ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. vs. Loque

G.R. No. 230005. January 22, 2020 
Topic: Constructive Dismissal vs. Abandonment of Employment
Doctrine:
 The placement of an employee on "floating status" must not exceed six months.
Otherwise, the employee may be considered constructively dismissed. The burden of
proving that there are no posts available to which the security guard can be assigned rests
on the employer.
 Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.
Facts:
Loque is a hired security guard of Seventh Fleet. He alleges that he was treated with hostility
after he filed a complaint for underpayment of wages and other money claims against Seventh
Fleet. He was relieved from his post upon request of the corporation he was assigned in. Later he
was suspended for 10 days. After the lapse of his 10-day suspension, he allegedly reported for
duty but he was informed that he was on “floating status” and was advised to wait for a call from
Seventh Fleet. More than 6 months later, he received a letter on a Friday, directing him to report
within 48 hours from receipt. He went to Seventh Fleet on a Monday but he was not allowed to
enter and was made to wait outside. Before leaving the premises, he handed a letter to the
security guard informing Seventh Fleet that he was ready to report for duty. Seventh Fleet wrote
a second letter saying that Loque failed to report for work despite the return to work order. In a
letter, he inquired with Seventh Fleet on the status of his employment stressing that he was
refused to return to work even though he obeyed the return to work order. Loque filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal.
Seventh Fleet denied all of Loque’s allegations. Seventh Fleet also added that it received a report
from the security guards regarding an offense committed by Loque – when he was no longer on
duty, he rode a motorbike with a guard from another agency, returned at midnight, entered
through the backdoor of the agency, took a key from the guard’s table, opened the building’s
basement so the guard from another agency can enter without passing through the guards on
duty, and stayed there overnight. To avoid argument, the guards on duty did not confront him but
decided to report him instead. This act of Loque is not authorized by Seventh Fleet nor Second
Midland’s Code of Disciplinary Rules and Regulations. Loque reasoned the inclement weather
forced him to ask the building administrator if he could stay in the building overnight and he
even offered help to the other guards in case of emergency or flooding in the area. In order to
avoid getting involved, the building manager requested that Loque be replaced. That’s when he
was relieved and suspended. Seventh Fleet alleged that on May 14, 2014, they sent Loque a letter
directing him to report for posting, but Loque did not comply with the directive. On May 28,
2014, Seventh Fleet sent Loque another letter reiterating the instruction to report for posting.
However, Seventh Fleet still received no word from Loque. Seventh Fleet was surprised to learn
that Loque had filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, and payment of separation pay and full
backwages.
LA found Seventh Fleet guilty of illegal constructive dismissal. NLRC reversed LA. CA
reaffirmed the LA.
Issue:
1. Whether Loque was constructively dismissed.
2. Whether Loque abandoned his employment.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
In security services, the "floating status" or temporary "off-detail" of an employee may take
place when there are no available posts to which the employee may be assigned. While there is
no specific provision in the Labor Code governing the "floating status" or temporary "off-detail"
of employees, the Court, applying Article 301 of the Labor Code by analogy, considers this
situation as a form of temporary retrenchment or lay-off, which shall not terminate employment
and in all such cases, the employee shall be reinstated to his former position if he indicates his
desire to resume his work not later than one (1) month from the resumption of operations of his
employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty. The placement of an employee on
"floating status" must not exceed six months. Otherwise, the employee may be considered
constructively dismissed. The burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the
security guard can be assigned rests on the employer. However, the mere lapse of six months in
"floating status" should not automatically result to constructive dismissal. The peculiar
circumstances of the employee's failure to assume another post must still be inquired upon.
To avoid liability for constructive dismissal, Seventh Fleet asserted that it had directed Loque to
report to their office for posting within forty-eight (48) hours. Seventh Fleet faulted Loque for
not complying with its directive. On the other hand, Loque claimed that he went to Seventh
Fleet's office to report for work on two occasions, as shown by his even dated letters. Loque
further alleged that he was barred from entering the premises of Seventh Fleet on those dates
and, thus, was constrained to write those letters instead. Other than bare denials, Seventh Fleet
was not able to show that Loque was not barred from entering its premises. Thus, Loque could
not be faulted for merely leaving the letter with security guard Amores, and for sending the
second letter through private courier. Seventh Fleet did not dispute the second letter or its
contents but merely attempted to discredit Loque by saying that the letter was merely "crafted" in
preparation to the filing of the complaint. The general return to work orders will not absolve
Seventh Fleet since jurisprudence requires not only that the employee be recalled to the agency's
office, but that the employee be deployed to a specific client before the lapse of six months. The
correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did not
report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually
received the letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed because none of these
letters indicated his reassignment to another client.
2. No.
Since Loque was constructively dimissed, it follows then that Loque could not have abandoned
his employment with Seventh Fleet, for abandonment is incompatible with constructive
dismissal.
Abandonment, as a just cause for termination, requires "a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any intention of returning to his or
her work." The following elements must therefore concur: (1) the failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-
employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts.
There is no showing that Loque intended to sever his employment with Seventh Fleet. On the
contrary, there is strong indication that Loque wanted to resume work.

. Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. vs. Roberto Cuizon

G.R. No. 184452. February 12, 2020
Topic: Loss of Trust and Confidence and Neglect of Duty as Ground for Dismissal
Doctrine:
 The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: (1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be
an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and (3) such loss of trust relates
to the employee's performance of duties.
 Neglect of duty to be a ground for dismissal must be both gross and habitual. Gross
negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform
one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
Facts:
Cuizon, who has worked there for 32 years in the Maintenance and Engineering Department of
PAL, then later on absorbed by Lufthansa where he held the position of MA2 Duty Manager,
was dismissed by Lufthansa for gross negligence because of his involvement in an accident that
resulted in substantial losses to Lufthansa. Lufthansa points out loss of trust and confidence due
to numerous violations and blatant disregard of their standards in the workplace committed in
two separate incidents: 1) concealment of accidental light-up of PAL Aircraft, and 2) failure to
observe safety guidelines and precautions with respect to aircraft towing causing damage to PAL
Aircraft.
In the first incident, a co-employee suggested to Cuizon to follow the Handbook on standard
operating procedure apprising the Maintenance Control Center (MA4) regarding the situation.
He however opted to tow the aircraft to the hangar and continued the scheduled check prior to
informing the MA4. And instead of informing them with the accidental light-up, he reported that
an engine fan blade was found hard to rotate upon arrival. His report was then found inconsistent
with the other reports filed by his co-employees so he amended his report, and tried to make
excuses like he verbally reported it.
In the second incident, Cuizon performed the tasks assigned to another without authority to do so
and despite having no expertise on such matters. He then assigned someone else who is
inexperienced and unqualified. He then left them in the hands of the inexperienced one. He
allowed the wing walkers and tail guides to leave their positions before towing of the aircraft was
completed. He even disregarded the safety precautions under the Boeing Maintenance Manual
regarding towing of an aircraft. He failed to wait for the clearance from the Mactan International
Tower prior to towing. As a consequence, the aircraft was grounded for repair due to damage
sustained upon its collision with a four-foot high utility post, amounting to USD21,000.00 plus
USD14,470.00 as lease charge for when it was grounded.
He was then served show cause memorandums.
Cuizon claims that he is being singled out due to event prior to the accidental light-up and
towing incidents. He alleged that there was a letter circulating about a co-employee’s (manager)
handling of the company in Cebu and his other culpabilities inimical to Lufthansa’s interest. And
in the same letter, Cuizon was praised for his work and better person as holding the manager
position. As a result, he is receiving cold treatment. He further points that he was the only one
terminated despite the involvement and admissions of other personnel. He claims that Lufthansa
railroaded his efforts to procure documents necessary to defend himself such as transcripts of the
investigation. He argues that he did not conceal information, rather he could not immediately
conclude the finding that there was an accidental light-up because the same had to be confirmed
using a boroscope. With regard to the towing incident, Cuizon claims that he did not abandon the
towing crew but only proceeded to do other tasks to support the leak check that was meant to be
conducted on the aircraft's engine.
After proper notice and hearing, Cuizon was dismissed. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the LA. LA decided for Lufthansa. NLRC affirmed LA. CA set aside NLRC decision
saying that Lufthansa failed to establish that Cuizon intentionally, willfully, knowingly and
purposely breached his duty. CA also said that Cuizon could not be guilty of deliberately giving
false, inaccurate, misleading, incomplete or delayed information to LTP regarding the accidental
aircraft engine light-up incident since: firstly, he indeed submitted a copy of the incident report
to manager and secondly, the report was based on his personal findings and appreciation of the
facts and were substantially corroborated and confirmed by the reports70 of his fellow
employees involved in the incident. The towing precautions that he allegedly did not follow and
which were made as the basis for his alleged negligence, were for the tow tractor operator, brake
rider and radio operator to comply with. Thus, Cuizon could not be faulted if in the course of the
towing operation, some members of the crew left. Granting that Cuizon should be responsible as
the supervisor of the crew, petitioners failed to prove that Cuizon consented or had full
knowledge that said crew members left their posts. Moreover, the CA gave credence to Cuizon's
argument that he did not abandon the towing job but only proceeded to do other tasks to support
the leak check that was meant to be conducted on the aircraft's engine.
Issue:
1. Whether Cuizon was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
2. Whether Cuizon is guilty of gross neglect of duty.
Ruling:
1. No.
The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: (1) the employee
concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence; and (3) such loss of trust relates to the employee's
performance of duties. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of
managerial employees – those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management
policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees
or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, etc. They are defined as those who in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Loss of
trust and confidence as a valid ground for dismissal is premised on the fact that the employee
holds a position whose functions may only be performed by someone who enjoys the trust and
confidence of the management. Such employee bears a greater burden of trustworthiness than
ordinary workers, and the betrayal of the trust reposed is the essence of the loss of trust and
confidence that becomes the basis for the employee's dismissal.
In the instant case, the Court finds that petitioners failed to substantially prove the second
requisite. For loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a
willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. Such breach is willful if it is done
intentionally, knowingly, and purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Lufthansa failed to prove that Cuizon
willfully, intentionally, knowingly, purposely and without justifiable excuse disregarded LTP's
rules and regulations in the workplace. On the contrary, this Court finds that Cuizon has
substantially refuted petitioners' claim on the alleged concealment of the accidental lightup and
the towing incident.
2. No.
In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was
for a valid and authorized cause. Lufthansa failed to discharge the burden. Firstly, petitioners
miserably failed to show that Cuizon did not exercise even a slight care or diligence which
caused the grounding of and damage to the aircraft during the towing operation. Moreover,
Lufthansa failed to prove that it as Cuizon’s act that directly or solely caused the grounding of
and damage to the aircraft during the towing incident. Lufthansa also failed to prove that Cuizon
was negligent in his job when he allegedly concealed the accidental light-up incident or allegedly
provided false information thereon. On the contrary, he performed his task in accordance with
the rules and procedures of LTP. He immediately informed his supervisor, through a phone call,
about his findings. He had timely submitted/furnished a copy of his incident report. Moreover, he
did not rely on hearsay information on what happened with the aircraft but he acted based on his
personal findings and appreciation of facts of the accidental aircraft engine light-up incident.
Considering Cuizon's untainted 32 years of service, the Court finds that it is incongruous for him
to deliberately act recklessly on his job, especially since his employer's line of business involves
the lives and safety of airline passengers.
BOGNOT VERSUS PINIC INT’L CORP/CD-R KING
G.R NO. 212471
MARCH 11, 2019
DOCTRINE: The rule is settled that “off-detailing” is not equivalent to dismissal, so long as
such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time and that it is only when such “floating
status” lasts for more than six months that the employee may be considered to have been
constructively dismissed. An employee who is on off-detail status is not dismissed from service.

FACTS: Bognot alleges that Respondent employed her as a branch head in 2003. She was
assigned to different CD-R King branches. She was responsible for the inventory, adjustment
and monitoring of stocks; deposit of daily sales to the bank; and supervision of store operations.
Sometime in April, she was accused of allowing unauthorized persons to enter CD-R king’s
Bodega in Robinson’s Place, because of this, she was suspended for three days. On May 10,
2010, Bognot was informed that she would be pulled out of the branch for no reason and was
told not to report for work anymore. According to her, she was threatened to be brought to the
police on false charges of theft and on My 9, she was pulled out of the branch. She then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.

Respondent, on the other hand, alleged that they were notified of Bognot’s actions/inactions and
required Bognot to submit a written explanations on the report that she allowed unauthorized
persons inside the restricted area of CD-R King and that she failed to organize and display store
merchandise. Due to Bognot’s negligence it led to a huge discrepancy in CD-R King’s Inventory.

LA RULING: Dismissed the case, finding that there is no ER-EE Relationship between Bognot
and Pinic Int’l.
NLRC RULING: Affirmed LA’s Ruling in it’s entirety.
CA RULING: Sustained NLRC’s Decision.

