Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34080             March 22, 1991

SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, represented by

CARMELO IMAZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of GREGORIO SERRA SERRA,
MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA, AND FRANCISCO JOSE
SERRA SERRA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JUDGE CARLOS ABIERA, THE PROVINCIAL
SHERIFF OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, ROGACIANA HERNAEZ AND
LUISA HERNAEZ, respondents.

G.R. No. 34693             March 22, 1991

SALVADOR SERRA SERRA, HEIRS OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA, respresented by

CARMELO IMAZ, as Special Administrator of the Estate of GREGORIO SERRA SERRA,
MARGARITA SERRA SERRA, FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA AND FRANCISCO JOSE
SERRA SERRA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUDGE NESTOR B. ALAMPAY, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch III of
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, FELIPE GARAYGAY AND NEGROS
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (SONEDCO), respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

These consolidated petitions under Rule 65 seeks the issuance of the following writs:

G.R. No. L-34080

a) Certiorari — To annul and set aside the Resolution of the respondent Court of Appeals,
promulgated on August 3, 1971, setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction it previously
issued on June 7, 1971 in CA-G.R. No. 00139-SP, entitled "Salvador Serra Serra, et al.,
Petitioners, vs. Hon. Carlos Abiera, et al., Respondents." . . .

b) Prohibition — To enjoin private respondents, respondent Judge Carlos Abiera and
respondent Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental or his deputies or representatives from
further dispossessing petitioners of Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685
and 717 of Ilog Cadastre.
 c) Mandamus — Directing private respondents to immediately restore petitioners in
possession of Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog
Cadastre. (pp. 1-2, Rollo of G.R. L-34080)

G.R. No. L-34693

a) Certiorari — To annul and set aside the Orders of the respondent Judge Nestor B.
Alampay, issued on November 29, 1971 and December 29, 1971, in Civil Case No. 10040 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental entitled "Salvador Serra Serra, et al. v.
Felipe Garaygay, et al." The Order of November 29, 1971 dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by Executive Judge Cesar Kintanar enjoining private respondent
SONEDCO from issuing and delivering sugar quedans to private respondent Felipe
Garaygay, while the Order of December 29, 1971 directed the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling sugar canes
from Lot Nos. 717 and 2685 "Ilog Cadastre" and Lot No. 1316 "Kabankalan Cadastre." As
hereafter shown, both Orders were issued with grave abuse of discretion and in utter
violation of the resolution of this Honorable Court of Appeals adopted on September 24,
1971 in G.R. No. L-34080, entitled "Salvador Serra Serra, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et
al."

b) Prohibition — To enjoin respondents, their agents, deputies or representatives from

interfering in any manner with petitioners' right of possession of Lot Nos. 717 and 2685 "Ilog
Cadastre" and Lot No. 1316 "Kabankalan Cadastre."

c) Mandamus — To compel private respondent Felipe Garaygay to return to petitioners the
value of the sugar canes covered by the sugar quedans issued and delivered to him by
respondent SONEDCO. (pp. 1-2, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34693)

The facts are as follows:

On December 27, 1967, Primitivo, Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez (Hernaezes, for
brevity) filed with then CFI of Bacolod City a petition for reconstitution of allegedly lost original
certificates of title in the name of their predecessor-in-interest, Eleuterio Hernaez, covering Lot No.
1316 of Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, all in the Province of
Negros Occidental. The petition was supported by a certification from the Register of Deeds,
Bacolod, Negros Occidental, that no certificates of titles had been issued covering the properties.
The petition was docketed as Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 (Annex "J").

On April 6, 1968, the petition was granted and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental issued on
May 6, 1969 reconstituted original certificates of title Nos. RO-10173 [N.A.]; RO-10174 [N.A.] and
RO-10175 [N.A.] for Lot Nos. 1316, 2685 and 717, respectively. On May 29, 1969, these
reconstituted original certificates of title were cancelled upon presentation by the Hernaezes of a
"declaration of heirship" and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. T-51546, T-51547 and T-51548 were issued in
their names.

Upon learning of the existence of the above transfer certificates of title, Salvador Serra Serra, for
and in behalf of his co-heirs (Serras, for brevity), filed with the Registry of Deeds an adverse claim
against the reconstituted certificates of title in the name of the Hernaezes. They also filed in
Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163, a motion for cancellation of said certificates of title
(Annex "L"), claiming that they are holders of valid existing certificates of titles and that they are in
actual possession of the properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of titles since before the
war. The motion was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental,
then presided by Judge Abiera, where the lots are situated. The Hernaezes sought the dismissal of
the motion for cancellation (Annex "M"). On March 16, 1970, Judge Abiera denied the motion for
cancellation (Annex "O") without conducting a formal hearing. The order denying the motion was
received by the Serras only on November 4, 1970. They moved for a reconsideration of the denial.
On March 27, 1971, the Hernaezes filed a motion with the trial court of Himamaylan for execution of
the order of the Bacolod court in the cadastral case granting the petition for reconstitution. The
motion prayed that they be placed in possession of the subject properties. On April 29, 1971, the trial
court denied Serras' motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motion for cancellation of the
reconstituted certificates of title (p. 87, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). On May 7, 1971, the Himamaylan
court issued the writ of possession prayed for (p. 91, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).

On May 12, 1971, the Serras challenged the legality of the issuance of the writ of possession before
the Court of Appeals in a petition of certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-00139. They alleged
that the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion and therein prayed that the order denying
the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of titles as well as the writ of possession
be nullified (Annex "T").

On May 21, 1971, the Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition and required the Hernaezes
to answer (p. 100, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). A writ of preliminary injunction was issued upon the
filing of a bond by petitioners in the amount of P500.00. On June 16, 1971, the Serras filed an ex-
parte motion for the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction which was granted on August 3,
1971. On August 13, 1971 petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dissolving the
writ. The motion was denied on August 23, 1971. From the resolution denying reconsideration,
petitioners brought this petition denying reconsideration, petitioners brought this petition docketed as
G.R. L-34080.

Petitioners alleged that respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it set aside
the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued thereby giving effect to the writ of possession
issued by the trial court. They argued that the questioned dissolution of the writ was tantamount to
an adjudication on the merits of the main petition which involves the issue of possession. The lifting
of the writ was allegedly premature. They also claimed that the order of the trial court for the
issuance of a writ of possession over the disputed lots in favor of private respondents is void
because a writ of possession in a cadastral proceeding can only be issued pursuant to a final decree
of registration and not, on the basis of an order denying a motion to cancel certificates of title.

On September 24, 1971, the Court required respondents to answer the petition and to show cause
why no mandatory injunction should issue requiring them to immediately return to petitioners
whatever they might have received in the implementation of the writ of possession. On September
28, 1971, a preliminary prohibitory injunction was issued upon the posting of a bond by petitioners in
the amount of P10,000.00 ordering respondents to desist from further dispossessing petitioners of
the lots in question until further orders (p. 145, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).

While G.R. L-34080 was pending in this Court, on October 11, 1971, the Serras filed with the Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Civil Case No. 10040 against Felipe Garaygay and
SONEDCO (Southern Negros Development Corp.). The complaint alleged that Garaygay cut, hauled
and milled with SONEDCO's sugar central, sugarcanes owned by the plaintiffs. The complaint also
prayed for the delivery of sugar quedans covering several truckloads of sugarcane harvested by
Garaygay on Field 17, Lot. No. 4726 of the Kabankalan Cadastre that were entrusted by him to the
corporation for milling; and for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the
corporation from issuing the quedans to Garaygay. The prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was
granted by Judge Cesar Kintanar, Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, on October 12, 1971 (p. 312, Rollo G.R. No. L-34080).
The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Nestor Alampay. On October 17, 1971, Felipe Garaygay,
who claimed that he obtained from the Hernaezes a contract to harvest and dispose of the sugar
canes produced from the disputed lots, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On October 18,
1971, Garaygay filed a motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued by Judge Kintanar.
On November 29, 1971, the trial court dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction dated October 12,
1971 (p. 331, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). In the same case, Garaygay filed an urgent motion dated
December 17, 1971 for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction against the Serras who
allegedly harvested and thereafter planted sugarcane on the lots disputed contrary to the intention of
this Court in its resolution of September 28, 1971 that the parties maintain the status quo. On
December 29, 1971, the trial court issued the writ against the Serras (p. 343, Rollo of G.R. No. L-
34080). The motion for reconsideration filed by them was denied on January 12, 1972 (p.
357, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080).

Petitioners challenged both orders (November 29, 1971 and December 29, 1971) before this Court
thru G.R. No. L-34693. They assailed that both orders of respondent Judge Alampay were issued
with grave abuse of discretion. They claimed that the writ of injunction issued by respondent judge
on October 12, 1971 was aimed to preserve their rights pending determination by this Court in G.R.
No. L-34080 of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The
dissolution of the said writ disturbed the status quo and allowed private respondent Garaygay to
obtain possession of the sugar quedans from SONEDCO. Petitioners also asserted that the
December 29, 1981 order of respondent judge for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
against them and their representative blatantly defied the resolution of this Court dated September
28, 1971 in G.R. No. L-34080 which enjoined private respondents Hernaezes, their representatives
and/or agents from executing further acts of dispossessing them of the lots in questions.

On February 15, 1972, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. No. L-34080 and G.R. No. L-
34693 and the issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining respondent Judge Nestor
Alampay, his representative, assigns, or persons acting upon his order and the Hernaezes, their
agents, representatives and successors-in-interest from interfering in any manner with petitioners
right of possession of Lots Nos. 717 and 2685 (Ilog Cadastre) and Lot No. 1316 (Kabankalan
Cadastre) and directed private respondent Garaygay to return to petitioners the value of the
sugarcanes covered by the sugar quedans which were released to him by SONEDCO (p.
359, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080). The petitions were heard (p. 397, Rollo of G.R. No. L-34080) on
July 25, 1972 after which they were deemed submitted for decision (p. 401, Rollo of G.R. No. L-
34080).

The issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it previously issued. The main petition in the writ of
preliminary injunction it previously issued. The main petition in the Court of Appeals, CA-G.R. No.
SP-00139, questioning the propriety of the issuance of a writ of possession by the trial court has not
been resolved to date and the issue before Us cannot be resolved without resolving also the issue in
the Court of Appeals. Therefore, We deemed it proper to resolve also the issue on the propriety of
the issuance of the writ of possession by the trial court in this petition.

After studying the first petition carefully, We hold that the issuance of the writ of possession by
Judge Abiera after the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title filed by
petitioners was dismissed and under the circumstances obtaining in this case, was not proper.
Consequently, the lifting of the previously issued writ of preliminary injunction by the respondent
appellate court, resulting in the enforcement of the writ of possession issued by the trial court and
the dispossession of the petitioners of the subject properties was a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack of jurisdiction.
In the case of Mabale v. Apalisok, L-46942, February 6, 1979, 88 SCRA 247, this Court enumerated
the cases where a writ of possession may be issued:

In that connection, it should be borne in mind that the law specifies when a writ of
possession may be issued. That writ is available (1) in a land registration proceeding, which
is a proceeding in rem (Sec. 17, Act No. 496; Estipona v. Navarro, L-41825, January 30,
1976, 69 SCRA 285, 291); (2) in an extra-judicial foreclosure of a realty mortgage (Sec. 7,
Act No. 3135); (3) in a judicial foreclosure of mortgage, a quasi in rem proceeding, provided
that the mortgagor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party
to the foreclosure suit, had intervened (Rivera v. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and
Rupac, 61 Phil. 201; Ramos v. Mañalac and Lopez, 89 , Phil. 270, 275) and (4) in execution
sales (last par. of Sec. 35, Rule 39, Rules of Court).

Since the instant case does not fall among the cases mentioned above, the issuance of the
writ of possession was not proper (Gatchalian v. Arlegui, L-35615 and L-41360, February 17,
1977, 75 SCRA 234, 244).

In a land registration case, a writ of possession may be issued only pursuant to a decree of
registration in an original land registration proceedings "not only against the person who has been
defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion
thereof during the proceedings up to the issuance of the decree." (Lucero v. Loot, G.R. No. L-16995,
October 28, 1968, 25 SCRA 687; Marcelo v. Hon. Mencias, L-15609, April 29, 1960; Demorar v.
Hon. Ibañez and Paras, G.R. No. L-7595, May 21, 1955, 97 Phil. 72). It cannot however, be issued
in a petition for reconstitution of an allegedly lost or destroyed certificate of title. Reconstitution does
not confirm or adjudicate ownership over the property covered by the reconstituted title as in original
land registration proceedings where, in the latter, a writ of possession may be issued to place the
applicant-owner in possession.

The purpose of the reconstitution of any document, book or record is to have the same reproduced,
after observing the procedure prescribed by law in the same form they were when the loss or
destruction occurred. The reconstitution of certificates of title should be made, as just stated, in the
same form and exactly as they were at the time they were lost or destroyed, . . . (Gov't. of the
Philippine Islands v. Abada, 48 O.G., p. 1872, April 1952). A person who seeks a reconstitution of a
certificate of title over a property he does not actually possess cannot, by a mere motion of the
issuance of a writ of possession, which is summary in nature, deprive the actual occupants of
possession thereof. Possession and/or ownership of the property should be threshed out in a
separate proceeding.

It should be noted also, that the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles filed by the
petitioners in the cadastral case, contained serious charge against the reconstitution proceeding
which if proven would result in the nullity of the reconstituted titles. The motion alleged:

That there had never been at any time decreed or any title issued in favor of Eleuterio
Hernaez over said lots which were in fact decreed and titled originally in favor of the
deceased Isabelo Javellana and Salvador Serra whose successors-in-interest, the herein
movants, hold subsisting transfer certificates of title and who are actually in possession and
owners of all improvements and buildings of said lands since before the war continuously up
to the present; the lands are declared for tax purposes in their names and taxes paid by
them; neither Eleuterio Hernaez, alleged predecessor-in-interest, nor the alleged heirs who
had fraudulent titles transferred in their names, declared the lands for tax purposes nor paid
any land tax up to the present;
 That the Hon. Court has been misled by the petitioners for reconstitution, Messrs. Primitivo
and Rogaciana Hernaez, into ordering the reconstitution of the so-called lost certificates of
title which were NON-EXISTENT in the first place by:

1. Not specifying, contrary to the requirements of Sec. 12 of Rep. Act No. 26, the
names and addresses of the actual occupants or persons in possession of the
property and, instead of the real adjoining owners, giving the names of fictitious
persons who naturally could not be located and hence NO notice was cause to be
sent to the herein movants-owners who were completely ignorant of the entire
proceedings.

2. Surreptitiously hiding from the Hon. Court the fact that these same parcels of land
were formerly the subject of said petitioner's attempt to include them in the estate of
Eleuterio Hernaez under Spec. Proc. No. 2336, CFI Neg. Occ., but which lots were
found out by the court to be properties of the movants herein and said special
proceedings was dismissed; that petitioners attempted, for the second time, to claim
ownership and take possession over these same lots by trying to include them in the
alleged estate of Eleuterio Hernaez under a second Spec. Proceedings numbered
212-5470, CFI, Neg. Occ., but which special proceedings was also dismissed by the
court after it was found out that the lots alleged to compose the estate of Eleuterio
Hernaez were owned by and titled in the names of other persons, more particularly
Lots Nos. 1316 Kabankalan Cad., 2685 and 717 Ilog Cadastre which are owned by
and titled in the names of the movants herein; (pp. 66-67, Rollo of G.R. No. L-
34080).

Moreover, petitioners were not mere possessors of the properties covered by the reconstituted
titles.  They are possessors under claim of ownership. Actual possession under claim of ownership
1âwphi1

raises a disputable presumption of ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the
recovery of the property (Article 433, New Civil Code), not summarily through a motion for the
issuance of a writ of possession. Furthermore, petitioners were holders of existing certificates of
titles to the same properties covered by the reconstituted certificates of title of private respondents. It
was error for Judge Abiera to issue a writ of possession against petitioners ousting them from the
premises without formal hearing.

Private respondents argue that the herein petitioners are bound by the order granting reconstitution
because the reconstitution proceedings was heard after notices were sent to alleged boundary
owners and the petition was published in the Official Gazette. However, the petitioner who were in
actual possession of the properties were not notified. Notice by publication is not sufficient as
regards actual possessors of the property. In the case of Alabang Development v. Valenzuela, No.
54094, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 277, We held that in petitions for reconstitution of titles, actual
owners and possessors of the lands involved must be duly served with actual and personal notice of
the petition.

To repeat what the writer hereof said in his concurring opinion in the Bernad Case, "The first
lesson to be drawn here is that courts must exercise the greatest caution in entertaining
such petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost certificates of title, particularly where the
petitions are filed, as in this case, after an inexplicable delay of 25 years after the alleged
loss. Furthermore, the courts must likewise make sure that indispensable parties, i.e. the
actual owners and possessors of the lands involved, are duly served with actual and
personal notice of the petition (not by mere general publication), particularly where the lands
involve constitute prime developed commercial land including a part of the South
Superhighway. . .
The private respondents alleged, and the trial court agreed, that the proceedings for their
reconstituted titles can no longer be reopened because the order for reconstitution had already
become final. The order for granting the reconstitution was issued on April 6, 1968 and the motion
for the cancellation of the reconstituted title was filed only on November 4, 1968.

We do not agree. Republic Act No. 26, pursuant to which the "titles" of private respondents were
reconstituted provides in its Sections 18 and 19, thus:

Sec. 18. In case a certificate of title, considered lost or destroyed, be found or recovered, the
same shall prevail over the reconstituted certificate of title, and, if both titles appear in the
name of the same registered owner, all memoranda of new liens or encumbrances, if any,
made on the latter, after its reconstitution, except the memorandum of the reservation
referred to in Section Seven of this Act, shall be transferred to the recovered certificate of
title. Thereupon, the register of deeds shall cancel the reconstituted certificate of title and
spread upon the owner's duplicate, as well as on the co-owners, mortgagee's or lessee's
duplicate, if any has been issued, such annotations of subsisting liens or encumbrances as
may appear on the recovered certificate of title, cancelling at the same time the
memorandum of the reservation referred to in Section seven hereof; Provided, however,
That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed
instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary, or by an order of the court, and a new
certificate of title has been issued, the recovered certificate of title shall be likewise
cancelled, but all subsisting liens or encumbrances, if any, appearing thereon shall be
transferred to the new certificate of title and to its owner's duplicate, as well as to any co-
owner's mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate that may have been issued, the memorandum of
the reservation referred to in section seven of this Act, if any, being thereby ipso facto
cancelled.

Sec. 19. If the certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, and subsequently found or
recovered, is not in the name of the same person in whose favor the reconstituted certificate
of title has been issued, the register of deeds should bring the matter to the attention of the
proper Court of First Instance, which, after due notice and hearing, shall order the
cancellation of the reconstituted certificates of title and render, with respect to the
memoranda of new liens or encumbrances, if any, made on the reconstituted certificate of
title, after its reconstitution, such judgment as justice and equity my require; Provided,
however, That if the reconstituted certificate of title has been cancelled by virtue of any deed
or instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary or by an order of the court, and a new
certificate of title has been issued, the procedure prescribed above with respect to
memoranda of new liens or encumbrances made on the reconstituted certificate of title, after
its reconstitution, shall be followed with respect to the new certificate of title, and to such new
liens or encumbrances, if any, as may have been made on the latter, after the issuance
thereof.

Thus, if no such original title in fact exists, the reconstituted title is a nullity and the order for its
reconstitution does not become final because the court rendering the order has not acquired
jurisdiction. It may be attacked at any time. The same rule applies if in fact there is an earlier valid
certificate of title in the name and in the possession of another person/s.

The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by the duly issued existing Torrens
titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance
under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without
first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. . . The courts simply
 have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the
names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of
titles covered under the Torrens System of Registration rules out as anathema the issuance
of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof. A fortiori, such
proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners and
holders of Torrens titles to the land are null and void." (Alabang Development v.
Valenzuela, supra).

Moreover, petitioners filed a motion to cancel the reconstituted certificates of title in the cadastral
case. Said motion was in the nature of a petition for relief from judgment. The relief sought in the
said motion of petitioners is the nullification of the final order for reconstitution. One way to set aside
a final and executory judgment is by a petition for relief from judgment as provided for by Rule 38, as
when the judgment has been entered against a party thru fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence, and the petition is filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and not
more than 6 months, after such judgment or order was entered (Rule 38, Sec. 3, Rules of Court).
When the judgment sought to be annulled is rendered by the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court); the petition may be filed in the same case and in the same court which rendered the
judgment (Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Sheriff of Manila et al., G.R. No. 74586, October 17,
1986). The order for the reconstitution in Cadastral Case No. 17 was issued on April 6, 1968. The
final entry of the order was on May 6, 1968. The motion for cancellation of the reconstituted
certificates of titles was filed on November 4, 1968, upon petitioners' knowledge of the existence of
the reconstituted titles. The filing of the motion was well within the period prescribed by the Rules.

In G.R. No. L-34693, We do not believe that respondent Judge Alampay abused his discretion or
acted without jurisdiction when he lifted the writ of preliminary injunction issued by then Judge
Kintanar enjoining SONEDCO from issuing and delivering sugar quedans in the name of the private
respondents. Private respondents, by virtue of the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction in CA-
G.R. SP-00139 by the Court of Appeals, took possession over the subject properties. It was not until
September 29, 1971 when We issued the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction against private
respondents ordering them to desist from committing further acts of dispossession against
petitioners. It did not cover already consummated acts of possession by private respondents such as
the cutting and hauling of sugar cane and the delivery thereof to SONEDCO before September 30,
1971, the date of receipt by private respondent's counsel of the writ of injunction in G.R. L-34080.
There was also no order yet from Us in G.R. 34090 commanding the return of whatever the private
respondents may have received by virtue of their possession of the premises. We agree with Judge
Alampay's conclusion that:

The writ issued in G.R. No. L-34080 has reference only to and enjoins further acts of
dispossession of the subject lots, obviously to maintain the status quo with respect to said
lands between the petitioners Serra and private respondents, Hernaezes, pending ultimate
and final determination of their ownership rights over such properties. On the other hand, the
writ issued in the present case is restricted to the defendant SONEDCO directing it to refrain
from issuing to defendant Felipe Garaygay the sugar quedans corresponding to the sugar
cane(s) delivered by and milled for the latter.

A reading of the writ issued in G.R. L-34080 (Exh. 5-Garaygay) persuades this Court to
conclude that the same was not intended to affect or relate to the sugar crops on the
quedans that would be issued for the value thereof, for it is there unequivocally stated.

. . . Within fifteen (15) days from notice of this order. The private respondents are
required to show cause, within the same period, why a mandatory injunction should
 not be issued requiring said respondents to immediately return to petitioners
whatever private respondents might have received in the implementation of the writ
of possession issued by Judge Carlos Abiera on 31 December, 1970 in Cad. Case
No. 17, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 163, etc. (Exh. 5-A, Garaygay).

In effect the return to the plaintiffs of whatsoever the private respondents Hernaezes or for
that matter their representatives (defendant herein, Felipe Garaygay) received or would
receive, has yet to be resolved by the Supreme Court in said case. Perhaps the application
for the provisional remedy herein sought directed against herein defendant and SONEDCO,
should be presented likewise in the Supreme Court in G.R. L-34080. . . (p. 74-75, Rollo of
G.R. No. L-34693).

Thus, it became necessary for Us to issue on February 15, 1972, a mandatory injunction ordering
Garaygay to return to petitioners the value of the sugarcanes cut from the lots involved herein.

But respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he issued the writ of preliminary
injunction dated December 29, 1971. Civil Case No. 10040 was a complaint for recovery of personal
property (sugarcane) and damages. Possession was never put in issue by the parties. The issuance
of the writ enjoining petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane produced from the
lots subject of G.R. No. L-34080 was beyond the jurisdiction of the trial court. It should be noted that
the issue of possession was then pending in the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-00139. The
issue of possession of the disputed properties should have been presented in the said case and not
in the Civil Case No. 10040. Moreover, in G.R. L-34080, this Court already issued a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction in G.R. L-34080 enjoining the private respondents from further
dispossessing the petitioners of the subject premises. The issuance of the questioned writ by
respondent Judge enjoining petitioners from harvesting, hauling and selling sugarcane produced
from the subject premises directly contravened the injunction of this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of the respondent Court of
Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction is SET ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in
Cadastral Case No. 17, GLRO Records No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records of this
case and of CA-G.R. No. 00139 are remanded to the trial court for hearing of the motion for
cancellation of the reconstituted titles. Private respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the
possession of the properties in question. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on
February 15, 1972, enjoining private respondents from interfering in any manner, with petitioners'
right of possession of the properties in questions, shall remain effective until the issue of ownership
and/or possession of the properties is finally settled by a competent court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-92-836 August 2, 1995

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JESUS V. MATAS, RTC, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao del Norte (acting Presiding Judge,
RTC Branch 18, Digos Davao del Sur) and EDUARDO C. TORRES, JR., OIC, Clerk of Court,
RTC, Tagum, Davao del Norte, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In his Memorandum dated 26 February 1992, then Deputy Court Administrator, now Court
Administrator, Ernani Cruz Paño informed the Court of a letter he received from Atty. Ma Dolores L.
Balajadia, Deputy Clerk of Court, Third Division of the Sandiganbayan, notifying his office that Judge
Jesus V. Matas and Eduardo C. Torres, Jr. were accused in Criminal Case No. 17378 of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. He then recommended that the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) be authorized to file the proper administrative charges against Judge Matas
and Torres, provided that, pending the outcome of Criminal Case No. 17378, proceedings in the
administrative case be suspended after the filing by the respondents of their comment.

The said recommendation having been approved, the OCA filed with this Court an administrative
complaint charging the herein respondents with the violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act committed as follows:

1. That on or about the month of March, 1987 respondents Judge Jesus V. Matas, Eduardo
Torres, Jr., OIC Clerk of Court and in connivance with private citizen George Mercado
concealed from J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises his (George Mercado's)
knowledge of the petition for the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies OCT Nos. P-
12658, 12659, P-12661 and T-9857, and filed Misc. Case No. 1626 before the sala of
respondent Judge and took cognizance of the same notwithstanding the fact that his Court
has no jurisdiction over Kapalong and Sto. Tomas, Davao where subject properties covered
by the aforesaid titles where located.

2. That notwithstanding the fact that the properties are owned by J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises, respondent Judge issued an Order directing the posting of said
Order and petition for at least ten days prior to the scheduled hearing on April 20, 1987 at
the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Municipal Hall, Barangay Hall or Barangay School where
the properties are located;

3. That thereafter on April 6, 1987 respondent Judge likewise issued an Order directing only
the Station Commander of Sto. Tomas, Davao to comply with the posting despite the fact
that some of the properties involved in Misc. Case No. 1626 are situated in Kapalong,
Davao; and
 4. That a day after the hearing where J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises was
not present, respondent Judge forthwith issued an Order for the issuance by the Register of
Deeds of Davao of new owner's duplicate of aforesaid titles to George Mercado thus,
causing injury to J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises whose owner's duplicate
copies in its possession were cancelled without due process.

Attached thereto is the original copy of the information in Criminal Case No. 17378 entitled "People
of the Philippines vs. Judge Jesus V. Matas, RTC, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao del Norte (Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur) and Eduardo Torres, Jr., OIC Clerk of
Court, RTC, Tagum, Davao, et al."

After the filing by the respondents of their separate verified answers, this Court referred the case to
Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.

On 17 December 1992, the OCA received respondent Torres's motion to dismiss the complaint as
against him on the ground of mootness because he had ceased to be employed in the judiciary and
had been cleared of all his accountability with the Supreme Court as of 13 April 1992. The Court
referred this motion on 26 January 1993 to Justice Imperial for inclusion in his investigation, report,
and recommendation. It turned out, however, that the said motion had been filed with the Court of
Appeals as early as 14 November 1992 and had already been denied by Justice Imperial in his
resolution of 6 January 1993 in the light of this Court's ruling in Administrative Case No. 223-J
(Perez vs. Abiera, 11 June 1975).

The hearing of the case commenced on 11 January 1993. However, after having presented two
witnesses, the counsel for the private complainant and the OCA representative moved for a
suspension of the proceedings because they intended to amend the complaint. Justice Imperial
granted the motion and gave the complainants ten days within which to file with this Court the
amended complaint.

The complainants then submitted to this Court an amended complaint adding the following grounds
for administrative discipline, viz.:

(a) gross inexcusable negligence, and

(b) gross ignorance of law.

and modifying portions of the specification of the charges by:

(a) Deleting from paragraph 1 of the original complaint the word Kapalong;

(b) Deleting the original paragraph 3 and making as the new paragraph 3 the original
paragraph 4 which was modified to read as follows:

3. That a day after the hearing where J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural
Enterprises was not present, respondent Judge, acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, with undue haste and/or gross inexcusable
negligence, to favor George Mercado, and grossly ignorant of the laws
involved, and knowingly fully well that his order dated 24, 1987 [sic] was not
complied with, forthwith issued an order dated April 21, 1987 for the
issuance of the Register of Deeds of Davao of new owner's duplicate of
 aforesaid titles, which George Mercado caused to be cancelled later when
he registered the deeds of sale over the said properties in his favor, thus,
causing injury to J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises whose
owner's duplicate copies in its possession were cancelled because of
fraudulent acts of respondents and without due process.

Attached thereto is the amended information in criminal Case No. 17378 before the Sandiganbayan.

This Court admitted the amended complaint, forwarded it to Justice Imperial, and required the
respondents to file their respective comments thereon.

Respondent Torres filed his comment (denominated as Answer). Respondent Judge Matas, on the
other hand, filed a motion to dismiss, which this Court referred to Justice Imperial for inclusion in his
investigation, report, and recommendation. The investigating Justice deferred the resolution thereof
until the termination of the investigation. Later respondent Judge Matas filed his comment on the
amended complaint.

Thereafter, the hearing was continued with the parties submitting, per their agreement, their
evidence in the form of affidavits to which were attached all pertinent supporting documents.

The hearing ended on 8 August 1994, and the parties submitted their respective lengthy
memoranda. Not to be outdone, Justice Imperial submitted a 44-page report, typed single-space on
legal size bond paper wherein he patiently narrated the minute details of the antecedent facts and
meticulously analyzed the arguments of the parties on the issues involved, namely:

1. Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Miscellaneous Case No. 1626;

2. Whether or not respondent Judge acted with gross and inexcusable negligence and gross
ignorance of law when he took cognizance of and decided Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 in
favor of petitioner therein, George Mercado;

3. Whether or not respondents conspired with George Mercado to conceal from J.K.
Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises the pendency of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626.

As to the first issue, the respondent Judge argues that the parcels of land subject of Miscellaneous
Case No. 1626 are located in Kapalong, Davao del Norte. The so-called Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Davao del Norte, where the said parcels are claimed to be located never legally existed as a
municipality because it was carved out of Kapalong and created into a separate municipality by then
President Carlos P. Garcia and not by Congress. Conformably with Pelaez vs. Auditor General (15
SCRA 569 [1965]), the creation of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas is void since 1 January 1960 upon
the effectivity of R.A. No. 2370. That Sto. Tomas does not legally exist as a municipality was
affirmed in the decision of this Court of 29 September 1988 in Municipality of Kapalong
vs. Hon. Felix L. Moya (166 SCRA 70 [1988]). Since the subject parcels of land are in fact located in
Kapalong, the same are within the administrative area over which his court, Branch I of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao del Norte, can exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Administrative Order No.
7.

The respondent Judge adds that, even granting for the sake of argument, that the Municipality of
Sto. Tomas legally exists and is within the administrative area of Branch IV, RTC of Davao del Norte,
his court can still exercise jurisdiction over the case because one of the parcels involved is located in
Kapalong, a fact recognized in the original administrative complaint. Furthermore, Miscellaneous
Case No. 1626 is not a real action but a personal one, and it being so, his court has jurisdiction over
it, since the petitioner therein, George Mercado, is a resident of Kapalong.

In resolving the first issue, Justice Imperial adopts the ratiocinations of the Sandiganbayan in its
denial of the respondent Judge's motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 17378 that at
the time he committed the questioned acts in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, the Municipality of Sto.
Tomas was not yet declared non-existent, that this Court has yet to come up with a modification of
Administrative Order No. 7 to effect the necessary amendment therein insofar as Sto. Tomas is
concerned; and that, in any event, it is not impossible at all that this Court may decide to maintain
the territorial jurisdiction of Branch IV of the RTC of Davao del Norte over the barrios of Kapalong
which were converted into the municipality of Sto. Tomas.

Nevertheless, Justice Imperial concluded:

While it is true that Judge Matas acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, it is likewise true that his mere acting without jurisdiction
should not subject him to an administrative action for gross inexcusable negligence and/or
ignorance of the law. In the case at bar, Judge Matas' act not being without basis
whatsoever nor motivated by bad faith, it cannot be said with certainty that respondent Judge
Matas acted with gross inexcusable negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law. Just
because he believed, though erroneously, that the action was in personam or that he had
jurisdiction over the four (4) properties, since one of the properties (OCT No. P-9855) was
located at Kapalong and all the properties were included in one petition, should not be taken
against him to the extent of being held liable administratively for gross inexcusable
negligence and/or gross ignorance of the law. To hold otherwise would be to subject every
Judge whose decision is reversed, to be charged with gross negligence or gross ignorance
of the law.

The second issue primarily revolves on the failure of the respondent Judge to require publication of
the petition in the Official Gazette and notices to the registered owners. Justice Imperial resolved the
issue in this wise:

In the case at bar, the respective certificate of title of the properties in question on file with
the Register of Deeds are existing, and it is the owner's copy of the certificate of title that was
alleged to have been lost or destroyed. Thus, it is Section 109 of P.D. 1529 which was
approved on June 11, 1978 that becomes effective and is applicable, a reading of which
shows that it is practically the same as Section 109 of Act No. 496, governing reconstitution
of a duplicate certificate of title lost or destroyed. Consequently, it is sufficient that the notice
under Section 109 is sent to the Register of Deeds and to those persons who are known to
have, or appear to have, an interest in the property as shown in the Memorandum of
encumbrances at the back of the original or transfer certificate of title on file in the office of
the Register of Deeds. From a legal standpoint, there are no other interested parties who
should be notified, except those above-mentioned since they are the only ones who may be
deemed to have a claim to the property involved. A person dealing with registered property is
not charged with notice of encumbrances not annotated on the back of the title.

The only piece of evidence that would show the alleged ownership of the J.K. Mercado over
the four (4) parcels of land, subject of Misc. Case No. 1626 is the alleged private
Memorandum of Agreement entered on November 19, 1981 by and between George
Mercado and J.K. Mercado. Said agreement was never entered on the Certificate of Titles in
the name of their original/former owners on file with the Register of Deeds at the time of the
 filing or pendency of Misc. Case No. 1626. As such, how can private complainant expect to
be notified.

Respondent Judge Matas, dated March 24, 1987 issued the following Order anent notice of
the petition, to wit:

. . . At Least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing, a copy of this Order
and the petition shall be posted at the expense of the petitioner on each
bulletin board of the following: the office of the Clerk of Court; the Municipal
Hall and the Barangay Hall or if there be none, the Barangay School where
the subject property is located. If there is no bulletin board in any of the
aforementioned places, the posting shall be made on a conspicuous place,
near the main door. . . . (emphasis supplied.)

Clearly, respondent Judge Matas had ordered proper and sufficient notice of the petition.
Furthermore, he had the right to rely on the 1st indorsement and certification of PFC Ciriaco
Obenza that posting was made (quoted on page 5 and numbered 11 of this report). The
mere fact that said certification did not specifically mention that posting was also made in the
bulletin board of the Clerk of Court does not rule out the posting thereon considering the
presumption that official duty has been done.

While it is true that no posting was made at Kapalong, where one of the properties was
located per the petition and OCT No. P-9855, the fault, if any, should be placed upon
respondent Torres who made the request only to the Station Commander of the Integrated
National Police of the Municipality of Sto. Tomas (none to Kapalong) to cause the posting,
although the order of Judge Matas specifically provided for posting "where the subject
property is located.

However, there is no clear evidence that respondent Torres acted with malice and/or gross
negligence in doing so, considering the certification of the Register of Deeds that the four (4)
properties were all located at Sto. Tomas (Exhs. "A-5-A" to "A-8-A") thereby misleading
Torres under the circumstances to have the posting made only in Sto. Tomas.

As to the third issue, Justice Imperial said:

A reading of the evidence and arguments of complainant in support of its claim that there
was conspiracy by and between respondents and George Mercado shows that the same is
founded on mere inferences and conjectures.

Thus, complainant concludes that there was complicity because Judge Matas assumed
jurisdiction over the case of which he has none and despite conflicting allegations in the
petition, as well as erroneous posting and notices, arguing in its Memorandum as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, the conclusion of petitioner that there was conspiracy between George Mercado
and respondent Judge Matas because the latter acted with "undue haste" in rendering the
Decision one (1) day after the reception of evidence in support of the petition is unfounded.
The issue involved is simple and the petition was unopposed and thus there was no reason
to delay its resolution. In fact, Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 is not the first and only case that
was decided by Judge Matas, either in open court immediately upon the termination of the
 presentation of evidence and/or a few days thereafter, to wit: [enumeration of nine (9)
Miscellaneous Cases, Exhibits "9-M-13" to "9-M-21," inclusive].

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, even assuming, arguendo, that undue injury resulted to complainant and

unwarranted benefits was obtained by George Mercado, in view of all the foregoing,
respondents did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, gross inexcusable
negligence or gross ignorance of the law.

Justice Imperial then recommends that the respondents, Judge Jesus V. Matas and Mr. Eduardo C.
Torres, be absolved from all the charges in the Amended Complaint.

We agree with him except as regards his opinion that the respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over
Miscellaneous Case No. 1626. There is, obviously, a confusion between jurisdiction and the exercise
of jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction is the power and authority to hear, try, and decide a case; it does not depend on the
regularity of the exercise of that power (Herrera vs. Barreto, 25 Phil. 245 [1913]; Century Insurance
Co., Inc. vs. Fuentes, 2 SCRA 1168 [1961]). It is conferred by substantive law, and, insofar as the
Regional Trial Courts are concerned, by B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) or by
other statutes. On the other hand, the manner of the exercise of jurisdiction is, unless otherwise
provided by the law itself, governed by the Rules of Court or by orders which are, from time to time,
issued by this Court. Under Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 129, the exercise of jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts and their judges is basically regional in scope (Malaloan vs. Court of Appeals, 232
SCRA 249, 260 [1994]), but under Section 18, it may be limited to the territorial area of the branch in
which the judge sits. The said section reads:

Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. — The Supreme Court shall
define the territory over which a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its
authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings, or actions,
whether civil or criminal, . . . (emphasis supplied)

Pursuant to this provision, the Court issued Administrative Order No. 7, series of 1983, (Exhibit "O"),
defining the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions I to XII. Under the said order, the
territorial areas covered by the RTC of Davao del Norte are as follows:

1 Branches I and II with seats at Tagum — comprising the municipalities of

Asuncion, Kapalong, Mabini, Maco, New Corella, Pantukan, San Vicente and Tagum.

2 Branch III with seat at Nabunturan — comprising the municipalities of Compostela, Mawab,
Monkayo, Montevista, Nabunturan, New Bataan and San Mariano.

3 Branch IV with seat at Panabo — comprising the municipalities of Babak, Carmen,

Kaputian, Panabo, Samal and Sto. Tomas.

In the Malaloan case, which involves a related Administrative Order No. 3 issued on 19 January

1983 defining the limits of the exercise of jurisdiction by the RTC's in the National Capital Judicial
Region, this Court held:
 In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did not per
se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that non-
observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines
the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its
authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

In the instant case, it cannot be said that Branch I of the RTC of Davao del Norte, then presided by
the respondent Judge, had no jurisdiction over Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 which is a "Petition for
the Issuance of Owner's Duplicate Certificates in lieu of Lost O.C.T. Nos. P-12658, P-12659, P-
12661, and P-9855."

Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529 states that Courts of First Instance (CFI) shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over all applications for original registration of title to lands including improvements and interests
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and determine
all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. Under Chapter X of the decree entitled
"Petitions and Actions After Original Registration" is Section 109 which governs petitions for
issuance of lost or stolen owner's duplicate certificate of title. Clearly, petitions for replacement of
lost duplicate certificates, as in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626, are cognizable by the RTCs.

Now, on the venue or the place where such petitions may be instituted. Section 17 of P.D. No. 1529
provides that the application for land registration shall be filed with the CFI (now RTC) of the
province or city where the land lies. Under Section 108 of the same decree, all petitions motions
after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of
registration was entered.

Notably, the certificates involved in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 were each obtained not pursuant
to a decree issued in a judicial registration proceeding, but pursuant to a patent issued by the
Director of Lands and registered in accordance with Section 122 of Act No. 496 (now Section 103 of
P.D. No. 1529). Nevertheless, applying Sections 2, 17, 108, and 109 of P.D. No. 1529, we may say
that the petition for replacement of lost duplicate certificates in Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 was
properly taken cognizance of by Branch I of the RTC of Davao del Norte presided by the respondent
Judge, since that petition stated that the lots covered by the lost duplicates are situated in Kapalong
and Sto. Tomas which are both in the province of Davao del Norte.

Hence, no lack of jurisdiction, gross ignorance of law, or gross inexcusable negligence can be
ascribed to the respondent Judge. If at all, there was an unwitting violation of Administrative Order
No. 7 which places Kapalong within the territorial area of either Branch I or II of the RTC of Davao
del Norte, and Sto. Tomas, within Branch IV of the same court. He exceeded the territorial area of
his Branch, for at the time Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 was filed, Sto. Tomas, which was
composed of the barrios of Kapalong, was not yet declared as non-existent. It was only in the
decision of 29 September 1988 in Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya that the non-existence of
Sto.Tomas as a municipality was confirmed.

Yet, even on this score, in point of adjective law the error consisted merely of the impropriety of the
venue of the petition. That procedural lapse is not so pervasive as to affect the validity of the
proceedings, absent a showing of bad faith therein. Considering that objections to venue may even
be waived, and the amorphous status of Kapalong in relation to Sto. Tomas during the period
material to the questioned proceeding, it would be too much to require accurate resolution of the
issue and unfailing compliance therewith by the respondent judge.

As correctly held by Justice Imperial, there is no proof of conspiracy between the respondents and
George Mercado. Neither is there any evidence that private complainant J.K. Mercado and Sons
Agricultural Enterprises suffered damage or injury in its claimed right and interest in the lots covered
by the lost certificates subject of Miscellaneous Case No. 1626.

In his order granting the petition, the respondent Judge merely declared as null and void the "lost"
owners' duplicate copies of the original certificates of title (OCT) and directed the issuance of new
duplicate copies which, perforce, remain in, the names of those appearing in the original copies of
the OCT's in the custody of the Register of Deeds. He did not order the issuance of new ones in the
name of George Mercado despite the latter's presentation of purported deeds of sale in his favor.

The private complainant claims to be the owner of the lots by virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement
executed between it and George Mercado on 19 November 1981 (Exhibits "W" and "W-1") wherein
the latter acknowledged that the lots belong to the former and undertook to execute the necessary
documents of conveyance in its favor. This Memorandum of Agreement was not annotated in the
OCT's. And, the private complainant has never satisfactorily explained why it failed to enforce its
rights under that agreement at anytime before the latter filed Miscellaneous Case No. 1626 in 1987.
Necessarily then, the fact of Mercado's recognition of the complainant's "ownership" of the lots
remained a private matter between Mercado and the complainant. By its own negligence, the private
complainant made possible any representation or misrepresentation by George Mercado, and it
cannot now be heard to say that the respondent Judge acted on the petition of George Mercado
"notwithstanding the fact that the properties are owned by" the private complainant, as alleged in
paragraph 2 of both the original and amended complaint.

Thus, the recommendation of Justice Imperial is in order.

But, before writing finis to this case, we need to stress two principles in disciplinary proceedings
against judges.

One, the investigating Justice or Judge designated by the Court to conduct an investigation, submit
a report, and make the appropriate recommendation does not have an authority to grant or deny a
motion to dismiss the case. His authority is not co-extensive with the power or authority of his office.
In this case, the investigating Justice should not have denied respondent Torres' motion to dismiss.
Even if the reason for the denial were correct, he should have merely noted the motion and
considered it in his report and recommendation, which the Court had suggested in the referral to him
of the motion.

Secondly, it must be noted that this Court had impliedly set aside the proviso in the resolution of 17
March 1992 that after the filing of comment by the respondents on the administrative complaint,
proceedings thereon should be suspended pending the outcome of Criminal Case No. 17378 before
the Sandiganbayan.

The demands of public interest and public policy would not be expeditiously served if administrative
cases should be made to await the termination of criminal cases or civil cases based upon the same
facts or incidents from which the administrative cases arose. In view of the public trust character of a
public office which exacts accountability and utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency at
all times, administrative cases must be resolved as expeditiously as possible. It is primarily for this
reason that in administrative cases only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond
reasonable doubt as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence as in civil cases (Section 5, in
relation to Sections 1 and 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court). We thus rule that the pendency of a criminal
case based on the same facts or incidents which gave rise to an administrative case does not
suspend the administrative proceedings. However, in consideration of the difference in the quantum
of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed, in the former and in the
latter, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding in the other.
WHEREFORE, the instant complaint is DISMISSED, and respondents JUDGE JESUS V. MATAS
and EDUARDO C. TORRES, JR. are hereby ABSOLVED of all the charges against them in the
Amended Complaint.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr. J., took no part.

G.R. Nos. 88521-22             January 31, 2000

HEIRS OF EULALIO RAGUA, namely, DOMINGO, MARCIANA, MIGUEL, FRANCISCO,

VALERIANA, JUANA, and REMEDIOS, all surnamed RAGUA; DANILO and CARLOS, both
surnamed LARA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY,
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., INC., J.M. TUASON & CO., INC. and HEIRS OF
D. TUASON, INC., respondents.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. 89366-67             January 31, 2000

MARINO T. REGALADO and ELISA C. DUFOURT, petitioners,

vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, (Branch 88) presided by Hon. Tirso D.C. Velasco
(formerly Court of First Instance, Quezon City, Branch 18, then presided by Hon. Ernani Cruz
Paño), and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (Special Ninth Division composed of the
HONORABLE ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LUIS A. JAVELLANA, REGINA G. ORDONEZ-BENITEZ,
AND LUIS L. VICTOR), respondents.

PARDO, J.:

These consolidated cases involve a prime lot consisting of 4,399,322 square meters, known as the
Diliman Estate, situated in Quezon City. On this 439 hectares of prime land now stand the following:
the Quezon City Hall, Philippine Science High School, Quezon Memorial Circle, Visayas Avenue,
Ninoy Aquino Parks and Wildlife, portions of UP Village and East Triangle, the entire Project 6 and
Vasha Village, Veterans Memorial Hospital and golf course, Department of Agriculture, Department
of Environment and Natural Resources, Sugar Regulatory Administration, Philippine Tobacco
Administration, Land Registration Authority, Philcoa Building, Bureau of Telecommunications,
Agricultural Training Institute Building, Pagasa Village, San Francisco School, Quezon City Hospital,
portions of Project 7, Mindanao Avenue subdivision, part of Bago Bantay resettlement project, SM
City North EDSA, part of Phil-Am Life Homes compound and four-fifths of North Triangle. This large
1 

estate was the subject of a petition for judicial reconstitution originally filed by Eulalio Ragua in 1964,
which gave rise to protracted legal battles between the affected parties, lasting more than thirty-five
(35) years.

