2020 P Cr.

L J 807

[Lahore]

Before Asjad Javaid Ghural and Farooq Haider, JJ

STATE through Assistant Director (Law), Regional Directorate Anti-Narcotics Force, Punjab, Lahore---
Petitioner

Versus

JUDGE ANTI-TERRORISM COURT, FAISALABAD and another---Respondents

Criminal Revision No. 25867 and Criminal Miscellaneous Nos. 4 and 3 of 2019, decided on 23rd October,
2019.

Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 6---"Terrorism"---Murderous assault on the police in order to save oneself from arrest---Scope---
Question requiring determination by the court was whether the alleged act of the accused and his co-
accused of launching murderous assault on the police party, who had intercepted and recovered
narcotic substance from him, was accompanied by a "design" or "purpose" within the ambit of
subsection (1)(b) & (c) of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in order to attract any of the categories
specified in subsection (2) thereof or not---Allegation was serious one but it was not accompanied by the
design of creating the sense of fear and terrorism---Theme for insurgence of the provisions was
specifically mentioned as an act designed to coerce, intimidate or overawe the government or the police
or section of the public to create the sense of insecurity, fear and panic in the society---Alleged act of
the accused was the result of his attempt to save himself from the arrest, which did not fall within the
categories specified under subsection (2) of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Allegations leveled
against the accused did not attract the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court---Impugned order did not
suffer from any illegality, perversity or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by the High Court---
Revision petition was dismissed in limine.

Zafar Iqbal Chohan, Special Prosecutor for Petitioner.

ORDER
Crl. Misc. No.4/2019

This application for restoration of Criminal Misc. No.3/2019 is allowed subject to all just and legal
exceptions. Let the said application be taken up for hearing.

Crl. Misc. No.3/2019

2. This application for restoration of main petition is allowed subject to all just and legal exceptions.
Let the main case be taken up for hearing.

Crl. Revision No.25867/2019

3. Through this criminal revision under section 435, Cr.P.C., the State has challenged the vires of order
dated 23.05.2018 passed by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Faisalabad whereby on receiving
report under section 173, Cr.P.C. in case FIR No.41 dated 27.08.2017, in respect of offences under
sections 324, 224, 353 and 186, P.P.C., section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and section 9(c) of the
Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court proceeded to transfer the
case to the Special Court established under the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 for trial.

4. The concise facts of the case are that the petitioner/State got lodged the aforementioned case
against respondents No.2 and others with the allegation that on 27.08.2017 at about 06:00 p.m., on a
tip-off, the police party intercepted one Tasawar Raza Shah, who was carrying narcotic substances. In
order to save himself, the said accused took out his pistol and started firing at the police party resulting
into fire arm injury to Muhammad Shoaib, constable and succeeded to flee away. After completion of
investigation, the prosecution prepared two separate challans, one in offence under section 9(c) of the
Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and the second in offences under sections 324, 353, 186, 224,
337-F(vi), P.P.C., section 13 of the Punjab Arms Ordinance (Ordinance XX of 1965) and section 7 of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The later was submitted before the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,
Faisalabad, who after hearing preliminary arguments, transferred the case to the Court where the
earlier challan was submitted vide impugned order dated 23.05.2018. The petitioner, being complainant,
felt aggrieved and filed this revision petition.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the available record with their able
assistance.

6. The question which requires determination by this Court is that whether the alleged act of the
private respondent and his co-accused for launching murderous assault upon the police party, who had
intercepted and recovered narcotic substance from him was accompanied by a "design" or "purpose"
within the ambit of subsection (1)(b) and (c) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in order to
attract any of the categories specified in subsection (2) thereof or not. Though the allegation was serious
one yet it was not accompanied the design of creating the sense of fear and terrorism. The theme for
insurgence of the provisions was specifically mentioned as an act designed to coerce, intimidate or
overawe the government or the public or section of the public to create the sense of insecurity, fear and
panic in the society. In the case in hand, the alleged act of the accused was the result of his attempt to
save himself from the arrest, which does not fall within the categories specified under subsection (2) of
section 6 of the Act ibid. To exercise the jurisdiction under the Act ibid, "design" or "purpose' behind the
action coupled with mens rea to constitute the offence of terrorism is sine qua non, which has rightly
been attended to by the learned Court below. Taking into consideration the aforesaid facts and
circumstances of the case, there is no iota of doubt in our mind to hold that the allegations levelled
against respondent No.2 did not attract the jurisdiction of Anti-Terrorism Court. Upon our own
independent evaluation of the material available on record, we have no manner of doubt in our mind
that the order impugned does not suffer from illegality, perversity or any jurisdictional defect to warrant
interference by this court.

In view of what has been discussed above, the petition in hand is without any merit, the same
stands, dismissed in limine.

SA/S-87/L Petition dismissed.

2020 S C M R 78

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Nasir-ul-Mulk, C.J, Amin Hani Muslim and Ejaz Afzal Khan, JJ

FAROOQ AHMED---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE and another---Respondents

Criminal Petition No. 110 of 2016 and Criminal Miscellaneous A. No.380 of 2015, decided on 9th June,
2015.

(On appeal from the judgment and order of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, dated
21.1.2015 passed in Criminal A. No. 342-ATA of 2014, Reference No. 4-ATA of 2014)

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 6(1)(b) & 7---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b)---Act of terrorism, qatl-i-amd---Reappraisal of
evidence---Murder committed due to previous enmity---Provisions of Ss. 6 & 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997, not attracted in a case of personal enmity---Held, that at a point between the Sessions Court and
its canteen the accused along with co-accused persons fired at the deceased and killed him---Alleged
motive for the crime was that the deceased had murdered a brother of one of the co-accused---Motive
of the crime was thus previous enmity---Accused was arrested on the spot and the weapon of offence
was also recovered from him---Nothing was available on the record to show that the accused wanted to
create fear or insecurity or terror in or around the Court premises---After shooting the deceased the
accused did not offer resistance and was arrested by the police along with the weapon of offence---Since
the accused had committed the offence to avenge the murder committed by the deceased, his action
would not fall under the ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Conviction of accused under S. 7
of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was set aside, in circumstances.

Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court PLD 2004 Lah. 199 ref.

(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 6 & 7---Act of terrorism --- Murder committed due to personal enmity---Provisions of Ss. 6 & 7 of
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would not be attracted if the murder was committed to avenge private
enmity.

Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court PLD 2004 Lah. 199 ref.

Kh. Muhammad Haris, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner.

Zubair Ahmed Farooq, Additional P.G. Punjab for the State.

Muhammad Munir Peracha, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant.

Date of hearing: 26th May, 2015.

JUDGMENT

NASIR-UL-MULK, C.J.---The petitioner was convicted under sections 302(b), P.P.C. and 7(a) of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (hereinafter to be referred to as "ATA, 1997") for causing death of Muhammad
Qasim and on each count was sentenced to death and payment of, compensation and fine respectively.
His conviction and sentences on both counts were maintained by the High Court. The legal heirs of the
deceased have now entered into compromise with the petitioner, who has filed Criminal Misc.
Application No. 380 of 2015 for disposal of the petition on the basis of the compromise. The application
along with the compromise deed and statements of the legal heirs of the deceased was sent to the trial
Court for verification of its genuineness. The report has been submitted, according to which the
deceased was survived by his mother, widow and three minor children. The statements of the adults
were recorded, who confirmed the factum of the compromise and expressed that it was brought about
with their free consent. The statement of the Naib Tehsildar was also recorded who confirmed that
there were no other legal heirs of the deceased. According to the statements of the widow and mother
of the deceased the petitioner had paid Rs. 50,00,000/- as Badl-e-Sulah/Diyat out of which they had
received their respective shares of Rs. 6,25,000/- and Rs.8,35,000/-. As regards the shares of the minors
Defence Savings Certificates have been purchased in their names and to that effect the statement of
Inam-ur-Rehman, Officer-in-Charge, National Saving Center-II, D.G. Khan was recorded. The Judge, Anti-
Terrorism Court, has reported that the compromise was entered into by the legal heirs voluntarily and
without any undue pressure. Further that the shares of the minors have been properly secured by the
purchase of National Saving Certificates.

2. In view of the statements of the legal heirs and the report of the trial Court we allow Criminal Misc.
Application No. 380 of 2015 and set aside the conviction and sentence of the petitioner under section
302(b), P.P.C.

3. As regards conviction and sentence under section 7(a) of ATA, 1997 the learned counsel submitted
that though the offence is not compoundable but on facts of the case the offence does. not fall within
the ambit of terrorism as defined under section 6 of ATA, 1997 in that according to the case of the
prosecution the murder was committed as revenge for the murder of the brother of one of the accused
by the deceased. The learned counsel referred to the change brought about in section 6 of the Act,
which defines terrorism to canvas that it is not the consequence of the crime but the design of the
accused which determines whether the accused is guilty of terrorism or not. He pointed out that though
the murder was allegedly committed in the vicinity of the Court premises but that would only confer
jurisdiction upon the Anti-Terrorism Courts to try the case in view of the amendment brought about in
the Schedule to ATA, 1997. That however, in order to convict an accused under section 6 of ATA, 1997
his act had to fall within the definition of terrorism. In support of his arguments the learned counsel
relied upon a number of judgments, one of which is unreported dated 12.12.2014 in Criminal Appeals
Nos. 487 and 488 of 2006 titled Muhammad Nazim v. The State which is based on a number of reported
judgment cited therein. The learned counsel further referred to the judgment of the Lahore High Court
Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court (PLD 2004 Lahore 199).

4. In order to determine whether section 6 read with section 7 of ATA, 1997 is attracted to the case,
the facts alleged by the complainant in the FIR as well as in the testimony before the Court need to be
stated. The case was registered on the report of Peer Bakhsh (PW-5), who stated that he along with
Azeem, Allah Ditta and Khadim Hussain had gone to the local Court in D.G. Khan on 28.2.2013; that on
that day Muhammad Qasim along with five other under trial prisoners was brought to the Court by the
police in a criminal case; that at about 12.30 in the afternoon the said Muhammad Qasim along with the
other under trial prisoners was being taken back by the police in custody after attending the Court when
at a point between the Court and Canteen of the Sessions Court four persons, Farooq Ahmad armed
with pistol, Muhammad Yousaf also armed with pistol, Paliyah Khan empty handed accompanied by an
unknown person came along; that Farooq Ahmed made three fires at Muhammad Qasim who was hit
and fell on the ground and later succumbed to his injuries. The alleged motive was that the accused had
taken the revenge of the murder of Muhammad Musa, brother of one of the accused, allegedly done to
death by Muhammad Qasim. The petitioner was arrested on the spot and the weapon of offence was
also recovered from him. The facts so disclosed by the prosecution leave one in no doubt that the
motive of the crime was previous enmity because of murder allegedly committed by the deceased.
There is nothing on the record to show that the accused wanted to create fear or insecurity or terror in
or around the Court premises. It appears that after shooting the petitioner did not offer resistance and
was arrested by the police along with the weapon of offence. The only provision in the ATA, 1997 that
may have relevance here is section 6(b) which reads:

"6. Terrorism.---(1) In this Act, "terrorism" means the use or threat of action where:

(a) .................

(b) the use of threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a
section of the public or community or sect or a Foreign Government or population or an International
Organization or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or

(c) .................."

