Mellor Lectures LDE7
Mellor Lectures LDE7
Page
Introduction to the Series (iii)
Introductory Remarks Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi 3
Lecture I Agricultural Growth and Employment 13
Discussion 34
Concluding Comments
Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi 49
Lecture II Research Needs for an Agricultural and Employment
Growth Strategy 55
Discussion 75
Further Reading 85
References 85
Concluding Remarks Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi g^
Appendix: Biographical Sketch of Prof. John W. Mellor 95
LECTURES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
The purpose of this new series is to create useful knowledge about
development economics and to disseminate it widely. It is not possible
to prescribe exactly the topics that will be discussed in this series.
Indeed, it would not even be desirable to do so because this subject is
still developing. The mystery of the development process is not yet fully
understood. The days of chivalry, when economic development was seen
as simply a function of physical capital formation, are gone. The
importance of such factors as human capital, education and religion as
determinants of both the rate and the composition of economic growth
is now gradually recognized. And then there are the efforts to understand
more clearly the relationship between economic growth and income
distribution, In this connection, the vital role of structural reform is
also being realized. The practical (social and political) requirement of
alleviating the incidence of absolute poverty has brought to the fore the
key role of agricultural development. Furthermore, there is now a
greater awareness of the importance of endogenizing the demographic
variables in order to understand fully the problem of underdevelopment
as well as the many ways of solving it.
(iv)
INTRODUCTORY
REMARKS
by
Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
by
Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi
Professor Mellor, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen;
It is my pleasure to briefly introduce, in the next ten minutes or
so, our distinguished speaker in the PIDE/PSDE series of Lectures in
Development Economics.
Professor John W. Mellor is one of the leading lights in the foggy
area of agriculture economics. His work, along with that of a few others,
is largely responsible for lending legitimacy and respectability to agri-
culture economics as a distinct and important field of enquiry in its
own right—indeed, for bringing agricultural economics within the fold
of the highly cultivated culture of economics. I am sure that there would
not be many serious graduate students who have not benefited from his
seminal contributions to the subject which are invariably marked by an
exceptional degree of expositive lucidity. I myself had the privilege of
reading his many articles as a graduate student at Princeton.
on the sector itself but also on what happens in the rest of the economy.
goods also turns the (domestic) terms of trade in favour of agriculture, which is undesirable for a
number of reasons-e.g., it redistributes income in favour of a low-saving sector and it discourages
the flow of rural labour to urban jobs.
9
For Hamlet, the play itself, I now call upon Professor John W.
Mellor. I also take this opportunity to congratulate Professor Mellor on
finally completing his long march (or shall we say Yatra?) from India to
Pakistan, via Washington!
The only way those measures can succeed, which will always be
glossed over by the political system, is by constraining the growth of
employment. That will be done by a tight fiscal policy (cutting back
government expenditures and the employment growing from government
18
effect from rapidly increasing food imports. You obtain a real exchange
rate that has the effect of raising real food prices and, therefore, the real
price of labour. Some counter-measures are likely to be taken, either
through neoclassical forces working through the market or, more likely,
through government actions to restrain food imports. In the latter case,
the domestic price rises directly in response to reduced imports or
through anti-inflationary fiscal or monetary policies of the type
previously discussed. Either way, employment is squeezed.
The World Bank and various other institutions have been berating
Africans for not doing something about raising their real food prices,
never noticing that the real food prices in most African countries have
been rising rapidly, essentially through more or less neoclassical forces of
the type which I have just outlined. Thus, we see potential for a substan-
tial wage goods problem in developing countries if they try to increase
employment rapidly.
Now, let us turn the argument around. What if, in fact, the agricul-
tural sector is moving at a reasonably rapid rate but the economy is not
experiencing sufficiently rapid growth of employment? What policies are
needed to accelerate growth in employment? What is the role of agricul-
ture in that context?
Accelerating growth in employment in a developing country is
basically a dual problem. The first element of the problem is expanding
the savings and investment rates. Development in the final analysis is
substantially a matter of increasing capital intensity. In fact, if you
define capital broadly so that it includes human capital, including
20
Now I want to make two related asides. What I have done so far is
talk about the role of agriculture in the production of wage goods and
the role of agriculture in structuring demand in a more labour-intensive
way. My first aside concerns the relation between poverty reduction
and an agriculture- and employment-oriented strategy of growth. They
are one and the same. Increased food supplies and increased income from
employment are the basic elements of poverty reduction. Recent analysis
at the International Food Policy Research Institute, using the extra-
ordinarily effective and useful sets of statistics compiled in India on rural
poverty — on the proportion of the population falling below the poverty
26
line — shed light on this relation. These data measure changes in poverty
over a substantial period of time.
Development strategies in India have had a very strong orientation
toward large-scale, capital-intensive, heavy industry. That has resulted in
slow growth in employment and, hence, has resulted in rather little
downward trend in absolute poverty. That, in turn, has made it essential,
in order to achieve political stability, to give emphasis to specific anti-
poverty programmes.
Study of change in the incidence of poverty in rural India over the
last few decades demonstrates several relations of importance to this
discussion. First, there has been a mild downward trend in the
underlying level of poverty in response to specific programmes. Second,
there have been very wide fluctuations in the incidence of poverty: using
a specific poverty measure based on basic calorie requirements, the fluc-
tuations were from below 40 to above 60 percent of the rural popula-
tion. That means 20 percent of the rural population moving up and
down across the poverty line over time.