Re: G.R. Nos. 88521-22

These cases are now before the Court for review via certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals that reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City,
2  3 

Branch 18, ordering the Register of Deeds, Quezon City to reconstitute Original Certificate of Title
No. 632 in the name of Eulalio Ragua.

On August 31, 1964, Eulalio Ragua, claiming to be the registered owner, together with co-owners
Anatalio B. Acuña, Catalina Dalawantan, and other co-owners, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Caloocan City a petition for reconstitution of Original Certificate Title (OCT) No. 632 of the
4 

Registry of Deeds of Rizal, covering a parcel of land with an area of 4,399,322 square meters, as
evidenced by plan bearing No. II-4816, known as the Diliman Estate, situated in the municipality of
Caloocan, province of Rizal. Attached to the petition was a photostatic copy of OCT No. 632 and a
photostatic copy of the plan of the property as surveyed for Eulalio Ragua. OCT No. 632 covered a
large parcel of land bounded on the North by the Culiat Creek, a ditch, the Piedad Estate; on the
East by the property of Gregorio Tiburcio and Mahabang Gubat; on the South by the property of
Miguel Estanislao; on the West by the property of Segundo Limoco, the Mariabelo Creek; and on the
South by the San Francisco del Monte Estate.

On September 9, 1961, J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (Tuason) filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Caloocan City an opposition to the petition alleging that OCT No. 632 was fictitious and the
land was covered by TCT No. 1356 in the name of People's Homesite and Housing Corporation
(PHHC). TCT No. 1356 originated from OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, registered in
the name of Tuason's predecessor-in-interest. Furthermore, the validity of OCT No. 735 had been
declared as beyond judicial review in the case of Maximo L. vs. Mariano Severe Tuason, 119 Phil.
612, promulgated on February 29, 1964.

On September 10, 1964, the People Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), later succeeded
by the National Housing Authority (NHA), filed with the same trial court its opposition to Ragua's
petition for reconstitution of OCT No. 632. PHHC averred that Ragua's petition did not comply with
the requirements of the law on judicial reconstitution. PHHC likewise contended that OCT No. 632 in
the name of Eulalio Ragua was fictitious, and that the property was covered by TCT No. 1356 in the
name of PHHC. PHHC maintained that TCT No. 1356 was originally covered by OCT No. 735, the
validity of which had been declared by the Supreme Court as beyond judicial review in the afore-
cited case of Maximo L. Galvez vs. Mariano Severo Tuason, supra.

Also on September 10, 1964, petitioner Eulalio Ragua filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VI, Pasig, Rizal another petition for reconstitution of OCT No. 632, G. L. R. O. No. 7984.
Ragua alleged that he was the owner of a parcel of land situated in Diliman, Quezon City, with an
area of four million three hundred ninety nine thousand three hundred twenty two (4,399,322) square
meters, particularly bounded and described as indicated on Plan II-4816 and that the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 632 had been lost and destroy many years ago when his personal effects and
papers were eaten by terminates.

On September 23, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasig, issued an order directing the
transfer of the record of G.L.R.O. No. 7984 to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City as
the land involved was situated in Caloocan City.

On September 28, 1964, Eulalio Ragua filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City
a manifestation for the consolidation of G.L.R.O. Record No. 7984 with Civil Case No. C-119. On
November 24, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City granted the manifestation
and consolidated the two cases.

On January 29, 1965, during the pendency of the petition, Sulpicio Alix applied for, and on the same
date, obtained from the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, an administrative reconstitution of OCT
No. 632.

On February 10, 1965, Tuason filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Branch 18 a
complaint for annulment of OCT No. 632 and subsequent transfer certificates of titles (TCTs)
5 

originating therefrom, against the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Eulalio Ragua, J. Sulpicio R.
Alix, Ramon S Mendoza, Leocadio D. Santiago, and others. Tuason alleged that he was the
successor-in-interest of the parcels of land in Quezon City originally covered by OCT 735 issued on
July 8, 1914 in G.L.R.O. Case No. 7681, as evidenced by TCT No. 32001 and TCT Nos. 37676 to
37686 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Tuason averred that on January 29, 1965, Ragua
and/or Alix knowingly caused to be reconstituted administratively in the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City, a fake OCT No. 632 covering 4,399,322 square meters of land situated in Diliman, Quezon
City. Tuason maintained that OCT No. 632 in the name of Ragua was a fake title since the records
of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal showed that OCT No. 632 was issued in the name of
Dominga J. Oripiano, for a parcel of land covering 97 hectares situated in Taytay, Rizal.

On February 15, 1965, Eulalio Ragua filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City a
"Motion to Confirm the Administrative Reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 632" alleging
that on January 29, 1965, Sulpicio Alix filed the owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 632 with the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City for the administrative reconstitution of said title. Alix secured the
owner's duplicate copy of OCT No. 632 by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his favor by Eulalio
Ragua. As a result, the Register of Deeds issued OCT No. 88081 in the name of Eulalio Ragua.
Subsequently, Alix succeeded in having OCT No. 88081 cancelled and replaced with TCT No.
88082 in his name, which, in turn, was replaced by 31 Transfer Certificates of Title on the strength of
deeds of absolute sale executed by Alix in favor of third parties.
1âwphi1.nêt

On February 17, 1965, Tuason filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City an
opposition to the motion of petitioners for the confirmation of the administrative reconstitution of OCT
No. 632. Tuason alleged that OCT No. 632 issued to Eulalio Ragua was a fake title, reconstituted
administratively by certain persons using surreptitious means, without any notice to all parties
concerned and without following the procedure prescribed by law governing the administrative
reconstitution of lost titles. Tuason further stated that the court had no jurisdiction to confirm the
administratively reconstituted OCT No. 632 inasmuch as under RA 26, administrative reconstitution
of titles and judicial reconstitution are two different matters.

On February 24, 1965, the Republic of the Philippines filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
6 

Caloocan City its opposition to the petition alleging that it was owner of the land including the
buildings and improvements thereon, now known as the Veterans Memorial Hospital (VMH),
acquired from the PHHC. The VMH site was part of the land acquired by PHHC from Tuason under
TCT No. 1356, originally covered by Tuason's OCT No. 735, the validity of which was judicially
recognized by the Supreme Court. The Republic adopted the opposition of the PHHC and Tuason. It
7 

further contended that it was a transferee in good faith, thereby barring any pretended right of
petitioners to the portion owned and possessed by it.

In sum, the petition for reconstitution filed by Eulalio Ragua was opposed by several parties, to wit:
the Tuasons, the National Housing Authority (formerly PHHC), Department of National Defense,
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Parks and Wildlife, Philippine American Life
Insurance Company, et. al., among other parties, which claimed to have purchased portions of the
Diliman Estate from the Tuasons.

On April 18, 1968, Eulalio Ragua died, and on April 29, 1968, was substituted by his heirs Domingo,
Marciana, Miguel, Juana, Francisco, Valeriana, and Remedios, all surnamed Ragua, and Carlito
Ragua Lara, as petitioners.

On January 10, 1972, petitioners and oppositors filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City a joint motion to transfer the proceedings in Case No. C-119 /G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 7984
to Branch 18, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City for consolidation with Civil Case No. Q-
8559, which consolidation was effected.
8 

After due hearing, on March 24, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City rendered
decision the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
9 

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment —

 1. In Case No. 119, the Quezon City Register of Deeds is ordered to reconstitute in the name
of Eulalio Ragua Original Certificate of Title No. 632, with the Technical Description
appearing in Plan II-4816 and Annexes A & B of the Petition, upon payment of all lawful fees;

2. In Case Q-8559, declaring null and void, and cancelling the administratively reconstituted
OCT 632 (88081) and Transfer Certificates of Title derived therefrom, including — TCT
88082, 88083, 88084, 88087, 88088, 88089, 88091, 88092, 88093, 88094, 88095, 88096,
88097, 88098, 88030, 88656, 88657, 88658, 88659, 88671, 85677, 88674, 88675, 88689,
and all any transfer certificates of title derived therefrom.

The claims in interventions in Case No. 119 of parties who upheld the validity of the Ragua
title, as well as any claims in Case 8559 against Sulpicio Alix may be prosecuted in separate
proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, March 24, 1980.

(SGD) ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO

District Judge 10

In due time, oppositors, including the Republic, filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration
of the decision. On August 29, 1980, the trial court denied the motion.

The Republic appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of Appeals. Private oppositors and the
11 

National Housing Authority filed separate appeals to the Court of Appeals.

After due proceedings on appeal, on May 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from is reversed insofar as it orders the

reconstitution of OCT 632 in the name of Eulalio Ragua.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 12

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution for
failure to comply with the jurisdictional requirements of publication and posting of notices provided
under Republic Act No. 26, Sections 12 and 13. The Court of Appeals ruled that
assuming arguendo that the trial court had jurisdiction over the petition, the evidence presented in
court to support the application was dubious in character and insufficient to justify the reconstitution.

The Court of Appeals held furthermore that the land in question was embraced in OCT No. 735,
issued in the name of Tuason, the validity of which was upheld by the Supreme Court in several
cases. The trial court could not proceed with the reconstitution proceedings without Tuason's title
13 

and those originating therefrom being annulled first. The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioners
14 
were guilty of laches since it took them nineteen (19) years from the end of World War II in 1945,
wherein OCT 632 was lost, to file the petition for reconstitution.

On July 22, 1989, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals'
decision. 15

Re: G.R. Nos. 89366-67

Petitioners Elisa G. Dufourt and Marino T. Regalado were owners of 45 and 55 hectares,
respectively, of the same parcel of land known as the Diliman Estate, which was subject of the
petition for judicial reconstitution of OCT No. 632, filed by Eulalio Ragua with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, later transferred to Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City.
Sometime in 1972, petitioners acquired the property by virtue of deeds of assignment executed by
Eulalio Ragua in their favor. Petitioners' rights and interests over the above property have been
confirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 20701, promulgated on May 4, 1989.

As heretofore stated, on March 24, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City rendered
decision in favor of Ragua, ordering the Register of Deeds, Quezon City, to reconstitute OCT 632 in
the name of Ragua.

On October 28, 1980, petitioners filed with the Court of Instance, Quezon City a motion for execution
of the judgment rendered by it, contending that the judgment had become final after the Register of
Deeds and Land Registration Commission failed to file an appeal within the prescribed period. On
January 5, 1981, the trial court denied the motion for execution and approved the record on appeal
filed by the Republic of the Philippines.

On March 7, 1983, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals, a motion to dismiss the appeal, which
the court denied.

As aforesaid, on May 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision.

On August 14, 1989, petitioners filed with this Court, a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with
prohibition and temporary restraining order seeking the execution of the trial court's order
16 

authorizing reconstitution of OCT No. 632.

On August 21, 1989, we consolidated G.R. Nos. 89366-67 with G.R. Nos. 88521-22. 17

On March 26, 1990, we required respondents in G.R. Nos. 88521-22 to comment on the
petition. On June 28, 1990, the Solicitor General filed his comment.
18  19

On November 23, 1992, we required respondents in G. R. Nos. 89366-67 to comment on the

petition. On September 27, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his comment.
20  21

In the course of this controversy, portions of the contested property had been the subject of sales to
different persons, some of whom moved to intervene in the cases, or to substitute the parties
therein, which further complicated the cases.

On October 7, 1997, the surviving heirs of Eulalio Ragua, assisted by judicial administratrix Norma
G. Aquino, filed with this Court a manifestation offering to executed deeds of donations in favor of
the government and its instrumentalities, of all portions of the real property actually occupied by
offices performing governmental functions, including roads and parking areas. 22
We give due course to the petitions and decide them jointly.

These cases present two (2) basic issues, namely, (1) whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the proceedings for reconstitution of title due to non-compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements prescribed for reconstitution of tittles, and (2) whether the evidence of the sources of
the title to be reconstituted was sufficient basis therefor.

With respect to the first issue, R. A. No. 26, Sections 12 and 13, provide for jurisdictional
requirements of petitions for reconstitution to titles filed on the basis of documents other than the
owners' or co-owners' duplicate certificates of title. The provisions are quoted hereunder:

Sec. 12. Petitions for reconstitution from sources enumerated in sections 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(f),
3(c), 3(d), 3(e), and/or 3(f) of this Act, shall be filed with the proper Court of First Instance, by
the registered owner, his assigns or any person having an interest in the property. The
petition shall state or contain, among other things, the following: (a) that the owner's
duplicate of the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed: (b) that no co-owner's
mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate had been issued, or if any had been issued, the same had
been lost destroyed; (c) the location, area and boundaries of the property; (d) the nature and
description of the buildings or improvements, if any which do not belong to the owner of the
land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such building or improvements; (e) the
name and addresses of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, of the
owners of the adjoining properties and of all persons who may have any interest in the
property; (f) a detailed description of the encumbrances, if any, affecting the property; and
(g) a statement that no needs or other instruments affecting the property have been
presented for registration, or if there be any, the registration thereof has not been
accomplished, as yet. All the documents, or authenticated copies thereof, to be introduced in
evidence in support of the petition for reconstitution shall be attached thereto and filed with
the same: Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources
enumerated in Section 2(f) and/or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall be further accompanied
with a plan and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the
General Land Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior
certificate of title covering the same property.

Sec. 13. The court shall cause a notice of the petition filed under the preceding section, to be
published, at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette,
and to be posted on the main entrance of the municipality or city in which the land is
situated, at the provincial building and of the municipal building at least thirty days prior to
the date of hearing. The Court shall likewise cause a copy of the notice to be sent, be
registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every person named therein
whose address is among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title if
known, the name of the registered owner, the names of the occupants or persons in
possession of the property, the owners of the adjoining properties and all other interested
parties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which all persons
having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objections to the petition. The
petition shall, at the hearing, submit proof of the publication, posting and service of the notice
as directed by the court.

Petitioners admittedly did not comply with the requirements of Section 12 (d), (e) and (g), namely,
the petition did not state (1) the nature and description of the buildings or improvements, if any,
which do not belong to the owner of the land, and the names and addresses of the owners of such
buildings or improvements, (2) the names and addresses of the occupants of the adjoining property
and of all persons who may have any interest in the property and (3) that no deeds or other
instrument affecting the property have been presented for registration. Neither do these data appear
in the notice of hearing. Besides, petitioners also did not comply with the notice and publication
requirement under Section 13 because the order directed that the notice be posted at the Caloocan
City Hall, not in Quezon City, where the land is situated.

We have ruled that the failure to comply with the requirements of publication and posting of notices
prescribed in Republic Act No. 26, Sections 12 and 13 is fatal to the jurisdiction of the court. Hence,
23 

non-compliance with the jurisdictional requirements renders its decision approving the reconstitution
of OCT No. 632 and all proceedings therein utterly null and void. 24

The next issue to resolve is whether the documents of the sources of the title to be reconstituted
sufficed for reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 632 in the name of Eulalio Ragua, in the
absence of genuine copies of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title or certified copy thereof.

The trial court allowed reconstitution of OCT 632 on the basis of sources as follows:

a. Plan II-4816, as certified by the Bureau of Lands;

b. Tracing Cloth Plan, certified by the Bureau of Lands;

c. Microfilm of Plan II-4816;

d. The application of Eulalio Ragua as certified to by Commissioner Noblejas on July 14,

1964;

e. Photographic copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 632;

f. Decree No. 6970 certified to by the Land Registration Commission;

g. Technical Description of the Ragua Property duly certified to by both the Bureau of lands
and Land Registration Commission;

h. Tax Declaration No. 8501 dated December 25, 1925 and made operative as of 1917.

The Court of Appeals held that the documents submitted were dubious in character and could not be
proper sources of reconstitution of OCT No. 632. This is a factual finding that we cannot review in
this review on certiorari.
25

First: Regarding Plan II-4816 and microfilm of Plan II-4816, the Court of Appeals found that there
were conflicting reports regarding their authenticity as there was showing of splicing of the microfilm,
which tainted its genuineness. Consequently, Plan II-4816 can not be considered as genuine
evidence for reconstitution.

Second: the application for registration of title of Eulalio Ragua, duly certified by Commissioner
Noblejas did not indicate that the application was approved. Hence, it can not constitute proof of the
title supposedly issued subsequently. Neither was there proof that such application was published in
the Official Gazette as required by law.

Third: the photographic copy of OCT No. 632 was not authenticated by the Register of Deeds.
Fourth: the copy of Decree No. 6970, can not be considered as competent evidence because only
the upper and lower parts of the document remain. The document does not show to whom the
decree was issued or the technical description of the property covered.

Fifth: the tax declarations covering the property do not prove ownership over the land. 26

Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals that none of the source documents presented
was reliable. We are convinced that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are supported by
sufficient evidence and, thus, binding on this Court. We will not disturb these factual findings.

Moreover, petitioners filed the petition for reconstitution of OCT 632 nineteen (19) years after the title
was allegedly lost or destroyed. We thus consider petitioners guilty of laches. Laches is negligence
27 

or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. 28

We find hypocritical and pharisaical petitioners' manifestation expressing willingness to donate to the
government the portions of the 439 hectares of land presently occupied by government offices. Nihil
dat qui non habet — He can not give what he does not have. 29

Petitioners contend that the trial court's decision has become final and executory for failure of the
Register of Deeds and Land Registration Commission to appeal within the prescribed period.

Petitioners' submission can not be sustained.

Petitioners were not parties in the case before the trial court for the judicial reconstitution of OCT
632. It was Eulalio Ragua, later succeeded by his heirs, who filed the petition for reconstitution. Not
being parties to the petition, petitioners have no personality to file the motion for execution of
judgment. In any event, the decision cannot be executed as timely appeals therefrom were taken by
the parties.

In a petition for judicial reconstitution of title, the Register of Deeds is merely a nominal party. In fact,
it is not even required to implead him. In the instant cases, the Republic of the Philippines together
with other intervenors and oppositors, interposed appeals to the Court of Appeals within the
prescribed period.

There is no merit to petitioners' argument that the Court of Appeals' decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
20701 is legally incompatible with its decision in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 00705-00706. CA-G.R. CV No.
20701 confirmed the legal rights of petitioners over the parcels of land ceded to them by virtue of the
deeds of assignments executed by Eulalio Ragua. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 20701 did not involve the validity of the Ragua title.

On the other hand, the decision in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 00705-06 dealt with the petition for judicial
reconstitution of title filed by Eulalio Ragua and granted by the trial court.

"The reconstitution of a title is simply the reissuance of a new duplicate certificate of title allegedly
lost or destroyed in its original form and condition. " Consequently, as the purported sources of the
30 

title to be reconstituted were dubious, the trial court erred in making use of them for the
reconstitution of the title in the name of Eulalio Ragua. 1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petitions in G.R. Nos. 88521-22 and G.R. Nos. 89366-
67, for lack of merit. The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos.
00705-00706, promulgated on May 30, 1989.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., took no part, I appeared as counsel for respondent Republic of the Philippines in an
incident before the trial court when I was Asst. Sol. Gen.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO

MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO,
ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN MANOTOK, FELISA
MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK, SEVERINO
MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M. BOCANEGRA, MA.
CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L. MANOTOK, RAMON
SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE
MANOTOK, JR. and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by their Attorney-in-fact, Rosa
R. Manotok, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE
HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review assail, in G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended
Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the
1 

Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605,
the November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second
2 

Division in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel
petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481, and the LRA to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177 and the
March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
3 

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

4 

Petitioners, (respondents herein) as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with
the LRA for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name
of Homer L. Barque, which was destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the
Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988. In support of the petition,
petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177, real estate tax receipts, tax
declarations and the Plan FLS 3168 D covering the property.

Upon being notified of the petition for administrative reconstitution, private respondents (petitioners
herein) filed their opposition thereto claiming that the lot covered by the title under reconstitution
forms part of the land covered by their reconstituted title TCT No. RT-22481, and alleging that TCT
No. 210177 in the name of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is spurious.

On June 30, 1997, Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the reconstitution of
TCT No. 210177 on grounds that:
5 
1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs.,
respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing an
area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M.
Manotok, et. al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr. Privadi
J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated
February 19, 1997. 6

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated February 10, 1998 hence
7 

they appealed to the LRA.

The LRA ruled that the reconstituting officer should not have required the submission of documents
other than the owner’s duplicate certificate of title as bases in denying the petition and should have
confined himself with the owner’s duplicate certificate of title. The LRA further declared:
8 

Based on the documents presented, petitioners have established by clear and convincing evidence
that TCT NO. 210177 was, at the time of the destruction thereof, valid, genuine, authentic and
effective. Petitioners duly presented the original of the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 210177 ....
The logbook of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City lists TCT No. 210177 as among the titles
lost .... The Register of Deeds of Quezon City himself acknowledged the existence and authenticity
of TCT No. 210177 when he issued a certification to the effect that TCT No. 210177 was one of the
titles destroyed and not salvaged from the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall on 11 June 1988 ....

It is likewise noteworthy that the technical description and boundaries of the lot reflected in TCT No.
210177 absolutely conform to the technical description and boundaries of Lot 823 Piedad Estate ...
as indicated in the B. L. Form No. 28-37-R dated 11-8-94 and B. L. Form No. 31-10 duly issued by
the Bureau of Lands ....

It therefore becomes evident that the existence, validity, authenticity and effectivity of TCT No.
210177 was established indubitably and irrefutably by the petitioners. Under such circumstances,
the reconstitution thereof should be given due course and the same is mandatory. 9

….

It would be necessary to underscore that the certified copy of Plan FLS 3168 D was duly issued by
the office of Engr. Ernesto Erive, Chief, Surveys Division LMS-DENR-NCR whose office is the lawful
repository of survey plans for lots situated within the National Capital Region including the property
in question. Said plan was duly signed by the custodian thereof, Carmelito Soriano, Chief Technical
Records and Statistics Section, DENR-NCR. Said plan is likewise duly supported by Republic of the
Philippines Official Receipt No. 2513818 Q dated 9-23-96 .... Engr. Erive in his letter dated 28
November 1996 addressed to Atty. Bustos … confirmed that a microfilm copy of Plan FLS 3168D is
on file in the Technical Records and Statistics Section of his office. Engr. Dalire, in his letter dated 2
January 1997 addressed to Atty. Bustos even confirmed the existence and authenticity of said plan.
…

.…

The claim of Engr. Dalire in his letter dated 19 February 1997 that his office has no records or
information about Plan FLS 3168-D is belied by the certified copy of the computer print-out duly
issued by the Bureau of Lands indicating therein that FLS 3168D is duly entered into the microfilm
records of the Bureau of Lands and has been assigned Accession Number 410436 appearing on
Page 79, Preliminary Report No. 1, List of Locator Cards and Box Number 0400 and said computer
print-out is duly supported by an Offical Receipt ….

The said Plan FLS 3168D is indeed authentic and valid coming as it does from the legal repository
and duly signed by the custodian thereof. The documentary evidence presented is much too
overwhelming to be simply brushed aside and be defeated by the fabricated statements and
concoctions made by Engr. Dalire in his 19 February 1997 letter. … 10

Nevertheless, notwithstanding its conclusion that petitioners’ title was fraudulently reconstituted, the
LRA noted that it is only the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which can declare that the same was indeed
fraudulently reconstituted. It thus opined that respondents’ title may only be reconstituted after a
judicial declaration that petitioners’ title was void and should therefore be cancelled.
11

The dispositive portion of the LRA’s decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in
the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 12

Petitioners’ filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by respondents with a prayer that
reconstitution be ordered immediately.

