[G.R. No. L-12629. December 9, 1959.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALFREDO

ARAQUEL, Defendant-Appellee.

Acting Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason

for Appellant.

Francisco Villanueva for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES; COURT

HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE. — Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code does not define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or
benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical
injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. Consequently, a complaint or
information charging homicide under the exceptional circumstances provided
therein must fall under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, the offense
charged being actually that of homicide. The fact that the exceptional
circumstances are also pleaded, as was done in the present case, would not affect
the nature of the crime charged. For they are not integral elements of the crime
charged but are matters which the accused has to prove in order to warrant the
application of the benefit granted by the law. As unnecessary and immaterial
averments to the crime charged, they may be stricken out as surplusage and still
leave the offense fully described.

2. COURT; INFERIOR COURTS; EXTENT OF JURISDICTION. — Under republic Act

No. 296, the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts, as
enlarged, extends only to "assaults where the intent to kill is not charged or
evidence at the trial." (Section 87 [c]. A fortiori, where the intent to kill is evident
— as in cases of homicide under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code — the case necessarily falls beyond the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

This is an appeal by the Government from an order of the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, dismissing the information for homicide filed against the accused Alfredo
Araquel on the ground of double jeopardy.
The record shows that on January 30, 1955, the acting chief of police of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, filed with the justice of the peace court of that municipality a complaint
for homicide against Alfredo Araquel accusing him of having hacked and killed
Alberto Pagadian with a bolo. More than a year and a half later, or on July 3, 1956,
while said complaint, for reasons not stated, was still pending in the justice of the
peace court, the chief of police of Narvacan moved for the amendment thereof,
alleging that upon reinvestigation of the facts he found that the crime committed by
the accused was not homicide as charged in the original complaint but that of
homicide under exceptional circumstances as provided for in article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. Finding the motion to be well taken, the justice of the peace
court, on July 16, allowed the filing of the amended complaint which charged the
accused with "the crime of HOMICIDE UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
defined and punished under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code." That same day,
the accused was arraigned under the amended complaint. And as he entered a plea
of "guilty", the justice of the peace court, also on that same day, sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of destierro for a period of one year to any place not within the
radius of at least 25 kilometers from the municipal building of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur.

During the service of the sentence by the accused, the acting Provincial Fiscal of
Ilocos Sur was informed of the case through the Department of Justice to which the
private prosecutor had lodged a complaint. And after conducting an investigation,
the said acting provincial fiscal, on February 16, 1957, filed with the Court of First
Instance of the province an information against the accused Alfredo Araquel
charging him with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code for the killing of Alberto Pagadian.

On July 9, 1957, the accused moved to quash the information on the ground of
double jeopardy, invoking the previous charge against him for homicide under
exceptional circumstances and the subsequent sentence passed upon him by the
justice of the Peace Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. The fiscal opposed the motion,
but the trial court, in its order of July 18, 1957, sustained the plea of double
jeopardy and dismissed the information. Hence, this appeal.

The plea of jeopardy made by the accused was, to our minds, erroneously
sustained by the lower court.

In order that a defendant may legally be placed in jeopardy, one of the necessary
and indispensable conditions is that he should have been tried before a court of
competent jurisdiction. (Sec. 9, Rule 113, Rules of Court.) The court below, in
upholding the plea of double jeopardy, held that the Justice of the Peace Court of
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for
"homicide under exceptional circumstances defined and punished under Article 247
of the Revised Penal Code," on the theory that "the act defined" in that article "is a
felony" which is penalized with destierro and, consequently, falls under the
jurisdiction of the inferior court, following the ruling laid down in the case of Uy
Chin Hua v. Dinglasan, Et Al., (86 Phil., 617; 47 Off. Gaz. No. 12, Supp., p. 233).

There can of course be no question that, under the rule enunciated in the case of
Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan Et. Al., supra, offenses penalized with destierro fall under
the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts. (See also De los
Angeles v. People, 103 Phil., 295.) That rule, however, cannot be made to apply to
the present case, for it is apparent that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does
not define a crime distinct and separate from homicide, parricide, or murder, as the
case may be, depending, in so far as those crimes are concerned, upon the
relationship of the victim to the killer and the manner by which the killing is
committed. The article in question reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injuries, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

"If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.

"These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while
the daughters are living with their parents.

"Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter,
or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse, shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article."
cralaw virtua1aw library

This article is found under Section One of Chapter One, Title Eight of Book Two of
the Revised Penal Code. Title Eight refers to Crimes against Persons, Chapter One is
entitled Destruction to Life and Section One thereof treats of the crimes of
parricide, murder and homicide.

As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-
quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment —
to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused - who would
otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be - is punished only with destierro. This
penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the
protection of the accused than a punishment. (People v. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And
where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted
from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or
serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to
no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i. e., that it defines and penalizes a
distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt
the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby
compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a
mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element
of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissions . . . constituting the offense" should
be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which mitigates
criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element
of the offense charged — but a matter of defense that must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court — need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court;
U. S. v. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)

That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under
the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons.
There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it
could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.

We also note that under Republic Act No. 296, the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace and municipal courts, as enlarged, extends only to "assaults where the intent
to kill is not charged or evident at the trial." (Section 87[c]). A fortiori, where the
intent to kill is evident - as in cases of homicide under the exceptional
circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code — the case must
necessarily fall beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. An absurd situation
would, indeed, be created if the justice of the peace courts could exercise
jurisdiction over a case involving an actual killing, when they lack jurisdiction to try
even a case of slight physical injury where the intent to kill was evident. Such could
not have been the intendment of the law.

It may not be amiss to state here that the killing under exceptional circumstances
under both the old (Art. 423) and Revised Penal Code (Art. 247) had invariably
been tried before the Courts of First Instance under an information charging the
accused with either homicide, parricide, or murder. (See U. S. v. Vargas, Et Al., 2
Phil., 194; U. S. v. Melchor, 2 Phil., 588; U. S. v. Posoc, Et Al., 10 Phil., 711; U. S.
v. Alano, 32 Phil., 381; U. S. v. Verzola, 33 Phil., 285; People v. Loata, 46 Phil.,
392; People v. Bituanan, 56 Phil., 23; People v. Zamora de Cortez, 59 Phil., 568;
People v. Gonzales, 69 Phil., 66; People v. Dumon, 72 Phil., 41; People v. Coricor,
79 Phil., 672; People v. Sabilul, 89 Phil., 283; 49 Off. Gaz., 2743.) In all the above-
cited cases, the accused merely invoked the privilege or benefit granted in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code or Article 423 of the old Penal Code.

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define
and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for
the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned. Consequently, a complaint or information
charging homicide under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247
must fall under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance, the offense charged
being actually that of homicide. The fact that the exceptional circumstances are also
pleaded — as was done in the amended complaint filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court of Narvacan — would not affect the nature of the crime charged. For they are
not integral elements of the crime charged but are matters which the accused has
to prove in order to warrant the application of the benefit granted by the law. As
unnecessary and immaterial averments to the crime charged, they may be stricken
out as surplusage and still leave the offense fully described.

Conformably to the above findings, we hold that defendant was not tried by a court
of competent jurisdiction when he was arraigned before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Narvacan upon the amended complaint for "homicide under exceptional
circumstances" filed against him by the chief of police of the municipality, and
consequently, has not legally been placed in jeopardy in the present case.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings. No special pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Labrador and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Bautista Angelo and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LARRY LUMAHANG

Y TALISAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by the accused-appellant Larry

Lumahang y Talisay (Lumahang) assailing the Decision2 dated July 14, 2014 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05819, which affirmed with
modifications the Judgment3 dated October 23, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 217 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-08-156459 and Q-08-
156460, finding Lumahang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder
and Slight Physical Injuries.

The Facts
Two Informations were filed against Lumahang for killing Rodel Velitario (Velitario)
and stabbing Augusto Pornelos (Pornelos), the accusatory portions of which read:
Criminal Case No. Q-08-156459

That on or about the 14th day of December 2008, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
[appellant], with intent to kill, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of
treachery did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission and evident premeditation of the crime of murder directly by overt
acts, by then and there stabbing one AUGUSTO PORNELOS Y Buizon, with a knife,
but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of murder by reason of some cause other than their
spontaneous desistance, that is, the timely intervention of another and non-fatal
nature of the wounds inflicted to the damage and prejudice of said offended party. 4

Criminal Case No. Q-08-156460

That on or about the 14th day of December 2008, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to
kill, with the qualifying aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of one RODEL VELITARIO y
CAPACIO, by then and there stabbing him several times, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim. 5
The version of the prosecution, as summarized in its Brief for the Appellee, 6 is as
follows:
On December 14, 2008, around nine o'clock in the evening, Alberto Poraso, Rodel
Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were attending a wake in Joan of Arc Street,
Barangay Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City when appellant appeared fuming mad.
Suddenly, appellant approached Pornelos from behind and stabbed him in a hook
motion with knife in his left hand. Pornelos, who was hit on the buttocks, quickly
ran towards an alley. Without warning, appellant then turned his ire on Velitario
and stabbed him repeatedly on different parts of his body.

Dr. Joseph Palmero, medico-legal examiner of Velitario, found two (2) stab wounds
in the latter's abdomen, one (1) incise wound on the left shoulder and another on
the left posterior thigh. He found multiple abrasions on the (sic) Velitario's right
collar bone and on both toes which were presumably caused by a scuffle between
said victim and his assailant. It was determined that the cause of Velitario's death
was the multiple stab wounds he sustained on the abdomen, which among others,
hit his left kidney. Dr. Palmero estimated that based on the depth of the wounds,
the assailant was within an arm's length from the victim and that the weapon used
was a bladed knife measuring around eight (8) cm. long.

On the other hand, Dr. Engelbert Ednacot of the Quezon City General Hospital,
examining physician of Pornelos, found a stab wound on the latter's right buttocks,
which he concluded to be a non-fatal wound that required treatment for around
seven (7) days. In his medical opinion, the victim was attacked from behind. 7
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as summarized in its Brief for the
Accused-appellant,8 is as follows:
On December 14, 2008, at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening, accused LARRY
LUMAHANG and his cousin LL were on their way home from buying barbecue when
five (5) bystanders who were under the influence of alcohol blocked their way. The
bystanders approached Larry and LL. Suddenly, two (2) of them touched the hands,
shoulders and breasts of LL while the others laughed. LL said "Huwag!" while the
accused asked them to stop and told them that if they like LL, they should do it the
right way and go to their house to court her. Upon hearing that, the bystanders
approached the accused and one of them punched him while another pulled out a
knife. The person who drew the knife stabbed the accused but he was able to
thwart the thrust. However, he was hit on his left thigh and they grappled with the
knife. When he saw a chance to run away, he ran towards the direction of his aunt's
house with the bystanders running after him. They were not able to catch him but
they tried to destroy the house of his aunt by kicking it but still, they were not able
to pull him out of the house.

He identified Augusto Pornelos as one of the bystanders who blocked their way.
When the BPSO went to his aunt's house looking for him, he voluntarily
surrendered, after which, he was brought to the hospital and thereafter, to Camp
Karingal. He was surprised of the charges of murder and attempted murder against
him because he only grappled with the knife and did not stab anyone.

The first time he met the private complainant Pornelos and the deceased Velitario
was during the incident and he could not recall any disagreement or confrontations
that happened between them before December 14, 2008.

He had also sustained injuries from being punched in the head and had a stab
wound on his left thigh. Due to these injuries, he was confined in a clinic in
Novaliches which name he could no longer remember. As proof, he showed to the
court a one-inch scar with five stitches on his left thigh. When he voluntarily
surrendered to the police authorities, no knife was recovered from him. 9
When Lumahang was arraigned, he pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged. 10 Pre-
trial and trial thereafter ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Judgment11 dated October 23, 2012, the RTC
convicted Lumahang of the crimes of Murder and Less Serious Physical Injuries. The
dispositive portion of the said Judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) In Criminal Case No. Q-08-156459, finding accused LARRY LUMAHANG Y TALISAY

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES and there
being attendant aggravating and mitigating circumstance (sic), he is thereby sentenced to
 suffer an imprisonment of 4 months and 1 day to 6 months;
2) In Criminal Case No. Q-156460 for Murder, likewise finding accused LARRY
LUMAHANG Y TALISAY guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged and
hereby sentences him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ORDERED to pay
the heirs of the deceased Rodel Velitario the sums of P75,000.00 as death indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.12
The RTC convicted Lumahang on the basis of the testimony of the prosecution
eyewitness Alberto Poraso (Poraso), who positively identified him as the assailant of
Velitario and Pornelos. The RTC held that the stabbing of Pornelos and the killing of
Velitario were attended by treachery because the attacks were sudden, the victims
were unarmed, and they were not able to defend themselves. However, as to the
attack on Pornelos, the RTC only convicted Lumahang of less serious physical
injuries as it could not be inferred from the attack, or the wound sustained by
Pornelos, that Lumahang had the intent to kill Pornelos.

Aggrieved, Lumahang appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision13 dated July 14, 2014, the CA affirmed with modifications
the RTC's conviction of Lumahang on the basis of Poraso's testimony. It reiterated
the rule that the testimony of a lone witness, if found by the trial court to be
positive, categorical, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction. 14

The CA held that Lumahang's defense of denial could not prevail over the positive
and categorical testimony of the eyewitness who identified him as the assailant of
Velitario and Pornelos. As to Lumahang's claim of defense of relative, the CA did not
give credence to the claim because the element of unlawful aggression was
insufficiently proven. As Lumahang's cousin, who was supposedly harassed by the
group of Velitario, was not presented in court, the CA concluded that the supposed
aggression relied on by Lumahang was not sufficiently proven. Moreover, the CA
held that when Lumahang used the plea of defense of relative, he had, in fact,
admitted to doing the acts charged against him as the plea was in the nature of a
confession in avoidance.15

The CA likewise upheld the RTC finding that the attacks were attended with
treachery. As to the attack against Pornelos, Lumahang effected the attack from
behind; as to Velitario, the attack, while made frontally, was made by Lumahang in
a sudden, unexpected, and swift manner.16 The CA also upheld the RTC's finding
that Lumahang was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
because he surrendered to the barangay at the night of the incident after having
been convinced by his aunt, Virginia Lumahang.17
While the CA upheld Lumahang's conviction for Murder for the killing of Velitario, it
did, however, downgrade Lumahang's conviction for the stabbing of Pornelos. The
CA convicted Lumahang of only Slight Physical Injuries, as Pornelos needed only
seven days of confinement in the hospital to recover from the injury.

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

For resolution of this Court are the following issues submitted by Lumahang:

(1) Whether the CA erred in convicting Lumahang despite the prosecution's failure to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
(2) Whether the CA erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is partially meritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of Lumahang
but for the crime of Homicide, instead of Murder, as the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not present in the killing of Velitario. The Court likewise affirms the
conviction of Lumahang for the crime of Slight Physical Injuries for stabbing
Pornelos.

On whether Lumahang's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt

In questioning his conviction, Lumahang again reiterates his argument that he

cannot be convicted on the basis of a single, uncorroborated testimony of an
eyewitness.18 He argues that the prosecution was unable to present evidence that
was contrary to his version of the facts, and this supposedly raises reasonable
doubt on his guilt.19

The arguments deserve scant consideration.

At the outset, it bears mentioning that Lumahang raises the same issues as those
raised in — and duly passed upon by — the CA. It is well-settled that in the absence
of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the
case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. 20 Thus,
when the case pivots on the issue of the credibility of the testimonies of the
witnesses, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and respect
as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the demeanor and sincerity
of witnesses during trial.21 Here, after examining the records of this case, the Court
finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the testimonial evidence,
which was affirmed in toto by the CA. In this connection, the Court quotes with
approval the following disquisition by the CA on the credibility of the testimony of
eyewitness Porazo:
It bears stressing that [Porazo] was only about a meter and a half away from
appellant when he saw the latter stab [Pornelos]. Also, [Porazo] was about 3
meters away from [Velitario] when he saw appellant turned to stab [Velitario]. Even
if it was already 9:00 in the evening, and he is not familiar with appellant,
[Porazo]'s proximity to the two victims and the appellant gave him unimpeded view
of the stabbing incident. Thus, appellant easily and unmistakably identified
appellant in open court as the assailant of the victims.

Of marked relevance is the failure of appellant to impute and show ill-motive on the
part of [Porazo] to wrongly implicate him in the present criminal cases. Appellant's
admission that he does not know [Porazo] and is unaware of any reason for the
latter to falsely testify against him, serves to bolster the credibility of [Porazo] 's
testimony. The rule is that when there is no evidence to show any dubious reason
or improper motive for a prosecution witness, like [Porazo] to testify falsely against
an accused, his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.22
As against the positive identification by an eyewitness, Lumahang could only
interpose the defense of denial and a blanket claim of defense of relative. To
repeat, his version was that the group of Poraso, Velitario, and Pornelos made
indecent advances to his cousin. According to him, he tried to intervene and protect
his cousin, but one of them stabbed him on his thigh. He then grappled with the
knife and ran away when the first opportunity to do so presented itself.

The Court has oft pronounced that denial is an inherently weak defense which
cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution witness
that the accused committed the crime.23 Thus, as between a categorical testimony
which has the ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi on the other,
the former is generally held to prevail.24

In this case, Lumahang simply denies that he stabbed the victims, and, at the same
time, claims that he was just protecting his cousin. The Court, however, cannot
give more weight to Lumahang's denial over the testimonial evidence presented by
the prosecution. Moreover, the Court cannot also give credence to Lumahang's
claim of defense of relative, as none of the elements to successfully invoke the
same was sufficiently proven in this case.

The justifying circumstance of defense of relative may be invoked by proving the

following elements:

(1) unlawful aggression;

(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or and repel it;

(3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the
defense had no part therein.25

Of these three requisites, the first element - the presence of unlawful aggression -
is said to be the most essential and primary, without which any defense is not
possible or justified.26 This must be so, because "[i]f there is no unlawful aggression
there would be nothing to prevent or repel." 27

In this case, the CA correctly held that Lumahang failed to prove that there was
unlawful aggression. As the RTC aptly noted:
At any rate, accused owned up to being present during the stabbing incident as he
stated that they grappled for the possession of the knife but he could not recall how
the victim Rodel Velitario and Augusto Pornelos were stabbed which is highly
incredible to be believed by the court. Further if indeed it is true that he was
with his cousin when Rodel Velitario, Alberto Porazo and Augusto Pornelos
molested his cousin "LL", why did LL did not (sic) file charges against
them? Or even then, why did his cousin did not (sic) testify to corroborate
his testimony?28 (Emphasis supplied)
With regard to the stab wound on his thigh, this, by itself and without any medical
examination conducted on the same, only proves that he had a stab wound. As the
CA stated, "it does not show how and when he sustained such injury or who
inflicted it and under what circumstances."29 Thus, the claim of defense of relative
must necessarily fail for the failure of the defense to establish the element of
unlawful aggression.

Without doubt, therefore, Lumahang should be liable for the killing of Velitario and
the stabbing of Pornelos.

Second Issue: Existence of the Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that the qualifying
circumstance was present, thereby making Lumahang liable for Murder instead of
Homicide for the death of Velitario. The CA reasoned as follows:
Appellant walked and approached [Pornelos] from behind, and suddenly stabbed
him with a knife on his right gluteal area. Dr. EDNACOT confirmed that [Pornelos]
was attacked from behind, as it would be difficult for the assailant to stab
[Pornelos] 's buttocks if he was facing him. Clearly, the execution of appellant's
attack made it impossible for [Pornelos] to defend himself or retaliate. Fortunately,
[Pornelos] was able to run away before appellant could stab him any further.

Meanwhile, granted that [Velitario] noticed the commotion between [Pornelos] and
appellant, as he was not more than 2 meters away from [Pornelos], the swiftness
and unexpected attack of appellant nonetheless caught [Velitario] off guard. Thus,
instead of running away from appellant, [Velitario] remained standing and was
unable to defend himself. Within a couple of seconds, appellant's right arm hooked
on [Velitario]'s nape and stabbed him four (4) times on the stomach with a six-inch
double blade knife. The mere fact that the attack on Rodel was frontal does not
negate the presence of treachery. A frontal attack would qualify as treachery when
the assault is sudden and unexpected and not even preceded by a dispute, to the
point of incapacitating the person attacked the opportunity to repel the assault or to
escape from it. Appellant's attack being sudden and unexpected, and with his right
armed (sic) locked on Rodel's nape, any attempt at excape (sic) by the latter would
be all for naught.30
The Court disagrees with the CA insofar as it holds that treachery attended the
attack on Velitario.

Treachery undoubtedly exists on the attack against Pornelos because (1) the
parties were attending a wake, and were thus not expecting an attack from
happening; (2) the attack was made suddenly and from behind. The attack on
Pornelos was therefore clearly attended by treachery.

The same is not true, however, for the attack on Velitario. As the CA itself correctly
pointed out:
Suddenness of the attack by itself, is inadequate to support a Finding of treachery.
It must be coupled with proof that the victim was completely deprived of a real
chance to defend himself against the attack thereby ensuring its commission
without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of
the victim. It is, thus, decisive that the attack was executed in a manner that the
victim was rendered defenseless and unable to retaliate. 31
The CA, however, oddly did not follow the foregoing standard. The CA held that the
swiftness and unexpectedness of the attack caught Velitario off guard, which
rendered him unable to defend himself.32 This conclusion is erroneous.

To borrow the words of the Court in People v. Santos,33

[t]reachery, just like any other element of the crime committed, must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence — evidence sufficient to establish its existence
beyond reasonable doubt. It is not to be presumed or taken for granted from a
mere statement that "the attack was sudden"; there must be a clear showing from
the narration of facts why the attack or assault is said to be "sudden." 34
Stated differently, mere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that
treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the aggressor does not positively
tend to prove that he thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment
of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the
victim might offer.35 Specifically, it must clearly appear that the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor was deliberately chosen with a view to accomplishing
the act without risk to the aggressor.36

In the case at bar, Lumahang had already made an attack against Pornelos who,
after being stabbed on the buttocks, was able to successfully run away towards
safety. Velitario was already apprised that there was danger nearby as he saw the
commotion between Pornelos and Lumahang. As eyewitness Porazo testified:
Q: Mr. Witness, if you know, after [Pornelos] was stabbed by [appellant] what was the
reaction of [Velitario]?
A: [Velitario] just stood there, Sir.37
Even if it was possible that Velitario was so surprised by the attack that he was
unable to do anything, this does not automatically make the attack on Velitario
treacherous. It is true that Velitario was unable to defend himself from Lumahang's
attacks not because he was not given an opportunity to do so, but simply
because he was not able to react in time from the initial attack on Pornelos.
The Court stresses that the essence of treachery is where the mode adopted by the
assailant is positively shown to have been knowingly intended to insure the
accomplishment of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the
defense that the victim might offer.38 The mode adopted by Lumahang in this
case was not unexpected; it did not necessarily ensure that the act would be
executed without any defense from the victim, or that the victim would not be able
to retaliate, as the latter had the opportunity to run away or even defend himself.
Unfortunately, the victim was just unable to do so. In other words, the fact that the
victim was unable to defend himself would not automatically mean that the killing
was attended by treachery if the prosecution - as in this case - failed to show that
the means used by Lumahang was consciously or deliberately adopted to ensure
the execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense that
the victim might offer. As the Court similarly held in People v. Tumaob:39
The qualifying circumstance of treachery can not logically be appreciated because
the accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner
as to insure the commission of the crime or to make it impossible or hard
for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate.40 (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the attack itself was frontal. In People v. Tugbo,41 the Court held that
treachery was not present because the attack was frontal, and hence, the victim
had opportunity to defend himself. While a frontal attack, by itself, does not negate
the existence of treachery, when the same is considered along with the other
circumstances, like the attack not being unexpected, it already creates a reasonable
doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance. From the foregoing, the Court
must perforce rule in favor of the accused and not appreciate the said
circumstance.

With regard to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,

the Court agrees with both the RTC and the CA that Lumahang is entitled to the
same. In De Vera v. De Vera,42 the Court held that for voluntary surrender to be
appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority
or the latter's agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary
surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and
submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his
search and capture.43 Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the
supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need to ensure his safety,
the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as
"voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance. 44

In the present case, Lumahang voluntarily surrendered to the barangay officers on

the same night the incident happened because he was convinced to do so by his
aunt.45 This satisfies all the aforementioned three requisites, thus entitling
Lumahang to claim the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender.

With the removal of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed
by Lumahang against Velitario is therefore Homicide andj not Murder. The penalty
for Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
However, since Lumahang is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of the
voluntary surrender, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision
mayor with a range of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus,
Lumahang shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years and ten (10) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

As to the Slight Physical Injuries committed against Pornelos, the Court upholds the
sentence of twenty (20) days of arresto menor imposed by the CA, as the generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery was offset by, the generic mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Finally, in view of the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,46 the damages awarded to

the heirs of Velitario are hereby modified to civil indemnity, moral damages, and
temperate damages of P50,000.00 each.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY

GRANTED. The Court DECLARES accused-appellant LARRY LUMAHANG y
TALISAY GUILTY of the crimes of (a) HOMICIDE, for which he is sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years and ten (10) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; and (b) SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, for which he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor. He is further
ordered to pay the heirs of Rodel Velitario the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as temperate damages. All
monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 229859 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JOJIT

ARPON Y PONFERRADA @ "MODIO", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 229859, June 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. JOJIT ARPON Y

PONFERRADA @ "MODIO", ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
 DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is an appeal1 from the September 26, 2016 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CR HC No. 02013 which affirmed the November 13, 2014
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Carigara, Leyte, Branch 13, in
Criminal Case No. RTC-2010-071-CR.

The Facts

Accused-appellant Jojit Arpon y Ponferrada @ "Modio" (Arpon) and Dindo Lanante

(Lanante) were charged with murder in an Information4 which reads:

That on or about the 27th day of May 2010, in the Municipality of Barugo, Leyte,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill and treachery, attack one Rodulfo 5 Moriel y
Robenta, stabbing the latter without any warning with the use of bladed weapons,
inflicting mortal wounds, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the
said victim. Contrary to law.6

A warrant of arrest was issued for their apprehension.7 On September 3, 2010,

Lanante was arrested.8 While he was arraigned on September 30, 2010, the case
against him was provisionally dismissed upon motion9 by the prosecution and
execution of an affidavit of desistance10 of the mother of the victim, Melita R. Moriel
(Melita); meanwhile, the case against Arpon was archived.11 Arpon was eventually
arrested two years after or on September 20, 2012 and ordered committed on
September 24, 2012.12 When arraigned on November 13, 2012, he pleaded not
guilty.13

Pre-trial was conducted and terminated; trial ensued thereafter. 14

The Version of the Prosecution

The evidence for the prosecution revealed that, at 3:00 a.m. on May 27, 2010, the
victim, Rodolfo R. Moriel (Rodolfo) and Bernardo S. Insigne (Bernardo) were
headed home walking side by side (from Barangay Guindaohan, Barugo, Leyte
where they attended the vespers, to Barangay Sagkahan, Carigara, Leyte where
they resided - a 30 minute-walk) when they were accosted by accused-appellant
Arpon.15 Using a short bladed weapon, Arpon stabbed Rodolfo on the left
chest.16 Rodolfo tried to run, but he was stabbed for a second time on the right
chest by Arpon until he fell to the ground.17 Fearing for his own life, Bernardo fled
the scene. On the same day, Bernardo went to the police accompanied by Melita
and reported the incident.
Rodolfo died due to hypovolemic shock resulting from acute blood loss caused by
three multiple stab wounds - two of which were deemed fatal. 18 His family incurred
P40,000.00 as burial and funeral expenses.19

The Version of the Defense

Arpon testified that he went to Barangay Guindaohan on May 26, 2010.20 He, along

with his friend, Kevin Ponferrada, stayed at the house of Meldy Lucelo, 21 the
mother-in-law of his brother, Edjel Arpon, from 8:00 p.m. on May 26, 2010 to 4:00
a.m. on May 27, 2010.22

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC found Arpon guilty as charged. It gave credence to the positive
identification of the prosecution eye witness, Bernardo, who was only two yards
away from Rodolfo when the latter was stabbed, over Arpon's defense of alibi. 23 It
noted that the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of Bernardo to
testify against Arpon whom the former knew prior to the incident. 24 It likewise
brushed aside the trivial inconsistencies in Bernardo's testimony in light of the
complete narration of the principal occurrence and positive identification of the
perpetrator.25

On the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the RTC noted that Arpon - who came
out of nowhere - deliberately, suddenly, and unexpectedly attacked Rodolfo - who
was then unarmed and completely unaware of the danger to his life. 26

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding accused JOJIT ARPON y PONFERRADA, GUILTY, beyond

reasonable doubt, of the crime of MURDER, this Court hereby sentences him [to] a
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Further, accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, civil indemnity, in
the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (Php75,000.[00]) Pesos, moral damages in
the amount of Seventy Five Thousand (Php75,000.00) Pesos, and temperate
damages in the amount of Twenty Five Thousand (Php25,000.00) Pesos.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.27

Arpon filed his appeal.28 In his Brief,29 he specifically assailed the credibility of
Bernardo for his failure to report the incident not only to Ms parents but also to
Rodolfo's parents.30 He also banked on the inconsistencies in Bernardo's written and
verbal testimony. He pointed out that Bernardo initially claimed arriving
at Barangay Guindaohan at 10:00 a.m. but later changed it to 10:00 p.m. and that
the latter originally stated in his affidavit that Rodolfo was attacked by Arpon and
Lanante but eventually declared in open court that he only saw Arpon stab
Rodolfo.31 He also argued that treachery was not present because the victim was
not alone at that time but accompanied by his friend and both could have easily
subdued the attacker.32 Finally, he insisted that the court should have upheld his
testimony rather than the contusing and inconsistent testimony of the prosecution
eye witness.33

On the other hand, the plaintiff-appellee averred that the RTC did not err in
convicting accused-appellant whose guilt was proven beyond reasonable
doubt;34 that no standard behavior can be expected from people who had just
witnessed a frightful experience;35 that assuming that there had been
inconsistencies in Bernardo's testimony, these only referred to minor details which
did not impair his credibility.36 Plaintiff-appellee likewise contended that the RTC
correctly appreciated the circumstance of treachery considering the time and
manner of the attack which clearly indicated that the killing was deliberately and
carefully planned to ensure the death of Rodolfo.37 Finally, it maintained that the
RTC did not err in discrediting the defense of alibi in light of accused-appellant's
revelation that he was in the vicinity of the crime scene.38

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC. It held that Bernardo's failure to
immediately inform his and Rodolfo's parents about the incident did not render his
testimony undeserving of faith and credit.39 Moreover, the CA held that the
inconsistencies, if any, pertained only to collateral matters, and not to the elements
of the crime.40 It concurred with the RTC in giving more credence to the positive
identification of the perpetrator by the prosecution witness, who had no ill motive to
testify, over the alibi and denial of accused-appellant.41 Finally, it declared that
treachery attended the commission of the crime in light of the circumstances on
record.42

Hence, the present appeal.43 In compliance with the directive to file a supplemental
brief, if it so desired,44 plaintiff-appellee submitted a Manifestation 45 in which it
stated that it would be adopting the Brief46 submitted earlier before the CA and
would be dispensing with the filing of Supplemental Brief before this Court. 47

Accused-appellant, through counsel, submitted his Supplemental Brief, 48 wherein he

insisted that no motive was proven by the prosecution as to why he would attack
and kill Rodolfo.49 He claimed that this failure to establish motive would make
anyone suspect, including Bernardo; hence, possibly the ill motive on the part of
Bernardo to fabricate a story and implicate Arpon.50 He further claimed that
treachery was not present, because Rodolfo was then accompanied by
Bernardo.51 He finally claimed that Bernardo's testimony was of doubtful veracity
because the latter failed to immediately report the incident.52

Our Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

In order to successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must
be established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c)
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
24853 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (d) the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.54

Here, the fact that Rodolfo was killed and that accused-appellant killed him were
both sufficiently established by the prosecution. Upon this point, the testimony of
Bernardo is clear and categorical:

Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court the incident that transpired on said time and
said place?
A We were accosted and he was stabbed.
   