And, those movements tend to be not sharp fluctuations from one
year to another, but sequences of years in which the poverty line is
rising and sequences of years in which it is declining. That provides
an opportunity to pin down rather accurately what are the forces at
work in causing those fluctuations. These forces are probably quite
common across developing countries, including Pakistan.
What are the primary forces at work? The most important are the
level of per capita food production and the level of food prices. When
the level of per capita food production is rising, the level of poverty is
declining. That relationship is very clear and for good reason. When per
capita food production is rising, both the direct and the indirect effects
of rising per capita food production cause increased employment.
Employment is a critical determinant of the level of absolute poverty in
rural areas throughout Asia.
We are able to statistically disentangle the level of food prices from
food production and find that prices are also very important. When food
27
prices rise, poverty also rises. Poverty declines, in turn, when food prices
fall. The level of food production and food prices are, of course, closely
related. We are able, however, with reasonably good statistical techniques,
to separate them moderately well.
The question one asks oneself, from the poverty point-of-view, is
how can one have rising food production and declining food prices?
Are they not antithetical to each other? Do we or do we not need rising
food prices in order to provide an incentive to farmers to increase food
production? The answer is no. Of course, there is a way out of that
problem and that is through technological change.
Incentives can be provided to farmers to increase food production
at the same time food prices are declining if the cost of production for
farmers is reduced. And we can reduce the cost of production with
high yielding crop varieties and the associated technical changes. It is
now possible to absorb much lower food prices than in the past and
still have rural prosperity because the cost of production, not per acre of
course, but the cost of production per unit of output, has declined signif-
icantly with the green revolution.
In India, judging from trends over time, I indicated three forces in
declining real poverty. The first is food production per capita, the
second food prices, and the third, marking a downward trend in poverty,
is specific poverty abatement policies.
What sort of public policies bring the development process directly
to the rural labouring class and the poorest rural people? One must, of
course, emphasize the importance of special employment-oriented
schemes. Such programmes, of themselves, have been quite effective in
rural India: guaranteed employment schemes, special loan programmes
for small and even landless farmers to get into dairy farming and other
labour-intensive enterprises, credit schemes, and so on.
If it had not been for the overbalancing effects on the food price
and the food production front, India would have had a declining trend
of rural poverty because of these special programmes. Poverty abatement
28
started from a small base of foodgrain imports. But the absolute numbers
from those countries are also impressive. They increased their foodgrain
imports from roughly four million tons to something over 12 million
tons in that 20-year period. They changed from being negligible
importers of foodgrains to becoming a significant element on the global
food market.
We know that if we do a closed economy model of agriculture-
driven growth, food prices will decline. In such a model, the dynamic
element is growth in foodgrains production. If we assume that employ-
ment grows maximally, consistent with the wage goods constraint, the
terms of trade will turn modestly against the agricultural sector. Thus,
it should be expected that in a development pattern led entirely by
agriculture, there should be rapid growth in employment but not quite
sufficiently rapid to maintain the terms of trade for food as they were
at the beginning of the period. There will be a deterioration in real
agricultural prices.
Given that, how do we explain the situation for the 28 fast-growth
agricultural countries? The explanation is that, in addition to the effect
of agricultural growth, some autonomous growth occurs in other sectors.
After all, even in low-income developing countries, there is initially a
non-agricultural sector of significant proportions. If there is growth
created endogenously in that sector as well, added to the growth in the
agricultural sector, the result is overall demand for food growing more
rapidly than the supply of food and, thus, pressure either for increased
imports or for increased prices.
In this context, the common question is how can those countries
afford to pay for increased imports of food. Let me be very clear on
two points in that respect. First, we are only talking about a small
proportion of the incremental demand being met from imports, so that
there is not a significant real exchange rate effect from that growth. And,
second, I want to emphasize that economies that experience rapid
growth in domestic agricultural production, relaxing the wage goods
constraint in that way, and that have rapid growth of employment are
facilitating their natural comparative advantage to export relatively
30
Of course, the poorer the infrastructure, the less we see the area;
so it is understandable that casual observations have a strong bias to
understate those needs. All of us have a high opportunity cost of our
labour and time. We are not going to take the time to go into the remote
rural areas. We understate the extent to which, even in the productive
agriculture areas, there are villages which are isolated due to underinvest-
ment in infrastructure.
Those people are not going to locate in such places unless they have
good soft infrastructure of institutions. And you cannot have a good
soft infrastructure unless you have a good hard infrastructure. So, what
I want to drive home is that, where agriculture is not moving adequately,
where it is not having a stimulating effect on growth and driving a very
vigorous small- and medium-scale industrial sector, that is substantially
because of the inhibitions coming from inadequate infrastructure
investment.
34
To summarize the public policies that favour the kind of develop-
ment strategy we are addressing, I come back to the need for a very
thoughtful expansion of trade policy and a very thoughtful and expan-
sionary investment policy in infrastructure. I would suggest that we look
back at countries that have been successful in this respect and see that, if
the essentials of development are to be provided, there are very few
resources and very little time required for governments to provide once
these principal requirements are met. Meeting those goals, however,
requires a considerable re-ordering of priorities.
DISCUSSION
Dr S. K. Qureshi: Prof. Mellor, you indicated that the area that public
policy needs to attend to is the provision of rural infrastructure. You
also said that, by implication, technical change would lead to increased
productivity. One thought that immediately comes to mind is this: how
would this kind of policy be financed? The real life situation, in Pakistan
at least, is that agriculture has been squeezed in many different ways.
