SUCCESSION – CASE DIGEST

CASE TITLE G.R. NO./DATE PAGE

1. ATUN VS NUNEX L-8018/OCT 26, 1955 1
2. LEDESMA VS MCLACHLIN 44837/NOV 23, 1938 2
3. USON VS DEL ROSARIO L-4963/JAN 29, 1953 3
4. RODRIGUEZ VS BORJA L-21993/JUN 21, 1966 4
5. CHAVEZ VS IAC 68282/NOV 8, 1990 5
6. SICAD VS IAC 125888/AUG 13, 1998 6
7. MACROHON VS SAAVEDRA 27531/DEC 24, 1927 7
8. CENTENERA VS SOTTO 49065/APR 30, 1947 8
9. LIMJOCO VS FRAGRANTE L-770/APR 27, 1948 9
10. VIARDO VS BELMONTE L-14127/AUG 21, 1962 10
11. LAO VS DEE L-3890/JAN 23, 1952 11
12. LITONJUA VS MONTILLA L-4170/JAN 31, 1952 12
13. VDA DE CARILLO VS SALAK DE PAZ L-4133/MAY 13, 1952 13
14. MOJICA VS FERNANDEZ L-3483/DEC 21, 1907 14
15. HEMADY VS LUZON SURETY L-8437/NOV 28, 1956 15
16. CONDE VS ABAYA 4275/MAR 23, 1990 16
17. BARRIOS VS DOLOR 559/MAR 14, 1903 17
18. ALVAREZ VS IAC 68053/MAY 7, 1990 18
19. REGANON VS IMPERIAL L-24434/JAN 17, 1968 19
20. FR. RIGOR VS RIGORS L-22036/APR 30, 1979 20
21. ALMEIDA VS CARILLO L-45320/JAN 26, 1939 21
22. IBARLE VS PO L-5064/FEB 27, 1953 22
23. OSORIO VS OSORIO L-10474/MAR 29, 1916 23
24. RAMIREZ VS BALTAZAR L-25049/AUG 30, 1968 24
25. DE BORJA VS MENCIAS L-20609/SEP 29, 1966 25
26. USON VS DEL ROSARIO L-4963/JAN 29, 1953 26
27. ILUSTRE VS FRONDOSA L-6077/NOV 16, 1910 27
28. BONILLA VS BARCENA L-41715/JUN 18, 1976 28
29. LORENZO VS POSADAS 43082/JUN 18, 1937 29
30. QUISON VS SALUD 4314/NOV 21, 1908 30
31. DAIS VS CFI OF ILOILO L-28770/JAN 21, 1928 31
32. MARABILLES VS QUITO L-10408/OCT 18, 1956 32
33. ONG VS CA 75884/SEP 24, 1987 33
34. BUTTE VS UY & SONS L-15499/FEB 28, 1962 34
35. NOCEDA VS CA 119730/SEP 2, 1999 35
36. NUFABLE VS NUFABLE 126950/JUL 2, 1999 36
37. BLAS VS SANTOS L-14070/MAR 29, 1961 37
38. DE BORJA VS DE BORJA L-28040/AUG 18, 1972 38
39. SUILONG CO VS CHIO-TAYSAN 4777/NOV 11, 1908 39
40. NERI VS AKUTIN L-47799/JUN 13, 1941 40
41. ROSALES VS ROSALES L-40789/FEB 27, 1987 41
42. BARANDA VS BARANDA 73275/MAY 20, 1987 42
43. BALAIS VS BALAIS L-33924/MAR 18, 1988 43
 Digested by: KCabus

ATUN VS NUNEZ
G.R. NO. L-8018, OCTOBER 26, 1955

FACTS:
The plaintiffs-appellants inherited the land in question from their widowed aunt Estefania
Atun, who died without any issue; that they had possessed the land from 1927 to 1930.
Said land was delivered to Silvestra Nuñez for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the
Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant
Eusebio Nuñez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver
their share of the produce. The defendant Eusebio Nuñez sold the land to his co-
defendant Diego Belga, who took the property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to
Nuñez, but to plaintiffs. However, there was no prior judicial declaration that the
plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs-appellants' complaint shall be dismissed on the ground of
prescription of action?

RULING:
No, the dismissal is erroneous. The land in question is admittedly covered by a
Torrens title in the name of Estefania Atun, deceased aunt of plaintiffs. And this
Court has repeatedly held that the right of the registered owner to recover
possession of the registered property is equally imprescriptible, since possession is a
mere consequence of ownership. And the title or right undergoing no change by its
transmission mortis causa.

The lower Court also erred in ruling that plaintiffs-appellants have failed to show a better
title than that of defendants who are presumed to possess with just title. As the land in
question still stands registered in the name of Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present
owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record that Estefania Atun died without
any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the children of her brother
Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a deceased may file
an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate judicial
declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for the
settlement of the decedent's estate.

1
 Digested by: KCabus

LEDESMA VS MCLACHLIN
G.R. NO. 44837, NOVEMBER 23, 1938

FACTS:
The plaintiff Socorro Ledesma lived maritally with Lorenzo M. Quitco, while the latter
was still single, of which relation a daughter was born, the other plaintiff Ana Quitco
Ledesma. When the relation ended, Lorenzo M. Quitco executed a deed, acknowledging
the plaintiff Ana Quitco Ledesma as his natural daughter and he issued in favor of the
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma a promissory note payable in instalment.
Meanwhile, Lorenzo M. Quitco married the defendant Conchita McLachlin, with whom
he had four children, who are the other defendants. On March 9, 1930, Lorenzo M.
Quitco died and later, on December 15, 1932, his father Eusebio Quitco also died leaving
real and personal properties without a will. An intestate proceeding was instituted and a
court order declared his compulsory heirs which did not include Ana as one. Hence,
plaintiff Socorro Ledesma proceeded to collect the sum payable on a promissory issued
by Lorenzo by filing a claim on the intestate proceedings of Eusebio’s Estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the declared compulsory heirs of Eusebio Quitco is bound to pay for the
debt of Lorenzo Quitco?

RULING:
No, the properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased
father, who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions
of articles 924 to 927 of the Civil Code, a child represents his father or mother who died
before him in the properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation
does not make the said child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased
father or mother, because, as may be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure referring to partition of inheritances, the inheritance is received with the
benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with the properties received
from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco, in
representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness
of their said father from whom they did not inherit anything.

2
 Digested by: KCabus

USON VS DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. L-4963, JANUARY 29, 1953

FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the
petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by the defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent’s common-law-spouse and her
children. As a defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed
by Faustino and Uson containing a statement giving a parcel of land by way of alimony
and the latter renouncing her right to inherit any other property from Faustino.

The defendants also contend that, while it is true that the four minor Defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not
entitled to any successional rights, however, under the new Civil Code which became in
force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and are
entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and
article 287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the
first time in the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new
Civil Code).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants’ contention that Maria Uson had relinquished her right
over the lands in question is correct?

RULING:
No. Said contention cannot be entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance
cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.

