStandart)
National Statistics Agency
Antimonopoly Agency
Production Scheduling Department, CJSC (EnergoRemont)
Department of the State Unitary Enterprise (Naftugas va Angisht)
RES Centre of the Academy of Sciences
Tajik Technical University
Association of Power Engineers
Environmental Specialist Association
National Energy Company Barki Tojik (TSO and DSO)
JSC Pamirenergo (DSO)
JSC TajikTransGas (TSO and DSO)
Shirkati Tizorati Soyod (coal company)
Petroleum Sugd LLC
Private oil and gas company
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Ukraine
Ministry of Energy
State Statistics Service
State Enterprise Energorynok
Electricity Generating Company TsentrEnergo
Electricity Generating Company UkrGidroEnergo
National Nuclear Generating Company EnergoAtom
Natinal Electricity TSO UKRENERGO
Kiev city DSO KyivoblEnergo
National Energy and Communal Services Regulatory Commission
NAK NaftoGas
National gas TSO UkrTransGas
JSC UkrNafta
Boyarka Metrology Center
State Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving
World Bank (Energy Sector and Development Programme)
EU Delegation
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)
UNDP
EBRD
European Business Association
American Chamber of Commerce in Ukraine
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Uzbekistan
EU Coordination Centre
National Statistics Committee
UzbekEnergo
UzbekNefteGas
Turkmenistan
Various bilateral meetings.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The individual country reviews were led by the IEA and co-ordinated by the INOGATE
Technical Secretariat. The authors of this publication are Sonja Lekovic and Thea
Khitarishvili, with inputs from Sylvia Beyer (Armenia and Azerbaijan) and Marc-Antoine
Eyl-Mazzega (Ukraine).
The IEA would like to express its sincere gratitude to the INOGATE Technical Secretariat,
and to Mr. Andrii Mitsai in particular for invaluable support in organising the country
review missions, for co-ordinating the work with country experts and for his valuable
contribution to the country review missions. Further thanks are extended to Ms. Gloria
Aguinaldo, Ms. Lemlem Said Issa, Mr. Vladimir Ternytskyi and Ms. Anna Petrus at the
INOGATE Technical Secretariat for their valuable work and contributions during the two-
year cycle of reviews, and to Ms. Irina Aryshchenko for organisational support.
The IEA and the INOGATE Technical Secretariat thank the INOGATE country experts, Mr.
Levon Vardanyan (Armenia), Mr. Zaur Mamadov (Azerbaijan), Mr. Andrew Molochko
(Belarus), Mr. Irakli Vardigoreli (Georgia), Ms. Ludmila Burlui (Moldova), Ms. Maryash
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Gcal gigacalories
GDP gross domestic product
GEDF Georgian Energy Development Fund
GEF Global Environment Fund/Global Environment Facility
GGFR Global Gas Flaring Reduction
GGTC Georgian Gas Transportation Corporation
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JI Joint Implementation
JICA Japanese International Cooperation Agency
JSC Joint Stock Company
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kt kilotonnes
kV kilovolt
kW kilowatts
kWh kilowatt-hours
m3 cubic metres
m/s metres per second
mcm million cubic metres
MENR Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
MFA Macro-Financial Assistance
MGRES Moldavskaya GRES
mm millimetres
MoREEFF Moldovan Residential Energy Efficiency Financing Facility
MoSEFF Moldovan Sustainable Energy Financing Facility
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
Mt million tonnes
Mtoe million tonnes of oil-equivalent
MtCO2 million tonnes of CO2
MtCO2-eq million tonnes of CO2 equivalent
MW megawatts
MWh megawatt-hours
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TWh terawatt-hours
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WB World Bank
WEG World Experience for Georgia
WEM wholesale electricity market
WREP Western Route Export Pipeline
WTO World Trade Organization
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This publication has been produced under the authority of the Executive Director of the International Energy Agency
(IEA) with European Union financial assistance provided through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument. This publication reflects the views of the IEA Secretariat, but does not necessarily reflect those of the
IEA member countries or of the European Union.
The IEA makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, in respect to the publication’s contents (including
its completeness or accuracy) and shall not be responsible for any use of, or reliance on, the publication.
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© OECD/IEA, 2015
Eastern Europe,
Caucasus and
Central Asia
Conveniently located near the world’s fastest growing energy markets, the
resource-rich and transit countries of Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central
Asia contribute significantly to world energy security. However, shared
challenges across the region include aged infrastructure, high energy
intensity, low energy efficiency, untapped alternative energy potential and
poorly functioning regional energy markets.
This publication highlights the energy policies and sector developments of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan during 2013-14 and
provides a summary of key recommendations for policy makers in the region.
Energy policy analysis is conducted in line with the INOGATE Programme’s
four main pillars of energy development: energy market convergence,
energy security, sustainable development and investment attraction. Started
in 1996, the INOGATE Programme is one of the longest running energy
technical assistance programmes funded by the European Union and
works within the policy frameworks of the Baku Initiative and the Eastern
Partnership. The INOGATE Programme co-operates with 11 Partner Countries
to support reduction in their dependency on fossil fuels and imports, to
improve the security of their energy supply and to mitigate overall climate
change. It also supports the Eastern Partnership, a joint initiative between
the European Union, EU Member States, and the Eastern European and
Caucasus countries. Launched in 2009, the Eastern Partnership aims at
advancing political association and economic integration.
This publication has been produced with European Union financial
assistance provided through the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument.
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© OECD/IEA, 2015