Even if the physical capacity to generate more finances exists in a tech-
nical sense, unless this is tapped properly, we will be resorting to infla-
tionary financing. Moreover, improper government responses may lead
to distortions and the growth process may not go very far. That is one
point.
With regard to the other case you made concerning poverty allevia-
tion, I agree with you that providing employment to the rural poor
solves about 80 percent of the problem. But then I would say that there
is a basic problem in the asset distribution that exists in Pakistan, if we
follow the kind of agriculture strategy that you pleaded for, what would
happen is that we will have more employment and also more income for
the rural poor. But, in the same vein, these technical innovations will be
increasing returns to land. As the process of development goes on, the
landlords will be earning a large part of this increase. So, unless there is a
policy on asset redistribution accompanied by substantial institutional
reform, the policy is likely to fail.
There is a need to think about whether to just give the poor more
jobs or to make decisions to provide some kind of asset redistribution
35
From what I know of the Pakistan scene, I suspect that eventually you
will find the lack of education in rural areas, mass education, an inhibit-
ing factor to development. Perhaps much sooner than you might think.
I recognize that this is a very delicate subject, but let me make a few
observations. We find that in developed countries, the educational level
of the mother is a far more important determinant of the educational
level of children than the education level of men or the father. This leads
me to suggest that you probably need to be concerned about the implica-
tions of an educational structure which leaves a high proportion of rural
women without much education. This clearly has implications in terms
of demand for education by the next generation. I realize that it is
dangerous to generalize from one culture to another, and I want to be
very cautious in saying that the relationship between mother's education
and that of her children in other countries will be true for Pakistan.
But at least you should be looking at that very seriously from this point
of view. Of course, this has immense income distribution implications.
Restricted access to education is probably more deleterious to the poor
in the long run than restricted access to land.
lecture. Your central thesis appears to present not just a strategy of agri-
cultural growth but a strategy of economic development. In that
context, the main emphasis that appears to come out of your lecture is
that agriculture should play a leading role in this strategy, I think there
cannot be two opinions about agriculture playing an important role in a
country like Pakistan, However, when it comes to giving a leading role
to a particular sector, then I think a number of questions arise and a
number of problems need to be resolved. As students of development
economics we all know that this type of strategy has been suggested in
the past in the idea of balanced and unbalanced growth and so on.
Looking at this particular strategy of development, the first question
that comes to mind is what are the objectives of this strategy. Do we
want to transform agriculture under the concept of the new international
economic order which considers that industrialization can take place
only if sufficient surplus has been generated in the agricultural sector, as
is evident from the history of other countries? Is the objective of this
development strategy to transform the society as it is? Are we looking at
the socioeconomic transformation of the society, as, of course, should be
the objective of the development strategy of any country like Pakistan?
Or are we simply looking at making agriculture a properly growing sector?
The second question which comes to mind is where are we right
now? Does the strategy which you are proposing imply a really rapid and
major shift in the agricultural sector? Moreover, how reproductive does
this change have to be? At what pace do we have to develop agriculture?
And if we have to neglect other sectors, what has to be the pace of that
neglect? Do we start from a clean slate? If we do then, perhaps, the
requirements for this strategy will be different. Currently, we are placed
in a very difficult economic situation where we have to find avenues for
financing heavy international debts. For this we have been striving to
generate more exportable commodities. What is going to happen to this
pressure on the economy if we go for a major shift in the agricultural
sector?
Prof. John W. Mellor: I think you are quite right that we should get the
objectives of development out into the open. As I see it, the objective of
development is to bring all people into processes that increase their
41
freedom of choice. For very poor people that means not only raising
their incomes, but also bringing them into productive processes where
they can make better use of their minds in facing expanding choices.
This, of course, involves formal education. Therefore, I prefer develop-
ment that emphasizes agriculture and small- and medium-scale sector
industrialization because it involves many more people.
Pakistan is following the development strategy I am talking about
to a degree greater than most developing countries. Pakistan's agricul-
tural sector has a very successful record. You have been one of the
fastest growing countries in basic food staple production. In my view,
your overall growth in GNP simply could not have been achieved with an
alternative strategy. There is a vigorous market-town economy in the
Punjab and you have had broad participation in other small- and medium-
scale sectors. I am emphasizing your achievement because I believe clear
thinking people will accept the broad strategy that you generally have
been following.
It obviously makes no sense for the capital-short countries of the
Third World to be net-repayers of debt. We have to get out of the mind
set that these debts ought to be repaid in the near future. A capital-
short country should be building high-growth rates on their rich labour,
and, I would argue, rich agricultural resources. These high growth rates
can finance an ever-increasing amount of debt which over time may
actually decrease as the percentage of the GNP. We have a very unfor-
tunate situation in the world at the present time, but I hope we will get
beyond it shortly. I was very encouraged by the comment of Barber
Conable, the new President of the World Bank, that we have to get the
debt crisis behind us so the World Bank can get on with its real business —
development. He also observed that the World Bank is misnamed; it is
not a bank, but a development institution. I welcome the return of this
approach after a four to five year hiatus.
sectors or sub-sectors where you can produce the most. But in the inter-
national environment where most of agriculture is subsidized heavily, the
development of some of the sectors of developing nations is severely
inhibited. Take the case of the dairy industry in Pakistan. We are import-
ing large quantities of milk powder which is heavily subsidized and
cheaply available. Because of this, it is not possible for Pakistan, in the
short term, to develop its dairy industries and compete with imported
milk,
Secondly, the Pakistan government follows the policy of what you
call support prices so that agricultural prices may not hurt the poor
farmers. This has advantages, but in the long run it can lead to the shift-
ing of land from one crop to another which maybe more productive at
that particular time. This is something of a disadvantage. Lastly, I think
you were mentioning mostly neoclassical type models and I may be
wrong in this, but in Pakistan's case, I think that a classical model is
more applicable as far as the land-owing class is concerned. This class is
not consuming manufactured goods produced in Pakistan but relies
mostly on imported goods. This has an adverse impact on our balance of
payments problems.