The words "use or threat is designed" cover all situations mentioned in the said provision as each is
followed by the word "or". For the present purpose the last of such situation would be relevant namely
"the use or threat is designed to .... create a sense of fear or insecurity in society". The said provision has
undergone change as pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The earlier section 6(b)
inserted through amendment brought about by Ordinance IX of 1998 opened with the words "commits
a scheduled offence, the effect of which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or create a sense of
fear and insecurity in the people ..." These have been substituted by Ordinance No. XXXIX of 2001 with
the words "use or threat is designed to ... create a sense of fear or insecurity in society". By this change
the legislature shifted the focus of the crime under Section 6(b) from the consequence of the act to the
intention or design of the accused. This change has been very aptly discussed in Basharat Ali v. Special
Judge, Anti-Terrorism. Court (ibid) authored by Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, as a Judge of the
Lahore High Court. The principle laid down in the said judgment has since been consistently followed in
that section 6 read with section 7 of ATA, 1997 would not be attracted if the murder is committed to
avenge private enmity. The 3rd Schedule to ATA, 1997 provides list of scheduled offences that are
triable by the Special Court to the exclusion of any other Court. By an amendment in 2005 the Anti-
Terrorism Courts were conferred jurisdiction to try an accused for firing or for the use of explosives by
any device including bomb blast in the Court premises. The inclusion in the scheduled offences only
extended the jurisdiction upon the Anti-Terrorism Court to try such an accused. However in order to
convict him under section 7 of the ATA, 1997 his act must fall within the scope of section 6 of the Act. As
has already been found that since the petitioner had statedly committed the murder to avenge murder
committed by the deceased his action would not fall within the definition of terrorism under section 6 of
ATA, 1997. There was no design to create fear or terror or insecurity in the Court premises. In this view
of the matter the petitioner's conviction under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act cannot be sustained
and the same is therefore, set aside.

5. As the offence under section 302(b), P.P.C. has been compromised and the conviction under section
7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act has been reversed, the petition is converted into appeal and allowed. The
conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge framed against
him. He be set at liberty if not required in any other cause.

MWA/F-11/SC Appeal allowed.

2020 S C M R 853

[Supreme Court of Pakistan]

Present: Sajjad Ali Shah and Sayyed Mazahar Ali Akbar Naqvi, JJ

MUHAMMAD YAQOOB---Petitioner

Versus

The STATE---Respondent

Jail Petition No. 36 of 2016, decided on 21st April, 2020.

(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 15.12.2015 passed in Criminal Appeal
No. 772 of 2013)

(a) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)---

----S. 4---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(g)---Making or keeping explosives with intend to
endanger life or property, connections with a proscribed organization---Reappraisal of evidence---Raid
proceedings---Crime report clearly reflected that the accused was active member of a proscribed
religious organization and as such in pursuance of information after constituting raiding party, the
premises of accused were raided---During course of proceedings of the raiding party, the accused led to
recovery of not only four grenades but also four detonators which was spelled out from the record
especially when the Bomb Disposal Officer came there for defusing the said ammunition which was
recovered and was found explosive in nature---Detail mentioned by the Bomb Disposal Unit reflected
the genuineness of the raid and recovery effected from the premises owned by the accused---
Conviction and sentence awarded to accused was maintained---Jail petition was dismissed.
(b) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)---

----Ss. 2 & 4---Making or keeping explosives with intend to endanger life or property---Reappraisal of
evidence---Explosive substance---Scope---'Grenade'---Whether "grenade" came within the definition of
explosive substance---Held, that in the present case, apart from grenades, detonators were also
recovered from the accused which ultimately if considered conjointly, came within the definition of
"explosive substance"---Definition of 'explosive substance' in the Explosive Substances Act, 1908,
reflected that any material which if utilized resulted into explosion came within the definition of
explosive substance---"Explosive substance" shall be deemed to be any material which was used or
attended to be used for causing any explosion which could endanger life---Recovery of four grenades
and detonators were materials which could explode and be utilized for an explosion so the same came
within the definition of "explosive substance"---Conviction and sentence awarded to accused was
maintained---Jail petition was dismissed.

(c) Explosive Substances Act (VI of 1908)---

----S. 4---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7(g)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 340(2)---
Making or keeping explosives with intend to endanger life or property, connections with a terrorist
organization---Reappraisal of evidence---Accused opting not to give evidence on oath in disproof of the
charge but presenting a defence witness subsequently---Held, that the accused who did not opt to
appear for his own defence to brush aside the prosecution evidence while availing legal recourse in the
shape of statement under S. 340(2), Cr.P.C. rather produced a witness in his defence, the statement of
such witness was found to be nothing but an afterthought---Said witness had never appeared before the
investigating officer during the course of investigation of the case in the defence of the accused---
Conviction and sentence awarded to accused was maintained---Jail petition was dismissed.

Saeed Khurshid Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-
Record for Petitioner.

Muhammad Jaffar, Additional P.G. Punjab for the State.

Date of hearing: 21st April, 2020.

JUDGMENT

SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.---The petitioner was convicted in a case bearing FIR No.
10/2013 dated 16.01.2013 registered with Police Station Kallur Kot, District Bhakkar.