On June 14, 2001, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and respondents’ prayer for immediate
reconstitution were denied. 13

From the foregoing, respondents filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals docketed as
14 

CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and praying that the LRA be directed to immediately reconstitute TCT No.
210177 without being subjected to the condition that petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] should
first be cancelled by a court of competent jurisdiction. Petitioners likewise filed a petition for review
15 

with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 16 

September 13, 2002, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered the assailed Resolution of the LRA dated June
24, 1998 is AFFIRMED in toto and the petition for review is ordered DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 17

Respondents moved for reconsideration. On November 7, 2003, the Special Division of Five of the
18 

Former Second Division rendered an Amended Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private
respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and
existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 19

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the amended decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 was
denied, hence, this petition docketed as G.R. No. 162605.
20 

Meanwhile, in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision on October 29, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
21 

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Resolution of the LRA dated 24 June 1998 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED. 22

In so ruling, the Third Division of the Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in
giving due course to the petition for reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or
annulling respondents’ title.
23

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration was granted by the Third Division of the Court of Appeals
on February 24, 2004, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court
dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute
forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED. 24

From the foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 and CA-G.R. SP No.
66642, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605
and G.R. No. 162335, respectively.

In G.R. No. 162605, petitioners argue that:

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE

CANCELLATION OF PETITIONERS’ EXISTING TITLE, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. THEY ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF TITLE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME IS
NOT PART OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT IN A RECONSTITUTION PROCEEDINGS.

b. THEY ALLOWED A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON A TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE; and

c. THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN RESOLVING AN APPEAL OF THE DECISION OF THE LAND

REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER THE
CANCELLATION OF TITLE, SINCE ONLY A PROPER REGIONAL TRIAL COURT CAN ORDER
THE ANNULMENT/CANCELLATION OF A TORRENS TITLE. BY ALLOWING A "SHORT CUT",
THE MAJORITY JUSTICES DEPRIVED THE PETITIONERS OF THEIR PROPERTY AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
 II

THE MAJORITY JUSTICES GRAVELY MISAPPLIED THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE

COURT IN ORTIGAS V. VELASCO, CONSIDERING THAT:

a. IN THE ORTIGAS CASE, THERE WERE TWO TITLES EXISTING OVER THE SAME PARCEL
OF LAND, AS A RESULT OF THE RECONSTITUTED TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF MOLINA.
IN THE INSTANT CASE, ONLY PETITIONERS HOLD TITLE TO THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION,
AS RESPONDENTS ARE MERELY TRYING TO HAVE TITLE RECONSTITUTED IN THEIR
NAMES.

b. IN ORTIGAS, THERE WERE SEVERAL DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHICH

PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP OF ORTIGAS’ PROPERTY. HENCE,
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO ANNUL MOLINA’S TITLE OUTRIGHT. IN THE INSTANT
CASE, THERE ARE NO SUCH DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS WHICH WOULD
JUSTIFY THE CANCELLATION OF THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS WITHOUT ANY HEARING. 25

In G.R. No. 162335, petitioners raise the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN ORDERING THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY TO CANCEL TCT NO. RT-22481 OF PETITIONERS MANOTOK
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COURT WAS FULLY COGNIZANT THAT IT HAS
NO JURISDICTION TO EXERCISE SUCH AUTHORITY AND POWER AND THE LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IS EQUALLY DEVOID OF JURISDICTION ON THE MATTER
BECAUSE UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980 SPECIFICALLY SECTION
19 (2) THEREOF, ONLY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR POSSESSION OF,
REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AND GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IN INVOKING EQUITABLE
CONSIDERATION TO JUSTIFY ITS CHALLENGED AMENDED DECISION DATED FEBRUARY
24, 2004 DIRECTING LRA TO CANCEL PETITIONERS MANOTOK’S TITLE NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT, AS STATED, THE LAW EXPLICITLY VESTS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS OVER CIVIL ACTIONS WHICH INVOLVES TITLE TO, OR
POSSESSION OF, REAL PROPERTY, OR ANY INTEREST THEREIN.

III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAILING TO ORDER THE
SETTING ASIDE OF THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTION DATED JUNE 24, 1998 OF
RESPONDENT LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY IN LRC ADMIN. CASE NO. Q-547 [97]
VIEWED FROM THE FACT THAT SAID RESOLUTION OF LRA IS PATENTLY AT WAR WITH
LAW AND CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE THAT PROHIBITS RECONSTITUTION OF TITLE
BY THIRD PARTY ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED IF ANOTHER VALID TITLE
IS EXISTING COVERING THE LAND SUBJECT THEREOF.

IV. THE LRA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ORDERING THE RECONSTITUTION OF THE TITLE OF HOMER
BARQUE, SR. SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONDITION THAT THE TITLE OF PETITIONERS
MANOTOK SHOULD FIRST BE ORDERED CANCELLED BY COURT OF COMPETENT
JURISDICTION IN THE FACE OF THE GLARING FACTS THAT SAID TITLE IS HIGHLY SUSPECT
AND BEARS BADGES OF FABRICATION AND FALSIFICATION AND THEREFORE NO OTHER
LOGICAL AND CREDIBLE CONCLUSION CAN BE DRAWN EXCEPT THAT IT IS A FAKE AND
SPURIOUS TITLE.

V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ALLOWING RESPONDENTS’
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH WAS CLEARLY FILED OUT OF TIME. 26

On August 2, 2004, the petition in G.R. No. 162605 was consolidated with the petition in G.R. No.
162335. 27

In sum, petitioners contend that (a) the LRA has no authority to annul their title; (b) the reconstitution
of respondents’ Torrens title would be a collateral attack on petitioners’ existing title; (c) they were
not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the validity of their Torrens
title; (d) the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the
cancellation of petitioners’ title; and (e) the ruling in Ortigas was misapplied.

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. Section 3 of Republic Act (RA) No. 26 clearly
28 

provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources hereunder
enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

....

When respondents filed the petition for reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner’s
duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should
have more than sufficed as sources for the reconstitution pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 26 which
explicitly mandates that the reconstitution shall be made following the hierarchy of sources as
enumerated by law. In addition, Section 12 of the same law requires that the petition shall be
accompanied with a plan and technical description of the property only if the source of the
reconstitution is Section 3(f) of RA No. 26. Thus:

Section 12. … Provided, That in case the reconstitution is to be made exclusively from sources

enumerated in section 2(f) or 3(f) of this Act, the petition shall further be accompanied with a plan
and technical description of the property duly approved by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, or with a certified copy of the description taken from a prior certificate of title
covering the same property. 29

Since respondents’ source of reconstitution is the owner’s duplicate certificate of title, there is no
need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the petition
on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious. By enumerating the hierarchy of
sources to be used for the reconstitution, it is the intent of the law to give more weight and
preference to the owner’s duplicate certificate of title over the other enumerated sources.
The factual finding of the LRA that respondents’ title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing, while
petitioners’ title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is
conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Findings of fact of administrative bodies are accorded respect, even finality by this Court and, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are no longer reviewable except only for very compelling reasons.
Basic is the rule that factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions … are accorded
not only respect but even finality, aside from the consideration that this Court is essentially not a trier
of facts.
30

Such questions as whether certain items of evidence should be accorded probative value or weight,
or rejected as feeble or spurious, or whether or not the proofs on one side or the other are clear and
convincing and adequate to establish a proposition in issue, are without doubt questions of fact.
Whether or not the body of proofs presented by a party, weighed and analyzed in relation to contrary
evidence submitted by adverse party, may be said to be strong, clear and convincing; whether or not
certain documents presented by one side should be accorded full faith and credit in the face of
protests as to their spurious character by the other side; whether or not inconsistencies in the body
of proofs of a party are of such gravity as to justify refusing to give said proofs weight – all these are
issues of fact. Questions like these are not reviewable by this court which, as a rule, confines its
review of cases decided by the Court of Appeals only to questions of law raised in the petition and
therein distinctly set forth. A petition for review should only cover questions of law. Questions of fact
31 

are not reviewable. 32

In Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, this Court categorically declared:
33 

Second. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals made a factual finding that petitioner’s title to
the land is of doubtful authenticity.

Having jurisdiction only to resolve questions of law, this Court is bound by the factual findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals....

In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to remand the case to the RTC for the
determination of which title, petitioners' or respondents', is valid or spurious. This has been ruled
upon by the LRA and duly affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals.

The LRA has the jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution. It has the authority
to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal the decision of the reconstituting officer. The
function is adjudicatory in nature – it can properly deliberate on the validity of the titles submitted for
reconstitution. Logically, it can declare a title as sham or spurious, or valid on its face. Otherwise, if it
cannot make such declaration, then there would be no basis for its decision to grant or deny the
reconstitution. The findings of fact of the LRA, when supported by substantial evidence, as in this
case, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. 34

In the reconstitution proceedings, the LRA is bound to determine from the evidence submitted which
between or among the titles is genuine and existing to enable it to decide whether to deny or
approve the petition. Without such authority, the LRA would be a mere robotic agency clothed only
with mechanical powers.

The Court of Appeals also properly exercised its appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the LRA.
Under Sections 1 and 3, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the appellate court has jurisdiction on
appeals from judgments or final orders of the LRA, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law.

Indeed, it would be needlessly circuitous to remand the case to the RTC to determine anew which of
the two titles is sham or spurious and thereafter appeal the trial court’s ruling to the Court of
Appeals. After all, the LRA and the two divisions of the appellate court have already declared that
petitioners’ title is forged. In Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that:
35 

Now, technically, the revocation and cancellation of the deed of sale and the title issued in virtue
thereof in de los Santos’ favor should be had in appropriate proceedings to be initiated at the
instance of the Government. However, since all the facts are now before this Court, and it is not
within de los Santos’ power in any case to alter those facts at any other proceeding, or the
verdict made inevitable by said facts, for this Court to direct at this time that cancellation
proceedings be yet filed to nullify the sale to de los Santos and his title, would be needlessly
circuitous and would unnecessarily delay the termination of the controversy at bar, .... This
Court will therefore make the adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further
proceedings, as it has done in other cases in similar premises.

No useful purpose will be served if a case or the determination of an issue in a case is remanded to
the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme
Court. The remand of the case or of an issue to the lower court for further reception of evidence is
not necessary where the Court is in position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it
and particularly where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand thereof. 36

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have jurisdiction to act on the petition for
administrative reconstitution. The doctrine laid down in Alabang Dev. Corp., et al. v. Hon.
Valenzuela, etc., et al. does not apply in the instant case. In Alabang, the Court stressed that:
37 

… [L]ands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles … cannot be the subject of
petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without
first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. … The courts simply have no
jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles
over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners. The very concept of stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the
Torrens System of registration rules out as anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the
same land to two different holders thereof. … 38

The Alabang ruling was premised on the fact that the existing Torrens title was duly issued and that
there is only one title subsisting at the time the petition for reconstitution was filed. In the instant
case, it cannot be said that petitioners’ title was duly issued much less could it be presumed valid
considering the findings of the LRA and the Court of Appeals that the same is sham and spurious.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the doctrine laid down in Ortigas in refusing to remand the
case to the trial court. As expressly declared in Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v. Velasco: 39

Ordinarily, the relief indicated by the material facts would be the remand of the reconstitution case
(LRC No. Q-5405) to the Court of origin with instructions that Ortigas’ and the Solicitor General’s
appeals from the judgment rendered therein, which were wrongly disallowed, be given due course
and the records forthwith transmitted to the appellate tribunal. This, in fact, is a relief alternatively
prayed for by petitioner Ortigas. Considering however the fatal infirmities afflicting Molina’s theory or
cause of action, evident from the records before this Court, such a remand and subsequent appeal
proceedings would be pointless and unduly circuitous. Upon the facts, it is not possible for Molina’s
cause to prosper. To defer adjudication thereon would be unwarranted and unjust.

The same rationale should apply in the instant case. As already discussed, the validity of
respondents’ and petitioners’ title have been squarely passed upon by the LRA and reviewed and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which factual findings are no longer reviewable by this Court.

A careful examination of the case of Spouses Cayetano, et al. v. CA, et al., where this Court, as
40 

claimed by petitioners, have affirmed their title over the disputed property, would reveal that the sole
issue resolved therein is whether or not a tenancy relationship exists between the parties. There
41 

was no adjudication on ownership. In fact, it cannot even be discerned if the property subject of
the Spouses Cayetano case refers to the property subject of the instant controversy.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due
process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without
a direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the
RTC for a re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same
has been squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the
petition for reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners
acquiesced to the authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of
Appeals, and recognized their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented
was duly considered by these tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners’ claim that they were
deprived of their right to be heard and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.

As held in Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian: 42

Therefore, it appearing from the records that in the previous petition for reconstitution of certificates
of title, the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue of ownership for determination in the said
petition, and they were given the full opportunity to present their respective sides of the issues and
evidence in support thereof, and that the evidence presented was sufficient and adequate for
rendering a proper decision upon the issue, the adjudication of the issue of ownership was valid and
binding.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners’ title which was irregularly
and illegally issued in the first place. As pertinently held in Dolfo v. Register of Deeds for the
43 

Province of Cavite: 44

The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed valid and, hence, is the best proof
of ownership of a piece of land does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its purported
origin.

In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the subject property is
indefeasible because of the presumption that her certificate of title is authentic. However, this
presumption is overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report … that TCT No.
T-320601 was issued without legal basis …

….

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that the
Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and
vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule
applies only where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.

Under similar circumstances, this Court has ruled that wrongly reconstituted certificates of title
secured through fraud and misrepresentation cannot be the source of legitimate rights and benefits. 45

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. In G.R. No. 162335, the February 24, 2004 Amended
Decision of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, ordering the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the Land
Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. 210177; and in G.R. No. 162605, the
November 7, 2003 Amended Decision of the Special Division of Five of the Former Second Division
in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT
No. RT-22481, and the Land Registration Authority to reconstitute respondents’ TCT No. T-210177
and the March 12, 2004 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

Footnotes
1
 Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 113-118. Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola
and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Edgardo F.
Sundiam.

 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-66. Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J.
2

Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Edgardo P. Cruz and
Danilo B. Pine. Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., dissented.

3
 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 71-73.

4
 In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 56-57.

5
 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 86.

6
 Id.

7
 Id. at 87.

8
 Id. at 90.

9
 Id. at 91.

10
 Id. at 92.

11
 Id. at 94.

12
 Id. at 95.

13
 Id. at 97.

14
 Id. at 99-121.

15
 Id. at 119.

 Id. at 236-240. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and concurred in by
16

Associate Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Eloy R. Bello, Jr.

17
 CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 240.

18
 Id. at 273-293.

19
 Id. at 65.

20
 Id. at 73.

 CA-G.R SP No. 66642, Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 106-111. Penned by Associate
21

Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-

Fernando and Edgardo F. Sundiam.

22
 Id. at 110.
23
 Id.

24
 Id. at 117.

25
 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, pp. 22-23.

26
 Rollo of G.R. No. 162335, pp. 35-37.

27
 Rollo of G.R. No. 162605, p. 386.

 AN ACT PROVIDING A SPECIAL PROCEDURE FOR THE RECONSTITUTION OF

28

TORRENS CERTIFICATES OF TITLE LOST OR DESTROYED.

29
 Section 3 of RA No. 26 provides:

Section 3. Transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted from such of the sources
hereunder enumerated as may be available, in the following order:

(a) The owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b) The co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of the certificate of title;

(c) A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a
legal custodian thereof;

(d) The deed of transfer or other document, on file in the registry of deeds, containing the
description of the property, or an authenticated copy thereof, showing that its original had
been registered, and pursuant to which the lost or destroyed transfer certificate of title was
issued;

(e) A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of
which is given in said document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated
copy of said document showing that its original had been registered; and

(f) Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for
reconstituting the lost or destroyed certificate of title.

30
 Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Corp. v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 193, 204 [1997].

31
 Paterno v. Paterno, G.R. No. 63680, March 23, 1990, 183 SCRA 630, 636-637.

32
 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 439, 449.

33
 G.R. No. 133465, September 25, 2000, 341 SCRA 58, 62-63.

34
 Section 10, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

35
 G.R. No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508, 514.
  Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, January 4,
36

1994, 229 SCRA 15, 29.

37
 201 Phil. 727 [1982].

38
 Id. at 744.

39
 G.R. Nos. 109645 & 112564, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455, 500-501.

40
 215 Phil. 430 [1984].

41
 Id. at 436.

42
 149 Phil. 688, 709 [1971].

43
 Heirs of Pael v. Court of Appeals, 423 Phil. 67, 69 [2001].

44
 Supra at 63 & 66.

45
 Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85157, December 26, 1990, 192 SCRA 735, 741.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

Severino M. Manotok IV, et al., Petitioners,

vs.
Heirs of Homer L. Barque, et al., Respondents.

SEPARATE OPINION

QUISUMBING, J.:

I concur in the result reached by Ynares-Santiago, J., in her opinion and I join Davide, Jr., C.J., and
Azcuna, J., in the majority vote to DENY the petitions.

While at the inception of this controversy, a trial by the Regional Trial Court would have been in
order, remand of this case for trial at this late stage would only be a time-consuming and pointless
exercise. Prompt resolution of the controversy is in order to avoid further delay.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

Associate Justice
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605 December 12, 2005

Severino M. Manotok IV, et al., Petitioners,

vs.
Heirs of Homer L. Barque, et al., Respondents.

SEPARATE OPINION

AZCUNA, J.:

From the record it appears undisputed that, as the LRA ruled and the CA affirmed, petitioners
Manotoks’ TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] is sham and spurious. For one thing, the property is
purportedly located in barrio Payong, Quezon City, whereas no such barrio existed or exists therein.
It is, therefore, in my view, unnecessary to go though the exercise of proving this matter again in the
regular courts, as would ordinarily be required, since the point is indubitable.

I thus find applicable the ruling of this Court in Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership v.
Veloso, as it would be unjust in the circumstances to require respondents to undergo a time-
1 

consuming and pointless exercise to cancel an evidently sham and spurious title.

I, therefore, concur with Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and vote to DENY the petitions.

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice

Footnotes

1
 G.R. No. 109645, July 25, 1994, 234 SCRA 455.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

G.R. No. 162335 December 12, 2005

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO M.
MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO,
ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN V. MANOTOK,
FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK,
SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M.
BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L.
MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA
MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by
their Attorney-in-fact, ROSA R. MANOTOK, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE-
HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 162605

SEVERINO M. MANOTOK IV, FROILAN M. MANOTOK, FERNANDO M. MANOTOK, FAUSTO M.

MANOTOK III, MA. MAMERTA M. MANOTOK, PATRICIA L. TIONGSON, PACITA L. GO,
ROBERTO LAPERAL III, MICHAEL MARSHALL V. MANOTOK, MARY ANN V. MANOTOK,
FELISA MYLENE V. MANOTOK, IGNACIO V. MANOTOK, JR., MILAGROS V. MANOTOK,
SEVERINO MANOTOK III, ROSA R. MANOTOK, MIGUEL A.B. SISON, GEORGE M.
BOCANEGRA, MA. CRISTINA E. SISON, PHILIPP L. MANOTOK, JOSE CLEMENTE L.
MANOTOK, RAMON SEVERINO L. MANOTOK, THELMA R. MANOTOK, JOSE MARIA
MANOTOK, JESUS JUDE MANOTOK, JR., and MA. THERESA L. MANOTOK, represented by
their Attorney-in-fact, ROSA R. MANOTOK, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HOMER L. BARQUE, represented by TERESITA BARQUE-
HERNANDEZ, Respondents.

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I dissent because the majority opinion deprives petitioners of their immensely valuable property —
worth billions of pesos — without due process of law.

The majority opinion cancels the Torrens title of petitioners in these cases which originated from an
administrative reconstitution petition filed by respondents before the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. The majority opinion patently violates Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree which 1 

expressly states that a Torrens title "cannot be x x x cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law." Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, "Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction x x x in all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein." Thus, only the proper trial court, in an action directly
2 

attacking the validity of a Torrens title, can cancel a Torrens title after trial on the merit.
Jurisprudence has aptly termed this hornbook doctrine. 3

In the present cases, there is no such direct attack on the Torrens title of petitioners. And yet the
majority opinion cancels petitioners’ Torrens title, covering thirty-four hectares of prime land located
in Quezon City conservatively estimated at more than One Billion Seven Hundred Million Pesos.

The Cases
Before the Court are two petitions for review filed by Severino M. Manotok IV, Froilan M. Manotok,
4 

Fernando M. Manotok, Fausto M. Manotok III, Ma. Mamerta M. Manotok, Patricia L. Tiongson,
Pacita L. Go, Roberto Laperal III, Michael Marshall V. Manotok, Mary Ann V. Manotok, Felisa
Mylene V. Manotok, Ignacio V. Manotok, Jr., Milagros V. Manotok, Severino Manotok III, Rosa R.
Manotok, Miguel A.B. Sison, George M. Bocanegra, Ma. Cristina E. Sison, Philipp L. Manotok, Jose
Clemente L. Manotok, Ramon Severino L. Manotok, Thelma R. Manotok, Jose Maria Manotok,
Jesus Jude Manotok, Jr., and Ma. Theresa L. Manotok ("Manotok, et al."), represented by their
attorney-in-fact, Rosa R. Manotok, against the Heirs of Homer L. Barque ("Heirs of Barque"),
represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez ("Barque-Hernandez"). The cases were consolidated in
the Court’s Resolution of 2 August 2004. 5

In G.R. No. 162335, Manotok, et al. assail the 24 February 2004 Amended Decision of the Court of
6 

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642. The Court of Appeals ordered the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City to cancel the Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") of Manotok, et al. and the Land Registration
Authority ("LRA") to reconstitute the TCT of the Heirs of Barque.

In G.R. No. 162605, Manotok, et al. assail the 7 November 2003 Amended Decision and the 12
7 

March 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. The Court of Appeals
8  9 

directed the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al. and the LRA to
reconstitute the TCT of the Heirs of Barque.

The Antecedent Facts

On 22 October 1996, Homer L. Barque, Sr. ("Barque, Sr.") represented by Barque-Hernandez filed a
petition for administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 of the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City. TCT No. 210177 was allegedly destroyed when a fire gutted the Quezon City
Hall on 11 June 1988. In support of the petition, Barque, Sr. submitted the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title, Real Estate Tax Receipts and Tax Declaration.

Atty. Benjamin M. Bustos ("Atty. Bustos"), Reconstituting Officer and Chief of the Reconstitution
Division, LRA, wrote a letter dated 29 October 1996 addressed to Engineer Privadi J. Dalire ("Engr.
10 

Dalire"), Chief of the Geodetic Surveys Division of the Lands Management Bureau, Binondo, Manila.
In the 29 October 1996 letter, Atty. Bustos requested Engr. Dalire for a certified copy of Subdivision
Plan Fls-3168-D ("Fls-3168-D"). Atty. Bustos wrote a similar but undated letter addressed to the
Chief of the Surveys Division of the Land Management Services, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, National Capital Region ("LMS-DENR-NCR"). 11

In his reply dated 7 November 1996, Engr. Dalire informed Atty. Bustos that the Land Management
12 

Bureau has no record of Fls-3168-D. In a letter dated 28 November 1996, Engineer Ernesto S.
13 

Erive ("Engr. Erive"), Chief of the Surveys Division of the LMS-DENR-NCR, informed Atty. Bustos
that a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D is on file in the Technical Records and Statistical Section of their
office.