ISSUE: WON BOGNOT WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

RULING:
NO.
The SC held that it is not unaware of the rule that in Illegal Dismissal cases, the employer has the
burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, however, there are
cases wherein the facts and the evidence do not establish prima facie that the employee was
dismissed from employment. Thus, it is likewise incumbent upon the employees that they should
first establish by substantial and competent evidence the fact of their dismissal from
employment. Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employees are burdened to prove that they
did not commit illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon the employee to first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of his or her dismissal. In this case, the established facts show that
Bognot was not dismissed from employment. She was merely pulled-out from her assignment
and instructed to be ready for the next company assignment. But after four days, Bognot already
filed this illegal dismissal case. Clearly, at that point, there was no dismissal to speak of yet.

The rule is settled that “off-detailing” is not equivalent to dismissal, so long as such status does
not continue beyond a reasonable time and that it is only when such “floating status” lasts for
more than six months that the employee may be considered to have been constructively
dismissed. An employee who is on off-detail status is not dismissed from service.

A complaint for illegal dismissal filed prior to the lapse of the said six-month period and/or the
actual dismissal of the employee is generally considered as prematurely filed. Such principle
finds legal basis in Article 286 of the Labor Code, which allows employers to put employees on
floating status for a period not exceeding six months as a bona fide suspension of the operation
of a business or undertaking.
TERMINATION; JUST CAUSES OF TERMINATION
1. Due Process: Substantive and Procedural
PARDILLO VERSUS DR. BANDOJO
G R NO. 224854
MARCH 27, 2019
DOCTRINE: The additional grounds cited in the notice of termination which were not
mentioned in the Notice to Explain violated Pardillo’s right to be informed of the administrative
charges against her. The NTE and the Notice of Termination did not specify the acts that
constituted breach of company policies resulting in loss of truss and confidence and the specific
policies that were violated.

FACTS: Pardillo was hired as midwife of E &R Hospital. In 1991, Pardillo was transferred to a
new position as Billing Clerk. In 2001, she was promoted and became the Business Office
manager and held such position until 2010 when her employment was terminated by Dr. Bandojo
in a letter of termination. On the other hand, Respondent alleged that Pardillo’s termination was
brought about by several infractions she has committed and her habitual tardiness totaling to
about 16,000 minutes. Because of this, the hospital suffered losses due to her negligence in
failing to process and send records of patients to Philhealth for refund of their paid claims.
Pardillo filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with the LA.

LA RULING: The complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.

NLRC RULING: Reversed and set aside LA’s ruling and held that Pardillo was dismissed
without substantive and procedural due process.
CA RULING: Pardillo was dismissed through just cause.

ISSUE: WON PARDILLO’S RIGHT TO BE INFORMED WAS VIOLATED.

RULING:
YES.
The SC held that Article 297 of the Labor Code allows an employer to terminate the services of
an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. There are two requisites for this
ground:
First, the employee must be holding aposition of trust and confidence; and second, there must be
a willful act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence which is based on clearly
established facts. Pardillo’s status as a managerial employee was never disputed in the case. The
pivotal issue therefore before the court is the existence of the second requisite.
The records show that in an NTE Pardillo was made to explain her alleged tardiness. Pardillo
replied in a letter apologizing for her tardiness. There was inclusions of new allegations in the
notice of termination but it was not sufficiently explained by Dr. Bandojo. Pardillo was not
served with any NTE so that she could proffer her new defense with regard to the new
allegations. Considering the foregoing, the court finds that Dr. Bandojo failed to prove with
substantial evidence the acts constituting willfull breach of company policy, resulting to loss of
trust and confidence, thus, Pardillo was illegally dismissed.

The additional grounds cited in the notice of termination which were not mentioned in the Notice
to Explain violated Pardillo’s right to be informed of the administrative charges against her. The
NTE and the Notice of Termination did not specify the acts that constituted breach of company
policies resulting in loss of truss and confidence and the specific policies that were violated.
PANASONIC VERSUS PECKSON
G R NO. 206316
MARCH 20, 2019
DOCTRINE: Petitioner cannot take refuge in the argument that it is the employer who bears the
burden of proof that the resignation is voluntary and not the product of coercion or intimidation.
Having submitted a resignation letter, it is then incumbent upon her to prove that the resignation
was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal with clear, positive, and
convincing evidence. Petitioner failed to substantiate her claim of constructive dismissal.

FACTS: Respondent John Peckson was employed as a sales supervisor for the Battery
Department of petitioner Panasonic Manufacturing Philippines.
In a letter dated Sept. 16, 2003, Peckson expressed his intention to resign effective on Oct. 30,
2003. In a subsequent letter dated Sept. 25, 2003, he informed Panasonic that he wished to
change the effectivity of his resignation to Oct. 15, 2003 so that he could attend to some personal
matters. In both letters, he expressed gratitude to Panasonic for giving him the opportunity to
work with it.
On April 11, 2005, Peckson filed a complaint for constructive dismissal against Panasonic and
Jose De Jesus (De Jesus), Panasonic’s manager, claiming for separation pay, other money
claims, damages and attorney’s fees. He alleged that he was forced to resign by De Jesus after
the latter accused him of falsifying his signature in an “Authority to Travel” form. He was placed
on “floating status” solely to be the subject of ridicule.
To these allegations, Panasonic maintained that Peckson voluntarily resigned from work, as seen
in the tenor of his two resignation letters, his willing completion of the exit interview and the
clearance procedure, as well as his signing of a quitclaim and release.

ISSUE: WON PECKSON WAS ILLEGALLY DISMISSED.

RULING:
NO.
To note, the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment; hence, the acts
of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining
whether he, in fact, intended to terminate his employment. In illegal dismissal cases, it is a
fundamental rule that when an employer interposes the defense of resignation, on him
necessarily rests the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily resigned.

Guided by these legal precepts, a judicious review of the facts on record will show that
Panasonic was able to show Peckson’s voluntary resignation.

First, the company aptly proved that Peckson’s resignation letters showed the voluntariness of
his separation from Panasonic. While the fact of filing a resignation letter alone does not shift the
burden of proof, and it is still incumbent upon the employer to prove that the employee
voluntarily resigned, in this case, the facts show that the resignation letters are grounded in
Peckson’s desire to leave the company as opposed to any deceitful machination or coercion on
the part of Panasonic.

The very contents of the letters show not only any lack of reluctance or tension on the part of
Peckson, but in fact express gratitude and welI wishes, without qualification, nor do they show
any sign of aggression, bitterness, or hostility towards his former employer. In Bilbao v. Saudi
Arabian Airlines, 678 Phil. 793 (2011), the Court found as voluntary the resignation of the
complainant, whose clear use of words of appreciation and gratitude negated the notion that she
was forced and coerced to resign. Likewise, the Court held in Rodriquez v. Park N Ride Inc., et
al., 807 Phil.747 (2017), that the petitioner-employee voluntarily resigned as evidenced in part
by her submission of two resignation letters containing words of gratitude.

Second, the Court finds that Peckson’s subsequent and contemporaneous actions belie his claim
that he was subjected to harassment on the part of Panasonic. Peckson neglected to show any
sign that he had reached out to company management regarding his alleged complaints with De
Jesus or any other employee of Panasonic, and if he did, he failed to show the same. It would
stand to reason that if Peckson had legitimate grievances, he would have raised them up with
management.

While Peckson alleges that he sent two complaint-affidavits detailing the acts of abuse heaped on
him, as well as his being put on floating status, the Court notes that Peckson was unable to
proffer any proof that he sent these to Panasonic. The lack of any proof that he did, without any
evidence of intimidation or coercion, should highlight the intangibility of these accusations
CASE TITLE: FIRST GLORY PHILIPPINES VERSUS LUMANTAO
G R NO. 237166
MARCH 6, 2019
DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence provides that poor performance or unsatisfactory work may fall
under gross and habitual neglect of duties under Article 296 (b) of the Code or may constitute
gross inefficiency.

FACTS: Petitioner is a corporation engaged in manufacturing and exporting garments while the
respondents are all fomer employees of petitioner as sewers and aside from being former
employees they are also officers and members of the Union. Petitioner, issued a Memoranda to
them ascribing their several offenses against the company and they were also directed to submit
their written explanation as well as to appear in an investigation to be conducted bu the HRD.
Alleged in the Memoranda that Cabatingan, Petarco and Ladrazo manipulated and improperly
used the petitioner’s RFID. Lumantao was also allegedly given an unsatisfactory rating for his
failure to achieve the required level of performance efficiency. These acts are deemed violative
of FGPI’s Code of Conduct. Instead of attending the investigation, the Union filed a Notice of
Strike before the NCMB. During the conciliation proceedings in the NCMB, respondents was
then again given the opportunity to submit their written explanation but still failed to produce the
same. The investigation proceedings still proceeded despite the respondents’ lack of response.
Using these Reports, the Respondents were severed from their employment. They then filed
ULP, Union busting and Illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: WON THERE WAS ILLEGAL DISMISSAL.

RULING:
NONE. Notwithstanding the correct appreciation of the LA and the NLRC, a perusal of the
documents and evidence at hand convinces this Court that the proof of valid dismissal has been
properly substantiated. Respondents, save for Lumantao, were proven to have committed
fraudulent acts which rendered them unfit to continue employment with FGPI.

Fraud as a just ground for dismissal is provided under paragraph (d) of Article 297 (formerly
282) of the Labor Code. Thus: (d) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized representative. The following are thus the requisites in
order to validate this ground: First, there must be an act, omission, or concealment; second, the
act, omission or concealment involves a breach of legal duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed; third, it must be committed against the employer or his/her representative; and fourth,
it must be in connection with the employee's work.

The Court finds that the foregoing elements are attendant to the case at bar. The respondents,
save for Lumantao, committed clear acts that involved a breach of trust and confidence by
directly deceiving their employer by making it seem that they worked with greater speed and
efficiency than they actually did. Once again, the Court sees no reason to disturb the findings of
fact of the lower tribunals that there was a clear discrepancy between the time goals purportedly
accomplished by the respondents -except Lumantao- and the regular time goals, as recorded.

Crucially, the fraud committed by respondents Cabatingan, Petarco, and Ladrazo is work-related
and renders them unfit to work for FGPI.

TOPIC: ILLEGAL STRIKE AND ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

CASE TITLE: BIGG’S INC. VERSUS MONCADAS
G R NO. 200487
MARCH 6, 2019
DOCTRINE: Art. 264 of the Code presents a substantial distinction of the consequences of an
illegal strike between union officers and mere members of the union. For union officers,
knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a valid ground for termination of their employment.
But for union members who participated in a strike, their employment may be terminated only if
they committed prohibited and illegal acts during the strike and there is substantial evidence or
proof of their participation.

FACTS: Bigg's was the employer of Boncacas et. Al. Bigg's operates a chain of restaurants. Its
employees formed a labor union named Bigg's Employees Union. Both parties have contrasting
versions of the incidents leading to the conflict between the Bigg's management and the union
members.
Bigg's alleges that on February 16, 1996, around 50 union members staged an illegal "sit-down
strike" in Bigg's restaurant. The union did not comply with the requirements of sending Notice of
Strike to the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Neither did the union obtain
the "strike vote" from its members. According to Bigg's, the union belatedly filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB on the same day to conceal the illegality of the sit-down strike. Bigg's
issued a memorandum to the striking union members placing them under preventive suspension
and requiring them to explain their actions within 24 hours from notice. The union members did
not comply with the company's order. Thus, they were sent employment termination letters on
February 19, 1996.4

On the other hand, the union members accuse Bigg's of interfering with union activities.
Allegedly, in February 1996, union members were asked to withdraw their membership under
threat of losing their employment. In the same month, employees Mariano Aycardo and Marilyn
Jana were dismissed from service purportedly due to their union membership. On February 16,
1996, the day of the alleged sit-down strike, union president Boncacas and other union members
were prevented from entering the premises of Bigg's. On the same day, they filed a Notice of
Strike with the NCMB. They attempted to return to work on February 17, 1996, but they were
informed to obtain their respective memoranda from the main office in Naga City. The
memoranda informed them of their suspension from work for participating in a sit-down strike.
Some union members tried to talk with the Bigg's management, but they were told not to report
for work the next day.
The union members filed a complaint before the NCMB for unfair labor practices, illegal
dismissal, and damages.

ISSUE: WON THE UNION OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES WERE VALIDLY

DISMISSED.