Q Who was stabbed?
A Rodolfo Moriel.
   
Q Who stabbed Rodolfo Moriel?
A Jojit Arpon.
   
Q How far were you from Rodolfo Moriel when he was stabbed by Jojit Arpon?
A About an armslength.
   
Q Do you know this Jojit Arpon prior to the stabbing incident?
A Yes, sir.
   
Q Why do you know this person of Jojit Arpon?
A Because I already saw him.
   
Q Saw him where?
A Brgy. Balire.
 
xxx
x
   
Q How were you able to identify Jojit Arpon when he stabbed Rodolfo Moriel?
A Because the moon at that time was shining brightly.
   
Q What weapon did Jojit Arpon utilize in stabbing Rodolfo Moriel?
A Short bolo.
   
Q Can you still recall what part of the body of Rodolfo was hit when Jojit Arpon stabbed
him?
A Witness at this juncture is pointing [to] his left chest.
   
Q How many times did you see Jojit Arpon stab Rodolfo?
A Three times.
   
Q In what particular part of the body of Rodolfo was hit when he was stabbed for the
second time by Jojit Arpon?
A Right chest.
   
Q How about the last one, where was he hit if you could still recall?
A I cannot recall anymore because after he died I ran.
 
xxx
x
   
Q When the second stabbing blow was delivered by Jojit Arpon how far were you then?
A Not so far.55

Given the foregoing categorical testimony, there is no doubt that treachery

attended the commission of the crime.

Treachery, as defined in Article 14, paragraph 1656 of the RPC, is present when at
the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, or when
the offender consciously adopted the particular means of attack employed.57
In the instant case, Rodolfo and Bernardo were walking side by side when they
were accosted by accused-appellant who suddenly stabbed Rodolfo with a short
bolo. Both Rodolfo and Bernardo were unarmed and were totally unaware of the
impending assault from the accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant's argument that he should be acquitted since the prosecution

had not established motive as to why he would attack and kill Rodolfo does not
persuade because:

[m]otive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not
prove the same. As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the
offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not
establish the innocence of [the] accused for the crime charged such as murder. The
history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives
comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational, hi murder, the specific intent is to kill
the victim.58 (citations omitted)

Likewise untenable is the accused-appellant's contention that treachery should not

have been appreciated to have attended the commission of the crime considering
that Rodolfo was then accompanied by Bernardo. In People v. Cagas,59 the Court
held that treachery was present when accused-appellant stabbed the victim, even if
the latter had been talking or conversing with his companion. 60 The Court in said
case placed emphasis on the fact that the victim was truly clueless about the fatal
attack that was to befall him.61 The same situation obtains in the case at bar.

The accused-appellant makes capital of the fact that Bernardo failed to report the
incident to the authorities, suggesting the possibility of a prior confrontation
between Rodolfo and Arpon - a happenstance that negates treachery. This
argument is neither here nor there.

Case law teaches that -

Delay in revealing the identity of the perpetrators of a crime does not necessarily
impair the credibility of a witness, especially where sufficient explanation is given.
No standard form of behavior can be expected from people who had witnessed a
strange or frightful experience. Jurisprudence recognizes that witnesses are
naturally reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to
be involved in criminal investigations because of varied reasons. Some fear for their
lives and that of their family; while others shy away when those involved in the
crime are their relatives or townmates. And where there is delay, it is more
important to consider the reason for the delay, which must be sufficient or well-
grounded, and not the length of delay.62

Anent the penalty, no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying

circumstance of treachery having attended the murderous assault, the RTC
correctly imposed the penalty of  reclusion perpetua which the CA properly affirmed.
Nonetheless, the amount of damages must be increased in light of prevailing
jurisprudence.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
September 26, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-HC No.
02013 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Jojit
Arpon y Ponferrada @ "Modio" is hereby declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of murder defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs
of Rodolfo Moriel the following amounts: (a) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b)
P75,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P75,000.00 as exemplary damages; (d)
P50,000.00 as temperate damages; and (e) legal interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 239032, June 17, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. GILBERT FLORESTA

Y SELENCIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Gilbert

Floresta y Selencio (Gilbert) assailing the Decision2 dated April 21, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 08103, which affirmed with
modifications the Decision3 dated November 23, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court of
Masbate City, Branch 44 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 15733 finding Gilbert guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information4 filed before the RTC, charging Gilbert of
the crime of Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 28th day of December, 2012, in the evening thereof, at Sitio
Calumpang, Brgy. Malinta, Masbate City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one JAY LOURD BONES y ZURBITO, with the use of a
firearm of an unknown caliber, hitting him on the left upper chest, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which were the direct cause of his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The prosecution alleged that at around  8:00  in the evening  of December 28,
2012, Jay Lourd Bones y Zurbito (Jay Lourd) was having a drinking session with his
friend Allan Andaya (Allan) and a certain Benjie at the kitchen of his house. After
drinking two (2) shots of gin, Jay Lourd suddenly stood up and said to Allan, "Pare,
I was hit, may tama ako." As Allan was about to hug Jay Lourd, he heard a cracking
sound behind him, causing him to run away. Meanwhile, Jay Lourd's wife, Jennifer
Bones (Jennifer),  was breastfeeding  their youngest  child when she heard the
gunshot coming from the kitchen. She hurriedly went to the kitchen and saw Jay
Lourd bloodied on the floor, prompting her to cover his wound with a piece of cloth.
At that moment, he told her, "Panggay, you see if Gilbert is still there?"
Subsequently, she hid in a room with her elder child until her uncle and sister-in-
law arrived to bring Jay Lourd to the hospital. She then decided to stay behind and
wait for the police officers to arrive. However, when they informed her that they
would continue the investigation the following day, she proceeded to the hospital
where she was informed that Jay Lourd was already dead. Thereafter, she went to
the Masbate City Police Station to tell the authorities that it was Gilbert who shot
Jay Lourd. Consequently, Gilbert was apprehended by the police. 6

For his part, Gilbert interposed the defense of alibi, alleging that from 12:30 until
3:00 in the afternoon of December 28, 2012, he was watching a cockfight in Purok
Casili, Barangay Igang, Masbate City. Afterwards, he proceeded to play cara y
cruz with Rico Adovas (Rico), Rely7 Dinglasan (Rely), Soy Tugbo, and Linkoy
Lorenzo  until 9:00 in the evening. Subsequently, he went back to Barangay Malinta
and saw a crowd near the house of Jay Lourd. Upon asking the people what
happened, he learned that Jay Lourd was shot to death. Thereafter, he went home
and had dinner. After having dinner, the police officers arrived at his house, and
then, he was investigated, examined, and detained. During trial, Gilbert's
averments were corroborated by the testimonies of Rico and Rely. 8

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision 9 dated November 23, 2015, the RTC found Gilbert guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Jay Lourd the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages. 10 It rejected
Gilbert's claim that the declaration made by Jay Lourd to Jennifer was a mere
afterthought, as the same was considered part of the res gestae. It explained that
when Jay Lourd asked Jennifer about the presence of Gilbert right after he was
shot, he simply relayed to her what he saw and observed. Likewise, his statement
was reliable as part of the res gestae for being spontaneously uttered in reaction to
a startling occurrence, i.e., the shooting of Jay Lourd.11 Moreover, the RTC found
the killing to have been attended by treachery, as the prosecution was able to
establish that: (a) at the time of the incident, Jay Lourd was drinking with his
friends and had no inkling that anyone would shoot him; 'and (b) the shooting took
place in which he could not properly defend himself. 12 On the other hand, it
discredited Gilbert's defense of alibi, since he failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the vicinity of the crime. 13

Aggrieved, Gilbert appealed14 to the CA.

 The CA Ruling

In a Decision15 dated April 21, 2017, the CA affirmed Gilbert's conviction with

modifications, increasing the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages to
P75,000.00 each; awarding P75,000.00 as exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as
temperate damages; and imposing on all monetary awards interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of its decision until fully
paid.16 Ultimately, it ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
the crime of Murder in light of the res gestae declaration of Jay Lourd who
positively identified Gilbert as his assailant.17

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Gilbert's conviction should be
upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire
case for review, and thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite,
and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
unassigned.18 "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case
and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal
law."19

To successfully prosecute the crime of Murder, the following elements must be

established: (a) that a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the
killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248
of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide.20

Proceeding from the foregoing considerations, the Court rules that the prosecution
failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt that Gilbert is the
perpetrator who shot and killed Jay Lourd.

To recount, the prosecution built its case primarily on Jay Lourd's res

gestae declaration that it was Gilbert who shot and killed him,  i.e., shortly after he
was shot, he uttered to Jennifer, "Panggay, you see if Gilbert is still there?"
Consequently, the RTC and the CA afforded the same with full evidentiary weight
and treated it as direct evidence in convicting Gilbert of the crime charged. Under
the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and
admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b)
the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances.21

Tested against these considerations, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC
and theCA that Jay Lourd's utterance is admissible in evidence as it formed part of
the res gestae, given that: (a) there was a startling occurrence, that is, he was
mortally shot; (b) the declaration was spontaneously done without an opportunity
to concoct or contrive a story, since it was done shortly after such shooting; and (c)
it concerned the shooting in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

At this point, however, it is well to clarify that admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence.22  Admissibility refers to the question of
whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value
refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends
on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. 23

Here, while the Court agrees that Jay Lourd's utterance – "Panggay, you see if
Gilbert is still there?" – should be admitted in evidence as part of the res gestae,
the courts a quo erred in considering the same as direct evidence of the killing and
that Gilbert was the perpetrator thereof. Plainly, Jay Lourd's utterance did not
contain any positive and categorical identification of Gilbert as his assailant. While it
may be argued that, from the utterance, Gilbert had something to do with his
mortal wounds, such utterance is ultimately inconclusive evidence to prove that
Gilbert was identified by Jay Lourd as his assailant.  Faced  with  conflicting
interpretations as to the nature of Jay Lourd's statement, the Court must be guided
by the equipoise rule, which instructs that where inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent
with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.24 Applying this rule to the present case would properly lead the Court to
conclude that Jay Lourd's utterance cannot be treated as direct evidence to
positively and categorically implicate Gilbert of the crime charged.

Be that as it may, the Court is aware that in certain instances, the prosecution may
still sustain a conviction despite the absence of direct evidence, provided that it is
able to present circumstantial evidence that would establish an accused's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral
facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on
reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on
circumstantial  evidence,  it is essential  that the circumstantial  evidence presented
must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty
person. Stated differently, the test to determine whether or not the circumstantial
evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of
circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other and that each and
every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent
with his innocence.25

Applying these principles to the evidence that appear on record, the Court finds that
the prosecution had likewise failed to present sufficient circumstantial evidence to
establish Gilbert's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Records show that aside from Jay
Lourd's utterance, there is only one (1) other circumstance that could possibly point
to Gilbert as the assailant, and that is their previous quarrel with one another. 26 
However, the totality of these circumstances is insufficient to produce a moral
certainty that it was indeed Gilbert who shot and killed Jay Lourd.

Finally, the Court also notes that the testimony of Allan who was with Jay Lourd
when the latter was killed, further cast doubt on the real identity of the
perpetrator.  On cross-examination, Allan admitted that it was improbable to see
who the shooter was and where the gunshot came from "because it was very dark."
Moreover, he opined that he was not sure if Jay Lourd was able to see the shooter,
as he already ran away. Pertinent portions of his testimony read:
[Atty. John Martin Sese]: But of course, before that Mr. Witness you will agree with
me that you heard a gun shot?
[Allan]: Yes, sir.

Q: And you will also agree with me Mr. Witness, that when you heard that gun
shot, you look (sic) at the direction where that gunshot came from?
A: Yes sir, I looked back but I did not see anybody because it was very
dark. "madulom-dulom"

xxxx

Q: Mr. Witness, you said that when you look (sic) back you cannot (sic) see
anybody because it was very dark, correct?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: Since it was very dark, Jay Lourd could not have (sic) also possibly seen the
person who fired the gun, is that correct?
A: I do not know if Jay Lourd was able to see because I already ran away.

Q: But immediately after the firing of the gun Mr. Witness, you looked at the
direction from where it came from, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: And personally, you did not see that any person was there because it
was very dark?
A: Yes, sir.27 (emphases and underscoring supplied)
In conclusion, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish with proof
beyond reasonable doubt the identity of Jay Lourd's killer.  It is elementary that in
every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must
be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the
prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for
even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction
without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. 28  Accordingly,
there being no evidence sufficient to support a conviction, the Court hereby acquits
Gilbert of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated April 21, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 08103 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gilbert Floresta y Selencio
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Murder.  The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ordered to cause his immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held in custody
for any other reason.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr. and Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 227013 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ARIES

REYES Y HILARIO, ARGIE REYES Y HILARIO, ARTHUR HILARIO, AND DEMETRIO
SAHAGUN Y MANALILI, ACCUSED, ARIES REYES Y HILARIO AND DEMETRIO
SAHAGUN Y MANALILI, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 227013, June 17, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ARIES REYES Y

HILARIO, ARGIE REYES Y HILARIO, ARTHUR HILARIO, AND DEMETRIO
SAHAGUN Y MANALILI, ACCUSED, ARIES REYES Y HILARIO AND DEMETRIO
SAHAGUN Y MANALILI, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This appeal1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated March 10, 2016 of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 07105 entitled "The People of the
Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus Aries Reyes y Hilario, Argie Reyes y Hilario,
Arthur Hilario, and Demetrio Sahagun y Manalili, Accused, Aries Reyes y Hilario and
Demetrio Sahagun y Manalili, Accused-Appellants," for murder. Its dispositive
portion reads:cralawred

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated August 27, 2014
of the Manila Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 08-259395 is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, in that, the accused-appellants Aries
H. Reyes and Demetrio M. Sahagun are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery. The payment for actual damages
representing medical, funeral and burial expenses is reduced to Php28,266.15;
moral damages is increased to P75,000.00; and exemplary damages is reduced
to P30,000.00. All damages awarded shall likewise earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this Decision until full payment
thereof.

All other aspects of the assailed Decision STAND.

SO ORDERED.3 (Emphasis in the original)

The Charge

By Information4 dated November 28, 2007, Aries Reyes y Hilario and Demetrio

Sahagun y Manalili, together with Argie Reyes y Hilario and Arthur Hilario were
charged with murder for the death of Jun Balmores, viz: cralawred

That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery
and with abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation, attack, assault and
use personal violence upon the person of one JUN BALMORES Y ATUN, by then and
there stabbing the latter on his right arm, hitting him with a plastic chair and a
broom and stabbing him on his back, thereby inflicting upon the said JUN
BALMORES Y ATUN stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
death thereafter.

Contrary to law.

Arraignment and Plea

On arraignment, Aries Reyes and Demetrio Sahagun pleaded "not guilty." 5 Their co-
accused Argie Reyes and Arthur Hilario have remained at large.

During the trial, Catherine Balmores, Jonalyn Balmores, Fernando S. Dela Cruz,
Mary Ann B. Nuñez, Dr. Bienvenido G. Torres and PO2 Joseph Y. Kabigting testified
for the prosecution. On the other hand, appellants Aries Reyes and Demetrio
Sahagun, Rizalinda Hilario, Jonjon De Leon and Rosalina Reyes testified for the
defense.
 The Prosecution's Version

The victim Jun Balmores, appellants Demetrio Sahagun and Aries Reyes, and
accused Argie Reyes and Arthur Hilario were all vendors who sold their wares along
the stretch of Hidalgo Street, Quiapo, Manila. On August 5, 2007, the police
apprehended the illegal vendors in the area. Jun asked brothers Aries and Argie
Reyes to allow his mother to leave her wares and vegetables in their stall. But the
Reyes brothers refused. An argument then ensued between them and Jun. 6

In the late afternoon, Jun and his wife Catherine packed up their wares and
prepared to go home. But before leaving the area, Jun went back to Hidalgo Street
for the shoulder bag he left earlier.7

When Aries, Demetrio, Arthur, and Argie saw Jun, they pursued him. As Jun tried to
run away, Demetrio hit him with a plastic chair in the head, causing the former to
fall to the ground. Arthur and Aries then alternately hit him with broomsticks. Jun,
nonetheless, managed to get back on his feet and run toward Villalobos Street. But
when he reached the comer of Villalobos Street, Argie was there waiting. Argie
stabbed Jun in the left side of his body. Though wounded, Jun did not stop running.
Shortly after, Argie caught up with him and stabbed him a second time, hitting him
in the arm. Jun fell anew. Meantime, Arthur and Aries arrived. Before they could
further hit Jun, Catherine stepped in and begged them to stop. The two desisted,
albeit Arthur uttered "Putang inang yan eh!. "8

Jun got rushed to the hospital where he was declared dead on arrival. 9 The Medical
and Autopsy Report10 revealed he died of "hypovolemic shock secondary to stab
wound of the trunk."

The prosecution offered the following exhibits: Medical/Autopsy Report 11 (Exhibit

"A"), Certificate of Death12 (Exhibit "B"), Handwritten Statement13 dated August 14,
2007 of Catherine Balmores (Exhibit "C"), Sworn Statement14 dated August 6, 2007
of Catherine Balmores (Exhibit "D"), Summary of Expenses 15 (Exhibit "E"), Funeral
and Burial receipts16 (Exhibit "F"), Receipts of medical and hospitalization
expenses17 (Exhibit "G"), Sworn Statement of Jonalyn Balmores18 (Exhibit "H"),
Sketch of the place of the incident19 (Exhibit "I"), Advance Information dated
August 10, 2007 prepared by PO2 Joseph Y. Kabigting 20 (Exhibit "J"), Affidavit of
Fernando Dela Cruz21 (Exhibit "K"), Medical Report22 (Exhibit "L"), Medico Legal
Form23 (Exhibit "M"), Certificate of Death of Jun Balmores24 (Exhibit "N"), and Sworn
Statement of Mary Ann Nuñez25 (Exhibit "O").

The Defense's Version

Appellants told a different story. According to them, when the stabbing incident
took place, they were playing "pusoy" inside the Picache Building. The victim came
and got into a heated argument with Argie. Jun brandished a small knife at Argie.
They grappled for the knife until Argie succeeded in wresting it from Jun. The latter
retreated but Argie gave chase. Argie caught up with and stabbed Jun. After Jun fell
to the ground, Argie ran away. The incident had already ended when Aries,
Demetrio, and Arthur arrived.26

Before the incident, Rosalina Reyes, mother of the Reyes brothers, received threats
from Jun's brothers regarding a space she bought from Demetrio. 27

The defense did not present any documentary evidence.

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision28 dated August 27, 2014, the trial court found appellants guilty of
murder, viz: cralawred

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused Aries Reyes y
Hilario and Demetrio Sahagun y Manalili beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds
both guilty of the crime of Murder, qualified by abuse of superior strength and
aggravated by treachery, thereby sentencing them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and all its accessory penalties.

Considering that they are detention prisoners, the period of their detention must be
credited in the service of their sentence.

Further, they are held solidarity liable to pay the heirs of the victim, Jun Balmores y
Atun, the following amounts: cralawred

(1) P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(2) P32,799.65 as medical, funeral and burial expenses;
(3) P500,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of loss of earning capacity;
(4) P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
(5) P35,000.00 by way of exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.29
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, appellants faulted the trial court for: (1) convicting them of murder
despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove with moral certainty their
complicity and conspiracy; (2) appreciating treachery and abuse of superior
strength despite the clear evidence on record that Jun and the Reyes brothers had
a misunderstanding prior to the stabbing incident; and (3) disregarding their
defense of denial.

On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) through Assistant
Solicitor General Ellaine Rose A. Sanchez-Corro and State Solicitor Lucy L. Butler-
Torres maintained that the prosecution was able to sufficiently prove that
appellants and their co-accused conspired in killing the victim with treachery and
abuse of superior strength.

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

In its assailed Decision30 dated March 10, 2016, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with
modification. It found that treachery attended the killing. As for abuse of superior
strength, it ruled that the same was deemed absorbed in treachery. It further
reduced the awards of actual and exemplary damages to P28,266.15 and
P30,000.00, respectively; increased the award of moral damages to P75,000.00;
and imposed six percent interest per annum on these amounts, from finality of the
decision until fully paid.

The Present Appeal

Appellants now seek affirmative relief from the Court and pray anew for a verdict of
acquittal. In compliance with Resolution dated November 14, 2016, both appellants
and the People manifested31 that, in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting
their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals.

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming appellants' conviction for murder?

Ruling

Murder requires the following elements: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused
killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 24832 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the
killing is not parricide or infanticide.33

The first and fourth elements - A person was killed and the killing is not parricide or
infanticide

The presence of the first and fourth elements was undisputed. Jun Balmores was
killed and the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

The second element - the accused killed the victim

Appellants assert they did not kill the victim. They point to Argie as the only one
who stabbed the victim to death.

Fernando dela Cruz, a vendor in the area, testified in detail how appellants and
their co-accused Argie Reyes and Arthur Hilario acted together in pursuing, hitting,
and stabbing Jun Balmores to death, thus: cralawred
 xxx xxx xxx

Q. While you were there in that place vending, was there any unusual incident that you can
recall that happened?
A. I was shocked, sir because I saw them running after the other, sir.
   
Q. Who did you see running after the other?
A. I saw Pareng Demet, Aries, and Atoy, sir.
   
Q. And who was the person they are running after?
A. Jun Balmores, sir.
 
xxxx
   
Q. And what happened when you see these persons running after Jun Balmores?
A. Someone hit Jun Balmores with a chair, sir.
   
Q. Who hit Jun Balmores with a chair?
A. It was Demet, sir, Demetrio.
 
xxxx
   
Q. What happened to the man after he was hit with the chair by Demetrio Sahagun?
A. He fell on the ground, sir.
   
Q. And when Jun-Jun fell on the ground what happened next?
A. He was hit repeatedly, sir with a broom stick.
   
Q. Who hit Jun-Jun with a broom stick?
A. It was Aries and Atoy, sir.
   
Q. Now, after that what happened next?
A. Jun had the opportunity to run away, sir and the two were still after him.
   
Q. Who ran after Jun-Jun after he was hit by (a) broom stick? Who again hit Jun-Jun with
broom stick?
A. It was Aries and Atoy, sir.
 
xxxx
   
Q. So, after he was hit by broom stick by Atoy and Aries Reyes, what happened next?
A. He was met by a person named Argie, sir.
   
Q. When you said Argie, what is the relationship of Argie Reyes, the accused in this case?
A. They are the same person, sir.
   
Q. You said this Argie met Jun-Jun Balmores. Up to what direction Jun-Jun was going when
he met Argie?
A. Going to Villalobos, sir.
   
Q. And what happened after this Argie Reyes met Jun-Jun Balmores while going to
Villalobos?
A. He was stabbed, sir in the left side of his body, sir.
   
Q. Was he hit?
A. Yes, sir.
 
xxxx
   
Q. He said that he was hit at the left side of his body. What happened to Jun after he was hit
on the left side of his body?
A. He still ran after Jun-Jun when he was running towards Mercury, sir.
   
Q. After that what else happened?
A. He was again stabbed, sir in his left arm.
   
Q. Who stabbed Jun Balmores?
A. Argie, sir.
 
xxxx
 
FISCAL:
   
Now, after Jun-Jun was stabbed the second time by Argie Reyes what happened next, Mr.
Witness?
 
ATTY. COSTO:
   
The witness already answered.
   
A. "Nabagsak na po siya eh."
 
xxxx
   
Q. Ano nangyari, alam mo ba ano nangyari kay Jun-Jun nung dinala sa hospital?
A. We just waited in Quiapo as to Jun Jun's condition and later on, sir we knew he was
already dead.34

Catherine Balmores,35 Jonalyn Balmores,36 and Mary Ann Nuñez37 substantially

corroborated Fernando's eyewitness account on all material points.

Based on the interlocking testimonies of the eyewitnesses, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that appellants and their co-accused each took
an active part in assaulting Jun Balmores. They in fact acted in concert toward one
common purpose: to kill Jun Balmores. This is conspiracy. In conspiracy, the parties
need not actually come together and agree in express terms to enter into and
pursue a common design. It is enough that at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused or assailants had the same purpose and were united in its
execution,38 as in this case.

Thus, upon seeing Jun back on Hidalgo Street, appellants and their co accused
altogether pursued Jun. As Jun tried to run away, Demetrio hit him in the head,
causing Jun to fall to the ground. Arthur and Aries then alternately hit Jun with
broomstick handles. Jun managed to get back on his feet and run. When he
reached the comer of Villalobos Street, Argie was there waiting. Argie then stabbed
Jun in the left side part of his body. Though wounded, Jun did not stop running for
his life. But Argie easily caught up with and stabbed Jun another time, hitting him
in the arm. This caused Jun to fall anew and never again rose to his feet.

Per Dr. Bienvenido Torres' Medical/Autopsy Report, 39 Jun died of "hypovolemic

shock secondary to stab wound of the trunk."40 The fact that it was Argie alone who
delivered the final coup de grace on the victim did not diminish appellants' shared
culpability. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 41

The third element - the presence of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code

In the alternative, appellants argue that, if at all, they should be found guilty only
of homicide, not murder. They vigorously claim that neither treachery nor abuse of
superior strength was proved to have attended the victim's killing. 42

The essence of treachery is the swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner by which
the offense was committed, affording the victim no opportunity to resist, escape,
much less, defend himself or herself.43 The offender must have planned the mode of
attack to ensure its execution without exposing himself to any danger which may
come from the victim's act of retaliation or self-defense.44

Here, although Jun and the Reyes brothers got into an argument in the morning of
August 5, 2007, the same appeared to have ended several hours before the killing
took place. In fact, according to Jun's wife Catherine, they had packed up their
things and prepared to go home in the late afternoon of August 5, 2007. Jun,
however, walked back to Hidalgo Street for the shoulder bag he left earlier.

There is no showing, as none was shown, that appellants and their co-accused
knew Jun was going back to the area at that late time of the day and that they had
planned to attack Jun there and then. On the contrary, appellants and their co-
accused appeared to have spontaneously acted as soon as they saw Jun back in the
area. They instantaneously pursued him, one hit him with a plastic chair in the
head, two alternately whipped him with broomstick handles, one waylaid and
stabbed him in the side of his body, and later, in his arm.

People of the Philippines vs. Cañaveras45 ruled that treachery is not present when
the killing is not premeditated or where the sudden attack is not preconceived and
deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on the part of the
accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at
the spur of the moment.

Another point, even after Jun fell to the ground and appellants alternately hit him
with broomstick handles, he still managed to get back on his feet and run for his
life. And although Argie subsequently waylaid and stabbed him in the left side of his
body, he did not stop running. The only time he did was when Argie caught up and
stabbed him another time.

Evidently, although Jun did not expect the sudden and concerted attack of his
assailants who were each armed with either a chair, broomstick handles, or a knife,
he was not rendered totally defenseless or prevented from escaping his assailants.
In fact, he was able to get back on his feet and run for his life, albeit in the end, he
still lost his life due to the stab wound he sustained in his trunk.

In conclusion, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not shown to have

attended the killing of Jun Balmores.

In another vein, We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that abuse of
superior strength, when absorbed in treachery, cannot be appreciated as a separate
qualifying or aggravating circumstance.46 It must be clarified though that this rule
applies only when both circumstances concur. Thus, when treachery is absent, as in
this case, abuse of superior strength may be appreciated as a distinct circumstance
which may qualify the killing to murder.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.47 Evidence must show that the aggressor/s
consciously sought the advantage, or their deliberate intent to use it. 48

No such evidence obtains in this case. Abuse of superior strength cannot be

inferred, as the trial court erroneously did, simply from the fact that Jun was
outnumbered four to one. Mere superiority in numbers is not indicative of the
presence of abuse of superior strength.49 Neither can the Court consider as
evidence thereof the fact alone that appellants and their co-accused were each
armed either with broomstick handles, plastic chair, or knife. As shown, there is no
evidence that appellants and their companions planned the attack or purposely
sought the advantage of superior strength by arming themselves to put the victim
in such notorious disadvantage to ensure the commission of the crime.

In sum, there being no qualifying circumstance attendant to the killing of Jun

Balmores, appellants may only be convicted of homicide50 under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, viz: cralawred

Art. 249. Homicide. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article
246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal.

Penalty

Applying the indeterminate sentence law,51 appellants should be sentenced to eight

years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months
and one day of  reclusion temporal as maximum.

In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,52 the heirs of Jun Balmores are entitled

to civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral damages of P50,000.00. Exemplary
damages may not be awarded here since no aggravating circumstance was proved.

We affirm the award of P28,266.15 as actual damages for medical, funeral and
burial expenses as the same were duly supported by receipts under Exhibits
"F"53 and "G."54

On the alleged loss of earning capacity, there is no evidence on record to prove the
actual extent thereof. What the record bears is Catherine's lone testimony that her
late husband, in his lifetime, used to earn P2,000.00 a week as vendor; P1,500.00
a month for each of the six students who availed of his school service; and P700.00
per trip as part-time personal driver. Catherine's unsubstantiated testimony thereon
is not sufficient, nay competent for the purpose of awarding actual damages tor
loss of earning capacity.55

Be that as it may, temperate damages may be awarded where the earning capacity
is clearly established but no evidence was presented to prove the actual income of
the offended party or the victim.56 Article 2224 of the Civil Code so provides, thus:
cralawred

Temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be provided with certainty.

Here, the Court of Appeals awarded P500,000.00 as temperate damages to the

Heirs of Jun Balmores. But this amount appears to be in excess of the usual
earnings of a typical vendor or tricycle driver in Quiapo, Manila.

In Tan vs. OMC Carriers, Inc.,57 the Court held that the award of P300,000.00 as
temperate damages to the heirs of a deceased tailor conformed with the usually
known earnings of a tailor, viz:
cralawred

According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed

tailor who earned approximately P156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. At
the time of his death in 1995, the prevailing daily minimum wage was P145.00, or
P3,770.00 per month, provided the wage earner had only one rest day per week.
Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring shop normally does
not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not have any documentary
evidence of the income it earns, Celedonio's alleged monthly income of P13,000.00
greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly minimum wage; thus, the exception set
forth above does not apply.

In the past, we awarded temperate damages in lieu of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity where earning capacity is plainly established but no evidence was
presented to support the allegation of the injured party's actual income.