2. As per allegations contained in the crime report, it was alleged that the petitioner had connection
with a terrorist organization and he is in possession of ammunition which can be recovered.
Consequently, raiding party was constituted which raided the premises of the petitioner who led to
recovery of four Russian made hand grenades and four detonators which were kept in a bag and the
same was concealed in an oven adjacent to eastern wall of the house. The petitioner was taken into
custody and during the course of proceedings, the accusation against the petitioner was found to be
correct and as such report in terms of section 173, Cr.P.C. was submitted in the court of competent
jurisdiction. The petitioner was charge sheeted by the learned trial court vide order dated 04.04.2013.
The petitioner denied the same and claimed trial. Prosecution led five prosecution witnesses to
substantiate the allegation against the petitioner. After recording of the statements of prosecution
witnesses, the petitioner made a statement in terms of section 342, Cr.P.C. During the statement made
by the petitioner he opted not to appear under section 340, Cr.P.C. in disproof of the allegation levelled
against him, however he produced defence evidence of one Maqbool son of Ahmad Din, who appeared
as DW.1.

3. The learned trial court after taking into consideration the statements of prosecution witnesses,
statement of petitioner found the accusation coming through the source which is confidence inspiring
and as such convicted the petitioner under section 4 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908, thereby
sentenced him to imprisonment for life. The learned trial court further found that the petitioner has also
committed an offence falling within the ambit of section 7(g) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, hence he
was further convicted for five years' Rigorous Imprisonment and fine to the tune of Rs.50,000/-,
however, benefit of section 382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended in favour of the petitioner.

4. The petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No. 772/2013 before the learned Lahore High Court Lahore
which met the same fate vide judgment dated 15.12.2015 while maintaining the sentences inflicted
upon by the learned trial court.

5. The crux of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner
cannot be saddled with the responsibility of keeping explosive substance in his possession as at the time
of raid he was empty handed and perhaps he was not in a constructive knowledge regarding the
possession of explosive substance which ultimately was taken into consideration by both the learned
courts and the petitioner was convicted. Further contends that perusal of the definition provided under
section 3 subsection 1(a)(iv) of the Arms Ordinance 1965, the "grenade' is part of the Arms Ordinance
and do not fall within the definition of Explosive Substances Act. Contends that the application of
section 7(g) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is not substantiated from the facts and circumstances as it is not
case of terrorism because for that it is mandatory that the petitioner must be having nexus with some
proscribed religious organization. Learned counsel has further argued that in fact the prosecution has
failed to substantiate the case against the petitioner as the witnesses of recovery are at variance
regarding the place from where petitioner was arrested.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.

7. It is an admitted fact that the opening sentence of the crime report clearly reflects that the
petitioner is active member of proscribed religious organization and as such in pursuance of information
after constituting raiding party; the premises of petitioner were raided. During course of proceedings of
the raiding party, the petitioner led to recovery of not only four grenades but also four detonators which
is spelled out from the record especially when the Bomb Disposal Officer came there for defusing the
aforesaid ammunition which was recovered and was found explosive in nature. The detail mentioned by
the Bomb Disposal Unit reflects a lot regarding the genuineness of the raid and recovery effected from
the premises owned by the petitioner. The arguments of the learned counsel that in fact the recovered
articles do not comes within the ambit of Explosive Substances Act, is not of any avail, rather the same
seems to be absurd in nature. The learned counsel while arguing the matter has only advanced the case
up to the extent of recovery of "grenades". The other article in the shape of detonator was also
recovered which ultimately if considered conjointly it comes within the definition of explosive
substance. The definition of the same reflects that any material which if utilized results into explosion
comes with the definition of explosive substance. Section 2 of Explosive Substances Act, 1908 is
reproduced as under:-

"2. Definition of "explosive substance".--- In this Act the expression "explosive substance" shall be
deemed to include any materials for making any explosive substance; also any apparatus, machine
implement or material used, or intended to be used, or adapted for causing, or aiding in causing, any
explosion in or with any explosive substance; also any part of any such apparatus, machine or
implement."

Bare perusal of the definition reflects that explosive substance shall be deemed to be any material which
is used or attended to be used for causing any explosion which could endanger the life. There is no
second cavil to this proposition that the recovery of four grenades and detonators are material which
could explode and utilized for the explosion so it comes within the definition of explosive substance.
Otherwise, the nature of the ammunition recovered from the petitioner bring in the mind of a person of
ordinary prudence that the utilization of such like articles cannot be retained except for only one
purpose which is clearly alleged against the petitioner and same has been taken into consideration by
the learned trial court as well as learned High Court. It is strange enough to mention here that the
petitioner opted to adduce defence evidence during the course of trial before learned trial court but he
did not opt to appear himself as a witness under section 340, Cr.P.C. to disproof the allegation against
him. A person who do not opt to appear for his own defence to brush aside the prosecution evidence
while availing legal recourse in the shape of statement under section 340, Cr.P.C. rather produce a
witness in his defence, the statement of such witness has been taken into consideration by us and found
to be nothing but an afterthought reason being that this witness had never appeared before the
investigating officer during the course of investigation of this case in the defence of the petitioner.
8. In view of the facts and circumstances narrated above while analysing the evidence adduced by the
prosecution witnesses and while evaluating the probative value of the same, if juxtaposed with the
evidence adduced by the defence, we found that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is straight-
forward, confidence inspiring and while satisfying all the legal requirements to prove the case to the hilt,
resulting into dismissal of petition before this Court. As a consequence, the same is dismissed.

9. Leave to appeal is refused.

MWA/M-20/SC Petition dismissed.

P L D 2020 Supreme Court 61

Present: Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, C.J., Mushir Alam, Manzoor Ahmad Malik, Sardar Tariq Masood, Ijaz ul
Ahsan, Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel

and Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, JJ

GHULAM HUSSAIN and others---Appellants

Versus

The STATE and others---Respondents

Criminal Appeals Nos. 95 and 96 of 2019, Civil Appeal No.10-L of 2017 and Criminal Appeal No.63 of
2013, decided on 30th October, 2019.
 (Against the judgments dated 5-12-2007, 27-4-2017, 22-11-2016 and 24-9-2012 passed by the
Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals Nos.397-J of 2006, 587-J of 2014 and 342-J of 2011 and
Capital Sentence References Nos.1-T of 2006 and 40-T of 2014 and Writ Petition No.15608 of 2016).