Prof. John W. Mellor: The strategy I have delineated has a good deal in
common with the current neoclassical emphasis on the private sector and
trade orientation to free the economy for small- and medium-scale
entrepreneurs. Once you have a vigorous private sector with substantial
public sector support in infrastructure and education, trade issues will
take care of themselves moderately well. Let us not understate the size
of the markets in developed countries for relatively labour-intensive
goods and services. They are not all textiles. In the case of Pakistan,
there are potentials for fruit and vegetables and livestock commodity
exports not only to Western Europe and North America but also to the
Middle East, where your geographical location gives you a comparative
advantage.
I understand the pessimism of lot of people about the trade
environment in developed countries these days. But do not forget that
there is a great deal of trade among these countries in labour-intensive
43
pace with which resources have been withdrawn from agriculture, the
important question is just how to reduce it. This question raises difficult
tradeoffs for those countries.
The large exports of cereals being made available by developed
countries is beneficial to developing countries which are able to increase
growth in employment more rapidly than in food production. These
countries are increasing imports of cereals. Conversely, developed
country exports are harmful to countries like Argentina and Thailand
and would be for Burma if that country had reasonable domestic
policies. It is not clear whether they are good or bad for Pakistan. So
far, you have been able to generate growth in demand for food more or
less commensurate with your agricultural growth capacity. Consequent-
ly, the cereals strategy of developed countries has not been inimical to
you.
My impression is that Pakistan should be concerned less about
exports of cereals from the developed countries and their subsidies and
devote much more attention to access to their fruit, vegetable and
livestock markets. That is where you want to fight the battle on trade.
In general, in the United States, those commodities have been left pretty
much to the free market and you do have some opportunities to sell
there. In Europe, there has been a tendency to protect those sectors.
So, there is probably an opportunity to fight a very limited battle in
the GATT negotiations, probably in alliance with the United States. You
once had access to those markets, a fact that gives you some advantage.
There also may be some points on which you can align yourself with
Australia and Canada.
I hope what I have just said will not be construed to mean that I
like or accept an international economic order in which rich countries
dominate world trade negotiations while developing countries are lucky
if they can have any influence at all. However, given that deplorable
situation, you need to pick your areas of influence on trade very care-
fully. As far as agriculture is concetned, I have suggested that you
concentrate on the fruit/vegetable/livestock sector. You also want to
play a role on anti-dumping. Dumping by the rich countries into the
47
process are missing from the plot: for example, what happens to employ-
ment in the rural sector, to the rural real wage, to the availability of
wage goods, and to the prices of wage goods? One also finds amiss in
traditional wisdom the subsidiary role assigned to the largest sector o f the
economy—the agricultural sector, that is—in the growth process. But,
above all, the central issue of p,overty, especially rural poverty, is left
undecided in the hope that the "trickle down" effect will take care
of the problem. But to miss all this is to miss an awful lot because,
if reducing poverty is the aim of economic development, a rising level
of employment — and hence of real wage of the (rural) poor — is among
the most essential means to achieve this aim. And somewhere in this
chain of events must also appear the level of supplies of wage goods (the
agricultural commodities), and the prices at which these supplies are
made available.
Prof. Mellor has chosen, unlike the modest lady who conceals more
than she reveals, to be somewhat 'immodest' by revealing what tradi-
tional wisdom usually keeps covered up. !He achieves this intellectual
'striptease' by making a high rate of agricultural growth and employment-
creation the necessary condition of a 'successful' story of economic
growth—whereby 'success' is directly related to the alleviation of mass
poverty. But note this. No claim is made for agricultural growth to
directly generate enough overall growth or employment. It would not.
Neither is it asserted that the share of agriculture in GDP would not
decline. It would. What Prof. Mellor does is to emphasize the role of
agriculture as an initiator — and not just a sustainer — of the growth
process. Prof. Mellor introduces technological change, food production,
and food prices, as vital elements of his model. Technological change—
i.e., the introduction of high-yielding varieties of seeds and improved
agronomic practices, etc. — tends to reduce the cost of production of
food. When this happens, it becomes possible to increase food output at
the same time as food prices are declining. With the growth in wage
goods (food) production playing a dynamic role, agricultural growth
will directly create employment. This will happen because of the relative-
ly labour-intensive nature of technological change in the agricultural
sector, which, in turn, permits the 'right' kind of "capital-spreading".
51
To inject some empirical content into his thesis, Prof. Mellor uses
his model to explain why the growth rate is higher in Pakistan than in
other countries—like India. While a low rate of savings remains the
Achille's heel of Pakistan's economy, its growth record can be explained
partly by the fact that capital is probably "spread" better here than
in India. His model would predict Pakistan's economy growing at a
faster overall rate because it has been relatively more successful in
increasing food production at reasonable prices, and in generating a
higher rate of employment. All this could only lead Pakistan, as it
actually did, to achieve greater success in reducing poverty (especially
rural poverty—and that, too, at a lower rate of savings) than did India.