In Pleno v. Court of Appeals, we sustained the award of temperate damages in the

amount of P200,000.00 instead of actual damages for loss of earning capacity
because the plaintiff's income was not sufficiently proven.

xxx xxx xxx

We adopt the same amount of P300,000.00 as temperate damages here. For this
amount appears to approximate the earnings of Jun Balmores for his triple job as
vendor, school service driver, and personal driver.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED, and the Decision dated March
10, 2016 of the Court of Appeals, MODIFIED.

Aries H. Reyes and Demetrio M. Sahagun are found guilty of homicide and
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of eight years and one day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

They are further ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of Jun Balmores
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P28,266.15 as actual
damages for medical, funeral and burial expenses; and P300,000.00 as temperate
damages, in lieu of actual damages for loss of earning capacity. These amounts
shall earn a six percent interest per annum from finality of this decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 232338 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v.

PROMULGATED: RAMON QUILLO Y ESMANI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

FIRST DIVISION
 G.R. No. 232338, July 08, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. RAMON QUILLO Y

ESMANI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

This is an appeal1 from the August 30, 2016 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
finding accused-appellant Ramon Quillo y Esmani (Ramon) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed 29 June 2015 Decision of the

Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-14-0548 is hereby AFFIRMED
with modification that the total awarded damages shall be subject to interest at
the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.3
The Antecedents

The Information4 against Ramon alleges:

That on or about the 28th day of May 2014, in Quezon City Philippines, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one VIVIEN YAP-DE
CASTRO, by then and there shooting her twice on her head, thereby inflicting upon
her serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her
untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said offended party.

The accused persistently planned the commission of the crime prior to the
execution and adopted sudden and unexpected attack thereby assaulting the victim
to ensure the commission of the crime without risk to himself therefore committing
the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses, namely: (1) Audrey
Phoebe Yap-Lopez (Audrey); (2) Michael M. Marinas 6 (Michael); (3) Gina A.
Besmonte (Gina); (4) Corazon D. Dasig (Corazon); and (5) PO2 Jogene Hernandez
(PO2 Hernandez).

According to the testimony of the companions of the victim, at about 6:30 p.m. of
May 28, 2014, Michael, Gina, Corazon, and the victim, Vivien Yap-De Castro
(Vivien), were walking along Ilang-Ilang Street towards IBP Road when a black
motorcycle of an unknown plate number with two persons onboard stopped beside
them. The back rider shouted "ate!", pointed a gun towards Vivien, and fired two
(2) successive shots immediately killing the victim.7 The witnesses alleged that they
saw the face of the back rider as he was not wearing any helmet. 8 After about one
(1) minute from the time Vivien was shot, the tandem proceeded to Litex Street.
Ramon was later identified as the back rider in Camp Karingal and in court. 9

The Medico-Legal Report No. QCA-14-202,10 issued by Police Chief Inspector Palima

MD, and the Autopsy Report11 dated May 29, 2014, revealed that the victim
sustained two (2) gunshot wounds and the one on her head caused her death. 12

Ramon maintained that on May 28, 2014, at the time Vivien was shot, he was
initially in Water Hall, Barangay Payatas B, Quezon City to look for money for his
son's school shoes. Thereafter, he went to Montalban because his first wife, Charito
Quillo, was confined at Rodriguez Hospital. 13 He also averred that at about 9:30
p.m. on June 3, 2014, there was a commotion between tricycle drivers and
teenagers. When he scolded them for being noisy, they turned to him and hit him
with a bottle of wine on his right eyebrow. He was then brought to Police Station 6
in Batasan where he saw the persons who mauled him. They accused him of
starting the fight. He was brought back to Barangay Payatas B and was instructed
by the police officer to file a complaint because he sustained an injury. Instead of
filing a complaint, he went to the house of his cousin Jun Bonifacio (Jun) where he
slept until about 8:00 a.m. the next day, June 4, 2014, until a barangay mobile
arrived at the house of Jun. He was brought to the house of Capt. Guarin who
turned him over to Major Marcelo and Monsalve in Camp Karingal. They allegedly
forced him to admit that he was "Bunso", hit his head about six (6) times with his
elbow, and punched him on his left side.14

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its judgment on June 29,
2015,15 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Ramon Quillo y
Esmani guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Likewise, said accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased-victim,
the following:

1) The amount of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2) The amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages;
3) The amount of Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) The amount of Php79,000.00 as actual damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.16
The RTC found that: (1) Vivien was killed on May 28, 2014 by a gunshot wound on
her head; (2) Ramon, the back rider of the motorcycle, delivered the fatal shot
upon Vivien; (3) Treachery is present as the assault was so sudden and quick as it
took Ramon only a brief moment to accomplish his mission on the unsuspecting
victim and consummate the crime; and (4) the present case is neither parricide nor
infanticide.17

On appeal,18 Ramon impugned the findings of the trial court and insisted that the
trial court gravely erred: (a) in finding him guilty of murder despite the prosecution
witnesses' failure to positively identify him as the perpetrator; (b) in convicting him
on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence; and (c) assuming arguendo that
he could be held liable for killing Vivien, in finding that treachery existed. 19 He
maintained that he had never seen Vivien and that, at the time she was killed, he
was in Montalban because his first wife was at the hospital. 20

Ruling of the CA

In a Decision21 dated August 30, 2016, the CA upheld Ramon's conviction but

modified the monetary award. The CA imposed the legal interest rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid on the
total awarded damages.22 In affirming Ramon's conviction, the CA found that the
evidence of the prosecution sufficiently established Ramon's culpability in the crime
charged and, thus, outweighs his mere denial. The qualifying circumstance of
treachery was supported by the fact that at the time the incident happened, Vivien
and her friends were merely walking along Ilang-Ilang Street, totally unaware and
unsuspecting of the forthcoming violence to be committed on the victim's person by
Ramon who was armed with a gun.23

On September 15, 2016, Ramon filed a Notice of Appeal. 24 The Court notified the
parties to file their supplemental briefs.25 However, Ramon opted to adopt his
Appellant's Brief as his supplemental brief. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor
General manifested that it will not file a supplemental brief considering that all
relevant factual and legal issues and arguments had been adequately discussed in
its Appellee's Brief.

Issues

The issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1. Whether the prosecution witnesses positively identified Ramon as the

assailant; and

2. Whether treachery was present in the killing of Vivien to qualify the crime as
murder.

Ruling of the Court

The lower courts committed reversible error in ruling that the positive identification
of Ramon by the prosecution witnesses established his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,26 the Court explained the concept of out-of-
court identification and the factors to consider in determining its admissibility and
reliability, thus:
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done
thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for
identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the
witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-ups where a witness
identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-
court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to
assure its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due
process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they
consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal
at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the
accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.27 (Citation omitted and emphasis in the original)
In this case, the identification was done through a police line-up. Applying the
totality of circumstances test, We find that the out-of-court identification made by
Michael, Gina, and Corazon is unreliable and cannot be made the basis for Ramon's
conviction. A comprehensive analysis of their testimonies reveals that such are
dubious and lack probative weight.

During Gina's redirect examination, she testified that she identified the assailant
based on his height and his complexion.28 When prodded further about her answer
during re-cross examination, the physical impossibility of assessing the height of
the assailant, taking into account his position when the crime was committed, was
highlighted in the following exchange between the witness and Atty. Estoesta,
counsel de officio of Ramon:
Q Was this backrider still in the motorcycle?
A He is in the motorcycle, ma'am.
Q So he was actually sitting down on the same motorcycle with the driver of the
motorcycle?
A Yes, ma'am.
Q And you were able to tell the height and the complexion while the alleged gunman was
sitting down, is that what you are saying from the start? You are able to identify or
described [sic] a gunman of his height while sitting down?
A Yes, ma'am.29 [Emphasis supplied]
Likewise, when asked whether she was able to see the face of the back rider, Gina
categorically admitted that:
A Naaninag ko lang po siya kasi nakafocus po ang aking paningin sa baril.
Q Did you notice the get up or the attire of the backrider when [sic] shot Vivien?
A No. sir.30
xxxx
Q And am I correct, Madam Witness, when you mentioned that you only saw a shadow of
the gunman? So, am I correct that you did not actually saw[sic] his face but only a
shadow?
A Yes, ma'am.31 [Emphasis supplied]
Considering Gina's quoted statements above, We cannot rely on her identification of
the assailant. She acknowledged seeing only the shadow of the assailant. She could
not have known the height of the assailant as the latter was sitting the whole time
as the back rider of a running motorcycle. Hence, her identification of Ramon during
the line-up and in court cannot be given credence.

Michael's testimony likewise failed to corroborate Gina's statements. It was only

after Vivien was shot that he allegedly saw the assailant because he was walking
ahead of her during the incident.32 He described the assailant whom he claims was
about two (2) meters away from him, and stopped in front of him for about one (1)
minute after shooting Vivien, as follows:
Q By the way, let me go back at [sic] the time that you saw the face of this back rider, what
else did you notice from the back rider when you first saw him?
A "Noong una ko po siya nakita, hindi gaanong katangkaran" (interrupted)
PROS. DEL ROSARIO: Come again? What... okay, just proceed.
A "Hindi katangkaran, yung kulay, di naman gaanong maputi, fair complexion lang po siya,
tapos medyo lubog yung..." (interrupted)
Q Aside from the physical appearance, what else did you notice from him if any?
A "Yun lang po, yung pananamit niya, yung nakawhite t-shirt siya, yun lang po yung
physical niya, color niya."33
The statements of Michael quoted above lead this Court to question how he was
able to give an accurate description for the composite illustration when he only
recalled the rider's skin complexion, height, and the color of the shirt he was
wearing. These are general descriptions that fail to provide a definitive account of
the physical appearance of the accused-assailant sufficient to convince the Court
that Ramon is the assailant.

In addition, it is worthy to note that Michael gave his description for the composite
illustration only on June 2, 2014 or approximately five (5) days after the shooting
incident.34 Prior to said date, Michael, Gina and Corazon did not give any statement
to the police regarding the identity of the assailant. Considering his testimony on
the appearance of the assailant, We find Michael's description of the assailant,
given during the trial and the composite illustration prepared through his
assistance, doubtful.

Gina and Michael maintained that the assailant stayed at the scene of the crime for
approximately one (1) to two (2) minutes after Vivien was shot before proceeding
to Litex Road35 which allowed them to remember his face, and, later on, identify
him. However, the Court finds this alleged conduct of the assailant contrary to
ordinary human experience. The instinct of any person under the same condition as
the assailant is not to be recognized. If Ramon really shot Vivien, he would have
immediately fled the scene of the crime in order to prevent being identified and
accosted by the authorities. It is illogical for him to stay for a minute just to watch
the victim die while there were many bystanders who could recognize him. It is
expected that the riding-in-tandem would immediately get away and not linger for a
minute or so just to be susceptible to identification by the bystanders. Assuming
arguendo that the assailant stayed for another minute after shooting Vivien, that
period would have been sufficient for them to recall the plate number of the
motorcycle, if there was any, along with distinguishing facial features of the
assailant to enable them to accurately recall his identity. We find the prosecution
witnesses' story unbelievable and a mere convenient excuse to conceal the fact that
they did not see the face of the assailant at the time of the incident and that they
had no knowledge of the identity of the true assailant.

We also point out that, unlike Gina and Michael, Corazon admitted that the
motorcycle only stopped for "seconds" before the riders fled from the scene of the
crime.36 Corazon's admission negates Michael's and Gina's story and makes their
testimonies even more doubtful. Their respective narrations of the incident fail to
create a coherent account of the incident on May 28, 2014 because they are
inconsistent with each other on substantial matters and contrary to ordinary human
experience.

The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the

appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed.
As the Court held in People v. Esoy:37
It is known that the most natural reaction of a witness to a crime is to strive to look
at the appearance of the perpetrator and to observe the manner in which the
offense is perpetrated. Most often the face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from a witness's
memory. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence
committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree
of reliability the identity of criminals at any given time.38 (Citations omitted)
Due to 1) the unusual situation that Michael, Gina and Corazon just witnessed, 2)
the brief period they allegedly saw the assailant's face,39 and 3) their position
relative to where the assailant was, We find it difficult to believe that they were
able to accurately identify the assailant. We cannot disregard the possibility that the
prosecution witnesses committed an error in identifying the assailant. The interim
period of about one (1) week from the time of the incident and the time they gave
their sworn statement to the authorities and identified Ramon from the police line-
up could have affected their ability to recall the assailant's identity. The prosecution
witnesses did not testify about any distinguishing mark nor significant feature of
Ramon's physical appearance, other than his height and skin complexion, that they
relied on in recognizing the assailant during the police line-up and trial. They also
admitted that they have never met nor seen the assailant prior to the
incident40 which compels the Court to doubt the accuracy of their recollection. To
Our mind, these factors, when taken as a whole, diminish the credibility of the
witnesses and raise doubt on the truthfulness of their testimonies and their
identification of Ramon as the assailant.

We have settled that although the defense of alibi is inherently weak, the
prosecution is not released from its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It is necessary to first establish beyond question the
credibility of the eyewitness as to the identification of the accused before a court
can apply the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi.41 The serious and
inexplicable discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses hardly lend credence to their supposed positive testimony and casts
serious doubt on the credibility of their charge. Having failed to indubitably prove
the identity of Ramon as the assailant, We cannot sustain Ramon's conviction.

In view of these findings, the Court no longer deems it necessary to discuss the
other issue raised by Ramon.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 30, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 07692 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Ramon
Quillo y Esmani is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered to immediately
be released unless he is being held for some other valid or lawful cause. The
Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action taken hereon
within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 230778

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUAN CREDO y DE VERGARA and DANIEL CREDO y DE VERGARA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

CARANDANG, J.:

This is an Appeal   from the Decision  dated October 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) finding
1 2

accused-appellants Juan Credo y De Vergara (Juan) and Daniel Credo y De Vergara (Daniel) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder and frustrated murder as co-conspirators. Juan was also found
guilty for violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1866,  the dispositive portion of which reads:
3

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
219 of Quezon City dated 9 September 2013, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.  (Emphasis in the original)

4
 The Antecedents

Juan and Daniel (collectively, accused-appellants) were charged with murder and frustrated murder.
The two separate Information   respectively read as follows:
5

MURDER CASE NO. Q-04-125714

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with four (4) other persons, whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified by evident premeditation[,] treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of ANTONIO ASISTIN y PALCO@ TONY, by then and there stabbing him several times with
a bladed weapon, hitting him on the back and other parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said ANTONIO ASISTIN y PALCO @ TONY.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

FRUSTRATED MURDER CASE No. 0-04-125715

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating with four (4) other persons, whose true names, identities and
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of EVANGELINE CIELOS-ASISTIN@
Vangie, by then and there stabbing her several times with a bladed weapon, hitting her on the
different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious and grave wounds, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would produce the felony of MURDER as consequence, but
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of some causes or accident independent of the medical
attendance rendered to the will of the said accused, that is, the timely and ablesaid victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the said EVANGELINE CIELOS-ASISTIN@VANGIE.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  7

Juan was additionally charged with violation of Section 32, in relation to Section 36 of Republic Act
No. (R.A.) 7166  and Section 264 of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 881,   and Commission on Election
8 9

Resolution No. 6446;   and violation of P.D. 1866.   The Information against Juan states:
10 11

VIOLATION OF GUN BAN CASE NO. 0-04-125717

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without
any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bear, carry or transport [a]
firearm, more particularly described as follows: one (1) homemade shotgun (sumpak) in a public
place, private vehicle or public conveyance, without written authority from the COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 12

VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1866 CASE NO. 0-04-125717

That on or about the 16th day of March, 2004 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without
any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and
under his custody and control one (1) homemade shotgun (sumpak), without first having secured the
necessary license/ permit issued by the proper authorities.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 13

Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against them.   Trial
14

thereafter ensued.

According to the prosecution witnesses, Spouses Antonio Asistin (Antonio) and Evangeline Asistin
(Evangeline) operated a computer shop and a store at their residence located at No. 5 Zodiac Ext.
Sagittarius St., Remar Village, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. Daniel and Juan, brothers, are
nephews of Evangeline. At around lunch time on March 16, 2004, Daniel, an assistant at the
computer shop, entertained male customers who wanted to rent tapes. Evangeline instructed Daniel
to let the male customers in. Evangeline got up and asked the men where they are from. One of the
men replied, "ano nga bang lugar iyon?." Evangeline then told them that if they are not from the
area, they could just buy the tapes. Evangeline went back to the table and continued eating her
lunch. 
15

When Evangeline stood up to get water from the refrigerator, Daniel and the two unidentified men
suddenly appeared. One of the unidentified men strangled her. Without saying anything, he pressed
the lanseta and started stabbing her. Evangeline struggled and resisted until she fell to the floor
while that person continued to stab her. Evangeline kicked him so he would not reach her body.
Thereafter, the men who assaulted her left. Evangeline recalled that she sustained eight stab
wounds.  16

Once the two unidentified men left, Evangeline stood up and saw Antonio standing at the gate with
several stab wounds. Upon seeing Antonio, Evangeline told Daniel to chase the two men who had
just left. According to Evangeline, Daniel did not help her and even watched while she was being
stabbed. He did not go out to chase the two men.  17

After being stabbed, Antonio was able to walk to the door of the computer shop.   Evangeline and
18

Rufo Baguio (Baguio), a neighbor, allegedly saw Daniel carry Antonio about two feet from the
ground and then drop him, causing his head to hit the ground.   A few minutes later, Antonio was
19

carried to the vehicle of a neighbor while Evangeline took a tricycle with neighbor Roy Bischotso to
the hospital.   Antonio was declared dead on arrival.
20

Medico-Legal Report No. M-1171-04   revealed that the cause of Antonio's death is "multiple stab
21

wounds on the back, chest, and neck."  On the other hand, Evangeline's Medico-Legal
22

Certificate   showed that she suffered multiple stab wounds specified below:
23

FINDINGS:

GS-conscious, coherent, stretcher-borne.

1. Multiple stab wounds located at the following areas:

a. 2.0 cm, epigastric area;

b. 4.0 cm, left upper quadrant, abdomen;

c. 2.0 cm and 3.0 cm, left anterior pectoral area;

d. 2.0 cm, level of T5-T6, anterior axillary line, left;

e. 3 .0 cm, left antero-medical axillary area;

f. 2.0 cm and 3.0 cm, proximal-third, postero-lateral, left brachial region;

g. 3.0 cm, left scapular region;

h. 3.0 cm, left infra-scapular region.

CONLUSION:

Under normal condition without subsequent complications and/or deeper involvement present but
not clinically apparent at the time of examination, the above-described physical injuries shall require
medical attention or shall incapacitate the patient/ victim for a period not less than 31 days x x x. 24

Incidentally, Baguio testified that at around 1:45 pm on March 16, 2004, he was in his house located
at No. 3 Zodiac Street, Remarville Subdivision, Bagbag, Novaliches, Quezon City. While watching
pool players with his grandchild Roy, he saw Juan and another person carrying a heavy bag.
Thereafter, two other men arrived.   Baguio noticed that Juan pointed to the direction of the
25

residence of Spouses Asistin. The two men proceeded to the house of Spouses Asistin, and, later
on, Juan and the other man followed.  26

Meanwhile, prosecution witness Reynante Ganal (Ganal) testified that he was outside Spouses
Asistin's residence when he saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other in a vacant room together
with three other male companions. Although he was merely four arms-length away, he did not hear
the conversation of the group.   Juan came up to him and asked how much he was renting his
27

place.  A few minutes later, while he was preparing to take a bath, he saw Juan walking with an
28

unidentified person.   Juan asked permission to urinate at the back of the house.   Thereafter,
29 30

someone shouted "nasaksak sila tatay at nanay." Then, his sister-in-law told him that two persons
climbed the fence.  31

In a sworn statement of Felipe Roque (Roque), Bantay Bay an Chairman, he stated that he
responded at the crime scene and assisted in rushing the victims to Bernardino Hospital. Roque
claimed that at the emergency room, Evangeline told him that Daniel was present when she and her
husband were brutally stabbed and that he did not do anything to help them.   He went back to the
32

crime scene where he found Daniel cleaning broken plates. He then turned Daniel over to the
responding barangay officials who later brought him to the police station for investigation. 
33

On March 17, 2004, a follow-up operation was conducted by the police led by Police Officer 2 (PO2)
Victorio B. Guerrero (PO2 Guererro) after Daniel allegedly implicated his brother Juan to the crime.
The operation resulted to the arrest of Juan at his rented room. In his sworn statement, PO2
Guerrero alleged that Juan was nabbed while stashing in his bag a homemade shot gun (sumpak).
The bag also contained clothing, two live ammunitions for shotgun and a fan knife measuring
approximately seven inches long. He was allegedly in the process of absconding when he was
apprehended.  34

Juan and Daniel denied the allegations against them. Juan maintained that he sought employment
with Spouses Asistin but was rejected. Juan accepted their decision without any ill-feelings.   On
35
March 16, 2004, at around 1:30 pm, Juan watched television at his rented place in Luzon, Fairview,
Quezon City. Thereafter, from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm, he watched a basketball game about 14 meters
away from the room he was renting. Then, at around 6:30 pm to 6:45 pm, he again watched
television at his place. It was at this time that he heard a noise coming from outside. Suddenly,
someone kicked the door of his room. An armed policeman appeared with his brother Daniel who
was in handcuffs. He was asked to go with them to the police station where he was allegedly
tortured into admitting committing the crimes he is charged with.   He also denied that a shotgun
36

or sumpak was confiscated from him. 37

On the other hand, Daniel testified that at around 11:00 am on March 16, 2004, he was painting the
roof of the house of Spouses Asistin when he suddenly heard Evangeline shouting for help. Daniel
immediately went down from the roof and saw Antonio lying covered with blood on the ground near
the garage.   He was shocked upon seeing Antonio's state.  Daniel testified that he raised Antonio
38 39

when he saw him wounded but the latter stood up, went out, and kept cursing. When he went inside,
he fell to the ground so Daniel carried him to a taxi.
40

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 219 rendered its Decision  dated
41

September 9, 2013, the dispositive portion of which reads:

MURDER CASE NO. 0-04-125714

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and
Daniel Credo y de Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and they are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reculsion perpetua for the death of Antonio Asistin y
Palco.1âшphi1

Accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are further adjudged to pay jointly
and severally, the heirs of Antonio Asistin y Palco, represented by his widow, Evangeline Cielos-
Asistin, and his daughter, Juliet Asistin, the following amounts:

1) Php 75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto;

2) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages;

3) Php 30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

4) Php 53,800.00 as actual damages.

FRUSTRATED MURDER CASE NO. 0-04-125715

WHEREFORE, the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are hereby
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder committed against
Evangeline Cielos-Asistin, and they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

The accused Juan Credo y de Vergara and Daniel Credo y de Vergara are also sentenced to pay,
jointly and severally, the victim, Evangeline Cielos-Asistin, the sum of P207,277,89.00 (sic) as actual
damages and moral damages in the sum of P20,000.00.
 VIOLATION OF GUN BAN CASE NO. 0-04-125716

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby acquits the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara of the offense of
violation of Section 32 in relation to Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7166 and Section 264 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6446, for lack of evidence.

VIOLATION OF P.D. NO. 1866 CASE NO. 0-04-125717

WHEREFORE, the accused Juan Credo y de Vergara is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
simple illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and he is
hereby imposed an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum, up to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The subject firearm and ammunitions shall be turned over to the Firearms and Explosives Division of
the Philippine National Police for disposal.

No cost is adjudged in any of these cases. 42

In convicting Juan, the RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The
RTC found that Juan and Daniel merely made a general denial and failed to support their respective
alibis. Consequently, they filed their appeal with the CA.

In their Brief,   Juan and Daniel impugned the findings of the RTC and raised the following errors:
43

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE

THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS INFLICTED THE FATAL INJURIES UPON THE
VICTIMS, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING TREACHERY AND ABUSE
OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH TO QUALIFY THE CRIMES TO MURDER AND FRUSTRATED
MURDER. 44

Juan and Daniel argued that their presence, without executing any overt act, does not prove
conspiracy in inflicting of fatal injuries to Spouses Asistin.  The defense emphasized that Daniel's
45

alleged failure to help the victims does not constitute positive act of assent or cooperation in the
commission of the crimes charged.   The defense pointed out that the testimonies of the prosecution
46

witnesses even confirmed that Daniel actually helped in carrying Antonio.   Also, Juan and Daniel
47

did not flee. Daniel remained at the house of Spouses Asistin and cleaned the place while Juan was
found watching television at his rented place.  Moreover, the defense insists that no motive can be
48

attributed to Daniel or Juan to conspire with strangers to commit the crimes. For the defense,
Antonio's refusal to accommodate Juan in their house is a shallow reason to provoke them to kill
Spouses Asistin. The defense also maintained that the admission of his arrest does not suffice to
warrant a conviction under P.D. 1866. The defense merely admitted the fact of Juan's arrest effected
by PO2 Guerrero and nothing more. There was no admission with regard to the confiscation of a
shotgun or sumpak, ammunitions, or fan knife from his possession. Hence, his conviction based on
his supposed admission constitutes a reversible error. 49
 Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision   dated October 13, 2016, the CA denied Juan and Daniel's appeal and affirmed their
50

respective convictions. In affirming their convictions, the CA held that the sworn statement of PO2
Guerrero sufficiently established Juan's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of P.D. 1866.
The CA also found the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficient to convict Juan
and Daniel of conniving to commit murder and frustrated murder.  The CA did not consider Daniel's
51

non flight as a badge of innocence sufficient to exculpate him from criminal liability. 
52

While the CA did not find treachery and abuse of superior strength attendant in the case, evident
premeditation was considered because Juan and Daniel were seen with the other unidentified co-
conspirators gathering near the scene of the crime.   Hence, this appeal.
53

Juan and Daniel filed a Notice of Appeal  on November 3, 2016. The Court notified the parties to file
54

their supplemental briefs.   However, Juan and Daniel opted not to file a supplemental brief since
55

they believe that they had exhaustively discussed the assigned errors in their brief.  For its part, the
56

Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it is adopting its brief for the plaintiff-appellee. 
57

Issues

1) Whether Juan and Daniel are guilty of murder;

2) Whether Juan and Daniel are guilty of frustrated murder; and

3) Whether Juan should be held criminally liable for violation of P.D. 1866.

Our Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

As a rule, the trial court's findings of fact are entitled great weight and will not be disturbed on
appeal. However, this rule does not apply where facts of weight and substance have been
overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under appeal.   After a judicious examination
58

of the records, this Court found material facts and circumstances that the lower courts had
overlooked or misappreciated which, if properly considered, would justify a conclusion different from
that arrived by the lower courts.

Murder Case No. Q-04-125714 & Frustrated Murder Case No. Q-04-125715

The Court cites Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court in stating that "[c]ircumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain a conviction if (i) there is more than one circumstance; (ii) the facts from which
the inference is derived are proven; and (iii) the combination of all circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubts.   Here, careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the
59

prosecution witnesses reveals flaws and inconsistencies that cast serious doubt on the veracity and
truthfulness of their allegations and would merit the acquittal of Juan and Daniel.

Evangeline admitted that neither Daniel nor Juan stabbed her and that she did not see Juan during
the incident.  Their complicity was merely based on circumstantial evidence, having been allegedly
60

seen near the residence of Spouses Asistin, talking to strangers, before the incident took place. The
prosecution witnesses admitted to not knowing nor hearing what Daniel, Juan, and the other men
were discussing. They also admitted not seeing who killed Antonio. 61
As We have held in Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,  to wit:
62

xxxx

Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate is
not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Hence,
conspiracy must be established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.

In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which
requires proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However,
conspiracies are not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second
form, the implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to
have aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part
so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Implied conspiracy is
proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a
concert of action and a community of interest.

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have
performed at least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without
being shown to do so none of them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be
held responsible for the results of his own acts.   (Citations omitted; emphasis ours)
63

In this case, We find that the prosecution failed to present sufficient proof of concerted action before,
during, and after the commission of the crime which would demonstrate accused-appellants' unity of
design and objective. There is no direct proof nor reliable circumstantial evidence establishing that
Juan and Daniel conspired with the unidentified men who stabbed Spouses Asistin.

The circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution - testimonies of Baguio and Ganal
claiming that they saw Juan and Daniel talking to each other moments before the crimes were
committed do not prove conspiracy. Baguio and Ganal insisted seeing three (3) unidentified men
and Juan enter the house of Spouses Asistin. However, neither of the witnesses could confirm to the
Court that these men were the same men who stabbed Spouses Asistin nor could they confirm that
they heared their conversation. Furthermore, the claim of Baguio and Ganal that three (3)
unidentified men entered the house of Spouses Asistin contradicts the statement of Evangeline that
only two (2) unidentified men were allowed by Daniel to enter their house,   and that she did not see
64

Juan.65

Ganal allegedly saw Juan and Daniel climb the fence of the compound of Spouses Asistin 's
residence moments after they were stabbed.   However, this allegation was belied by his
66

subsequent testimony quoted below:

PROS ONG:

Q What did you find out, if any?

A When I went out of the house I heard a shout repeatedly saying "si tatay at nanay nasaksak
and my sister in law told me that two male persons "umakyat sa bakod".
Q When your hipag told you that there were two persons "umakyat sa bakod" did she point to you
the direction of that bakod?

A Yes, ma'am.  (Emphasis ours)

67

It is evident from the above-quoted testimony that he was testifying on a matter not perceived by his
very own senses as he did not see Juan and Daniel climb the fence. He merely relied on what his
sister-in-law told him.

Moreover, Ganal's statement that Juan and Daniel climbed a fence is belied by the claim of Baguio
that he guarded Daniel while waiting for him to be arrested.   His statement is difficult to believe
68

since even Roque mentioned in his Sinumpaang Salaysay  that upon returning to the scene of the
69

crime, he found Daniel cleaning broken plates. Thus, We cannot rely on Ganal's testimony to
corroborate the claim of the prosecution that they tried to escape.

Anent the strange behavior of Daniel, We find the degree of interference or participation of Daniel by
allegedly standing still while Evangeline was being stabbed and failing to come to her and Antonio's
aid, insufficient to warrant the conclusion that he is a co-conspirator. His conduct during and
immediately after the stabbing incident cannot be equated to a direct or overt act in furtherance of
the criminal design of the two unidentified men.

While it may be true that Daniel acted differently from what was expected of him in the given
situation, We cannot fault him for reacting the way he did. We have held that "different people react
differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard form of behavioral
response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful experience."  Certainly, a
70

stabbing incident unfolding before his very eyes, involving his aunt and uncle at that, was a frightful
experience for Daniel. He should not be faulted for being in a state of shock after witnessing a
gruesome event.

Neither Evangeline nor any of the other prosecution witnesses saw who stabbed Antonio.  The 71

glaring fact that her statements are not consistent with each other and that her conclusion was not
supported by evidence is shown in the exchange quoted below:

Q And, then what happened, Madam Witness? [sic]

A Afterwards, he left me and when I saw that he was gone, I stood up and I saw my husband
standing at the gate. But, before that he already sustained several stab wounds because I
think Daniel and the other man help out in stabbing him.

Prosecutor Macaren

Q And, when you saw your husband bloodied standing by your gate, what happened next?

