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RISK ASSESMENT OF HEAT RECOVERY STEAM GENERATOR (HRSG) USING

RBI METHODOLOGY

Thesis · January 2017

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11704.14080

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of Study

Utility Gebeng is a facility that supplies utility requirements from a common and
strategically located utilities complex. It provides competitive edge to petrochemical
and surrounding industries by economy of scale due to cost effective compared to own
facilities, reliability and availability of supply due to centrally located and modular
design and focus on core operation due to focus on core business rather than utility
Operation & Maintenance. The complex consist of few plants which are Cogeneration
Plant, Demineralised Plant, Nitrogen Generation Plant and Cooling Water Plant. For
Cogen Plant, it have three (3) Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) and one (1)
auxiliary boiler. The HRSG have experienced many failures especially on the tube i.e.
economizer, evaporator and superheater since its commissioning in 1999. These
failure have incurred a large amount of price of non-conformance (PONC) to the plant.
Therefore, Root Cause Failure Analysis (RCFA) have been conducted and performed
to determine its root cause of failure. The failure is caused generally by its design,
fabrication, commissioning, operating and maintainability.

Figure 1: Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG) in Utility Gebeng

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1.2 Problem Statement

From the RCFA, the team have proposed to initiate the Risk Based Inspection (RBI)
assessment on this particular HRSG to determine its risk and come out with its
Inspection Reference Plan (IRP) that useful in managing the HRSG and reduce its
existing risk. Furthermore, without RBI, the Certificate of Fitness (CoF) of this unit
are restricted for extension.

1.3 Objective

The objective of the study is to evaluate the risk of HRSG and to propose an inspection
plan that will manage the risk of the equipment. With the plan, the unit’s inspection
interval can be extended up to thirty six (36) months in compliance of local authority
regulation i.e. Factory Machinery Act (FMA 1967).

1.4 Scope of Study

The scope of the study is the Risk Based Inspection study on the Heat Recovery Steam
Generator (HRSG) Unit comprises of 17 components. From those component, the
assessment will select the highest component as the risk driver for the whole
equipment.

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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Risk Based Inspection

2.1.1 RBI Concept

Risk Based Inspection (RBI) is a multi-disciplinary approach that requires

involvement mainly from operations, maintenance, inspection, and engineering
personnel to provide input on design, materials of construction, operating parameters,
inspection data, failure history, etc.

RBI involves the planning of an inspection on the basis of the information obtained
from a risk analysis of the equipment. The purpose of the risk analysis is to identify
the potential degradation mechanisms and threats to the integrity of the equipment and
to assess the consequences if the failure occurs.

The inspection program can then be focused on the high-risk equipment and
appropriate technique(s) is applied to assess potential degradation mechanisms. Where
further analysis is required, fitness-for-service analysis can be applied.

RBI’s aim is to focus management action on prioritising resources to manage the risk
associated with the equipment. RBI is a logical and structured process of planning and
evaluation as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2: RBI Concept

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2.1.2 RBI Model for Boiler in Local Industry

Prior commence the study, review need to be performed at the existing RBI study on
boiler that had been conducted elsewhere in local industry. There are two RBI study
that had been reviewed which are from the power plant and refinery. The design from
the power plant is totally different from the HRSG’s design as it is conventional
thermal boiler powered by coal. Otherwise, the design of the refinery boiler is same
of the HRSG. From the review, it really shows that the corrosion study of the power
plant boiler is very much different which contain damage mechanism such fly ash
erosion and soot-blower erosion. Thus, it will affect the POF of the analysis. For the
COF analysis, it only cover for the safety consequences and not for Production Losses
as the HRSG’s assessment. For the refinery boiler, the methodology is not much
different as it is using the same software and the boiler’s design is the same. Thus it
will translate to same POF and COF analysis.

2.1.3 RBI Model for Boiler in International Industry

In international industries, there were many software (model) used for the RBI
assessment. In essence, the philosophy of the methodology followed API 580 & API
581. For example, one RBI model for Boiler from Thailand (Mosagul 2014) is using
5x5 matrix. The approach is on the component level up to equipment level in
assessment of the risk. The difference is much on the damage mechanism for each
boiler which depended on the design, operating condition, its fuel either coal, gas. The
RBI are widely used to several reasons which are best in reducing cost in a long term
and best tool in managing ageing plant.

For example, the development of South African legislation (Holland 1998) concerning
the inspection of boilers is briefly reviewed in order to understand of current
prescriptive time-based inspection requirements. The alternative philosophy of Risk
Based Inspection (RBI) is having potential benefits in terms of increased equipment
integrity and reduced cost in a long term.

All boiler are susceptible to ageing, and so are automatically subject to the risks of
mechanical integrity failure such as loss of containment. Given this, companies should
be taking action to manage their ageing boiler, but at the same time all companies need

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more output for less input; higher production and less investment, higher reliability
but lower maintenance. Risk Based Inspection (RBI) may be a solution in effectively
managing ageing boiler and achieving that aspiration of higher productivity through
less down time. RBI is about inspection of the boiler in a manner which is bespoke to
its needs, and finding the correct and most efficient inspection regime. This can
remove the need for unnecessary and costly inspections, especially those which are
legally enforced.

2.1.4 RBI in Other Application

RBI is widely used for other application beside on the boiler itself. In Taiwan (Chi et
al. 2008), there have been a study on its Pressure safety valve using RBI methodology.
The purpose of a pressure safety valve (PSV) is to protect the life and safety of pressure
vessels in a pressurized system. If a weakened PSV fails to function properly, a
catastrophic event might occur if no other protective means are provided. By utilizing
the as-received test data and statistical analysis of the aging conditions of PSVs in
lubricant process units, a risk-based inspection (RBI) system was developed in this
study. First of all, the characteristics of PSV were discussed from the practical
viewpoint of engineering inspection and maintenance. The as-received test data, which
shows obvious PSV damage, will be separated from the data used in the following
statistical analysis. Then, the relationship between the aging conditions and the
corresponding PSV parameters was analysed by using the statistical technique analysis
of variance. Finally, a strategy for semi-quantitative RBI is proposed. Also, a
definitive estimated inspection interval for every PSV is suggested. The outcome
indicated most of the risks result from a few PSVs, for which the corresponding
inspection intervals will be shorter than the 2 years in accordance with relative
standards and local government regulations. Meanwhile in China (Tan et al. 2010),
the RBI methodology was used to evaluate the maintenance strategy in industrial
process which was constructed in one of the units of Fujian Oil Refinery unit. Using
classic definition of risk, both the probability and consequence of accident or failure
were investigated respectively under the support of risk-specific code. All equipment
in this unit were evaluated and categorized into five risk zone based on the RBI result
which covered five levels. In addition, an application of the analytical hierarchy

5
process (AHP) to select the most practicable maintenance strategy for equipment
which was located in each risk rating scale was described. To arrange the hierarchic
structure and evaluation, four main criteria were defined for pairwise judgments.
Finally, four possible alternative strategies were proposed for administrators on the
site.

In Italy (Bertolini et al. 2010), they have develop RBI and maintenance procedures
for an oil refinery. The management of failure analysis has a strategic importance
within a refinery from the organizational, engineering and economic point of view.
The determination of an algorithm, that allows a methodical and as far as possible
automatic approach to management of failure data, can make substantial
improvements in the organization of work and in the decision-making processes. A
panel of expert, made up of academicians and refinery operators, was formed in order
to develop a Risk-Based Inspection and Maintenance (RBI&M) procedure. RBI&M
procedure developed comprises six modules: identification of the scope, functional
analysis, risk assessment, risk evaluation, operation selection and planning, J-factor
computation and operation realization. Taking into consideration historical data
regarding Near Accidents, Operating Drawbacks, Occupational and Environmental
Accidents occurred in refinery over the last years the panel of expert defined a risk
matrix in order to evaluate the risk associated to critical events and maintenance
activities. Five probability classes and five severity categories, that take into account
four impact categories (Health and Safety, Environmental, Economic and Reputation),
have been defined. The study reports the application of the RBI&M method to two
specific stages in the maintenance activities of the refinery, i.e. the oil refinery
turnaround and work orders management. The panel of expert developed heuristic
methods in order to apply RBI&M procedure to the two cases allowing the refinery to
minimize the overall risk taking into consideration the limits in term of time and
budget (in turnaround case) and of human resources (in the management of work
orders). The results have highlighted a clear improvement in the indices which
measure the quality of maintenance.