3
 Digested by: KCabus

RODRIGUEZ VS BORJA
G.R. NO. L-21993, JUNE 21, 1966

FACTS:
Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963. On March 4, 1963, Anatolia
Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a last will
and testament of the decedent. Petitioners filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging that Fr. Rodriguez was a
resident of Rizal and died without leaving a will and prayed that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate. Meanwhile, Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probate of the will delivered by
them on March 4, 1963.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the estate of Rodriguez?

RULING:
Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the
court could, motu propio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3,
Rules 76, of the revised Rules of Court.

4
 Digested by: KCabus

CHAVEZ VS IAC
G.R. NO. 68282, NOVEMBER 8, 1990

FACTS:
The land in question is the paraphernal property of petitioner Manuela Buenavista who
had six (6) children, named Antonio, Rosario, Concepcion, Raquel, Presentacion and
Floserpina. While said property remains in her possession, three of her children sold each
their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of
sale were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the
latter sold the entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez.
Respondent sued for the annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the
trial court but which later decision overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal,
petitioner contends that their mother has left a last will and this will supercedes the earlier
transfers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partition inter vivos which had been implemented long before the
execution of the said Last Will and Testament could be revoked by the later instrument?

RULING:
No. Article 1080 of the New Civil Code allows a person to make a partition of his estate
either by an act inter vivos or by will and such partition shall be respected insofar as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs. While the law prohibits contracts
upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080, is a case
expressly authorized by law. Art. 1080 of the Civil Code clearly gives a person two
options in making a partition of his estate; either by an act inter vivos or by WILL. When
a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be executed in
accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes the
partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and
need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the
legitime of compulsory heirs.

In the instant case, the respondent appellate court declared the Deeds of Sale executed by
Presentacion, Floserfina and Raquel, all surnamed Chavez in favor of Concepcion
Chavez as evidence of a valid partition of the land in question by and between Manuela
Buenavista and her children as she not only gave her authority thereto but also signed the
sales. The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance
but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by
the property owner herself, is valid.

5
 Digested by: KCabus

SICAD VS IAC
G.R. NO. 125888, AUGUST 13, 1998

FACTS:
On Dec 11, 1979, a deed of donation inter vivos was executed by the late Aurora De
Montinola in favor of her grandchildren. The deed also contained the signatures of the
donees in acknowledgment of the acceptance of the donation. Montinola however
retained the owners duplicate copy of the new title, as well as the property itself, until she
transferred the same ten (10) years later, on Jul 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and
Evelyn Sicad.

On Mar 12, 1987, Montinola then drew up a deed of revocation of the donation, and
caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim. She filed a petition with for the
cancellation of said title. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her
three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the
formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively
serve as basis for the cancellation of the title. The donees opposed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation executed by the late Aurora De Montinola is inter
vivos or mortis causa?

RULING:
MORTIS CAUSA. In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the
deed of donation in question to Montinolas grandchildren, the ostensible donees. They
did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits
thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not
acquire the right to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten (10)
ears from Montinolas death. Indeed, they never even laid hands on the certificate of title
to the same. They were therefore simply paper owners of the donated property. All these
circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation
reserving the exercise of rights of ownership to the donee and prohibiting the sale or
encumbrance of the property until ten (10) years after her death ineluctably lead to
the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa,
contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donors demise.

6
 Digested by: KCabus

MACROHON VS SAAVEDRA
G.R. NO. 27531, DECEMBER 24, 1927

FACTS:
Victoria and Macario executed a joint will. That in case Macario died before Victoriana
the 16 properties described in the will be jointly given to Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka
Jian, and the e properties shall belong exclusively to Victoriana. And if Victoriana die
before Macario, the lot No. 817-A be adjudicated to Segunda, widow, sister of
Victoriana Saavedra, free of all liens and encumbrances.
Victoria died partly intestate. As such, aside from her devisee Segunda, her siblings Juan
and Segunda were entitled to receive her estate and participation in the 16 parcels of land,
devised to the named legatees, Ong Ka Chiew and Ong Ka Jian, under the terms of the
said joint will. However, the appellant’s argued that no one who has executed a will can
die partly intestate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Victoriana Saavedra died partly intestate?

RULING:
YES. According to Art. 658 of the Civil Code, there are three ways in which
succession may be effected: by the will of man, by the law, or by both at the same
time. In the first case the succession is called testamentary, because it is based on the
last will and testament, which is the orderly manifestation of the testator's will; in
the second, it is called legal, because it takes effect by operation of the law; and the
third is called mixed, because it partakes of the character of both testamentary and
legal succession.

Assuming that the joint will in question is valid, it follows that the deceased Victoriana
Saavedra specified therein that parcels 187 and 768 in proceeding No. 7880 be delivered
as a legacy to her sister Segunda Saavedra, the first parcel free of all liens and
encumbrances, and the second on the condition that the legatee devote the products of the
same to having masses said for the repose to the testatrix's soul.

As to the remaining sixteen parcels, the testatrix disposed of her part in them
conditionally, that is to say, in case her husband Macario Macrohon Ong Ham died
before she died, said parcels were to be awarded to her husband's nephews, or to either of
them in case one should have died before the said Macario Macrohon Ong Ham. The
condition imposed in the will as precedent to the vesting in the alleged legatees Ong Ka
Chiew and Ong Ka Jian of the right to the legacy, not having been complied with, the
trial court found that the part of said property belonging to the testatrix should be
partitioned among the persons called on to succeed her under the law.

7
 Digested by: KCabus

CENTENERA VS SOTTO
G.R. NO. 49065 APRIL 30, 1947

FACTS:
On June 20, 1940, Mariano Garchitorena filed a motion praying that subdivision plan
Psu-66063-Amd. be approved and that certificates of title be issued in his name on lots 2,
3, and 4 of the original plan Psu-66063 and upon lots 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the subdivision
plan Psu-66063-Amd.

The movant alleged that a decision was rendered by the lower court granting Rita
Garchitorena as heiress of her father Andres, title over four lots subject to lien in favor of
Mariano Garchitorena and other creditors. A civil case was instituted by Mariano, Flor,
and Marcel Garchitorena against Rita Garchitorena, to recover the lots in question, on the
ground that said properties pertained really to the deceased Andres Garchitorena and
should be made available to answer for the latter’s debts, and the intestate of Andres
Garchitorena. Said proceedings ended in the sale of the lots in question to Mariano
Garchitorena.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the creditors of the decedent have the preferential right than the heirs on
the estate of the decedent?

RULING:
Yes. Although the Civil Code provides that succession takes effect from the time of the
death of the owner, no succession shall be declared unless and until a liquidation of the
assets and debts left by the deceased shall have been made and all his creditors fully paid.
Until a final liquidation is made and all debts are paid, there is no way of determining if
his heirs may inherit anything.

Until such a liquidation has been made, the right of heirs to inherit remains to be
inchoate. It partakes of the nature of hope. Liquidation is necessary to determine; if the
deceased has left any liquid asset which may be transmitted to his heirs. Before any liquid
asset is determined, all debts and obligations must first be liquidated and paid.

8
 Digested by: KCabus

LIMJOCO VS FRAGRANTE
G.R. NO. L-770, APRIL 27, 1948

FACTS:
The petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the
respondent despite his demise. She contended that it was error on the part of the
commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O.
Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending before the commission,
and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be
in contravention of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the legal representative of estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is entitled to
continue the decedent’s application for a certificate of public convenience?