A When I saw him standing I saw blood in his mouth and I told Daniel to help me in chasing the two
(2) men because they had just left but Daniel did not help me. And even before that, I already asked
him while we were being stabbed but he didn't help us and instead just watched us being stabbed.

Prosecutor Macaren

Q And, then what did you [sic] after asking Daniel to chase these two (2) persons who he let in?
A He didn't go out?

Q And, what happened then?

A I was even the first one (1) to go out of the house and that's why the neighbors learned that I was
stabbed, Sir.   (Emphasis ours)
72

If she really thought at that moment that Daniel conspired with the two unidentified men in stabbing
them, then it is illogical for her to ask Daniel to help in chasing the two men. Moreover, considering
that Antonio was at the gate outside of the house and Daniel was inside the house while Evangeline
was being stabbed, Evangeline could not have known who stabbed Antonio. Thus, Evangeline's
statement that Daniel watched her being stabbed inside the house negates her own claim that
Daniel helped out in stabbing Antonio who was at the gate of the house.

Interestingly, the claim ofEvangeline  and Baguio that Daniel carried Antonio and suddenly dropped
73 74

him, causing the latter to sustain a head injury, is belied by the Medico-legal Report. The report did
not indicate that Antonio sustained any head injury at the time of his death.   Moreover, this
75

assertion contradicts Evangeline's other claim that Daniel did not assist nor come to their aid after
the stabbing incident. Considering that she and Baguio admitted seeing Daniel carrying Antonio, We
find no other reasonable explanation for him to carry Antonio at that moment other than to come to
the aid of Antonio.

It is also contrary to ordinary human experience to remain at the crime scene after the victims were
brought to the hospital. One who is guilty would have immediately fled the scene of the crime to
avoid being arrested by the authorities. If Daniel really conspired with the two unidentified men, he
would have done acts that would consummate the crime and he would have escaped to avoid being
identified. A person with a criminal mind would have ensured Evangeline's death and immediately
fled the scene of the crime. Contrary to the observation of the lower court, his non-flight is sufficient
ground to exculpate him from criminal liability. His non-flight, when taken together with the numerous
inconsistencies in the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented, provides the Court
sufficient basis to acquit Daniel.

To Our mind, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, when taken as a whole, failed to present
a coherent and consistent narration of the facts. Absent any proof sufficient to connect/relate Daniel
and Juan to the criminal design of killing Spouses Asistin, it cannot be concluded that Daniel and
Juan were in conspiracy with the unidentified aggressors in committing murder and frustrated
murder. With their inconclusive conduct and participation, We cannot conscientiously declare that
they were principals or even accomplices in the crimes charged. The presumption of innocence in
their favor has not been overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Violation of P.D. No. 1866 (Case No. Q-04-125717)

Juan's conviction of violation of P.D. 1866, based solely on the testimony of arresting officer PO2
Guerrero, is erroneous. We cannot ignore the possibility that the shotgun, ammunitions, and knife
confiscated from Juan were merely planted. It is too coincidental that at the very moment the police
conducted a follow-up operation and made a protective search at the room where Juan was staying,
he was caught packing a bag filled with the seized items.

As pointed out by the defense, PO2 Guerrero only admitted the fact of Juan's arrest and nothing
more. There was no admission with regard to the confiscation of a shotgun or sumpak, ammunitions
or fan knife from Juan's possession.   Juan cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the self-
76

serving statement of PO2 Guerrero   who was not even presented during trial. Even the shotgun and
77
the ammunitions confiscated were not presented during the trial. The non-presentation of PO2
Guerrero and the seized items was suspicious, and should have alerted the lower courts to be more
circumspect in examining the records, considering the persistent claim of Juan of having been a
victim of frame-up. In view of the possibility of that the shotgun and ammunitions were planted, We
find PO2 Guerrero's statement insufficient to convict Juan of violation of P.D. 1866.

Furthermore, even if the weapons seized from Juan were not planted, it does not follow that the
prosecution proved Juan's purported participation in the crimes charged against him. Contrary to
what the prosecution would like Us to believe, there appears to be no direct relation between the
seized articles and the weapons used to inflict the stab wounds on Evangeline and Antonio. It was
not shown during trial that the weapons allegedly confiscated from Juan were the same objects used
in stabbing Evangeline and Antonio. In view of the dismissal of the criminal cases for murder and
frustrated murder, there is no reason to consider the items seized from Juan during an alleged
protective search on the person of Juan pursuant to a follow-up operation PO2 Guerrero conducted.

In conclusion, We recognize that the evidence for the defense is not strong because Daniel and
Juan merely denied participating in the brutal stabbing of Spouses Asistin. Their testimonies were
uncorroborated by any other evidence. Admittedly, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has
been viewed with disfavor. Nevertheless, the apparent weakness of Juan and Daniel's defense does
not add any strength nor can it help the prosecution's cause. If the prosecution cannot establish, in
the first place, Juan and Daniel's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the need for the defense to adduce
evidence in its behalf in fact never arises. However weak the defense evidence might be, the
prosecution's whole case still falls. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 9, 2013 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219 in Criminal Case Nos. Q-04-125714, Q-04-125715, Q-04-
125717, as well as the Decision dated October 13, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06428 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-Appellants Juan Credo y De Vergara
and Daniel Credo y De Vergara are ACQUITTED for failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, and are ORDERED to be immediately released unless they are being held for some other
valid or lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court of the action taken
hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin (C.J.), Jardeleza , and Gesmundo, JJ., concur.

*

Del Castillo, J., on official leave.

G.R. No. 231827, January 20, 2020

EDGARDO PATUNGAN, JR. Y LAGUNDI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
PERALTA, C.J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the

Rules of Court are the Decision[1] dated January 17, 2017 and the
Resolution[2] dated April 4, 2017 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 38444.
 
In an Information[3] dated March 24, 2008 filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Carig, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, petitioner was charged
with the crime of homicide, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about OCTOBER 13, 2007 in the Municipality of Solana,
Province of Cagayan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused EDGARDO PATUNGAN, JR. Y LAGUNDI armed
with a pointed knife, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab VENANCIO L.
FURIGAY, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
[4]
parts of his body which caused his death. 
Upon arraignment, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty[5] to the charge. Pre-trial conference and trial thereafter ensued.
 
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: PO3 Isagani
Bago (PO3 Bago),  Kristine Furigay  (Kristine),  Gladys
Furigay  (Gladys),  and Dr. Josefina Chua (Dr. Chua).  Their testimonies
established the following facts:
 
At 9 o’clock in the evening of October 13, 2007, sisters Kristine and
Gladys went to the store of a certain Viring located near petitioner’s
house in Barangay Centro, Northwest Solana, Cagayan [6] While on
their way back home, they met Richard Ventura (Richard) who
shouted “pokpok”  at Kristine,[7] and he proceeded to the house of
petitioner. Kristine and Gladys hurriedly went home to report the
incident to their father, Venancio Furigay (Venancio) [8] As Venancio
was not in their house, the sisters went to petitioner’s house to talk to
Richard. Kristine and Gladys saw that there was a group of men –
composed of petitioner, Erwin Patungan and Ismael Portina- having a
drinking spree at petitioner’s house.[9] Initially, Richard hid upon seeing
Kristine, but eventually went out of petitioner’s house and Kristine,
who was then crying, asked Richard why he called her “pokpok,”  but
Richard just kept quiet. Petitioner even tried to cover up for Richard
saying that the latter could not have uttered the word ”pokpok”  at
Kristine.[10]
 
Later, Venancio arrived at the petitioner’s house to fetch her
daughters. Kristine told her father to wait as she had to confront
Richard on why he called her “pokpok.”[11] Venancio had a heated
argument with Richard.[12] Gladys asked Kristine and their father to just
go home instead. [13]
However, after Venancio and his daughters had left the place and were
already on the road, petitioner, who was running, suddenly stabbed
Venancio on his stomach.[14] Venancio subsequently fell to the ground.
Gladys tried to rescue her father, but Erwin Patungan even boxed him.
[15]
 When Kristine tried to pacify Erwin, the latter slapped her and so she
screamed for help. Their uncle Lauro went to their rescue and rushed
Venancio to the St. Paul Hospital, and was later transferred to the
Cagayan Valley Medical Center where he was operated on because of
the stab wound, but he died after the operation.[16]
 
At 10:30 p.m., PO3 Bago of the Solana Police Station, received a report
of an incident in Barangay Centro Northwest, so he and Special Police
Officer (SPO4)  Florante Balagan were immediately dispatched to the
area. Upon arriving at the scene of the incident, they were met by
Gladys who told them that her father Venancio was rushed to the
hospital as he was stabbed by petitioner. They then proceeded to
petitioner’s house, where the latter voluntarily surrendered and was
brought to the police station.[17] PO3 Bago and SPO4 Balagan went to
the St. Paul Hospital and asked the victim, Venancio, if he could
identify his assailant to which the victim replied that it was petitioner.
[18]
 PO3 Bago took the victim’s ante-mortem statement which was
reduced to writing. However, the statement was not reflected in PO3
Bago’s affidavit of arrest nor in the police blotter because according to
him, they were running out of time and had no pen and paper. [19]
 
Dr. Josefina C. Chua, Medical Officer III of the City Health Office of
Tuguegarao City, was presented to interpret the findings in the death
certificate issued by the late Dr. Beran. She testified that the
underlying cause of Venancio’s death was stab wound in the umbilical
area hitting parts of small intestines.[20]
Petitioner denied the charge. He testified that at 7 o’clock in the
evening of October 13, 2007, he was in his house with one Venerando
Danga practicing church songs; that he heard someone shouting
outside his house and he saw Richard holding a knife and screaming
that he was slapped three times by Kristine .[21] He advised Richard to
hide his knife as it was embarrassing to fight with a woman, so the
latter went home. After a while, there was someone yelling behind him
and saw Kristine, who smelled intoxicated, asking him why he called
her ”pokpok” that Kristine was with Gladys who was crying. He asked
Kristine why she was blaming him when he never called
her ”pokpok.”  Kristine then admitted that she mistook him for Richard
and left.[22] Few minutes after, Richard, together with his companions,
arrived with a bottle of gin and invited him to a drink, but he refused
as he had LBM.[23] He just allowed them to drink in the veranda of his
house and excused himself to go to the comfort room (CR).[24]  While
he was inside the CR, he heard Karla Melissa
Patungan (Karla)  shouting. When he came out, he asked Karla what
was happening, and the latter replied that there was a commotion
outside the house. He went outside and saw Venancio sprawled on the
ground. He helped Venancio to stand up, but the latter told him to
leave him or he would implicate him.[25] When he noticed Venancio’s
bloodied body, he left him alone because of what he said. Later, their
house was stoned by the brother and son of Venancio. The police
invited him and Richard to their station because they were both
wearing white t-shirts and have the same physical appearance. While
at the station, Richard gave his statement ahead of him and the police
did not take his statement anymore.
 
Karla, wife of Erwin Patungan, and Melecio Patungan, corroborated
petitioner’s testimony that he was in the comfort room when the
commotion happened in his house. Karla added that petitioner went
outside of the house and carried Venancio’s body, and then putting it
down as he might be suspected of causing his injuries.[26] Melecio was
the one who reported that there was someone causing trouble in
petitioner’s house and the stoning incident . [27]
On January 28, 2016, the RTC rendered its Decision , [28] the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
EDGARDO PATUNGAN, JR. y Lagundi GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide, appreciating in his [favor] the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and applying the
Indeterminate
Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer a prison term of Eight (8)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor[,] as minimum[,] to Twelve (12)
years of prision mayor[,] as maximum[,] and to pay the heirs of the
deceased Venancio Furigay the following amounts: P75,000.00,
mandatory dal11ages death; P50,000.00 moral damages, P70,000[.]00
as nominal damages; and P1,512,000.00 as unearned salaries.
 
The accused should also suffer the accessory penalty provided for in
Art. 42 of the Revised Penal Code.
 
[29]
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that petitioner’s defense in his Counter-Affidavit was
self-defense which he changed during trial to denial,  i.e., he has no
participation in the stabbing incident. It found petitioner’s defense not
credible because it cannot be that his Counter-Affidavit and his
testimony in court are both true, that one is necessarily false or it can
be that both are false; that why did he surrender to the police and why
did he not tell them that he did not stab Venancio; that there was no
motive for the family of Venancio to falsely accuse petitioner nor was
there any reason for PO3 Bago to implicate petitioner in the killing of
Venancio.
 
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed an appeal with the CA. After the
submission of the parties’ respective pleadings, the case was
submitted for decision.
 
On January 17, 2017, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC
Judgment, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Judgment dated 28 January
2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao City, Cagayan, Branch
5 in Criminal Case No. 12128, finding accused-appellant Edgardo
Patungan, Jr. y Lagundi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and
requiring him to pay the heirs of the victim Venancio Furigay the
amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS in that the award of nominal damages in the amount
of Php70,000.00 and unearned salaries in the amount of
Phpl,512,000.00 are hereby DELETED; he should suffer the accessory
penalties provided for in Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code;
and accused-appellant is hereby ORDERED, as follows:
1. to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor,  as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,  as maximum;
 
2. to pay the heirs of the victim Venancio Furigay civil indemnity in the
decreased amount of Php50,000.00, and temperate damages in the
amount of Php50,000.00; and
 
3. to pay interest at the rate of 6% per annum  on all damages, from
the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid; and
[30]
SO ORDERED.
The CA found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution
established the elements of the crime of homicide beyond reasonable
doubt. Venancio’s daughters, who were with him on his way home,
both categorically and positively identified petitioner, their neighbor,
as the one who stabbed their father on the stomach; that although the
incident happened at night, there were streetlights near the locus
criminis; and that with the sisters’ eyewitness account of their father’s
death, it would not matter whether or not the testimony of PO3 Bago
as to the alleged ante-mortem statement is hearsay.
 
The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses involved minor details and did not touch upon the material
points which cannot overturn a conviction established by competent
evidence. While the CA agreed to petitioner’s claim that his Counter-
Affidavit could not be considered since it was never formally offered in
court as evidence, however, the prosecution was able to prove
petitioner’s guilt based on the testimonies of Gladys and Kristine.
 
The CA ruled that petitioner’s defense of denial could not prevail over
the prosecution’s positive identification of him as the perpetrator of
the crime; and that no ill motive could be attributed to Gladys and
Kristine on why they would implicate petitioner to such a serious
crime.
 
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution
dated April 4, 2017.
 
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari  on the following grounds:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF DOCTOR CHUA.
 
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
STATE TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE IDENTITY OF
[31]
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE ASSAILANT.
Anent the first issue, petitioner claims that he objected to the
presentation of the testimony of Dr. Chua to interpret the death
certificate, since she was not the one who prepared the same and
treated the victim; that hence, there was no evidence to prove the
cause of the victim’s death because the doctor who treated him did
not testify in court.
 
We are not persuaded.
 
Article 410 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
A death certificate is a public document.[32] As a public document, it is
admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness.[33] Thus, even if Dr. Beran, the one who
issued the death certificate, did not testify in court as he had already
died, the death certificate is admissible to prove the cause of
Venancio’s death. Moreover, the death certificate also deserves to be
given evidentiary weight because it constitutes prima facie evidence of
the facts stated therein.[34] Notably, petitioner had not presented any
evidence to contradict the entries in the said death certificate which
showed the cause of Venancio ‘s death, which is stab wound.
Petitioner next contends that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
Kristine and Gladys, on his identity as the one who stabbed their father
is doubtful; that the alleged stabbing incident happened during
nighttime and there was no evidence that there was sufficient
illumination; that Kristine was crying and looking for Richard, thus, her
emotional state as well as her state of intoxication as shown in the
excerpt of the police blotter, could have diminished her degree of
perception and she could not make a clear identification of the one
who stabbed her father.
 
Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to
declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can
weigh such testimony in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct
and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.[35] This is
especially true when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by
the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the latter
court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and
circumstances of significance in the case.[36] Here, we find that
petitioner failed to show that the RTC and the CA had overlooked any
significant facts which could affect the result of the case.
 
A review of the records would show that the prosecution witnesses,
Kristine and Gladys, had sufficiently proven that petitioner was the one
who stabbed their father, Venancio. In her direct examination, Kristine
testified, thus:
Q. After leaving the place, what happened next?
A. Edgardo Patungan stabbed my father, sir.
 
Q. Did you see him personally stab your father?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. What part of the body of your father was stabbed by the accused?
 
MR. INTERPRETER.
The witness is pointing to the left side of her stomach.
 
PROS. DALIUAG:
Q. After your father was stabbed, what happened to him?
A. He fell to the ground.
 
Q. When he fell to the ground, what happened next?
A. My sister went to his rescue, bu[t] Erwin Patungan boxed my father
and when I tried to pacify Erwin, he slapped me.
 
Q. How many times did Erwin slap you?
A. Once only, sir.
 
Q. After that, what happened next?
[37]
A. I screamed for help and my Uncle Lauro went to our rescue.
And Gladys corroborated Kristine’s testimony as follows:
Q. After that what happened next?
A. While we were with our father along the road going home suddenly
Edgar Patungan was running, sir.
 
Q. After that what happened?
A. He suddenly stabbed our father, sir.

Q. What part of the body of your father was stabbed?

THE INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to her stomach.
 
PROS. DALIUAG:
Q. After stabbing your father what happened next?
A. He ran towards their house while our father was already lying and
then his brother Erwin ran towards the person of our father and boxed
the head of our father, sir.
 
Q. How did you know that it was the accused who stabbed your
father?
A. Because I know him very much , sir.
 
THE COURT.
Q. How far were you from the accused when the accused stabbed your
father?

A. He was beside holding his back , sir.

Q. After Erwin Patungan boxed your father, what happened next?

A. He went near my sister and slapped my sister, sir.

Q. How many times the accused stabbed your father?

[38]
A . Once, sir. 
Kristine and Gladys positively identified petitioner as the one who
stabbed their father. They could not be mistaken on the identity of
petitioner as they were just beside their father walking on their way
home when their father was stabbed by petitioner. Notably, petitioner
is their neighbor whom they know very much.[39] We have ruled that
the familiarity of the witness to the perpetrator of the crime erased
any doubt that the witness could have erred in identifying him; and
that a witness related to the victim of a crime has a natural tendency
to remember the faces of the person involved in the attack on the
victim, because relatives, more than anybody else, would be
concerned with seeking justice for the victim and bringing the
malefac   or before the law.[40] Moreover, to blame an innocent man for
the killing of the victim would serve them no purpose.[41]
 
Moreover, contrary to petitioner’s claim that the prosecution failed to
show that there was sufficient illumination on the night when the
stabbing incident happened, Kristine’s testimony proved otherwise.
She declared on cross-examination, to wit:
Q. Now, how far was the street light from the so[-]called incident?
A. It is located in front of the house, sir.
 
Q. How many meters from where you were seated? Will you please
point.
A. Around 2 or 1 meter, sir.
 
THE INTERPRETER
The witness is pointing to a distance from the place where she was
seated which is approximately 2 meters, your Honor.
 
Q. What kind of light is that to illuminate the place of the incident?
A. A street light, sir.
 
Q. How far is the street light from the Viring’s Store? Let us assume
you are at the Viring’s Store, How far is the street light from the place
where you were seated?
 
PROS. DALIUAG:
It is immaterial, your Honor.
 
ATTY. LASAM:
Very material, your Honor.
 
THE COURT
Q. How far were you from the Viring’s Store when your father was
stabbed?
A. Approximately 2 meters, sir.
 
THE COURT.
So[,] I will allow the question.

ATTY. LASAM:
Q. How far is the street light from Viring’s Store from where you were
seated?
A. Maybe 3 meters away, sir.
 
Q. From Viring’s store?
A. Yes, sir.
 
Q. 3 meters away from Viring’s Store. So[,] if that is true then you
stated that when your father was allegedly stabbed you were two
meters only from Viring’s store?
A. Yes, sir.
 
Q. So[,] in short when you stated that it is two meters away and the
street light was also three meters away from Viring’s store there is no
possibility for you [to] identify the accused and his companion
because that street light according to you is in front of Viring’s store
and not the residence of the accused?
A. There were two street lights, sir one is located at the other house.
 
Q. Why did you not tell us a while ago that there were two and you
mentioned only one?
A. That is the reason why I was thinking which of the two street lights
you
are referring to, sir.
 
Q. So[,] in short there are two street lights.?
A. Yes, sir.
 
Q. And the first street light is 3 meters away from Viring’s store or
fronting
Viring’s store?
A. Yes, sir.
 
Q. And how far is the next street light?
A. It is located adjacent to Viring’s store, sir.
 
Q. So[,] in front of Viring’s store there are two adjacent street lights?
A. One is located beside the Viring’s store and the other one is located
[42]
fronting the house of auntie Rina, sir. 
Thus, there were two streetlights near the area where the stabbing
incident happened which provided sufficient visibility for Kristine and
Gladys to identify petitioner even when the incident happened at
night and coupled with the fact that petitioner is known to them for
being their neighbor. In several cases, we have found that illumination
from a lamp post is sufficient for purposes of identification. [43]
 
Kristine and Gladys’ positive identification of petitioner as their father’s
assailant prevailed over petitioner’s mere denial, because such denial,
being negative and self-serving evidence, was undeserving of weight
by virtue of its lack of substantiation by clear and convincing proof.[44]
Moreover, we find no showing that Kristine and Gladys were
motivated by ill feelings towards petitioner as to impute to him the
responsibility of killing their father. It is well settled that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated, and
his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. [45]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 17,
2017 and the Resolution dated April 4, 2017 issued by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38444 are hereby AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019

FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Subject to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court at the instance of petitioner Fernando N.
Fernandez (Fernandez) are the Decision1 dated February 15, 2017 and the Resolution2 dated August
17, 2018 in CA-G.R. CR No. 38074, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for
Frustrated Murder committed against private respondent Noel C. Garino (Garino) under the
Decision3 rendered on April 27, 2015 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in
Criminal Case No. 11-1667.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts as posited by Fernandez and Garino are summarized in the decision of the CA. In the
on January 21, 2011 at around 1:00 a.m., Garino
prosecution's narration of events,
and an unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney which was parked
in front of Fernandez's house, when Garino saw someone go out of the
gate.4 When they heard a gunshot, they immediately alighted from the
jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the person who fired the shot
was Fernandez, though he did not know the latter's name at the time. As the
two ran away, Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino on his
right gluteal area, or "buttocks" in layman's terms. Garino was then brought
to the Ospital ng Makati and resultantly underwent immediate surgery. He
was confined for some two weeks and spent almost P200,000.00 for his stay
in the hospital.5
Garino presented his doctor, Dr. Teresita Sanchez (Dr. Sanchez), as a witness, who testified that
Garino was near death when he was taken to the hospital, and had to undergo a second operation
because his large vessel, external iliac vein and intestines were injured. 6

When questioned if he knew who his assailant was, Garino testified that he previously saw him at the
salon where he and a certain Me-Ann Barcenas (Barcenas) worked. 7 He found out his assailant's name
only when Barcenas visited him at the hospital a few days after his surgery. Of note, however, neither
Barcenas nor Garino's companion during the night of the shooting was presented as witness for the
only Garino, his brother Albert, who had the incident blottered at
prosecution, as
the police station, and Dr. Sanchez were presented to testify.8
For its version of the facts, the defense presented Fernandez himself, as well as his son Jayvee, to
denied the prosecution's
testify as witnesses. Fernandez, a retired police officer, vehemently
version of the events and claimed that he was sleeping with his wife at the
time of the incident and was unaware of any unusual incident outside his
house at the time.  According to Fernandez, he was not investigated by the police or by any
9

barangay official on the alleged shooting, and only learned of the charge for Frustrated Murder upon
receipt of a subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City. 10

While Fernandez admitted owning the jeepney parked outside his house, he denied any knowledge of
Garino and said that he first laid eyes on the latter only during the trial proper. He could likewise not
think of any reason why Garino would file a case against him. 11

After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision12 on April 27, 2015 convicting Fernandez of the crime
charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds [FERNANDEZ], guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor as the
minimum period to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum
period.

Accused is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P50,000.00 as temperate damages and
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. The accused is also ordered to pay the Costs of this
Suit.

SO ORDERED.13

Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal on September 17, 2015 which was given due course by the CA in
an Order dated October 20, 2015. 14 The CA, however, denied Fernandez's appeal for lack of merit, and
affirmed with modification Fernandez's conviction as meted out by the RTC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is hereby DENIED. However, the Decision dated 27
April 2015 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION, in that the dispositive portion of which shall read as follows:
xxxx

WHEREFORE, this court finds accused FERNANDO N. FERNANDEZ, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 6 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of,
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor
as the minimum period to SIXTEEN (16) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as the
maximum period.

Accused is also ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate damages,
the amount of P40,000.00 as moral damages, and the amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The accused is also ordered to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused is likewise ORDERED to pay legal interest on all damages awarded in this case
at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this decision until
fully paid.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.15 (Emphasis in the original)

Fernandez's Motion for Reconsideration was denied, prompting recourse to the Supreme Court. Hence,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari.16

The Issue of the Case and the Arguments of the Parties

whether or not Fernandez is indeed guilty of the crime of

The issue in the case is
Frustrated Murder, for shooting Garino and failing to kill the latter despite inflicting a deep
wound on the victim.

In his Petition, Fernandez argues that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to
establish that he was the perpetrator of the crime charged in the Information. 17 First, Fernandez
questions the veracity of his identification as the one who shot Garino, considering: a) Garino did not
know Fernandez prior to the incident; b) Garino only learned of Fernandez when he was merely
pointed to by Barcenas, who was not the companion of Garino at the time of the incident; c) Barcenas
was not presented to the witness stand to confirm the identity of Fernandez as the person who shot
Garino; and d) Garino could not have seen his perpetrator as he was allegedly running when shot on
his right gluteal area.18

The defense added that, as the incident took place during the wee hours of the morning, the condition
of visibility at the time of the alleged shooting would not be favorable to ascertaining the perpetrator's
identity, much less determining that Fernandez indeed was the culprit. 19

Fernandez further contends that Garino merely assumed that the perpetrator was Fernandez because
the jeepney, where Garino stayed in with his unknown companion, was parked in front of Fernandez's
house. Barcenas only confirmed that Fernandez was the owner of the house, but not that he was the
one who shot Garino.20

Alleging the defense of alibi, Fernandez states that the lower courts erred in dismissing this as an
inherently weak defense. Fernandez cited the case of People v. Caverte,21 where it was held that
"[w]hile alibi is a weak defense and the rule is that it must be proved to the satisfaction of the court,
the said rule has never been intended to change the burden of proof in criminal cases. Otherwise, an
absurd situation will arise wherein the accused is put in a more difficult position where the prosecution
evidence is vague and weak as in the present case."22

Finally, Fernandez argues that even hypothetically admitting that he was the person seen by Garino,
the evidence offered by the latter was insufficient if not altogether absent to show the commission of
Frustrated Murder. Fernandez states that the prosecution failed to prove that there was intent to kill
on his part, especially since Garino did not even testify that he actually saw Fernandez point a gun
towards him and fire the same.23 Anent the injury itself, Fernandez points out that it was caused by a
single gunshot wound in the gluteal area, which is clearly not a vital part of Garino's body and thus
cannot be considered as a fatal wound.24 Fernandez alleges that the prosecution was unable to show
intent, nor the presence of treachery in the commission of the offense - vital elements of the crime he
is being accused of. Even conceding but definitely not admitting that Fernandez was the one who shot
Garino, in the absence of clear proof of the existence of treachery, the crime is only physical injuries,
or at the most, frustrated or attempted homicide, warranting a reduction of the penalty. 25

In its Comment26 to the Petition, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), argues that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the
crime charged. The facts accordingly show that Fernandez, with intent to kill, inflicted an injury upon
Garino that was sufficient to kill the latter, such act of inflicting injury being attended and qualified to
become Murder by treachery, however Garino did not die due to the timely medical assistance given
to him.27

The OSG counters that, while it is true that Garino did not know Fernandez's name at the time of the
attack, he was able to recognize him from the salon where he worked. The fact that he was only
informed as to Fernandez's name through his co-worker does not negate his positive identification that
Fernandez was the perpetrator of the crime.28 According to the transcript of records, during the trial,
Garino repeatedly testified in open court that he saw and identified Fernandez when he alighted from
the jeepney after the first shot. 29 Said identification was not only clear from the direct testimony, but
also from Garino's cross-examination, wherein he said on record that he knew who Fernandez was
through his friend.30

The OSG points out that the physical evidence shows proof of Fernandez's intent to kill, as Garino
would have died from his wounds had he failed to timely undergo an operation at the hospital.
According to the findings, Fernandez was armed with a gun when he came out of his house, and with
this weapon, fired a shot. When the first shot missed, he then shot Garino, who was running from the
scene and was only one and a half arm's length away from Fernandez. The act of firing another shot
after the initial miss was an indication that Fernandez really intended to kill Garino. 31

Moreover, the OSG contends that this intent is manifest in how Fernandez deprived Garino of any
chance to defend himself due to the suddenness of the attack and as seen in the entry point of the
gunshot wound on Garino's right gluteal area. 32

Ruling of the Court

The Court acquits Fernandez on the ground of reasonable doubt. The lower courts committed grave
abuse of discretion in hastily convicting Fernandez on the basis of questionable evidence.

It is a basic and immutable principle in criminal law that an accused individual cannot be convicted if
there is reasonable doubt in his or her commission of a crime. Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
accused must be acquitted, even if, on
must be adduced by the prosecution otherwise the
face, he or she appears to be most suspicious or even if there is no other
possible or identifiable perpetrator in the records despite there having been
a crime committed.
As aptly stated in People v. Claro:33
Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt of
the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further means that the
courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process the courts should
persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance favoring
his innocence should be fully taken into account. That is what we must be [sic] do herein, for he is
entitled to nothing less.

Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His acquittal should follow, for, as we have
emphatically reminded in Patula v. People:
[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to prove each and
every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for that crime or for
any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must further prove the participation of
the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing all these, the Prosecution must rely on the
strength of its own evidence, and not anchor its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the
accused. The burden of proof placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his
innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set free should the
Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In other words, the weakness of
the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution
has not discharged its burden of proof in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in
identifying the accused as the malefactor responsible for it. 34 (Citations omitted)

The RTC and the CA are one in their findings that Fernandez is the actual perpetrator of the crime
against Garino, based in major part on the latter's testimony, which was found as clear,
straightforward, and believable. As a general rule, the Court is obliged to rely on the observations of
the trial court, as the latter had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude. It has since become imperative that the evaluation of
testimonial evidence by the trial court be accorded great respect by the Court; for it can be expected
that said determination is based on reasonable discretion as to which testimony IS acceptable and
which witness is worthy of belief.35

Although it is entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect because it had ample opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the declarants at the witness stand, this rule admits exceptions. The saving instance is
said to be when a fact or circumstance of weight and influence has been overlooked, or its significance
misconstrued by the trial court sufficient to harbor serious misgivings on its conclusions. 36

Even a casual observer can see that almost the entire case for the prosecution rests exclusively on
Garino, the victim, and his testimony. No other witness was presented to narrate the events of that
fateful night, even though Garino had a companion. A more nuanced glance at the antecedent facts
will unearth several glaring inconsistencies in Garino's testimony as well as the evidence on record.
While these inconsistencies on their own may not be enough to completely decimate his testimony,
taken together with the fact that the prosecution relied solely on the alleged victim's narration of
events, these more than show the presence of reasonable doubt substantial enough to acquit the
accused.