RBI on large scale crude oil tanks have been also developed in China (Jian et al.
2011). Periodic Internal Inspection Method often results in under-inspection or over-
inspection for large-scale crude oil tank. Therefore, how to determine reasonable
internal inspection interval (INTII) has great significance on balancing the safe

6
operation requirement and inspection cost for crude oil tanks. Here, RBI (risk-based
inspection) technology is used to quantitatively assess the risk of crude oil tanks in an
oil depot in China. The risk comparison between tank shell and bottom shows that the
risk of tank depends on the risk of tank bottom. The prediction procedure of INTII for
crude oil tanks is also presented. The INTII predicted by RBI method is gradually
extended with the increasing of the acceptable risk level. The method to determine the
acceptable risk of crude oil tanks is proposed, by which 3.54Eþ04 are taken as the
acceptable risk of the oil depot. The safety factor of 0.8 is proposed to determine the
final INTIIs for 18 crude oil tanks. The INTII requirement in China code SY/T 5921,
5e7 years, is very conservative and lower than predicted service life of tanks. The
INTIIs predicted by Gumbel method are smaller than by RBI method for tanks with
short INTII. Therefore, the study recommends RBI method to predict the INTII for
crude oil tanks.

In Australia (Marlow et al. 2011), risk based prioritization and its application to
inspection of valves in water sector have been initiated. Isolation valves facilitate the
effective operation and maintenance of water supply networks, but their sheer number
presents a significant asset management challenge. If left unmanaged, valve reliability
issues can become widespread. Inspections provide a means of increasing reliability,
but a survey of industry practices indicated that some utilities did not have such a
program in place. To improve asset management and reduce business risk exposure,
such utilities need an effective means of commencing inspection programs. From a
theoretical perspective, risk concepts provide a means of optimizing maintenance
effort. However, in the face of poor data on reliability or condition, pragmatic
approaches to risk-based prioritization are needed. One such approach, risk indexing,
is considered in this paper. Background on the research is been reviewed, including
the application of risk-based inspection concepts within the water sector. The
development of a risk indexing scheme is then investigated, drawing on two industry
workshops in which the analytical hierarchy process was used to set relative weights.
It is concluded that risk indexing provides the basis for a rational prioritization process
in the absence of data on valve reliability or condition.

A risk-based inspection system and a piping inspection guideline model were

developed in Taiwan (Shiaw et al. 2006). The research procedure consists of two
parts—the building of a risk-based inspection model for piping and the construction

7
of a risk-based piping inspection guideline model. Field visits at the plant were
conducted to develop the risk-based inspection and strategic analysis system. A
knowledge-based model had been built in accordance with international standards and
local government regulations, and the rational unified process was applied for
reducing the discrepancy in the development of the models. The models had been
designed to analyze damage factors, damage models, and potential damage positions
of piping in the petrochemical plants. The purpose of this study was to provide
inspection-related personnel with the optimal planning tools for piping inspections,
hence, to enable effective predictions of potential piping risks and to enhance the better
degree of safety in plant operations that the petrochemical industries can be expected
to achieve. A risk analysis was conducted on the piping system of a petrochemical
plant. The outcome indicated that most of the risks resulted from a small number of
pipelines.

2.2 Heat Recovery Steam Generator (HRSG)

The main function of a gas turbine HRSG (API 534 2007) is to utilize the sensible
heat from turbine exhaust gas to generate steam. Supplemental heat input from an
internal duct burner is also routinely used to provide additional heat input. A gas
turbine HRSG, in its simplest form, consists of a casing enclosure to collect, contain,
direct and conserve the heat in the hot exhaust gas; banks of tubes in which the steam
is generated; a steam drum to supply water to the tubes and separate the steam from
the steam/water mixture after it has passed through the tube banks; and an exhaust
stack. The two basic types of HRSGs are horizontal and vertical as defined by the
direction of the flue gas flow. Single and multi-pressure steam systems are possible.
Tube orientation can be in-line or staggered. Horizontal exhaust flow units are more
common than vertical exhaust flow units for larger gas turbines. Most of these
incorporate natural circulation. Tubes are arranged vertically. Vertical units generally
require forced circulation. They can occupy smaller footprints than horizontal units.
Tubes are arranged horizontally.

Modular design is standard. Modular sections are transported and lifted into place.
Module size may be maximized as limited by transportation limits and fabrication
plans. A typical HRSG system includes:

8
  Superheater that heats the steam above saturation temperature.
 Attemporator to control superheater steam temperature.
 Multiple pressure steam generation.
 Economizer to preheat the boiler feed water.
 Steam drum(s), headers and blowdown system.
 Deaerator (where applicable).
 Interconnecting piping, valves, instrumentation.
 Casing, structure, expansion joints.
 Dampers (where applicable).
 Ladders and platforms.

Supplementary firing burner and burner management system (BMS) (where

applicable) used to provide supplemental heat for peaking conditions or additional
steam production.

Flow distribution grid used to evenly distribute and straighten the flue gas flow where
required to:

 tube banks,
 supplementary firing burners, and
 Circulation pumps (where applicable).
 Emission reduction equipment
 Stack(s).

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3.0 METHODOLOGY

3.1 RBI Methodology

RBI methodology balances between the complexity of a fully quantitative analysis,

which is data dependent, and lack of discrimination of a fully qualitative analysis,
which is expert dependent as shown in Figure 3. The methodology employed is semi-
quantitative.

Engineering
RBI
Analysis
Discrimination

Expert Opinion RCM

Complexity

Figure 3: Illustration of Discrimination vs Complexity of RBI Methodology

10
RBI processes focus on continuously improving and optimising inspection program.
The methodology incorporates inspection planning strategies to provide consistency
in optimizing operating cost and managing risk.

In RBI, software analysis tool and integrated inspection database are used to automate
the analysis and planning work steps and develop recommendations but it is
recommended that expert are consulted by the RBI Team before decision is finalised.

•Define and agree Scope

Scope

 Corrosion
•Data gathering & verification
Asset Integrity study
Database

•Corrosion loop development

 Process
RBI  Criticality assessment study &
Assessemtn &
Inspection
criticality
Planning

 Inspection Planning

Figure 4: RBI Methodology Flow Chart

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3.2 Data Gathering

The following sources of essential data/information were used in this study to carry
out the risk assessment of HRSG:

Table 1: Data used for RBI Assessment

No Essential Data Details

1 Design and a) P&IDs, PFDs, MDRs
Construction b) Piping list, specifications & isometric
Records/Drawings drawings.
c) (Materials of construction records.
d) Codes and standards used.
e) Inventory records.
f) Layout.
g) Equipment drawings.
h) Coating, linings and insulation
specifications
2 Process Data a) Operating parameters e.g. pressure,
temperature, flow rates
- Design
- Operating
- Upset conditions

3 Inspection Records. a) Inspection history & findings.

b) Repairs, replacement, re-rating and
alterations.
c) Corrosion monitoring records
d) Plant and equipment specific failure data.

4 Management of change (a) Process changes

(MOC) records.
5 Economic impact (a) Loss of production/opportunity.

3.2.1 Quality Check

Data quality has a direct relation to the relative accuracy of the RBI analysis. Although
the data requirements are quite different for the various types of RBI analysis, quality
of input data is equally important. It is beneficial to the integrity of a RBI analysis to
assure that the data are up to date and validated by experts.