The letter of Engr. Erive confirming the existence of a microfilm copy of Fls-3168-D conflicted with
the letter of Engr. Dalire that his office has no record of Fls-3168-D. Thus, Atty. Bustos sent another
letter dated 2 December 1996 to Engr. Dalire requesting for clarification. In a letter dated 5
14 

December 1996, Engr. Dalire requested the Regional Technical Director of LMS-DENR-NCR for a
15 

copy of Fls-3168-D for evaluation. Engr. Dalire wrote:

In connection with the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and
Chief Reconstitution Division of LRA relative to the certified reproduction plan Fls-3168-D (microfilm)
issued by the Chief, Technical Records & Statistical Section on September 23, 1996 and our letter
dated November 7, 1996 that we have no record of Fls-3168-D. In this regards (sic), please forward
to us the copy on file in that office (DENR-NCR) from where the Chief of Technical Records and
Statistics Section reproduced a copy he issued to LRA for our evaluation.

In the machine copy of Fls-3168-D (furnished to us by LRA) from the copy of that office
issued to LRA, the said copy on file in your office did not emanate from this Office. The
stamp, particularly, bearing the name of this office and the Chief of Geodetic Surveys is not
the same stamp we are using.

Please forward to us the said plan for evaluation and comment. (Emphasis supplied)

A letter dated 2 January 1997, purportedly from Engr. Dalire, addressed to the LRA Administrator,
16 

was handcarried to, and received by the LRA General Records Section on 7 January 1997. The
letter states:

In reply to your letter dated December 2, 1996, please be informed that the copy of the subject plan
was forwarded to this office by the Chief, Technical Records and Statistical Section of the National
Capital Region Lands Management Sector for our evaluation. As per verification and comparison
made in our microfilm records, it was found out that they are identical and bore the same stamps
and initials used in this office.

In view hereof, it is further informed that in our reply letter dated Nov. 7, 1996 we indicated
the status thereof because we failed to verify from our index cards then for our last result,
hence, this case be given due course for Administrative reconstitution (sic). (Emphasis
supplied)

Interestingly, barely three days after his purported letter of 2 June 1997, Engr. Dalire wrote a letter
dated 5 January 1997 addressed to the Regional Technical Director, LMS-DENR-NCR, thus:
17 

This is a follow-up to our previous request dated 05 December 1996 to that Office in connection with
the letter of clarification dated December 2, 1996 of the Reconstituting Officer and Chief
Reconstitution Division of the Land Registration Authority relative to the certified reproduction of plan
Fls-3168-D (microfilm) issued by that office (signed by Carmelita A. Soriano, Chief of Technical
Records and Statistics Section) on September 23, 1996 to Teresita Hernandez and our letter dated
November 7, 1996 to the LRA that we have no records of Fls-3168-D.

The Land Registration Authority however, furnished us with machine copy of Fls-3168-D
reproduced from the copy issued by that Office and we found out that the copy of Fls-3168-D
file (sic) in your office did not emanate from this Office. We reiterate that we have no records
(sic) of Fls-3168-D.

May we request you again to please forward to us the said copy of plan Fls-3168-D on file in
your office for our evaluation and comment. (Emphasis supplied)

Engr. Dalire sent another letter dated 31 January 1997 to the LRA Administrator. The letter states:
18 

In your letter dated December 2, 1996 (IN RE: Administrative Reconstitution of the Original Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 210177 in the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Homer L. Barque, Sr.,
Represented by Teresita Barque-Hernandez, Petitioner) you requested us to clarify the fact that the
Regional Office has a microfilm copy of plan Fls-3168-D, while our office does not have a record of
the same. In that letter, you attached for our reference the following:
1. Xerox copy of a certified true copy of plan Fls-3168-D, issued by the TRSS, NCR;

2. Reply letter of Engr. Ernesto S. Erive, dated Nov. 28, 1996;

3. Our reply letter dated November 7, 1996 to your letter dated October 29, 1996

In this connection, please be informed that we wrote on December 5, 1996 the DENR-NCR about
your letter dated December 2, 1996 informing them that the plan Fls-3168-D filed in that Office from
where the reproduced copy furnished to LRA did not emanate from our office. We requested them to
forward to us the said plan for our evaluation and comment. Likewise, on January 5, 1997, we made
a follow-up, reiterating that we have no records (sic) of Fls-3168-D and requesting them to forward
the plan for our evaluation and comment. It is regretted, they did not respond.

Upon examination of the copy of Fls-3168-D allegedly issued by DENR-NCR, it is certain that the
source of the copy is a spurious plan which may have been inserted in the file. We requested for the
copy in their file last 05 December 1996 and 05 January 1997 but until this writing, NCR has not sent
us the copy for authentication as required by DENR Administrative Order. We are sure that the copy
did not come from this Office. The reasons are:

a. Our inventory of approved plans enrolled in our file, our Microfilm Computer list of plans available
for decentralization all show that we do not have this plan Fls-3168-D, logically we cannot issue any
copy.

b. The copy of the plan Fls-3168-D shows visible signs that it is a spurious copy.

1) The certification (rubber stamp) serves a two piece stamp. The certification and the signing official
are separate. Ours is one-piece.

2) The alignment of: Lands, GEODETIC, this, Privadi, and Chief in the syndicates (sic) stamp differ
from our stamp. Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division is our stamp, their (sic) is Survey without the "s"
plural.

3) We do not stamp the plan twice as the syndicate did on the copy.

4) The size of the lettering in the rubber stamp "Not for Registration/Titling For Reference Only" is
smaller than our stamp. It is also incomplete as an (sic) Stamp, in addition to the above is "of
_________".

5) The copy bears forged initials of my section officer and myself. I sign completely
certification.

6) The name of the claimant is very visible to have been tampered in the master copy.

7) Again, it is certified that this Bureau does not have copy of Fls-3168-D.

In view of the foregoing, the copy of Fls-3168-D furnished your Office as well as the alleged
letter authenticating it should be disregarded or rejected as they come from spurious
sources. This involves the reconstitution of title allegedly lot 823-A of Fls-3168-D with an area of
171,473 Sq. M. Surely, the use of the spurious copy of Fls-3168-D for the reconstitution of title will
create land problem involving prime lots in that area.
Meanwhile, we requested our Records Division to find out to whom lot 823 (or portion thereof)
Piedad Estate was conveyed. (Emphasis supplied)

In a letter dated 13 February 1997 to the LRA Administrator, Engr. Dalire explained that the 2
19 

January 1997 letter, purportedly written by him, was forged. Thus:

In reply to your letter dated January 28, 1997 which we received today, please be informed that as
per the inventory of approved surveys which are officially enrolled in our file, the locator cards, the
microfilm, list of plans on file which were decentralized to our regions, that are on file in this Bureau
show that plan Fls-3168-D is not among the plans in our file. The non-existence of plan Fls-3168-
D in our file, hence there is none to decentralize to our National Capital Region, is the subject
of our reply to you dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached).

With respect to the letter dated 02 January 1997, xerox copy attached to your letter, this letter
definitely did not come from this office; it is a forged document. The statement that the
subject plan was forwarded to us by the Chief, Technical Records Statistics Section of the
NCR-LMS is not true. Until now the NCR has not turned over the plan they reproduced in
compliance with our urgent requests dated 03 January 1996 and followed up by our letters 03
January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached).

With respect to the questioned plan of Fls-3168-D, xerox copy attached to your letter of December 2,
1996, our detailed findings tending to prove it is a spurious copy have been discussed in our letter-
reply dated 31 January 1997.

Meanwhile, we are retrieving the plan allegedly in the file of NCR for investigation and/or validation
under DENR Administrative Order No. 40, s. 1991. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, in a letter dated 19 February 1997, Engr. Dalire requested Atty. Bustos to disregard Fls-
20 

3168-D for being spurious, thus:

In reply to your query whether or not

a) the copy of plan Fls-3168-D submitted to you involving lot 823, Piedad Estate as surveyed for
Emiliano Setosta;

b) the letter dated 07 November 1996, and

c) the letter dated 02 January 1997

are authentic and really coming from this office.

The letter dated 07 November 1996 (copy attached) stating that this Bureau has no records of Fls-
3168-D is authentic. Our Inventory Record of Approved Surveys, our computerized list of plans
officially filed in this Bureau, the Locator Cards, and the microfilm all show that we have no records
or information about Plan Fls-3168-D.

The copy of Fls-3168-D attached to your letter dated December 2, 1996 is not issued by this Office.
There are many markings on the copy to prove it did not come from LMB. Reasons, among others,
are:

1) We have no copy of Fls-3168-D on file so how can we issue a copy of plan that is non-existing?
2) The copy of plan bears two "Certifications" at the top and at lower half. This is not our practice;

3) The rubber-stamp shows there are two pieces; one for the certification and another for the signing
official. We use one piece rubber stamp. The alignment of the letters/words of one rubber stamp is
different from this marking on this spurious plan;

4) The plan shows only initial. I sign in full copies of plans with the initials of my action officers and
their codings below my signature. These are not present in the spurious copy of plan;

5) The letter size of the rubber stamp "NOT FOR REGISTRATION/TITLING, FOR REFERENCE
ONLY" is smaller than our rubber stamp;

6) The spurious copy of plan you furnished us does not carry our rubber stamp "GOVERNMENT
PROPERTY NOT TO BE SOLD: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OF ___________________ "This is
stamped on all microfilm copies we issue because all microfilm copies are for official use only of our
LMS. We have shown you our rubber stamps to prove that the copy of Fls-3168-D in your
possession is a spurious plan.

I firmly deny having prepared and issued the letter dated 02 January 1997 stating that copy of
subject plan (Fls-3168-D) was forwarded to us by the Chief Technical Records and Statistics
Section of the NCR and that as per verification, the plan is identical to the microfilm and that
the case be given due course for administrative reconstitution. Certainly this is not true. This
is the handiwork of forgers. How can this be when NCR has never given us the alleged copy
in their file for validation. The forwarding of the copy to us is mandatory under DAO No. 49
for our validation. This is the subject of our letters to NCR dated 05 December 1996, 03
January 1997 and 06 February 1997 (copies attached). Definitely this letter was never
prepared and issued by this Office. Our record books and file attest to this. We do not use
letterheads for letters involving this topic.

Apparently our letter of 31 January 1997 (copy attached) was intercepted and did not reach you.

For all intent and purposes, please disregard the plan Fls-3168-D and the letter dated 02 January
1997 as they are proven to be spurious documents. (Emphasis supplied)

On 14 April 1997, Manotok, et al. filed their formal opposition to the petition for reconstitution upon
learning of the petition.

The Ruling of the Reconstituting Officer

In an Order dated 30 June 1997, Atty. Bustos denied the reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 on the
21 

following grounds:

1. Lots 823-A and 823-B, Fls-3168-D, containing areas of 171,473 Sq. Mtrs. and 171,472 Sq. Mtrs.,
respectively, covered by TCT No. 210177, appear to duplicate Lot 823 Piedad Estate, containing
an area of 342,945 Sq. Mtrs., covered by TCT No. 372302 registered in the name of Severino M.
Manotok, et al., reconstituted under Adm. Reconstitution No. Q-213 dated February 01, 1991;

2. The submitted plan Fls-3168-D is a spurious document as categorically stated by Engr.

Privadi J.G. Dalire, Chief, Geodetic Surveys Division, Land Management Bureau, in his letter dated
February 19, 1997. (Emphasis supplied)
Barque, Sr. moved for reconsideration of the Order. In an Order dated 10 February 1998, Atty.
22 

Bustos denied the motion for lack of merit.

The Heirs of Barque filed an appeal with the LRA, docketed as Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A [97].

The Ruling of the Land Registration Authority

In a Resolution dated 24 June 1998, the LRA gave due course to the appeal. The LRA ruled that
23 

under LRA Circular No. 13, only the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of an original or transfer
24 

certificate of title could be used as a source of administrative reconstitution. Hence, the LRA ruled
that Atty. Bustos erred in requiring the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate of
the TCT. The LRA further ruled that Engr. Dalire failed to deny or question the genuineness of his
signature in the letter of 2 January 1997. The LRA held that the 2 January 1997 letter is an official
communication from Engr. Dalire. Finally, the LRA ruled that Manotok, et al.’s TCT No. RT-22481
[372302] is sham and spurious, thus:

It is undisputed that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate, the property in question, is located at Barrio
Matandang Balara, Quezon City. Several documents submitted by oppositors particularly the several
Deeds of Sale and Unilateral Deed of Conveyance including the real estate tax receipts would show
that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong, and/or Barrio Culiat [Annexes "2" to
"77" inclusive "79", "84" and "85" of Opposition] which is grossly inaccurate. The map of Quezon City
[Annex "N" of Petitioners’ Position Paper] would show that there is no such barrio as Payong. It must
likewise be noted that there is a Barrio Culiat but the same is separate and distinct from Barrio
Matandang Balara and they do not adjoin each other. Quite perplexing though is the fact that the
real estate tax receipts for payments made after the Quezon City Hall was gutted by fire on 11 June
1988 would show that the property covered thereby is already situated at Barrio Matandang Balara
[Annexes "91" to "104" inclusive of Opposition], while in other tax payment receipts [Annexes "103"
to "114" inclusive of Opposition], Barrio Capitol is indicated as the location of the property in
question. This is highly questionable and likewise highly irregular. The said real estate tax receipts
also reflect the tax declarations of the property covered thereby. It is highly irregular that the tax
declaration numbers indicated therein would vary and those tax declarations which appear to have
been canceled would again be revived.

The claim of the oppositors that the property in question per TCT No. RT-22481 [372302] covers
only one [1] lot is also inaccurate and without any basis. Plan FLS 3168D shows that the property in
question indeed consists of two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and Lot 823-B. The same is being buttressed and
corroborated by the certified copy of the tax map over the property in question issued by the Quezon
City Assessor’s Office [Annex "H" of Petitioners’ Position Paper]. Said tax map shows that similar to
TCT No. 210177 and Plan FLS 3168D, the property in question covers two [2] lots, Lot 823-A and
Lot 823-B. Granting arguendo that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate has not yet been subdivided into two
[2] lots from the date of original survey in 1907, it is highly irregular that TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
would have Lot 822-A Psd 2498, Lot 818-A and Lot 818-C Psd 2507 as boundaries when at the time
of the original survey, there were no such Psd’s yet.

Examination of the technical decription and boundaries appearing in TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]
would show that the same do not, in all respects, conform to the certified technical description and
boundaries of Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate [property in question] which are the B. L. Form No. 28-
37-R and B. L. Form No. 31-10 issued by the Bureau of Lands [Annexes "I" and "J" of Petitioners’
Position Paper]. There was never any mention of Payatas Estate nor Tuazon Estate as the
boundaries of the lot in question. The lot in question does not at all adjoin the Payatas Estate which
was surveyed only on January 12, 1923 as per certification issued by the LMS-DENR-NCR [Annex
"L" Petitioners’ Position Paper]. As correctly pointed out by petitioners, Lot 822 was mentioned as
one of the boundaries of TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. It was not, however, indicated whether or not
it was Lot 822 of the Piedad Estate. 25

However, the LRA ruled that TCT No. 210177 could only be reconstituted after a court of competent
jurisdiction has cancelled TCT No. RT-22481 [372302]. The dispositive portion of the LRA
Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 in
the name of Homer L. Barque, Sr. shall be given due course after cancellation of TCT No. RT-22481
(372302) in the name of [the] Manotoks upon order of a court of competent jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED. 26

Manotok, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration. In an Order dated 14 June 2001, the LRA denied
27 

the motion.

Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 before the Court of
Appeals challenging the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA.

The Heirs of Barque filed a petition for review docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66700 praying for the
modification of the 24 June 1998 Resolution and 14 June 2001 Order of the LRA. The Heirs of
Barque prayed for the immediate reconstitution of TCT No. 210177 without prior cancellation of TCT
No. RT-22481 [372302] by a court of competent jurisdiction.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

CA-G.R. SP No. 66642

The Court of Appeals initially dismissed CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 in the Resolution of 23 October
2001 for failure to show that Rosa R. Manotok had authority to sign the verification and certification
28 

against forum shopping in behalf of the other petitioners. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by
Manotok, et al., the Court of Appeals reinstated the petition in the Resolution of 27 November 2001. 29

In its Decision of 29 October 2003, the Court of Appeals denied Manotok, et al.’s petition and
30 

affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. However, upon motion for reconsideration of the Heirs
of Barque, the Court of Appeals promulgated an Amended Decision on 24 February 2004, the 31 

dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of this Court
dated 29 October 2003 is RECONSIDERED and a new one is entered ordering the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City to cancel petitioners’ TCT No. RT-22481 and directing the LRA to reconstitute
forthwith respondents’ TCT No. T-210177.

SO ORDERED. 32

Manotok, et al. appealed to this Court for relief. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 162335.

CA-G.R. SP No. 66700

In a Decision promulgated on 13 September 2002, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Heirs of
33 

Barque’s petition and affirmed the LRA Resolution of 24 June 1998. The Heirs of Barque moved for
reconsideration of the Decision.

In an Amended Decision promulgated on 7 November 2003, the Court of Appeals reconsidered its
34 

13 September 2002 Decision, as follows:

WHEREFORE, our decision dated 13 September 2002 is hereby reconsidered. Accordingly, the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. RT-22481 of private
respondents and the LRA is hereby directed to reconstitute forthwith petitioners’ valid, genuine and
existing Certificate of Title No. T-210177.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 35

Manotok, et al. filed a motion for reconsideration of the Amended Decision. In its Resolution of 12
March 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
36 

Manotok, et al. filed a petition for review with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 162605.

The Issues

In their Memoranda, Manotok, et al. raise a number of issues which may be summarized as follows:
37 

1. Whether the Land Registration Authority has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Manotok, et al.’s
title.

2. Whether the Court of Appeals may assume equity jurisdiction over the cases.

3. Whether the Court of Appeals, applying Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.

Velasco, may order the cancellation of Manotok, et al.’s title and the reconstitution of the Heirs of
38 

Barque’s title.

Administrative Reconstitution under PD 1529

Section 110 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 ("PD 1529"), as amended by Republic Act No.
39 

6732, governs the administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of titles. Section 110
40 

of PD 1529 provides:

SEC. 110. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Original of Torrens Title. – Original copies of

certificate of titles lost or destroyed in the offices of Register of Deeds as well as liens and
encumbrances affecting the lands covered by such titles shall be reconstituted judicially in
accordance with the procedure prescribed in Republic Act No. 26 insofar as not inconsistent with this
Decree. The procedure relative to administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificate
prescribed in said Act may be availed of only in case of substantial loss or destruction of land titles
due to fire, flood or other force majeure as determined by the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority: Provided, That the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged should be at least ten
percent (10%) of the total number in the possession of the Office of the Register of Deeds: Provided,
further, That in no case shall the number of certificates of titles lost or damaged be less than five
hundred (500).
Notice of all hearings of the petition for judicial reconstitution shall be furnished the Register of
Deeds of the place where the land is situated and to the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority. No order or judgment ordering the reconstitution of a certificate of title shall become final
until the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and the Administrator of the
Land Registration Authority of a notice of such order or judgment without any appeal having [been]
filed by any such officials.

The LRA, in reversing Atty. Bustos’ Order, ruled that Atty. Bustos blatantly disregarded LRA Circular
No. 13 when he required the submission of documents other than the owner’s duplicate of TCT No.
41 

210177. The LRA ruled that Atty. Bustos should have confined himself to TCT No. 210177. The LRA
cited paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13, thus:

4. Sources of Reconstitution. – Only the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of an original or transfer

certificate of title may be used as a source of administrative reconstitution.

However, paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13 should be read in conjunction with its paragraph 8,
which states:

8. Order of Reconstitution. – If the Reconstituting Officer or the Register of Deeds of another

registry, after appropriate verification, is convinced that the certificate of title may be reconstituted,
he shall issue an order of reconstitution. Otherwise, he shall deny the petition, stating his reasons
therefor. The Register of Deeds concerned and the petitioner shall be furnished with copies of the
order. (Emphasis supplied)

When Atty. Bustos requested Engr. Dalire to furnish his office with a copy of Fls-3168-D, it was part
of the verification process prior to reconstitution of the title. Considering the numerous petitions for
reconstitution due to the destruction of the Quezon City Hall, Atty. Bustos was merely exercising
caution to avoid the reconstitution of spurious titles. Atty. Bustos conducted a verification of TCT No.
210177 pursuant to paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13. Hence, the LRA erred in ruling that Atty.
Bustos should have confined himself to the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 210177.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 26 ("RA 26") enumerates the sources for reconstitution of transfer
42  43 

certificates of title. For administrative reconstitution of title, the only source documents are the
owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title and the co-owner’s, mortgagee’s, or lessee’s duplicate of
the certificate of title. Section 12 of RA 26 does not apply in the present cases since Section 12
44 

refers to judicial reconstitution of title.

The reconstitution of a certificate of title is far from being a ministerial act. In an administrative
reconstitution, the petitioner must submit the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title
as required by Section 3 of RA 26 and paragraph 4 of LRA Circular No. 13.

However, the submission of the source documents does not mean that the reconstituting officer
must forthwith grant the petition for reconstitution. It does not also mean that the reconstituting
officer must confine himself with the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title. In
accordance with paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13, the reconstituting officer or the Register of
Deeds shall issue an order of reconstitution only after appropriate verification which means that he
must be convinced that the certificate of title is genuine and not spurious. Thus, the reconstituting
officer must go beyond the owner’s or co-owner’s duplicate certificate of title to determine whether
the title is genuine. The process of verification allows the reconstituting officer to countercheck with
other government agencies to determine the validity of the title to be reconstituted.
When Atty. Bustos requested for a copy of Fls-3168-D, he was not only exercising caution but more
importantly, it was part of the verification process under paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13. The
Heirs of Barque filed the petition for reconstitution only in 1996, eight years after the alleged
destruction of the original TCT in 1988. The reconstituting officer should not be blamed for verifying if
he should grant the petition for reconstitution. Paragraph 8 of LRA Circular No. 13 mandates that
Atty. Bustos shall issue an order of reconstitution only after appropriate verification.

The Jurisdiction of the Land Registration Authority

Section 6 of PD 1529 enumerates the general functions of the Land Registration Commissioner, as 45 

follows:

SEC. 6. General Functions –

(1) The Commissioner of Land Registration shall have the following functions:

(a) Issue decrees of registration pursuant to final judgments of the courts in land registration
proceedings and cause the issuance by the Registers of Deeds of the corresponding certificates of
title;

(b) Exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds and other personnel of the
Commission;

(c) Resolve cases elevated en consulta by, or on appeal from decision of, Registers of Deeds;

(d) Exercise executive supervision over all clerks of court and personnel of the Court of First
Instance throughout the Philippines with respect to the discharge of their duties and functions in
relation to the registration of lands;

(e) Implement all orders, decisions, and decrees promulgated relative to the registration of lands and
issue, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, all needful rules and regulations therefor;

(f) Verify and approve subdivision, consolidation, and consolidation-subdivision survey plans of
properties titled under Act No. 496 except those covered by P.D. No. 957. (Emphasis supplied)

The LRA has jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions on petitions for reconstitution. However, it is
not within its powers and functions to declare a title void. Under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129 ("BP Blg. 129"), "Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction xxx in all
civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein." The
LRA, in its 24 June 1998 Resolution, recognized that only the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") could
declare a title fraudulently reconstituted. The LRA declared:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is noted that although TCT No. RT-22481 (372302) in the name of
the Manotoks is alleged to cover a property with an "expanded area" and that the same was
fraudulently reconstituted, the same is existing as a reconstituted title at the Office of the Register of
Deeds of Quezon City. It is thus presumed valid until ordered declared null and void by a court of
competent jurisdiction. A title issued under the Torrens system enjoys the presumption of validity
(Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 244 SCRA 418). Although it is now being claimed that the title of the
Manotoks was wrongly reconstituted, it is only the Regional Trial Court which can declare that the
same was fraudulently reconstituted. Well-settled is the rule that a certificate of title cannot be
altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law (Section 48, P.D.
1529; Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88, 106). xxx

xxx

It must likewise be stressed that questions affecting title to real property fall within the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts as expressly provided for under B.P. Blg. 129, particularly Section 19(2)
thereof xxx.46

Clearly, LRA’s jurisdiction to act on petitions for administrative reconstitution does not include the
power to declare a title sham or spurious or to order the cancellation of a certificate of title.