On the witness stand, Garino testified that he and his companion were sitting inside a jeepney outside
Fernandez's house a little after midnight. Garino then saw someone come out of the gate, presumably
Fernandez as he alleged he discovered later on. Garino and his companion then heard a gunshot,
which prompted them to flee the jeepney, and it was only then that Garino saw that it was Fernandez
with the gun. As the two ran away, Fernandez fired another shot which hit Garino in the latter's right
gluteal area, which caused his hospitalization and near-death.

Notably, the testimony is anchored on Garino's positive identification of Fernandez as the culprit who
shot him, even though he did not know his name at the time, and only zeroed in on Fernandez after
the incident as a result of Barcenas' own identification. In this regard, the Court finds Garino's
testimony to be highly suspect, and laden with several inconsistencies which militate against
Fernandez's culpability as a suspect.

First, the condition of visibility at the time was not specified to by Garino. The incident happened after
midnight, and there was no mention that the area was illuminated sufficiently in that Garino would be
able to take a good look at his assailant. The need to take a good look at his assailant's features is
indispensable and crucial, as Garino did not know who Fernandez was, and only identified the latter
based on how Garino's description of Fernandez was apparently in sync with Barcenas' own
identification. In this case, apart from Garino's own testimony, no other competent nor corroborative
proof was adduced by the prosecution that would answer the question of visibility.

Despite this testimonial omission, Garino indirectly attempts to justify his positive identification of
Fernandez during the incident by pointing to the happenstance that he saw Fernandez clearly due to
the latter's closeness to him at the time of the first shot. This close distance was testified to by Garino
during his direct examination, to wit:
Prosecutor Paolo
Talban:
Q: Could you enlighten us, Mr. Witness, could you tell us your exact position at
the time you were fired upon by the accused?
A: My back was turned to the accused.
Q: Assume, Mr. Witness, the place where you are now seating as a point of
reference, could you tell us from what direction did the accused come from?
A: If this is the jeep, he came from the back portion of the jeep.
Q: And approximately, how far away were you from the accused when he
emerged from his house and fired at you?
A: One and a half arms[-]length, sir.  (Emphasis omitted)
37

However, Garino's alluded justification only draws further attention to yet another questionable facet
in Garino's testimony, which was Fernandez's apparent point-blank miss even when he was less than
two meters away from Garino when he presumably shot the latter. The Court finds it unlikely that
Fernandez, or any other individual, would miss at almost point-blank range. This, especially by
Fernandez who is a former police officer and who would have considerable skill in both aiming and
shooting a firearm. The rapidity of the events unfolding would even go against Garino's attestation
that he was able to identify his assailant. Logically, Garino would not stick around to take a closer look
at his assailant with his life in danger, especially at that close a distance. In fact, it is a strange
assumption that Garino would even be able to run away at all, considering the depth of the wound
inflicted on him, by his own account. It is incredulous that, if Fernandez intended to kill Garino, the
former would allow Garino to stagger away instead of finishing the job or even attempting to flee from
the scene of the crime.

The foregoing makes it highly doubtful that Garino was able to identify Fernandez as the perpetrator
of the crime, While the Court does not question that Garino was indeed shot, the Court has its
misgivings that it was indeed Fernandez who shot him, especially if the only proof adduced is Garino's
testimony.

Second, the Court finds as a misstep on the part of the lower courts that they did not question the
circumstances or even the identity of Garino's alleged companion during the night of the shooting.
Even putting aside his non-presentation during trial as a witness, the Court finds it baffling that Garino
did not even know his name, or at least could not identify him. A survey of the transcript of records
will show this strange unfamiliarity, viz.:
TSN
04 July 2012
Witness: Noel Garino

Page 8

xxxx

PROS. TALBAN:
On that given time and date, what were you doing?

WITNESS:
I met a friend during that time and we were inside the jeep.

PROS. TALBAN:
And could you give is [sic] the name of that friend of yours? Page 9

WITNESS:
I don't know the name sir.38

There was no explanation as to why Garino could not identify his companion. The Court finds that this
omission without explanation casts doubt on the narration of events from the part of Garino. To note,
Garino also failed to explain why he and his "companion" were there in the middle of the night, inside
a jeepney, property of someone else, and, by Garino's own admission, right outside another's
property. The logical explanation then is that either Garino was doing something worthy of suspicion
to which he was trying to cover up the same, or his companion did not exist, which would create
doubt as to the veracity of his testimony.

Thus, the Court finds that Garino's testimony is tainted with inconsistencies and lack of substantiation.
Ultimately, it becomes a verbal tussle between Garino and Fernandez, and of course both sides would
be very much biased towards their version of the story. In a criminal case however, it is the onus of
the complainant, through the prosecution, to present a case laden with surety and without the shadow
of the doubt, and this is lacking in the case herein.

Third, the Court finds it puzzling that the prosecution only presented three witnesses: Garino himself,
his brother who was not present and who only assisted in filing the complaint, and Dr. Sanchez, who
testified as to Garino's severity of wounds. The latter two were not even directly involved in the
incident. While the Court is aware as to the jurisprudential pronouncement that it is not in the realm of
courts to decide the order or even the presentation of witnesses, with Garino's testimony suffering.
from infirmities, the Court finds that circumstantial evidence is necessary in order to bolster his
narration, corroborative testimony from either his unnamed companion during the shooting, or even
from Barcenas herself. The lack of this the Court finds troubling especially as a second voice could and
should have shed more light on the truth.

Fourth, it was not shown that Fernandez had any motive for shooting Garino. While motive is
generally immaterial when it comes to considering intent in a criminal case, it can help facilitate the
intrusion into the accused's mind especially when there is an issue as to the identity of the latter.
In People v. De Guzman,39 the Court explained, thus:
Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven.
Proof of the same, however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the
assailant is in question. In People v. Vidad, the Court said:
It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the particular motive for taking the
life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when the commission of a
crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its commission is
unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the
commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which
tempted the mind to indulge in the criminal act. 40 (Citations omitted)

In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew each other beforehand, and
as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that Garino zeroed in on Fernandez as the
culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas. There was also no plausible reason for Fernandez to
risk his safety and life in shooting Garino, especially with a possible witness in tow. If Fernandez
wanted to end Garino's life, it would also be strange that he would not run after Garino and finish the
job, as Garino would certainly have been hobbled as a result of the wound.

Fifth, the Court finds that the lower courts hastily brushed off Fernandez's defense of alibi, to the
latter's detriment. After all, considering the fact that the accused and the victim did not know each
other and had not heard about each other prior to the incident, with even Fernandez stating that the
first time he saw Garino was during the trial, it makes complete sense that Fernandez's flat denial that
he was a participant in the offense, and his whereabouts during that time would be his only defenses.

In the case of Lejano v. People,41 the Court expanded on the alibi versus positive identification

conundrum, to wit:
The trial court and the [CA] are one in rejecting as weak Webb's alibi. Their reason is uniform: Webb's
alibi cannot stand against Alfaro's positive identification of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and,
apparently, the killer as well of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts,
Webb's denial and alibi were fabricated.

But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is truly innocent,
he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can such accused penetrate a mind that has
been made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangman's noose in the
face of a witness positively swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion
automatically dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is
distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any chance of
prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?

There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty
conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. A positive
declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel
out the accused's claim that he did not do it. 42

The tale of this case's tape is that the prosecution relied solely on Garino's testimony that Fernandez
was the one who shot him. Aside from his positive identification, which the Court finds too
unconvincing, no legitimate and convincing evidence was offered to prove the veracity of the events
as Garino alleges. With this, Fernandez's justification of alibi finds stronger ground, and the Court is
thus obliged to favor it while taking into absolute consideration the promise that reasonable doubt is
sufficient to acquit an accused individual of the crime.

In People v. Nuñez,43 the Court held, thus:

Conviction in criminal cases demands proof beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not require
absolute certainty, it calls for moral certainty. It is the degree of proof that appeals to a magistrate's
conscience:

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. Unless
his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is
demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from conviction
except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which
he is charged. The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such degree of proof as excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.44 (Emphasis supplied)

Our laws proscribe the conviction of the accused if doubt taints the circumstances of the crime. And,
for good reason. A man's life and liberty are not aspects to be trifled with, which is why only the most
exacting standard is required in order to find a person criminally liable. In this case, more than just
reasonable doubt is attendant to the circumstances of the crime alleged. While the Court does not
deny that Garino indeed suffered a grievous injury, the Court does heavily question if Fernandez was
the one who inflicted it. This doubt is enough to sway the mind of the Court and acquit Fernandez.

Henceforth, the Court is constrained to reverse the RTC and the CA rulings due to the presence of
lingering doubts which are inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as
quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a criminal case. Fernandez is entitled to an acquittal, as
a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2017
and the Resolution dated August 17, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38074 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Fernando N. Fernandez is ACQUITTED of the charge of Frustrated Murder on the ground of
reasonable doubt.

Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Perlas-Bernabe, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and Delos Santos, JJ.,
concur.

Endnotes:
Republic Act No. 10591
May 29, 2013

S. No. 3397
H. No. 5484

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand twelve.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591]

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A COMPREHENSIVE LAW ON FIREARMS AND

AMMUNITION AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

ARTICLE I

TITLE, DECLARATION OF POLICY AND

DEFINITION OF TERMS

SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Comprehensive Firearms and
Ammunition Regulation Act”.

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. – It is the policy of the State to maintain peace and order
and protect the people against violence. The State also recognizes the right of its qualified
citizens to self-defense through, when it is the reasonable means to repel the unlawful aggression
under the circumstances, the use of firearms. Towards this end, the State shall provide for a
comprehensive law regulating the ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture, dealing in and
importation of firearms, ammunition, or parts thereof, in order to provide legal support to law
enforcement agencies in their campaign against crime, stop the proliferation of illegal firearms or
weapons and the illegal manufacture of firearms or weapons, ammunition and parts thereof.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

(a) Accessories  refer to parts of a firearm which may enhance or increase the operational
efficiency or accuracy of a firearm but will not constitute any of the major or minor internal parts
thereof such as, hut not limited to, laser scope, telescopic sight and sound suppressor or silencer.
(b) Ammunition refers to a complete unfixed unit consisting of a bullet, gunpowder, cartridge
case and primer or loaded shell for use in any firearm.

(c) Antique firearm refers to any: (1) firearm which was manufactured at least seventy-five (75)
years prior to the current date but not including replicas; (2) firearm which is certified by the
National Museum of the Philippines to be curio or relic of museum interest; and (3) any other
firearm which derives a substantial part of its monetary value from the fact that it is novel, rare,
bizarre or because of its association with some historical figure, period or event.

(d) Arms smuggling  refers to the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer
of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, from or across the territory of one
country to that of another country which has not been authorized in accordance with domestic
law in either or both country/countries.

(e) Authority to import  refers to a document issued by the Chief of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) authorizing the importation of firearms, or their parts, ammunition and other components.

(f) Authorized dealer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business

entity duly licensed by the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) of the PNP to engage in the
business of buying and selling ammunition, firearms or parte thereof, at wholesale or retail basis.

(g) Authorized importer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business

duly licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of importing ammunition and
firearms, or parts thereof into the territory of the Republic of the Philippines for purposes of sale
or distribution under the provisions of this Act.

(h) Authorized manufacturer refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, or partnership duly

licensed by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of manufacturing firearms, and
ammunition or parts thereof for purposes of sale or distribution.

(i) Confiscated firearm refers to a firearm that is taken into custody by the PNP, National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and all other law
enforcement agencies by reason of their mandate and must be necessarily reported or turned over
to the PEO of the PNP.

(j) Demilitarized firearm refers to a firearm deliberately made incapable of performing its main

purpose of firing a projectile.

(k) Duty detail order  refers to a document issued by the juridical entity or employer wherein the
details of the disposition of firearm is spelled-out, thus indicating the name of the employee, the
firearm information, the specific duration and location of posting or assignment and the
authorized bonded firearm custodian for the juridical entity to whom such firearm is turned over
after the lapse of the order.

(l) Firearm refers to any handheld or portable weapon, whether a small arm or light weapon, that
expels or is designed to expel a bullet, shot, slug, missile or any projectile, which is discharged
by means of expansive force of gases from burning gunpowder or other form of combustion or
any similar instrument or implement. For purposes of this Act, the barrel, frame or receiver is
considered a firearm.

(m) Firearms Information Management System (FIMS) refers to the compilation of all data and
information on firearms ownership and disposition for record purposes.

(n) Forfeited firearm refers to a firearm that is subject to forfeiture by reason of court order as

accessory penalty or for the disposition by the FEO of the PNP of firearms considered as
abandoned, surrendered, confiscated or revoked in compliance with existing rules and
regulations.

(o) Gun club refers to an organization duly registered with and accredited in good standing by
the FEO of the PNP which is established for the purpose of propagating responsible and safe gun
ownership, proper appreciation and use of firearms by its members, for the purpose of sports and
shooting competition, self-defense and collection purposes.

(p) Gunsmith refers to any person, legal entity, corporation, partnership or business duly licensed
by the FEO of the PNP to engage in the business of repairing firearms and other weapons or
constructing or assembling firearms and weapons from finished or manufactured parts thereof on
a per order basis and not in commercial quantities or of making minor parts for the purpose of
repairing or assembling said firearms or weapons.

(q) Imitation firearm refers to a replica of a firearm, or other device that is so substantially

similar in coloration and overall appearance to an existing firearm as to lead a reasonable person
to believe that such imitation firearm is a real firearm.

(r) Licensed citizen  refers to any Filipino who complies with the qualifications set forth in this
Act and duly issued with a license to possess or to carry firearms outside of the residence in
accordance with this Act.

(s) Licensed, juridical entity  refers to corporations, organizations, businesses including security

agencies and local government units (LGUs) which are licensed to own and possess firearms in
accordance with this Act.

(t) Light weapons are: Class-A Light weapons which refer to self-loading pistols, rifles and
carbines, submachine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns not exceeding caliber 7.62MM
which have fully automatic mode; and Class-B Light weapons which refer to weapons designed
for use by two (2) or more persons serving as a crew, or rifles and machine guns exceeding
caliber 7.62MM such as heavy machine guns, handheld underbarrel and mounted grenade
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers
of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and
mortars of a caliber of less than 100MM.

(u) Long certificate of registration refers to licenses issued to government agencies or offices or

government-owned or -controlled corporations for firearms to be used by their officials and
employees who are qualified to possess firearms as provider in this Act, excluding security
guards.

(v) Loose firearm refers to an unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm, firearm

which has been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered firearms in the
possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked licenses in accordance
with the rules and regulations.

(w) Major part or components of a firearm refers to the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder or
the bolt assembly. The term also includes any part or kit designed and intended for use in
converting a semi-automatic burst to a full automatic firearm.

(x) Minor parts of a firearm refers to the parts of the firearm other than the major parts which
are necessary to effect and complete the action of expelling a projectile by way of combustion,
except those classified as accessories.

(y) Permit to carry firearm outside of residence refers to a written authority issued to a licensed

citizen by the Chief of the PNP which entitles such person to carry his/her registered or lawfully
issued firearm outside of the residence for the duration and purpose specified in the authority.

(z) Permit to transport firearm refers to a written authority issued to a licensed citizen or entity

by the Chief of the PNP or by a PNP Regional Director which entitles such person or entity to
transport a particular firearm from and to a specific location within the duration and purpose in
the authority.

(aa) Residence refers to the place or places of abode of the licensed citizen as indicated in his/her
license.

(bb) Shooting range refers to a facility established for the purpose of firearms training and skills
development, firearm testing, as well as for sports and competition shooting either for the
exclusive use of its members or open to the general public, duly registered with and accredited in
good standing by the FEO of the PNP.

(cc) Short certificate of registration refers to a certificate issued by the FEO of the PNP for a
government official or employee who was issued by his/her employer department, agency or
government-owned or -controlled corporation a firearm covered by the long certificate of
registration.

(dd) Small arms  refer to firearms intended to be or primarily designed for individual use or that
which is generally considered to mean a weapon intended to be fired from the hand or shoulder,
which are not capable of fully automatic bursts of discharge, such as:

(1) Handgun which is a firearm intended to be fired from the hand, which includes:

(i) A pistol which is a hand-operated firearm having a chamber integral with or permanently
aligned with the bore which may be self-loading; and
(ii) Revolver which is a hand-operated firearm with a revolving cylinder containing chambers for
individual cartridges.

(2) Rifle which is a shoulder firearm or designed to be fired from the shoulder that can discharge
a bullet through a rifled barrel by different actions of loading, which may be classified as lever,
bolt, or self-loading; and

(3) Shotgun which is a weapon designed, made and intended to fire a number of ball shots or a
single projectile through a smooth bore by the action or energy from burning gunpowder.

(ee) Sports shooting competition refers to a defensive, precision or practical sport shooting

competition duly authorized by the FEO of the PNP.

(ff) Tampered, obliterated or altered firearm refers to any firearm whose serial number or other

identification or ballistics characteristics have been intentionally tampered with, obliterated or
altered without authority or in order to conceal its source, identity or ownership.

(gg) Thermal weapon sight  refers to a battery operated, uncooled thermal imaging device which
amplifies available thermal signatures so that the viewed scene becomes clear to the operator
which is used to locate and engage targets during daylight and from low light to total darkness
and operates in adverse conditions such as light rain, light snow, and dry smoke or in conjunction
with other optical and red dot sights.

ARTICLE II

OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF FIREARMS

SEC. 4. Standards and Requisites for Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess
Firearms. – In order to qualify and acquire a license to own and possess a firearm or firearms
and ammunition, the applicant must be a Filipino citizen, at least twenty-one (21) years old and
has gainful work, occupation or business or has filed an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the
preceding year as proof of income, profession, business or occupation.

In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by appropriate
authorities attesting the following:

(a) The applicant has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude:

(b) The applicant has passed the psychiatric test administered by a PNP-accredited psychologist
or psychiatrist;

(c) The applicant has passed the drug test conducted by an accredited and authorized drug testing
laboratory or clinic;

(d) The applicant has passed a gun safety seminar which is administered by the PNP or a
registered and authorized gun club;
(e) The applicant has filed in writing the application to possess a registered firearm which shall
state the personal circumstances of the applicant;

(f) The applicant must present a police clearance from the city or municipality police office; and

(g) The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending criminal case
before any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of more than two (2) years.

For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before the courts
of law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license.

The applicant shall pay the reasonable licensing fees as may be provided in the implementing
rules and regulations of this Act.

An applicant who intends to possess a firearm owned by a juridical entity shall submit his/her
duty detail order to the FEO of the PNP.

SEC. 5. Ownership of Firearms and Ammunition by a Juridical Entity. – A juridical person

maintaining its own security force may be issued a regular license to own and possess firearms
and ammunition under the following conditions:

(a) It must be Filipino-owned and duly registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC);

(b) It is current, operational and a continuing concern;

(c) It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the SEC; and

(d) It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.

The application shall be made in the name of the juridical person represented by its President or
any of its officers mentioned below as duly authorized in a board resolution to that
effect: Provided, That the officer applying for the juridical entity, shall possess all the
qualifications required of a citizen applying for a license to possess firearms.

Other corporate officers eligible to represent the juridical person are: the vice president,
treasurer, and board secretary.

Security agencies and LGUs shall be included in this category of licensed holders but shall be
subject to additional requirements as may be required by the Chief of the PNP.

SEC. 6. Ownership of Firearms by the National Government. – All firearms owned by the
National Government shall be registered with the FEO of the PNP in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines. Such registration shall be exempt from all duties and taxes that may otherwise be
levied on other authorized owners of firearms. For reason of national security, firearms of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Coast Guard and other law enforcement agencies shall
only be reported to the FEO of the PNP.

SEC. 7. Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence or Place of Business. – A permit to carry

firearms outside of residence shall be issued by the Chief of the PNP or his/her duly authorized
representative to any qualified person whose life is under actual threat or his/her life is in
imminent danger due to the nature of his/her profession, occupation or business.

It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove that his/her life is under actual threat by
submitting a threat assessment certificate from the PNP.

For purposes of this Act, the following professionals are considered to be in imminent danger
due to the nature of their profession, occupation or business:

(a) Members of the Philippine Bar;

(b) Certified Public Accountants;

(c) Accredited Media Practitioners;

(d) Cashiers, Bank Tellers;

(e) Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;

(f) Physicians and Nurses;

(g) Engineers; and

(h) Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking, are exposed to high risk of
being targets of criminal elements.

ARTICLE III

REGISTRATION AND LICENSING

SEC. 8. Authority to Issue License. – The Chief of the PNP, through the FEO of the PNP, shall
issue licenses to qualified individuals and to cause the registration of firearms.

SEC. 9. Licenses Issued to Individuals. – Subject to the requirements set forth in this Act and
payment of required fees to be determined by the Chief of the PNP, a qualified individual may be
issued the appropriate license under the following categories;

Type 1 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of two (2) registered firearms;

Type 2 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of five (5) registered firearms;
Type 3 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of ten (10) registered firearms;

Type 4 license – allows a citizen to own and possess a maximum of fifteen (15) registered
firearms; and

Type 5 license – allows a citizen, who is a certified gun collector, to own and possess more than
fifteen (15) registered firearms.

For Types 1 to 5 licenses, a vault or a container secured by lock and key or other security
measures for the safekeeping of firearms shall be required.

For Types 3 to 5 licenses, the citizen must comply with the inspection and bond requirements.

SEC. 10. Firearms That May Be Registered. – Only small arms may be registered by licensed
citizens or licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and concealed carry. A light
weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and other law
enforcement agencies authorized by the President in the performance of their
duties: Provided,  That private individuals who already have licenses to possess Class-A light
weapons upon the effectivity of this Act shall not be deprived of the privilege to continue
possessing the same and renewing the licenses therefor, for the sole reason that these firearms are
Class “A” light weapons, and shall be required to comply with other applicable provisions of this
Act.

SEC. 11. Registration of Firearms. – The licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity shall
register his/her/its firearms so purchased with the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the type of
license such licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity possesses. A certificate of registration of
the firearm shall be issued upon payment of reasonable fees.

For purposes of this Act, registration refers to the application, approval, record-keeping and
monitoring of firearms with the FEO of the PNP in accordance with the type of license issued to
any person under Section 9 of this Act.

SEC. 12. License to Possess Ammunition Necessarily Included. – The licenses granted to

qualified citizens or juridical entities as provided in Section 9 of this Act shall include the license
to possess ammunition with a maximum of fifty (50) rounds for each registered
firearm: Provided; That the FEO of the PNP may allow more ammunition to be possessed by
licensed sports shooters.

SEC. 13. Issuance of License to Manufacture or Deal In Firearms and Ammunition. – Any

person desiring to manufacture or deal in firearms, parts of firearms or ammunition thereof, or
instruments and implements used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of
firearms or ammunition, shall make an application to:

(a) The Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) in the case of
an application for a license to manufacture; and
(b) The Chief of the PNP in the case of a license to deal in firearms and firearms parts,
ammunition and gun repair.

The applicant shall state the amount of capitalization for manufacture or cost of the purchase and
sale of said articles intended to be transacted by such applicant; and the types of firms,
ammunition or implements which the applicant intends to manufacture or purchase and sell
under the license applied for; and such additional information as may be especially requested by
the Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP.

The Secretary of the DILG or the Chief of the PNP may approve or disapprove such application
based on the prescribed guidelines. In the case of approval, the Secretary of the DILG or the
Chief of the PNP shall indicate the amount of the bond to be executed by the applicant before the
issuance of the license and the period of time by which said license shall be effective, unless
sooner revoked by their authority.

Upon approval of the license to manufacture or otherwise deal in firearms by the Secretary of the
DILG or the Chief of the PNP as the case may be, the same shall be transmitted to the FEO of
the PNP which shall issue the license in accordance with the approved terms and conditions,
upon the execution and delivery by the applicant of the required bond conditioned upon the
faithful compliance on the part of the licensee to the laws and regulations relative to the business
licensed.

SEC. 14. Scope of License to Manufacture Firearms and Ammunition. – The scope of the
License to Manufacture firearms and ammunition shall also include the following:

(a) The authority to manufacture and assemble firearms, ammunition, spare parts and
accessories, ammunition components, and reloading of ammunitions, within sites, areas, and
factories stated therein. The Secretary of the DILG shall approve such license;

(b) The license to deal in or sell all the items covered by the License to Manufacture, such as
parts, firearms or ammunition and components;

(c) The authority to subcontract the manufacturing of parts and accessories necessary for the
firearms which the manufacturer is licensed to manufacture: Provided, That the subcontractor of
major parts or major components is also licensed to manufacture firearms and ammunition; and

(d) The authority to import machinery, equipment, and firearm parts and ammunition
components for the manufacture thereof. Firearm parts and ammunition components to be
imported shall, however, be limited to those authorized to be manufactured as reflected in the
approved License to Manufacture. The Import Permit shall be under the administration of the
PNP.

A licensed manufacturer of ammunition is also entitled to import various reference firearms

needed to test the ammunition manufactured under the License to Manufacture. A licensed
manufacturer of firearms, on the other hand, is entitled to import various firearms for reference,
test and evaluation for manufacture of similar, types of firearms covered by the License to
Manufacture.

An export permit shall, however, be necessary to export manufactured parts or finished products
of firearms and ammunition. The Export Permit of firearms and ammunition shall be under the
administration of the PNP.

SEC. 15. Registration of Locally Manufactured and Imported Firearms. – Local manufacturers

and importers of firearms and major parts thereof shall register the same as follows:

(a) For locally manufactured firearms and major parts thereof, the initial registration shall be
done at the manufacturing facility: Provided, That firearms intended for export shall no longer
be subjected to ballistic identification procedures; and

(b) For imported firearms and major parts thereof, the registration shall be done upon arrival at
the FEO of the PNP storage facility.

SEC. 16. License and Scope of License to Deal. – The License to Deal authorizes the purchase,
sale and general business in handling firearms and ammunition, major and minor parts of
firearms, accessories, spare parts, components, and reloading machines, which shall be issued by
the Chief of the PNP.

SEC. 17. License and Scope of License for Gunsmiths. – The license for gunsmiths shall allow
the grantee to repair registered firearms. The license shall include customization of firearms from
finished or manufactured parts thereof on per order basis and not in commercial quantities and
making the minor parts thereof, i.e. pins, triggers, trigger bows, sights and the like only for the
purpose of repairing the registered firearm. The license for gunsmiths shall be issued by the
Chief of the PNP.

SEC. 18. Firearms for Use in Sports and Competitions. – A qualified individual shall apply for a
permit to transport his/her registered firearm/s from his/her residence to the firing range/s and
competition sites as may be warranted.

SEC. 19. Renewal of Licenses and Registration. – All types of licenses to possess a firearm shall
be renewed every two (2) years. Failure to renew the license on or before the date of its
expiration shall cause the revocation of the license and of the registration of the firearm/s under
said licensee.

The registration of the firearm shall be renewed every four (4) years. Failure to renew the
registration of the firearm on or before the date of expiration shall cause the revocation of the
license of the firearm. The said firearm shall be confiscated or forfeited in favor of the
government after due process.

The failure to renew a license or registration within the periods stated above on two (2) occasions
shall cause the holder of the firearm to be perpetually disqualified from applying for any firearm
license. The application for the renewal of the license or registration may be submitted to the
FEO of the PNP, within six (6) months before the date of the expiration of such license or
registration.

SEC. 20. Inspection and Inventory. – The Chief of the PNP or his/her authorized representative
shall require the submission of reports, inspect or examine the inventory and records of a
licensed manufacturer, dealer or importer of firearms and ammunition during reasonable hours.

ARTICLE IV

ACQUISITION, DEPOSIT OF FIREARMS, ABANDONED,

DEMILITARIZED AND ANTIQUE FIREARMS

SEC. 21. Acquisition or Purchase and Sale of Firearms and Ammunition. – Firearms and
ammunition may only be acquired or purchased from authorized dealers, importers or local
manufacturers and may be transferred or sold only from a licensed citizen or licensed juridical
entity to another licensed citizen or licensed juridical entity: Provided, That, during election
periods, the sale and registration of firearms and ammunition and the issuance of the
corresponding licenses to citizens shall be allowed on the condition that the transport or delivery
thereof shall strictly comply with the issuances, resolutions, rules and regulations promulgated
by the Commission on Elections.

SEC. 22. Deposit of Firearms by Persons Arriving From Abroad. – A person arriving in the

Philippines who is legally in possession of any firearm or ammunition in his/her country of
origin and who has declared the existence of the firearm upon embarkation and disembarkation
but whose firearm is not registered in the Philippines in accordance with this Act shall deposit
the same upon written receipt with the Collector of Customs for delivery to the FEO of the PNP
for safekeeping, or for the issuance of a permit to transport if the person is a competitor in a
sports shooting competition. If the importation of the same is allowed and the party in question
desires to obtain a domestic firearm license, the same should be undertaken in accordance with
the provisions of this Act. If no license is desired or leave to import is not granted, the firearm or
ammunition in question shall remain in the custody of the FEO of the PNP until otherwise
disposed of in-accordance with law.

SEC. 23. Return of Firearms to Owner upon Departure from the Philippines. – Upon the
departure from the Philippines of any person whose firearm or ammunition is in the custody of
the FEO of the PNP, the same shall, upon timely request, be delivered to the person through the
Collector of Customs. In the case of a participant in a local sports shooting competition, the
firearm must be presented to the Collector of Customs before the same is allowed to be loaded
on board the carrier on which the person is to board.

SEC. 24. Safekeeping of Firearms and Ammunition. – Any licensee may deposit a registered
firearm to the FEO of the PNP, or any Police Regional Office for safekeeping. Reasonable fees
for storage shall be imposed.

SEC. 25. Abandoned Firearms and Ammunition. – Any firearm or ammunition deposited in the
custody of the FEO of the PNP pursuant to the provisions of this Act, shall be deemed to have
been abandoned by the owner or his/her authorized representative if he/she failed to reclaim the
same within five (5) years or failed to advise the FEO of the PNP of the disposition to be made
thereof. Thereafter, the FEO of the PNP may dispose of the same after compliance with
established procedures.

SEC. 26. Death or Disability of Licensee. – Upon the death or legal disability of the holder of a
firearm license, it shall be the duty of his/her next of kin, nearest relative, legal representative, or
other person who shall knowingly come into possession of such firearm or ammunition, to
deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police Regional Office, and such firearm or
ammunition shall be retained by the police custodian pending the issuance of a license and its
registration in accordance, with this Act. The failure to deliver the firearm or ammunition within
six (6) months after the death or legal disability of the licensee shall render the possessor liable
for illegal possession of the firearm.

SEC. 27. Antique Firearm. – Any person who possesses an antique firearm shall register the
same and secure a collector’s license from the FEO of the PNP. Proper storage of antique firearm
shall be strictly imposed. Noncompliance of this provision shall be considered as illegal
possession of the firearm as penalized in this Act.