As is true in any inspection program, data validation is essential for a number of

reasons. Among the reasons are outdated drawings and documentation, inspector

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error, clerical error, and measurement equipment accuracy. Another potential source
of error in the analysis is assumptions on equipment history. For example if baseline
inspections were not performed or documented, nominal thickness may be used for
the original thickness. This assumption can significantly impact the calculated
corrosion rate early in the equipment’s life. The effect may be to mask a high corrosion
rate or to inflate a low corrosion rate. A similar situation exists when the remaining
life of a piece of equipment with a low corrosion rate requires inspection more
frequently. The measurement error may result in the calculated corrosion rate
appearing artificially high or low.

This validation process stresses the need for a expert comparing data from the
inspections to the expected deterioration mechanism and rates. This person may also
compare the results with previous measurements on that system, similar systems at the
site or within the company or published data. Statistics may be useful in this review.
This review should also factor in any changes or upsets in the process.

3.3 Corrosion Study

3.3.1 Corrosion Group Development

Corrosion Groups (CG) shall be developed for static equipment and piping during the
materials and corrosion study. The group development is based on the material of
construction, the operating conditions and the properties of the chemicals (fluids).
Prior to developing the group, it is recommended for a short plant visit to have a better
picture on plant operation besides having understanding on historical problematic
areas. CG should document the CG name, description and potential damage
mechanism for particular CG.

Identification of damage mechanism

The damage mechanisms of interest are those which developed over a period of time,
gradually weakening the pressure boundary integrity of components until failure
occurs.

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Based on an assessment of the components, the internal fluids and the operating
conditions, the following potentially active damage mechanisms should be identified:

 Internal Thinning, being either general or localised

 External damage
 Atmospheric corrosion

Subject matter expert should identify the potential damage mechanisms and damage
rates during the materials and corrosion study. Discussion with team members is
required to identify and confirm the damage mechanisms.

Internal Corrosion

Generally all equipment and piping is subjected to internal corrosion analysis. The
type of thinning is subdivided into general, localised or pitting based on its material of
construction and corrodents.

General thinning is defined as corrosion affecting more than 10% of the surface area
and localised thinning is defined as corrosion affecting less than 10% of the surface
area

External Corrosion

For non-insulated equipment and piping, they are assessed for external corrosion for
which a predicted corrosion rate is used.

3.3.2 Recommend corrosion rate to apply – Actual (Inspection data) vs.

Prediction

In RBI, there are two types of measured corrosion rates to be considered, namely Short
Term Average and Long Term Average Corrosion Rates, which are defined as follows:

14
In absence of measured corrosion rates, a predicted rate shall be used for RBI
assessment.

The logic applied to selecting a corrosion rate is shown in Figure 4. The approach is
conservative for the following reasons:

1) The “predicted corrosion rate” is based on a review of a literature source

2) In the case where there are multiple measured corrosion rates available, the
expert shall decide on the most appropriate corrosion rate to be used that best
reflect the current condition.

3) In cases where a measured corrosion rate as well as predicted corrosion rate are
available the approach is as below:

a) If the measured corrosion rate value is higher than predicted corrosion rate then the
measured corrosion rate value will be applied upon verification and consultation with
expert, and high confidence factors in the measured corrosion rate.

b) If the measured corrosion rate value is lower than the predicted corrosion rate but
the inspection carried out had a high confidence factor as defined in Inspection
Confidence Criteria (see Appendix A) then the measured corrosion rate value will be
applied.

c) If the measured corrosion rate value is lower than predicted corrosion rate and also
the inspection carried out had a low confidence factor as defined in Inspection
Confidence Criteria then the expert corrosion rate value will be applied.

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 Figure 5: Flowchart for Corrosion Rate Selection

3.4 Risk Assessment

3.4.1 Probability of Failure (PoF)

The probability of failure of an item shall be carried out by analysing all types of
damage mechanisms present as a result of its operations (temperature, pressure, etc.),
process environment (corrosive gases, contaminants, water, etc.), materials of
construction, type of equipment (e.g. column, vessel, heat exchanger, storage tank,
piping, etc.) and its physical configurations.

Corrosion often concentrates at certain locations such as at dead legs, stagnant areas,
condensation areas, bends, impingement areas, injection location, liquid-gas interface,
under insulation and etc.

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As such all these potential locations shall be considered when undertaking corrosion
study and determining the probability of failure.

For RBI, the PoF analysis shall be carried out for the following analysis whichever
appropriate:

1) Internal corrosion - Thinning

2) External Corrosion - Thinning

The combined effect of more than one damage mechanisms above is considered when
evaluating the overall probability result.

3.4.1.1 Internal Thinning PoF Analysis

In order to determine the Internal Corrosion Probability Category (ICPC), a few items
need to be calculated. The following steps required in order to calculate the ICPC.

Wall Ratio

The minimum wall thickness is calculated based on pressure, mechanical and

structural considerations using the appropriate design formula and code allowable
stress. Once the minimum allowable wall thickness has been determined, the
remaining wall thickness is calculated based on initial thickness less the wall loss due
to internal corrosion (that is internal corrosion rate multiplied by the number of years
it is in the current service). A ratio of the remaining wall thickness to the minimum
wall thickness is calculated and for any value of less than one, the item being evaluated
shall be reviewed whether the data used is correct and it is safe for continued operation
through Fitness for Service(FFS) analysis.

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Fractional Wall Loss

The fractional wall loss is determined as follows:

Fractional Wall Loss = estimated wall loss / initial thickness

= ar/t

where;

a = age in years

r = corrosion rate

t = initial thickness

Inspection Confidence

The number of internal inspection and its associated level of confidence performed on
the item shall be determined. For internal corrosion probability analysis, only the
inspection for detecting and quantifying internal corrosion are counted. The
confidence level ranging from very high, high, medium or low is determined by
evaluating the damage mechanism, type of equipment, type of inspection done and its
coverage. A reference standard on how to evaluate the effectiveness shall be used to
ensure consistency in assigning the confidence level. For the evaluation, the allowable
Inspection Confidence categories and their capabilities to assess damage are defined
as follows:

Table 2: Inspection Confidence Category (API 581)

Confidence Category Correctly Identify Damage

(at least)
Very High 90%
High 70%
Medium 50%
Low 35%

As an example, a very high inspection confidence shall be able to provide the evaluator
confidence to determine whether damage is present and assess its extent with 90%
probability. For RBI, the guideline to evaluate the number and confidence of
inspection is included in Appendix A.

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Internal Corrosion Factor

The Internal Corrosion factor is determined based on fractional wall loss, number of
inspection and inspection confidence undertaken as specified in Appendix B.

Internal Corrosion Probability Category

For RBI software, the Internal Corrosion Probability Category is then determined
based on the following table:

Table 3: Internal Corrosion Probability Category (API 581)

Internal Corrosion Internal Corrosion

Factor Probability Category

1-9 B
10-99 C
100-999 D
1000 + E

The Internal Corrosion Probability Category starts as a “B” if the equipment is in

essentially “Like New” condition. For RBI, the Internal Corrosion Probability
Category can then be reduced by one category (such as from “B” to a “A”) if the wall
ratio is greater than 1.5 and the corrosion rate is less than 0.125 mm/yr.

3.4.1.2 External Thinning PoF Analysis

In order to determine the External Corrosion Probability Category (ECPC), a few

items need to be calculated. The following shows the steps required in order to
calculate the ECPC. However, the steps do not apply to stainless steel items (insulated
or non-insulated) exposed to external environment containing significant amount of
Chloride.

19
Wall Ratio

The wall ratio calculation for external corrosion is similar to the wall ratio calculation
for internal corrosion section. However, instead of the number of years in service, the
external age shall be considered as the years since the exterior surface of the equipment
was known to be in “like new” condition. This could be based on installation age, or
the date the equipment was recoated and insulated. A paint or coating provides credit
by reducing the “external” age in service to the original age, less the anticipated life
of the coating. Coating life is anticipated to be 1 to 10 years, depending on the type of
system that has been applied.