The settled rule is a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral attack. A certificate of title may
47 

only be altered, modified or cancelled in a direct proceeding. Section 48 of PD 1529 provides:

48 

Section 48. Certificate not Subject to Collateral attack. — A certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law. (Emphasis supplied)

To allow the cancellation of Manotok, et al.’s title in an administrative reconstitution proceeding will
permit an indirect attack on the certificate of title in violation of Section 48 of PD 1529.

The LRA exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared that Manotok, et al.s’ title is sham and spurious.
The LRA itself acknowledged that only the RTC could declare a title fraudulently reconstituted. By
ruling on the validity of Manotok, et al.’s title, the LRA assumed the function of the RTC. The LRA
also preempted whatever decision the RTC may render on the matter.

The Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction to act on the petition
for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of Barque in view of the existing Torrens title of Manotok, et al.
No court, much less an administrative body, can entertain a petition for reconstitution of lost or
destroyed title if the land is already covered by a Torrens title in the name of another party, unless
there is a final judgment first cancelling such Torrens title. The only exception is when the Torrens
title has been issued for less than one year, which is not the situation in the present cases.
49 

To allow such reconstitution is to allow a collateral attack on the existing Torrens title in violation of
Section 48 of PD 1529. Such reconstitution will result in an anomalous situation where two Torrens
title in the name of two different owners cover one property, a situation anathema to the very
concept of stability and indefeasibility of a Torrens title. In Alabang Development Corporation v.
Valenzuela the Court ruled:
50 

The Court stresses once more that lands already covered by duly issued existing Torrens Titles
(which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance under Section 38
of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or
destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing by final judgment the cancellation of such
existing titles. x x x The courts simply have no jurisdiction over petitions by such third parties
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by
duly issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly registered owners. The very concept of
stability and indefeasibility of titles covered under the Torrens System of registration rules out as
anathema the issuance of two certificates of title over the same land to two different holders thereof.
A fortiori, such proceedings for "reconstitution" without actual notice to the duly registered owners
and holders of Torrens Titles to the land are null and void. Applicants, land officials and judges who
disregard these basic and fundamental principles will be held duly accountable therefor. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Court has repeatedly reiterated this ruling in subsequent cases. 51

By cancelling the TCT of Manotok, et al., and upholding the TCT of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of
Appeals resolved in the administrative reconstitution case the issue of ownership over the property
in dispute. This is grave error because ownership is never in issue in a petition for reconstitution of
title. As this Court ruled in Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. : 52 

Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the
ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the
re-issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not
determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted
title , like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or estate
covered thereby. (Emphasis in original)

In a petition for reconstitution of title, the only relief sought is the issuance of a reconstituted title
because the reconstituting officer’s power is limited to granting or denying a reconstituted title. The
reconstituting officer has no power to decide questions of ownership. A Torrens title, even a
reconstituted title, is "evidence of an indefeasible title to the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein." Certainly, the reconstituting officer in an administrative proceeding has no
53 

authority to deprive a third party of his property by cancelling his Torrens title to the property. In a
petition for reconstitution, such third party is not even required to be impleaded as a respondent.

Equity Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals

In its original Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642, the Court of Appeals held that Manotok, et al.’s title
is presumed valid until annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction. In CA-G.R. SP No. 66700, the
Court of Appeals originally ruled that the LRA is without jurisdiction and cannot determine which of
the two titles is valid.

Yet, in the two Amended Decisions, the Court of Appeals sustained as conclusive the LRA’s finding
that the title of the Heirs of Barque is the genuine and authentic title. Moreover, in the Amended
Decisions, the Court of Appeals ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel Manotok, et al.’s TCT No.
RT-22481 even without a direct proceeding before the proper RTC as mandated by Section 48 of
PD 1529 and Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. Clearly, the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of
their property without due process of law.

In reversing itself, the Court of Appeals insists that it may decide the cases on the merits based on
the records before it "in the pursuit of expeditious administration of justice." In other words, the Court
of Appeals assumed equity jurisdiction over the cases.

Equity jurisdiction aims to attain complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to render
judgment to meet the special circumstances of a case because of the limitations of its statutory
jurisdiction. However, equity follows the law, and courts exercising equity jurisdiction must still apply
54 

the law and have no discretion to disregard the law. Where the law prescribes a particular remedy
55 

with fixed and limited boundaries, the court cannot, by exercising equity jurisdiction, extend the
boundaries further than the law allows. Thus, the Court ruled:
56 
As for equity, which has been aptly described as ‘a justice outside legality,’ this is applied only in
the absence of, and never against, statutory law or, as in this case, judicial rules of
procedure. Aequetas nunguam contravenit legis. The pertinent positive rules being present here,
they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based only on equity. (Emphasis
57 

supplied)

Hence, the Court of Appeals may not extend jurisdiction to the LRA where the law has not granted
such jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals may not also allow a collateral attack on a Torrens title, either
before the LRA or before itself, in gross violation of Section 48 of PD 1529. The present cases
involve a vast tract of land in a prime district. The property in question contains an area of 342,945
square meters. At a conservative estimate of ₱5,000 per square meter, the value of the property
amounts to ₱1,714,725,000. The documents submitted by the parties are conflicting. The parties
question the authenticity of each other’s documents. Manotok, et al. claim that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 1919 while the Heirs of
Barque allegedly have never set foot on the property.

The determination of the authenticity of the documents and veracity of the claims of both parties
requires a trial on the merits. The LRA exceeded its jurisdiction when it made a conclusive finding on
the validity of the titles of the parties. Such function falls under the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of
the RTC under Section 19 of BP Blg. 129. The Court of Appeals should not have resolved the factual
issues by adopting as its own the LRA’s finding. This Court accords respect, if not finality, to factual
findings of an administrative body. However, this rule does not apply when the administrative body
has no jurisdiction to make a conclusive factual finding particularly when the findings might conflict
with findings of the tribunal or agency which has jurisdiction on the matter.

Respondents claim that there is no Barrio Payong in Quezon City. Respondents point to the 24 June
1998 Resolution of the LRA stating that Barrio Payong is non-existent. However, the Decision of the
Court of Agrarian Relations, the court of origin in Spouses Tiongson, et al. v. Court Appeals and
Macaya, shows that Lot 823 of the Piedad Estate is located at Barrio Payong, Old Balara, Quezon
58 

City. Indeed, the Court of Agrarian Relations made an ocular inspection of the property, thus:
59 

On June 20, 1978, the Court issued an Order directing the Clerk of Court to conduct an ocular
inspection of the landholding in question, which is as follows:

"Conformably with ‘Urgent Motion For An Ocular Inspection’ filed with this Court on even date and as
stated in paragraph 2 thereof, the Clerk of Court is hereby direct to conduct an ocular inspection of
the landholding in question situated at Payong, Quezon City, which as agreed upon between them
is set on June 23, 1978 at 8:30 o’clock A.M. (sic), wherein the parties shall meet at the site of said
landholding and to determine.

(a) Portions of the property planted to rice (sic) by the plaintiff and/or his children;

(b) Portions of the property where the rice paddies are located;

(c) Portions of the property planted to (sic) corn and vegetables;

(d) Portions of the property where the houses of the plaintiff and/or his children are built and located;

(e) Portion of the property which, according to the defendants, had been, before the filing of the
complaint in this case, worked on by Victorino Macaya and returned by him to the defendants,
through Atty. Perpetua Bocanegra, with an area of more or less one hectare;
(f) Portions burned by the plaintiff."

Upon accomplishment thereof, said Clerk of Court is hereby directed to submit his report as well as
his sketch plan for further disposition of the Court.

On June 27, 1977, the Clerk of Court submitted his "REPORT", which is as follows:

"In compliance with the Order of the Honorable Court dated June 20, 1978, undersigned together
with Mr. Victor Flores of this Branch, proceeded to Barrio Payong, Quezon City on June 23, 1978,
to conduct an ocular inspection of the landholding involved in this case. xxx" (Emphasis supplied)
60 

The findings of the LRA that Barrio Payong does not exist is based merely on LRA’s evaluation of
the documents. In contrast, the findings of the Court of Agrarian Relations that the property of the
Spouses Tiongson is located in Barrio Payong, Quezon City, is based on ocular inspection. The
majority opinion adopts the findings of the LRA. This issue, however, should be threshed out by the
proper trial court in an action directly attacking the validity of the Torrens title of Manotok, et al.

The Applicability of Ortigas & Company

Limited Partnership v. Velasco________

In ordering the Register of Deeds to cancel Manotok, et al.’s title and the LRA to reconstitute the title
of the Heirs of Barque, the Court of Appeals relied on Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership v.
Velasco. The Court of Appeals ruled that it would be unjust to the Heirs of Barque to initiate a new
61 

proceeding before the RTC for the sole purpose of seeking the cancellation of Manotok, et al.’s title.

The Heirs of Barque claim that the pendency of the cases for a long period of time justifies the
application of the Ortigas case in their favor. On the other hand, Manotok, et al. argue that if ever
the Ortigas case is applicable, it will apply in their favor since this Court in a prior decision involving
62 

tenancy relationship affirmed their right to the property in question.

The Ortigas case is not authority to deprive Manotok, et al. of their right to a direct proceeding
before the proper court concerning the validity of their Torrens title. In Ortigas, the Court ruled that a
remand of the case would be pointless and unduly circuitous, and that to defer adjudication on the
matter would be unwarranted and unjust. This is because the records showed that Ortigas’ titles had
already been upheld and affirmed in three other cases, involving either the original registration or
direct attacks on the titles, decided in 1906, 1985 and 1987. The Court ruled that Ortigas’
63 

documents of ownership have been passed upon, sanctioned and sustained by the Court more than
once. This peculiar circumstance is absent in the cases before us.

However, the Ortigas case, which the Heirs of Barque insist applies to the present cases, is
authority to hold that the Register of Deeds, the LRA and the Court of Appeals have no jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for reconstitution filed by the Heirs of Barque. The Court held in Ortigas: 64

x x x So, too, this Court has stressed "that lands already covered by duly issued existing
Torrens titles (which become incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from their issuance
under section 38 of the Land Registration Act) cannot be the subject of petitions for
reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed titles filed by third parties without first securing
by final judgment the cancellation of such existing titles. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

This is the specific ruling in Ortigas that applies to the present cases.

In summary, the Heirs of Barque filed before the Register of Deeds an administrative petition to
reconstitute their allegedly destroyed TCT. The Register of Deeds, as reconstituting officer, denied
the petition of the Heirs of Barque because, based on official records, the property involved is
already registered under the Torrens system in the name of Manotok, et al. The LRA affirmed the
Register of Deeds, stating that only the proper trial court could cancel the TCT of Manotok, et al.
although the LRA believed that the TCT of Manotok, et al. was a sham. The LRA recognized that in
an administrative reconstitution, the decision of the reconstituting body is either to deny or approve
the reconstitution of the applicant’s title, never to cancel the Torrens title of a third party. However,
on appeal, the Court of Appeals declared the TCT of Manotok, et al. void and the TCT of the Heirs of
Barque valid. Clearly, the Court of Appeals deprived Manotok, et al. of their property without due
process of law. The Court of Appeals blatantly disregarded Section 48 of PD 1529 and Section 19 of
BP Blg. 129 which confer on the proper trial court exclusive original jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens
title in an action directly attacking the validity of the Torrens title. The Court should not countenance
this gross injustice and patent violation of the law.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petitions and set aside the 24 February 2004 Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66642 and the 7 November 2003 Amended Decision and
the 12 March 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66700. The Land
Registration Authority must defer its ruling in Admin. Recons. No. Q-547-A [97] until after the proper
Regional Trial Court shall have rendered a final judgment on the validity of the titles of the parties.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 176043               January 15, 2014

SPOUSES BERNADETTE and RODULFO VILBAR, Petitioners,

vs.
ANGELITO L. OPINION, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

"Registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the
land."  Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari  of the May 26, 2006 Decision  of the
1 2 3

Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84409 which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision  of 4

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 255, Las Piñas City in Civil Case No. 98-0302, an accion
reinvindicatoria case filed by respondent Angelito L Opinion (Opinion) against petitioner-spouses
Bernadette and Rodulfo Vilbar (spouses Vilbar) and others.

Also assailed is the CA' s December 22, 2006 Resolution  which denied spouses Vilbar's Motion for
5

Reconsideration. 6

Factual Antecedents

Spouses Vilbar claimed that on July 10, 1979, they and Dulos Realty and Development Corporation
(Dulos Realty), entered into a Contract to Sell  involving a 108-square meter lot designated as Lot
7

20-B located in Airmen’s Village, Las Piñas City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. S-39849 for ₱19,440.00. Lot 20-A which is also covered and embraced by the same certificate
of title is the subject of another Contract to Sell between Elena Guingon (Elena) and Dulos Realty.
Sometime in August 1979, spouses Vilbar took possession of Lot 20-B in the concept of owners and
exercised acts of ownership thereon with the permission of Dulos Realty after making some advance
payment. 8

Upon full payment of the purchase price for Lot 20, or on June 1, 1981, Dulos Realty executed a
duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale  in favor of spouses Vilbar and their co-purchaser Elena. Dulos
9

Realty also surrendered and delivered the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. S-39849 covering Lot
20 to the buyers and new owners of the property. However, spouses Vilbar and Elena were not able
to register and transfer the title in their names because Dulos Realty allegedly failed to have the lot
formally subdivided despite its commitment to do so, until its President, Juan B. Dulos (Juan), died
without the subdivision being accomplished. 10

Spouses Vilbar and Dulos Realty also executed a Contract to Sell  dated July 10, 1979 covering Lot
11

21, Block 4 of Airmen’s Village, with an area of 216 square meters and covered by TCT No. S-39850
amounting to ₱128,880.00. To pay for the balance of the purchase price amounting to ₱99,216.00,
spouses Vilbar obtained a housing loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)
secured by a real estate mortgage  over the said lot. Dulos Realty facilitated the approval of the
12

loan, the proceeds of which were immediately paid to it as full payment of the purchase price. 13
In 1991, the spouses Vilbar were able to pay the loan in full and DBP issued the requisite
Cancellation of Mortgage  on March 25, 1991. Thereafter, DBP surrendered TCT No. 36777 / T-
14

17725-A issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City in the name of Bernadette Vilbar to the
spouses Vilbar.  The spouses Vilbar have been in actual, open and peaceful possession of Lot 21
15

and occupy the same as absolute owners since 1981.

In contrast, Opinion claimed that he legally acquired Lots 20 and 21 through extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage constituted over the said properties by Otilio Gorospe, Sr. and Otilio "Lito"
Gorospe, Jr. (Gorospes) in his favor. Opinion alleged that on January 12, 1995, the Gorospes
borrowed ₱440,000.00 and, to secure the loan, executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage  over the 16

subject lots covered by TCT Nos. T-44796 (Lot 21)  and T-44797 (Lot 20).  The Gorospes defaulted,
17 18

prompting Opinion to file a Petition for Extra-Judicial Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage  dated19

October 17, 1995 with the Office of the Notary Public of Las Piñas City. Subsequently, the subject
properties were sold at a public auction where Opinion emerged as the highest bidder. A Certificate
of Sale  was issued in his favor on December 18, 1995 and subsequently annotated on the TCTs of
20

the properties. The Gorospes failed to redeem the properties within the reglementary period
resulting in the eventual cancellation of their titles. Thus, TCT No. T-59010 (Lot 21)  and TCT No. T-
21

59011 (Lot 20)  in the name of Opinion were issued on January 22, 1997 by the Registry of Deeds
22

of Las Piñas City.

On February 13, 1997, Opinion filed a Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession  against the
23

Gorospes with the RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 253, docketed as LRC Case No. LP-162. Branch
253 initially issued a Writ of Possession and spouses Vilbar and Elena were served with a notice to
vacate the premises. However, the writ was quashed when spouses Vilbar filed an urgent motion for
the quashal of the writ and presented their title to Lot 21, while Elena presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Dulos Realty covering Lot 20. Consequently, Opinion filed a Complaint
for Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages  docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0302 and raffled to
24

Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Piñas City for him to be declared as the lawful owner and possessor
of the subject properties and for his titles to be declared as authentic. He likewise prayed for the
cancellation of the titles of spouses Vilbar and Elena. 25

During trial, spouses Vilbar presented the Absolute Deed of Sale  executed by Dulos Realty in their
26

favor and the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. S-39849  covering Lot 20. With respect to Lot 21,
27

spouses Vilbar presented the real estate mortgage  they executed in favor of DBP; the official
28

receipts  issued by DBP showing that they had paid the amortizations for the housing loan; the
29

Cancellation of Mortgage  issued by DBP as proof that they have fully paid the loan; tax
30

declarations  and receipts  to show that the property’s tax declaration under the name of Dulos
31 32

Realty had been cancelled and a new one had been issued in their name in 1987 and that they have
been paying the real property taxes on the property since 1980. The spouses Vilbar also presented
TCT No. 36777/T-17725-A  issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City on May 22, 1981, as
33

proof of their ownership of Lot 21.

Opinion, on the other hand, justified the legality of his claim over the properties by tacking his rights
on the rights passed on to him by the Gorospes. He traced his rights over the properties by claiming
that Gorospe, Sr. was the former chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) of Dulos Realty. He was offered substantial benefits and privileges by Dulos Realty as
compensation for the positions he held, including a residential house and lot in Airmen’s Village, Las
Piñas City valued at ₱180,000.00 and various allowances. However, Dulos Realty was not able to
give to Gorospe, Sr. the promised allowances despite repeated demands. Thus, Gorospe, Sr. was
constrained to file a Complaint for Sum of Money, Specific Performance and Damages  dated May34

12, 1981 with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. Subsequently, Juan signed a
compromise agreement and based thereon the trial court rendered a Decision  dated April 1, 1982
35
ordering Dulos Realty to pay Gorospe, Sr. the total amount of ₱578,000.00. A Writ of Execution and
Alias Writ of Execution were issued by the trial court in its Orders  dated May 7, 1982 and
36

September 30, 1983, respectively. Dulos Realty filed several cases challenging the validity of the
compromise agreement and seeking to nullify the writs of execution, as well as the consequent levy
and public auction sale of its properties.  One of the cases it filed was Civil Case No. 88-
37

2800  seeking the nullification, cancellation and reconveyance of title on the ground, among others,
38

that during the auction sale its properties were undervalued. All of its efforts, however, proved futile.
Meanwhile, real properties of Dulos Realty were levied on October 31, 1984, which included Lots 20
and 21 covered by TCT Nos. S-39849 and S-39850, respectively.  The disputed properties were
39

eventually sold at public auction on June 24, 1985 where Gorospe, Sr. emerged as the highest
bidder.  On June 2, 1987, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City issued TCT Nos. 117331 (Lot
40

20)  and 117330 (Lot 21)  in the name of Gorospe, Sr. and his wife. Upon the death of Gorospe,
41 42

Sr.’s wife, the Gorospes transferred the titles in their names resulting in the issuance of TCT Nos. T-
44797 (Lot 20)  and T-44796 (Lot 21)  by the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City.
43 44

During the course of the trial, Opinion likewise stated under oath that prior to the execution of the
real estate mortgage between him and the Gorospes, he was given copies of the titles to the
properties which he verified with the Registry of Deeds to be authentic  and that he inspected the
45

subject properties and learned that there were occupants.  Opinion stated that he was informed by
46

the Gorospes that the occupants, spouses Vilbar and Elena, were mere tenants renting from
them.  Opinion admitted that he neither talked to the occupants nor made any inquiries as to the
47

nature of their occupation over the subject properties;  he did not inquire further to determine
48

whether there was a pending controversy;  and, that he merely relied on the statements of Gorospe,
49

Sr. regarding the tenancy of the occupants without having been shown any contract of lease, proof
of rental payments, or even an electric bill statement. 50

It was only after his Writ of Possession was quashed when he learned that spouses Vilbar and Elena
are also claiming ownership over the properties, prompting him to make a more thorough
investigation.  Opinion stated that despite the discovery of the adverse claims over the properties
51

mortgaged to him, he did not ask Gorospe, Sr. why there are other claimants to the subject
properties.  When asked about what he learned after investigating said claims, he declared that the
52

titles of the spouses Vilbar are spurious because they contain discrepancies with the originals on file
with the Registry of Deeds. According to Opinion, spouses Vilbar’s titles do not have entries
indicating the titles from which they were derived.  To bolster his claim, Opinion also presented a
53

2nd Indorsement  dated May 11, 1988 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City which states
54

that TCT No. 36777 of the spouses Vilbar is presumed to be not validly issued.  Upon clarification,
55

however, Opinion admitted that he made no further follow-up with the Registry of Deeds to
determine the final outcome of the investigation on the title of the spouses Vilbar. 56

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 31, 2005, the trial court rendered its Decision  in favor of Opinion declaring that he
57

lawfully acquired the disputed properties and that his titles are valid, the sources of which having
been duly established.  The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
58

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Angelito L.
Opinion, and against defendants Sps. Bernadette and Rodulfo Vilbar, including defendants Otilio
Gorospe, Sr., Otilio Gorospe, Jr. and Elena Guingon, ordering the said defendants to immediately
turn over possession of Lots 20 and 21, both of Block 4, located at Airmen’s Village, Las Piñas City,
to the herein plaintiff being the registered owner thereof per TCT Nos. T-59010 and T-59011 issued
in his name.
Likewise, the above defendants are hereby directed to pay to the herein plaintiff the sum of
₱100,00.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees, including the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED. 59

The trial court, in ruling for Opinion, ratiocinated that there was no doubt that Opinion’s
predecessors-in-interest likewise acquired title to the properties through lawful means.  Titles
60

originally in the name of Dulos Realty were cancelled after implementation and execution of the April
1, 1982 Decision of the CFI in favor of Gorospe, Sr. and new titles were issued in his name.  The
61

trial court noted that when a new title for Lot 21 was issued in the name of Gorospe, Sr. on June 2,
1987, there was no indication that the title of Dulos Realty was already cancelled by Bernadette
Vilbar’s TCT No. 36777 purporting to have been issued on May 22, 1981.  As to Lot 20, the trial
62

court noted that the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1, 1981 in favor of defendants
Bernadette Vilbar and Guingon was not annotated on TCT No. 39849. Thus, when this was
cancelled by the subsequent titles, the property was not subject to any lien or encumbrance
whatsoever pertaining to said purported Deed of Absolute Sale.  The trial court also opined that the
63

efforts of Dulos Realty to question and annul the earlier rulings of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court and Supreme Court did not prosper thereby strengthening the validity of the title of the
Gorospes.  Further, the trial court found the mortgage in favor of Opinion, and the subsequent
64

extrajudicial foreclosure thereof to be in order.

65

As to spouses Vilbars’ evidence, the trial court found their title to Lot 21 questionable as there was
no showing that it came from TCT No. 39850 issued in the name of Dulos Realty.  The Contract to
66

Sell of the spouses Vilbar can hardly serve as basis for the transfer of Lot 21 in their favor. Besides,
the same was not even annotated on the title of Dulos Realty.  The trial court also found the
67

issuance of TCT No. 36777 questionable because there was no proof that the purchase price was
already paid considering that only a Contract to Sell was available. As a result, spouses Vilbar only
had an inchoate right over the property.  The trial court went on to state:
68

Definitely, defendants Sps. Vilbar cannot readily claim that they acquired Lot 21 in good faith and for
value. Based on the documents they presented, they cannot assert ignorance or allege that they
were not aware that the purchase price for Lot 21, including any interest they may have in Lot 20,
has not been duly settled at the time TCT No. 36777 for Lot 21 was issued in their favor or even
when the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 01 June 1981 for Lot 20 was executed.