ARTICLE V

PENAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 28. Unlawful Acquisition, or Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. – The unlawful

acquisition, possession of firearms and ammunition shall be penalized as follows:

(a) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a small arm;

(b) The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed if three (3) or more
small arms or Class-A light weapons are unlawfully acquired or possessed by any person;

(c) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a Class-A light weapon;

(d) The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall, unlawfully
acquire or possess a Class-B light weapon;

(e) The penalty of one (1) degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) in this section
shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm under any or
combination of the following conditions:

(1) Loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine;

(2) Fitted or mounted with laser or any gadget used to guide the shooter to hit the target such as
thermal weapon sight (TWS) and the like;
(3) Fitted or mounted with sniper scopes, firearm muffler or firearm silencer;

(4) Accompanied with an extra barrel; and

(5) Converted to be capable of firing full automatic bursts.

(f) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a small arm;

(g) The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a small arm or Class-A light weapon. If the
violation of this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful
acquisition or possession of a small arm, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;

(h) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-A light weapon;

(i) The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-A light weapon. If the violation of
this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or
possession of a Class-A light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter;

(j) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess a major part of a Class-B light weapon; and

(k) The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed upon any person who
shall unlawfully acquire or possess ammunition for a Class-B light weapon. If the violation of
this paragraph is committed by the same person charged with the unlawful acquisition or
possession of a Class-B light weapon, the former violation shall be absorbed by the latter.

SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose firearm,
when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other
special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the crime
committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is
penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the
preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised
Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.

If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act
shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.

SEC. 30. Liability of Juridical Person. – The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum to prision
mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or
other responsible officer of/any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity who shall
willfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or
entity to be used by any person or persons found guilty of violating the provisions of the
preceding section, or willfully or knowingly allow any of them to use unregistered firearm or
firearms without any legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the course of their
employment.

SEC. 31. Absence of Permit to Carry Outside of Residence. – The penalty of prision

correccional and a fine of Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person
who is licensed to own a firearm but who shall carry the registered firearm outside his/her
residence without any legal authority therefor.

SEC. 32. Unlawful Manufacture, Importation, Sale or Disposition of Firearms or Ammunition or

Parts Thereof, Machinery, Tool or Instrument Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture
of Firearms, Ammunition or Parts Thereof. – The penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully engage in the manufacture,
importation, sale or disposition of a firearm or ammunition, or a major part of a firearm or
ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used by the same person in
the manufacture of a firearm, ammunition, or a major part thereof.

The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument used directly in the manufacture of
firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by any person whose business, employment or
activity does not lawfully deal with the possession of such article, shall be prima facie evidence
that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful or illegal manufacture of firearms,
ammunition or parts thereof.

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period to prision mayor in its medium period shall
be imposed upon any laborer, worker or employee of a licensed firearms dealer who shall
unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms or ammunition which the company
manufactures and sells, and other materials used by the company in the manufacture or sale of
firearms or ammunition. The buyer or possessor of such stolen part or material, who is aware that
such part or material was stolen, shall suffer the same penalty as the laborer, worker or
employee.

If the violation or offense is committed by a corporation, partnership, association or other

juridical entity, the penalty provided for in this section shall be imposed upon the directors,
officers, employees or other officials or persons therein who knowingly and willingly
participated in the unlawful act.

SEC. 33. Arms Smuggling. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall engage or participate in arms smuggling as defined in this Act.
SEC. 34. Tampering, Obliteration or Alteration of Firearms Identification. – The penalty
of prision correccional to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who shall tamper, obliterate or alter without authority the barrel, slide, frame, receiver,
cylinder, or bolt assembly, including the name of the maker, model, or serial number of any
firearm, or who shall replace without authority the barrel, slide, frame, receiver, cylinder, or bolt
assembly, including its individual or peculiar identifying characteristics essential in forensic
examination of a firearm or light weapon.

The PNP shall place this information, including its individual or peculiar identifying
characteristics into the database of integrated firearms identification system of the PNP Crime
Laboratory for future use and identification of a particular firearm.

SEC. 35. Use of an Imitation Firearm. – An imitation firearm used in the commission of a crime
shall be considered a real firearm as defined in this Act and the person who committed the crime
shall be punished in accordance with this Act: Provided, That injuries caused on the occasion of
the conduct of competitions, sports, games, or any recreation activities involving imitation
firearms shall not be punishable under this Act.

SEC. 36. In Custodia Legis. – During the pendency of any case filed in violation of this Act,
seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tools or instruments shall remain in the
custody of the court. If the court decides that it has no adequate means to safely keep the same,
the court shall issue an order to turn over to the PNP Crime Laboratory such firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tools or instruments in its custody during the pendency
of the case and to produce the same to the court when so ordered. No bond shall be admitted for
the release of the firearm, ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument. Any
violation of this paragraph shall be punishable by prision mayor in its minimum period
to prision mayor  in its medium period.

SEC. 37. Confiscation and Forfeiture. – The imposition of penalty for any violation of this Act
shall carry with it the accessory penalty of confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument in favor of the government which
shall be disposed of in accordance with law.

SEC. 38. Liability for Planting Evidence. – The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
shall be imposed upon any person who shall willfully and maliciously insert; place, and/or
attach, directly or indirectly, through any overt or covert act, any firearm, or ammunition, or
parts thereof in the person, house, effects, or in the immediate vicinity of an innocent individual
for the purpose of implicating or incriminating the person, or imputing the commission of any
violation of the provisions of this Act to said individual. If the person found guilty under this
paragraph is a public officer or employee, such person shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

SEC. 39. Grounds for Revocation, Cancellation or Suspension of License or Permit. – The Chief
of the PNP or his/her authorized representative may revoke, cancel or suspend a license or permit
on the following grounds:
(a) Commission of a crime or offense involving the firearm, ammunition, of major parts thereof;

(b) Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude or any offense where the penalty carries an
imprisonment of more than six (6) years;

(c) Loss of the firearm, ammunition, or any parts thereof through negligence;

(d) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof outside of residence or workplace
without, the proper permit to carry the same;

(e) Carrying of the firearm, ammunition, or major parts thereof in prohibited places;

(f) Dismissal for cause from the service in case of government official and employee;

(g) Commission of any of the acts penalized under Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”;

(h) Submission of falsified documents or misrepresentation in the application to obtain a license

or permit;

(i) Noncompliance of reportorial requirements; and

(j) By virtue of a court order.

SEC. 40. Failure to Notify Lost or Stolen Firearm or Light Weapon. – A fine of Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) shall be imposed upon any licensed firearm holder who fails to report to the
FEO of the PNP that the subject firearm has been lost or stolen within a period of thirty (30) days
from the date of discovery.

Likewise, a fine of Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person holding a
valid firearm license who changes residence or office address other than that indicated in the
license card and fails within a period of thirty (30) days from said transfer to notify the FEO of
the PNP of such change of address.

SEC. 41. Illegal Transfer/Registration of Firearms. – It shall be unlawful to transfer possession

of any firearm to any person who has not yet obtained or secured the necessary license or permit
thereof.

The penalty of prision correccional shall be imposed upon any person who shall violate the
provision of the preceding paragraph. In addition, he/she shall be disqualified to apply for a
license to possess other firearms and all his/her existing firearms licenses whether for purposes
of commerce or possession, shall be revoked. If government-issued firearms, ammunition or
major parts of firearms or light weapons are unlawfully disposed, sold or transferred by any law
enforcement agent or public officer to private individuals, the penalty of reclusion temporal  shall
be imposed.
Any public officer or employee or any person who shall facilitate the registration of a firearm
through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation or submission of falsified documents shall suffer the
penalty of prision correccional.

ARTICLE VI

FINAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 42. Firearms Repository. – The FEO of the PNP shall be the sole repository of all firearms
records to include imported and locally manufactured firearms and ammunition. Within one (1)
year upon approval of this Act, all military and law enforcement agencies, government agencies,
LGUs and government-owned or -controlled corporations shall submit an inventory of all their
firearms and ammunition to the PNP.

SEC. 43. Final Amnesty. – Persons in possession of unregistered firearms and holders of expired
license or unregistered firearms shall register and renew the same through the Final General
Amnesty within six (6) months from the promulgation of the implementing rules and regulations
of this Act. During the interim period of six (6) months, no person applying for license shall be
charged of any delinquent payment accruing to the firearm subject for registration. The PNP
shall conduct an intensive nationwide campaign to ensure that the general public is properly
informed of the provisions of this Act.

SEC. 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – Within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of this Act, the Chief of the PNP, after public hearings and consultation with
concerned sectors of society shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of this Act to be published in at least two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.

SEC. 45. Repealing Clause. – This Act repeals Sections 1, 2, 5 and 7 of Presidential Decree No.
1866, as amended, and Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8294 and all other laws, executive orders,
letters of instruction, issuances, circulars, administrative orders, rules or regulations that are
inconsistent herewith.

SEC. 46. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act or any part hereof is held invalid or
unconstitutional, the remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall remain
valid and subsisting.

SEC. 47. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days from its publication in a
newspaper of nationwide circulation.

Approved,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR. (Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

Speaker of the House President of the Senate
of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 3397 and House Bill No. 5484 was finally
passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 4, 2013 and February 5,
2013, respectively.

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP (Sgd.) EDWIN B. BELLEN

Secretary General Acting Senate Secretary
House of Representatives

Approved: May 29, 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

President of the Philippines

G.R. No. 235749 - RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 235749, June 19, 2019

RAMON PICARDAL Y BALUYOT, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 (Petition) filed by accused-

appellant Ramon Picardal y Baluyot (Picardal) assailing the Decision2 dated May 31,
2017 and Resolution3 dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 38123, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated September 24, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 14-304527,
finding Picardal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms.

The Facts

An Information5 was filed against Picardal for Qualified Illegal Possession of

Firearms, the accusatory portion of which reads: cralawred
That on or about March 28, 2014, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under
his control one (1) caliber .38 revolver loaded with five (5) live ammunitions,
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefore (sic) from the
proper authorities.

Contrary to law.6
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

When arraigned, Picardal pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, pre-trial and
trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution's version, as summarized in its Appellee's Brief, 7 is as follows: cralawred

Police Officer (PO) 1 Mark Anthony Peniano is a regular member of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) assigned at Ermita Police Station located at Baseco PNP
Compound, Port Area, Manila. On March 27, 2014, at around 8:00 o'clock in the
evening, together with his companion PO1 William Cristobal and PO1 Rodrigo Co,
while they were on a beat patrol back to the station, they chanced upon a person
urinating against the wall. The police officers approached said person who was later
identified as accused-appellant Ramon Picardal. The place is well-lighted since it is
within the main road. PO1 Peniano told accused-appellant that it is forbidden to
urinate in public. In view of said violation, they invited accused-appellant to go with
them to the precinct. When PO 1 Peniano is about to handcuff him, accused-
appellant attempted to run. His attempt failed since PO1 Peniano was able to get
hold of his hand. Once caught, PO1 Peniano frisked accused-appellant and was able
to recover a caliber .38 revolver from his waist. The rusty [pistol] with a handle
made of wood contained five (5) live ammunitions. Accused-appellant was brought
to the police station, after PO1 Cristobal apprised him of his constitutional rights.

At the police station, PO1 Peniano referred accused-appellant to the officers in-
charge for the purpose of medical examination and the recovered items were
surrendered to P/Chief Insp. William Santos for safekeeping. The following morning,
the items were retrieved back by PO1 Peniano and gave the same to the assigned
investigator, PO3 Anthony Navarro, for proper marking.

PO1 Peniano had the confiscated firearm checked with the Firearm and Explosive
Division (FED) of the PNP and it was discovered that the same is a loose firearm.
The FED was issued a certification stating that accused-appellant is not licensed or
registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber.8
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

On the other hand, the evidence of the defense is based on the lone testimony of
Picardal, who testified as follows:
cralawred

x x x Accused RAMON PICARDAL (Picardal) denied the charges against him. On

March 28, 2014, he was buying viand in the wet market of Baseco Compound,
Tondo, Manila, when he noticed three (3) armed police officers in uniform within
the vicinity. Two (2) of the three (3) police officers called him because of allegedly
urinating at the side of the market. Upon denying the said accusation, the police
officers got mad, frisked him, took his cellphone, and brought him to the police
precinct. He went voluntarily with the police officers to the police precinct and was
detained there overnight. Thereafter, he was brought for inquest the following day.
He was surprised when he was charged for urinating and illegal possession of
firearms. He also denied that said confiscated items were seized from him. He
asked the police officers to take his finger print to prove that the subject firearm
does not belong to him, but the police officers refused. The case for urinating in
public filed against him was dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of
Manila, Branch 26.9
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Decision10 dated September 24, 2015, the RTC
convicted Picardal of the crime charged. The dispositive portion of the said Decision
reads: cralawred

WHEREFORE, accused RAMON PICARDAL y BALUYOT is hereby

declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Illegal
Possession of Firearms penalized under Section 28(a) in relation to Section 28(e-1)
of Republic Act No. 10591 and there being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance that has been established, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of  prision mayor as minimum to
10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.11
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

In finding Picardal guilty, the RTC held that the prosecution was able to prove all
the elements of the crime charged, namely: (1) the existence of the subject
firearm; and (2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed it, does not
have the license or permit to possess the same. The RTC also held that Picardal's
defense of denial was self-serving and inherently weak.12

Aggrieved, Picardal appealed to the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision13 dated May 31, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's
conviction of Picardal. Relying on the testimonies of the apprehending officers, in
addition to the certification presented in court which said that Picardal was "not a
licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind of caliber," 14 the CA held that Picardal
was indeed guilty of the crime charged.

Hence, the instant Petition.

Issue

Proceeding from the foregoing, for resolution of the Court is the issue of whether
the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Picardal.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

At the outset, it is well to emphasize that the factual findings of the CA, affirming
that of the trial court, are generally final and conclusive on the Court. 15 The
foregoing rule, however, is subject to the following exceptions: cralawred

(1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures;

   
(2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
   
(3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
   
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
   
(5) the findings of fact are conflicting;
   
(6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based;
   
(7) the findings of absence of fact are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record;
   
(8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
   
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;
   
(10) the findings of the CA are beyond the issues of the case; and
   
(11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.16 (Emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the ninth exception applies. The CA manifestly overlooked the
undisputed facts that: (1) the firearm subject of this case was seized from Picardal
after he was frisked by the police officers for allegedly urinating in a public place;
and (2) the aforementioned case for "urinating in a public place" filed against
Picardal was subsequently dismissed by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. 17 The
act supposedly committed by Picardal — urinating in a public place — is punished
only by Section 2(a) of Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Regulation No.
96-00918 (MMDA Regulation), which provides that: cralawred

Sec. 2. Prohibited Acts

a) It is unlawful to dump, throw or litter, garbage, refuse, or any form of solid
waste in public places and immediate surroundings, including vacant lots, rivers,
canals, drainage and other water ways as defined in Section 1 of this Regulation
and to urinate, defecate and spit in public places. (Emphasis supplied)

The MMDA Regulation, however, provides that the penalty for a violation of the said
section is only a fine of five hundred pesos (PhP500.00) or community service of
one (1) day. The said regulation did not provide that the violator may be
imprisoned for violating the same, precisely because it is merely a regulation issued
by the MMDA. Stated differently, the MMDA Regulation is, as its name
implies, a mere regulation, and not a law or an ordinance.

Therefore, even if it were true that the accused-appellant did urinate in a public
place, the police officers involved in this case still conducted an illegal search when
they frisked Picardal for allegedly violating the regulation. It was not a search
incidental to a lawful arrest as there was no or there could not have been any lawful
arrest to speak of.

In Luz v. People,19 a man who was driving a motorcycle was flagged down for
violating a municipal ordinance requiring drivers of motorcycles to wear a helmet.
While the police officer was issuing him a ticket, the officer noticed that the man
was uneasy and kept touching something in his jacket. When the officer ordered
the man to take the thing out of his jacket, it was discovered that it was a small tin
can which contained sachets of shabu. When the man was prosecuted for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the Court acquitted the accused as the confiscated
drugs were discovered through an unlawful search. Hence: cralawred

First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down
for committing a traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this
reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound
to answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of
the person to be arrested or by that person's voluntary submission to the custody
of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of actual force, manual
touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to
arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.

Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but
the confiscation of the driver's license of the latter[.]

xxxx

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was
violated by petitioner, the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a
motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant
of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an
offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that
neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.20 (Additional
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same principle applies in the present case. There was similarly no lawful arrest
in this case as Picardal's violation, if at all committed, was only punishable by fine.

In this connection, the Court, in Sindac v. People,21 reminds: cralawred

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant
predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent which, such
search and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within the meaning of said
constitutional provision. To protect the people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence
obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words, evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are
deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be
affected is a search incidental to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made
— the process cannot be reversed.22 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original)

Thus, as the firearm was discovered through an illegal search, the same cannot be
used in any prosecution against him as mandated by Section 3(2), Article III of the
1987 Constitution. As there is no longer any evidence against Picardal in this case,
he must perforce be acquitted.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision dated May 31, 2017 and Resolution dated October 27, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 38123 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, petitioner Ramon Picardal y Baluyot is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is
being lawfully held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued
immediately.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 240475 - JONATHAN DE GUZMAN Y AGUILAR, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 240475, July 24, 2019

JONATHAN DE GUZMAN Y AGUILAR, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands moral certainty. The prosecution's reliance
on nothing more than the lone testimony of a witness, who is faulted with a
vendetta and illegal activities allegedly committed against the accused, hardly
establishes moral certainty.

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, praying that the Court of Appeals' March 21, 2018
Decision2 and July 5, 2018 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 40017 be reversed and
set aside, and that a new Decision be rendered acquitting Jonathan De Guzman y
Aguilar (De Guzman) of the charge of illegal possession of a firearm.

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the March
1, 2017 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City convicting De
Guzman. It subsequently denied his Motion for Reconsideration in its assailed July
5, 2018 Resolution.
In an Information, De Guzman was charged with illegal possession of a firearm, or
of violating Republic Act No. 10591, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act.5 The Information read: cralawred

That on or about the 22nd day of October 2014, in Pasay City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to possess, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession, custody and control One (1) Smith and Wesson Caliber .38 Revolver
(Marked "JAD-1") loaded with Four live [ammunition] (Marked "JAM-2" to ["]JAM-
5") (sic) without the necessary license and/or authority to possess the same.

Contrary to law.6 (Citation omitted)

On arraignment, De Guzman pleaded not guilty to the crime charged Trial

followed.7

The prosecution presented its lone witness, Senior Police Officer 1 Ador Estera
(SPO1 Estera),8 who testified as follows: cralawred

At around 4:00 p.m. on October 22, 2014, he and nine (9) other police officers
were on patrol along Taft Avenue, Libertad, Pasay City. As they were approaching
the White House Market, they noticed that people were running away from it. They
went to investigate and saw a revolver-wielding man, whom they later identified as
De Guzman, shouting as though quarreling with someone. They rushed to De
Guzman and introduced themselves as police officers. SPO1 Estera told De Guzman
to put down the gun, to which he complied. After picking up the gun, SPO1 Estera
asked De Guzman if he had a license to possess it, but De Guzman kept mum.
SPO1 Estera then handcuffed and frisked De Guzman, discovering in his possession
a sachet of suspected shabu.9

SPO1 Estera then brought De Guzman to the Pasay City Police Station and referred
him to SPO3 Allan V. Valdez (SPO3 Valdez) for further investigation. In SPO3
Valdez's presence, SPO1 Estera marked the revolver with De Guzman's initials,
"JAD-1." It was then that the officer found four (4) live ammunition rounds, which
he marked as "JAD-2" to "JAD-5." He also marked the sachet of suspected shabu as
"JAD." SPO1 Estera then turned the seized items over to SPO3 Valdez. 10

De Guzman was separately charged with illegal possession of a firearm and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. The case for illegal possession of a firearm was
raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, while the case for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110,
Pasay City.11

The defense alleged an entirely different version of events. It emphasized, first,

that De Guzman was arrested on October 21, 2014, not on October 22, 2014. It
then explained that on October 21, 2014, De Guzman and his sister, Jessica, were
dressing chicken to sell at the public market. While they were taking a break at
around 4:00 p.m., 10 men in civilian clothes arrived, as though looking for
something. Among them, SPO1 Estera, as De Guzman later identified, approached
De Guzman and asked him why he had knives. De Guzman replied that he used
them for dressing chickens to be sold at the public market. SPO1 Estera then asked
De Guzman if they had a mayor's permit, to which De Guzman replied that since
they merely operated a small business, they did not obtain such a permit. 12

Calling De Guzman's reply "bastos," an angry SPO1 Estera pulled out his gun and
pointed it at him. At gunpoint, De Guzman begged SPO1 Estera for forgiveness.
However, SPO1 Estera took De Guzman's knives and ordered him to lie on his
stomach. He then frisked De Guzman, but he found nothing. As SPO1 Estera's
companions arrived, SPO1 Estera told them that he was arresting De Guzman for
having the knives in his possession. De Guzman was then brought to the Pasay City
Police Station.13

There, SPO1 Estera allegedly demanded P300,000.00 from De Guzman lest he be

charged with illegal possession of a firearm and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs. Unable to produce the amount demanded by SPO1 Estera, De Guzman was
formally charged with the threatened offenses. 14

In testifying for his defense, De Guzman noted that he did not personally know
SPO1 Estera. He recalled, however, that about a month prior to his arrest, he won a
P50,000.00 cockfight bet against SPO1 Estera. He added that, after collecting his
winnings, a "kristo" at the cockfighting arena told him that SPO1 Estera had asked
for De Guzman's name and where he worked. The kristo admitted to telling SPO1
Estera that De Guzman had a stall at the White House Market.15

De Guzman also expressed perplexity at his supposedly carrying a .38 caliber

revolver. He admitted to owning a firearm, a .45 caliber Amscor, which was covered
by Firearm License No. 1222309512278865 and Permit to Carry Control No. JAD-
1210006530. He presented as evidence both his Firearm License and Permit to
Carry, along with a March 16, 2016 Certification showing that he was indeed a
licensed firearm holder. He emphasized that there was no point in him carrying
around an unlicensed firearm when he had a licensed gun. 16

De Guzman's sister, Jessica, testified to corroborate De Guzman's version of

events.17

In a March 1, 2017 Decision,18 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City
convicted De Guzman. According to it, the presentation during trial of a .38 caliber
revolver and ammunition, coupled with SPO1 Estera's identification of them as the
same items obtained from De Guzman, established the elements for conviction of
the charge of illegal possession of a firearm. It added that, in any case, De Guzman
himself admitted to not having a license to own, possess, or carry a .38 caliber
revolver or ammunition.19

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court Decision read: cralawred
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused JONATHAN DE
GUZMAN y AGUILAR a.k.a. "Jojo" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
R.A. No. 10591 (Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act) and
hereby sentences him to suffer the minimum penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years and eight (8) months of prision mayor in
its medium period.

The firearm and [ammunition] subject matter of this case is declared forfeited in
favor of the government and ordered to be turned over to the Firearms and
Explosive Unit, [Philippine] National Police, Camp Crame, Quezon City for its
appropriate disposition.

SO ORDERED.20
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

Aggrieved, De Guzman appealed before the Court of Appeals. He maintained that

the gun and ammunition presented against him were merely "planted evidence." 21

In its assailed March 21, 2018 Decision,22 the Court of Appeals affirmed De

Guzman's conviction with modification. As with the Regional Trial Court, the Court
of Appeals lent credence to the prosecution's evidence, particularly to SPO1 Estera's
recollection of events.23

The dispositive portion of the assailed Court of Appeals Decision read: cralawred

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision

dated September 2, 2016 (sic) of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Laoag City
(sic) is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant Jonathan De
Guzman y Aguilar a.k.a. "Jojo" is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.24 (Citation omitted)

In the interim, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City rendered a Decision
on April 3, 2018,25 acquitting De Guzman of the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. It reasoned that the subsequent search on De Guzman, which
supposedly yielded a sachet of shabu, was not founded on a prior lawful arrest for
illegal possession of a firearm.26 It noted that De Guzman was not proven to have
carried a firearm—which would have justified his initial arrest—but merely had
"knives which he used in his occupation in selling dressed chicken." 27 Without a
prior lawful arrest, the trial court ruled that the subsequent frisking that allegedly
yielded the sachet of shabu was an invalid search. The allegedly seized sachet was,
thus, a proverbial "fruit of the poisonous tree" 28 that is inadmissible in evidence.
Without proof of the actual narcotics allegedly obtained from De Guzman, his
acquittal followed.29
Aggrieved by the Court of Appeals' March 21, 2018 Decision convicting him of
illegal possession of a firearm, De Guzman filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but
the Court of Appeals denied this in its July 5, 2018 Resolution. 30

Thus, De Guzman filed this Petition.31

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not petitioner Jonathan De
Guzman y Aguilar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Republic Act No.
10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act.

It was a serious error for the Court of Appeals to affirm petitioner's conviction.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is imperative to sustain a conviction in criminal

cases. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: cralawred

SECTION 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. — In a criminal case, the accused is

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

This requisite quantum of proof is borne by the constitutional imperative of due

process. It is also in keeping with the presumption of innocence of an accused until
the contrary is proved.32 While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not demand
absolute, impeccable, and infallible certainty, it still requires moral
certainty.33 In People v. Que:34

Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction
in an unprejudiced mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is
responsible for the offense charged.35
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

Proof beyond reasonable doubt imposes upon the prosecution the burden of proving
an accused's guilt through the strength of its own evidence. The prosecution cannot
merely capitalize on the defense's supposed weaknesses.36 "[U]nless it discharges
[its] burden[,] the accused need not even offer evidence in his [or her] behalf, and
he [or she] would be entitled to an acquittal." 37

To sustain convictions for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must show
two (2) essential elements: (1) that the firearm subject of the offense exists; and
(2) that the accused who possessed or owned that firearm had no corresponding
license for it.38

The Regional Trial Court was quick to conclude that the first element was shown
merely when the prosecution presented a .38 caliber revolver and ammunition, and
had them identified by SPO1 Estera. Offering nothing but a singular paragraph as
reasoning, it stated: cralawred
In the instant case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements
of the crime. The subject firearm and ammunitions recovered from the accused
were duly presented to the Court and identified by SPO1 Estera, the one who
arrested the accused. The same were marked as Exhibits "C" and "D" to "D-4". 39
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

On the second element, the Regional Trial Court noted not only a Certification
issued by the Firearms and Explosive Division of the Philippine National Police
belying petitioner's license or registration to possess, but also petitioner's own
declaration that he had no such license to possess a .38 caliber revolver: cralawred

[A]ccused even admitted in his testimony that he has no license to own, possess or
carry any caliber .38 or ammunition which are the subject matter of this case. 40
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary

For its part, when it sustained petitioner's conviction, the Court of Appeals faulted
the defense for failing to present witnesses other than petitioner's sister to support
its version of events, pointing out that her testimony was bound to be biased. 41 In
the same vein, it condoned the prosecution's reliance on nothing more than SPO1
Estera's testimony, explaining that corroborating testimonies may be dispensed
with since there was no basis to suspect that SPO1 Estera "twisted the truth, or
that his . . . observation was inaccurate."42

The Regional Trial Court's reasoning and the Court of Appeals' sustaining it place far
too much faith in the lone prosecution witness' flimsy, self-serving posturing. They
come from a misplaced emphasis on the defense's supposed weakness and,
ultimately, fail to appreciate what proof beyond reasonable doubt demands.

Proving its version of events beyond reasonable doubt made it necessary for the
prosecution to present evidence that not only trumped that of the defense, but
even addressed all the glaring loopholes in its own claims. It was, therefore,
inadequate for it to have relied on the single testimony of the police officer whose
credibility had been put into question not only with respect to the veracity and
accuracy of his version of events leading to petitioner's arrest, but even with
respect to a supposed prior vendetta against petitioner, and an attempt to extort
from him. It was the prosecution's duty to show that its version of events deserves
credence, the inadequacies of SPO1 Estera notwithstanding. It abandoned the
chance to discharge this duty when it declined to present other witnesses to
buttress the claims of its single, grossly flawed witness.

This is not to say that petitioner's own allegations against SPO1 Estera are all true.
Still, the requisite of moral certainty demanded that petitioner's reservations
against SPO1 Estera be addressed. In what amounted to a contest between two (2)
vastly different accounts, the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not
have been met by the prosecution by wagering its case on no one but SPO1 Estera.
The prosecution could have presented the testimonies of disinterested witnesses to
prove and expound on the different facets of its narrative: (1) the fleeing of people
from the market; (2) petitioner's going amok or apparent quarrel with another
person; (3) the police officer's pacification of petitioner; (4) petitioner's delivery to
the police station; and (5) the turnover to SPO3 Valdez and SPO3 Valdez's own
investigation. It never bothered to do so. Instead, it saw it fit to rely on no one but
the same person who is also alleged to have extorted from an unwitting seller at a
public market.

It is not for this Court or any other tribunal to impose technique on or to suggest
strategy to a party. However, as we are now compelled to grapple with the
sufficiency of a lone witness' testimony and ascertain if the lower courts were right
to take that, and that alone, as enough to convict, our attention is drawn to how
the prosecution's evidence is egregiously wanting. The prosecution's manifest
deficiencies themselves cannot help but draw attention to how the prosecution
could have proceeded more judiciously and how the lower courts have themselves
been so credulous.

It was also an error for the Regional Trial Court to say that petitioner's own
declaration that he had no license to own, possess, or carry a .38 caliber revolver
was enough to establish the second element for conviction. This is not merely an
inordinate reliance on what is wrongly seen as the defense's weakness, but an
outright distortion of what petitioner meant when he said he had no such license.

Petitioner declared that he had a .45 caliber Amscor, covered by Firearm License
No. 1222309512278865 and Permit to Carry Control No. JAD-1210006530. He
presented both of these documents in court, along with a March 16, 2016
Certification stating that he was indeed a licensed firearm holder. Petitioner's point
was that he had no reason to brandish an unlicensed firearm when he already had a
perfectly legitimate, licensed gun.43 He was making his own positive assertion, not
an admission against interest.

Rather than take petitioner's declaration for what it was, the Regional Trial Court
saw it fit to read more into what he said and conclude that he had incriminated
himself. It did not only make much of a supposed weakness in the defense; rather,
it itself conjured that weakness.

Moreover, the defense noted inconsistencies in the prosecution's version of events.

Most notably, it emphasized that petitioner was not even arrested on October 22,
2014, as the Information had alleged.44 There was also no record on the police
station's blotter attesting to the conduct of the patrol that supposedly preceded the
arrest.45 Yet, the Court of Appeals dismissed these inconsistencies as minor
details.46

However, these inconsistencies are not mere trivial minutiae. The dates of the
supposed criminal incidents and of petitioner's ensuing arrest are matters contained
in the Information, and are matters that concern no less than an accused's
constitutional right to be informed of the charges against him or her. A proper
record of police operations would have helped establish the occurrences upon which
petitioner's being taken into custody were predicated.

The entire narrative upon which the prosecution rests its case has been
compromised by its reliance on a solitary witness whose credibility is itself
compromised and by imagined weaknesses in the defense. The added
inconsistencies noted by the defense only further weaken the prosecution's position
and instill greater doubt on petitioner's guilt.