Table 4: External Protection Credit (API 581)

Coating Condition External Protection Credit (years)

None 1
Average 5
Best 10

Fractional Wall Loss

The fractional wall loss is determined as follows:

Fractional Wall Loss= estimated wall loss / initial thickness

= ar/t

a = External Age

r = corrosion rate

t = initial thickness

For non-insulated equipment and piping, the rate can be determined based on actual
measurement or an expert value provided by the corrosion engineer

Inspection Confidence

The number of external inspection and its associated level of confidence performed on
the item shall be determined in a similar manner as for internal inspection confidence.

20
External Corrosion Factor

The External Corrosion factor is determined based on fractional wall loss, number of
inspection and inspection confidence undertaken as specified in Appendix B.

External Corrosion Probability Category

The External Corrosion Probability Category is then determined in a similar manner

as for Internal Corrosion.

3.4.1.3 Other Damage Mechanisms

All types of Damage Mechanisms that are identified as potential or active for the item
being evaluated shall be considered during probability analysis. The following is a list
of damage mechanisms to be included in probability analysis, but not limited to:

 Creep
 Spheroidization (Softening)
 Short Term Overheating

The user shall assign the probability of failure category for the damage mechanisms
based on operator’s experience and engineering assessment. A qualified corrosion
engineer shall be consulted when determining the item’s susceptibility to any damage
mechanisms.

Prior inspection data or published data of other units that operate with similar
operating conditions can be used to determine the item susceptibility to the damage
mechanism.

3.4.2 Consequence of Failure (COF)

The Consequence of Failure (CoF) analysis in RBI is performed to aid in establishing

a relative ranking of the equipment items on the basis of risk. Generally, the CoF
analysis is evaluated as loss of fluid or containment to the external environment and
the consequence effects is generally considered for the following:

1) Safety and health impact (Flammability and toxicity).

21
2) Environmental impact.

3) Production losses

For example, if a pressure vessel is subjected to deterioration of general or localised

corrosion either from internal or external part that causes a leak, a variety of
consequences could occur. Some of the possible consequences are:

 Formation of a vapour cloud that could ignite causing injury and equipment
damage.
 Release of a toxic chemical that could cause health problems.
 Result in a spill and could cause environmental deterioration.
 Force a shutdown and have an adverse economic impact.
 Incidents that result in minimal safety, health, environmental and/or
economic impact.

In RBI, the CoF is calculated by taking into account the Safety Consequences of a
release of a hazardous fluid that generally falls into either Flammability or Toxicity
categories, or both, and the Production Loss Consequences of the equipment being
evaluated. The final consequence category (A to E) is based on the highest of the
flammable, toxic and production loss consequences, which provide a relatively
ranking of CoF of the equipment item. The six CoF categories are shown in the table
below:

Table 5: COF Category (API 581)

Category Consequence
5 Catastrophic
4 Very Serious
3 Serious
2 Significant
1 Minor
0 No consequence

22
3.4.2.1 Determining CoF Ranking for Fixed Equipment

Generally, for fixed equipment the CoF categories analysed are safety consequence
and production loss consequence. This applies to:

 Pressure Vessel
 Boiler i.e. HRSG

Safety Consequence

The following data is required to perform the safety consequence rating for the fixed
equipment items:

 Representative fluid
 Initial state of representative fluid
 Final state of representative fluid
 Mixed toxic fluid, if any
 Percentage (%) of toxic composition
 Operating pressure
 Operating temperature
 Fluid inventory
 Leak duration

The contents of the equipment need to be characterized as a representative fluid. The

main constituent of the process will generally also be the representative fluid. There
are two categories of safety consequence that are analysed in RBI, namely flammable
and toxic categories.

a. Flammable category

The consequences of flammable fluid are measured in terms of the area affected by
the ignition of a release. There are several potential outcomes for any release involving
a flammable fluid, however, RBI determines a single combined result as the average
of all possible outcomes, and weighted according to how likely the release is to be
ignited.

The probability of ignition is a function of the representative fluid being considered

for release and its operating temperature. In general, as the temperature of the released

23
fluid increases, the probability of ignition increases. Proximity to ignition sources is
covered in the analysis by allowing a selection of “Near Ignition Source”, which sets
the probability of ignition for that release scenario to 1.0. The probability of an
outcome represents the probability that a specific physical phenomenon (outcome)
will be observed after the release has occurred.

Flammable consequence results are not highly sensitive to the exact fluid selected,
provided the molecular weights are similar, because air dispersion properties and heats
of combustion are similar for all hydrocarbons with similar molecular weights. It is
important to the consequence calculation that the correct initial state of the fluid (i.e.
gas or liquid) be selected that is generally determined from the process conditions
(pressure, temperature and fluid composition).

b. Toxic category

The toxic category is not applicable for this study.

Production Loss Consequences

In addition to the safety consequences of a release of a hazardous fluid, a production

loss consequence can be assigned to the equipment being analysed. For production
loss category, the calculation is based on total downtime of equipment when the
equipment experienced a failure. Specifically, the downtime for equipment is the total
time taken to shut down the plant, carry out repair works, perform an inspection and
resume normal operation. In other words, it is a “product to product” situation. The
downtime is measured in hours and the total hours are converted to production loss
value, in terms of money, by taking into account the production cost per day for the
plant or platform.

The calculation for the production loss is done within the RBI software. The potential
downtime, production loss and associated repair costs due to failure is input into the
RBI software. The production loss consequence category will be assigned
automatically by the RBI software based on the category selected as shown below.

24
 Table 6: Production Loss (API 581)

Consequence Category Production Loss (USD) per

event
5 > 10,000,000.00
4 1,000,000.00 – 10,000,000.00
3 100,000.00 – 1,000,000.00
2 10,000.00 – 100,000.00
1 <0.01 – 10,000.00
0 0

For a combined CoF, RBI analysis will always go for the worst case between
Flammability, Toxicity and Production Loss where the software will choose the
highest CoF ranking of the three categories

3.4.3 Risk Categorisation

3.4.3.1 Risk Matrix

The Risk for each equipment component is derived by combining the Probability
Category and Consequence Category of the component. The Risk Rating for the
component is then plotted into a risk matrix. To achieve adequate resolution of detail,
a 6 x 5 matrix is used.

The matrix has Probability Category on the vertical axis and Consequence Category
on the horizontal axis. The overall risk for an equipment item is the combination of
the Combined Probability and Combined Consequence.

The risk matrix is divided into four categories – High, Medium, Low and Very Low.

3.4.3.2 Inspection Priority

Each of the thirty boxes in the matrix is assigned a number called the Inspection
Priority. Items with the highest risk category are assigned an Inspection Priority of 1
and items with the lowest risk category are assigned an Inspection Priority of 30, i.e.
the lower the number, the higher the Inspection Priority. The purpose of assigning
inspection priority is to enable prioritisation of inspection between different equipment
items. When developing the inspection plan, priority is given to items with higher
Inspection Priority over those with lower Inspection Priority.

25
 Figure 6: RBI Risk Matrix – Inspection Priorities (RBI Software)

3.5 Inspection Management

3.5.1 Inspection Planning

An Inspection Reference Plan (IRP) shall be developed for each equipment item based
on the results of the RBI analysis. For each degradation mechanism, the RBI software
will recommend the inspection method(s), extent and frequency of inspection based
on the Inspection Priority. This is done using a set of inspection strategies built into
the software.

The Inspection Engineer shall review the software generated inspection plan and may
accept or modify the recommended plan as necessary. The finalised inspection plan
shall contain the following items:

 Damage Mechanism

The software will identify the respective degradation mechanisms for which
scheduled inspection is required. This is based on the degradation mechanism
identified and analysed in the RBI Software analysis.

26
  Inspection Priority

The inspection priority is generated based on the risk result for each degradation
mechanism.

 Location

The selection of appropriate inspection location will be determined by RBI engineer,

based on input from relevant resources such as qualified Piping or Vessel inspectors,
available information on critical spots from inspection records, and experience learnt
from similar units or piping at same or other plants.

 Method

The inspection engineer shall review the method recommended by the software
to determine whether the method is appropriate for the equipment component,
taking into account factors such as accessibility, availability and cost. If deemed
necessary, the inspection method recommended may be substituted with another
inspection method that can give equivalent or higher confidence of inspection.
However, if there arise cases where the method recommended need to be replaced
with another method with lower inspection confidence, the inspection interval should
be decreased, so that an equivalent cumulative inspection confidence will be reached
over time.