This is an interesting hypothesis about Pakistan's consistently superior
growth performance, a phenomenon which most observers find some-
what paradoxical.
I have presented here just the bare bones of Prof. Mellor's growth
model to make sure that his essential message is not lost. But the bare-
bones picture is no substitute for the fleshy, real-life picture which Prof.
Mellor just presented to us in his lecture. I am sure that the audience has
52
enjoyed seeing this picture at least as much as I have done. A vivid proof
of this assertion of mine is the lively question-and-answer session in
which we all participated enthusiastically, and which I had to cut short
somewhat prematurely to meet the binding time-constraint.
are dealing with a very large sector, through that decrease in the cost of
agricultural production and the increase in factor productivity, a major
increase occurs in national income. That increase in national income
falls into the hands of the farming classes, the small farmers and the
peasant farmers, whose expenditure stimulates growth and increased
national income in other sectors of the economy.
The impact on other sectors of the economy works most important-
ly through expenditures on consumption goods and services. Of the
increment to income, perhaps 20 to 30 percent is expended for capital
investment in agriculture, leaving 70 to 80 percent for increased con-
sumption expenditure. At that point, we are talking about a somewhat
Keynesian phenomenon in which growth in expenditure stimulates
growth in sectors of the economy where there are underemployed
resources, particularly including labour; thereby mobilizing those re-
sources in relatively labour-intensive production of goods and, particu-
larly, of services in the rural sector.
That process certainly includes major market towns, thereby includ-
ing urban concentrations of at least modest significance. When I allude
to a Keynesian phenomenon, I am referring to the increase in effective
demand stimulating production processes which use underemployed
resources particularly labour. But, it is a nort-Keynesian phenomenon in
the sense that it cannot be accomplished simply with fiscal policy. The
reason those sectors cannot be stimulated with fiscal policy or monetary
policy is because the mobilization of labour requires an increased supply
of the wage goods on which the increased labour force spends its money.
A key underemployed resource, labour, requires for its mobilization
another resource, food, that is already being utilized fully.
To further recapitulate what is in fact a fairly complex argument:
the increased demand from the increased real income of technological
change brings about increased employment. Labour is, in one sense, an
underemployed resource and, in that sense, the strategy outlined has
Keynesian elements. However, that labour will spend its incremental
income largely on food and agricultural commodities; if that food and
the agricultural commodites are not available, increased demand creates
57
the increased income of the peasant farming class, the small farmer, the
kulak as they are sometimes pejoratively called. What is their income
class? How are they spending that income?
In the case of landlord-tenant systems, one obviously has to be con-
cerned with the increased incomes of the tenants, as well as those of the
landowners. How the added income divides between these groups is
itself a complex matter, relating to tenancy rules, land supply and
demand for labour and land, as well as customary practices. Neither neo-
classical economics nor theories of exploitation will assure the answer to
this question. It is an empirical issue.
Thus, we need a breakdown of expenditure patterns or consumption
expenditures according to income and social class. Then, we need to
look at a rather detailed breakdown of the consumption patterns of
these people especially with respect to non-agricultural goods and services.
We find here that our consumption surveys tend to provide detail
only on those elements which are dominant for the population as a
whole. They do not often shed light on the non-agricultural goods and
services which are important for the income groups experiencing the
initial major increase in benefits from the green revolution or, more
generally, from improved agricultural technologies. For example, the
breakdown on consumer durables in most consumption surveys is quite
inadequate for understanding what policies are needed to facilitate
growth in supply of those goods. The breakdown for services, in general,
is inadequate for understanding the major opportunities and needs for
that sector. Even the education and the transportation categories that
do appear in most consumer surveys are not detailed enough to illuminate
the needs for meeting the demands implicit in these expenditures.
We need to know, in particular, to what extent these expenditure
patterns are oriented towards locally-produced goods and services, to
what extent are they oriented towards goods produced in more distant
parts of the same nation and to what extent are they imported from
other countries. Further, we need to know the capital intensity of their
production. These data tell us much about the policies needed to obtain
59
maximum national growth and employment multipliers from the initial
stimulus of agricultural growth.
Thus, the need is for considerable detail beyond that normally
contained in consumer surveys. We must remind ourselves why we want
that information — it is so that we can know in some detail what sectors
of the economy are to be stimulated and, particularly, what role govern-
ment must play in providing that stimulus.
more favourable the GNP effect will be, the more favourable the em-
ployment impact will be, and hence, the more favourable will be the
distribution impact. What one would most particularly like to see from
these expenditure multipliers from rural people, as their incomes rise due
to increases in agricultural production, is a stimulus to the local landless
class. Thus, we need to understand what kinds of restrictions there may
be to expanding production of those goods and services, and what kind
of restrictions there may be to participation by the poor.
From our studies of rural infrastructure in Bangladesh, we find that,
where the rural infrastructure is favourable, wage rates for the landless
labour class are about 12 percent higher than in areas that are similar but
lacking good infrastructure. This is important evidence of the role of
infrastructure in facilitating large local. employment multipliers from
agricultural growth, an issue to which we will return shortly.