The Court of Appeals has been grossly inattentive to crucial details. In the opening
paragraph of its assailed Decision, while identifying the object of the appeal before
it, it referred to a Decision of the "Pasig City"47 Regional Trial Court, rather than of
the Pasay City Regional Trial Court. Moreover, in the dispositive portion—the most
crucial, controlling portion of its assailed Decision—rather than properly refer to the
March 1, 2017 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, the
Court of Appeals instead referred to "[t]he Decision dated September 2, 2016 (sic)
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Laoag City[.] (sic)"48

These demonstrated the Court of Appeals' heedlessness, with the latter error being
made in no less than the most critical portion of its assailed Decision. While these
are not per se badges of an accused's innocence, or points that engender
reasonable doubt, they nevertheless raise serious questions on whether the Court
of Appeals reviewed the entirety of petitioner's case with the requisite care and
diligence consistent with an inquiry on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such
conspicuous gaffes make the Court of Appeals' conclusions on petitioner's guilt even
more tenuous.

It is worth emphasizing that petitioner has since been acquitted of the charge of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs that had been brought against him along with
the charge of illegal possession of a firearm. The case against petitioner for
violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was premised on exactly the
same facts that are the basis of this case.

In ruling on petitioner's guilt for violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act,
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, Pasay City declared that petitioner's prior
arrest had no basis as he "was not in fact carrying a firearm, but knives which he
used in his occupation in selling dressed chicken." 49

In the case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 110, the facts as asserted by
the prosecution were found to be so unreliable as to warrant petitioner's acquittal.
While not binding in this case, the trial court's finding still raises the
commonsensical question of why the same factual allegations should be the basis of
conviction here. The contemporaneous findings of another trial court, which
inquired into essentially the same set of facts as those involved here, militate
against petitioner's guilt. They highlight the reasonable doubt that the prosecution
failed to surmount.
Here, the trial court gave extraordinary weight to the bare assertion of a police
officer, who was presented as the only witness to an alleged crime that he himself
claimed to have been discovered because of a public disturbance. It trivialized the
defense's version of events, despite being more logical. This, coupled with an
assertion of the motives of the lone prosecution witness—extortion and getting
even after losing a bet—should have been enough to give pause especially because
of the fundamental guarantee for every accused to be presumed innocent.

Our courts should be zealously sensitive in protecting our citizens' rights even as we
participate in prosecuting and reducing criminality. We should always imagine the
predicament of the accused, especially those with very little financial resources who
may be faced with an intimidating atmosphere when charged with a crime they did
not commit. In such situations, it will only be their word against that of a police
officer. They will then only have the conscientiousness and the practical wisdom of
a judge to rely upon. That will spell the difference between serving time for a crime
they did not commit and witnessing justice being done.

This Court also takes notice and expresses its concern about the haphazard way
that the Court of Appeals handled the appeal. Judicial efficiency and speedy justice
should not be obtained at the expense of inaccuracy and injustice.

The Court of Appeals should be as concerned with deciding accurately so that this
Court will not be flooded with cases where mistakes could have easily been spotted
by an appellate court. After all, that is why the Court of Appeals exists: to be the
initial forum for appeal so that only policy-determining and transcendental cases
reach the highest court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The March 21, 2018 Decision and July 5,
2018 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 40017 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jonathan De Guzman y Aguilar is ACQUITTED for the
prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
cralawlawlibrary

Peralta (Chairperson), A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, and Inting, JJ., concur.

September 4, 2019

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs / Mesdames: cralawred

Please take notice that on July 24, 2019 a Decision, copy attached hereto, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which
was received by this Office on September 4, 2019 at 4:00 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG

Deputy Division Clerk of Cour
G.R. No. 222974 - JEFFREY CALAOAGAN, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 222974, March 20, 2019

JEFFREY CALAOAGAN, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This appeal by certiorari  seeks to reverse and set aside the February 9, 2016
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 35518. The CA affirmed
the November 5, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan,
Branch 53 (RTC),  finding Jeffrey Calaoagan (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Sec. 10(a) of Republic Act (R.A.)  No. 76103 in Criminal Case No.
4877-R; and modifying the RTC decision in Criminal Case No. 4878-R finding
appellant guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

Antecedents

Two separate Informations for violation of R.A. No. 7610 were filed against
petitioner before the RTC for the alleged physical maltreatment of minors AAA and
BBB.4 The accusatory portions of the informations state:

Criminal Case No. 4877-R:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 2004 at around 12:00 midnight, in Brgy.
Poblacion, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and for no apparent reason[,] physical[ly]
maltreat[ed] the complainant AAA, a minor of about 15 years of age[,] by hitting
him with a stone on his left shoulder, thus place (sic) him in an embarrasing (sic)
and shameful situation in the eyes of the public.

Contrary to Article VI, Section 10(a), Republic Act 7610. 5

Criminal Case No. 4878-R:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 2004, at around 12:00 o'clock midnight,
in Brgy. Poblacion, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and for no apparent reason[,] physically maltreat
the complainant BBB, a minor of about 17 years of age[,] by punching his face and
head, thus place (sic) him in an embarrasing (sic) and shameful situation in the
eyes of the public.

Contrary to Article VI, Section 10(a), Republic Act 7610. 6

Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.7 Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented the private offended parties AAA and BBB, and Dr. Raul
Castaños8(Dr. Castaños),  medico-legal officer. Their testimonies established the
following:

AAA was born on December 18, 1988, while BBB was born on September 21,
1987.9 They alleged that at around 12:00 midnight on October 31, 2004, they were
on their way home to Barangay Poblacion, Rosales, Pangasinan, when they
encountered petitioner accompanied by two persons. Petitioner, seemingly annoyed
by AAA and BBB, brought AAA near the church and hit AAA's right shoulder with a
stone. BBB followed petitioner and AAA, which prompted petitioner to punch BBB on
the right cheek.10

Dr. Castaños conducted a medical examination on AAA and BBB. The examination
showed that AAA suffered from "confluent abrasion" on the left shoulder and "soft
tissue contusion" in the deltoid area; while BBB bore a "soft tissue contusion" on
the left periorbital area and on the right occipital parietal area of the head. 11

Version of the Defense

Petitioner had a different version of the events at midnight of October 31, 2004. He
averred that he and his two companions passed by a group of persons which
included AAA and BBB. The group shouted "Hoy!"  at them, which impelled him to
shout back "Hoy!" at the group. Thereafter, AAA and BBB's group started hurling
stones at him and his companions, which made them run to petitioner's house. AAA
and BBB's group then pelted stones at petitioner's house, prompting petitioner to
call the police. After the police had responded and left, AAA and BBB returned to
petitioner's house. Petitioner claimed that he saw BBB carrying a knife and
attempting to attack his sister, Jennifer Malong (Jennifer). Consequently, petitioner
picked up a bamboo stick and swung it towards AAA and BBB. 12 However, he
claimed that he did not know whom he hit while swinging the bamboo
stick.13 Thereafter, when he saw other persons entering his gates, petitioner ran
inside his house. After the incident, Jennifer went to the police station to report the
incident.14

The RTC Ruling

In its November 5, 2012 Decision, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Other Acts of Child Abuse, as defined and
penalized under Sec. 10, par. (a) of R.A. No. 7610. Accordingly, it sentenced
petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and
eleven (11) days of prision correccional,  as minimum, to six (6) years and eight (8)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, in each of the two (2)
cases.15

The RTC held that petitioner physically maltreated AAA and BBB. Thus, it ruled that
petitioner committed two (2) counts of violation of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 in
Criminal Case Nos. 4877-R and 4878-R. The RTC gave credence to AAA and BBB's
straightforward testimonies despite the variance between their testimony and the
medical findings.16

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its February 9, 2016 Decision, the CA affirmed petitioner's conviction in Criminal

Case No. 4877-R for physically maltreating AAA. It ruled that petitioner had struck
AAA, then a minor. It accorded respect to the findings of the RTC in giving merit to
the testimonies of AAA and BBB as corroborated by their medical examinations. The
CA opined that despite the variance between the testimonies of AAA and BBB and
the results of the medical examination, there was no cogent reason to discount AAA
and BBB's testimonies. Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 4877-R, it awarded moral
damages in the amount of P20,000.00, with an interest rate of 6%  per annum  from
the finality of the decision until its full payment. 17

However, in Criminal Case No. 4878-R, the CA held that petitioner was not liable for
violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 for assaulting BBB. Instead, it ruled that
petitioner was only guilty of slight physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the RPC
because BBB was allegedly already eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
incident. Consequently, in this case, the CA sentenced petitioner to suffer the
penalty of arresto menor and ordered him to pay P20,000.00 as moral damages,
and P20,000.00 as temperate damages, with an interest rate of 6% per
annum  from the finality of the decision until its full payment.18

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING

THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF
R.A. No. 7610 IN CRIM. CASE NO. 4877-R BY GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT AAA THAT HE WAS MAULED BY THE ACCUSED WHO
HIT HIM SEVERAL TIMES ON THE LEFT SIDE OF HIS FACE AND WHO ALSO HIT HIM
WITH A STONE ON HIS RIGHT SHOULDER, CONTRARY TO THE MEDICO-LEGAL
FINDINGS.

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING

THE ACCUSED IN CRIM. CASE NO. 4878-R OF THE CRIME OF PHYSICAL INJURIES,
AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER ARTICLE 266(1) OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, BY GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT BBB
THAT HE WAS PUNCHED BY THE ACCUSED ONCE ON HIS RIGHT CHEEK,
CONTRARY TO THE MEDICO-LEGAL CERTIFICATE FINDINGS. 19

Petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision because AAA's
testimony was not consistent with the results of the medical examination showing
that the injury sustained was "confluent abrasion, shoulder left, soft tissue
contusion deltoid area." Likewise, he claims that the CA erred in convicting him of
slight physical injuries under the RPC because BBB's testimony was contrary to the
medical examination findings that the injury sustained was "soft tissue contusion,
shoulder left, soft tissue contusion, occipital parietal area head, right." 20

In its Comment,21 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),  representing the People

of the Philippines, countered that the issues in the petition constitute questions of
fact. As such, the petition must be dismissed for being contrary to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The OSG also argues that the petition seeks a review of the factual
viability of the findings of the courts a quo  in arriving at their verdicts, without
presenting a question of law. Further, it claims that petitioner is guilty of child
abuse under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 for hitting AAA, and is likewise guilty of
slight physical injuries for striking BBB.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is partly meritorious.

Generally, a question of fact
cannot be entertained by the
Court; exceptions

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.22 Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a
trier of facts. Its function in petitions for review on certiorari is limited to reviewing
errors of law that may have been committed by the lower courts. 23

Nevertheless, the Court has enumerated several exceptions to this rule: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference
is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the findings of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial
court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
CA are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties.24

In this case, two exceptions exist, particularly, that the judgment of the CA was
based on misapprehension of facts and that the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts. Thus, as the exception applies, the Court may then entertain a
question of fact, such as the existence of the elements of the crimes charged.

Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 requires an

intent to debase, degrade, or demean
the intrinsic worth of a child victim.

In Criminal Case No. 4877-R, petitioner was charged with violating Sec. 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. No. 7610, which states:

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development. —

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor  in its minimum period, (emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, child abuse is defined by Sec. 3(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
follows:

Section 3. Definition of terms. —

xxxx

(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child
which includes any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in

serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity
or death.25 (emphasis supplied)

Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 penalizes an act when it constitutes as child abuse. In
relation thereto, Sec. 3(b) of the same law highlights that in child abuse, the act by
deeds or words must debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of
a child as a human being. Debasement  is defined as the act of reducing the value,
quality, or purity of something; degradation, on the other hand, is a lessening of a
person's or thing's character or quality; while demean  means to lower in status,
condition, reputation, or character.26

When this element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is present, the accused
must be convicted of violating Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610, which carries a heavier
penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries under the RPC. 27

In Bongalon v. People,28  the petitioner therein was charged under Sec. 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610 because he struck and slapped the face of a minor, which were done
at the spur of the moment and in anger. The Court ruled that only when the
accused intends to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child as a
human being should it be punished with child abuse under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610. Otherwise, the act must be punished for physical injuries under the RPC. It
was emphasized therein that the records must establish a specific intent to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being as it
is the essential element in the crime of child abuse. As the prosecution failed to
establish the said intent, the petitioner therein was only convicted of slight physical
injuries.

Comparably, in Jabalde v. People,29 the petitioner slapped and struck a minor as an

offshoot of the former's emotional rage. In the absence of any intention to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child victim, the Court declared that
the act of the petitioner was merely slight physical injuries punishable under the
RPC, since there was no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for
labor or of any required medical attendance. Underscored is that the essential
element of intent must be established with the prescribed degree of proof required
for a successful prosecution under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

More recently, in Escolano v. People,30  the Court held that the petitioner's act of
shouting invectives against private complainants does not constitute child abuse
since petitioner had no intent to debase the intrinsic dignity of the child. The Court
opined that petitioner's acts therein were done in the heat of anger because sachets
of ketchup were thrown at her by the minors involved. As such, the Court held that
the petitioner was only guilty of other light threats under the RPC.

On the other hand, in Lucido v. People,31 the petitioner maltreated an eight-year old

child through numerous and repeated acts of strangulation, pinching, and beating
causing the said child to limp. The Court then held that these acts of abuse were
intrinsically cruel and excessive because these impair the child's dignity and worth
as a human being and infringe upon the child's right to grow up in a safe,
wholesome, and harmonious environment.

Prosecution failed to prove intent

to debase, degrade or demean.

In this case, the Court finds that the prosecution did not present any iota of
evidence to show petitioner's intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth of the child victim. The records do not show that petitioner's act of hitting the
victims had been intended to place the latter in an embarrassing, shameful, and
demeaning situation. There was no indication that petitioner had any specific intent
to humiliate and degrade AAA and BBB.

On the contrary, the Court finds that petitioner inflicted the injuries in the heat of
argument. AAA and BBB claim that it was petitioner's group that first annoyed the
former's group; while petitioner claims that it was AAA and BBB's group that
initiated the shouting match. Nevertheless, it is clear that the altercation between
AAA, BBB, and petitioner only occurred when their groups met on the street without
any prior confrontation.

As observed in the cases of Bongalon, Jabalde, and Escolano,  when the infliction of

physical injuries against a minor is done at the spur of the moment, it is imperative
for the prosecution to prove a specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the
intrinsic worth of the child; otherwise, the accused cannot be convicted under Sec.
10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

Verily, as the prosecution in this case failed to specify any intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of AAA and BBB, petitioner cannot be held
criminally liable under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.

Petitioner committed the crime

of slight physical injuries.
Even though there was no intent to debase, degrade or demean, the Court affirms
the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner struck AAA with a stone on his
shoulder and hit BBB, causing physical injuries. While there may be some minor
inconsistencies in the exact location of the injuries based on the testimonies of AAA
and BBB and the medical findings of Dr. Castaños, it was established that petitioner
assaulted AAA and BBB. Petitioner even admitted that he swung a bamboo stick
towards AAA and BBB in the altercation.

In Criminal Case No. 4877-R, petitioner is found guilty of slight physical injuries
under the RPC for assaulting AAA. The prosecution was not able to present any
evidence of actual incapacity of AAA for labor or of a required medical attendance
as a result; nor was there proof as to the period of AAA's incapacity for labor or of a
required medical attendance. Nevertheless, under Art. 266 of the RPC, an offender
may still commit slight physical injury even if the inflicted injuries did not require
medical assistance or there was no proof of the victim's incapacity.

On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 4878-R, the CA found that BBB was no
longer a minor on the date of the incident on October 31, 2004, because he was
already eighteen (18) years old. However, the CA's finding is incorrect. BBB's
Certificate of Live Birth32 shows that he was born on September 21, 1987. Thus, he
was a minor being only seventeen (17) years, one (1) month, and ten (10) days old
at the time of the incident.

Nonetheless, even if BBB was still a minor, the Court affirms that petitioner is guilty
of the crime of slight physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 4878-R because the
prosecution failed to prove the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth of the child. Petitioner's act of hitting BBB resulted in the latter's
injuries requiring medical attendance for one (1) to nine (9) days, which is within
the definition of slight physical injuries.

The crime of slight physical injuries is punishable under Article 266 of the RPC as
amended by R.A. No. 10951,33 to wit:

Section 61. Article 266 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment.— The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:

1. By arresto menor  when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one (1) day to nine (9) days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period.

2. By arresto menor  or a fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00)

and censure when the offender has caused physical injuries which do not prevent
the offended party from engaging in his habitual work nor require medical
assistance.

3. By arresto menor  in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) when the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing
any injury.

Accordingly, in Criminal Case Nos. 4877-R and 4878-R, petitioner committed two
(2) counts of slight physical injuries. Thus, he is sentenced to suffer the straight
penalty of arresto menor of twenty (20) days for each count.

The award of damages

Under par. (1), Art. 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in a
criminal offense resulting in physical injuries. Moral damages compensate for the
mental anguish, serious anxiety, and moral shock suffered by the victim and his
family as being a proximate result of the wrongful act. An award requires no proof
of pecuniary loss. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, an award of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) moral damages is appropriate for less serious, as well as slight
physical injuries.34 In this case, the CA awarded P20,000.00 as moral damages.
However, petitioner only committed slight physical injuries against AAA and BBB.
Thus, the award of moral damages to AAA and BBB must be reduced to
P5,000.00.35

On the other hand, temperate or moderate damages, which are more than nominal
but less than actual or compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court
finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered, but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty. 36 As such, its award is premised on the
fact that actual damages could have been recovered were it not for the fact that the
precise amount of damages could not be accurately ascertained. In other words, if
a party-claimant had not suffered any damages, no damages, either actual nor
temperate, are recoverable.37

In this case, the CA simply awarded temperate damages to BBB because he

suffered pecuniary loss for the treatment of his injuries, although the actual amount
could not be determined. However, there was no discussion on the facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged pecuniary loss. BBB neither asserted that he
suffered any pecuniary loss nor any kind of loss of earning capacity as to justify the
temperate damages awarded by the CA. As such, the Court deletes the award of
P20,000.00 as temperate damages for lack of factual basis. 38

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The February 9, 2016

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 35518
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that petitioner Jeffrey Calaoagan
is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of Slight
Physical Injuries under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal Code. He
is SENTENCED to suffer the penalty of 20 days of arresto menor for each count
and to pay AAA and BBB the amount of P5,000.00 each as moral damages for each
count, with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum  from the
finality of judgment until full payment.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Congress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Ninth Congress

Republic Act No. 7610

June 17, 1992

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE AND SPECIAL

PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

ARTICLE I

Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act.”

Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared to be the policy
of the State to provide special protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial their development; provide
sanctions for their commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and
crisis intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall
intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or
custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian,
teacher or person having care and custody of the same.

It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened or
endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and normal development
and over which they have no control.

The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions concerning
them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call for
Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the Child. Every effort
shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful
and happy life.

Section 3. Definition of Terms.

(a) “Children” refers to person below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to
fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition;

(b) “Child abuse” refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
any of the following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;

(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;

(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter;

(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

(c) “Circumstances which gravely threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of
children” include, but are not limited to, the following;

(1) Being in a community where there is armed conflict or being affected by armed conflict-
related activities;

(2) Working under conditions hazardous to life, safety and normal which unduly interfere with
their normal development;

(3) Living in or fending for themselves in the streets of urban or rural areas without the care of
parents or a guardian or basic services needed for a good quality of life;

(4) Being a member of a indigenous cultural community and/or living under conditions of
extreme poverty or in an area which is underdeveloped and/or lacks or has inadequate access to
basic services needed for a good quality of life;

(5) Being a victim of a man-made or natural disaster or calamity; or

(6) Circumstances analogous to those above stated which endanger the life, safety or normal
development of children.

(d) “Comprehensive program against child abuse, exploitation and discrimination” refers to the
coordinated program of services and facilities to protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual abuse;

(2) Child trafficking;

(3) Obscene publications and indecent shows;

(4) Other acts of abuses; and

(5) Circumstances which threaten or endanger the survival and normal development of children.

ARTICLE II

Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination

Section 4. Formulation of the Program. There shall be a comprehensive program to be

formulated, by the Department of Justice and the Department of Social Welfare and
Development in coordination with other government agencies and private sector concerned,
within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children against child prostitution
and other sexual abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of
abuse; and circumstances which endanger child survival and normal development.

ARTICLE III

Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
upon the following:

(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are
not limited to, the following:

(1) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute;

(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral

advertisements or other similar means;

(3) Taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute;

(4) Threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or

(5) Giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution.

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited
in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape
and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious
conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and

(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the
establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of
entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to
the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment.

Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. There is an attempt to commit child

prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a
child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel,
motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other
hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe
that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof
when any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic,
health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that
prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the
principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the
proper case, under the Revised Penal Code.

ARTICLE IV

Child Trafficking

Section 7. Child Trafficking. Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children
including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other
consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age.

Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. – There is an attempt to commit child

trafficking under Section 7 of this Act:

(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefore and without
clearance issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or
justification from the child’s parents or legal guardian;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples
to bear children for the purpose of child trafficking; or

(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or
any other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or

(e) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals,
clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the
purpose of child trafficking.

A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section
7 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under
this Act.

ARTICLE V

Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows

Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows. Any person who shall hire, employ, use,
persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows,
whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell or
distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prison mayor in its medium period.

If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age,
the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall
cause and/or allow such child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act,
movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium period.

ARTICLE VI

Other Acts of Abuse

Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development.

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or
who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint,
discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or
similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any
person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond
recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or
legal duty.

(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to
keep or have in his company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less than Forty thousand pesos
(P40,000); Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be an ascendant, stepparent or
guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental authority over the
minor.

(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private
place of accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential
places, who allows any person to take along with him to such place or places any minor herein
described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less
than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of the license to operate such a place or
establishment.

(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to;

(1) Beg or use begging as a means of living;

(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug trafficking or pushing; or

(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua.

For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Articles 248,
249, 262, paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and serious physical
injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of
lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and white slave
trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law when the victim is
under twelve (12) years age.

The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.

ARTICLE VII

Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises

Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct
Activities Constituting Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene
Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other Acts of Abuse. – All establishments and enterprises
which promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene
publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be immediately closed and their
authority or license to operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof
being prosecuted under this Act and/or the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A
sign with the words “off limits” shall be conspicuously displayed outside the establishments or
enterprises by the Department of Social Welfare and Development for such period which shall
not be less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine. The unauthorized removal of
such sign shall be punishable by prision correccional.

An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual
abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse if the
acts constituting the same occur in the premises of said establishment under this Act or in
violation of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a sauna, travel agency,
or recruitment agency which: promotes the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign
tourists; exhibits children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child masseurs for adults of the
same or opposite sex and said services include any lascivious conduct with the customers; or
solicits children or activities constituting the aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have
committed the acts penalized herein.

ARTICLE VIII

Working Children

Section 12. Employment of Children. Children below fifteen (15) years of age may be
employed except:

(1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and
where only members of the employer’s family are employed: Provided, however, That his
employment neither endangers his life, safety and health and morals, nor impairs his normal
development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian shall provide the said minor
child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or

(2) When a child’s employment or participation in public & entertainment or information

through cinema, theater, radio or television is essential: Provided, The employment contract
concluded by the child’s parent or guardian, with the express agreement of the child concerned,
if possible, and the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, That the
following requirements in all instances are strictly complied with:

(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety and morals of the child;

(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent the child’s exploitation or discrimination
taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and the duration and arrangement of
working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and supervision of
competent authorities, a continuing program for training and skill acquisition of the child.

In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer shall first
secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall ensure observance of the above requirement.

The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the
effective implementation of this Section.

Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children. The Department of Education,

Culture and Sports shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal education program
aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of working children who
have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such course design shall
integrate the learning process deemed most effective under given circumstances.

Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. No

person shall employ child models in all commercials or advertisements promoting alcoholic
beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and violence.

Section 15. Duty of Employer. Every employer shall comply with the duties provided for in
Articles 108 and 109 of Presidential Decree No. 603.

Section 16. Penalties. – Any person who shall violate any provision of this Article shall suffer
the penalty of a fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more than
three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of repeated
violations of the provisions of this Article, the offender’s license to operate shall be revoked.

ARTICLE IX

Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities

Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. In addition to the rights guaranteed to
children under this Act and other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural communities
shall be entitled to protection, survival and development consistent with the customs and
traditions of their respective communities.

Section 18. System of and Access to Education. The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports shall develop and institute an alternative system of education for children of indigenous
cultural communities which culture-specific and relevant to the needs of and the existing
situation in their communities. The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall also
accredit and support non-formal but functional indigenous educational programs conducted by
non-government organizations in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. The delivery of basic social services in health and nutrition
to children of indigenous cultural communities shall be given priority by all government
agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health institution shall ensure that children of
indigenous cultural communities are given equal attention. In the provision of health and
nutrition services to children of indigenous cultural communities, indigenous health practices
shall be respected and recognized.

Section 20. Discrimination. Children of indigenous cultural communities shall not be subjected

to any and all forms of discrimination.

Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000).

Section 21. Participation. Indigenous cultural communities, through their duly-designated or

appointed representatives shall be involved in planning, decision-making implementation, and
evaluation of all government programs affecting children of indigenous cultural communities.
Indigenous institution shall also be recognized and respected.

ARTICLE X

Children in Situations of Armed Conflict

Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. Children are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It
shall be the responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned to resolve armed conflicts
in order to promote the goal of children as zones of peace. To attain this objective, the following
policies shall be observed.

(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall be entitled to special respect. They shall be
protected from any form of threat, assault, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment;

(b) Children shall not be recruited to become members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of
its civilian units or other armed groups, nor be allowed to take part in the fighting, or used as
guides, couriers, or spies;

(c) Delivery of basic social services such as education, primary health and emergency relief
services shall be kept unhampered;

(d) The safety and protection of those who provide services including those involved in fact-
finding missions from both government and non-government institutions shall be ensured. They
shall not be subjected to undue harassment in the performance of their work;

(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals and rural health units shall not be utilized for
military purposes such as command posts, barracks, detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the reunion of families temporarily separated
due to armed conflict.

Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict. Children shall be given priority
during evacuation as a result of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be
tapped to look after the safety and well-being of children during evacuation operations. Measures
shall be taken to ensure that children evacuated are accompanied by persons responsible for their
safety and well-being.

Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. Whenever possible, members of the same
family shall be housed in the same premises and given separate accommodation from other
evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal family life. In places of temporary shelter,
expectant and nursing mothers and children shall be given additional food in proportion to their
physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children shall be given opportunities for physical
exercise, sports and outdoor games.

Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons Related to Armed Conflict. Any child
who has been arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant, courier, guide or
spy is entitled to the following rights;

(a) Separate detention from adults except where families are accommodated as family units;

(b) Immediate free legal assistance;

(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or guardians of the child; and

(d) Release of the child on recognizance within twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or any responsible member of the community as
determined by the court.

If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the court should find that the aforesaid
child committed the acts charged against him, the court shall determine the imposable penalty,
including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment
of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such child to the
custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any training
institution operated by the Government, or duly-licensed agencies or any other responsible
person, until he has had reached eighteen (18) years of age or, for a shorter period as the court
may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he
has been committed.

The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other
officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can appeal from the order of the court in the
same manner as appeals in criminal cases.

Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in Situations of Armed Conflict. The

chairman of the barangay affected by the armed conflict shall submit the names of children
residing in said barangay to the municipal social welfare and development officer within twenty-
four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed conflict.

ARTICLE XI

Remedial Procedures

Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. Complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed
against the children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following:

(a) Offended party;

(b) Parents or guardians;

(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;

(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;

(f) Barangay chairman; or

(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred.

Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. The offended party shall be immediately placed
under the protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development pursuant to
Executive Order No. 56, series of 1986. In the regular performance of this function, the officer of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any administrative, civil
or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 603.

Section 29. Confidentiality. At the instance of the offended party, his name may be withheld
from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.

It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and
director of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of
any case of violation of this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of the
offended party.
Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. Cases involving violations of this Act shall be heard in
the chambers of the judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile and Domestic
Court.

Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas
corpus, election cases, and cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by Republic
Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the hearing or disposition of cases involving
violations of this Act.

ARTICLE XII

Common Penal Provisions

Section 31. Common Penal Provisions.

(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender
has been previously convicted under this Act;

(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or association, the officer or employee
thereof who is responsible for the violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty imposed in its
maximum period;

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is
an ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to
operate or its license has expired or has been revoked;

(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be deported immediately after service of sentence
and forever barred from entry to the country;

(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is
a public officer or employee: Provided, however, That if the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or reclusion temporal, then the penalty of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty imposed is prision
correccional or arresto mayor, the penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and

(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be imposed and administered as a cash fund by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each
child victim, or any immediate member of his family if the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.

ARTICLE XIII

Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. Unless otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of
Justice, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and Development, shall
promulgate rules and regulations of the effective implementation of this Act.

Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.

Section 33. Appropriations. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act is
hereby authorized to be appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year following its
enactment into law and thereafter.

Section 34. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force and
effect.

Section 35. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the provisions of this
Acts are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 36. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in
at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: June 17, 1992.

This entry was posted under Legislature, Republic Acts. Bookmark the permalink.

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Twelfth Congress

Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two
thousand three.

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9231]

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD

LABOR AND AFFORDING STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING CHILD,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7610, AS AMENDED,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST
CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION ACT”

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7610, as amended, otherwise known as the
“Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act”, is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. – It is hereby declared to be the

policy of the State to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development including child labor and its worst forms; provide sanctions for their
commission and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and discrimination. The State shall
intervene on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having
care or custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against abuse,
exploitation and discrimination or when such acts against the child are committed by the
said parent, guardian, teacher or person having care and custody of the same.

“It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate children gravely threatened
or endangered by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival and normal
development and over which they have no control.

“The best interests of children shall be the paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies, consistent with the
principle of First Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare of children and
enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.”

SECTION 2. Section 12 of the same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended to

read as follows:

“SEC. 12. Employment of Children. – Children below fifteen (15) years of age shall not
be employed except:

“1) When a child works directly under the sole responsibility of his/her parents or legal
guardian and where only members of his/her family are employed: Provided, however,
That his/her employment neither endangers his/her life, safety, health, and morals, nor
impairs his/her normal development: Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian
shall provide the said child with the prescribed primary and/or secondary education; or

“2) Where a child’s employment or participation in public entertainment or information

through cinema, theater, radio, television or other forms of media is essential: Provided,
That the employment contract is concluded by the child’s parents or legal guardian, with
the express agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and the approval of the
Department of Labor and Employment: Provided, further, That the following
requirements in all instances are strictly complied with:
“(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health, safety, morals and normal
development of the child;

“(b) The employer shall institute measures to prevent the child’s exploitation or
discrimination taking into account the system and level of remuneration, and the
duration and arrangement of working time; and

“(c) The employer shall formulate and implement, subject to the approval and
supervision of competent authorities, a continuing program for training and skills
acquisition of the child.

“In the above-exceptional cases where any such child may be employed, the employer
shall first secure, before engaging such child, a work permit from the Department of
Labor and Employment which shall ensure observance of the above requirements.

“For purposes of this Article, the term “child” shall apply to all persons under eighteen
(18) years of age.”