RULING:
Yes. The present chief Justice of this Court draws the following conclusion from the
decisions cited by him “Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, any
action affecting the property or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which
may be brought by or against him if he were alive, may likewise be instituted and
prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the action is for recovery of money,
debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot survive, because death
extinguishes the right . . . .

It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience
before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions
and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not
extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which,
being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, cannot
be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors,
devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved
happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an
application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public
Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and
entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

9
 Digested by: KCabus

VIARDO VS BELMONTE, et al
G.R. NO. L-14127, AUGUST 21, 1962

FACTS:
On 27 May 1946 Bartolome Driz and Pilar Belmonte filed in the CFI a complaint against
Leon C. Viardo (civil case No. 161) praying for the reconveyance of the property in
question upon payment of the lawful redemption price. On 11 April 1950 the CFI,
absolves the defendant from the complaint of the plaintiffs, in the same manner that
plaintiffs are absolved from the counter complaint of the defendant, with costs to the
plaintiff.

Not satisfied with the judgment dismissing his counter-claim, the defendant Leon C.
Viardo appealed to the Court of Appeals which passed a resolution granting his prayer
that the children and only heirs be substituted for the deceased appellee Bartolome Driz.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment awarding damages prayed for in the
counterclaim of Leon Viardo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Bartolome Driz could be held personally liable for the
judgment rendered against their father in Civil Case No. 161?

RULING:
No. The substitution of parties was made obviously because the children of Bartolome
Driz are his legal heirs and therefore could properly represent and protect whatever
interest he had in the case on appeal. But such a substitution did not and cannot have the
effect of making these substituted parties personally liable for whatever judgment might
be rendered on the appeal against their deceased father. The trial court, therefore,
correctly ruled that the remedy of Leon C. Viardo, the creditor, was to proceed against
the estate of Bartolome Driz.

10
 Digested by: KCabus

LAO VS DEE
G.R. NO. L-3890, JANUARY 23, 1952

FACTS:
Ignacia Lao and Domingo Lao filed an action against Francisco Dee and Maria Lao. The
plaintiffs prayed for the annulment of an order approving the sale of real property of the
decedent during the testate proceedings and the sale thereof in favor of Francisco Dee.

The order is sought to be annulled on the following grounds: that Maria Lao the court
overlooked the fact that a special administrator has no power to sell real property; the
court approved the sale in the belief that Ignacia Lao had given her consent to the sale,
when in fact she was Induced to sign the deed of sale by Maria Lao and her attorney
through misrepresentation that the deed of sale was a mere petition for the approval of the
proposed sale; the court did not know that the vendee Francisco Dee was not a Filipino
citizen, or that Ignacia Lao executed the deed of sale on the alleged misrepresentation
that Francisco Dee was a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action to recover the title and possession of a property which formed
part of the estate may be filed by the plaintiffs against the heirs of the decedent?

RULING:
NO. Section 8, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, bars the filing of an action by an heir to
recover the title or possession of lands belonging to the estate until there is an order of the
probate court assigning said lands to such heir. In other words, there must be first a
partition of the estate, and delivery of the latter to the heir.

The reasons for this rule are aptly stated by former Chief Justice Moran as follows: "An
executor or administrator who assumes the trust, takes possession of the property left by
the decedent for the purpose of paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and
unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the heirs and devisees.
Consequently, before distribution is made or before any residue is known, the heirs, or
devisees have no cause of action against the executor or administrator for recovery of the
property left by the deceased."

11
 Digested by: KCabus

LITONJUA VS MONTILLA
G.R. NO. L-4170, JANUARY 31, 1952

FACTS:
Pedro L. Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of the
sum of P4,039. In due time, a writ of execution was issued, but no property of Claudio
Montilla was found which could be levied upon.
Hence, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 532 of the CFI, Intestate Estate of
Agustin Montilla, Sr., deceased, a motion praying that the interest, property and
participation of Claudio Montilla, one of the heirs of Agustin Montilla, Sr., in the latter’s
intestate estate be sold and out of the proceeds the judgment debt of Claudio Montilla in
favor of Pedro L. Litonjua be paid. This motion was opposed by Claudio Montilla and by
Agustin Montilla, Jr., administrator of the intestate estate.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant could collect his claim against the estate of the debtor’s
deceased parent?

RULING:
No, because the appellant is not a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he
seeks to collect his claim out of the inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the
net assets of the intestate estate have been determined.

An execution cannot legally be levied upon the property of an intestate succession to pay
the debts of the widow and heirs of the deceased, until the credits held against the latter at
the time of his death shall have been paid, and only after the debts of the estate have been
paid can the remaining property that pertains to the said debtor heirs be attached.

12
 Digested by: KCabus

VDA DE CARILLO VS SALAK DE PAZ

G.R. NO. L-4133, MAY 13, 1952

FACTS:
Lot No. 221 was mortgaged by the sps Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to sps Magat and
Silva, who in turn assigned their mortgage rights to Honoria Salak. Severino Salak
transferred his 1/2 interest in the property to Honoria Salak representing 1/2 of the
consideration paid by her to the mortgagees Magat. Severino Salak later died leaving the
defendants as heirs. Honoria Salak also died leaving the plaintiff as heir. Intestate
proceedings were instituted for the settlement and distribution of the estate of the
deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia, including lot No. 221, and after proper
proceedings, said lot was adjudicated to the defendants. Plaintiff sued for the
reconveyance of the ½ of the portion of the lot in her favour as sole heir of Honoria.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff can still press her claim against the heirs of the deceased
Severino Salak?

RULING:
Yes. Although the sale of an undivided interest in the property has not been registered in
the office of the Register of Deeds, nor annotated on the Torrens title covering it, such
technical deficiency does not render the transaction ineffective, nor does it convert it into
a mere monetary obligation, but it simply renders the transaction not binding against a
third person because, being a registered land, the operative act to bind the land is the act
of registration (section 50, Act No. 496).

Said transaction however is valid and binding between the parties and can serve as basis
to compel the register of deeds to make the necessary registration. It is error to say that
that plaintiff should have filed her claim in the intestate proceedings of the late Severino
Salak if she wanted to protect her interest in the land for, the transaction being binding
between the parties, the same can still be invoked against them or their privies.

This means that plaintiff can still press her claim against the heirs of the deceased
Severino Salak who were made parties-defendants in this case. These heirs cannot escape
the legal consequence of this transaction because they have inherited the property subject
to the liability affecting their common ancestor. The fact that Francisca Salak bought the
shares of her co-heirs in said property is of no moment.

13
 Digested by: KCabus

MOJICA VS FERNANDEZ
G.R. NO. L-3483, DECEMBER 21, 1907

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Benito Mojica, sold to Pedro Sanchez three pieces of real estate, the sale
was made con pacto de retro. Sanchez made the necessary consolidation entry after the
lapse of 4 years when the vendor did not exercise such right. Meanwhile, Sanchez and
Mojica made a new agreement in a private document whereby Sanchez leased the said
real estate to Mojica for ten years and agreed that Mojica was to have the right of
repurchase at the expiration of the said period. Mojica thereafter continued to pay the
rental at the rate of P150 per month to Sanchez and to the latter’s widow after his death.