That 12 percent higher real wage rate tells us some very important
things about the development process. We know from other studies that
markets in rural Bangladesh are working quite well. Thus, we know that
this higher rural wage in areas of good infrastructure is not due to tradi-
tional market imperfections. The difference does not lie with people in
poor infrastructure areas not knowing about jobs in areas where there is
good infrastructure. We also know that migration occurs quite easily
with low frictions. So there must be some very sound economic reasons
why people are willing to stay in an area with poorer infrastructure and
work for a wage rate that is less than is available in areas not very far
away, where there is good infrastructure. Those better jobs are within
walking distance of one or two hours.
Why then do we find such wage differentials? We do not know for
sure and, thus, that should be one of the priorities for further research.
But, I would speculate that the reason lies with the social overhead
required for a labour force. In the area with the lower wage rate, there
is a labour force which already has housing and at least, minimal public
services. If labourers move towards the better infrastructure where there
is a higher wage rate, they have to provide housing for themselves in the
new location. They probably require other social overhead expenditure
as well.
61
may working capital disappear if such firms do not prosper, but the
borrower also may disappear! They are not tied to a fixed capital
requirement. So this is a very difficult problem for the lender.
We also note from the experience of developed countries, where
these small firms also represent a very large proportion of the manufac-
turing output, that the mortality rate for such firms is quite high. This,
too, is a very difficult problem with respect to financing. On the one
hand, one must encourage these small firms because they are the back-
bone of industrial growth, particularly in early stages of development.
We know that they have substantial working capital requirements. We
know that it is difficult to provide working capital and to get security.
And, we know that there is going to be a fairly high failure rate. In fact,
you do not want to stand in the way of that high failure rate because
you do want natural selection to set in to choose the more able
entrepreneurs.
the old demand structures. That again calls for expansion and the
development of the agricultural research system to meet the compleit
new needs of those regions.
I must now emphasize a point about human capital. The kind of
development strategy I am discussing, with agriculture as the leading
edge providing strong multiplier forces on other sectors of the economy,
is a trained personnel-intensive development strategy. The heavy indus-
try kind of strategy, the capital-intensive development strategy, uses
significantly fewer trained people. First of all, it makes much less
employment generally, but it makes proportionally even less employment
for trained people.
For example, how many highly-trained people are necessary to run a
steel mill as compared to basic labourers? We find that proportion to be
small in a good deal of large-scale industry. That may be contrary to
some of the conventional wisdom, but common sense will tell you that
when you move into agriculture, where you have to develop a very
complex institutional structure of research and so on to support it, you
are obviously talking about a tremendous increase in the demand for
educated people. This is especially true when you note the small-scale
industries where the proportion of entrepreneurs to workers is quite high.
I make that comment in the context particularly of the need for many
institutions to support agriculture.
In Pakistan, we see tremendous efforts in developing the Agricul-
tural Research Council and all the work that goes on under that. It has
been an exemplary development, but it obviously needs considerable
further development to move into the highly modern world of high yield
foodgrain production. Further, that system must broaden itself into the
very wide range of commodities which come out of agriculture as
incomes rise and as the high-income elasticities for many commodities
begin to exert themselves.
Thus, we do need much more of research in the whole manpower
area to figure out what the increased demands will be, where they are go-
ing to be and how the higher educational system has to be structured to
74
meet those needs. I use research to illustrate the tremendous needs for
trained people for a modern agriculture, but the types of points I make
can be replicated for many other areas as well. And remember that
expansion of investment in human capital is not only a means to a
development end but it is an important part of the end itself. How mar-
velous and fortuitous!
The topic of this lecture has been research needs. I am sure that
readers have been a little surprised by my research agenda. Coming from
an economist, it probably sounds fairly pedestrian — a whole range of
studies that involve fairly simple-minded surveys of what is happening
around small-scale industries and market towns, looking at consumption
patterns, which we have always looked at, in fairly straightforward ways
and a number of manpower studies. But, I would like to make the point
that in a development strategy that provides high growth rates and has a
high degree of dynamism, there is a tremendous burden on government
to try to adjust to the dynamics.
Thus, a tremendous amount of analysis is needed in order to
support government in making these critical decisions. That analysis
may seem fairly pedestrian on the surface, but research methodology
need not be restricted to straightforward, old-fashioned economic tools.
There are ways of using sophisticated statistical and econometric tech-
niques in doing what I am suggesting. Such tools are, however, frosting
on the cake, not the cake itself. We are talking about the multiplication
of a large number of studies that have to be replicated over a fairly wide
area in order to give us rather precise information for good policy
determination.
I will make a general closing comment. We have many disbelievers
about the development strategy set forth here. From that point of view,
getting out and doing some social accounting matrices in rural areas, as
we have been doing at the International Food Policy Research Institute
and as has been done elsewhere, can be quite convincing. For that, you
collect the data describing the total economic system of the regions of
interest. You feed into those results the changes in agricultural produc-
tivity that are feasible, that are being put into effect now, and then
75
DISCUSSION
Mr Inayatullah: I have a rather unconventional set of questions on
research. What is the social utility of knowledge being produced by our
research institutions? Because we are increasingly concerned with what is
produced in the country in physical terms and what reaches the common
man, does our research actually reach the common man? Does it enable
him to act effectively and protect his interests? Secondly, most of our
dealings in any conference like this are with the professional researchers
and the civil servants who are mostly employees of the government.
Obviously, the government is not very neutral in its objectives. It has its
own interests and, as a result, the institutions and the research agenda
seek to legitimize the power of the ruling group and do not necessarily
promote the interests of the common man. Basically, the research agenda
becomes biased in favour of whoever is the controller of the resources.
have stressed those for which more technological solutions are promising.