RULING:
YES.
The strike on March 5, 1996 was illegal; dismissal of union president valid
The Court upholds the consistent and uniform findings of the CA, NLRC, and LA on the
illegality of the strike on March 5, 1996, despite the compliance with the procedural
requirements of a valid strike. It was established that the striking union members committed acts
of violence, aggression, vandalism, and blockage of the free passage to and from Bigg's
premises.
While the law protects the right of workers to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or to seek redress for unfair labor practices, this right must be exercised in
accordance with the law. Article 279 (formerly 264) (e) of the Labor Code provides:

No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or
obstruct public thoroughfares.
The Court, however, reverses the CA's findings that the union president Boncacas' dismissal was
invalid as he did not commit illegal acts during the March 5, 1996 strike.
In Magdala Multipurpose & Livelihood Cooperative v. Kilusang Manggagawa ng LGS,63 the
Court summarized the above rule accordingly:
We now come to the proper sanctions for the conduct of union officers in an illegal strike and for
union members who committed illegal acts during a strike. The above-cited Art. 264 of the Code
presents a substantial distinction of the consequences of an illegal strike between union officers
and mere members of the union. For union officers, knowingly participating in an illegal strike is
a valid ground for termination of their employment. But for union members who participated in a
strike, their employment may be terminated only if they committed prohibited and illegal acts
during the strike and there is substantial evidence or proof of their participation, i.e., that they are
clearly identified to have committed such prohibited and illegal acts.
Thus, for union members, what is required is that they knowing participated in the commission
of illegal acts during the strike for there to be sufficient ground for termination of employment.
For union officers, however, it suffices that they knowingly participated in an illegal strike.
It must be noted that Boncacas not only knowingly participated but was the one who principally
organized two illegal strikes on February 16, 1996 and March 5, 1996. Thus, the dismissal of
Boncacas and the other union officers after the illegal strike on February 16, 1996 as well as the
March 5, 1996 strike was valid. However, as to the union members who did not participate in
any prohibited act during the strikes, their dismissal was invalid.
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL
CASE TITLE: AIRBORNE MAINTENANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES VERSUS EGOS
G R NO. 222748
APRIL 3, 2019
DOCTRINE: Here, the totality of the foregoing circumstances shows that petitioner’s acts of
not informing respondent and the Dole of the suspension of its operations, failing to prove the
bona fide suspension of its business or undertaking, ignoring respondent’s follow-ups on a new
assignment, and belated sending of letters/notices which were returned to it, were done to make
it appear as if respondent had not been dismissed. These acts, however, clearly amounted to a
dismissal, for which petitioner is liable.

FACTS: On April 9, 1992, petitioner Airborne Maintenance and Allied Services Inc. hired the
services of respondent Arnulfo Egos as janitor. He was assigned at the Balintawak branch of
Meralco, a client of Airborne.
On June 30, 2011, the contract between Airborne and Meralco-Balintawak branch expired and a
new contract was awarded to Landbees Corp. which absorbed all employees of Airborne except
respondent, who allegedly had a heart ailment. Respondent consulted another doctor who
declared him in good health and fit to work. He showed a duly issued medical certificate to
Airborne but the same was disregarded. Feeling aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for
constructive illegal dismissal on Aug. 5, 2011.
Airborne insisted that respondent was never dismissed from the service. It claimed that when its
contract with Meralco was terminated, it directed all its employees including respondent to report
to its office for reposting. When respondent failed to comply with the directive, it sent him letters
dated Aug. 12, 2011 and Sept. 21, 2011 to his last known address reiterating the previous
directive but which were returned with a notation “RTS unknown.” It further argued that it had
placed respondent on floating status when the contract with Meralco was terminated.

ISSUE: WON THE ACTS OF THE EMPLOYER OF NOT INFORMING THE

EMPLOYEE AND THE DOLE OF THE SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS SUPPORT
THE CLAIM THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE CONSTRUCTIVELY DISMISSED.

RULING:
YES.
The Court finds that petitioner failed to prove that the termination of the contract with Meralco
resulted in a bona fide suspension of its business operations so as to validly place respondent in a
floating status.
In implementing this measure, jurisprudence has set that the employer should notify the
Department of Labor and Employment (Dole) and the affected employee, at least one month
prior to the intended date of suspension of business operations. An employer must also prove the
existence of a clear and compelling economic reason for the temporary shutdown of its business
or undertaking and that there were no available posts to which the affected employee could be
assigned.
Here, a review of the submissions of the parties shows that petitioner failed to show compliance
with the notice requirement to the Dole and respondent.
Making matters worse for petitioner, it also failed to prove that after the termination of its
contract with Meralco it was faced with a clear and compelling economic reason to temporarily
shut down its operations or a particular undertaking. It also failed to show that there were no
available posts to which respondent could be assigned.
Also, not only did petitioner fail to prove it had valid grounds to place respondent on a floating
status, but the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and the Court of Appeals both
correctly found that respondent even had to ask for a new assignment from petitioner, but this
was unheeded. Further, when respondent filed the complaint on Aug. 5, 2011, petitioner, as an
afterthought, subsequently sent notices/letters to respondent directing him to report to work.
These, however, were not received by respondent as the address was incomplete.
Here, the totality of the foregoing circumstances shows that petitioner’s acts of not informing
respondent and the Dole of the suspension of its operations, failing to prove the bona fide
suspension of its business or undertaking, ignoring respondent’s follow-ups on a new
assignment, and belated sending of letters/notices which were returned to it, were done to make
it appear as if respondent had not been dismissed. These acts, however, clearly amounted to a
dismissal, for which petitioner is liable.
Bookmedia Press, Brizuela vs. Sinajon, Abenir
G.R. No. 213009. July 17, 2019
Topic: Just Causes of Termination
Doctrine: Serious misconduct and willful disobedience must have the elements of seriousness
and willfulness in order to constitute as a just cause. These requirements show that the intent of
the law was to reserve only the penalty of dismissal to the gravest infraction. Dismissal is the
most severe penalty an employer can impose and must be taken with due care and due regard to
the circumstances.
Facts:
Bookmedia hired Sinajon and Abenir as in-house security personnel. Brizuela, President of
Bookmedia, received a report that both Sinajon and Abenir left the premises right after they
punched-in one morning, and Sinajon returned only in the evening of the same day and punched-
out for the both of them. The following day, they were summoned by Brizuela to explain
regarding the complaint but they ignored. The next day, they sent letter explanations saying that
they had to leave because of family emergencies. Abenir explained that he only left at 5:00 pm
but only forgot to punch out that’s why he asked Sinajon to do it for him. Sinajon explained that
an impending storm was coming and their roof needs urgent repair, and that his wife was sick
that day and that he needed to take care of her. The day after that they were fired. Sinajon and
Abenir filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the LA contending lack of cause and non-
observance of due process. Bookmedia denied the contention saying that the former incident was
just the latest of a string of past incidents when they were caught skipping work and that the
repeated infractions amounted to serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an employer’s
lawful order, or fraud. Bookmedia’s allegations were substantiated only by the letter-
explanations of Sinajon and Abenir.
LA found the dismissal illegal due to “failure to prove otherwise” saying that they presented no
evidence to support that they repeatedly skipped work, the letter-explanations recorded only one
instance. LA said that one instance cannot be considered as just cause for dismissal and that a
written reprimand with warning would have been more reasonable. LA ordered reinstatement.
NLRC dismissed appeal for failure to file a bond. MR was also unsuccessful. CA affirmed
NLRC.
Issue:
1. Whether Sinajon and Abenir’s acts constitute just cause for termination.
2. Whether Abenir having asked Sinajon to punch out for him constitute fraud.
Ruling:
1. No.

There was only one instance. Therefore, the only issue is whether that one instance
amounted to a just cause for dismissal of employee. Art. 297 provides for the just causes
one of which is serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or fraud.

In Ha Yuan Restaurant vs NLRC, serious misconduct must be “willful in character, and

implies wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment.” In Gold City Integrated Port
Services vs NLRC, willful disobedience requires that the willfulness being characterized
by a wrongful and perverse attitude. All these, including fraud, must imply the presence
of “willfulness” or “wrongful intent” or of a “wrongful and perverse attitude”. The
requirement of which underscores the intent of the law to reserve only the penalty of
dismissal to the gravest infraction, not merely trivial, reflective of a certain degree of
depravity or ineptitude on the employee’s part. The acts lack the elements of willfulness
 or seriousness so as to warrant dismissal. The acts were not motivated by any wanton
desire to transgress the company time policy. There were emergencies and in view of
such context, would show that the failure to seek permission could be attributed to a
momentary lapse of judgment, rather than some design to circumvent company policy.

2. The dishonest act of Abenir of asking someone else to punch out his card can be
mitigated by the fact that he rendered service until 5:00 pm, and that he only forgot to
punch out. Certainly, this act does not constitute the fraud contemplated by the law. In
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp. vs. NLRC, the court ruled that the penalty of
dismissal should not be imposed on just “any act of dishonesty”, but only upon those
whose depravity is commensurate to such penalty. Dismissal is the most severe penalty
an employer can impose and must be taken with due care and due regard to the
circumstances.
TERMINATION – JUST CAUSE & TWIN NOTICE RULE

MECO MANNING & CREWING SERVICES, INC. and CAPT. IGMEDIO G.

SORRERA, Petitioners
vs.
CONSTANTINO R. CUYOS, Respondent
GR No. 222939, July 3, 2019

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that
the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal. For this purpose, the employer must present substantial evidence to prove
the legality of an employee's dismissal. "Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."

Section 17(D) of the POEA-SEC clearly shows that it is only the second notice or the notice of
dismissal which may be dispensed with under exceptional circumstances - the first written notice
could never be dispensed with. The seafarer-employee should always be furnished with the
written notice informing him of the charges against him and the date, time, and place of the
formal investigation.

FACTS:

On March 10, 2008, Cuyos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and claims for salaries and
other benefits for the unexpired portion of his employment contract, damages, and attorney's fees
against International Crew Services, Ltd. (ICS). Constantino alleged that he was hired as the
Second Marine Engineer of the vessel "M/V Crown Princess." The employment was for a period
of eight months. Constantino claimed that the ship's Chief Engineer, Francisco G. Vera, Jr.
(Vera), mistreated him during his short stay on board. He recounted that Vera started shouting at
him whenever he would ask questions concerning the engine operations of the vessel; and that on
one day, he was attending to the freshwater generator when, all of a sudden, Vera slapped his
hand and kept on shouting at him allegedly because he was not doing his work properly. In
February, he was relived as challenged Vera to a fight and went back to Manila. Vera, however
claimed that it was Vera who was very rude to him.

MECO Manning claimed that Constantino's dismissal was valid. Petitioners claimed that
Constantino's dismissal was necessitated by reason of his unsatisfactory performance evaluation,
violation of his contract of employment as he violated the provisions on insubordination and
inefficiency, his angry and provocative utterances and his attempt to physically assault his
superior. Thus, Constantino's dismissal was for a just cause and was resorted to in order to
protect and maintain the peace of the vessel and the safety of its crew. In support of their
allegations is a letter signed by Vera and attested by two witnesses.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.
The NLRC concurred with the Labor Arbiter's observation. CA reversed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Constantino Cuyos was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

YES. Petitioners failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that Constantino's dismissal was
grounded on just and valid causes. It is settled that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests
upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause. Failure to do so would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. For this purpose, the employer must present
substantial evidence to prove the legality of an employee's dismissal. "Substantial evidence is
defined as such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to justify a conclusion."

The pieces of evidence presented by the petitioners to establish the validity of the dismissal are
either unreliable or plainly insufficient to prove that Constantino is guilty of insubordination and
serious misconduct. 

In this case, the petitioners admit that they did not furnish Constantino with any written notice
prior to his dismissal and that this is justified under Section 17(D) of the POEA-SEC. However,
Section 17(D) is inapplicable to this case because the alleged offenses by Constantino have not
been established by substantial evidence. Assuming for the sake of argument that the aforesaid
infractions have been duly shown, Section 17(D) would still be inapplicable because Capt.
Kolidas failed to conduct the required investigation under Section 17(8). Finally, it is clear from
Section 17 that it is only the second notice or the notice of dismissal which may be dispensed
with under exceptional circumstances - the first written notice could never be dispensed with.
The seafarer-employee should always be furnished with the written notice informing him of the
charges against him and the date, time, and place of the formal investigation. Very clearly, the
petitioners failed to afford Constantino with procedural due process prior to his termination.
TERMINATION – JUST CAUSE AND TWIN NOTICE RULE

AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA, PETITIONER, v. ABS-CBN CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT
GR No. 242875, August 28, 2019

DOCTRINE:

In this case, no valid second notice was given to petitioner because while the memorandum dated
September 1, 2015 informed him that he was sanctioned with the penalty of dismissal for his
serious misconduct, the same was not effected considering the expiration of his purported fixed-
term employment contract. Consequently, for not having been furnished the second notice,
which purpose is to inform the employee of his or her termination from employment, petitioner's
right to procedural due process was violated.

Jurisprudence provides that in cases where the dismissals are for a just cause but are procedurally
infirm, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for violation of his statutory
rights. The rationale is that the employer should not be compelled to continue employing a
person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued
employment is patently inimical to the employer, as in this case.

FACTS:

In 2002, petitioner was hired by respondent ABS-CBN Corporation as a video editor. He was

allegedly rehired repeatedly and continuously for the same position, under purported fixed-term
contracts.

An incident which happened where petitioner was intoxicated and placed his hands inside a
female co-worker's pants and touched her buttocks, led to administrative hearings. In 2015, he
was dismissed. Petitioner filed a complaint 18 for illegal dismissal, underpayment of holiday pay,
non-payment of salary/wages, 13th month pay, separation pay, and night shift differential, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees against respondent.

Respondent averred that petitioner was engaged only for a fixed period and his employment
automatically ceased on the end date. It also claimed that even if petitioner's employment had not
yet expired, the latter was dismissed for a just cause for having been found guilty of serious
misconduct in: (a) reporting for work while intoxicated; and (b) committing lascivious acts
against a female co-worker.

LA found petitioner to have been illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed the LA's Decision. CA
reversed.
ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.

RULING:

NO. While petitioner is considered regular employee, and not a fixed-term employee, the
respondent had a just cause in terminating petitioner's employment as the latter committed
serious misconduct against a female co-worker.