In his last will and testament, Sanchez expressly recognized Mojica’s right of repurchase
of said property under the terms of said contract of lease and repurchase, but this
instrument was not admitted in a probate proceeding due to noncompliance with the
formal provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the defendant
administratrix of Sanchez increased the monthly rental to P350 per month. Hence, this
action praying for the defendant to register as a public document the private rental
contract of the said lands for a period of ten years, and the agreement to sell the same at
the end of the said term, annulling at the same time the consolidation entry of ownership
of the said lands in favor of Don Pedro Sanchez.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant may be compelled to execute a public instrument
evidencing the terms of the private document of September 1, 1901?

RULING:
Yes, with respect to the contract entered into by the deceased and evidenced by the
document of September 1, 1901, the heirs cannot be regarded as "third persons." Article
27 of the Mortgage Law defines a "third person" to be "one who has taken part in the act
or contract recorded." Under the Civil Code, the heirs, by virtue of the right of succession
are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased and and, therefore, under
the provisions of article 1279 of the Civil Code, the heirs of Pedro Sanchez may be
compelled in a proper action to execute the public instrument evidencing the said
contract, as required by the provisions of article 1280 of that code.

14
 Digested by: KCabus

HEMADY VS LUZON SURETY

G.R. NO. L-8437, NOVEMBER 28, 1956

FACTS:
The Luzon Surety Co. had filed a claim against the Estate based on twenty different
indemnity agreements, or counter bonds, each subscribed by the deceased K. H. Hemady,
a surety solidary guarantor in all of them, in consideration of the Luzon Surety Co.’s of
having guaranteed, the various principals in favor of different creditors. The Luzon
Surety Co., prayed for allowance, as a contingent claim, of the value of the twenty bonds
it had executed in consideration of the counterbonds, and further asked for judgment for
the unpaid premiums and documentary stamps affixed to the bonds, with 12 per cent
interest thereon.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a liability of a surety solidary guarantor is extinguished upon his death?

RULING:
No, the solidary guarantor’s liability is not extinguished by his death, and that in such
event, the Luzon Surety Co., had the right to file against the estate a contingent claim for
reimbursement. It becomes unnecessary now to discuss the estate’s liability for premiums
and stamp taxes, because irrespective of the solution to this question, the Luzon Surety’s
claim did state a cause of action, and its dismissal was erroneous.

15
 Digested by: KCabus

CONDE VS ABAYA
G.R. NO. 4275, MARCH 23, 1990

FACTS:
Casiano Abaya died unmarried leaving two unaknowledged children by herein plaintiff-
appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as ascendant heir of her children, sued for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as
natural children of the deceased. Roman Abaya opposed said appointment and claimed to
be declared as the sole heir of Casiano Abaya being the nearest relative of the deceased.
Conde, in her reply, claimed that her right was superior to his and moved for a hearing of
the matter. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff Conde. Hence, this
appeal filed by defendant Abaya.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not a right of action for the acknowledgment of natural children can be
instituted against the heirs of Casiano Abaya?
 Whether or not Paula can represent her deceased children in an action for the
acknowledgment of natural children?

RULING:
 No. Inasmuch as the right of action accruing to the child to claim his legitimacy lasts
during his whole life, he may exercise it either against the presumed parents, or their
heirs; while the right of action to secure the acknowledgment of a natural child, since
it does not last during his whole life, but depends on that of the presumed parents, as
a general rule can only be exercised against the latter.

 An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an exception, be

exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event of
the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery
of some instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or
mother, the existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter. But as such
action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him.
It cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or to his ascendants.

16
 Digested by: KCabus

BARRIOS VS DOLOR
G.R. NO. 559, MARCH 14, 1903

FACTS:
The plaintiff has brought an action for the recovery from the defendants, heirs of the late
Don Ciriaco Demonteverde, of ½ of a sugar estate and the stock thereon, which he claims
to have purchased from the said Don Ciriaco Demonteverde. In support of his contention,
he attached to the complaint a public instrument which appears to have been executed by
himself and Demonteverde, in which a stipulation is made for a contract of partnership
for the operation of the said estate, and a community of ownership is established with
respect to the estate in favor of the two parties to this instrument. It does not appear that
this instrument has been recorded in the registry of property.
Service of the complaint having been had on the defendants, Doña Maria Pascuala Dolor
raised an incidental issue as a previous question, praying that the instrument referred to
be ruled out of evidence on the ground that it had not been recorded in the registry of
property. This motion was granted by the judge, against which the plaintiff appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of Don Ciriaco Demonteverde should be regarded as third
persons for the purpose of Mortgage Law with respect to the contract executed by
Demonteverde?

RULING:
The defendants, therefore, are not third persons with respect to the contract entered into
by their decedent, Don Ciriaco, in the instrument and they therefore cannot avail
themselves of the prohibition contained in article 389 of the Mortgage Law for the
purpose of opposing the admission of this instrument as evidence in the case, because not
recorded in the registry of property. This prohibition was established solely and
exclusively in favor of those who, within the meaning of that law, are third persons. Were
it otherwise, the position of the defendants would be superior to that of the person whom
they derived their rights, because he, not being a third person, could not set up such an
exception.

17
 Digested by: KCabus

ALVAREZ VS IAC
G.R. NO. 68053, MAY 7, 1990

FACTS:
Aniceto left his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora, Lots 773 and 823. Teodora
cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823. While, Rufino and his children left the province
during World War II and were informed that Fortunato, Fuentebella and Alvarez were in
possession of Lot 773. Two years later, Teodora and the children of her brother
Rufinofiled an action for the reconveyance of Lots 773 and 823 against Fortunato,
Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. While pending in
court, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A, 773-B and another lot to Siason. Accordingly, TCT Nos.
30919 and 30920 were issued to Siason.

On October 11, 1963, CFI rendered its decision ordering the defendant Alvarez to
reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 and to deliver the possession of said lots
to the plaintiffs. However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to
Lot 773. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not liabilities of Alvarez arising from the sale of lots to Siazon shall be
transmitted his heirs?

RULING:
Yes. Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father’s transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for
damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment
because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their
father’s hereditary estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always
liable in their totality for the payment of the debts of the estate. It must, however, be
made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

18
 Digested by: KCabus

REGANON VS IMPERIAL
G.R. NO. L-24434, JANUARY 17, 1968

FACTS:
The heirs of Pedro Reganon filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession
of about one-hectare portion of a parcel of land with damages, against Rufino Imperial.
Defendant was declared in default. The Court a qou rendered a decision declaring the
plaintiff as lawful owners of the land in question; ordering defendant to immediately
vacate the portion occupied by him and pay the plaintiffs P1,929.20.

Meanwhile, the heirs of said Eulogio Imperial, one of whom is defendant, executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of the residuary estate, wherein P1,471.97 was
apportioned to the defendant Rufino Imperial. Informed of this development, the
plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for issuance of an alias writ of execution and of an
order directing the representative of the PNB to hold and deliver the share of defendant to
the provincial sheriff of the province to be applied to the balance of the money judgment.
Defendant filed a motion for the quashal of the alias writ of execution to which the trial
court denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the money in the guardianship proceedings and deposited in a bank are
considered in custodia legis hence not subject to attachment?