And, (2) I want to be absolutely clear that I am talking about research
that relates to a broad development strategy, not the total research
agenda for either agriculture or the general economy. There are a lot of
other issues that are not part of my agenda.
Mr Akmal Siddique: Thank you very much, Professor Mellor for another
excellent lecture this morning. I have questions and comments on two
basic areas. The first is regarding the telecommunication facilities we are
talking about — telephone facilities and the like in developing countries—
and the second is regarding small farms in developing countries.
Regarding telephone facilities, I would like to share a small personal
observation. Everybody knows that telephone facilities are very bad in
big towns like Islamabad. The public decision-making in a country like
Pakistan does not really involve proper economic sense. If I want to
make a call to a railway station, I cannot get my call through because
of faulty facilities so I have to pick up my motorbike and get onto the
road. I spend two or three liters worth of gas, my time and its opportu-
nity costs while I am on the road. The road is congested and the proba-
bility of accidents is high. The social and economic costs of this effort
add up. if I had a good telephone facility I could have made a 50 paisa
telephone call and received the information right in my house. So this
is one aspect that public decision-makers should take into consideration.
They should look at the economic cost of not having a proper telephone
facility in the country.
Secondly, I would like to comment on small firm businesses. As I
understand it, you have advocated small firm business in Third World
countries and doing away with capital-intensive projects in a country like
Pakistan. Well, my question is what about economies of scale? Moreover,
while literacy levels are very low in a country like Pakistan, entrepreneur
skills are also very low. What do you suggest under circumstances like
this one?
Prof. John W. Mellor: Infrastructure is a serious matter in rural areas and
its development will require vast resources. I would not for a minute
78
knowledge will not be itself produce the results which we are trying to
achieve, to improve prosperity and have the spread effects and improve
the quality of life for the people. This requires institutional development
at the local level.
The third point I would like to emphasize is that in a developing
country, the demand for resources is enormous. Unfortunately, the
availability is far less. Therefore, the social scientist's contribution to
using the limited resources to optimum advantage is of paramount
importance to us. It is here that the research effort is required. What is
best for improving the quality of life of the people of Pakistan should be
borne in mind. This is the other important aspect. We want to see that
the fruits of increased agricultural production are supportive. With
increased production, we want to see that the poorest do not become
poorer through increased cost of foodgrains. Therefore, the subsidy that
the government gives should really go only to the most deserving person.
Not everybody in the urban areas should be entitled to that subsidy.
I am glad Professor Mellor has mentioned the need to develop know-
ledge. I assure you that if knowledge exists it will eventually be utilized.
In an environment where the resources are limited, the social scientists
and especially the economists have a crucial role in assuring that there is
no waste of scarce resources. We need to develop the capacity here
within our research systems so that we can benefit from the advice and
the guidelines derived in international research. I want to thank you
Prof. Naqvi for this opportunity and thank you, Professor Mellor.
Prof. John W. Mellor: Well, I'd just like to make a brief comment. First
of all, thank you for those very kind remarks. They obviously have
caught the essence of what I am trying to say. I think one of the great
problem with economists is sometimes we are afraid that if we state
things too clearly it will seem so simple-minded that we might not
command sufficient respect. I sometimes take that risk, sometimes
failing in it. I have had a long association with you with respect to
Pakistan and I admire very much the work that you were doing in the
ministry here. And I think we see a lot of the benefits of that around at
this time, so it is a great privilege to have you in the audience here.
Thank you.
85
FURTHER READING
These lectures are based on a long chain of work, starting with
William Petty, Adam Smith, and, to some extent, Thomas Robert
Malthus. A more recent impetus is derived from Colin Clark and,
perhaps most of all, from W. Arthur Lewis and his celebrated paper on
development with "unlimited supplies of labour". In picking up this
thread, I owe much to my long time associate Bruce Johnston, as we
each took the early ideas and elaborated on them to culminate in a full
strategy of economic development which plays to the. comparative
advantage of developing countries in fostering a technologically improv-
ing agriculture and deriving from that a labour using broadly participatory
strategy of economic development.
I list below several references that elaborate on my own work, a few
that show the thrust of Bruce Johnston's special contributions and one
reference to T. H. Lee, now President of Taiwan, who worked with me at
Cornell and earlier with Professor Ishikawa. T.H. Lee elaborates the
optimal role of agriculture in development with extraordinarily detailed,
historical, social accounting data from Taiwan. Two of the readings are
co-authored with my wife Uma Lele who contributed much to those two
seminal pieces and through endless discussion in these areas of mutual
interest. The references are arranged in chronological order according to
publication date.
REFERENCES
"The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development". With Bruce F.
Johnston. The American Economic Review. Vol. 51, No. 4. Septem-
ber 1961. pp. 566-593.
"The Use and Productivity of Farm Family Labor in Early States of
Agricultural Development". Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 45, No.
3. August 1963. pp. 517-534.
The Economics of Agricultural Development. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press. 1966.
86
Mellor, John W., and Gunvant M. Desai (eds.). Agricultural Change and
Rural Poverty: Variations on a Theme by Dharm Narain. Baltimore,
MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 1985.
"Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization". In Development Strate-
gies Reconsidered. Edited by John P. Lewis and Valeriana Kallab.
U.S. Third World Policy Perspectives Mo. 5. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Books for the Overseas Development Council, 1986. pp.
67-89.
Mellor, John W., and Ahmed, Raisuddin. Agricultural Price Policy for
Developing Countries. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University
Press. 1988.