He tried to hug and kiss a female co-worker, then placed his hands inside her pants and touched
her buttocks. These acts constitute serious misconduct. However, despite the existence of a just
cause, respondent failed to observe the proper procedure in terminating petitioner's employment.

In this case, no valid second notice was given to petitioner because while the memorandum dated
September 1, 2015 informed him that he was sanctioned with the penalty of dismissal for his
serious misconduct, the same was not effected considering the expiration of his purported fixed-
term employment contract. Consequently, for not having been furnished the second notice,
which purpose is to inform the employee of his or her termination from employment, petitioner's
right to procedural due process was violated.

Jurisprudence provides that in cases where the dismissals are for a just cause but are procedurally
infirm, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for violation of his statutory
rights. The rationale is that the employer should not be compelled to continue employing a
person who is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued
employment is patently inimical to the employer, as in this case.
BREACH OF TRUST;LOSS OF CONFIDENCE

July 29, 2019

G.R. No. 225586

THE PENINSULA MANILA and SONJA VODUSEK, Petitioners

vs.
EDWIN A. JARA, Respondent

DOCTRINE:Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a
willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts

FACTS:Jara was unable to reconcile the excess cash on hand with the cash transaction receipts
but he did not turn over the excess cash of ₱6,500.00 and kept the same in his office locker.
What Jara did to remedy the discrepancy was post the ₱613 .00 amount appearing on the tape
receipt, instead of the entire ₱7,113 .08 appearing in the sales receipt. This way, the cash count
tallied with the data posted in the micros system.

The following day, July 23, was Jara's birthday so he did not report for work. He, however, dined
at the Escolta. On July 24, Jara again did not report for work because it was his day-off. When he
reported for work on July 25, he informed the hotel's internal auditor about the overage of
₱6,500.00.

ISSUE: Was Jara illegally dismissed?

RULING:

Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination
of employment, viz:

Art. 297. Termination by employer. - An employee may terminate an employment

for any of the following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful

orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or duly authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and
 (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

For dismissal due to cause under subsection (c), certain requirements must be complied with, viz:
(1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence and (2) there must
be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, there are two (2) classes of positions of
trust.1âшphi1 The first class consists of managerial employees, or those vested with the powers
or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions.
While the second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. or those who, in
the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money
or property.

As for the first requirement, Jara indisputably comes within the second class of employees as he
is tasked to handle significant amounts of money from sales in petitioners' restaurant Escolta.

As to the second requirement,Jara tampered with the sales record and misrepresented to his
supervisor that he was able to balance the cash transactions with the cash on hand. Moreover,
Jara did not immediately report the overage which he kept in his custody. 

When the breach of trust or reason for the loss of confidence is clearly borne by the records, as in
this case, the right of the employer to dismiss an employee based on this ground must be upheld.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

G.R. No. 232870, June 03, 2019

MANUEL G. ACOSTA, PETITIONER, v. MATIERE SAS AND PHILIPPE GOUVARY,

RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE:In redundancy, an employer must show that it applied fair and reasonable criteria
in determining what positions have to be declared redundant. Otherwise, it will be held liable
for illegally dismissing the employee affected by the redundancy.

FACTS:Matiere SAS, represented by its resident manager Philippe Gouvary (Gouvary),

executed a Consulting Agreement with Acosta. Per the agreement, Matiere SAS engaged Acosta
as its technical consultant for 12 months, with a monthly salary of P70,000.00.

Upon the Consulting Agreement's expiration, Matiere SAS hired Acosta as its technical assistant
with the same P70,000.00 monthly salary.
On June 27, 2013, Matiere SAS sent Acosta a letter with the subject, "Ending of the employment
agreement."The decision is due to the cessation of delivery operations and the diminution of
activities.

The sole issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not petitioner Manuel G. Acosta was
validly dismissed from employment on the ground of redundancy.

RULING:

This Court declares petitioner to have been illegally dismissed.

For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid, the employer must comply with the
following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of
Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (2)
payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher; (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions;
and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant
and accordingly abolished.

Respondents complied with the first and second requisites.

As to the third requisite,there was no mention of monitoring shipments as part of petitioner's

tasks. If his work pertains mainly to the delivery of supplies, it should have been specifically
stated in his job description. Respondents did not even present any evidence to support their
claim or to contradict petitioner's documentary evidence. There was, hence:, no basis for
respondents to consider his position irrelevant when the shipments had been completed.

As to the fourth requisite,likewise, respondents failed to show that they used fair and reasonable
criteria in determining what positions should be declared redundant.

Among the five (5) employees dismissed, petitioner cannot be similarly situated with the other
employees. Petitioner's duty is not limited to the monitoring of deliveries

G.R. No. 233413, June 17, 2019

CELIAR. ATIENZA, PETITIONER, v. NOEL SACRAMENTO SALUTA, RESPONDENT.

DOCTRINE:Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally

presumed from certain equivocal acts.

Facts:Petitioner claimed that respondent was not an employee of CRV Corporation, but was
hired by the petitioner as her personal/family driver with a monthly salary of P9,000.00 and free
board and lodging. His duty was simply to drive for her and her family to anywhere they wish to
go. His monthly salary was coursed through Reyes.Petitioner contended that respondent was not
dismissed from work, rather he abandoned his job when he refused to report for work and took a
leave of absence without permission.
Respondent alleged that when he failed to report for work on December 24, 2014, he was
verbally terminated by the petitioner. Respondent claimed that Reyes confirmed his termination.
On the other hand, petitioner contended that the respondent just stopped reporting for work after
he left his work

Issue:Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed from work

The Court’s Ruling

Respondent is the personal/family

driver of the petitioner

Respondent did not proffer any competent evidence, documentary or otherwise, as would prove
his claimed employment with the company. In the case at bench, the respondent did not present
his employment contract, company identification card, company pay slip or such other document
showing his inclusion in the company payroll that would show that his services had been
engaged by CRV Corporation. His contention that he received his salaries through the ATM like
the other employees of the company, even if true, does not sufficiently show that his salaries
were paid by the company as its employee. Respondent also failed to present any proof showing
how the company wielded the power of dismissal and control over him. Evidence is wanting that
the company monitored the respondent in his work.  It had not been shown that respondent was
required by the company to clock in to enable it to check his work hours and keep track of his
absences. 

The Civil Code shall govern the

rights of family drivers

Due to the express repeal of the Labor Code provisions pertaining to househelpers, which
includes family drivers, by the Kasambahay Law; and the non-applicability of
the Kasambahay Law to family drivers, there is a need to revert back to the Civil Code
provisions, particularly Articles 1689, 1697 and 1699, Section 1, Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV
thereof.

EC. 1 — Household Service.

ART. 1689. Household service shall always be reasonably compensated. Any stipulation that
household service is without compensation shall be void. Such compensation shall be in addition
to the [househelper's] lodging, food, and medical attendance.

x x x x

ART. 1697. If the period for household service is fixed neither the head of the family nor the
[househelper] may terminate the contract before the expiration of the term, except for a just
cause. If the [househelper] is unjustly dismissed, he shall be paid the compensation already
earned plus that for fifteen days by way of indemnity. If the [househelper] leaves without
justifiable reason, he shall forfeit any salary due him and unpaid, for not exceeding fifteen days.
x x x x

ART. 1699. Upon the extinguishment of the service relation, the [househelper] may demand
from the head of the family a written statement on the nature and duration of the service and the
efficiency and conduct of the [househelper].

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS

G.R. No. 200811, June 19, 2019

JULITA M. ALDOVINO, JOAN B. LAGRIMAS, WINNIE B. LINGAT, CHITA A.

SALES, SHERLY L. GUINTO, REVILLA S. DE JESUS, AND LAILA V. ORPILLA,
PETITIONERS, v. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC., SAGE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LTD., AND ALBERTO C. ALVINA, RESPONDENTS.

ISSUES:

First, whether or not the Compromise Agreement barred all other claims against respondents
Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc. and Sage International
Development Company, Ltd., and Alberto C. Alvina; and

Second, whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to the
reimbursement of their placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.

RULING

This is outright erroneous.

Waivers and quitclaims executed by employees are generally frowned upon for being contrary to
public policy. This is based on the recognition that employers and employees do not stand on
equal footing

Here, the parties entered into the Compromise Agreement to terminate the case for
underpayment of wages, which petitioners had previously filed against respondents in Taiwan.
The object and foundation of the Compromise Agreement was to settle the payment of salaries
and overtime premiums to which petitioners were legally entitled. Hence, it should not be
construed as a restriction on petitioners' right to prosecute other legitimate claims they may have
against respondents.
Paragraph 7 of the Compromise Agreement, which stipulates that petitioners "shall give up other
rights of compensation . . . [and] shall not ask for any compensation based on any other
causes[,]" cannot bar petitioners from filing this case and from being indemnified should
respondents be adjudged liable. Blanket waivers exonerating employers from liability on the
claims of their employees are ineffective.

Besides, at the time the parties' Compromise Agreement was executed, respondents had just
terminated petitioners from employment.With no means of livelihood, they signed the
Compromise Agreement out of dire necessity.

As to the second issue, a review of the records here shows that the termination of petitioners'
employment was effected merely because respondents no longer wanted their services. This is
not an authorized or just cause for dismissal under the Labor Code. Employment contracts
cannot be terminated on a whim.

Furthermore, petitioners were not accorded due process. A valid dismissal must comply with
substantive and procedural due process: there must be a valid cause and a valid procedure. The
employer must comply with the two (2)-notice requirement, while the employee must be given
an opportunity to be heard. Here, petitioners were only verbally dismissed, without any notice
given or having been informed of any just cause for their dismissal.

ARTICLE 300. [285] Termination by employee. — (a) An employee may terminate without just
cause the employee-employer relationship by serving a written notice on the employer at least
one (1) month in advance. The employer upon whom no such notice was served may hold the
employee liable for damages.
 
An employee may put an end to the relationship without serving any notice on the
(b)
employer for any of the following just causes:

1. Serious insult by the employer or his representative on the honor and person of the
employee;

2. Inhuman and unbearable treatment accorded the employee by the employer or his
representative;

3. Commission of a crime or offense by the employer or his representative against the

person of the employee or any of the immediate members of his family; and

4. Other causes analogous to any of the foregoing.

As a consequence of the illegal dismissal, petitioners are also entitled to moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or
fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to good morals,
good customs or public policy.
Petitioners have sufficiently shown how bad faith attended respondents' actions. They were made
to sign a new employment contract on a piece-rate basis, which violates the Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act.

Consequently, the award of exemplary damages is necessary to deter future employers from
committing the same acts.

The clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less"
under Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection and substantive due process clauses.

A statute declared unconstitutional "confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no

protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all." Incorporating a
similarly worded provision in a subsequent legislation does not cure its unconstitutionality.

Hence, petitioners are entitled to the award of salaries based on the actual unexpired portion of
their employment contracts. The award of petitioners' salaries, in relation to the three (3)-month
cap, must be modified accordingly.

G.R. No. 225075, June 19, 2019

ARNULFO M. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, v. KALOOKAN SLAUGHTERHOUSE

INCORPORATED*/ERNESTO CUNANAN, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:According to petitioner, he was hired in 1994 as a butcher by Kalookan Slaughterhouse,

Inc. (Kalookan Slaughterhouse), a single proprietorship owned by respondent Emesto Cunanan
(Cunanan). He claimed that he worked from Monday to Sunday, from 6:30P.M. to 7:30A.M.,
with a daily wage of P700.00, which was later reduced to P500.00. He further claimed that he
met an accident while driving Kalookan Slaughterhouse's  truck in December 2013 and that
deductions were made from his wages. He questioned these deductions in July 2014, and
thereafter he was treated unreasonably. Petitioner further claimed that on July 21, 2014, he
suffered from a headache and did not report for work.

The next day, however, he was shocked when he only received P200.00 due to his previous
undertime and was informed that he could no longer report for work due to his old age.
Kalookan Slaughterhouse,  on the other hand, asserted that petitioner received payment based on
the number of hogs he butchered and was only required to be in the slaughterhouse  when
customers  brought hogs to be slaughtered.

WHETHER THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE NLRC

DECISION AND RESOLUTION WHICH FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS
AN EMPLOYER EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP  BETWEEN  THE  PETITIONER  AND THE
RESPONDENTS.

WON THERE WAS AN ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.

The Court's Ruling

Petitioner was an employee of

Kalookan Slaughterhouse.

It is  settled that "[t]o determine the  existence of an  employer-employee relationship,   four 
elements generally need to  be  considered, namely: (1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (2) the payment of  wages;  (3)  the  power of dismissal;   and  (4)  the  power  to 
control the employee's conduct. These elements or indicators comprise the so-called 'four-fold'
test of employment relationship."

The  totality  of  petitioner's   evidence  and  the  admissionsof Kalookan Slaughterhouse 
convinces the Court that petitioner was indeed an employee of Kalookan Slaughterhouse.
Petitioner was able to present an LD., gate  passes,  log  sheets,  and  a  trip  ticket.  Kalookan 
Slaughterhouse  even admitted through De Guzman that uniforms were given to all personnel,
including petitioner.