RULING:
No. The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of death
and, where, as in this case, the heir is of legal age and the estate is not burdened with any
debts, said heir immediately succeeds, by force of law to the dominion, ownership and
possession of the properties of his predecessor, and consequently stands legally in shoes
of the latter.

That the interest of an heir in the estate of a deceased person may be attached for
purposes of execution, even if the estate is in the process of settlement before the courts,
is already a settled matter in this jurisdiction. It is admitted that the heirs of Eulogio
Imperial executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. This instrument suffices to settle the
entire estate of the decedent even without the approval of the court. Therefore, the estate
for all practical purposes has been settled. The heirs are at full liberty to withdraw the
residuary estate from the Philippine National Bank-Dipolog Branch and divide it among
themselves. The fact that the guardianship proceedings is closed and terminated and the
residuary estate no longer under custodia legis.

19
 Digested by: KCabus

FR. RIGOR VS RIGORS

G.R. NO. L-22036, APRIL 30, 1979

FACTS:
Father Rigor died leaving a will which was probated by the CFI. Named as devisees in
the will were the testators nearest relatives, namely, his three sisters: Florencia Rigor-
Escobar, Belina Rigor-Manaloto and Nestora Rigor-Quiambao. The testator gave a devise
to his cousin, Fortunato Gamalinda. The parish priest of Victoria, who claimed to be a
trustee of the said lands, appealed to this Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the order of the probate court declaring that the said devise was inoperative.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the bequest in question shall be merged into the estate?

RULING:
Yes. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that this case is covered by article 888 of the
old Civil Code, now article 956, which provides that if "the bequest for any reason should
be inoperative, it shall be merged into the estate, except in cases of substitution and those
in which the right of accretion exists.

This case is also covered by article 912(2) of the old Civil Code, now article 960 (2),
which provides that legal succession takes place when the will "does not dispose of all
that belongs to the testator." There being no substitution nor accretion as to the said
ricelands the same should be distributed among the testator's legal heirs. The effect is as
if the testator had made no disposition as to the said ricelands.

The Civil Code recognizes that a person may die partly testate and partly intestate, or that
there may be mixed succession. The old rule as to the indivisibility of the testator's win is
no longer valid. Thus, if a conditional legacy does not take effect, there will be intestate
succession as to the property recovered by the said legacy.

20
 Digested by: KCabus

ALMEIDA VS CARILLO
G.R. NO. L-45320, JANUARY 26, 1939

FACTS:
Macario Carrillo died leaving as next of kin, his widow, Rosenda Almeida, the appellee,
and his three children by his first marriage, Corazon Edelmira Carrillo, Romulo Carrillo
and Gracia Carrillo, the appellants. With the consent of all the relatives, the appellee
caused the remains of the deceased to be buried in the private lot of the Intengan family
in the North Cemetery.

Sometime in January, 1963, the appellee built a mausoleum in Biñan for the remains of
her late husband. Shortly before the expiration of the period of five years for the
exhumation of said remains, the appellants secured the consent of the appellee to have the
remains of the deceased transferred to the Ermita Church in Manila. As she was made to
understand that such transfer would only be a temporary, the appellee gave her consent.
However, the appellee moved the court to enjoin the appellants from removing the
remains to the Ermita Church. The motion was granted and the court ordered the
appellants to abstain from removing the remains of the deceased. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants have a better right than the appellee to disinter the remains
of the deceased and transfer them to the place they had chosen?

RULING:
NO. The court held that the appellee's right, as the widow, is preferred, as may be
gathered from the spirit of section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code and from
some American cases. We hold that the court correctly decided the case and did not
commit any of the assigned errors.

In the United States of America the superior and preferred right of the surviving spouse
to the burial and any other legal disposition of the remains of the husband or of the wife,
has always been held undisputed. . "It is generally conceded that on the death of a
husband or a wife, the primary and paramount right to possession of the body and to
control the burial or other legal disposition thereof is in the surviving spouse, and not in
the next of kin, at least in the absence of a different provision by the deceased."

21
 Digested by: KCabus

IBARLE VS PO
G.R. NO. L-5064, FEBRUARY 27, 1953

FACTS:
Leonardo and Catalina were husband and wife. On April 15, 1946, Catalina sold the
entire parcel of land to Maria for the support of her children. On May 24, 1947, Canoy
sold the same land to the plaintiff Ibarle. Both deeds of sale were not registered. On June
6, 1946, Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina and
minor children. On January 17, 1948, after her appointment as guardian of her minor
children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question to Po, which portion now
belonged to the children as heirs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale to Esperanza Po was valid and is the rightful owner?

RULING:
Yes, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent court was
undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the
plaintiff because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition. On the other hand,
when Catalina sold the entire parcel to the Canoy, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller’s children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children’s
title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children’s
share.

"The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to
the inheritance, whether such right be pure or contingent. It is immaterial whether a short
or long period of time lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into
possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be
retroactive from the moment of death."

22
 Digested by: KCabus

OSORIO VS OSORIO
G.R. NO. L-10474, MARCH 29, 1916

FACTS:
Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a complaint alleging that he is a natural son of one
Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896. That he had been in continuous possession
of the status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter
and of his family. That the defendant Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of
said Osorio y Reyes, be ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y
Reyes, and is entitled to share in his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant
be ordered to furnish subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem
proper to fix. The evidence offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to
Osorio Reyes is strong and unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of
claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly established.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff has the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the
rights appertaining to his deceased father's estate?

RULING:
Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in
continuous possession of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his
baptism, in the certificate in which his name and that of his mother appear, though the
document contains errors, and by his father's statement to various friends that the boy was
his natural son, and by his father's always having attended to the care, education and
support of his son. So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts
proven in this case and the law on the subject, is entitled to have his half-sister Soledad
Osorio, a legitimate daughter of the father of both of them, recognize him as being the
natural, recognized son of Francisco Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights granted
him by law in respect to his deceased father's estate, all of which is in possession of the
defendant spouses.

23
 Digested by: KCabus

RAMIREZ VS BALTAZAR
G.R. NO. L-25049, AUGUST 30, 1968

FACTS:
Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgage her parcel of land to spouses Baltazar, defendants in
this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging that plaintiffs
Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as
adminstrator but did not qualify thus, Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial
administrator of the estate.

The mortgagees then filed a complaint for foreclosure of the mortgaged property against
Diawan, whom was later declared in default. The Sheriff sold the property at public
auction to the highest bidder who happened to be the plaintiffs themselves. Subsequently,
Felimon filed a complaint for the annulment of the foreclosure sale proceedings, alleging
the failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended
that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and have no cause of action.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs have a legal standing in court upon the commencement of
intestate proceedings?

RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the
heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal
declaration or recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation,
this Court has, under special circumstances, protected these rights from
encroachments made or attempted before the judicial declaration. In Pascual vs.
Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon the
commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception
as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in
his place."