(a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 6---"Terrorism"---Historical account of different acts, events, episodes and phenomena that have
from time to time been perceived or understood in different parts of the world to be "terrorism",
provided.

(b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 6 & Third Sched. Entry No.4---Anti-Terrorism Court, jurisdiction of---Scope---Heinous offences
specified under Entry No.4 to Third Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, that did not constitute
terrorism---Such heinous offences did not per se constitute the offence of terrorism but were to be tried
by an Anti-Terrorism Court because of their inclusion in the Third Sched.---In such cases an Anti-
Terrorism Court could punish the person committing such specified heinous offences only for
commission of those offences and not for committing terrorism because such offences did not constitute
terrorism---Supreme Court observed that definition of 'terrorism' contained in S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997 ('the Act') as it stood at present was too wide and the same included many actions, designs
and purposes which had no nexus with the generally recognized concept of what terrorism was; that
including some other heinous offences in the Preamble and the Third Sched. to that Act for trial of such
offences by an Anti-Terrorism Court when such other offences did not qualify to be included in the
definition of "terrorism" put an extra and unnecessary burden on such courts and caused delay in trial of
actual cases of terrorism; that the Parliament may consider substituting the present definition of
'terrorism' by a more succinct definition bringing it in line with the international perspectives of that
offence and focusing on violent activities aimed at achieving political, ideological or religious objectives
and that the Parliament may also consider suitably amending the Preamble to the Act and removing all
those offences from the Third Sched. to the Act which offences had no nexus with the offence of
terrorism.

Farooq Ahmed v. State and another 2020 SCMR 78; Amjad Ali and others v. The State PLD 2017
SC 661 and Muhammad Bilal v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 1362 ref.
(c) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 6 & 7(e) & Third Sched. Entry No.4---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 365-A---Explosive Substances Act
(VI of 1908), Ss. 4(b), 5 & 6---Terrorism, kidnapping or abduction for ransom, possessing explosives---
Offences mentioned under Entry No. 4 to Third Sched. of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Conviction for
such offences under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Scope---Offence of abduction or kidnapping for
ransom under S.365-A, P.P.C. was included in Entry No. 4 of the Third Sched. to the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997 and kidnapping for ransom was also one of the actions specified in S.7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997---Abduction or kidnapping for ransom was a heinous offence but the scheme of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997 showed that an ordinary case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under S.365-A, P.P.C.
was merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but if kidnapping for ransom was committed with the
design or purpose mentioned in cl. (b) or cl. (c) of subsection (1) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997
then such offence amounted to terrorism attracting S.7(e) of that Act---In the former case the convicted
person was to be convicted and sentenced only for the offence under S. 365-A, P.P.C. whereas in the
latter case the convicted person was to be convicted both for the offence under S.365-A, P.P.C. as well
as for the offence under S.7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Same rule may also be applied to the
other offences mentioned in Entry No. 4 of the Third Sched. to the Act pertaining to "Use of firearms or
explosives by any device, including bomb blast in a mosque, imambargah, church, temple or any other
place of worship, whether or not any hurt or damage is caused thereby", "Firing or use of explosive by
any device, including bomb blast in the court premises", "Hurt caused by corrosive substance or attempt
to cause hurt by means of a corrosive substance" and "Unlawful possession of an explosive substance or
abetment for such an offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908"---Such distinction between
cases of terrorism and other heinous offences by itself explained and recognizes that all heinous
offences, howsoever serious, grave, brutal, gruesome, macabre or shocking, did not ipso facto constitute
terrorism which was a species apart.

(d) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----Ss. 6(1) & 6(2)---"Terrorism"---Acts constituting terrorism in terms of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997 ('the Act')---Scope---'Actus reus' and 'mens rea' for terrorism---Scope---For an action or threat of
action to be accepted as terrorism within the meanings of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 the action
must fall in subsection (2) of S.6 of the said Act and the use or threat of such action must be designed to
achieve any of the objectives specified in cl. (b) of subsection (1) of S.6 of Act or the use or threat of such
action must be to achieve any of the purposes mentioned in cl. (c) of subsection (1) of S.6 of that Act---
Requirements that needed to be satisfied for invoking cl.(c) of subsection (1) of S.6 were that the use or
threat of action should be for "the purpose of advancing areligious, sectarian or ethnic cause" or for the
purpose of"intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, media persons, business community"
or for the purpose of "attacking the civilians, including damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson,
or by any other means, government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement
agencies"---Clause (b) of subsection (1) of S.6 specified the 'design' and cl.(c) of subsection (1) of S.6
earmarked the 'purpose' which should be the motivation for the act and the actus reus had been clearly
mentioned in subsection (2) of S.6---Only when the actus reus specified in subsection (2) of S.6 was
accompanied by the requisite mens rea provided for in cl.(b) or cl.(c) of subsection (1) of S.6 that an
action could be termed as 'terrorism'---Thus, it was not the fear or insecurity actually created or
intended to be created or likely to be created which would determine whether the action qualified to be
termed as terrorism or not but it was the intent and motivation behind the action which would be
determinative of the issue irrespective of the fact whether any fear and insecurity was actually created
or not---Any action constituting an offence, howsoever grave, shocking, brutal, gruesome or horrifying,
did not qualify to be termed as terrorism if it was not committed with the design or purpose specified or
mentioned in cls. (b) or cl.(c) of subsection (1) of S.6 of the Act---Action could be termed as terrorism if
the use or threat of that action was designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or
the public or a section of the public or community or sect, etc. or if such action was designed to create a
sense of fear or insecurity in the society or the use or threat was made for the purpose of advancing a
religious, sectarian or ethnic cause, etc.---Creating fear or insecurity in the society was not by itself
terrorism unless the motive itself was to create fear or insecurity in the society and not when fear or
insecurity was just a by product, a fallout or an unintended consequence of a private crime---Mere
shock, horror, dread or disgust created or likely to be created in the society did not transform a private
crime into "terrorism"---"Terrorism" was a totally different concept which denoted commission of a
crime with the design or purpose of destabilizing the government, disturbing the society or hurting a
section of the society with a view to achieve objectives which were essentially political, ideological or
religious---Violent activity against civilians that had no political, ideological or religious aims was just an
act of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to "terrorism".