As to the power of control,the record appears that  De  Guzman,  who  is  also  an employee  of
Kalookan  Slaughterhouse,  was the one who exercised control over  petitioner's means  and
methods  as he reprimanded  petitioner  for his failure to properly store his butchering knives,
coming to Kalookan Slaughterhouse  with dirty clothes, reporting for work drunk, and not having
an I.D. before going to the slaughterhouse.

Petitioner was illegally dismissed and

entitled to his money claims.

Petitioner claims that on July 22, 2014 he was callously informed that he could no longer report
for work because of his old age. Kalookan Slaughterhouse,  however,  claims that petitioner  was
not dismissed  but was only barred from entering as he failed to comply with the "No I.D., No
Entry" Policy and the "No Uniform, No Entry" Policy.

The Court finds that the LA was correct in ruling that petitioner was illegally dismissed.

The LA ruled that petitioner's allegation of dismissal was unrebutted as De Guzman only attested
to several instances where petitioner was reprimanded for his failure to comply with the
slaughterhouse's policy. For the LA, De Guzman did not state that on July 22, 2014 he had
barred petitioner from entering for his failure to comply with the policies.

JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT

G.R. No. 223082, June 26, 2019

CMP FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, INC. AND/OR MS. CAROLINA MABANTA-

PIAD, PETITIONERS, v. NOEL T. REYES, SR., RESPONDENT.

Reyes claimed that he kept on reporting for duty until July 30, 2013 when he was verbally
informed of his termination. On this very date (July 30, 2013), he received a Notice of
Termination.

Petitioners denied the complaint and averred that, starting January 2013, Reyes had been remiss
in the discharge of his duties as Detachment Commander at MG Terminal;that Reyes' dismissal
was justified because Reyes was negligent in the performance of his duties as shown by his
repeated disregard of company rules; that Reyes' position was one of trust and confidence, to
which Reyes proved untrustworthy when he leaked confidential information. This breach,
according to the petitioners, stymied CMP Federal's planned takeover of the vacant Cabcaben
property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED in affirming the Decision
of the NLRC, reversing the Decision of the Labor Arbiter Fe Cellan in finding that the
Respondent Reyes was illegally dismissed.

The Court's Ruling

Just cause for Reyes's termination

In the case at bar, the explanations proffered by Reyes showed that he was not animated by any
wrongful intent when he committed the infractions complained of. Moreover, the finding that he
was guilty of serious misconduct was incompatible with the charges for negligence which, by
definition, requires lack of wrongful intent.

The Court cannot also consider negligence as a valid ground for Reyes' dismissal. To be a valid
ground for dismissal, the neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence
implies want of care in the performance of one's duties. Habitual neglect, on the other hand,
implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case, the Court finds that, although Reyes' negligence
was habitual, they could in no way be considered gross in nature. It cannot be said that Reyes
was wanting in care. For, based on his explanations, his infractions were the result of either
simple negligence or errors in judgment.
Nevertheless, the Court rules that there was still just cause for Reyes' termination - gross
inefficiency.

In the leading case of Lim v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court considered
inefficiency as an analogous just cause for termination of employment under Article 282 of the
Labor Code.

VALID DISMISSAL;MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVE

G.R. No. 232194, June 19, 2019

ALVIN M. DE LEON, PETITIONER, v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS,

INC. AND ANNA MARIA MORALEDA, RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE:The Court has upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.

FACTS:

De Leon received a gift during his tenure with PTC — his only contentions are: (1) that it did not
constitute a violation of the foregoing rule as he did not receive it from a crew member, ex-crew
member, or representative of a crew member, and (2) that the rule was vague, unreasonable, and
unfair.

De Leon's dismissal was anchored on his violation of PTC's Code of Discipline, the pertinent
provision again reads:
Section O. CONCERTED ACTIONS AGAINST COMPANY  & OTHER
OFFENSES

5. No employee shall offer or accept directly or indirectly any gift with a

collective value of Php 500.00 and above. Any item worth Php 500.00 and above
should be returned or surrendered to HR Department. In addition, an employee
who accepts any amount of money or any gift in kind from a crew member, ex-
crew member, or representative of a crew member shall be dismissed.

Offering or accepting any gift with collective value of P500.00 and above
should be dealt with DISMISSAL.

1st Offense - DISMISSAL

Issue

WON the mere act of receiving a gift constitutes a violation of PTC's Code of Discipline;
Won the penalty of dismissal too harsh and not commensurate to the act committed

The Court's Ruling

The Court has, in the past, upheld a company's management prerogatives so long as they are
exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not for the purpose of
defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements. In this case, the Court holds that PTC was well within its management prerogative
in terminating de Leon's employment upon a finding of violation of its company rules.

The Court agrees with the explanation of PTC. Indeed, in light of the strict provisions of the
POEA Rules, it was reasonable for PTC to protect itself by crafting its Code of Discipline that
imposes the supreme penalty of dismissal for those who commit acts that, if construed to be
PTC's, would merit the cancellation of its license. Thus, as it is recognized that company policies
and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law, are generally valid and
binding on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended, the dismissal
of de Leon — hinged on a rule that provides for dismissal even on the first instance of violation
— should therefore be upheld.

Illegal Dismissal-Regular Employees;Quitclaims

G.R. No. 242834, June 26, 2019

RAMON E. MIRANDILLA, RANIL D. ATULI, AND EDWIN D. ATULI, PETITIONERS, v.

JOSE CALMA DEVELOPMENT CORP. AND JOSE GREGORIO ANTONIO C. CALMA,
JR., RESPONDENTS.

DOCTRINE:It is crucial that the employees were informed of their status as project

employees at the time of hiring and that the period of their employment must be knowingly
and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties

The burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the
employer.

FACTS:

In May 2013, respondent Jose Calma Development Corp. (JCDC), a company engaged in the
construction business, allegedly hired Ramon as finishing carpenter for the latter's construction
project in Makati City, and later, in October 2014, also hired Ranil and Edwin as carpenter and
finishing carpenter, respectively.

Sometime in October 2015, Ramon was asked by JCDC to sign a document purporting to be a
termination of his project employment contract; the following month, Ranil and Edwin were
asked to sign a similar document.Claiming that they were regular employees, petitioners were
surprised to learn that their employment had been terminated despite not having violated any
company policy. This prompted them to file a complaint for illegal dismissal and other money
claims 

Respondents submitted their Weekly Time Records(WTRs) as primary proof of his alleged
project employment status. No project employment contract was shown designating his
engagement for each particular undertaking, much more was it demonstrated that he was
informed of the scope and duration thereof.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that petitioners were
project employees, and thus, were legally dismissed.

The Court's Ruling

Petitioners were regular employees

To expound, Article 295 (formerly 280) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides that a regular
employee is one who has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer, while a project employee is one whose
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination
of which has been determined at the time of engagement of the employee.

According to jurisprudence, the principal test for determining whether particular employees are
properly characterized as project employees as distinguished from regular employees, is whether
or not: (a) the employees were assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking; and (b)
the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for
that project.

It is crucial that the employees were informed of their status as project employees at the time of
hiring and that the period of their employment must be knowingly and voluntarily agreed
upon by the parties, without any force, duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon
the employees or any other circumstances vitiating their consent.

By virtue of the pattern of reassignment, Ramon should be deemed as a regular employee, as he

was actually tasked to perform work which is usually necessary and desirable to the trade and
business of his employer, and not merely engaged for a specific project or undertaking.

In addition, if Ramon were to be considered as a project employee for each of the project sites
indicated in the WTRs, then JCDC should have submitted a report of termination to the nearest
public employment office every time his employment was terminated due to completion of each
construction project.The Court has] consistently held that failure of the employer to file
termination reports after every project completion proves that the employees are not project
employees.

Likewise, same as in Ramon's case, Ranil and Edwin's project employment contracts for their
engagement were not even shown. These contracts would have shed light to what projects or
undertakings they were engaged; but all the same, none were submitted. As case law holds, the
absence of the employment contracts puts into serious question the issue of whether the
employees were properly informed of their employment status as project employees at the time
of their engagement, especially if there were no other evidence offered.

As such, they were regular employees who could only have been dismissed for a just or
authorized cause, none of which exists. Accordingly, as the LA correctly ruled, they were
illegally dismissed.

The quitclaims signed by Ranil and Edwin, in consideration of P6,917.47 and

P7,290.06, respectively, do not appear to have been made for a reasonable and credible
consideration, considering that these amounts only pertained to their 13 th month pay for the year
2015, and as such, do not approximate any reasonable award (such as backwages and separation
pay) that would have been awarded to them should they successfully pursue litigation. Notably,
the 13th month pay is a statutory obligation of the employer under the law.

TOPIC:

Twin Requisites of Valid Dismissal; Due Process Requirement

DOCTRINE:

The employer is required to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices before
termination of employment can be effected: a first written notice that informs the employee of
the particular acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, and a second written
notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Anent the second
notice, the written notice of termination should indicate that: (a) all circumstances involving the
charge against the employees have been considered; and (b) grounds have been established to
justify the severance of their employment.
G.R. No. 242875, August 28, 2019

AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA, PETITIONER, v. ABS-CBN CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

In 2002, petitioner was hired by respondent ABS-CBN Corporation (respondent), as a

video editor for the latter's television broadcasting at an hourly rate of P230.00. He was allegedly
rehired repeatedly and continuously for the same position, under purported fixed-term contracts.
In 2013, petitioner admittedly reported for work and went to respondent's editing bay while
intoxicated. This led to an incident where petitioner placed his hands inside a female co-worker's
pants and touched her buttocks. On September 1, 2015, respondent served a memorandum to
petitioner informing him of management's decision to "impose on [him] the penalty of
dismissal." However, respondent claimed that it can no longer effect the same, since petitioner's
program contract dated August 16, 2013 had already expired on December 31, 2013, and his
"current program contract dated March 16, 2015 to September 15, 2015 no longer covers the
incident.

ISSUE:

Whether the respondent failed to observe the proper procedure in terminating petitioner's
employment.

RULING:

Yes. As a rule, the employer is required to furnish the employee with two (2) written notices
before termination of employment can be effected: a first written notice that informs the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, and a
second written notice which informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss
him. Anent the second notice, the written notice of termination should indicate that: (a) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been considered; and (b) grounds
have been established to justify the severance of their employment. In this case, no valid second
notice was given to petitioner because while the memorandum dated September 1, 2015
informed him that he was sanctioned with the penalty of dismissal for his serious misconduct, the
same was not effected considering the expiration of his purported fixed-term employment
contract. Consequently, for not having been furnished the second notice, which purpose is to
inform the employee of his or her termination from employment, petitioner's right to procedural
due process was violated
TOPIC:

Serious Misconduct

DOCTRINE:

Misconduct has been held to be an improper or wrong conduct; a transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, wilful in character,
and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct must be of such a
grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.

G.R. No. 242875, August 28, 2019

AUGORIO A. DELA ROSA, PETITIONER, v. ABS-CBN CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

In 2002, petitioner was hired by respondent ABS-CBN Corporation (respondent), as a

video editor. In 2013, petitioner admittedly reported for work and went to respondent's editing
bay while intoxicated. This led to an incident where petitioner placed his hands inside a female
co-worker's pants and touched her buttocks. This incident was witnessed by several employees
who stated that despite the resistance from and uneasiness of said co-worker, petitioner
persistently teased and harassed her, thereby negating petitioner's claim that the same was a mere
accident. On September 1, 2015, respondent served a memorandum to petitioner informing him
of management's decision to "impose on [him] the penalty of dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether respondent had a just cause in terminating petitioner's employment as the latter
committed serious misconduct against a female co-worker.

RULING:

Yes. Misconduct has been held to be an improper or wrong conduct; a transgression of

some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To be considered a valid
cause for dismissal within the meaning of the Labor Code, the misconduct must be of such a
grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant.

The foregoing acts constitute serious misconduct, as petitioner did not only violate
respondent's Code of Conduct, particularly, its policy on Offenses Against Persons and Offenses
Against Conduct and Decorum, but also adversely reflected on the ethics and morality in the
company. As respondent aptly pointed out, when he came to work intoxicated, petitioner posed a
serious threat to company property, considering that the editing bay contained expensive
equipment which he could have damaged due to his intoxication.