SECTION 3. The same Act, as amended, is hereby further amended by adding new
sections to be denominated as Sections 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, and 12-D to read as follows:

“SEC. 12-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. – Under the exceptions provided in

Section 12 of this Act, as amended:

“(1) A child below fifteen (15) years of age may be allowed to work for not more than
twenty (20) hours a week: Provided, That the work shall not be more than four (4) hours
at any given day;

“(2) A child fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall not be allowed to work
for more than eight (8) hours a day, and in no case beyond forty (40) hours a week;

“(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be allowed to work between eight
o’clock in the evening and six o’clock in the morning of the following day and no child
fifteen (15) years of age but below eighteen (18) shall be allowed to work between ten
o’clock in the evening and six o’clock in the morning of the following day.”

“SEC. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and Administration of the Working Child’s Income. –

The wages, salaries, earnings and other income of the working child shall belong to
him/her in ownership and shall be set aside primarily for his/her support, education or
skills acquisition and secondarily to the collective needs of the family: Provided, That
not more than twenty percent (20%) of the child’s income may be used for the collective
needs of the family.

“The income of the working child and/or the property acquired through the work of the
child shall be administered by both parents. In the absence or incapacity of either of the
parents, the other parent shall administer the same. In case both parents are absent or
incapacitated, the order of preference on parental authority as provided for under the
Family Code shall apply.

“SEC. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the Working Child’s Income. – The parent or
legal guardian of a working child below eighteen (18) years of age shall set up a trust
fund for at least thirty percent (30%) of the earnings of the child whose wages and
salaries from work and other income amount to at least two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00) annually, for which he/she shall render a semi-annual accounting of the
fund to the Department of Labor and Employment, in compliance with the provisions of
this Act. The child shall have full control over the trust fund upon reaching the age of
majority.

“SEC. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of Child Labor. – No child shall be

engaged in the worst forms of child labor. The phrase “worst forms of child labor” shall
refer to any of the following:

“(1) All forms of slavery, as defined under the “Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003”,
or practices similar to slavery such as sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage and
serfdom and forced or compulsory labor, including recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict; or

“(2) The use, procuring, offering or exposing of a child for prostitution, for the production
of pornography or for pornographic performances; or

“(3) The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal or illicit activities, including the
production and trafficking of dangerous drugs and volatile substances prohibited under
existing laws; or

“(4) Work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is
hazardous or likely to be harmful to the health, safety or morals of children, such that it:

“a) Debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being; or

“b) Exposes the child to physical, emotional or sexual abuse, or is found to be highly
stressful psychologically or may prejudice morals; or

“c) Is performed underground, underwater or at dangerous heights; or

“d) Involves the use of dangerous machinery, equipment and tools such as power-
driven or explosive power-actuated tools; or

“e) Exposes the child to physical danger such as, but not limited to the dangerous feats
of balancing, physical strength or contortion, or which requires the manual transport of
heavy loads; or
“f) Is performed in an unhealthy environment exposing the child to hazardous working
conditions, elements, substances, co-agents or processes involving ionizing, radiation,
fire, flammable substances, noxious components and the like, or to extreme
temperatures, noise levels, or vibrations; or

“g) Is performed under particularly difficult conditions; or

“h) Exposes the child to biological agents such as bacteria, fungi, viruses, protozoans,
nematodes and other parasites; or

“i) Involves the manufacture or handling of explosives and other pyrotechnic products.”

SECTION 4. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 13. Access to Education and Training for Working Children. – “a) No child shall
be deprived of formal or non-formal education. In all cases of employment allowed in
this Act, the employer shall provide a working child with access to at least primary and
secondary education.

“b) To ensure and guarantee the access of the working child to education and training,
the Department of Education (DEPED) shall: (1) formulate, promulgate, and implement
relevant and effective course designs and educational programs; (2) conduct the
necessary training for the implementation of the appropriate curriculum for the purpose;
(3) ensure the availability of the needed educational facilities and materials; and (4)
conduct continuing research and development program for the necessary and relevant
alternative education of the working child.

“c) The DEPED shall promulgate a course design under its non-formal education
program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of working
children who have not undergone or finished elementary or secondary education. Such
course design shall integrate the learning process deemed most effective under given
circumstances.”

SECTION 5. Section 14 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in Certain Advertisements. – No

child shall be employed as a model in any advertisement directly or indirectly promoting
alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts, gambling or any
form of violence or pornography.”

SECTION 6. Section 16 of the same Act, is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 16. Penal Provisions. –

“a) Any employer who violates Sections 12, 12-A, and Section 14 of this Act, as
amended, shall be penalized by imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) but not more than
Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) or both at the discretion of the court.

“b) Any person who violates the provision of Section 12-D of this Act or the employer of
the subcontractor who employs, or the one who facilitates the employment of a child in
hazardous work, shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00), or
imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, or
both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

“c) Any person who violates Sections 12-D(1) and 12-D(2) shall be prosecuted and
penalized in accordance with the penalty provided for by R.A. 9208 otherwise known as
the “Anti-trafficking in Persons Act of 2003”: Provided, That such penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.

“d) Any person who violates Section 12-D(3) shall be prosecuted and penalized in
accordance with R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002”: Provided, That such penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.

“e) If a corporation commits any of the violations aforecited, the board of

directors/trustees and officers, which include the president, treasurer and secretary of
the said corporation who participated in or knowingly allowed the violation, shall be
penalized accordingly as provided for under this Section.

“f) Parents, biological or by legal fiction, and legal guardians found to be violating
Sections 12, 12-A, 12-B and 12-C of this Act shall pay a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) but not more than One hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00), or be required to render community service for not less than thirty (30)
days but not more than one (1) year, or both such fine and community service at the
discretion of the court: Provided, That the maximum length of community service shall
be imposed on parents or legal guardians who have violated the provisions of this Act
three (3) times: Provided, further, That in addition to the community service, the penalty
of imprisonment of thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or both at the
discretion of the court, shall be imposed on the parents or legal guardians who have
violated the provisions of this Act more than three (3) times.

“g) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his/her duly authorized representative
may, after due notice and hearing, order the closure of any business firm or
establishment found to have violated any of the provisions of this Act more than three
(3) times. He/she shall likewise order the immediate closure of such firm or
establishment if:

“(1) The violation of any provision of this Act has resulted in the death, insanity or
serious physical injury of a child employed in such establishment; or
“(2) Such firm or establishment is engaged or employed in prostitution or in obscene or
lewd shows.

“h) In case of such closure, the employer shall be required to pay the employee(s) the
separation pay and other monetary benefits provided for by law.”

SECTION 7. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding a new section to be
denominated as Section 16-A, to read as follows:

“SEC. 16-A. Trust Fund from Fines and Penalties. – The fine imposed by the court shall
be treated as a Trust Fund, administered by the Department of Labor and Employment
and disbursed exclusively for the needs, including the costs of rehabilitation and
reintegration into the mainstream of society of the working children who are victims of
the violations of this Act, and for the programs and projects that will prevent acts of child
labor.”

SECTION 8. Section 27 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

“SEC. 27. Who May File a Complaint. – Complaints on cases of unlawful acts

committed against children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following:

“(a) Offended party;

“(b) Parents or guardians;

“(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity;

“(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution;

“(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development;

“(f) Barangay chairman of the place where the violation occurred, where the child is
residing or employed; or

“(g) At least three (3) concerned, responsible citizens where the violation occurred.”

SECTION 9. The same Act is hereby further amended by adding new sections to
Section 16 to be denominated as Sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C to read as follows:

“SEC. 16-A. Jurisdiction. – The family courts shall have original jurisdiction over all
cases involving offenses punishable under this Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces
where there are no family courts yet, the regional trial courts and the municipal trial
courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction depending on the penalties prescribed for the
offense charged.
“The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of filing.

“If the preliminary investigation establishes a prima facie case, then the corresponding
information shall be filed in court within forty eight (48) hours from the termination of the
investigation.

“Trial of cases under this Act shall be terminated by the court not later than ninety (90)
days from the date of filing of information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered
within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case.

“SEC. 16-B. Exemptions from Filing Fees. – When the victim of child labor institutes a
separate civil action for the recovery of civil damages, he/she shall be exempt from
payment of filing fees.

“SEC. 16-C. Access to Immediate Legal, Medical and Psycho-Social Services. – The

working child shall have the right to free legal, medical and psycho-social services to be
provided by the State.”

SECTION 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The Secretary of Labor and

Employment, in coordination with the Committees on Labor and Employment of both
Houses of Congress, shall issue the necessary Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) to effectively implement the provisions of this Act, in consultation with concerned
public and private sectors, within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act.

Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.

SECTION 11. Separability Clause. – If any provision of this Act is declared invalid or

unconstitutional, the validity of the remaining provisions hereof shall remain in full force
and effect.

SECTION 12. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, or rules inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 13. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its
complete publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.

Approved,

REPUBLIC ACT No. 8049

AN ACT REGULATING HAZING AND OTHER FORMS OF INITIATION RITES IN FRATERNITIES,

SORORITIES, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES THEREFOR
Section 1. Hazing, as used in this Act, is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission
into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant
in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and
other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or
injury.

The term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine
National Police, Philippine Military Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military
Training and Citizen's Army Training. The physical, mental and psychological testing and training
procedure and practices to determine and enhance the physical, mental and psychological fitness of
prospective regular members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police as approved ny the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director General of the
Philippine National Police shall not be considered as hazing for the purposes of this Act.

Section 2. No hazing or initiation rites in any form or manner by a fraternity, sorority or organization
shall be allowed without prior written notice to the school authorities or head of organization seven
(7) days before the conduct of such initiation. The written notice shall indicate the period of the
initiation activities which shall not exceed three (3) days, shall include the names of those to be
subjected to such activities, and shall further contain an undertaking that no physical violence be
employed by anybody during such initiation rites.

Section 3. The head of the school or organization or their representatives must assign at least two
(2) representatives of the school or organization, as the case may be, to be present during the
initiation. It is the duty of such representative to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be
inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Section 4. If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical
injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization
who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. The person or
persons who participated in the hazing shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) if death, rape, sodomy or mutilation
results there from.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period (17 years, 4 months and 1 day to
20 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become insane, imbecile, impotent
or blind.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months and one day
to 17 years and 4 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall have lost the use
of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a hand, a foot, an arm
or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member shall have become incapacitated for
the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period (12 years and one day to 14 years
and 8 months) if in consequence of the hazing the victim shall become deformed or shall
have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost the use thereof, or shall have been ill
or incapacitated for the performance on the activity or work in which he was habitually
engaged for a period of more than ninety (90) days.
 5. The penalty of prison mayor in its maximum period (10 years and one day to 12 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance
on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than thirty
(30) days.

6. The penalty of prison mayor in its medium period (8 years and one day to 10 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance
on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged for a period of ten (10) days or
more, or that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.

7. The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum period (6 years and one day to 8 years) if in
consequence of the hazing the victim shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance
on the activity or work in which he was habitually engaged from one (1) to nine (9) days, or
that the injury sustained shall require medical assistance for the same period.

8. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum period (4 years, 2 months and one day
to 6 years) if in consequence of the hazing the victim sustained physical injuries which do not
prevent him from engaging in his habitual activity or work nor require medical attendance.

The responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or citizen's army training organization,
may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the person or the persons charged under
this provision even before their conviction. The maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed
in any of the following instances:

(a) when the recruitment is accompanied by force, violence, threat, intimidation or deceit on
the person of the recruit who refuses to join;

(b) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant initially consents to join but upon learning that
hazing will be committed on his person, is prevented from quitting;

(c) when the recruit, neophyte or applicant having undergone hazing is prevented from
reporting the unlawful act to his parents or guardians, to the proper school authorities, or to
the police authorities, through force, violence, threat or intimidation;

(d) when the hazing is committed outside of the school or institution; or

(e) when the victim is below twelve (12) years of age at the time of the hazing.

The owner of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as an accomplice, when he has
actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same
from occurring. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or members of the fraternity,
group, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals when they have actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from
occurring.

The school authorities including faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual
knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be
punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the perpetrators.

The officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization, group, fraternity or sorority who actually
planned the hazing although not present when the acts constituting the hazing were committed shall
be liable as principals. A fraternity or sorority's adviser who is present when the acts constituting the
hazing were committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring shall be liable
as principal.

The presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as
principal unless he prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein.

Any person charged under this provision shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that
there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

This section shall apply to the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a
corporation engaged in hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner provided herein.

Section 5. If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or
provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 6. All laws, orders, rules or regulations which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are hereby amended or repealed accordingly.

Section 7. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) calendar days after its publication in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.

Seventeenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fourth day of July, two thousand seventeen.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 11053

"An Act Prohibiting Hazing and Regulating Other Forms of Initiation Rites of Fraternities,
Sororities, and Other Organizations, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 8049, Entitled "An Act Regulating Hazing and
Other Forms of Initiation Rites in Fraternities Sororities, and Organizations and Providing
Penalties Therefor."

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:

Section 1. A new section to be denomintaed as Section 1 is hereby inserted in Republic Act No.
8049, to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as sthe "Anti-Hazing Act of 2018".

Section 2. Section 1 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:

"(a) Hazing refers to any act that results in physical or psychological suffering, harm, or injury
inflicted on a recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member as part of an initiation rite or practice made as
a prerequisite for admission or a requirement for continuing membership in a fraternity, sorority, or
organization including, but not limited to paddling, whipping, beating, branding, forced calisthenics,
exposure to the weather, forced consumption of any food, liquor, beverage, drug or other substance,
or any other brutal treatment or forced physical activity which is likely to adversely affect the physical
and psychological health of such recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member. This shall also include any
activity, intentionally made or otherwise, by one person alone or acting with others, that tends to
humiliate or embarrass, degrade, abuse, or endanger, by requiring a recruit, neophyte, applicant, or
member to do menial, silly, or foolish tasks.

"(b) Initiation or Initiation Rites refer to ceremonies, practices, rituals, or other acts, weather formal or
informal, that a person must perform or take part in order to be accepted into fraternity, sorority,
organization as a full-fledged member. It includes ceremonies practices , rituals, and other acts in all
stages of membership in a fraternity, sorority, or organization.

"(c) Organization refers to an organized body of people which includes, but it is not limited to, any
club, association, group, fraternity, and sorority. This term shall include the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP), the Philippine Miltary Academy (PMA), the
Philippine National Police Academy (PNPA), and other similar uniformed service learning
institutions.

"(d) Schools refer to colleges, universities, and other educational institutions."

Section 3. A new section to be denominated as Section 3 is hereby inserted in the same Act to
readas follows:

Sec. 3. Prohibition on Hazing. - All forms of hazing shall be prohibited in fraternities, sororities, and
organizations in schools, including citizens' military training and citizens' army training. This
prohibition shall likewise apply to all other fraternities, sororities, and organizations that are not
school-based, such as community-based and other similar fraternities, sororities and
organizations: Provide, That the physical, mental, and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental, and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP
as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and National Police Commission, duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and Director General of the PNP, shall not be
considered as hazing purposes of this Act: Provided, further, That the exemption provided herein
shall likewise apply to similar procedures and practices approved by the respective heads of other
uniformed learning institutions as to their prospective members, nor shall this provision apply to any
customary athletic events or other similar contests or competitions or any activity or conduct that
furthers a legal and legitimate objective, subject to prior submission of a medical clearance or
certificate.

"In no case shall hazing be made a requirement for employment in any business or corporation."

Section 4. Section 2 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 4. Regulation of Schoo-Based Initiation Rites. Only initiation rites or practices that do not
constitute hazing shall be allowed: Provided, That:

"(a) A written application to conduct initiation rites shall be made to the proper authorities of the
school not later than seven (7) days prior to scheduled initiation date;

"(b) The written application shall indicate the place and date of the initiation rites and the names of
the recruits, neophytes, or applicants to be initiated and the manner by which they will conduct the
initiation rites;
"(d) The initiation rites shall not last more than three (3) days;

"(e) The application shall contain the names of the incumbent officers of the fraternity, sorority, or
organization and any person or persons who will take charge in the conduct of the initiation rites;

"(f) The application shall be under oath with a declaration that it has been posted in the official
school bulletin board, the bulletin board of the office of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, and
two(2) other conspicuous places in the school or in the premises of the organization; and

"(g) The application shall be posted from the time of submission of the written notice to the school
authorities or head of organization and shall only be removed from its posting three (3) days after the
conduct of the initiation rites.

"The school, fraternity, sorority, or organization shall provide for their respective bulletin boards for
purposes of this section. 1âwphi1

"Guidelines for the approval or denial of the application to conduct initiation rites by a registered
fraternity, sorority, organization shall be promulgated by the appropriate school official not later than
sixty (60) days after the approval of this Act. The appropriate school authorities shall have the
obligation to disapproved the application to conduct initiation rites that do not conform with any of the
requirements of this section, and in unequivocal terms in a formal advice to the fraternity sorority, or
organization concerned, taking into consideration the safety and security of participants in the
activity.

"School officials shall have the authority to impose after due notice and summary hearing,
disciplinary sanctions, in accordance with the school's guidelines and regulations on the matter,
which shall include, but shall not be limited to, reprimand, suspension, exclusion, or expulsion, to the
head and all other officers of the fraternity, sorority and organization which conducts an initiation
without first securing the necessary approval of the school as required under this section. All
members of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, who participated in the unauthorized initiation
rites, even if no hazing was conducted, shall also be punished accordingly.

"In case the written application for the conduct of initiation rites contains false or inaccurate
information, appropriate disciplinary sanctions in accordance with the school's guidelines and
regulations on the matter ranging from reprimand to expulsion shall be imposed, after due notice and
summary hearing, against the person who prepared the application or supplied the false and
inaccurate information and to the head and other officers of the fraternity, sorority, or organization
concerned."

Section 5. Section 3 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 5. Monitoring of Initiation Rites.- The head of the school or an authorized representative must
assign at least two (2) representatives of the school to be present during the initiation. It is the duty
of the school representatives to see to it that no hazing is conducted during the initiation rites and to
document the entire proceedings. Thereafter, said representatives who were present during the
initiation shall make a report of the initiation rites to the appropriate officials of the school regarding
the conduct of the said initiation: Provided, That if hazing is still committed despite their presence, no
liability shall attach to them unless it is proven that they failed to perform an overt act to prevent or
stop the commission thereof."
Section 6. A new section to be denominated as Section 6 is hereby inserted in the same Act to read
as follows:

Sec. 6. Registration of Fraternities, Sororities and Other Organizations. - All existing fraternities
sororities, and other organizations otherwise not created or organized by the school but has existing
members who are students or plans to recruit students to be its member shall be required to register
with the proper school authorities before it conducts activities whether on or off-campus, including
recruitment of members.

"A newly established fraternity, sorority, or organization in a school shall immediately register with
proper school authorities during the semester or trimester in which it was established or
organized: Provided, That the new fraternity, sorority, or organization has complied with the
requirements prescribed by the school in establishing a fraternity, sorority, or organization has
complied with the requirements prescribed by the school in establishing a fraternity, sorority, or
organization: Provided, further, That schools shall promulgate their guidelines in the registration of
fraternities , sororities, and organizations within their jurisdiction not later than sixty (60) days from
the approval of this Act.

"Upon registration, all fraternities, sororities, or organizations shall submit a comprehensive list of
members, which shall be updated not later than thirty (30) days from the start of every semester or
trimester, depending on the academic calendar of the school.

"School official shall have the authority to impose, after due notice and summary hearings,
disciplinary penalties in accordance with the school's guidelines and regulations on the matter
including suspension to the head and other officers of the fraternity, sorority, or organization who fail
to register or update their roster of members as required under this section.

"Failure to comply with any of the requirements in this section shall result in the cacellation of the
registration of the fraternity, sorority, or organization."

Section 7. A new section to be denominated as Section 7 is hereby inserted in he same Act to read
as follows:

Sec. 7. Faculty Adviser. - Schools shall require all fraternities, sororities, or organizations, as a
condition to the grant of accreditation or registration, to submit the name or names of their respective
faculty adviser or advisers who must not be members of the respective fraternity, sorority, or
organization. The submission shall also include a written acceptance or consent on the part of the
selected faculty adviser or advisers.

"The faculty advisers shall be responsible for monitoring the activities of the fraternity, sorority, or
organization is established or registered.

"In case of violation of any of the provisions of this Act, it is presumed that the faculty adviser has
knowledge and consented to the commission of any of the unlawful acts stated therein."

Section 8. A new section to be denominated as Section 8 is hereby inserted in the same Act to be
read as follows:

Sec. 8. Role of Educational Institutions. - The responsibility of schools to exercises reasonable

supervision in loco parentis over the conduct of its students requires the diligence that prudent
parents would employ in the same circumstances when discriminating and protecting their children.
To this end, it shall be the duty of schools to take more proactive steps to protect its students from
the dangers of participating in activities that involve hazing.

"Schools shall implement an information dissemination campaign at the start of every semester or
trimester to provide adequate information to students and parents or guardians regarding the
consequences of conducting and participating in hazing.

"An orientation program relating to membership in a fraternity, sorority, or organization shall also be
conducted by schools at the start of every semester or trimester.

"Schools shall encourage fraternities, sororities, and organizations to engage in undertakings that
foster holistic personal growth and development and activities that contribute to solving relevant and
pressing issues of society."

Section 9. A new section to be denominated as Section 9 is hereby inserted in the same Act to read
as follows:

Sec. 9. Registration of Community-Based and Other Similar Fraternities, Sororities, or

Organizations. - All new and existing community-based fraternities, sororities, or organizations,
including their respective local chapters, shall register with the barangay, municipality, or city
wherein they are primarily based.

"Upon registration, all community-based fraternities, sororities, or organizations including their

respective local chapters, shall submit a comprehensive list of members and officers which shall be
updated yearly from the date of registration."

Section 10. A new section to be denominated as Section 10 is hereby inserted in the same Act to
read as follows:

"Sec. 10. Regulation of Initiation Rites for Community-Based Fraternities, Sororities, or

Organizations. - Only initiation rites or practices that do not constitute hazing shall be
allowed: Provided, That:

"(a) A written application to conduct the same shall be made to the punong barangay in the
barangay or municipal or city mayor in the municipality or city where the community-based fraternity,
sorority, or organization is based, not later than seven (7) days prior to the schedules initiation date;

"(b) The written initiation shall indicate the place and date of the initiation rites and the names of the
recruits, neophytes, or applicants to be initiated;

"(c) Such written application shall further contain an undertaking that no harm or any kind shall be
committed by anybody during the initiation rites;

"(d) A medical certificate of the recruit, neophyte, or applicant must be attached to the application to
ensure fitness to undergo initiation when it involves physical activity not failing under the definition of
hazingas used in this Act;

"(e) The initiation rites shall not last more than three (3) days;
"(f) The application shall contain the names of the incumbent officers of the community-based
fraternity, sorority, or organization and any person or persons who will take charge in the conduct of
initiation rites;

"(g) The application shall be under oath with a declaration that it has been posted on the official
bulletin board of the barangay hall or the municipal or city hall where the community-based fraternity,
sorority or organization is based, and the bulletin board of the office of the community-based
fraternity, sorority or organization; and

"(h) The application shall be posted from the time of submission of the written notice to the punong
barangay or municipal or city mayor and shall only be removed from its posting three (3) days after
the conduct of the initiation rites."

Section 11. A new section to be denominated as Section 11 is here inserted in the same Act to read
as follows:

Sec. 11. Monitoring of Initiation Rites of Community-Based and All Similar Fraternities, Sororities or
Organizations. - The punong barangay of the barangay or the municipal or city mayor of the
municipality or city where community-based fraternity, sorority or organization is based must assign
at least two (2) barangay or municipal or city officials to be present during the initiation and
document the entire proceedings. Thereafter, said representatives who are present during the
initiation shall make a report of the initiation rites to the punong barangay, or the municipal or the city
mayor regarding the conduct of the initiation: Provided, That if hazing is still committed despite their
presence, no liability shall attached to them unless it is proven that they failed to perform an overt act
prevent or stop the commission thereof."

Section 12. A new section to be denominated as Section 12 is hereby inserted in the same Act to
read as follows:

Sec. 12. Nullity of Waiver and Consent. - Any form of approval, consent, or agreement, whether
written or otherwise, or of an express waiver of the right to object to the initiation rite or proceeding
which consists of hazing, as defined in this Act, made by a recruit, neophyte, or applicant prior to an
initiation rite that involves inflicting physical or psychological suffering, harm, or injury, shall be void
and without any binding effect on the parties. 1âwphi1

"The defense that the recruit, neophyte, or applicant consented to being subjected to hazing shall
not be available to persons prosecuted under this Act."

Section 13. A new section to be denominated as Section 13 is hereby inserted in the same Act to
read as follows:

"Sec. 13 Administrative Sanctions. - The responsible officials of the school, the uniformed learning
institutions, the AFP or the PNP may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions, after due
notice and summary hearing, on the person or the persons charged under this Act even before their
conviction."

Section 14. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 14. Penalties. - The following penalties shall be imposed:

"(a) The penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of Three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon those who actually planned or participated in
the hazing if, as a consequence of the hazing, death, rape, sodomy, or mutilation
results therefrom;

"(b) The penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of Two million pesos

(P2,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon:

"(1) All persons who actually planned or participated in the conduct of the
hazing;

"(2) All officers of the fraternity, sorority, or organization who are actually
present during the hazing;

"(3) The adviser of a fraternity, sorority, or organization who is present when

the acts constituting the hazing were committed and failed to take action to
prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the
law enforcement authorities if such adviser or adviser or advisers can do so
without peril to their person or their family;

"(4) All former officers, nonresident members, or alumni of the fraternity,

sorority, or organization who are also present during the
hazing: Provided, That should the former officer, nonresident member, or
alumnus be a member of the Philippine Bar, such member shall immediately
be subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the Supreme Court pursuant to
its power to discipline members of the Philippine Bar: Provided, further, That
should the former officer, nonresident member, or alumnus belong to any
other profession subject to regulation by the Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC), such professional shall immediately be subjected to
disciplinary proceedings by the concerned Professional Regulatory Board,
the imposable penalty for which shall include, but is not limited to,
suspension for a period of not less than three (3) or revocation of the
professional license. A suspended or revoked professional license pursuant
to this section may be reinstated upon submission of affidavits from at least
three (3) disinterested persons, good moral certifications from different
unaffiliated and credible government, religious, and socio-civic organizations
and such other relevant evidence to show that the concerned professional
has become morally fit for readmission into the profession: Provided, That
said readmission into the profession shall be subject to the approval of the
respective Professional Regulatory Board;

"(5) Officers ir members of a fraternity, sorority, or organization who

knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be
present thereat; and

"(6) members of the fraternity, sorority, or organization who are present

during the hazing when they are intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol
or illegal drugs;

"(c) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period and a fine of One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon all persons who are present in the
conduct of the hazing;
 "(d) The penalty of reclusion temporal and fine of One million pesos (P1,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon former officers, nonresident member, alumni of the fraternity,
sorority, or organization who, after the commission of any of the prohibited acts
proscribed herein, will perform any act to hide, conceal, or otherwise hamper or
obstruct any investigation that will be conducted thereafter: Provided, That should the
former officer, nonresident member, or alumnus be a member of the Philippine Bar,
such member shall immediately be subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its power to discipline members of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, further, That should the former officer, nonresident members, or
alumnus belong to any other profession subject to regulation by the PRC, such
professional shall immediately be subjected to disciplinary proceedings by the
concerned Professional Regulatory Board, the imposable penalty for which shall
include, but is not limited to, suspension for a period of not less than three (3) years
or revocation of the professional license pursuant to this section may be reinstated
upon submission of affidavits from at least three (3) disinterested persons, good
moral certifications from different unaffiliated and credible government, religious, and
socio-civic organizations, and such other relevant evidence to show that the
concerned professional has become morally fit for readmission into the
profession: Provided, That said readmission into the profession shall be subject to
the approval of the respective Professional Regulatory Board."

"(e) The penalty of prision correcional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person who shall intimidate, threaten, force, or employ, or administer any form of
vexation against another person for the purpose of recruitment in joining or
promoting a particular fraternity, sorority, or organization. The perssistent and
repeated proposal or invitation made to a person who had twice refused to
participate or join the proposed fraternity, sorority, or organization, shall be prima
facie evidence of vexation for purposes of this section; and

"(f) A fine of One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on the school if the
fraternity, sorority, or organization filed a written application to conduct an initiation
which was subsequently approved by the school and hazing occurred during the
initiation rites or when no representatives from the school were present during the
initiation as provided under Section 5 of this Act: Provided, That if hazing has been
committed in circumvention of the provisions of this Act, it is incumbent upon school
officials to investigate motu propio and take an active role to ascertain factual events
and identity witnesses in order to determine the disciplinary sanctions it may impose,
as well as provide assistance to police authorities."

"The owner or lessee of the place where hazing is conducted shall be liable as principal and
penalized under paragraphs (a) or (b) of this section, when such owner or lessee has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from
occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the law enforcement authorities if they can do so
without peril to their person or their family. If the hazing is held in the home of one of the officers or
members of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, the parents shall be held liable as principals and
penalized under paragraphs (a) or (b) hereof when they have actual knowledge of the hazing
conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the same from occurring or failed to
promptly report the same to the law enforcement authorities if such parents can do so without peril to
their person or their family.

"The school authorities including faculty members as well as barangay, municipal, or city officials
shall be liable as an accomplice and likewise be held administratively accountable for hazing
conducted by the fraternities, sororities, other organizations, if it can be shown that the school or
barangay, municipal, or city officials allowed or consented to the conduct of hazing, but such officials
failed to take anby action to prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report to the law
enforcement authorities if the same can be done without peril to their person or their family.

"The presence of any person, even if such person is not a member of the fraternity, sorority, or
organization, during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation therein as a principal unless
such person or persons prevented the commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly
reported the same to the law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril, to their person
or their family.

"The incumbent officers of the fraternity, sorority, or organization concerned shall be jointly liable
with those members who actually participated in the hazing.

"Any person charged under this Act shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstances that there
was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.

"This section shall apply to the president, manager, director, or other responsible officer of
businesses or corporations engaged hazing as a requirement for employment in the manner
provided herein.

"Any conviction by final judgement shall be reflected on the scholastic record, personal, or
employment record of the person convicted, regardless of when the judgment conviction has
become final."

Section 15. A new section to be denominated as Section 15 is hereby inserted in the same Act to
read as follows:

Section 15. Implementing Rules and Regulations. (IRR). - The Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), together with the Department of Education (DepED), Department of Justice (DOJ),
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), AFP, PNP, and National Youth Commission (NYC), shall promulgate the IRR
within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of this Act."

Section 16. Separability Clause. - If any provision or part of this Act is declared invalid or
unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions hereof shall remain valid and effective.

Section 17. Repealing Clause. - Republic Act No. 8049 and all other laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, rules or regulations, or parts thereof which are inconsistent with or contrary to
the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or modified accordingly.

Section 18. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ
Speaker of the House of Representatives

AQUILINO "KOKO" PIMENTEL III

President of the Senate
This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1662 and House Bill No. 6573 was passed by the
Senate and the House of Representatives on March 12, 2018 and March 13, 2018, respectively.

CESAR STRAIT PAREJA

Secretary General
House of Representatives

LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of Senate

Approved: June 29, 2018

RODRIGO ROA DUTERTE