The debate up to 2007 My view in 2007 Ernst’s recent result Consequences for my approach

Recent developments in the philosophy of

category theory

Ralf Krömer

Bergische Universität Wuppertal

Recent developments in the philosophy of category theory

The debate up to 2007 My view in 2007 Ernst’s recent result Consequences for my approach

The debate up to 2007

My view in 2007

Ernst’s recent result

Consequences for my approach

Recent developments in the philosophy of category theory

The debate up to 2007 My view in 2007 Ernst’s recent result Consequences for my approach

The consistency of ZFC

I undecidable (Gödel)
I In particular, ZFC could be inconsistent
I but this could only be proved by finding one day a
contradiction.
I Bourbaki: trust in the consistency of ZFC on “empirical”
grounds (no contradiction discovered so far)

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Bourbaki’s line of argument

1954 introduction of Ensembles (my translation):

“In the 40 years since one has formulated with sufficient precision the
axioms of [set theory] and has drawn consequences from them in the
most various domains of mathematics, one never met with
contradiction, and one has the right to hope that there never will be
one. (. . . ) We do not pretend that this opinion rests on something
else than experience.” [Bourbaki(1954)]

talk “Foundations of mathematics for the working mathematician”

delivered 1949 by André Weil:

“Absence of contradiction, in mathematics as a whole or in any given

branch of it, (. . . ) appears as an empirical fact, rather than as a
metaphysical principle. The more a given branch has been
developed, the less likely it becomes that contradictions may be met
with in its further development.” [Bourbaki(1949)]

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Bourbaki seems to suggest a certain way in which contradictions are

met with in the everyday work of mathematicians. Is this truly the
usual way they have been met with historically? [Krömer(2012)]

“As far as sets occur and are necessary in mathematics (at least in
the mathematics of today, including all of Cantor’s set theory), they
are sets of integers, or of rational numbers (. . . ), or of real numbers
(. . . ), or of functions of real numbers (. . . ), etc.; when theorems about
all sets (or the existence of sets) in general are asserted, they can
always be interpreted without any difficulty to mean that they hold for
sets of integers as well as for sets of real numbers, etc. (. . . ). This
concept of set, however, according to which a set is anything
obtainable from the integers (or some other well defined objects) by
iterated application of the operation “set of”, and not something
obtained by dividing the totality of all existing things into two
categories, has never led to any antinomy whatsoever; that is, the
perfectly “naive” and uncritical working with this concept of set has so
far proved completely self-consistent.” [Gödel(1947), p. 518f]

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Grothendieck universes
“It is certain that one needs to be able to consider categories,
functors, homomorphisms of functors and so on . . . as mathematical
objects on which one can quantify freely and which one can consider
as in turn forming the elements of some set. Here are two reasons for
this necessity: to be able to carry out for functors the types of
properly mathematical reasoning (induction and so on. . . ), without
endless complications installed in order to save the fiction of the
functor which is nothing but a specific metamathematical object;
because the sets of functors or of functorial homomorphisms, with the
various natural structures which one has on them (group of
automorphisms of a given functor and so on) obviously are
mathematically important, and because many structures
(semi-simplicial structures and so on) are most naturally expressed
by considering the new objects to be defined as functors.”

(Grothendieck in Bourbaki manuscript no 307, July 1958-March 1959)

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Grothendieck universes and consistency

I usual way of allowing for large categories: postulating the

existence of Grothendieck universes
I equivalent: existence of strongly inaccessible cardinals
(“Tarski’s axiom”)
I Tarski’s axiom independent of ZFC [Drake(1974), p.67]
I relative consistency is undecidable [Kunen(1980), p.145]
I no Bourbaki-type empirical justification

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Intended models vs. formalism

My central focus: the relation between formal definitions and

intended uses of mathematical concepts.

Already in the early days of axiomatic mathematics, Poincaré

stressed that the formal can’t stand for itself:

“[ . . . ] A selection must be made out of all the constructions

that can be combined with the materials furnished by logic. The
true geometrician makes this decision judiciously, because he
is guided by a sure instinct, or by some vague consciousness of
I know not what profounder and more hidden geometry, which
alone gives a value to the constructed edifice” [Poincaré(1914),
148].

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In the case of non-standard models of formal systems, the

formal definition is “overcomprehensive”: it has more models
than just the intended one(s).