TOPIC:

Willful Disobedience

DOCTRINE:

Willful disobedience or insubordination requires the concurrence of two (2) requisites:

(1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful which is characterized by a wrongful
and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

ALLAN M. ADOR, Petitioner - versus –JAMILA AND COMPANY SECURITY SERVICES,

SERGIO JAMILA III EDDIMAR 0. ARCENA,
G.R. No. 245422

Facts:

On February 13, 2014, petitioner Ador sued respondents Jamila and Company Security
Services, Inc., its President Jamila and HR Manager Arcena for illegal dismissal and other
unpaid benefits. After he got involved in a brawling incident against a co-employee, the security
agency stopped giving him posting assignments from April 2012 to April 2013. On June 11,
2013, he talked to the security agency's HR Manager Eddimar Arcena and requested for a new
assignment. He was, however, surprised to receive three (3) notices dated June 29, 2013, July 31,
2013, and August 31, 2013 bearing respondents' plan to terminate him. The notices were sent to
him on August 23, 2013, September 6, 2013, and October 4, 2013, respectively. He reported to
respondents' office every time he received the notices, but respondents refused to give him
posting assignments. On September 18, 2013, after receiving the 2nd notice, he gave a letter to
the security agency stating that he cannot renew the documents because he did not have money.
On November 27, 2013, however, he received a Memorandum dated September 31, 2013
terminating his employment for insubordination. The three (3) notices to report for work sent to
petitioner were merely general return-to-work orders which did not specify the required details
of his posting assignment. On the other hand, respondents allegedly notified petitioner thrice
(June 29, 2013, July 31, 2013, and August 3 1, 2013) to submit his updated requirements so he
can be given a new posting assignment. Respondents themselves admitted that the notices were
sent to petitioner only via registered mail.
Issue:
Whether the Petitioner is guilty of insubordination

Ruling:

No. Willful disobedience or insubordination requires the concurrence of two (2) requisites: (1)
the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful which is characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to
the employee, and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge. Both
requisites are not present here. Notably, the notices did not indicate the required specific details
under DO 14-01. They merely directed petitioner to report to the security agency's head office
and explain why he failed to comply with the orders, nothing more. Indeed, the notices to report
for work allegedly violated by petitioner could hardly qualify as specific, reasonable, and
sufficiently known to him. The allegation of insubordination here was an obvious attempt on the
security agency's part to justify petitioner's dismissal from employment.

TOPIC:

Willful Disobedience

DOCTRINE:

Not every case of insubordination or wilful disobedience by an employee of a lawful

work-related order of the employer or its representative is reasonably penalized with
dismissal. There must be reasonable proportionality between, the wilful disobedience by the
employee and, on the penalty imposed therefor.

G.R. No. 227550, August 14, 2019

UNIVERSITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY EMILY DE LEON AS PRESIDENT,

DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE BENGUET PINES TOURIST
INN, PETITIONER, v. JOSEPHINE P. PINERA, * YOLANDA A. CALANZA AND
LEONORA P. SONGALIA,** RESPONDENTS

FACTS:

Respondents Calanza, Pinera and Songalia were all hired by Atty. Delos Santos and his
mother Cordelia, to work in BPTI as receptionists and all-around employees, in 1984, 1993 and
1999, respectively. Petitioner University of Manila is engaged in the business of operating hotels
and restaurants. In here, the order alleged to be violated is the order to transfer workplace from
Baguio to Manila. Petitioner justified the transfer as a legitimate business strategy in order to
avert the continuous anomaly going on in the company. The anomaly referred to herein was the
case of the missing booklets of unused official receipts being blamed against Calanza, and the
allegations that all respondents were reporting to nearby Dely's Inn during office hours and their
failure to report the alleged theft of supplies committed by Atty. Delos Santos.

ISSUE:

Whether the transfer order, while in the guise of legitimate business prerogative, was
issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

Yes. First, it smacks of unreasonableness. Second, it was issued without regard to due
process. Third, it was not shown that the transfer was work-related or would give maximum
benefit to the company. It bears stressing that not every case of insubordination or willful
disobedience by an employee of a lawful work-related order of the employer or its representative
is reasonably penalized with dismissal. There must be reasonable proportionality between, on the
one hand, the willful disobedience by the employee and, on the other hand, the penalty imposed
therefor. Here, the act of respondents in defying the transfer order is justified because the transfer
order itself was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Clearly, there was a notable disparity
between the alleged insubordination and the penalty of dismissal meted out by petitioner.

TOPIC:

Substantial evidence

DOCTRINE:
 The employee bears the burden to prove by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal
from employment

The evidence to prove the fact of the employee's constructive dismissal must be clear,
positive, and convincing. Absent any showing of an overt or positive act proving that
respondents had dismissed petitioner, the latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.

G.R. No. 201396, September 11, 2019

YUSHI KONDO, PETITIONER, v. TOYOTA BOSHOKU (PHILS.) CORPORATION,

MAMORU MATSUNAGA, KAZUKI MIURA, AND JOSELITO LEDESMA,
RESPONDENTS.

JARDELEZA, J.

Facts:

Yushi Kondo (petitioner), a Japanese citizen, applied with and was hired by respondent
Toyota on September 26, 2007 as Assistant General Manager for Marketing, Procurement and
Accounting. When respondent Matsunaga took over as President of Toyota, petitioner was
transferred to the Production Control, Technical Development and Special Project department as
Assistant Manager. Petitioner allegedly objected to the transfer on the ground that it is in
violation of the terms of his AEP, and admitted having no knowledge, skills, and experience in
production control and technical development. Nonetheless, petitioner assumed his new post on
July 1, 2008. Since petitioner could not report for work, he considered himself constructively
dismissed. Toyota allegedly had no intention of dismissing petitioner, as it actually later sent him
two notices to return to work.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner proved by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from
employment.

Ruling:

No. The employee bears the burden to prove by substantial evidence the fact of his
dismissal from employment. Petitioner did not allege and prove specific facts that would indicate
his inability to function fully in the new department as a result of his lack of expertise, or that his
transfer constituted dear discrimination or harassment. The evidence to prove the fact of the
employee's constructive dismissal must be clear, positive, and convincing. Absent any showing
of an overt or positive act proving that respondents had dismissed petitioner, the latter's claim of
illegal dismissal cannot be sustained.
TOPIC:

Twin Requisites of Valid Dismissal: Due Process Requirement

DOCTRINE:

It is settled that for the manner of dismissal in termination proceedings to be valid, the
employer must comply with the employee's right to procedural due process by furnishing him
with two written notices before the termination of his employment. The first notice apprises the
employee of the specific acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, while the
second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him or her.
EAGLE CLARC SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC., MAMA SHIPPING SARL AND
CAPT. LEOPOLDO ARCILLA, Petitioners,
- versus –

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION) and JOHN P.

LOYOLA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 245370

Facts:
John P. Loyola (Loyola) was employed by the petitioner. On November 26, 2015, Loyola
boarded the vessel MV Grande Luanda and he disembarked on February 2, 2016 or six months
before the expiration of his contract. On October 19, 2016, Loyola filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against Eagle Clare, Mama Shipping and Capt. Leopoldo Arcilla, herein petitioners,
claiming that on January 29, 2016, he was called by Capt. Palerom Guiseppe and referred to
Chief Mate Rago Francesco. He was shown a document which he refused to sign because he did
not know the contents thereof. Because of his refusal to sign the document, Loyola was advised
that he was terminated and forced to disembark from the vessel. He alleged that prior to his
disembarkation, he was neither informed of the offense he allegedly committed nor afforded due
process. Petitioners meanwhile averred that Loyola had difficulty performing his tasks. The Ship
Master served a first formal warning to him which informed him of his breach of the Code of
Conduct, incompetence and inefficiency in performing his duties on-board. A disciplinary
hearing was set to investigate his alleged poor performance. The petitioners maintained that
Loyola's dismissal on the ground of 'incompetency and inefficiency' was based on Section 33 of
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC) in relation to Article 297 of the Labor Code. They alleged that Loyola's failure to comply
with the standards set forth in the company's Code of Conduct was sufficient justification to
terminate his contract. They also averred that he was afforded due process through the two
notices which he refused to receive. After the investigation and hearing, Loyola was notified of
the termination of his contract which stated that he did not pass the training/probation period as
mentioned in the contract of employment.

Issue:
Whether the twin notice rule in termination disputes has been complied with.

Ruling:
No. It is settled that for the manner of dismissal in termination proceedings to be valid,
the employer must comply with the employee's right to procedural due process by furnishing him
with two written notices before the termination of his employment. The first notice apprises the
employee of the specific acts or omissions for which his or her dismissal is sought, while the
second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him or her. In here,
Respondent was not given ample time to answer the charge against him. The notations in the
notices that Loyola refused to sign or receive were also not sufficient proof that the petitioners
attempted to serve the notices to him. Hence, the twin notice rule in termination disputes was not
complied with.

TOPIC:
 Twin Requisites of Valid Dismissal: Due Process Requirement

DOCTRINE:

The inconsistencies in the charges, findings, and ground for termination make the
termination notice substantially and procedurally defective.

G.R. No. 206795, September 16, 2019FOODBEV INTERNATIONAL AND LUCILA S.

DELA CRUZ, PETITIONERS, v. NOLI C. FERRER, JEVER BELARDO, FELIX
GALELA, ROMEO SISCAR, MICHAEL BALDESCO, RICO ACADEMIA, EDUARDO
DELA CRUZ, RYAN AQUINO, GAUDENCIO PARIO, MARK TRAPAGO, MAIR
GOMEZ, NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG FOODBEV INTERNATIONAL,
RICHARD EROLES AND BERNADETTE BELARDO, RESPONDENTS.

REYES, J. JR., J
Facts:
Foodbev avers in this petition that management dismissed respondents because of gross
negligence, habitual absence, infractions, serious misconduct, and willful disobedience.
However, the first notice only charged respondents of gross negligence resulting to loss, which
caused grave damage to the company's reputation and image. Subsequently, the termination
notice stated that Foodbev found respondents "guilty of serious misconduct, fraud and willful
breach of trust and confidence causing serious damage and prejudice to the company." The
same notice indicated that the ground for termination is a violation of Foodbev International
Code of Discipline Article VI Section 13 (Gross Negligence resulting to loss...which causes
grave damage to our company's reputation and image).
Issue:
Whether due process was observed in dismissing the respondents.

Ruling:
No. The inconsistencies in the charges, findings, and ground for termination make the
termination notice substantially and procedurally defective. Since respondents were not formally
charged of serious misconduct, fraud, and willful breach of trust and confidence causing serious
damage and prejudice to the company, they were unable to defend their side and present
evidence on their behalf. It is unfair and unjust to base a termination on a finding that had not
undergone notice and hearing. The termination notice clearly violates respondents' rights to due
process.

TOPIC:

Effect of Violation of Due Process

DOCTRINE:

An employer's failure to comply with the procedural requirements under the Labor Code
entitles the dismissed employee to nominal damages.

G.R. No. 199469, September 11, 2019

GERTRUDES D. MEJILA, PETITIONER, v. WRIGLEY PHILIPPINES, INC.,

JESSELYN P. PANIS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 199505, September 11, 2019

WRIGLEY PHILIPPINES, INC., PETITIONER, v. GERTRUDES D. MEJILA,

RESPONDENT

Facts:

WPI is a corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of chewing gum. It

engaged the services of Mejila, a registered nurse, as an occupational health practitioner for its
Antipolo manufacturing facility sometime in April 2002. On October 26, 2007, WPI sent a
memorandum to Mejila informing her that her position has been abolished as a result of the
company's manpower rationalization program and that her employment will be terminated
effective November 26, 2007. WPI notified the Department of Labor and Employment's (DOLE)
Rizal Field Office of its decision to terminate Mejila and two others due to redundancy. WPI
concedes that the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code textually require that
the notice of termination should be submitted to the appropriate DOLE Regional Office.
However, it argues that many functions of the regional offices have been devolved to the
provincial, field and/or satellite offices. Thus, it posits that it "substantially complied with the
requirement that the DOLE should be notified thirty (30) days prior to the effective date of the
employee's separation" when it gave notice to the DOLE Rizal Field Office.

Issue:

Whether WPI complied with the procedural requirements under the Labor Code when it
notified the Department of Labor and Employment's (DOLE) Rizal Field Office of its decision to
terminate Mejila and two others due to redundancy.

Ruling:

No. Under Book V, Rule XXIII, Section 2 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code, this procedural requirement is "deemed complied with upon service of a written
notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department at least thirty days
before the effectivity of the termination, specifying the ground or grounds for termination." In
this regard, the Regional Director of DOLE Regional Office IV-A, Atty. Ricardo S. Martinez,
Sr., certified that the office did not receive a copy of WPI's termination notice. An employer's
failure to comply with the procedural requirements under the Labor Code entitles the dismissed
employee to nominal damages. 42 After finding that both notices to Mejila and the DOLE were
defective, WPI is liable to pay nominal damages in the sum of P50, 000.00

TOPIC:

Substantial evidence

DOCTRINE:

Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was
for a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer. Substantial evidence must be presented to
prove that the termination of employment was validly made. Failure to discharge this duty would
lead to the conclusion that the dismissal is illegal.

G.R. No. 202851, September 09, 2019

FEATI UNIVERSITY, PETITIONER, v. ANTOLIN PANGAN, RESPONDENT.

REYES, J. JR., J

Facts:

Antolin Pangan is the University Cashier of FEATI University (petitioner). On August 6,

2005, respondent was terminated from employment on the ground of redundancy. According to
petitioner, respondent's position became redundant due to the progressive decline of enrolment in
the Graduate Program and as such, the Graduate Program Coordinator can adequately handle the
tasks without a need for an assistant. Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and other monetary claims against petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of
redundancy.

Ruling:

No. Well-settled is the rule that the burden of proving that the dismissal of an employee was for
a valid or authorized cause rests on the employer. Substantial evidence must be presented to
prove that the termination of employment was validly made. Failure to discharge this duty would
lead to the conclusion that the dismissal is illegal. Indeed, an employer cannot simply declare
that it has become overmanned and dismiss its employees without adequate proof to sustain its
claim of redundancy. Neither can an employer merely claim that it has reviewed its
organizational structure and decided that a certain position has become redundant. It bears
stressing that adequate proof of redundancy and criteria in the selection of the employees to be
affected must be presented to dispel any suspicion of bad faith on the part of the employer.
Respondent's dismissal on the ground of redundancy, therefore, cannot be sustained.