Muhammad Ajmal v. The State 2000 SCMR 1682; Mumtaz Ali Khan Rajban and another v.
Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2001 SC 169; Muhammad Mushtaq v. Muhammad Ashiq and
others PLD 2002 SC 841; Mst. Raheela Nasreen v. The State and another 2002 SCMR 908; Muhammad
Amin v. The State 2002 SCMR 1017; Zia Ullah v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorist Court, Faisalabad and 7
others 2002 SCMR 1225; State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar v. Muhammad Shafiq
PLD 2003 SC 224; Naeem Akhtar and others v. The State and others PLD 2003 SC 396; Sh.Muhammad
Amjad v. The State PLD 2003 SC 704; Mst. Najam-un-Nisa v. Judge, Special Court constituted under Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 2003 SCMR 1323; Abdul Ghafoor Bhatti v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2003
SCMR 1934; Muhammad Farooq v. Ibrar and 5 others PLD 2004 SC 917; Azizullah and another v. The
State and another 2005 SCMR 802; Mirza Shaukat Baig and others v. Shahid Jamil and others PLD 2005
SC 530; Zahid Imran and others v. The State and others PLD 2006 SC 109; Muhammad Idrees and others
v. The State 2008 SCMR 1544; Nazeer Ahmed and others v. Nooruddin and another 2012 SCMR 517;
Shahid Zafar and 3 others v. The State PLD 2014 SC 809; Kashif Ali v. The Judge, Anti-Terrorism, Court
No.II, Lahore and others PLD 2016 SC 591 and Shahbaz Khan alias Tippu and others v. Special Judge,
Anti-Terrorism, Court No.3, Lahore and others PLD 2016 SC 1 distinguished and held not to be followed.
 Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1998 SC 1445; Jamat-i-Islami
Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, Secretary-General v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary,
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs PLD 2000 SC 111; Ch. Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed Iqbal and 7 others
PLD 2001 SC 521; Muhammad Mushtaq v. Muhammad Ashiq and others PLD 2002 SC 841; Fazal Dad v.
Col. (Rtd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik and others PLD 2007 SC 571; Mohabbat Ali and another v. State
and another 2007 SCMR 142; Tariq Mahmood v. State 2008 SCMR 1631; Muhammad Yaqoob and others
v. The State and others 2009 SCMR 527; Bashir Ahmed v. M. Siddique PLD 2009 SC 11; Ahmad Jan v.
Nasrullah and others 2012 SCMR 59; Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v. The State and others PLD 2016
SC 17; Khuda-e-Noor v. The State PLD 2016 SC 195; Sagheer Ahmed v. The State and others 2016 SCMR
1754; Ch. Shaukat Ali v. Haji Jan Muhammad and others 2016 SCMR 533; Waris Ali and 5 others v. The
State 2017 SCMR 1572; Sajid Rasheed Qureshi v. Munawar Ahmad 2017 SCMR 162; Amjad Ali and
others v. The State PLD 2017 SC 661; Abdul Nabi v. The State 2017 SCMR 335; Province of Punjab
through Secretary Punjab Public Prosecution Department and another v. The State PLD 2018 SC 178 and
Dilwar Mehmood alias Dulli and another v. The State 2018 SCMR 593 ref.

(e) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 6(3)---"Terrorism"---Section 6(3) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997---Scope---Subsection (3) of S.6 of

the Act, provided that "The use or threat of use of any action falling within subsection (2) which involves
the use of firearms, explosive or any other weapon is "terrorism", whether or not subsection (1)(c) is
satisfied" which meant that if for commission of the actions mentioned in subsection (2) of S.6, a
firearm, an explosive substance or any other weapon was actually used or a threat regarding use of the
same was extended then all such actions were to constitute the offence of terrorism even if the other
requirements of cl.(c) of subsection (1) of S. 6 were not satisfied or fulfilled---Provisions of S.6(3) of the
Act were quite problematic as they did not piece well with the remaining provisions of S. 6 as far as the
matter of defining "terrorism" was concerned---If provisions of subsection (3) of S.6 of the Act, as they
were worded, were to be given effect then the distinction between the peculiar offence of terrorism and
most of the run of the mill offences committed in the society in routine would be obliterated---Supreme
Court observed that the legislature may like to have another look at the provisions of S.6(3) of the Act
and to consider deleting or suitably amending the same so as to bring them in harmony with the
remaining provisions of the Act.

(f) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)---

----S. 6(2)---"Terrorism"---Offence committed due to personal enmity or vendetta---Actions specified in

subsection (2) of S.6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 did not qualify to be labeled or characterized as
terrorism if such actions were taken in furtherance of personal enmity or private vendetta.
In attendance:

Shahid Azeem, Advocate Supreme Court.

Javed Iqbal Raja, Advocate Supreme Court.

Burhan Moazam Malik, Advocate Supreme Court.

Mian Pervaiz Hussain, Advocate Supreme Court.