Kreisel: we have the capacity to cope with this situation:

“Many formal independence proofs consist in the construction

of models which we recognize to be different from the intended
notion. It is a fact of experience that one can be honest about
such matters! When we are shown a ‘non-standard’ model we
can honestly say that it was not intended. [ . . . ] If it so happens
that the intended notion is not formally definable this may be a
useful thing to know about the notion, but it does not cast doubt
on its objectivity [ . . . ].” [Kreisel(1970), 25]

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In the case of category theory, the situation is complementary:

usual formalizations are too restrictive to capture the naive
theory. It seems at first glance that this situation provokes but
another instance of the capacity stressed by Kreisel:

“The restrictions employed [Grothendieck universes or NBG]

seem mathematically unnatural and irrelevant. Though
bordering on the territory of the paradoxes, it is felt that the
notions and constructions [as the category of all structures of a
given kind or the category of all functors between two
categories] have evolved naturally from ordinary mathematics
and do not have the contrived look of the paradoxes. Thus it
might be hoped to find a way which gives them a more direct
account” [Feferman(1977), 155].

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The view of the working mathematicians

“The well known fact that some basic constructions applied to large
categories take us out of the universe seems to me to indicate that
the constructions are not yet properly presented. The discovery of
proper presentations is too difficult, though, for all work on these
constructions to wait for it.” [Isbell(1966)]

“Categoricians have, in their everyday work, a clear view of what

could lead to contradiction, and know how to build ad hoc
safeguards.” [Bénabou(1985)]

“Our intuition tells us that whenever two categories exist in our world,
then so does the corresponding category of all natural
transformations between the functors from the first category to the
second.” [Lawvere(1966), 9]

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These quotations suggest the following situation:

I the workers in the field are convinced that category theory

is a clear and reliable conceptual framework for a certain
type of mathematical work, the absence of a “proper
presentation” notwithstanding;
I (Grothendieck universes being part of an unproper
presentation, replacing the obscurum by the obscurius);
I they feel able to make judicious choices — by some
“instinct”?
I Epistemological questions pursued in my 2007 book:
I On which grounds do workers in the field feel justified in
using various category-theoretic constructions; on which
grounds do they find them “intuitive” ?
I Would a set-theoretical foundation be appropriate to justify
this feeling? (is this feeling related to the hoped-for
possibility to reduce the constructions to trusted-in
set-theoretical axioms?)
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Topos-theoretic foundations and Feferman’s objection

Feferman quotes Mac Lane (personal communication):

“mathematicians are well known to have very different

intuitions, and these may be strongly affected by training”
[Feferman(1977), 153]

Feferman replies:

“I believe our experience demonstrates [the] psychological

priority [of the general concepts of operation and collection with
respect to structural notions such as ‘group’, ‘category’ etc.]. I
realize that workers in category theory are so at home in their
subject that they find it more natural to think in categorical
rather than set-theoretical terms, but I would liken this to not
needing to hear, once one has learned to compose music.”
[ibid.]
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I A composer makes judicious choices without hearing, because

he or she has learned how to do that.
I My thesis in 2007 was that psychological priority is in the last
analysis irrelevant for the problem of proper presentation:
I one needs to take into account the effects of training because
without the training one is not able to judge the “properness”.
I Kreisel pointed out that we manage to restrict uses of a formal
concept to those in agreement with an intended model, even if
this intended model is not formally definable in the sense that it
is not (yet) grasped exactly by the formal concept.
I The existence of such a capacity presupposes a corresponding
training.
I In order to use the concept competently, you need to know both
the formal definition and the intended model.
I I tried to work out a conception of intuition in agreement with
these observations by focussing on intuitive uses (following
Peirce)
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Unlimited category theory

Feferman already in 1977 suggested the following requirements and
in [Feferman(2013)] gave a foundational system (set-theoretical in
nature and based on Quine’s “New foundations”) meeting them
“nearly” (p.9):

(R1) Form the category of all structures of a given kind, e.g. the
category Grp of all groups, Top of all topological spaces, and
Cat of all categories.
(R2) Form the category B A of all functors from A to B, where A, B are
any two categories.
(R3) Establish the existence of the natural numbers N , and carry out
familiar operations on objects a, b, . . . and collections A, B, . . .,
including the T Qof {a, b}, (a, b), A ∪ B, A ∩ B, A − B,
S formation
A × B, B A , A, A, Bx [x ∈ A], etc.