TOPIC:

Breach of Trust, Loss of Confidence – Fraud, Dishonesty

DOCTRINE:

The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are 1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; 2) there must be an act
that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and 3) such loss of trust relates to the
employee’s performance of duties.

San Miguel, Corporation, Petitioner versus Rosario Gomez, Respondent

GR No. 200815

Facts:

San Miguel, Corporation (SMC) claims that Gomez is a mailing coordinator at the
Mailing Department tasked with weighing and determining the volume of documents and other
shipments of the corporation, including the Kaunlaran Magazines. However, SMC terminated
her services on the ground of fraud and willful breach of trust. C2K IS SMC’s courier. C2K
encountered difficulty in collecting its service fee from SMC. Eventually, it was found out that
C2K’s former manager Daniel Tamayo, formed another courier services group, Starnec, which
had been using fake C2K receipts and collecting the fees pertaining to C2K. C2K claimed that it
was through Gomez’s intervention that Tamayo’s group was able to transact business with SMC.
An audit was conducted where it was discovered that was allegedly involved in anomalies which
caused tremendous losses to SMC. SMC conducted administrative investigation and hearing and
found out that Gomez was found guilty of committing fraud against SMC and of receiving bribes
through commissions in connection with the performance of her function.

Issue:

Whether Gomez was validly terminated on the grounds of fraud and betrayal of the trust
and confidence reposed on her.

Ruling:

Yes. The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are 1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; 2) there must be an act
that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and 3) such loss of trust relates to the
employee’s performance of duties. In view of the first requisite, Gomez was routinely charged
with custody of SMC’s mail letter. In addition, SMC likewise substantially proved the second
requisite, in which she wilfully, intentionally, knowingly, purposely and without justifiable
excuse disregarded SMC’s rules and regulations in the workplace. In here, it was through
Gomez’s intervention that Starnec was able to transact with SMC, wherein used fake receipts
and collected the fees pertaining to C2K. This should have known by Gomez since she had
previously transacted with C2K. In view of the foregoing, Gomez was validly terminated on the
grounds of fraud and betrayal of the trust and confidence reposed on her.

Topic:

Substantial evidence

Doctrine:

In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the dismissal
was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his dismissal from
service. 

G.R. No. 240254

 July 24, 2019

RODESSA QUITEVIS RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner

vs.
SINTRON SYSTEMS, INC. AND/OR JOSELITO CAPAQUE, Respondents

Facts: Petitioner Rodessa Rodriguez (Rodriguez) works at Sintron Systems, Inc. (SSI) as Sales
Coordinator since July 4, 2001. Rodriguez filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal,
and monetary claims as she was allegedly forced to go on absences in order to avoid the abusive
words of Capaque, for which she filed requests for leave.

SSI negated the claims of Ms. Rodriguez and offered in evidence affidavits of employees who
claimed that there was no shouting that took place during the meeting where allegedly, Capaque
humiliated Rodriguez and shouted at her vindictive words. That it was Rodriguez who was tardy,
inefficient and disrespectful to clients. As to her absenteeism, SSI denied having received
requests for leave from Rodriguez for her absence on November 19 and 20, 2013.  As to her
succeeding leaves, her request therefor was denied by SSI in a letter dated December 2, 2013.
Hence, in an SSI memorandum, Rodriguez was warned that her continued absence may be
ground for termination and required her to respond to the memorandum, else her termination
would be reported to the DOLE.

ISSUE:

Whether the illegal dismissal or abandonment of Rodriguez was proven by substantial evidence
1. No. In illegal dismissal cases, before the employer must bear the burden of proving that
the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his
dismissal from service. Obviously, if there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to its
legality or illegality.  As an allegation is not evidence, it is elementary that a party alleging a
critical fact must support his allegation with substantial evidence. Moreover, the evidence to
prove the fact of dismissal must be clear, positive and convincing.

Here, the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA unanimously found that Rodriguez failed to discharge
her burden of proving, with substantial evidence, her allegation that she was dismissed by SSI,
constructively or otherwise. There was no evidence to prove that indeed Capaque shouted
invectives at Rodriguez during the November 18, 2013 meeting. It appears that she stopped
reporting to work and successively filed applications for leave of absence (which were not
approved) because she did not want to report to the newly appointed EA and SSI did not have the
chance to actually terminate her employment because of her continued absences.

Topic:

AWOL, Abandonment of Work

Doctrine:

Abandonment of employment is a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his

employment, without any intention of returning. It requires the concurrence of two elements: 1)
failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and 2) a clear intention
to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt acts.

G.R. No. 240254

RODESSA QUITEVIS RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner

vs.
SINTRON SYSTEMS, INC. AND/OR JOSELITO CAPAQUE, Respondents

Facts: Petitioner Rodessa Rodriguez (Rodriguez) works at Sintron Systems, Inc. (SSI) as Sales
Coordinator since July 4, 2001. Rodriguez filed a complaint for constructive illegal dismissal,
and monetary claims as she was allegedly forced to go on absences in order to avoid the abusive
words of Capaque, for which she filed requests for leave.

SSI negated the claims of Ms. Rodriguez and offered in evidence affidavits of employees who
claimed that there was no shouting that took place during the meeting where allegedly, Capaque
humiliated Rodriguez and shouted at her vindictive words. That it was Rodriguez who was tardy,
inefficient and disrespectful to clients. As to her absenteeism, SSI denied having received
requests for leave from Rodriguez for her absence on November 19 and 20, 2013.  As to her
succeeding leaves, her request therefor was denied by SSI in a letter dated December 2, 2013.
Hence, in an SSI memorandum, Rodriguez was warned that her continued absence may be
ground for termination and required her to respond to the memorandum, else her termination
would be reported to the DOLE.
ISSUE: Whether Rodriguez is guilty of abandonment of work

Ruling:

Rodriguez is not guilty of abandonment of work

Abandonment of employment is a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his

employment, without any intention of returning. While it is not expressly enumerated under
Article 297 of the Labor Code as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, it has been
recognized by jurisprudence as a form of, or akin to, neglect of duty. It requires the concurrence
of two elements: 1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt
acts.

The rule is that one who alleges a fact bears the burden of proving it, Hence, SSI has the burden
of proof to show a deliberate and unjustified refusal of the employee to resume her employment
without any intention of returning. It is therefore incumbent upon SSI to determine Rodriguez's
interest or non-interest in the continuance of her employment.

Here, the continued filing of applications for leave of absence by Rodriguez even without
awaiting SSI's approval indicate that she did not intend to leave her work in SSI for good. Thus,
Respondents failed to prove the second element of abandonment.

Topic:

Doubts Resolved in Favor of Labor

CASE DOCTRINE: Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy espoused by the Constitution. 

G.R. No. 209072

ARLENE A. CUARTOCRUZ, Petitioner
vs.
ACTIVE WORKS, INC., AND MA. ISABEL E. HERMOSA, BRANCH MANAGER,
Respondents

FACTS:

Arlene A. Cuartocruz (petitioner) was employed as a domestic helper in Hongkong by Cheng

Chi Ho, a Hong Kong national through the Respondent Active Works, Inc. (AWI), a Philippine
corporation engaged in the recruitment of domestic helpers in Hong Kong.

About a week into her job, petitioner received a warning letter from her employer requiring her
to be more attentive and to improve her performance within one month and that failure to do so
will make the letter serve as a written notice for the termination of the contract. However, after
five days, petitioner's contract was terminated for the following reasons, i.e. disobedience,
mirepresentation and refusal to do her job.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, and money claims. Petitioner denied committing
the acts imputed to her by Cheng Chi Ho, and claimed that those were baseless and fabricated.
That at no time was her attention called with respect to those acts that she allegedly committed.

The ELA held that petitioner's employment contract was validly terminated, and awarded her
compensation equivalent to the six days that she worked with her employer. The NLRC differed,
and found neither just cause for the termination of petitioner's employment nor observance of
procedural due process. Finally, the CA is convinced of the just cause for the termination of
petitioner's employment, but not the observance of procedural due process.

ISSUE: Whether Arlene was illegally dismissed.

HELD: Yes. Under Philippine law, workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due
process before the termination of their employment. The purpose of these two-pronged
qualifications is to protect the working class from the employer's arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of its right to dismiss.

In this case, respondents failed to prove by substantial evidence that there was just or authorized
cause for the termination of petitioner's employment. The burden of proving that there is just
cause for termination is on the employer, who must affirmatively show rationally adequate
evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. Failure to show that there was valid or just
cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.

Here, no evidence was presented to substantiate the employer's accusations. There was no
showing of particular instances when petitioner supposedly disobeyed her employer and refused
to take care of his baby. With respect to petitioner's alleged misrepresentation that she was single
when in fact she was a single parent, there is also no showing how this affected her work as a
domestic helper.

Petitioner was likewise not afforded procedural due process.

Procedural due process requires the employer to give the concerned employee at least two
notices before terminating his employment. The first is the notice which apprises the employee
of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is being sought along with the
opportunity for the employee to air his side, while the second is the subsequent notice of the
employer's decision to dismiss him.

In this case, while the warning letter may have served as the first notice that satisfies the above
requirement, the petitioner was terminated much earlier and without further advice. The grounds
stated in the termination letter were different from the warning letter. Hence, Petitioner was left
in the dark as regards the real reason for the termination of her employment, and was not given
sufficient opportunity to rectify her shortcomings or explain her side.
Here, there is no showing of a clear, valid, and legal cause for the termination of employment.
Undeniably, the petitioner was illegally dismissed on both substantive and procedural grounds.

Topic:

Loss of trust and confidence act inimical to the company's interests.

Doctrine:

To justify a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, the concurrence of two (2)
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and
confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence.

G.R. No. 220434

SM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, JOANN HIZON, ATTY. MENA OJEDA, JR.,

and ROSALINE QUA, Petitioners
vs.
TEODORE GILBERT ANG, Respondent

FACTS: Respondent Teodore Gilbert Ang is the Project Director of SMDC since December
2006.

Petitioner issued a Show-Cause Notice to the Respondent

On May 17, 2012, after serving a 30-day preventive suspension without pay on account of a
Show Cause Notice, Respondent Ang was informed that he was already dismissed by virtue of a
termination letter dated May 15, 2012. He was surprised to learn of an alleged May 7 and 9,
2012 administrative hearing mentioned in the said termination letter because he was never given
any notice or even notified of the said hearings. Consequently, he filed a case for illegal
dismissal with money claims against the petitioners.

On the other hand, Petitioners averred that sometime in 2012, the management of SMDC
received reports on several incidents and negligent acts directly involving respondent as Project
Director which resulted in pecuniary loss to SMDC or which exposed the corporation and its
officers to possible criminal, administrative and civil sanctions. Several meetings were then held
between respondent and the management of SMDC to discuss these incidents. These reports
were consolidated and attached to a Memorandum dated April 16, 2012 with the subject "Show-
Cause Notice. However, respondent did not submit any explanation to the charges hurled against
him and even failed to attend the administrative hearings despite due notice. Thus, a decision
was rendered to dismiss him effective May 16, 2012.
Both the LA and NLRC ruled in favour of SMDC and held that the Respondent was validly
dismissed, however, the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the labor tribunals and held that
the respondent has been illegally dismissed and ordered the petitioners to reinstate respondent
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and awarded money claims.

ISSUES: Whether the Respondent may be dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.

HELD:

1. Yes. To justify a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, the concurrence
of two (2) conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employee concerned must be holding a position of
trust and confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and
confidence. These two requisites are present in this case:

As to the first condition, respondent was holding an executive position in SMDC as Project
Director. As Project Director, respondent was the overall head of the project where he was
assigned with the responsibility of ensuring that the expectation and objectives set by
management on the project are properly implemented and achieved in terms of business
planning, sales, marketing, planning and construction, permits and licenses, finance, sales
documentation, property management, customer service, inventory management and legal
concerns and requirements. Clearly, there is no doubt that respondent is a managerial employee.

Second, Respondent's failure to properly manage these projects clearly is an act inimical to the
company's interests sufficient to erode petitioners' trust and confidence in him. He ought to know
that his job requires that he keep the trust and confidence bestowed on him by his employer
untarnished. He failed to perform what he had represented or what was expected of him, thus,
petitioners had a valid reason in losing confidence in him which justified his termination.

Hence, due to the nature of his occupation, respondent's employment may be terminated for
willful breach of trust under Article 297(c) of the Labor Code.

TOPIC:

Willful disobedience

DOCTRINE:

The just causes of serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an employer's lawful order, and
fraud all imply the presence of "willfulness" or "wrongful intent" on the part of the employee.
G.R. No. 213009

BOOKMEDIA PRESS, INC. and BENITO J. BRIZUELA, Petitioners

vs.
LEONARDO* SINAJON** and YANLY ABENIR, Respondents

FACTS:

Based on a report, the President of Bookmedia, Benito J. Brizuela (Brizuela), summoned

repondents Yanly Abenir (Abenir) and Leonardo Sinajon (Sinajon), both an in-house security
personnel, on an alleged violation of Bookmedia’s time policy for skipping work after punching-
in their time cards repeatedly.