27
  Extent

The extent of inspection should be adequate to achieve the desired inspection

confidence for the respective risk rating. For example, for a vessel with an ICPC
of Medium, a medium confidence internal inspection is required, in this case
50% internal visual inspection coverage with spot UT measurements.

 Availability

For each inspection method, the inspection engineer shall identify whether the
inspection can be performed online, whether the equipment needs to be taken off-line,
or whether a plant shutdown is required.

 Last Inspection Date

The last inspection date is recorded in the inspection plan based on the inspection
history of the equipment item.

 Due Date

The due date for each inspection method is identified, which is obtained by
adding the inspection interval (in years) to the last inspection date.

 Inspection Interval (Frequency)

The software recommends the inspection interval based on the risk rating e.g. for a
risk rating of High, the software recommends an interval of 5 years, while for a risk
rating of Medium, the software recommends an interval of 10 years. If NDE data has
been recorded for the equipment, the software will use the half-life as calculated
by the NDE module, if the half-life is less than the interval calculated based on the
risk rating. The Inspection Engineer shall review the recommended inspection interval
to comply with statutory requirements and company business strategy.

28
4.0RESULTS

4.1 Define & Agree Scope

For the RBI assessment for this particular HRSG, it has been agreed that it will cover
17 components which are shown in Table 7. The location of every component is shown
in Figure 7:

Table 7: Components analysed

No Component

1 Economiser Header M11

2 Economiser Header M16

3 Economiser Header Tube M11

4 Economiser Header Tube M16
5 Evaporator Header M10
6 Evaporator Header M5
7 Evaporator Header M7
8 Evaporator Header M8
9 Evaporator Header Tube M10
10 Evaporator Header Tube M5
11 Evaporator Header Tube M7
12 Evaporator Header Tube M8
13 Primary SH Header M1
14 Primary SH Header Tubes M1
15 Secondary SH Header M4
16 Secondary SH Header Tubes M4
17 Steam Drum Shell

M: Module, SH: Superheater

29
 Steam Drum Shell

Secondary SH Header Tube

Evaporator Header Tube
Secondary SH Header
(Module 3-4)
Evaporator Header
(Module 5-10)
Primary SH Header Tube

Economiser Header Tube

Primary SH Header
(Module 1-2)
Economiser Header
(Module 11-16)

Figure 7: Component’s Location in HRSG

30
4.2 Data Gathering & Verification

Data gathered for the RBI assessment are as below;

a) Design & Construction Record/Drawings

The design and construction data then uploaded into the software. Below shown the data that been recorded such as Design Pressure,
Design Temperature, Material Specification, Material Grade, Initial Wall Thickness and Diameter. These data are essential for the
analysis

Table 8: Design/Construction Data

Component Design Pressure Design Temperature Material Materials Initial Wall Thickness Diameter
(barg) (°C) Spec Grade (mm) (mm)

Economiser Header M11 67 258 SA 106 B 25 324

Economiser Header M16 67 258 SA 106 B 25 324
Economiser Header Tube 67 258 SA 192 - 3 51
M11
Economiser Header Tube 67 258 SA 192 - 3 51
M16
Evaporator Header M10 67 275 SA 106 B 25 324
Evaporator Header M5 67 275 SA 106 B 25 324
Evaporator Header M7 67 275 SA 106 B 25 324
Evaporator Header M8 67 275 SA 106 B 25 324
Evaporator Header Tube 67 275 SA 192 - 3 51
M10

31
Evaporator Header Tube 67 275 SA 192 - 3 51
M5
Evaporator Header Tube 67 275 SA 192 - 3 51
M7
Evaporator Header Tube 67 275 SA 192 - 3 51
M8
Primary SH Header M1 67 452 SA 335 P11 40 324
Primary SH Header Tubes 67 452 SA 213 T11 3 45
M1
Secondary SH Header M4 67 460 SA 335 P11 25 273
Secondary SH Header 67 460 SA 213 T11 3 45
Tubes M4
Steam Drum Shell 67 284 SA 299 - 65 2300

32
b) Process Data

Apart from that, the process data are also been recorded such as operating pressure, operating temperature, representative fluid, fluid
phase and date the equipment start its service.

Table 9: Process Data

Component Operating Pressure (barg) Operating Temperature (°C) Representative Fluid Fluid Phase Date In Service

Primary SH Header M1 67 452 Steam Gas 01/11/1999

Primary SH Header Tubes M1 67 452 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Secondary SH Header M4 67 460 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Secondary SH Header Tubes M4 67 460 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Economiser Header M11 67 258 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Economiser Header M16 67 258 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header M10 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header M8 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header Tube M10 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header Tube M5 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header Tube M7 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header Tube M8 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Steam Drum Shell 67 284 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Economiser Header Tube M11 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Economiser Header Tube M16 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999

33
 Evaporator Header M5 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999
Evaporator Header M7 67 275 Steam Gas 01/11/1999

c) Inspection Records

Inspection records are one of the important record which would drive its POF analysis. The thickness data will determine the corrosion
rate and subsequently the internal thinning probability analysis (internal corrosion probability category). The defect & repair history will
be recorded into the system as a history profile of the equipment.

i) Thickness Data – Refer Appendix C

ii) Defect & Repair History

Table 10: HRSG Failures and Repair History

Failure Repair
No. Date Completion Date Location Type of Failure(s) Type of Repair(s)
(When?) (When?)
HRSG e
1 25 May 2001 30 May 2001 HRSG-Economiser tube leaked (various location) Grind and build up weld

2 02 October 07 October 2001 HRSG-Economiser tube leaked (various location) Grind and build up weld
2001
3 15 Januari 22 Januari 2002 HRSG-Economiser tube leaked (various location) Grind and build up weld
2002
4 03 April 03 April 2002 Perforation on HRSG superheater tube no. 9, 8 and 5 at Plug tube no. 9, row no. 1, module no. 1,
2002 row no. 1, module no. 1. Defects located at near bottom partial retubing on tube no. 8 and 5, row
header no. 1, module no. 1 from tube no. 9
leftover. Perform hydrotest.

34
5 03 April 10 April 2002 Perforated HRSG superheater tube no. 1, row 1, module Partial retubing on tube no. 1, row no. 1,
2002 2 found during hydrotest for repair item no. 5. module no. 2. Also partial retubing on
15th other tubes that has less than 2.9mm
thickness.
6 12 February to 3 Economiser modules total replacement.
March 2003

7 21 May 2004 25 May 2004 Steam cut at HRSG steam drum RV nozzles Rebuild weld of the nozzles and hydrotest.

8 26 May 2004 26 May 2004 Perforated HRSG evaporator tube no. 1, 1st row module Plugged the perforated tube and hydrotest.
no. 5 druing hydrotest after repair item no. 7.

9 26 May 2004 28 May 2004 Perforated HRSG evaporator tube no. 20 and 22, row Partial retubing on evaporator tube no. 20
no. 1, module no. 2 found during hydrotest after repair and 22, row no. 1, module no. 2 and
item no. 8. hydrotest. Result OK.
10 2 to 6 6 February 2005 Found grind mark near thermal couple clip at HRSG Build up weld on grind mark at tube no.
February superheater tube no. 6, 11 and 16, row 1, module no. 1. 6, 11, 16. row no. 1, module no. 1.
2005 Slightly bend HRSG superheatert tube no. 31, 30, 29,
and 28, row no. 1, module no. 1.

11 20-23 June 23 June 2005 Localised and scattered pitting observed at manhole, Partial retubing at previously build up
2005 bottom shell wall, swel seams and distributor pipe welding of grind mark of thermocouple
(depth less than 1.0 mm). At HRSG economiser, tube clip at tube no.2, 6, 11, and 16, row 1,
no. 18, module no. 16, found bowing. At evaporator, module 1.
multiple tubes at the middle of bowing module no. 10
bowed towards north.