(R1)-(R3) spell out what workers in the field intend a foundation to

provide
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Ernst’s result
I M. Ernst [Ernst(2015)] showed that “unlimited category
theory” in the sense of [Feferman(2013)] is inconsistent,
i.e. that presupposing (R1)-(R3) leads to a contradiction.
I Ernst’s strategy: build a proof in analogy to the proof that
there can be no set of all sets using Cantor’s theorem.
I Cantor’s theorem says that there is no surjection between
any set and its powerset; established by a diagonal
argument
I In Ernst’s proof (relying on Lawvere’s 1969 work on
transporting diagonal arguments to the language of
category theory) the set-theoretical notion of “surjection” is
replaced by a notion of onto mapping in a
category-theoretic sense, and “set of all sets” and
“powerset” by corresponding objects in a certain category
of graphs.
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Some comments

I Ernst’s proof does not easily generalize to other

candidates for contradiction:
“There are certain barriers to extending this result to other
categories beyond the aforementioned categories of
graphs.” [Ernst(2015)] p.319
(neither for a category of all sets nor for a category of all
categories)
I The way Ernst actually arrived at the contradiction
underlines my criticism concerning the Bourbaki viewpoint
I Since Feferman’s 2013 system is based on Quine’s NF —
can Ernst’s result be of any help in the investigation of the
consistency of Quine’s system?

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A suggestion of mine from 2007 dismissed?

“there may be a shortcoming in the usual claims about the

set-theoretical illegitimacy (or inconsistency) of Cat. For Cat
contains “itself” not as the entire complicated building of points,
arrows and labels (its inside) but as a single point connected to
certain arrows (the functors between other categories and this
category). Thus, to speak about “self-containing” here seems
quite simplifying. This is naturally no proof for the claim that a
category of all categories is consistent but a remedy to the
usual arguments in favor of its illegitimacy.” [Krömer(2007)]
p.280

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I But Ernst takes this difference into account. The situation

is the following:
I there is a problem with self-containing pointed out by the
standard proof that there can be no set of all sets using
Cantor’s theorem;
I Ernst shows that this problem stays put when the
category-theoretic equivalents of all set-theoretical notions
intervening in this proof are used (when the
category-theoretic equivalent of self-containing is used, so
to say)
I (My idea was too naive with respect to the notion of
cardinality, after all.)
I One should ask: on which grounds is Lawvere’s theorem
from [Lawvere(1969)] proved?

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A failure of category-theoretic foundations of math?

“One could take the failure of unlimited category theory as an
indictment of categorial foundations more generally. This is a
tempting conclusion to draw, but it fundamentally misunderstands the
role of unlimited category theory with respect to foundations. It is true
that unlimited category theory cannot be a foundation for
mathematics because it is inconsistent. However, unlimited category
theory is not one of the proposals for a categorial foundation of
mathematics. Its inconsistency could be used as a case against
categorial proposals only if those proposals could provide a
foundation for unlimited category theory.

This is certainly false for the most well known proposals.”

[Ernst(2015)] p.318

In my opinion, Ernst’s result rather shows the strength of

category-theoretic tools in foundational research (since his proof
relies successfully on these tools)

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Other foundational proposals reinforced?

“[. . . ] many different foundations fail to found unlimited category
theory. This failure has been taken as an argument against the use of
those foundations. For example, ZFC has been considered
inadequate as a foundation for mathematics because it cannot
provide a foundation for unlimited category theory. What the result of
this paper shows is that such objections are ultimately unfounded. No
foundation can underwrite unlimited category theory and so one
cannot reject a foundation for such a failure. Thus, the inconsistency
of unlimited category does not produce new objections to
foundational proposals, it actually removes objections. Whatever
foundation one wants to accept, that decision cannot be made based
on the relationship between that foundation and unlimited category
theory.” [Ernst(2015)] p.318

I would argue only (and still) that ZFC is inadequate as a foundation

for any version of category theory of any use in actual mathematics.

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Is my epistemological investigation now pointless?