The payments supposedly made by the defendants Sps. Vilbar to the DBP only establishes the fact
that they have not complied with what they obligated themselves with insofar as the above contracts
to sell are concerned. More importantly, there is nothing in the records which would show that these
contracts have been superseded by another deed to justify the transfer, among others, of TCT No.
39850 registered in the name of the defendant Dulos Realty to the defendants Sps. Vilbar, or the
execution of a deed of sale involving Lot 20 covered by TCT No. 39849. Needless to state, the fact
that a mortgage contract was allegedly entered into by the defendants Sps. Vilbar with the DBP does
not, by itself, result in a conclusive presumption that they have a valid title to Lot 21. Instead, this
begs more questions than answers since the said mortgage was entered into on 21 May 1981, or a
day after TCT No. 36777 was issued in favor of the defendants Sps. Vilbar. Added to this, the herein
defendants failed to establish the basis for the issuance of their said title even when their contracts
to sell indicate that the purchase price for Lot 21 would be paid on installments over a long period of
time.

As to the tax declarations and real property tax payments made by the defendants Sps. Vilbar for Lot
21 the same are of no moment. It has been held that tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of
ownership, let alone of the private character of the land – at best, they are merely ‘indicia of a claim
of ownership.’ (Seville v. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112) However, and with the
plaintiff presenting convincing evidence of the basis and validity of his acquisition of the subject lots,
such "indicia" in favor of the defendants Sps. Vilbar had been effectively impugned or refuted.

Moreso, the possession of the alleged original owner’s copy of TCT No. 39849 for Lot 20 by the
defendants Sps. Vilbar or the execution of a deed of sale in favor of defendants Bernadette Vilbar
and Guingon over the same cannot ripen into ownership thereof. It must be stressed that no
subsequent title was issued in favor of the said defendants even when they have the above
documents with them. On the other hand, the plaintiff eventually secured a title over Lot 20 after
consolidating his ownership with respect thereto.

The fact that the defendants Sps. Vilbar are in possession of the subject lots cannot persuade the
Court to rule in their favor. This is more settled insofar as Lot 20 is concerned. Having a valid title
thereto, the claim of the plaintiff cannot just be ignored. It is a fundamental principle in land
registration that a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. (Vda. De Retuerto vs. Barz, 372
SCRA 712) 69

Further, the trial court gave much credence to the 2nd Indorsement dated May 11, 1988 from the
Registry of Deeds of Pasay City which provided that TCT No. 36777 is presumed not to be validly
issued considering that no inscription exists at the back of the original title (TCT No. S-39850)
showing that a Deed of Sale between Dulos Realty and spouses Vilbar had been registered. The
discrepancy in the entries, or lack of it, in the TCTs in the custody of the spouses Vilbar and the
Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City  also tilted the balance against the said spouses.
70

Aggrieved, the spouses Vilbar appealed to the CA on February 22, 2005. 71

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On May 26, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision  affirming the Decision of the RTC. The CA
72

agreed with the trial court’s ruling that Opinion validly acquired title over Lots 20 and 21 through a
valid mortgage, extrajudicial foreclosure, and eventual consolidation proceedings instituted over the
said properties.  The CA went on to state that there was no doubt as to the validity of the title of
73

Opinion’s predecessors-in-interest, the Gorospes, because the same was affirmed by the Supreme
Court in a case involving the said properties.  In contrast, spouses Vilbar’s TCT No. 36777 does not
74

state the title from which it was derived.  Spouses Vilbar’s title becomes even more dubious in light
75

of the aforementioned 2nd Indorsement issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City, which they
failed to refute.  The CA further stated that acquisitive prescription will not set in because spouses
76

Vilbar lacked the prerequisite just title, while the tax declaration is not a conclusive evidence of
ownership.  As to Lot 20, the CA ratiocinated that the spouses Vilbar never registered the property
77

in their names despite the lapse of several years, while Opinion was able to register the same
property in his name. Being the registered owner, Opinion’s title thus takes precedence over the
unregistered claim of ownership of spouses Vilbar. 78

Lastly, the CA opined that it is the registration that binds the whole world and that mere possession
of the properties in question cannot defeat the right of Opinion as registered owner of the property.
Since the sale claimed by the spouses Vilbar was never registered, it cannot bind Opinion. 79

The spouses Vilbar moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision which was denied in a Resolution
dated December 22, 2006. Hence, this Petition.

Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:

A.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

RESPONDENT ANGELITO OPINION HAS A BETTER TITLE AND/OR HAS PREFERENCE OVER
THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES IDENTIFIED AS LOTS 20 AND 21.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT
OTILIO GOROSPE, AS STOCKHOLDER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF DULOS REALTY AND RESPONDENT OPINION’S PREDECESSOR-IN-
INTEREST, ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN HE LEVIED ON EXECUTION AND WHEN HE
PURCHASED IN AN AUCTION SALE THE TWO LOTS SUBJECT OF THE INSTANT CASE
ALREADY SOLD AND DELIVERED TO THE PETITIONERS BY DULOS REALTY.

C.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE

FACT THAT X X X RESPONDENT OPINION WAS LIKEWISE A PURCHASER IN BAD FAITH.

D.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THAT

THE PETITIONERS SPOUSES VILBAR ARE THE OWNERS OF LOT[S] 21 AND 20 UPON
DELIVERY THEREOF.

E.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT TCT NO. 36777 WAS NOT VALIDLY
ISSUED IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS. 80

The pivotal issue to be resolved is: who between the parties has a better right over Lots 20 and 21?

Petitioners contend that they are the rightful owners and possessors of the contested properties
through a valid sale perfected in 1981. They maintain that Gorospe, Sr., the predecessor-in-interest
of Opinion, did not acquire ownership over Lots 20 and 21 because at the time of the levy and
execution, said properties were no longer owned by Dulos Realty. Gorospe, Sr. could not, therefore,
validly pass any rights to Opinion which the former did not have in the first place.
81

Our Ruling

The Court finds no merit in the Petition.

Respondent Opinion’s predecessor-in-
interest is an innocent third party
purchaser in the public auction sale,
absent proof to the contrary.

This Court notes that Dulos Realty, the former owner and common predecessor of the parties
herein, contracted with the spouses Vilbar for the sale and transfer of Lots 20 and 21 on July 10,
1979. As early as August 1979, the spouses Vilbar were already in peaceful and actual possession
of the subject properties and have been exercising acts of ownership and dominion over their portion
of Lot 20 and the entire Lot 21 despite the fact that the purchase price of the lots have not yet been
paid in full. Admittedly, all these took place before Gorospe, Sr. filed his Complaint for Sum of
Money, Specific Performance and Damages against Dulos Realty on May 12, 1981; prior to the
issuance of the Writ of Execution and Alias Writ of Execution by the trial court on May 7, 1982 and
September 30, 1983, respectively;  prior to the levy of the properties of Dulos Realty on October 31,
82

1984 to answer for the judgment favorable to Gorospe, Sr. in said collection/specific performance
case; and prior to the public auction sale held on June 24, 1985. However, the Court also notes that
the sale of Lot 20 was not annotated on the original title in the name of Dulos Realty, while only a
Contract to Sell was executed between the spouses Vilbar and Dulos Realty as regards Lot 21
which makes the issuance of the title in the name of Bernadette Vilbar questionable. What makes
spouses Vilbar’s title over Lot 21 even more doubtful is the 2nd Indorsement issued by the Registry
of Deeds of Pasay City which states that Bernadette Vilbar’s title over said lot is presumed to be not
validly issued.

The spouses Vilbar contend that Gorospe, Sr. acted in bad faith when he levied on the disputed
properties and bought them at public auction. However, this Court cannot treat as significant the
alleged fact that Gorospe, Sr. was the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board of
Directors of Dulos Realty at the time the transactions with the spouses Vilbar were entered into by
the company. Evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1, 1981
covering Lot 20, as well as the Contract to Sell over Lot 21, was signed by Juan as President of
Dulos Realty. Simply, spouses Vilbar cannot ascribe bad faith on the part of Gorospe, Sr. absent
clear and convincing proof that he had knowledge of the said spouses’ transactions with the
company. As far as the Court is concerned, the evidence presented shows that Gorospe, Sr. had no
knowledge of the transactions between Dulos Realty and the spouses Vilbar because it was Juan
who executed and signed the documents. More importantly, the aforementioned Deed of Absolute
Sale and Contract to Sell were not registered and annotated on the original titles in the name of
Dulos Realty. Under land registration laws, the said properties were not encumbered then, and third
parties need only to rely on the face of the duly issued titles. Consequently, the Court finds no bad
faith on Gorospe, Sr.’s part when he bought the properties at public auction free from liens and
encumbrances.

It is worth stressing at this point that bad faith cannot be presumed. "It is a question of fact that must
be proven"  by clear and convincing evidence. "[T]he burden of proving bad faith rests on the one
83

alleging it."  Sadly, spouses Vilbar failed to adduce the necessary evidence. Thus, this Court finds
84

no error on the part of the CA when it did not find bad faith on the part of Gorospe, Sr.

Furthermore, the Court recognizes "[t]he settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes
preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the
[properties] involved [were] duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental
principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien
upon the land."  As aptly observed by the trial court:
85

To say the least, there is no reason to doubt that the predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiff
(Opinion) with respect to the said properties, the defendants Gorospes, likewise acquired the same
through lawful means. Indeed, and as acknowledged by both plaintiff Opinion and defendants Sps.
Vilbar, the defendant Dulos Realty previously owned the above parcels of land under TCT Nos.
39849 and 39850. However, the said titles were cancelled after the Decision dated 01 April 1982
rendered in favor of defendant Otilio Gorospe, Sr. was implemented or executed. Consequently,
TCT Nos. 117330 and 117331 were issued in the name of defendant Otilio Gorospe, Sr. Later on,
the foregoing titles were cancelled owing to the death of the wife of defendant Otilio Gorospe, Sr.,
the late Leonor Gorospe, and TCT Nos. 44796 and 44797 were issued to defendants Gorospes as
surviving heirs. These two titles then became the subject of the mortgage agreement that
defendants Gorospes executed in favor of plaintiff Opinion on 12 January 1995.

The Court notes that when TCT No. 117330 dated 02 June 1987 for Lot 21 in the name of defendant
Otilio Gorospe, Sr. was issued to cancel TCT No. 39850 for the same lot registered in favor of the
defendant Dulos Realty there was no mention whatsoever that the latter title was already cancelled
by TCT No. 36777 supposedly issued on 22 May 1981 to defendant Bernadette Vilbar. This being
so, the subsequent cancellation of TCT No. 117330 by TCT No. 44796 dated 09 January 1995 for
Lot 21 could not be affected by the supposed existence of the title of defendants Spouses Vilbar.

As to Lot 20, it is also noteworthy that the supposed Deed of Absolute Sale dated 01 June 1981 in
favor of defendants Bernadette Vilbar and Guingon was not annotated on TCT No. 39849. Thus,
when this was cancelled by TCT No. 117331 and, later on, by TCT No. 44797 also dated 09 January
1995, it was not subject to any lien or encumbrance whatsoever pertaining to the claim of the above
defendants over the same.  (Emphasis supplied)
86

In effect, Gorospe, Sr. acquired through lawful means a valid right to the properties, and he and his
son had a legal right to mortgage the same to Opinion. As a consequence, the Goropes transmitted
property rights to Opinion, who, in turn, acquired valid rights from the Gorospes.

Respondent Opinion is a Buyer in Good Faith.

This Court also treats Opinion as a buyer in good faith. Admittedly, Opinion stated that prior to the
execution of the mortgage, he only went to Lots 20 and 21 once and saw that the properties had
occupants. He likewise admitted that he never talked to the spouses Vilbar and Guingon to
determine the nature of their possession of the properties, but merely relied on the representation of
Gorospe, Sr. that the occupants were mere tenants. He never bothered to request for any kind of
proof, documentary or otherwise, to confirm this claim. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the CA
that Opinion is not required to go beyond the Torrens title, viz:

Contrary to the [Spouses Vilbar’s] claim, [Opinion] was never remiss in his duty of ensuring that the
Gorospes had clean title over the property. [Opinion] had even conducted an investigation. He had,
in this regard, no reason not to believe in the assurance of the Gorospes, more so that the claimed
right of [Spouses Vilbar] was never annotated on the certificate of title covering lot 20, because it is
settled that a party dealing with a registered land does not have to inquire beyond the Certificate of
Title in determining the true owner thereof, and in guarding or protecting his interest, for all that he
has to look into and rely on are the entries in the Certificate of Title.
87

Inarguably, Opinion acted in good faith in dealing with the registered owners of the properties. He
relied on the titles presented to him, which were confirmed by the Registry of Deeds to be authentic,
issued in accordance with the law, and without any liens or encumbrances. 88

Besides, assuming arguendo that the Gorospes’ titles to the subject properties happened to be
fraudulent, public policy considers Opinion to still have acquired legal title as a mortgagee in good
faith. As held in Cavite Development Bank v. Spouses Lim: 89

There is, however, a situation where, despite the fact that the mortgagor is not the owner of the
mortgaged property, his title being fraudulent, the mortgage contract and any foreclosure sale arising
therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy. This is the doctrine of ‘the mortgagee in good
faith’ based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of
Title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on the face of the title.
The public interest in upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of the lawful
ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon, protects a buyer or mortgagee who, in good
faith, relied upon what appears on the face of the certificate of title.
90

Respondent Opinion was proven to be in good faith when he dealt with the Gorospes and relied on
the titles presented to him. Spouses Vilbar, on the other hand, failed to present substantial evidence
to prove otherwise.

Proofs of ownership of spouses Vilbar

over Lots 20 and 21 are insufficient to
conclude real ownership, thus, they
cannot be considered as owners of
subject lots.

In support of their claim of ownership, spouses Vilbar presented the following documentary
evidence: (1) Contracts to Sell; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 20; (3) Real Estate Mortgage
Agreement with DBP over Lot 21 with reference to the spouses Vilbar as owners of the said property
covered by TCT No. 36777; (4) Cancellation of Mortgage issued by the DBP in favor of the spouses
Vilbar in connection with Lot 21; (5) various original Official Receipts issued by Dulos Realty in favor
of the spouses Vilbar for installment payments of the purchase price of the lots in question; (6)
various original Official Receipts issued by the DBP in favor of the spouses Vilbar for payment of
loan amortizations; (7) owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 36777 in the name of Bernadette Vilbar;
(8) owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. S-39849 in the custody of the spouses Vilbar; and, (9) tax
declarations and receipts.

A review of these documents leads the Court to the same inescapable conclusion reached by the
trial court.  With regard to Lot 20, spouses Vilbar brag of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Dulos
1âwphi1

Realty in their favor and aver that they have the owner’s copy of TCT No. S-39849 and are presently
enjoying actual possession of said property. However, these are not sufficient proofs of ownership.
For some unknown reasons, the spouses Vilbar did not cause the transfer of the certificate title in
their name, or at the very least, annotate or register such sale in the original title in the name of
Dulos Realty. This, sadly, proved fatal to their cause. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that
"a certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the property in
favor of the person whose name appears therein."  Having no certificate of title issued in their
91

names, spouses Vilbar have no indefeasible and incontrovertible title over Lot 20 to support their
claim. Further, it is an established rule that "registration is the operative act which gives validity to
the transfer or creates a lien upon the land."  "Any buyer or mortgagee of realty covered by a
92

Torrens certificate of title x x x is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title."  Failing to annotate the deed for the eventual transfer of title over Lot 20 in
93

their names, the spouses Vilbar cannot claim a greater right over Opinion, who acquired the property
with clean title in good faith and registered the same in his name by going through the legally
required procedure.

Spouses Vilbar’s possession of the owner’s copy of TCT No. 39849 is of no moment. It neither cast
doubt on Gorospe Sr.’s TCT No. 117331 from which Opinion’s TCT No. T-59011 covering Lot 20
emanated nor bar Gorospe Sr. from transferring the title over Lot 20 to his name. It should be
recalled that Gorospe Sr. acquired Lots 20 and 21 thru forced sale. Under Section 107  of 94

Presidential Decree No. 1529,  Gorospe Sr. could have the TCTs of said lots cancelled and
95

transferred to his name even if the previous registered owner (Dulos Realty) refused or neglected to
surrender the owner’s copy thereof. In Valbuena v. Reyes,  it was held that:
96
[W]here one acquires a valid deed or title to a property as a result of execution sale, tax sale, or any
sale to enforce a lien, after the expiration of the period, if any, allowed by law for redemption, when
said new owner goes to court and the office of the register of deeds to have his deed recorded and
have a new certificate of title issued in his name, it is sufficient for purposes of notifying the former
owner to surrender his certificate of title and show cause why it should not be cancelled, that the
notification is effected by mail or by publication as the court may order; and if despite such
notification by mail or by publication, he fails to appear and surrender his certificate of title, the court
may validly order the cancellation of that certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in favor of
the new owner. 97

Here, it is clear that Gorospe Sr. was able to secure TCT No. 117331,  which was marked as Exhibit
98

"N." Said title explicitly provides that it cancelled TCT No. 39849. Hence, having been superseded
by TCT No. 117331, spouses Vilbar’s possession of TCT No. 39849 is of no consequence. It may
not be amiss to state at this point that spouses Vilbar’s claim that Dulos Realty conveyed to them Lot
20 on June 1, 1981 is incongruous with Dulos Realty’s filing of a complaint for reconveyance against
Gorospe Sr. on January 4, 1990. We simply find it difficult to understand why Dulos Realty would
seek recovenyance of Lot 20 from Gorospe Sr. if, indeed, it had already sold the same almost a
decade earlier to spouses Vilbar as evidenced by the latter’s Deed of Absolute Sale  dated June 1,
99

1981. (This complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 88-2800 though was dismissed for failure to
prosecute.) 100

With respect to Lot 21, the Court is likewise puzzled as to why spouses Vilbar’s TCT No. 36777 does
not indicate where it came from. The issuance of the said title also becomes suspect in light of the
fact that no Deed of Absolute Sale was ever presented as basis for the transfer of the title from
Dulos Realty. In fact, the spouses Vilbar do not even know if a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 21
was executed in their favor. As the evidence extant on record stands, only a Contract to Sell which is
legally insufficient to serve as basis for the transfer of title over the property is available. At most, it
affords spouses Vilbar an inchoate right over the property. Absent that important deed of
conveyance over Lot 21 executed between Dulos Realty and the spouses Vilbar, TCT No. 36777
issued in the name of Bernadette Vilbar cannot be deemed to have been issued in accordance with
the processes required by law. In the same manner, absent the corresponding inscription or
annotation of the required transfer document in the original title issued in the name of Dulos Realty,
third parties are not charged with notice of said burden and/or claim over the property. The
aforementioned flaws in the title (TCT No. 36777) of spouses Vilbar is aggravated by the 2nd
Indorsement dated May 11, 1988 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City which provides that TCT
No. 36777 is presumed not to have been validly issued considering that no inscription or annotation
exists at the back of the original title (TCT No. S-39850) showing that a deed of sale between Dulos
Realty and spouses Vilbar had been registered, coupled with the established material discrepancies
in the certificate of title in the custody of the Registry of Deeds of Las Piñas City and the title
presented by the spouses Vilbar.

Simply, the spouses Vilbar were not able to present material evidence to prove that TCT No. 36777
was issued in accordance with the land registration rules.

In addition, the real estate mortgage entered into by the spouses Vilbar with the DBP does not, by
itself, result in a conclusive presumption that they have a valid title to Lot 21. The basic fact remains
that there is no proof of conveyance showing how they acquired ownership over Lot 21 justifying the
issuance of the certificate of title in their name.

With respect to the tax declarations, the trial court aptly declared, thus:
As to the tax declarations and real property tax payments made by the defendants Sps. Vilbar for Lot
21 the same are of no moment. It has been held that tax declarations are not conclusive proofs of
ownership, let alone of the private character of the land – at best, they are merely ‘indicia of a claim
of ownership.’ (Seville v. National Development Company, 351 SCRA 112) However, and with the
plaintiff presenting convincing evidence of the basis and validity of his acquisition of the subject lots,
such "indicia" in favor of the defendant Sps. Vilbar had been effectively impugned or refuted. 101

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
May 26 2006 of he Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 84409 affirming the Decision dated January
31, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court Branch 255 Las Piñas City in Civil Case No. 98-0302 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson s Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of he Court’s Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 G.R. No. 217120, April 18, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES FLORENTINO AND

PACENCIA MOLINYAWE, REPRESENTED BY MARITES MOLINYAWE AND FRED
SANTOS, Respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) praying that the
February 20, 2015 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP No. 133803 be reversed and set
aside and that Civil Case No. 10-658 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City (RTC-
Branch 57), be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. .

In the CA, the appellate court denied the Republic's petition for certiorari which sought to annul the orders,
dated September 6, 20133 and November 19, 2013,4 of the RTC-Branch 57 admitting the Amended and
Supplemental Petition of the respondents, seeking the cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back
of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and for quieting of title of said TCTs on
the ground of prescription because the Republic failed to execute the .final and executory decision of a co-
equal court.

The Antecedents:

On May 16, 1960, criminal .cases for malversation were filed with the then Court of First Instance of La
Union (CFI-La Union) against several accused including Florentino Molinyawe (Florentino) and docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 2996 and 2997.5

In that same year, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a forfeiture case
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1379 before the then CFI-Pasig against Florentino, his relatives, and the
respondents in this case, namely: Patricia Molinyawe, Salisi Molinyawe, Oscar Molinyawe, Vicente Miranda,
Baldomera Miranda, Cresence Padilla, Leonarda Recinto Padilla, and Vicente Leus (respondents). The
forfeiture case, docketed as Civil Case No. 6379, involved several parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
75239, 76129 and 77577, and registered in the names of the Spouses Vicente Miranda and Baldomera
Miranda (Spouses Miranda), Spouses Cresence Padilla and Leonarda Recinto Padilla (Spouses Padilla) and
Vivencio Leus (Leus). The Republic claimed that Florentino had illegally acquired the said properties as their
values were said to be grossly disproportionate to his declared income.

On November 18, 1960, the Republic caused the annotation of the forfeiture case on the back of the titles of
the subject lots.6

On September 22, 1972, the CFI-Pasig declared the sale of the subject properties to the Spouses Miranda,
Spouses Padilla and Leus null and void, and ordered that the said properties be forfeited in favor of the
Republic.

The decision was appealed to the CA but the appeal was denied by the CA in its February 13, 1974
Resolution. No further action was taken to set aside the judgment. Thus, on August 23, 1974, the CA issued
an Entry of Judgment.

The CFI-Pasig then issued a writ of execution on February 14, 1975. Although the writ was duly served on
the respondents in that case, more than thirty (30) years had passed , but still the Republic failed to cancel
TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and transfer them to its name. It appeared that Florentino did not turn
over to the Republic the owner's duplicate copies of the subject TCTs.7

Meanwhile, on January 12, 1973, in Criminal Case Nos.r2996 and 2997, the CFI-La Union acquitted
Florentino of malversation.
Many years later, on July 9, 2010, the respondents, as heirs of Florentino, filed with the RTC-Branch 57,
a Complaint/Petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 10-658, praying for the cancellation of the lis
pendens annotated at the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and for quieting of title regarding said
TCTs on the ground of prescription for the non-execution of the September 22, 1972 CA decision.8

Thereafter, on October 6, 2010, the Republic caused the annotation of the September 22, 1972 decision on
the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577.