CONCLUDING
REMARKS
by
Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi
CONCLUDING REMARKS
by
Professor Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi
fruit; and that it would have been better if this role had been assigned to
agriculture instead. But since such an 'error' has already been committed
in almost all the developing countries, how can we implement Prof.
Mellor's recommendation to assign agriculture the initiating role in
achieving high rates of growth of output and employment? Prof. Mellor's
message is the following: now that the growth process has already been
initiated by industry, nothing can be done to rewrite history; let us then
cut our losses by not neglecting agriculture as has been done in the past.
Agricultural growth should be accelerated; but all this does not mean
that agriculture would henceforth grow at a faster rate than the rest of
the economy. Prof. Mellor would rule out such a back-to-agriculture
strategy. I wish to emphasize this point in order to avoid any misunder-
standing on this issue.
Prof. Mellor has also presented today a whole agenda of research
highlighting the need for investigating the consumption patterns, the
production processes in rural areas, infrastructure, the distribution
mechanism, and the overall development process. It promises to be a
highly creative research programme which will help us to a better under-
standing of the mystique of agricultural growth and employment genera-
tion, and the many ways through which the initial growth impulses
originating in the agriculture sector spread to the rest of the economy.
This research agenda should also form an excellent basis of intellectual
collaboration between the PIDE and the IFPRI.
I would now like to thank Prof. Mellor for giving us two very
enlightening lectures. It is on such occasions that we realize that time
flies. I am extremely grateful to the academics and policy-makers, too,
who have attended these lectures in such large numbers. They raised
penetrating questions, which prompted Prof. Mellor to shed more light
on his ideas. We should also compliment the management of Holiday Inn
for making extremely good arrangements for this Seminar.
On this happy note, I declare the session closed.
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
of
Prof. John W. Mellor
95
Appendix
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
OF
PROFESSOR JOHN W. MELLOR
Professional
affiliations: Director, Chair, or Member of Project, Commissions, or
Groups:
Member, Senior Expert Group on Rural Credit, Reserve
Bank of India, 1987
Chairman, Directors of the International Agricultural
Research Centers, 1987
Member, Council for Agricultural Science and Tech-
nology (CAST) task force on the project, "The Long-
Term Viability of U.S. Agriculture". 1986.
Director, Research Project (AID and Cornell University),
Analysis of Direct and Indirect Effects of Technological
Change in Agriculture, 1974-75
Chairman, Mekong Development Panel, Southeast Asia
Development Advisory Group of the Asia Society, 1974
Director of Research, 20th Century Fund Project on
India, 1970-72
Director, Research Project (AID and Cornell University),
Agricultural Prices in Economic Development: Their
Role, Function, and Operation, 1966—70
Representative for Cornell University on the 10-member
Interuniversity Committee for Study Fellowships in
International Development, 1962—67
97
Publications
of
Professor John W. Mellor
A. Books — Author
The Economics of Agricultural Development. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press. 1966.
The New Economics of Growth — A Strategy for India and the Develop-
ing World. A Twentieth Century Fund Study. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press. 1976.
B. Books - Editor
C. Encyclopedia Articles
"Farm Mangement". With J. R. Raeburn. Encyclopedia Britannica. Vol.
10, No. 1. 1965.
"Agriculture in Developing Countries". International Encyclopedia of
the Social Sciences. 1969.
D. Journal Articles
"British Postwar Policy Towards Farm Mechanization". Journal of
Farm Economics. Vol. 36, No. 1. February 1954. pp. 98—107.
"The Average and Marginal Product of Farm Labor in Underdeveloped
Economies". With Robert D. Stevens. Journal of Farm Economics.
Vol 38, No. 3. August 1956. pp. 780-791.
"Grain Feeding Related to Milk-Feed Price Ratios". With Conrad B.
Strauss. Journal of Farm Economics. Vol 41, No. 4. November
1959. pp. 805-808.
"The Nature of Agriculture's Contributions to Economic Development".
With Bruce. F. Johston. Food Research Institute Studies. Vol. 1,
No. 3. November 1960. pp. 335-336.
"The Role of Agriculture in Economic Development". With Bruce F.
Johnston. The American Economic Review. Vol. 51, No. 4,
September 1961. pp. 566—593.
"Increasing Agricultural Production in Early Stages of Development".
The Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics. Vol 17, No. 2. April-
June 1962. pp. 29-46.
"The Process of Agricultural Development in Low-Income countries".
Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 44, No. 3. August 1962. pp.
700-716.
102
"Agricultural Issues and Trends in Asia and the Near East: Reflections
for the Next Decade". Paper Prepared for the USAID Asia and Near
East Bureau Senior Agricultural Development Officers Conference
held in Bangkok. February 1987.
H. Notes, Comments and Reviews
"Sample Bias from the Elimination of Poultry men Who Don't Keep
Financial Records". Journal of Farm Economics, Vol, 34, No. 1.
February 1952. pp. 119-123.
"Outlets Used by New York Farmers for Sale of Eggs and Poultry".
Farm Economics No. 184., March 1952. pp. 4,836—4,838.
"Atomic Energy Applications with Reference to Underdeveloped Areas"
(review article). Journal of Farm Economics. Vol. 39, No. 4. Novem-
ber 1957. pp. 1 040-1042.
"The Land Changes and the Land Endures". With Howard E. Conklin.
Land, the Yearbook of Agriculture. United States Department of
Agriculture. 1958. pp. 104-108.