A similar situation obtains in the case at bar. The administrator is being charged to
have been in collusion and connivance with the mortgagees of a property of the
deceased, allowing its foreclosure without notifying the heirs, to the prejudice of the
latter. Since the ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure
proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in
which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be farfetched to expect the
said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the
heirs, who have an interest to assert and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably,
this case should fall under the exception, rather than the general rule that pending
proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence an
action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased.

24
 Digested by: KCabus

DE BORJA VS MENCIAS
G.R. NO. L-20609, SEPTEMBER 29, 1966

FACTS:
Petitioners levied against the rights, interest and participation which Crisanto de Borja
had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de
Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special Proceedings Nos. F-7866
and 1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively. This Court hereby holds that
whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have in the testate estate of
Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject to attachment
and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against the said
heir. Hence, this petition for the reversal of the order of Judge Mencias.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights, interest and participation of Crisanto de Borja in the estate left
by decedents Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja may be sold at public auction to
satisfy the money judgment rendered against him?

RULING:
Yes, provided that the sale shall be only of whatever rights, interest and participation
maybe adjudicated to said heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates, and that
delivery thereof to the judgment creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale thereof
shall be made only after the final settlement of the estates and in the manner provided by
the legal provision mentioned above..

25
 Digested by: KCabus

USON VS DEL ROSARIO

G.R. NO. L-4963, JANUARY 29, 1953

FACTS:
Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson, the
petitioner. The latter filed an action for the reconveyance of five parcels of land occupied
by the defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent’s common-law-spouse and her children.
The defendants contended that, while it is true that the four minor Defendants are
illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda under the new Civil Code which
became in force in June, 1950, they are given the status and rights of natural children and
are entitled to the successional rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant’s contention on the successional rights of her children is
correct?

RULING:
No. There is no merit in this claim. The right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands
in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so
because of the imperative provision of the law which commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death (Article 657, old Civil Code). The
new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria
Uson over the lands in dispute.

26
 Digested by: KCabus

ILUSTRE VS FRONDOSA
G.R. NO. L-6077, NOVEMBER 16, 1910

FACTS:
Franciso Calzado died leaving the land in question. The plaintiff alleges, that he was
appointed as administrator of the estate of the decedent. Nearly six years after the death
of the decedent, the plaintiff, as administrator, commenced the present action to recover
the property in question. The defendant showed by oral and documentary proof that he
was in possession of the land in question which he purchased from the nephews and heirs
of the deceased Calzado. There was no proof during the trial to show that any of the heirs
of the deceased were minors or that there were any debts existing against the said estate.
The trial court rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff but was later reversed by this
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not successional rights are transmitted to the heirs upon the death of the
decedent?

RULING:
Yes. Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the
succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words,
the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence
of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is
certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and
partition of the estate among the heirs.

There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of
the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present action. If
there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their
remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

27
 Digested by: KCabus

BONILLA VS BARCENA
G.R. NO. L-41715, JUNE 18, 1976

FACTS:
On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion
Bonilla and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action to quiet title over certain
parcels of land located in Abra. On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no
legal capacity to sue. The court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case on the
ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to
sue. On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation
praying that the minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute
their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's prayer for lack of merit. Hence,
this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action filed by the Fortunata survives even after her death?

RULING:
Yes. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the
death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the
rights and obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto
except by the methods provided for by law.

When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her claim or right to the parcels of land in
litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to
her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in
litigation and became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the
respondent Court not to allow their substitution as parties in interest for the deceased
plaintiff.

28
 Digested by: KCabus

LORENZO VS POSADAS
G.R. NO. 43082, JUNE 18, 1937

FACTS:
The plaintiff, Pablo Lorenzo, in his capacity as trustee of the estate of Thomas Hanley,
brought this action against the defendant, Juan Posadas, Jr., then the Collector of Internal
Revenue, for the refund of the amount paid by the plaintiff as inheritance tax on the estate
of the deceased, and for the collection of interest thereon computed from the date when
the aforesaid tax was paid under protest. The defendant set up a counterclaim alleged to
be interest due on the tax in question and which was not included in the original
assessment. The Court dismissed both the plaintiff’s complaint and the defendant’s
counterclaim. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not inheritance tax shall be based upon the value of the estate upon the death
of the testator?

RULING:
Yes. Whatever may be the rule in other jurisdiction, we hold that a transmission by
inheritance is taxable at the time of the predecessor’s death, notwithstanding the
postponement of the actual possession or enjoyment of the estate by the beneficiary,
and the tax measured by the value of the property transmitted at that time
regardless of its appreciation or depreciation.

If death is the generating source from which the power of the state to impose inheritance
taxes takes its being and if, upon the death of the decedent, succession takes place and the
right of the state to tax vests instantly, the tax should be measured by the value of the
estate as it stood at the time of the decedent’s death, regardless of any subsequent
contingency affecting value of any subsequent increase or decrease in value.

The right of the state to a inheritance tax accrues at the moment of death, and hence is
ordinarily measured as to any beneficiary by the value at that time of such property as
passes to him. Subsequent appreciation or depreciation is immaterial

29
 Digested by: KCabus

QUISON VS SALUD
G.R. NO. 4314, NOVEMBER 21, 1908

FACTS:
The land in controversy is situated between this line of trees and the estero. Claro Quison
owned the land to the north of the estero is undisputed, but the defendant claims that he
[Quison] never owned any land south of the estero. A large amount of evidence,
principally parol, was introduced upon this question, and after an examination thereof, it
was proven at the trial that the land in question belongs to the heirs of Quison.
ISSUE:
Whether or not successional rights are transmitted to the heirs after the decedent’s death?

RULING:
Yes. It was proven at the trial that the present plaintiffs are the next of kin and heirs. The
Civil Code provides that the title to property owned by a person who dies intestate
passes at once to his heirs. Such transmission is, under the present law, subject to the
claims of administration and the property may be taken from the heirs for the
purposes of paying debts and expenses, but this does not prevent the immediate
passage of the title, upon the death of the intestate, from himself to his heirs. Without
some showing that a judicial administrator had been appointed in proceedings to settle
the estate of Claro Quison, the right of the plaintiffs to maintain this action is established.

30
 Digested by: KCabus

DAIS VS CFI OF ILOILO

G.R. NO. L-28770, JANUARY 21, 1928

FACTS:
In course of the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
Separion Dais, Manuel Arnaldo was appointed administrator of the estate. For the
payment of some of the debts of the deceased, said administrator was authorized to sell
certain parcels of land of said estate to Antonio Habana, which sale was approved by the
court of February 15, 1926.

The herein petitioners or some of them objected to such approval (sale) and filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, this petition for a writ of certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs have the right to intervene in a cause involving certain property
of the decedent despite the appointment of a legal administrator?

RULING:
Yes. This court has held in various decisions that the right to the succession of a person
are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs immediately
succeed to the dominion, ownership and possession of the property of their predecessor.
The fact that the law provides for the appointment of a legal administrator for the
liquidation of the deceased's property, and the partition of his hæreditas jacens among his
heirs, does not deprive the heirs of the right intervene in the administration of said
property for the protection of their interests. The heirs have a right to intervene when they
believe the administrator's acts are prejudicial to their interest. And it cannot be said that
the administrator answers with his bond for any damage he may cause to the interests of
the estate, since such bond might not be sufficient to cover said damages.