On December 5, 2010, the Republic filed a separate action with the RTC, Branch 138, Makati City (RTC
Branch 138), docketed as LRC Case No. M-5469, specifically a petition for annulment of owner's duplicate
copy of said TCTs and the issuance of new ones pursuant to Section 107 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1529 allegedly due to the respondents' refusal to surrender the owner's duplicate copies.9

On September 12, 2011, the RTC-Branch 138 decided in favor of the Republic in LRC Case No. M-5469
declaring the owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 in possession of the
respondents as null and void. Thus, the RTC-Branch 138 cancelled the same and directed the Register of
Deeds of Makati (RD-Makati) to issue new owner's duplicate copies of said TCTs in the name of the
Republic.10

On April 12, 2012, the RD-Makati caused the cancellation and transfer of the subject TCTs as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

a. TCT No. 75239 in the names of the spouses Vicente Miranda and Baldomera Miranda -
cancelled and transferred to "the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006-2012000526.

b. TCT No. 76129 in the names of the spouses Cresence Padilla and Leonarda Recinto Padilla -
cancelled and transferred to the Republic of the Philippines with TCT No. 006-2012000527.

c. TCT No. 77577 in the name of Vivencio Leus - cancelled and transferred to the Republic of
the Philippines with TCT No. 006- 2012000528.11

Considering that no appropriate remedy was pursued within the reglementary period, the September 12,
2011 decision in the LRC case became final and executory. In January 2012, the Republic filed a motion for
execution which was granted by the RTC-Branch 138 in its March 16, 2012 Order.12

Due to the decision in the LRC case, the respondents filed on June 10, 2013, a Motion to Admit Amended
and Supplemental Petition (attaching to it the said Amended and Supplemental Petition), in Civil Case
No. 10-658. In its September 6, 2013 Order, the RTC-Branch 57, granted the same. The Republic moved for
a reconsideration but its motion was denied in, its November 19, 2013 Order of the Court.

Consequently, the Republic filed a Rule 65 petition for certiorari before the CA seeking the annulment of the
orders, dated September 6, 2013 and November 19, 2013, issued by the RTC-Branch 57 in Civil Case No.
10-658. It argued that the trial court had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the September 6, 2013 and November 19, 2013 orders considering that: a] it had
no jurisdiction over the original complaint/petition; b] the amendment sought a review of a final and
executory decision of a co-equal court; and c] the amendment is a collateral attack on TCT Nos. 006-
201000526, 006-201200527 and 006-201200528.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its February 20, 2015 Decision, the CA dismissed the petition. The appellate court ruled that the RTC-
Branch 57 did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
its questioned orders. It explained that the RTC had jurisdiction over an action for quieting of title. The CA
explained that the order of the RTC to admit the respondents' amended and supplemental petition inspite of
being fully aware of the finality of the decision of a co-equal court was not tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion which would warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari. Further, the Court found that the RTC's
judgment was not performed in a capricious or whimsical manner because the alleged abuse of discretion
was not so patent and gross. Hence, the CA concluded that its judgment was not.exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. In other words, the CA was saying that
although the actions of the RTC-Branch 57 could constitute imprudence, it could not be regarded as an act
of grave abuse of discretion that could justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
Finally, the CA opined that the decision of RTC-Branch 138 in LRA Case No. M-5469 was a "flawed decision"
reasoning as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Shifting to another point, We are in awe on how LRA Case No. M-5469 was decided. There are some
observations that tinker with our curiosity. It is quite strange and mind boggling too that in LRA Case No. M-
5469, it seems apparent that the decision made therein was only based on the decision dated September
22, 1972 pertaining to the forfeiture case without regard for taking into account the January 23, 1975
decision in the malversation case acquitting Florentino Molinyawe. Of course, it is understandable that no
mention of the acquittal was made in petitioner's Petition for annulment of the owner's duplicate copy of the
TCTs covering the subject properties. Interestingly too, private respondents merely opted to file a motion to
dismiss, instead of filing their answer and presenting the trial court (Branch 138) the January 23, 1975
decision. Had these been considered, a complete turn of events could have transpired considering that such
acquittal necessarily rendered the forfeiture of the properties ineffective and invalid. By the virtue of the
acquittal, the forfeiture of his properties became ineffective. Consequently, it is but proper that his forfeited
properties be given back to him or in his absence, to his heirs. That said, the decision in LRA Case No. M-
5469 is, to Us, a flawed decision. But then, of course, this is not a matter that necessitates a discussion in
the present case mindful of the fact that this is not within the thrust of a petition for certiorari. In certiorari,
We are only limited to the determination of whether or not public respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders and as earlier stated, no such
abuse of discretion was found to be availing under the circumstances.13 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Not in conformity with the CA decision, the Republic filed the subject petition based on the following
GROUNDS:

THE DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE SINCE:

1) RTC-BRANCH 57 COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

ADMITTING RESPONDENTS' AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL
PETITION AS IT HAS NO JURISDICTION IN THE FIRST PLACE
OVER CIVIL CASE NO. 10-658; AND
2) THE COURT OF APPEALS WENT BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION
UNDER RULE 65 WHEN IT RULED THAT THE CIVIL FORFEITURE
CASE IS CONTINGENT OR DEPENDENT ON THE CRIMINAL
CASE.14
The Republic emphasizes that RTC-Branch 57 gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the
respondents' Amended and Supplemental Petition because, in the first place, it had no jurisdiction over Civil
Case No. 10-658. Citing jurisprudence, it argues that an amendment of a pleading is not permissible when
the court has no jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, by admitting the Amended and Supplemental Petition,
it was allowing the respondents to alter both the factual and legal findings of the RTC-Branch 138 in its
decision in LRC No. M-5469, which had long become final and executory.

The Republic argues that the respondents' Complaint/Petition should have been dismissed right away by the
RTC-Branch 57 because, pursuant to Section 77 of P.D. No. 1529, they were not the proper parties to ask
for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. It points out that the allegations show that the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens was but an ancillary or incident to Civil Case No. 6374. The Republic highlights
that the respondents admitted that they did not have a legal or an equitable interest in TCT Nos. 75239,
76129 and 77577; that the original complaint/petition failed to allege any of the grounds under Section 77
of P.D. No. 1529 for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens; and that only the court having jurisdiction
over the main action or proceeding involving the property may order its cancellation.

More importantly, the Republic contends that the admission, of the respondents' Amended and
Supplemental Petition seeks to alter the final and executory findings of a co-equal branch. It being the
purpose, it concludes that the RTC-Branch 57 should have dismissed the petition and amended petition
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which allows motu propio dismissal of
cases.

Finally, the Republic stresses that the CA went beyond its jurisdiction under Rule 65 when it stated that the
civil forfeiture case was contingent or dependent on the outcome of a criminal case.
Position of the Respondents

The respondents counter that the RTC-Branch 57 had jurisdiction over the original petition that they had
filed and that the admission of their amended and supplemental petition was in order and in accordance with
the Rules of Court. They point out that actions for quieting of title and cancellation of lis pendens are actions
which are incapable of pecuniary estimation. Hence, the respondents posit that the RTC-Branch 57 had
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof pursuant to the provisions of Section 19 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
129, as amended.

They further argue that the amended and supplemental petition will not alter the findings of the RTC-Branch
138 considering that they chose to amend and supplement their original petition because its decision in LRC
Case No. M-5469 rendered moot and academic their action for cancellation of lis pendens and quieting of
title. In this regard, they assert that the CA did not go beyond its jurisdiction under Rule 65 when it briefly
discussed its observation and stated that the LRC case was flawed.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Grant of extraordinary remedy of  certiorari  justified when grave abuse of discretion present

For the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to be justified, the petitioner must satisfactorily establish that the
court gravely abused its discretion. Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment that effectively brings the acting entity outside the exercise of its proper jurisdiction. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the; duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.15

In the case at bar, a cursory review of the records would reveal that the RTC-Branch 57 violated several
rules of procedure and well-settled rulings. Thus, its decision was arrived at arbitrarily and whimsically
clearly constituting grave abuse of discretion.

Jurisdiction; Final and Executory judgment

Records show that when the respondents filed Civil Case No. 10-658 in July 2010 for the cancellation of
the lis pendens annotated on the back of TCT Nos. 75239, 76129 and 77577 and for quieting of said titles
before the RTC-Branch 57, there was already a decision rendered by the CFI-Pasig City in the forfeiture case
(Civil Case No. 6379) declaring null and void1 the sale of the subject properties to the Spouses Miranda,
Spouses Padilla and Leus and at the same time ordering said properties forfeited in favor of the Republic.
The September 22, 1972 decision of the CFI-Pasig, in Civil Case No. 6379 became final and executory on
August 23, 1974 after the CA issued an entry of judgment. Subsequently, in February 1975, the CFI-Pasig
issued a writ of execution in Civil Case No. 6379.

The records further establish that when the respondents filed their Motion To Admit Amended and
Supplemental Petition on June 10, 2013 before the RTC-Branch 57, a decision had already been rendered by
the RTC-Branch 138 in LRC Case No. M-5469, declaring the owner's duplicate copies of TCT Nos. 75239,
76129 and 77577 in possession of the respondents null and void, cancelling the same and directing the RD-
Makati to issue new owner's duplicate copies of said TCT's in the name of the Republic. On April 12, 2012, in
compliance with the said decision in the LRC case, the RD-Makati caused the cancellation and transfer of the
subject TCTs. Hence, TCT Nos. 75239,76129 and 77577 were all cancelled and TCT Nos. 006-2012000526,
006-2012000527 and 006-2012000528 were issued, respectively, all in the name of the Republic.

From the above scenario, it cannot be denied that the forfeiture case involving the subject TCTs was filed
before the CFI-Pasig while the complaint/petition for cancellation of lis pendens and quieting of title was filed
before the RTC-Branch 57. There is likewise no dispute that the CFI-Pasig tried and decided the forfeiture
case. Therefore, it was the CFI-Pasig that had jurisdiction over the main action or proceeding involving the
subject TCTs, not the RTC-Branch 57. As the CFI-Pasig had jurisdiction over the main action, said court
exercised exclusive power and control over,the TCTs that were the subjects of the respondents'
complaint/petition with the RTC-Branch 57. Hence, the RTC-Branch 57 had no jurisdiction over the
respondents' complaint/petition.
The Court agrees with the Republic's contention that only the court having jurisdiction over the main action
or proceeding involving the property may order the cancellation thereof. In this case, only the CFI-Pasig (or
its successor) can order the cancellation of lis pendens, not the RTC-Branch 57. The case of J. Casim
Construction Supplies, Inc. v. Registrar of Deeds of Las P
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 200180, June 06, 2016

BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ, Petitioner, v. MARIE JOSEPHINE CORDERO SOLANO A.K.A. MA. JOSEPHINE

S. CABAÑEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Amended
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated August 29, 2011 and January 10, 2012,
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 101406.

Subject of the present controversy are two (2) parcels of land located in Alabang Hills, Muntinlupa, with land
areas measuring 739 and 421 square meters, and are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 154626
and 154627, respectively. Appearing on the face of these titles as the registered owner is herein
respondent, "Maria Josephine S. Cabañez, of legal age, married to [herein petitioner] Benjamin H. Cabañez
x x x."

On February 12, 2007, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City a "Petition for
Correction of the Name and Marital Status of the Registered Owner of Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT)
No[s.] 154626 and 154627 of the Registry of Deeds for Muntinlupa City."3 The petition was docketed as LRC
Case No. 07-007 and raffled to Branch 203. In the said petition, respondent alleged as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

xxxx

1. Petitioner is of legal age, single and a resident of #21 Dona Ines St., Alabang Hills Village, Muntinlupa
City;

2. Petitioner is the owner of two parcels of land situated in Alabang, Muntinlupa City covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 154626 and 154627 issued by the Registry of Deed for Muntinlupa, though the same
were issued under the name Ma Josephine S. Cabañez, married to Benjamin H. Cabañez. x x x

3. Without knowing the legal implication, Petitioner erroneously made it appear that she is married to Mr.
Benjamin when in truth and in fact they are not married but merely living a common-law relationship

4. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez is actually married to a certain Leandra D. Cabañez who had previously filed a
case against Petitioner, questioning the ownership of the said properties which case however was
terminated by virtue of a compromise approved by the court in an Order dated November 23, 2000. xxx

5. Mr. Benjamin H. Cabañez has also declared that he is not actually married to the Petitioner and that he
has no interest or share whatsoever in the aforesaid properties as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of
the Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest dated January 22, 2007. x x x

6. No interests or rights will be affected by the correction of the name and status of Petitioner as registered
owner of the said properties.

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that Petitioner's name and marital status
appearing in Transfer Certificates of Title No. 154626 and 154627 be corrected to (sic) from "MA.
JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ" to ["]MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO, single" as
it is the true and actual status of petitioner.
x x x x4 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC then conducted hearings where respondent presented her evidence ex parte.

On June 28, 2007, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 203, rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be well-founded and meritorious, the same is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Muntinlupa City is directed to cause the correction of the name and
civil status of the registered owner of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 154626 and 154627 from MA.
JOSEPHINE S. CABAÑEZ, married to BENJAMIN H. CABAÑEZ, to MARIE JOSEPHINE C. SOLANO, single.

SO ORDERED.5 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The RTC held that from the evidence presented by herein respondent, it has been satisfactorily established
that the subject properties should indeed be in respondent's name and that her status should be "single".

On November 23, 2007, herein petitioner filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of Judgment6 assailing
the above Decision of the RTC on the ground that the said trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case because respondent's petition was not published in a newspaper of general
circulation and that petitioner and other persons who may have interest in the subject properties were not
served summons.

On January 27, 2011, the CA rendered a Decision, disposing as follows:

chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28

June 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in LRC Case No. 07-007,
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.7 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The CA ruled, among others, that respondent's petition for correction of her name and marital status as
appearing in the subject TCTs should have been published in accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
and that respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove compliance with such requirement. The
appellate court also held that respondent also failed to serve summons upon petitioner, which is in violation
of the latter's right to due process and of the principle of fair play.

Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration8 contending, among others, that the provisions of PD
1529, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, should be applied in the present case; posting of the notice of
hearing of respondent's petition is deemed constructive notice to the whole world, including petitioner; the
petition filed by respondent is an action in rem where jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

After petitioner filed its Comment,9 the CA rendered its presently assailed Amended Decision and disposed,
thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2007 of the

Regional Trial Court or Muntinlupa City, Branch 203, in LRC Case No. 07-007, is REINSTATED. Perforce,
the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.10 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

This time, the CA agreed with respondent and ruled that PD 1529 is the governing law and that there is
nothing under the pertinent provisions of the said law which states that publication is a requirement for the
RTC to acquire jurisdiction over respondent's petition. The CA also ruled that petitioner failed to prove the
existence of extrinsic fraud as a ground for annulment of the assailed judgment of the RTC.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.11

However, in its Resolution of January 10, 2012, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on the following grounds:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN AMENDING ITS ORIGINAL
DECISION DATED JANUARY 27, 2011 CONSIDERING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLICATION AND
SUMMONS WERE NOT COMPLIED WITH.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDING PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1529 IS SUMMARY IN NATURE ALBEIT THE EVIDENT PRESENCE. OF OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES THAT
MAY BE AFFECTED BY THE JUDGMENT AS A RESULT OF EX-PARTE PROCEEDINGS.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CHAN V. COURT OF
APPEALS (298 SCRA 713, 733) APPLIES IN THE INSTANT CASE WHERE IT WAS RULED THAT MERE NOTICE
TO THE REGISTER OF DEEDS WAS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE.

D.

WHETHER OR NOT AMENDMENT AND ALTERATION OF CERTIFICATES OF TITLE PROVIDED FOR UNDER
SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 IS AN IN REM PROCEEDINGS THAT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE
PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT.

E.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT SUPPLETORILY APPLY TO
THE PROCEEDINGS PROVIDED FOR UNDER SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 WHEREIN THE REQUIREMENT OF
PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY.

F.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PHRASE "THE COURT MAY HEAR AND DETERMINE THE PETITION AFTER NOTICE TO
ALL PARTIES IN INTEREST" IN SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 INCLUDES PUBLICATION AND SERVICE OF
SUMMONS.

G.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
PETITION IN THE ABSENCE OF SUMMONS AND PUBLICATION.

H.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IN THE PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF NAME
AND MARITAL STATUS IN THE TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 154627 AND 154628.

I.

WHETHER OR NOT LEANDRA D. CABAÑEZ IS ENTITLED TO NOTICE AND SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY VIRTUE
OF THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATIY CITY-BRANCH 137 TO THE EFFECT THAT
THE PARCELS OF LAND LEGALLY BELONGED TO THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTY.

J.

WHETHER OR NOT AN AFFIDAVIT THE CONTENTS OF WHICH WAS NOT TESTIFIED TO HAS PROBATIVE
VALUE.

K.

WHETHER OR NOT THE SECURITY OR BOND MENTIONED IN SECTION 108 OF PD 1529 BEFORE ENTRY OF
CORRECTION OR ALTERATION MAY BE MADE IS MANDATORY TO PROTECT THE INTEREST OF THIRD
PERSON.
 L.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS [IS] PROCEDURALLY CORRECT IN ADMITTING THE
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF THE RESPONDENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PETITION WAS
ALREADY LONG SUBMITTED FOR DECISION.12 ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court finds merit in the petition, but for reasons which are not identical as those espoused by petitioner.

At the outset, it bears to reiterate that the CA ruled on the basis of the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1529 (PD 1529), otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree. Specifically, the CA cited Sections 2
and 108 of the said law, which provide as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts. Judicial proceedings for the registration
of lands throughout the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens system.

Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for original registration of title
to lands, including improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration
of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court
through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with
the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Section 108. Amendment, and alteration of certificates. No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be

made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the
attestation of the same be Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A
registered owner of other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register
of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court
upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or
inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that new interest not appearing upon
the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or
any memorandum thereon, or, on any duplicate certificate; or that the same or any person on the certificate
has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage
has been terminated and no right or interests of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a
corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not convened the same within three
years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the
petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the
entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and
conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, That this
section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration,
and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a
purchaser holding a certificate for value and in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their
written consent. Where the owner's duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as
provided in the preceding section. (emphasis supplied)

All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after
original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was
entered.
The Court notes that the petition was clearly one which was filed after original registration oi title, as
provided under the abovequoted Section 2 of PD 1529. Moreover, respondent's petition was filed with the
RTC for the purpose of correcting supposed errors which were committed when entries were made in the
subject TCTs, as contemplated under Section 108 of the same law.

However, under settled jurisprudence, the enumerated instances for amendment or alteration of a certificate
of title under Section 108 of PD 1529 are non-controversial in nature.13 They are limited to issues so
patently insubstantial as not to be genuine issues. The proceedings thereunder are summary in nature,
contemplating insertions of mistakes which are only clerical, but certainly not controversial issues.

As early as the case of Tangunan v. Republic of the Philippines14, which was later cited in Angeles v. Razon,
et al.15, this Court, sitting en banc, ruled that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x the lower court did not err in finding that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain the present petition for the
simple reason that it involves a controversial issue which takes this case out of the scope of Section 112 of
Act No. 496 [now Section 108 of PD 1529]. While this section, among other things, authorized a person in
interest to ask the court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground
that registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent expectant, or inchoate, have
terminated and ceased", and apparently the petition comes under its scope, such relief can only be granted
if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious objection on the part of any
party in interest; otherwise the case becomes controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case
or in the case where the incident properly belongs. Thus, it was held that "It is not proper to cancel an
original certificate of Torrens title issued exclusively in the name of a deceased person, and to issue a new
certificate in the name of his heirs, under the provisions of Section 112 of Act No. 496, when the surviving
spouse claims right of ownership over the land covered by said certificate." And, in another case, where
there was a serious controversy between the parties as to the right of ownership over the properties
involved, this court held, "that following the principle laid down in the decision above cited, the issues herein
should be ventilated in a regular action x x x."16 (citations omitted)
In the present case, the Court notes that in a separate action for annulment of title and recovery of
ownership filed by petitioner's wife against respondent, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 137, in its decision in
Civil Case No. 91-2648, dated July 5, 1993, made a categorical finding that petitioner and his wife are the
lawful owners of the subject properties and ordering respondent to surrender possession thereof to the said
spouses.17 This RTC judgment was later affirmed by the CA in its Decision18 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49446, dated
April 29, 1997. Respondent, on the other hand, claims that she together with petitioner and his wife
subsequently executed an amicable settlement dated June 22, 2000, which was approved by the RTC,
wherein petitioner's wife waived her rights and interests over the said properties. She also alleged that
petitioner executed an Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest, dated January 22, 2007, indicating that he
has no right or interest over the subject properties. Petitioner, nonetheless, claims that he executed a
subsequent Affidavit of Non-Waiver of Interest, dated January 14, 2008, claiming that he was deceived by
respondent into signing the said Affidavit of Declaration Against Interest and that he was seriously ill at the
time that he affixed his signature.

From the foregoing, there is no question that there is a serious objection and an adverse claim on the part
of an interested party as shown by petitioner's subsequent execution of his Affidavit of Non-Waiver of
Interest. The absence of unanimity among the parties is also evidenced by petitioner's petition seeking the
annulment of the RTC Decision which granted respondent's petition for correction of entries in the subject
TCTs. These objections and claims necessarily entail litigious and controversial matters making it imperative
to conduct an exhaustive examination of the factual and legal bases of the parties' respective positions.
Certainly, such objective cannot be accomplished by the court through the abbreviated action under Section
108 of PD 1529. A complete determination of the issues in the present case can only be achieved if
petitioner and his wife are impleaded in an adversarial proceeding.

In addition, the Court finds apropos to the instant case the ruling in the similar case of Martinez v.
Evangelista19 where the petitioner in the said case, being the registered owner of certain real properties,
sought to strike out the words "married to x x x" appearing in the Transfer Certificates of Title covering the
said properties on the ground that the same was so entered by reason of clerical error or oversight and in
lieu thereof the word "single" be substituted, which according to the petitioner in the said case is his true
and correct civil status. This Court held that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

x x x x changes in the citizenship of a person or in his status from legitimate to illegitimate or from married
lo not married are substantial as well as controversial, which can only be established in an appropriate
adversary proceeding as a remedy for the adjudication of real and justifiable controversies involving actual
conflict of rights the final determination of which depends upon the resolution of issues of nationality,
paternity, filiation or legitimacy of the marital status for which existing substantive and procedural laws as
well as other rules of court amply provide.20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

In the present case, it is now apparent that before the trial court can alter the description of the civil status
of respondent in the transfer certificates of title in question, it will have to receive evidence of and determine
respondent's civil status. This requires a full dress trial rendering the summary proceedings envisaged in
Section 108 of PD 1529 inadequate.

Finally, it is settled that a land registration case is a proceeding in rem, and jurisdiction in rem cannot be
acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of
notice.21 However, as found by the CA, respondent failed to comply with the said requirements. In all cases
where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining
jurisdiction is mandatory, it must be strictly complied with, or the proceedings will be utterly void.22 It is
wrong for the CA to rule in its Amended Decision that publication is not a jurisdictional requirement for the
RTC to take cognizance of respondent's petition. The appellate court's reliance on the case of Chan v. Court
of Appeals23 is misplaced. In the said case, this Court considered the notice to the Register of Deeds as
substantial compliance with the notice and publication requirements of the law simply because in the
petition for correction filed by the petitioner therein, only the said petitioner and the Register of Deeds had
an interest in the correction of titles sought for. This Court ruled that there is therefore no necessity to notify
other parties who had no interest to protect in the said petition. This is not true, however, in the present
case. As discussed above, on the bases of petitioner's serious objection and adverse claim, it is apparent
that he has an interest to protect. Thus, the ruling in Chan finds no application in the instant case. chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Amended Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, dated August 29, 2011 and January 10, 2012, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 101406,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 27, 2011, which
annulled the June 28, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 203,
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on leave.