35
12 18 July 2006 15 August 2006 Steam Drum 1) Intermittent Lack of Penetration and broken root at 1) Nozzle cut off and rewelded. PWHT
approximately 50% of weldment of nozzle 9. Maximum performed after welding.
depth 1.5 mm. 2) Pinholes were ground off and built up
2) Isolated pinholes noted on east and west manhole weld. 3)
with diameter 0.5 mm to 1.5 mm and depth where Manhole raised face was resurfaced.
visible 1.5 mm. 3) East manhole raised face noted Boiler was hydrotested fully.
with scratch marks across gasket face (3 locations).
Superheater 1) Tube bowing badly on: 1) Tubes replaced (13 nos.)
Mod. 2 Row 1 Tube 1, 2 & 3; 2) To be monitored.
Mod. 2 Row 2 Tube 1, 2 & 3;
Mod. 1 Row 1 Tube 6, 9, 13, 15, 17, 18 and 19;
2) Tube slightly bowing at Mod. 1, Row 1 Tube 11, 30
and 31.

Evaporator 1) Tube leak found during pre-HT at Mod. 7 Row 1 1) Partial retubing with 5 tubes cut for
Tube 19 (crack at weld to bottom header) access.

13 22 Sept 2006 17 Dec 2006 Economizer Severe leak detected. Found leak point at Mod 15 Row Partial retubing of defect tube, and HT on
3 Tube 1 (crack at weld to bottom header) Economizer modules only. Mod 16 jacked
for access and 2 Golden Joints.

14 29 Dec 2007 Superheater Tubes slightly bowing & out of guide plate: To be monitored
1) Module 1, Row 1, Tube 2,3,4,7,8,30 & 31 from west
2) Module 1, row2, tube 31& 32 from west
3) Module 2, row 1, tube 4 & 5 from west

15 9 April 2008 18-Apr-08 Superheater Superheater tube no 7, module 1, row 1 out out slot Install new U clamp & welding attach to
tube slot
16 16 Feb 2009 23 Mac 2009 Economizer Severe leak detected. Found leak point at Mod 15 Row Partial retubing done on defect tube and
1 Tube 1 (crack at toe weld to bottom header) HT on all Economizer, Evaporator &
superheater modules. Module 14 jacked
for access. HT satisfactory

36
 1) Module 15, row 1, tube 4: Grind and build up weld
Overlap capping of weldment at top toe butt joint.This
tube completely fabricated by vendor
2) Module 15, Row 1, tube 17:
Incomplete fillet groove & lack of side wall fusion was
noted at at weldment (butt joint). This tube completely
fabricated by vendor
3) Module 15, row 1, tube 9:
Round indication approx 4.5mm dia. This tube
completely fabricated by vendor

Steam Drum Perforated localize pitting at toe weldment Grind and build up weld
approximately orientation 4 o'clock position (view via
east side). DPI found 5mm dia round indication (reject
as per code)

Superheater Tube 1, row 1 & 2, module 2 came out of slot Pull back tube into slot, tack weld short
Tube 3 & 4, row 2, module 2 came out of slot piece
17 9-Aug-2010 3-Sep-2010 Evaporator Tube no 21, Module 7, Row 1 leak at parent metal. Sacrifice 5 nos of tube using capping
(Module 7, Row 3, Tube 20 & 21 +
Module 7, Row 2, Tube 21 & 22 +
Module 7, Row 1, Tube 21) & partial
retubing at Module 7, Row 3, Tube 22
Steam Drum 2 no’s of pin hole <7 mm diameter at demister pad fillet Grind and build up weld
weld joint
Superheater Tube dislodge from guide plate at Module 2, Row 1, Reinstall back tube in its original position
Tube 4,5 & 6 and at Module 2, Row 2, Tube 3 & 4. & tack weld guide plate.
18 8-Nov-2011 22-Nov-2011 Superheater Tack weld plate between guide plate and baffle plate To reweld as per original condition.
was broken off between T5 & T6 (M1, R1)
Steam Drum Sign of mechanical damage to the serration at both side To resurface at both side flange.
flanges face (neck & blind flange) approx < 12mm
length.

37
Signs of scattered pitting corrosion at filler weld joint of Grin flush at defect area.
rung attach to header with roundness indication is < 15
mm diameter. But defect does not involve pressure part
material.

38
4.3 Corrosion Study (Identifying Damage Mechanism)

The corrosion study is part of the important assessment in determining the POF. Prior the corrosion study, all the component data need
to be collected and recorded such as Material specification, materials grade, Operating pressure (barg), operating temperature, process
service, date in service and corrosion group that the component tied to as shown in Table 11.

Table 11: Component Data

Component Material Materials Operating Operating Process Date In Corrosion Group

Spec Grade Pressure (barg) Temperature (°C) Service Service
Economiser Header SA 106 B 67.00 258.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
M11
Economiser Header SA 106 B 67.00 258.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
M16
Economiser Header SA 192 - 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Tube M11
Economiser Header SA 192 - 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Tube M16
Evaporator Header SA 106 B 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
M10
Evaporator Header M5 SA 106 B 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Evaporator Header M7 SA 106 B 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Evaporator Header M8 SA 106 B 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Evaporator Header SA 192 - 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Tube M10
Evaporator Header SA 192 - 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Tube M5
Evaporator Header SA 192 - 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Tube M7
Evaporator Header SA 192 - 67.00 275.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004
Tube M8

39
 Primary SH Header M1 SA 335 P11 67.00 452.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-SST/LA-
005
Primary SH Header SA 213 T11 67.00 452.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-SST/LA-
Tubes M1 005
Secondary SH Header SA 335 P11 67.00 460.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-SST/LA-
M4 005
Secondary SH Header SA 213 T11 67.00 460.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-SST/LA-
Tubes M4 005
Steam Drum Shell SA 299 - 67.00 284.0 Steam 01/11/1999 CUFG-ST/CS-004

The internal thinning assessment data for corrosion study specify the damage mechanism, comment/historical data, corrosion rate and
corrosion rate type that be used for the assessment.

Table 12: Internal Thinning Assessment

Component Damage Comment Corrosion Rate Corrosion Rate

Mechanism (mm/yr) Type
Economiser Header M11 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eco tubes 0.010 Expected
Economiser Header M16 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eco tubes 0.010 Expected
Economiser Header Tube M11 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eco tubes 0.010 Expected
Economiser Header Tube M16 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eco tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header M10 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header M5 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header M7 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header M8 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected

40
 Evaporator Header Tube M10 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header Tube M5 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header Tube M7 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Evaporator Header Tube M8 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at Eva tubes 0.010 Expected
Primary SH Header M1 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at SH tubes 0.010 Expected
Primary SH Header Tubes M1 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at SH tubes 0.010 Expected
Secondary SH Header M4 General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at SH tubes 0.010 Expected
Secondary SH Header Tubes General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at SH tubes 0.010 Expected
M4
Steam Drum Shell General Corrosion History showed perforated pit at inside steam 0.010 Expected
drum

The external thinning assessment data for corrosion study specify the damage mechanism, corrosion rate and corrosion rate type that be
used for the assessment.

Table 13: External thinning assessment

Component Damage Mechanism Comment Corrosion Rate (mm/yr) Corrosion Rate Type

Economiser Header M11 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Economiser Header M16 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Economiser Header Tube M11 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Economiser Header Tube M16 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header M10 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

41
Evaporator Header M5 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header M7 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header M8 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header Tube M10 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header Tube M5 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header Tube M7 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Evaporator Header Tube M8 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Primary SH Header M1 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Primary SH Header Tubes M1 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Secondary SH Header M4 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Secondary SH Header Tubes M4 HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

Steam Drum Shell HT Oxidation 0.010 Expected

42
The other damage mechanism assessment data for corrosion study specify the damage mechanism, comment/historical data and the
potential that be used for the assessment.