31
 Digested by: KCabus

MARABILLES VS QUITO
G.R. NO. L-10408, OCTOBER 18, 1956

FACTS:
Plaintiffs filed an action for the reconveyance of a parcel of land consisting of 18 hectares
situated in Pili against the defendants. Instead of answering the complaint, the defendants
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds (1) that Plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue,
(2) that the complaint states no cause of action, and (3) that the action had prescribed.
Defendants attached to their motion TCT Nos. 1065 and 1018 issued in the name of one
Guadalupe Saralde and Patricio Marabiles, respectively, a homestead patent granted
under Act No. 2874. Plaintiffs filed a written opposition to the motion, to which
Defendants replied, and thereafter the court issued an order sustaining the motion.
Accordingly, it dismissed the complaint with costs against the Plaintiffs. When Plaintiffs
appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals, the case was certified to us on the
ground that the questions raised are purely of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a judicial declaration of heirship is necessary for an heir to have a legal
capacity to file an action for recoveyance of property belonging to the deceased?

RULING:
No. The right to assert a cause of action as an heir, although he has not been judicially
declared to be so, if duly proven, is well settled in this jurisdiction. This is upon the
theory that the property of a deceased person, both real and personal, becomes the
property of the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and as such he
can deal with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt, subject
only to the limitations which by law or by contract may be imposed upon the deceased
himself. Thus, it has been held that “There is no legal precept or established rule which
imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an
intestate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the
legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right
which belonged to their ancestor.

32
 Digested by: KCabus

ONG VS CA
G.R. NO. 75884, SEPTEMBER 24, 1987

FACTS:
Sps. Alfredo Ong and Julita Go Ong own two parcels of land identified as Lot no. 12 and
Lot no. 1, covered by TCT no. 188705. When Alfredo Ong died, Julita Go Ong was
appointed administratrix of her husband's estate. Thereafter, through her attorney-in-fact
Jovita K. Yeo mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking Corporation to secure a loan of
P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. The mortgage was registered on TCT No.
188705 on the same date. When the loan amounting to P828,000.00 become due, Allied
Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita and instituted the extrajudicial
foreclosure on the mortgaged property. Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the
mortgage contract for lack of judicial approval.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the mortgage constituted over the parcel of land belonging to the
decedent’s estate under petitioner’s administration is null and void for want of judicial
approval?

RULING:
No. The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court
cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of her
Ideal [not inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her
hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code)} share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the
other heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.).

Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case where judicial approval has to be
sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under
administration for the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, The conjugal
and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite judicial approval
for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is
caused others, including the government.

33
 Digested by: KCabus

BUTTE VS UY & SONS

G.R. NO. L-15499, FEBRUARY 28, 1962

FACTS:
Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de
Ramirez, 1/6; and Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6 co-owned a house and lot in Sta. Cruz. When
Jose V. Ramirez died a Special Proceeding was instituted to settle his estate, including his
undivided share in the aforementioned property. His last will and testament, wherein he
bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and onethird (1/3) of the free
portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte, has been admitted to probate but are still pending due to
the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased.

Meanwhile, Marie Garnier, one of the co-owners, sold her undivided share to Manuel Uy
& Sons, Inc. for the sum of P500,000.00 afterwhich a formal notices of the sale had been
sent to all possible redemptioners. The said letter was received by the appellant on Dec
19, 1958. Subsequently, appellant sent a letter and a PNB cashier's check of P500,000.00
to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Marie Garnier. This
tender having been refused, plaintiff consigned the amount in court and filed an action for
legal redemption. Trial was held and the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the
ground that she has no right to redeem the property. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiff-appellant, as an heir, can exercise the right of legal redemption
on the property subject of the pending testate proceedings?

RULING:
Yes. The appellant Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption.
As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an
interest in the undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor in the Santa
Cruz property, from the moment of the death of J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the
succession of a deceased person are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his
death, and the right of succession includes all property rights and obligations that survive
the decedent.

The situation is in no wise altered by the existence of a judicial administrator of the

estate of Jose V. Ramirez while under the Rules of Court the administrator has the
right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as
needed for the payment of the decedent's debts and the expenses of administration (sec. 3,
Rule 85), and the administrator may bring or defend actions for the recovery or protection
of the property or rights of the deceased (sec. 2, Rule 88), such rights of possession and
administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to
Uy & Company by Mrs. Garnier Ramirez.

34
 Digested by: KCabus

NOCEDA VS CA
G.R. NO. 119730, SEPTEMBER 2, 1999

FACTS:
Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo, the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late
Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land-Lot 1121. On the same date,
plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, her
nephew. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of Lot
1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Arbizo.

Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him
by plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial
settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in
1985, defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo,
occupied the three huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her
consent. Plaintiff Directo demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the
latter refused. Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery
of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant
Noceda before the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner did not usurp the property of respondent Directo since the
metes and bounds of the parcel of land left by their predecessorare still undetermined?

RULING:
No. In this case the source of co-ownership among the heirs was intestate succession.
Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its
partition, owned in common by such heirs subject to the payment of debts of the
deceased. 

The heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo namely Maria Arbizo, Aurora A. Directo (private
respondent) and Rodolfo Noceda (petitioner) entered into an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate on August 17, 1981 and agreed to adjudicate among themselves the property
left by their predecessor-in-interest. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the
exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.

Thus, the areas allotted to each heir are now specifically delineated in the survey plan.
There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable,
though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the
same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in
their respective owners.29 A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive
ownership of the property adjudicated to him.30cräläwvirtualibräry

35
 Digested by: KCabus

NUFABLE VS NUFABLE
G.R. NO. 126950, JULY 2, 1999

FACTS:
Edras Nufable owned an untitled parcel of land consisting of 948 square meters, more or
less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel
Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition for probate
filed by said heirs. The heirs agreed to settle the estate in accordance with the terms and
condition of the will that the parcel of land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental remains undivided for community ownership. Subsequently, such property was
mortgaged entirely by spouses Angel and Aquilina to the DBP. Said mortgagors became
delinquent for which reason the mortgaged property was foreclosed by DBP to which the
son of the mortgagor purchased on February 26, 1973. Hence, this complaint to declare
the Deed of Sale executed by the DBP in favor of the defendants be declared null and
void on the ground that the ¾ rights on the mortgaged property belong to the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Angel Custodio Nufable had the right to mortgage the subject property in
its entirety?

RULING:
No. It should be noted that the late Esdras Nufable die on Aug 9, 1965. When the entire
property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged on Mr 15, 1966 by his son Angel Custodio
with the DBP, the other heirs of Esdras-namely: Generosa, Vilflor and Marcelo-had
already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is because of the
principle contained in Art 777 to the effects that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Accordingly, for the purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last
Will and Testament of late Esdras Nufable was admitted on Mar 30, 1966 or thereafter or
that the Settlement of Estate was approved on Jun 6, 1966 or months later.

Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouse mortgaged the subject property to DBP on
March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property. Angels right over the
subject property was limited only to pro indiviso share. As coowner of the subject
property, Angels right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be
allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership.