I Ernst’s result at first glance seems to show that the
epistemological question posed earlier is ultimately only of
historical interest: people when introducing the
constructions felt justified to do so, but finally the feeling
turned out to be misleading. (And one might wonder why
they erroneously had that feeling.)
I First of all, this would be a wrong description of the
situation since obviously the workers in the field did not
confound their convictions with a consistency proof.
I I maintain that my question is still of philosophical interest.
I (still and even more) think that
I thinking in terms of set membership is not the only form of
thinking leading to mathematical knowledge
I the debate on category theory and foundations should
make us think about what we expect a foundation of
mathematics to accomplish
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I A foundation is often thought of as an axiom system

(set-theoretical, for instance) to which we reduce
deductively other mathematical propositions and theories;
it is the possibility of this reduction which ascertains that
we indeed have obtained mathematical knowledge
I If we think of a foundation like this, we ultimately come
down to the problem why we believe in these axioms.
I Pen Maddy in her early two-part paper on "Believing the
axioms" [Maddy(1988)] investigates justifications
(nondemonstrative arguments) in favour of set-theoretical
axioms
I (Unfortunately, I was not aware of this important paper
when writing my 2007 book)

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Maddy and extrinsic vs. intrinsic justifications

Maddy in particular distinguishes between intrinsic and
extrinsic justifications for axioms.

“The suggestion is that the axioms of ZFC follow directly from

the concept of set, that they are somehow "intrinsic" to it
(obvious, self-evident)” p.482

“I have argued elsewhere [. . . ] that we acquire our most

primitive physical and set-theoretic beliefs when we learn to
perceive individual objects and sets of these. [. . . ] The simplest
axioms of set theory, like Pairing, have their source in this sort
of intuition. [. . . ] Given its origin in prelinguistic experience, the
best indication of intuitiveness is when a claim strikes us as
obvious [. . . ]” p.758

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Types of extrinsic justification (Maddy p.758f)

(1) confirmation by instances (the implication of known
lower-level results)
(2) prediction (the implication of previously unknown lower
level results)
(3) providing new proofs of old theorems
(4) unifying new results with old, so that the old results
become special cases of the new
(5) extending patterns begun in weaker theories
(6) providing powerful new ways of solving old problems
(7) providing proofs of statements previously conjectured
(8) filling a gap in a previously conjectured "false, but natural
proof"
(9) explanatory power
(10) intertheoretic connections
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I It is only with respect to extrinsic arguments that Maddy says: “A

careful analysis of the structure of such arguments must
precede what we hope will be an explanation of why they lead us
toward truth” (p.759)
I I think that there is not really a difference between intrinsic and
extrinsic arguments when we are searching for such an
explanation. (Maddy labelled the distinction as "vague" herself.)
I In Tool and Object I presented an (admittedly very wide)
conception of intuition (of experts) and tried to present evidence
supporting the claim that in the case of category theory, experts
are using such an intuition in their mathematical work. I have the
impression that such an intuition of experts includes appeals to
many nondemonstrative arguments Maddy would have classified
as extrinsic (in the sense that they can be seen as belonging to
some type of (1)-(10)).
I My claim is that it depends on the context in which a concept is
used whether such an argument counts as intrinsic or extrinsic
to the concept.
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I More precisely, Maddy with (1)-(10) focusses on the roles

some axiom can play in some mathematical working
situation. I would rather focus on why the fact that the
axiom can play one of these roles makes it more
convincing.
I To label a proposition as “obvious” or “self-evident” is done
by relying on a capacity called intuition. While Maddy
concentrates on “our most primitive physical and
set-theoretic beliefs” stemming from “prelinguistic
experience”, we have seen many much less primitive
beliefs labelled as intuitive by experts.
I How do experts develop such an intuition? I think: it is
developed during exactly such specific manipulations of
theories like those yielding results of the types (1)-(10).
I I do not see why to privilege prelinguistic experience with
respect to expert knowledge.
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Mathematical intuition has been described as stored experience by

[Davis and Hersh(1980)].

At another place, they stress the effect of training on intuition:

“We have defined [velocity] v by means of a subtle relation between

two new quantities,  and δ, which in some sense are irrelevant to v
itself. [ . . . ] The truth is that in a real sense we already knew what
instantaneous velocity was before we learned this definition; for the
sake of logical consistency we accept a definition that is much harder
to understand than the concept being defined. Of course, to a trained
mathematician the epsilon-delta definition is intuitive; this shows what
can be accomplished by training.” [Davis and Hersh(1980), 245f]

(Think of Feferman’s composer argument again).

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Bénabou, J.
Fibered categories and the foundations of naive category
theory.
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MR87h:18001.
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