Table 15: Other Damage Mechanism Assessment

Component Damage Mechanism Comment Potential

Primary SH Header M1 Creep N/A

Short Term Overheating Due to uneven heat flow cause localised thermal expansion Low
Spheroidization (Softening) Low
Primary SH Header Tubes M1 Creep N/A
Short Term Overheating Due to uneven heat flow cause localised thermal expansion Low
Spheroidization (Softening) Low
Secondary SH Header M4 Creep N/A
Short Term Overheating Due to uneven heat flow cause localised thermal expansion Low
Spheroidization (Softening) Low
Secondary SH Header Tubes M4 Creep N/A
Short Term Overheating Due to uneven heat flow cause localised thermal expansion Low
Spheroidization (Softening) Low
Steam Drum Shell Thermal Fatigue At downcomer nozzle-to-shell weld joint Low

43
4.3.1 Corrosion Group Description

The corrosion group is been analysed by the corrosion specialist. Below figures are the corrosion group for the HRSG that be used for
the Corrosion Study.

Figure 8: Corrosion Group for Superheated Steam in Low Alloy

44
Figure 9: Corrosion Group for Steam in Carbon Steel

45
4.3.2 Corrosion Rate Applied

The corrosion rate applied is from the Expected Corrosion Rate as the calculated corrosion rate is lower.

4.4 Risk Assessment

4.4.1 POF

4.4.1.1 Internal Thinning POF Analysis

The POF analysis that been utilised for the risk assessment is internal thinning. Data that been specified are initial wall thickness,
minimum allowable thickness, corrosion type, corrosion rate, years in service, number of inspection, inspection confidence, fractional
wall loss, remaining life, corrosion factor and the result from all the data is Probability Category.

Table 15: Internal Thinning POF Analysis

Component Initial Min Corrosion Corrosion Years No. Inspection Fractional Remaining Corr. Probability
Wall Allowable Type Rate In of Confidence Wall Loss Life (yrs) Factor Category
Thickness Thickness (mm/yr) Service Insp.
(mm) (mm)
Economiser 25 17.61 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 765 1 B
Header M11
Economiser 25 17.61 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 765 1 B
Header M16
Economiser 3 2.05 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 101 1 B
Header Tube
M11

46
Economiser 3 2.05 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 101 1 B
Header Tube
M16
Evaporator 25 17.61 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 765 1 B
Header M10
Evaporator 25 17.61 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 765 1 B
Header M5
Evaporator 25 17.61 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 765 1 B
Header M7
Evaporator 25 17.61 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 765 1 B
Header M8
Evaporator 3 2.04 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 102 1 A
Header Tube
M10
Evaporator 3 2.04 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 102 1 A
Header Tube
M5
Evaporator 3 2.04 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 102 1 A
Header Tube
M7
Evaporator 3 2.04 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 102 1 A
Header Tube
M8
Primary SH 40 21.3 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.003 1856 1 A
Header M1
Primary SH 3 1.72 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 134 1 A
Header
Tubes M1
Secondary 25 18.45 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.005 681 1 B
SH Header
M4
Secondary 3 1.76 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.043 130 1 A
SH Header
Tubes M4
Steam Drum 65 53.76 Pitting 0.01 13.758 12 Low 0.002 1110 1 B
Shell

47
4.4.1.2 External Thinning POF Analysis

The POF analysis that been utilised for the risk assessment is internal thinning. Data that been specified are insulated condition,
insulation type, susceptible to CUI, area humidity, corrosion rate, external age, number of inspection, inspection confidence, remaining
life, corrosion factor and the result from all the data which is Probability Category.

Table 16: External Thinning POF Analysis

Component Insulated Insulation Susceptible Area Corrosion External No. Inspection Remaining Corr. Probability
Type to CUI Humidity Rate Age of Confidence Life (yrs) Factor Category
(mm/yr) Insp.
Primary SH N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 1857 1 A
Header M1
Primary SH N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 135 1 A
Header Tubes
M1
Secondary N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 682 1 B
SH Header
M4
Secondary N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 131 1 A
SH Header
Tubes M4
Economiser N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 766 1 B
Header M11
Economiser N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 766 1 B
Header M16
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 766 1 B
Header M10
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 766 1 B
Header M8

48
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 103 1 A
Header Tube
M10
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 103 1 A
Header Tube
M5
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 103 1 A
Header Tube
M7
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 103 1 A
Header Tube
M8
Steam Drum Y 5 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 1111 1 B
Shell
Economiser N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 102 1 B
Header Tube
M11
Economiser N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 102 1 B
Header Tube
M16
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 766 1 B
Header M5
Evaporator N 0 N 1 0.01 12.758 12 4 766 1 B
Header M7

49
4.4.1.3 Other Damage POF Analysis

Other Damage POF Analysis analysed based on the data such as location, the damage mechanism, the potential and its probability
category.

Table 17: Other Damage Mechanisms

Component Location Other Mechanism Potential Probability Category

Primary SH Header M1 External Creep N/A N/A

Short Term Overheating Low B
Spheroidization (Softening) Low B
Primary SH Header Tubes M1 External Creep N/A N/A
Short Term Overheating Low B
Spheroidization (Softening) Low B
Secondary SH Header M4 External Creep N/A N/A
Short Term Overheating Low B
Spheroidization (Softening) Low B
Secondary SH Header Tubes M4 External Creep N/A N/A
Short Term Overheating Low B
Spheroidization (Softening) Low B
Steam Drum Shell External Thermal Fatigue Low A

50
4.4.2 COF

4.4.2.1 Safety Consequences COF Analysis

For Safety Consequences CPF analysis, the flammable category been considered. The result is shown in Table 18.

Table 18: Safety Consequence COF Analysis (Flammable Category)

Component Representative Toxic Toxic Toxic Inventory Flammable Probability Toxic Probability
Fluid Mixture Fluid Fluid % (kg) Category Category
Economiser Header M11 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Economiser Header M16 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Economiser Header Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Tube M11
Economiser Header Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Tube M16
Evaporator Header M10 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Evaporator Header M5 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Evaporator Header M7 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Evaporator Header M8 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Evaporator Header Tube Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
M10
Evaporator Header Tube Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
M5
Evaporator Header Tube Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
M7
Evaporator Header Tube Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
M8
Primary SH Header M1 Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Primary SH Header Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Tubes M1

51
Secondary SH Header Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
M4
Secondary SH Header Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A
Tubes M4
Steam Drum Shell Steam N N/A N/A 4536 1 N/A

52
4.4.2.1 Production Loss COF Analysis

For production loss COF analysis, the total daily production revenue based on the steam capacity for the expected downtime is been
considered together with the maintenance cost.

53
Figure 10 & 11: Production Loss COF Analysis

54
4.5 Risk Categorisation

4.5.1 Risk Rating (Risk Matrix) & Inspection Priority

The final assessment is the risk categorisation which is the risk rating in the matrix together with its inspection priority. Based on the
probability analysis for the internal thinning and external thinning, the combined probability category been considered in the analysis.

Table 19: Probability Analysis

Internal External Internal Environmental External Environmental. Internal External

Component Combined
Thinning Thinning Cracking Cracking Others Others
Economiser Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
M11
Economiser Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
M16
Economiser Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tube M11
Economiser Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tube M16
Evaporator Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
M10
Evaporator Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
M5
Evaporator Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
M7
Evaporator Header B B B N/A N/A N/A N/A
M8
Evaporator Header A A A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tube M10
Evaporator Header A A A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tube M5

55
 Evaporator Header A A A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tube M7
Evaporator Header A A A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tube M8
Primary SH Header B A A N/A N/A N/A B
M1
Primary SH Header B A A N/A N/A N/A B
Tubes M1
Secondary SH Header B B B N/A N/A N/A B
M4
Secondary SH Header B A A N/A N/A N/A B
Tubes M4
Steam Drum Shell B B B N/A N/A N/A A

The consequence analysis which cover for the people consequences which are the flammability category and asset consequences which
are the production loss analysis translated into combined consequence category.