36
 Digested by: KCabus

BLAS VS SANTOS
G.R. NO. L-14070, MARCH 29, 1961

FACT:
This action was instituted by plaintiffs against the administration of the estate of Maxima
Santos, to secure a judicial declaration that one-half of the properties left by Maxima
Santos Vda. de Blas, the greater bulk of which are set forth and described in the project
of partition presented in the proceedings for the administration of the estate of the
deceased Simeon Blas, had been promised by the deceased Maxima Santos to be
delivered upon her death and in her will to the plaintiffs, and requesting that the said
properties so promised be adjudicated to the plaintiffs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the document referred to Exhibit "A" is valid and enforceable?

RULING:
Yes. While future inheritance cannot be subject of a sale or a donation, inheritance that
has accrued already may be the subject of such contract. Future inheritance is any
property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract,
that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the
contract Exhibit "A" are well defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement,
which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as belonging to his wife as her share in the
conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may not
be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time
Exhibit "A" was executed. Thus, a wife may properly dispose of her share of the conjugal
properties, since this share is her own, indeed not future inheritance. It is not even
accrued inheritance. It is indeed her own existing property.

37
 Digested by: KCabus

DE BORJA VS DE BORJA
G.R. NO. L-28040, AUGUST 18, 1972

FACTS:
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has
been plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar,
some eighteen (18) cases remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of
Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a century. In order to
put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement was entered into on 12
October 1963 by and between "[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first
marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of
Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his
second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis
Panaguiton Jr.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a compromise agreement constituted by the heirs are valid even without
first probating the will of the decedent, Francisco de Borja?

RULING:
Yes. Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between "Jose de Borja
personally and as administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on the one hand,
and on the other, "the heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second
marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the transaction was
binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the same. The only difference
between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and approved by the
Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.

38
 Digested by: KCabus

SUILONG CO VS CHIO-TAYSAN
G.R. NO. 4777, NOVEMBER 11, 1908

FACTS:
Avelina borrowed from Francisca, the intervener-appelant, P1,000 secured by the title of
deeds. Avelina died leaving defendant Silvina as her sole heir. Defendant mortgaged the
land in question to the FMI for P2,500. Thereafter, the husband of Silvina instituted a
special proceedings for the administration of the estate of the Avelina and submitted an
inventory of the estate including the land in question. To which, Francisca submitted her
claim of P1,000 to the commissioner appointed in these proceedings.

Meanwhile, the plaintiff, Suilong- liquidator of FMI filed an action for recovery of sum
of money against the defendant and foreclosure of the mortgaged property. To this, F.
Jose filed her separate "complaint in intervention" prayed that the court declare the
mortgage executed by Silvina Chio-Taysan in favour of FMI rescinded and of no effect;
and that it annul the inscription in the land registry of the title of Silvina Chio-Taysan to
the land in question; and declare this land subject to her claim against the estate of
Avelina Caballero, deceased. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not heirs succeed the deceased in all his rights and obligations?

RULING:
Yes. The property of the deceased, both real and personal, became the property of
the heir by the mere fact of death of his predecessor in interest, and he could deal
with it in precisely the same way in which the deceased could have dealt with it, subject
only to the limitations which by law or by contract were imposed upon the deceased
himself.

He could alienate or mortgage it with the same freedom as could the deceased in his
lifetime; the unsecured debts and other personal obligations of the deceased
becoming the unsecured debts and personal obligations of the heir for which he was
held personally responsible in precisely the same manner as the deceased, save only,
as has been said before, where he availed himself of the privilege of taking the estate
"with the benefit of an inventory," in which case the extent of his liability was limited
to the value of the estate which came into his hands, though in other respects its
character as a personal liability remained unchanged.

39
 Digested by: KCabus

NERI VS AKUTIN
G.R. NO. L-47799, JUNE 13, 1941

FACTS:
Agripino Neri y Chavez died leaving six children by his first marriage and five children
by his second marriage. In Agripino Neri’s testament, which was admitted to probate, he
willed that his children by the first marriage shall have no longer any participation in his
estate, as they had already received their corresponding shares during his lifetime. At the
hearing for the declaration of heirs, the trial court found, contrary to what the testator had
declared in his will, that all his children by the first marriage had not received any
advancement of inheritance during his lifetime.

And upon this finding it rendered judgment declaring the children by the first and second
marriages intestate heirs of the deceased. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s
decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the omission of the children of the first marriage annual the institution of
the children of the second marriage as sole heirs of the testator?

RULING:
Yes. The preterition of one or all of the forced heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall void the
institution of heir.

In the instant case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will,
they were not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being
disinherited. Further, no express betterment is made in favor of the children by the second
marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their behalf consisting of the third
available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs by the second
marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already
received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator’s intention, as may be
clearly inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally among all
his children.

40
 Digested by: KCabus

ROSALES VS ROSALES
G.R. NO. L-40789, FEBRUARY 27, 1987

FACTS:
Petra V. Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales
and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child,
Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner.

Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased in the CFI which issued an order declaring Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4;
Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son,
¼ as the legal heirs of the deceased. However, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration
of the Orders praying that she be declared as compulsory heir of the deceased as the
surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased. The trial court denied
her plea. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the
latter, her mother-in-law?

RULING:
No. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving
spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any
provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own
right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the
order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude
the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased
all the more confirms our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving
spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code. We
so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.

41
 Digested by: KCabus

BARANDA VS BARANDA
G.R. NO. 73275, MAY 20, 1987

FACTS:
Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs, the
herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6
parcels of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales. What
made these transactions suspect was the subsequent complaint filed by the late Paulina
against her nieces alleging that she had signed the said deeds of sale without knowing
their contents and sought for the reconveyance of the subject parcels of land. The
complaint, however, did not materialized.

The petitioners, siblings of the decedent, now sought the annulment of the supposed sale
or transfers. Respondents question the petitioners legal standing, them being not the
legitimate and compulsory heirs of Paulina Baranda nor were they parties to the
challenged transactions.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can impugn the validity of the sales?

RULING:
Yes. This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in
interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased,
without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that
there is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.

There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate,
the petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the
disputed properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution
later in accordance with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales
and the subjects thereof would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would
thus have been permitted to benefit from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed
that those suing through attorneys-in-fact were not properly represented, the remaining
petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the validity of the deeds of sale.

42
 Digested by: KCabus

BALAIS VS BALAIS
G.R. NO. L-33924, MARCH 18, 1988

FACTS:
On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of
the late Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children
of the deceased. The trial court decreed reconveyance of the portion of the property
belonging to the legitime and further declaring partition that sent 1/4 portion of the
legitime to the respondents. Petitioners come now questioning the partition and seeking
the reconveyance of the 1/4 share that went to the spurious children.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spurious children of the decedent are entitled to a share in the latter’s
estate?

RULING:
No, the decedent having passed away during the regime of the Civil Code of 1889 under
which bastards, in bulgar parlance, were entitled to no share in the estate. In Uson v. Del
Rosario, we said that the rights given to the adulterous children under the new Civil Code
have no retroactive application.

43