Syed Tayyab Mehmood Jaffari, Advocate Supreme Court.

Muhammad Ishtiaq Ahmad Raja, Advocate Supreme Court.

Raja Abdul Ghafoor, Advocate-on-Record.

Malik Ghulam Mustafa Kandwal, Advocate Supreme Court.

Kamran Murtaza, Advocate Supreme Court.

Abid Hussain Saqi, Advocate Supreme Court.

Muhammad Sadiq Baloch, Advocate Supreme Court.

Ch. Munir Sadiq, Advocate Supreme Court.

Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court.

Khadim H. Sandhu, Advocate Supreme Court.

On Court's Notice

Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Deputy Attorney-General of Pakistan.

Tariq Mehmood Jehangiri, Advocate General, Islamabad.

Ahmed Awais, Advocate General, Punjab.

Ch. Faisal Farid, Additional Advocate-General, Punjab.

Ahmed Raza Gillani, Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab.

Barrister Shabbir Hussain Shah, Additional Advocate-General, Sindh.

 Salim Akhtar, Additional Prosecutor-General, Sindh.

Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Additional Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Syed Baqar Shah, State Counsel, Balochistan.

Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional Advocate-General, Balochistan.

Date of hearing: 2nd April, 2019.

JUDGMENT

ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA, C.J.---The meanings, scope and import of the term 'terrorism' defined in
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, as amended from time to time, have been a subject of
controversy in this Court for some time and different Honourable Benches of varying strength deciding
different cases have differed with each other in the past and have understood and interpreted the said
term differently. It is in this backdrop that the present Larger Bench has been constituted so as to put an
end to that controversy.

2. The facts of the present appeals giving rise to the issue at hand are summed up as follows:

Ghulam Hussain v. The State

(Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019)

After a regular trial Ghulam Hussain appellant was convicted by the trial court on two counts of the
charge under section 302(b), P.P.C. for killing two minors and was sentenced to death on each count. He
was also convicted on two counts of the charge under section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and
was sentenced to death on each such count. His appeal filed before the High Court was dismissed and all
his convictions and sentences recorded by the trial court were upheld and confirmed. Leave to appeal
was granted by this Court in order the reappraise the evidence and also to consider as to whether the
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case or
not.
Muhammad Azeem and 3 others v. The State

(Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2019)

The appellants were convicted by the trial court for offences under section 302(b), P.P.C. and section
7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and were sentenced to death each for committing the said offences
besides having been convicted and sentenced for some other offences. The appellants filed a joint
appeal before the High Court which was dismissed and all their convictions and sentences were upheld
and maintained except their sentences of death on two counts of the charge which sentences of death
were reduced by the High Court to imprisonment for life each on each of the relevant counts of the
charge. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court in order to reappraise the evidence and also to
consider as to whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were attracted to the facts and
circumstances of the case or not.

Tanvir v. Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore, etc.

(Civil Appeal No. 10-L of 2017)

In this case the investigating agency had deleted section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 from the FIR
and the Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Lahore had refused to treat the case as one of terrorism. A writ petition
filed in that regard before the High Court succeeded and the case was ordered to be transferred to the
Anti-Terrorism Court for trial. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court to determine as to whether the
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were attracted to the case or not.

Sikandar Hayat v. The State

(Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2013)

The appellant was convicted by the trial court for an offence under section 302(b), P.P.C. read with
section 149, P.P.C. and was sentenced to imprisonment for life besides having been convicted and
sentenced for an offence under section 148, P.P.C. read with section 149, P.P.C. The appellant's appeal
was dismissed by the High Court and leave to appeal was granted by this Court in order to reappraise
the evidence.
3. Before making an attempt to understand as to what the term 'terrorism' defined in section 6 of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 denotes it may be advantageous to recapitulate how different acts, events,
episodes and phenomena have from time to time been perceived or understood in different parts of the
world as terrorism and distinct from ordinary and usual crimes howsoever heinous in nature.

4. History is full of instances where likeminded groups of people have resorted to violence as a tool for
achieving political, ideological and religious ends. Jewish sects Zealots and Sicarii (or Sicarris), using small
daggers called sicae hidden in their cloaks to stab people in crowds and then melting away in the throng,
attacking the Roman occupiers of Judea and their allies in public places between 2 B.C. and 70 A.D.; the
Assassins of Persia and Syria, Muslims belonging to the Ismaili sect who were called the Assassins
because they were given hashish (hashishin) before being launched for terrorist acts, killing their targets
and threatening the governments of several states between the 11th and 13th centuries; suicidal attacks
carried out by different groups against the colonial rule in India, Indonesia and Philippines in the 18th
and 19th centuries; Russian anarchists attacking members and supporters of the Tsarist regime with
explosives at the end of the 19th century; Japanese Kamikaze pilots launching suicide attacks against
American ships in the Pacific ocean during World War II, particularly in the Battle of Okinawa in April
1945 wherein some 2,000 Kamikaze pilots rammed fully fuelled planes into more than 300 ships killing
about 5,000 Americans and about 2000 Kamikaze; Hizbullah supporters launching devastating attacks
against the American and French forces in Lebanon in the year 1983; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE) using hundreds of suicide bombers and killing thousands of people including Indian Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the year 1991 and Sri Lankan President Premadasa in the year 1993; and the
Marxist-Nationalist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) carrying out many suicide attacks in Turkey against a
range of targets during the end of the last century and beginning of the current century have all been
universally perceived and acknowledged as terrorists indulging in acts of terrorism.