Table 20: Consequence analysis

Component Combined People Consequence Asset Consequence Environment Consequence Reputation Consequence

Economiser Header M11 4 1 4 N/A N/A

Economiser Header M16 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Economiser Header Tube M11 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Economiser Header Tube M16 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header M10 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header M5 4 1 4 N/A N/A

56
Evaporator Header M7 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header M8 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header Tube M10 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header Tube M5 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header Tube M7 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Evaporator Header Tube M8 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Primary SH Header M1 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Primary SH Header Tubes M1 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Secondary SH Header M4 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Secondary SH Header Tubes M4 4 1 4 N/A N/A
Steam Drum Shell 4 1 4 N/A N/A

57
From the COF & POF combined category, the risk rating is been assigned and inspection priority been selected based on the risk
matrix.
Table 21: Risk rating & Inspection Priority

Component Risk Rating Inspection Priority Date of Analysis

Economiser Header M11 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Economiser Header M16 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Economiser Header Tube M11 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Economiser Header Tube M16 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header M10 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header M5 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header M7 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header M8 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header Tube M10 Low 19 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header Tube M5 Low 19 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header Tube M7 Low 19 04/08/2013
Evaporator Header Tube M8 Low 19 04/08/2013
Primary SH Header M1 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Primary SH Header Tubes M1 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Secondary SH Header M4 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Secondary SH Header Tubes M4 Medium 13 04/08/2013
Steam Drum Shell Medium 13 04/08/2013

58
 Table 22: Risk Matrix

A B C D E

0 0 0 0 0 0

1 0 0 0 0 0

2 0 0 0 0 0

3 0 0 0 0 0

4 4 13 0 0 0

5 0 0 0 0 0

UTILITY
PLANT GEBENG
UNIT/AREA/MODULE COGEN/HRSG
SYSTEM COGEN
EQUIPMENT TYPE Boiler

59
4.6 Inspection Management

4.6.1 Inspection Planning

The inspection planning which is Inspection Reference Plan (IRP) is the final product of the RBI analysis based on the Risk Rating and
Inspection Priority. It specify the damage mechanism, method of inspection, coverage, availability, last inspection date, inspection
interval and due date. The Inspection priority determined the inspection interval for the component to be inspected.

Table 23: Inspection Planning Report

Last
Damage Inspection
System Equipment Method Coverage Availability Inspection Due Date
Mechanism Interval
Date
COGEN HRSG External VI-Ext 100% Coverage Online 13/11/2011 10 07/04/2021
Corrosion
COGEN HRSG ID and OD UT or 10% of tube locations on 25% Offline 13/11/2011 10 13/11/2021
Corrosion Profile RT of tubes.
Tube
COGEN HRSG Internal UT Random Corrosion - consult Offline 13/11/2011 10 13/11/2021
Corrosion with Materials Engineer. As a
minimum take the following
UT's: 25% of Potential
locations by Location Category.

60
5.0 DISCUSSION

a) The scope for the assessment is confined to HRSG component only included
Steam Drum. The piping & attachments outside the scope of the ASME V is
not covered. The total components covered is 17 components which the major
component are Economiser Header & Tube, Evaporator Header & Tube,
Primary Superheater Header & Tube, Secondary Superheater Header & Tube
and the last one is Steam Header.

b) Data gathered are design & construction drawing, process data from Operating
Manual and inspection record eg Thickness data, inspection & repair history.

c) The corrosion study for the unit is categorised to two Corrosion Study Group
which are Superheated Steam in Low Alloy and Steam in Carbon Steel. The
damage mechanism identified is general corrosion for internal thinning
assessment and for the external thinning assessment is High Temperature
Oxidation. For other damage mechanism assessment, three damage
mechanism are been identified which are Short Term Overheating,
Spheroidization (Softening) & Thermal Fatigue for the components which
experienced elevated temperature.

d) From POF analysis, there are three major POF analysis which are internal
thinning, external thinning and other damage analysis. The internal thinning
analysis found that most of the component is been categorised having POF of
‘B’ and the remaining is ‘A’. It is also same for the external thinning analysis.
For the other damage mechanism, all but one component have been categorised
having POF of ‘B’.

e) From the assessment, it is been found that the COF analysis is derived from
two type which are safety consequences & production losses. The safety
consequences is from the flammability category which having COF of ‘1’. For
the production losses or asset consequences is having COF of ‘4’.

61
f) The risk categorisation for all components are Medium Risk except for 4
components which having Low Risk. It translate to Inspection Priority of 13
& 19 respectively.
g) The Inspection Planning or Inspection Reference Plan is been schedule for the
next 10 years as the inspection interval is been drive by the inspection priority
which are lower than the Remaining Half Life of all components.

62
6.0 CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATION

6.1 Conclusion

a) Based on the risk assessment using RBI methodology, the HRSG is having
Medium risk. The risk may be changed subject to new finding in the next
outage or shutdown. The risk also may be changed by the new assessment such
as adding new damage mechanism in the study such as Creep analysis for the
Superheater Header & Tube. As of now, based on the microstructural condition
of inspected replica locations are found to be in Class 1 according to VGB-
TW507 Edition 2005.

b) The inspection interval for the HRSG is 10 years based on the analysis
performed. The inspection interval is drive by the limiting factor of inspection
priority due to longer Remaining Half-Life from the Thickness Data of the
components. The accuracy of Remaining Life (RL) can be increased by
assessing more area of the components by addition of the Condition
Monitoring Location (CML).

6.2 Recommendation
a) For the next risk assessment, new damage mechanism should be explored
and included in the analysis such as Creep. The creep stage may be
increased after certain time of operation. The future condition need to be
verified by performing microstructure replication during the next outage.

b) For COF analysis, the Reputation consequences can be included in the next
study. The study need to be collaborated with other HRSG in the Malaysia.

63
7.0 REFERENCES

1. API RP 580 Risk Based Inspection, 2009

2. API RP 581 Risk based Inspection Technology, 2008

3. API RP 534 Heat Recovery Steam Generator, 2007

4. API RP 573 Inspection of Fired Boilers & Heaters, 2003

4. Factory Machinery Act (FMA) 1967

5. Kihara Shigemitsu. Maintenance of Thermal Power Boiler by RBI/RBM – The

Application & Effect, Journal of Japan Boiler Association

6. API 571 Damage Mechanism Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining

Industry, 2011

7. VGB-TW 507 2005 Edition: Guidelines for the Assessment of Microstructure &
Damage Development of Creep Exposed Materials for Pipes & Boiler Component

8. RBI Study for HRSG of Malaysian Refinery

9. RBI Study of Power Boiler of Malaysian Power Plant

10. A. Anastasopoulos & J. Redmon. Integrating Risk Based Inspection into Plant
Condition Monitoring Software

11. Nacera Le Mat Hamata & Ahmed Shibli. A Risk Based Maintenance Model for
Power Plant Boilers

12. Chamni Mosagul. 2014. Risk Based Inspection for Boilers

13. M.L Holland Cost savings achievable through application of risk based
inspection philosophies

14. Managing ageing plant through Risk Based Inspection [Online] Available at:
www.hazardexonthenet.net

15. Chi-Hui Chien, Chun-Hung Chen & Yuh J. Chao. 2008. A Strategy For The
Risk-Based Inspection Of Pressure Safety Valves

64
 16. Tan Zhaoyang, Li Jianfeng, Wu Zongzhi, Zheng Jianhu & He Weifeng. 2010. An
Evaluation Of Maintenance Strategy Using Risk Based Inspection

17. M. Bertolini, M. Bevilacqua, M. Bevilacqua & G. Giacchetta. 2007.

Development Of Risk-Based Inspection And Maintenance Procedures For An Oil
Refinery

18. Jian Shuai, Kejiang Han & Xuerui Xu. 2011. Risk-Based Inspection For Large-
Scale Crude Oil Tanks

19. David R. Marlow, David J. Beale & John S. Mashford. 2011. Risk-Based
Prioritization And Its Application To Inspection Of Valves In The Water Sector

20. Shiaw-Wen Tien, , Wen-Tsung Hwang & , Chih-Hung Tsai. 2006. Study Of A
Risk-Based Piping Inspection Guideline System

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