5. There are also many other instances in history where some individual acts or collective activity were,
and are, perceived and accepted as terrorism and not just commission of normal, though heinous,
offences. In the year 1881 anarchists killed the Russian Tsar Alexander II and 21 bystanders; in the year
1901 anarchists killed the US President McKinley as well as King Humbert I of Italy; World War I started
in the year 1914 when anarchists killed Archduke Ferdinand of Austria; the British Raj referred to Bhagat
Singh, Chandrasekhar Azad and many other Indian freedom fighters as terrorists; guerrilla fighters from
Mao Zedong to Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro killed civilians during their revolutionary campaigns and
they too were called terrorists until they triumphed; after World War II some Jewish groups in Palestine,
i.e. Haganah, Irgun and Stern Gang fought for the creation of a Jewish state, bombing hotels and
installations and killing civilians and the British, who then governed Palestine, called those Jewish groups
terrorists and many of those terrorists including Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin and
Ariel Sharon later became leaders of the independent state of Israel and, ironically, those former
terrorists then derided terrorism, applying this label to the Arabs, including Yasser Arafat, fighting for
the very same nationhood that the Jews had fought for earlier; in Germany in the years 1968 to 1992
the Baader-Meinhoff Gang killed dozens, including the head of Treuhand, the German privatization
agency; in Italy the Red Brigades kidnapped and killed Aldo Moro, a former prime minister, and the
Japanese Red Army was an Asian version of that; Japan was also the home of Aum Shinrikyo, a Buddhist
cult that tried to kill thousands in the Tokyo metro system using nerve gas in the year 1995; in Europe
the Irish Republican Army has been a Catholic terrorist organization for almost a century; Spain and
France face a terrorist challenge from ETA and the Basque terrorist organization; Lord's Salvation Army
in Uganda and Boko Haram in Nigeria are universally acknowledged as terrorist outfits; the Afghan
freedom fighters were called the Mujahideen (holy warriors) by the West when they were fighting the
Soviet occupying forces but they are now branded as terrorists when they are fighting to oust the
American occupying forces; the Muslim freedom fighters in the Indian occupied Kashmir, the Sikhs led
and inspired by Bhindranwale in Punjab, the United Liberation Front and Bodo of Assam, militant groups
in Tripura, Christian Mizos mounting an insurrection for decades, Christian Nagas waging a freedom
struggle and the Maoist groups operating in no less than 150 out of India 's 600 districts are all termed
by India as terrorists; and the savagery perpetrated by Talibans of different shades in Afghanistan and
Pakistan for the last many decades is generally accepted and treated as acts of terrorism.

6. The historical context of terrorism given above shows that at different times in history terrorism has
been resorted to for achieving different political, ideological or religious objectives. There are many
explanatory theories about terrorism in modern times but the one advanced by David C. Rapoport,
Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, in the year 2004
(published in his journal Terrorism and Political Violence) has received wide acceptance. The theory
propounded by him is known as the 'waves of terrorism' theory and according to him modern terrorism
can be divided into four waves which are Anarchists (1880s-1920s), Anti-Colonial (1920s-1960s), Left
Wing (1960s-1990s) and Religious (1990 to date). He maintains that each wave came and died out and
that these waves have at times overlapped also. The common factor in all those waves is that all the
relevant acts of violence were and are universally recognized as terrorism because the unlawful use of
violence was and is meant to achieve political, ideological or religious goals. By now the international
community understands quite well that terrorism is a species quite distinct from all other usual and
private crimes howsoever heinous or gruesomely executed.

7. In his book 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (published by Random House LLC, New York in 2018) the
author Yuval Noah Harari has come up with a very interesting, and quite apt, analysis of how terrorists
operate and succeed in their objectives. The following part of his analysis is quite enlightening:

"Though the challenges are unprecedented, and though the disagreements are intense, humankind
can rise to the occasion if we keep our fears under control and be a bit more humble about our views.
 Terrorists are masters of mind control... terrorism is a military strategy that hopes to change the
political situation by spreading fear rather than by causing material damage.

In this respect, terrorists resemble a fly that tries to destroy a china shop. The fly is so weak that it
cannot move even a single tea-cup. So how does a fly destroy a china shop? It finds a bull, gets inside its
ear, and starts buzzing. The bull goes wild with fear and anger, and destroys the china shop. This is what
happened after 9/11, as Islamic fundamentalists incited the American bull to destroy the Middle Eastern
china shop. Now they flourish in the wreckage. And there is no shortage of short-tempered bulls in the
world.

Terrorism is a very unattractive military strategy, because it leaves all the important decisions in the
hands of the enemy. Terrorists are so weak that they cannot wage war so they opt instead to produce a
theatrical spectacle that they hope will provoke the enemy and cause him to overreact. By killing a
handful of people the terrorists cause millions to fear for their lives.

Terrorists don't think like army generals. Instead, they think like theatre producers. Because we
intuitively understand that terrorism is theatre, we judge it by its emotional rather than material impact.

Terrorists undertake an impossible mission: to change the political balance of power through
violence, despite having no army.

Every now and then a state loses its temper and reacts far too forcefully and publicly, thus playing
into the hands of the terrorists. The legitimacy of the modern state is based on its promise to keep the
public sphere free of political violence. Consequently, sporadic acts of political violence that kill a few
dozen people are seen as a deadly threat to the legitimacy and even survival of the state. A small coin in
a big empty jar makes a lot of noise.

The theatre of terror generates visceral fear of anarchy, making people feel as if the social order is
about to collapse. The state is driven to respond to the theatre of terror with its own theatre of security.
So instead of acting quietly and efficiently, the state unleashes a mighty storm, which not infrequently
fulfills the terrorists' most cherished dreams.
 How then should the state deal with terrorism? A successful counter-terrorism struggle should be
conducted on three fronts: First, governments should focus on clandestine actions against the terrorist
networks. Second, the media should keep things in perspective and avoid hysteria. The theatre of terror
cannot succeed without publicity.