Both respondents, in their letters of explanation to Brizuela, explained that such incident only
happened once and it is due to some emergency they have to attend in their respective homes.

Respondents were fired the next day on account of, among others, serious misconduct, willful
disobedience of an employer's lawful order, or fraud. Contending that their firing has been
effected without cause and observance of due process, the respondents filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against petitioners.

The LA, NLRC and the CA held that the respondents were indeed illegally dismissed and
established only one instance of infraction where respondents had left work early after having
their time cards punched-in, Thus, this fact was binding and conclusive upon the SC.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the actions of the respondents on that solitary incident on July 20, 1997
constituted just causes for the dismissal of the respondents.(NO)

HELD:

1. NO. As can be observed, the just causes of serious misconduct, willful disobedience of an
employer's lawful order, and fraud all imply the presence of "willfulness" or "wrongful
intent" on the part of the employee. Hence, serious misconduct and willful disobedience
of an employer's lawful order may only be appreciated when the employee's transgression
of a rule, duty or directive has been the product of "wrongful intent" or of a "wrongful
and perverse attitude,” but not when the same transgression results from simple
negligence or "mere error in judgment." In the same vein, fraud and dishonesty can only
be used to justify the dismissal of an employee when the latter commits a dishonest act
that reflects a disposition to deceive, defraud and betray his employer.

Here, the actions of the respondents on July 20, 1997, lack the elements of willfulness or
seriousness so as to warrant their dismissal. The respondents' act of leaving the
workplace early, though unauthorized and violative of company time policy, was
certainly not motivated by any wanton desire to transgress said policy.
The penalty of dismissal authorized under the Labor Code should not be imposed on just
"any act of dishonesty" committed by an employee, but only upon those whose depravity
is commensurate to such penalty. A grave injustice is committed in the name of justice
when the penalty imposed is grossly disproportionate to the wrong committed.

All in all, and considering the fact that this is the first and only time that the respondents
had committed any infraction against Bookmedia, The Court ruled that the Respondents
have been illegally dismissed.
TOPIC:

serious misconduct

Case Doctrine: Physical violence inflicted by one employee on another constitutes serious
misconduct, which justifies the former's dismissal. Nevertheless, the employer bears the onus of
proving that the attack was work-related and has rendered the erring employee unfit to continue
working. This burden is not overcome by the mere fact that the act occurred within company
premises and during work hours. Verily, the employer must establish a reasonable connection
between the purported offense and the employee's duties.

G.R. No. 209735

STANFILCO - A DIVISION OF DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. AND REYNALDO

CASINO, Petitioner
vs.
JOSE TEQUILLO AND/OR NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION -
EIGHTH DIVISION, Respondent

DECISION

FACTS:

Respondent Tequillo, was a Farm Associate at Stanfilco (petitioner), a banana plantation in

Bukidnon.

Instead of attending the company inititated "Kaibigan Fellowship, Tequillo”, opted to go on a

drinking spree at the farm shed area of petitioner's premises with several of his fellow workers.
Tequillo was then expressing resentment towards petitioner's refusal to provide him with a
performance incentive. Since Gayon was not yet a regular employee of petitioner, Tequillo
advised him not to work at the plantation, warning the former that he, too, might meet the same
fate, and not receive any incentive for his efforts. Gayon told Tequillo to air his grievances to
petitioner's higher-ranking employees. Irked by the suggestion, Tequillo proceeded to maul
Gayon.

Tequillo was given the chance to explain his side. However, petitioner found his explanations
unsatisfactory, and eventually terminated him on the ground of serious misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether the Tequillo was validly dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct.

HELD: YES. Under the law, an employee's termination may be justified on the ground of
serious misconduct. Misconduct is generally defined as "a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." In labor cases, misconduct, as a ground for
dismissal, must be serious—that is, it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not
merely trivial or unimportant. In addition, the act constituting misconduct must be connected
with the duties of the employee and performed with wrongful intent.

Jurisprudence requires that the confrontation be "rooted on workplace dynamics" or connected

with the performance of the employees' duties. Stated otherwise, time and location do not, by
themselves, determine whether violence should be classified as work-related. Rather, such
determination will depend on the underlying cause of or motive behind said violence.

Clearly, the fact that the act complained of in this case, particularly the mauling of Gayon, took
place at the plantation and while the "Kaibigan Fellowship" was held irrelevant.

Here, the work-relatedness of and wrongful intent behind Tequillo's violent conduct cannot be
questioned. Tequillo himself admitted that he mauled Gayon out of emotional disturbance, which
was ultimately caused by petitioner's refusal to provide the former employee with a productivity
incentive. Therefore, while it may be true that Tequillo acted out of resentment towards
petitioner, the same resentment was essentially attributable to his own work-related neglect. It
follows, then, that the attack was connected to the sub-standard performance of Tequillo's duties,
and that it was fundamentally rooted in his confounded notion of workplace dynamics.

The incident disturbed the peace in the farm and breached the discipline expected by petitioner
from its employees. That Tequillo is ill-suited to continue working is shown by his perverse
attitude and by the possibility that the attack may be repeated. On the other hand, his wrongful
intent is shown by the arbitrary and unfounded manner in which he attacked Gayon. All the
requisites of serious misconduct are present in this case, hence, the termination was valid.
COKIA INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS MANAGEMENT, INC. AND/OR GEORGE LEE CO,
PRESIDENT & CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, v. BEATRIZ C. BUG-OS
TOPIC: Constructive Dismissal
DOCTRINE: The employer has the burden of proving that an employee voluntarily resigned.
However, an allegation of constructive dismissal must be proven by the employee, especially
when he or she has given a resignation letter to the employer, as held in the appropriate case of
Gan v.  Galderma Philippines, Inc. Whether the parties were able to discharge their respective
burdens involves a review of the factual findings of the courts a quo.
FACTS: Several irregularities, including forgeries and falsifications on the Pag
Ibig loan supposedly obtained by Shirley, as the corporate officer, and on the remittances to Pag-
Ibig have been found out. The documents for the loan under Shirley's name bore her forged
signature and that of Biange's. George issued an Office Memorandum to Bug-Os, directing her to
explain on the said matter, Bug-Os submitted her handwritten explanation on the same day
denying that she has any knowledge of the irregularities. Allegedly, Gina Co (Gina), sister-in-
law of George and Bug-O's immediate supervisor, was the one responsible for the forgery. Bug-
Os claimed that she merely prepared the loan forms and submitted it to Pag-Ibig and later on
filed her departure through a handwritten resignation letter. She has received a check amounting
to P 9, 163.50 covering her salary, incentive leave pay and 13th month prompting her to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether Bug-Os was illegally dismissed
RULING: No. Bug-Os claims that George and his mother subjected her to harsh treatment the
moment the irregular transactions were discovered. This made working for CII-IMI unbearable
and compelled her to resign. However, she did not submit proof in support of her contentions.
Bare allegations alone are insufficient to establish constructive dismissal. Bug-Os did not cite the
statements made by George that were demeaning to her. Hence, We cannot say whether George
uttered words which made working in CIHMI unbearable for her, or simply expressed his anger
over the misappropriation of CIHMI's funds.

We also take note of the fact that Bug-Os resigned merely two days after she was given the
Office Memorandum, or from July 4 to 6, 2015. It is incredulous that in that short span of time,
she was subjected to so much harassment that it made working for CIHMI unbearable.  While
there is no fixed period for constructive dismissal, the period from the time Bug-Os was asked to
explain the irregularities discovered until she resigned simply does not lend credibility to her
claim that she was constructively dismissed.
ALASKA MILK CORPORATION, PETITIONER, v. RUBEN P. PAEZ, FLORENTINO
M. COMBITE, JR., SONNY O. BATE, RYAN R. MEDRANO, AND JOHN BRYAN S.
OLIVER, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 237317

ASIAPRO MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, PETITIONER, v. RUBEN P. PAEZ,

FLORENTINO M. COMBITE, JR., SONNY O. BATE, RYAN R. MEDRANO, AND
JOHN BRYAN S. OLIVER, RESPONDENTS.

TOPIC: legitimate job contractor/ LABOR-ONLY CONTRACTING; lllegal dismissal

DOCTRINE: Regular employees may only be terminated for just or authorized cause. This
applies in cases of labor-only contracting, where the law creates an employer-employee
relationship between the principal and the employees of the purported contractor 

FACTS: Alaska Milk Corporation (Alaska) is a duly organized domestic corporation engaged in
the business of manufacturing dairy products, while Asiapro Multipurpose Cooperative
(Asiapro), is a duly registered cooperative that contracts out the services of its worker-members.
Paez, Combite, Jr., Bate, Medrano, and Oliver worked as production helpers at Alaska's San
Pedro, Laguna milk manufacturing plant (the San Pedro plant). All of them were originally
members of Asiapro until respondents Bate, Combite, and Oliver transferred to 5S Manpower
Services (5S)

Through several Joint Operating Agreements, Asiapro and 5S undertook to provide Alaska with
personnel who could perform "auxiliary functions" at the San Pedro plant. By virtue of one such
agreement, respondents Medrano and Paez, who became members of Asiapro on March 1 and
May 4, 2009, respectively, were assigned to work at the San Pedro plant immediately upon the
acquisition of their membership. On the other hand, respondents Bate, Combite, and Oliver were
assigned to work at the same plant beginning September 2008, June 2010, and May 2007,
respectively, and despite their transfer to 5S, they continued to work thereat.

Respondents were then informed through separate memoranda that their respective assignments
at Alaska were to be terminated later that year. Paez's was then relieved of duty; Bate, Combite,
and Oliver and Medrano on. Subsequently, Paez and Medrano requested that Asiapro transfer
them to a different client-principal, while Bate Combite, and Oliver made a similar request with
5S.

However, before the cooperatives acted on said requests, the respondents filed with the Labor
Arbiter (LA) separate complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, and payment of money
claims.
ISSUE: whether the respondents were illegally dismissed.
RULING: It is uncontroverted that respondents Bate, Combite, and Oliver were terminated from
Alaska due to the expiration of their contracts with 5S, through which they were assigned to
render services at the San Pedro plant. However, because of the finding hat 5S was engaged in
labor-only contracting, they are, by fiction of law, considered as Alaska's regular employees.
Hence, having been terminated without lawful cause, they are entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges, in addition to full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and benefits, pursuant to Article 279 of the Labor Code. On the other hand,
respondents Medrano and Paez were not illegally dismissed. In fact, they were not dismissed at
all. As found by the NLRC, after their contracts with Alaska expired, they refused to report to
Asiapro for reassignment to another client-principal, 
G.R. No. 229703, December 04, 2019
EDITHA SALINDONG AGAYAN, PETITIONER, v. KITAL PHILIPPINES CORP.,
RICARDO CONSUNJI III AND JOCELYN CAVANEYRO, RESPONDENTS.

TOPIC: TERMINATION; JUST CAUSES OF TERMINATION / BREACH OF TRUST

DOCTRINE: Willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the following: the employee's
assailed conduct has been willful or intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a
"wrongful and perverse attitude;" and the order violated must have been reasonable, lawful,
made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had been engaged to
discharge.
FACTS: Petitioner was hired by Kital on 30 March 2011 to work as the Head of
Telecommunications. Prior to her dismissal on 08 September 2014, Petitioner supposedly earned
a monthly basic salary of Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000.00), excluding other benefits, as well
as commissions on sales based on the amount(s) collected. Petitioner claimed that she was
illegally dismissed from employment without just cause due to Private Respondents' disdain for
her. She did not follow the instructions to terminate Maranan because she, Petitioner, was
Maranan's superior and believed in good faith that there was no justifiable ground for the
dismissal in view of the latter's satisfactory performance. Respondents countered that Petitioner
committed several infractions in the course of her employment: she e-mailed Mr. Kuti Mor
(Kital's foreign principal) and falsely accused Consunji and Cavaneyro of creating chaos and
disruption in the office; she refused to accept Consunji's authority as company president, even
declaring that she will no longer report to him; she was organizing another company in direct or
indirect competition with the business of Kital, and had formulated a business concept/plan for
that purpose; she refused to follow the established disciplinary procedure(s) when she interfered
and meddled in the disciplinary actions taken against Maranan; she refused to follow the lawful
order of; and she allowed Maranan to use the title of "Telecom Sales and Business Development
Manager" despite the fact that no such position exists
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was validly dismissed.
RULING: Petitioner committed willful disobedience and breach of trust which are just causes
for dismissal under the Labor Code. As the chief executive of Kital, Consunji is ultimately
responsible, inter alia, for the general oversight of company operations, and by virtue thereof, he
has the right to direct his subordinates to furnish him with information relative to the business.
Since the primary function of the RMs is to assist Kital in doing business, albeit for a
commission, it stands to reason that Consunji's order to Petitioner was within the purview of the
company's operations, and therefore, the said instruction was reasonable and lawful. Moreover,
Petitioner's outright refusal to respect the authority of Consunji, her superior, strengthens the
conclusion that she committed willful disobedience. Although perhaps there is nothing inherently
wrong with the act of an employee in expressing his or her grievances to the company's
principals, such is not the case here. Willful disobedience requires the concurrence of the
following: the employee's assailed conduct has been willful or intentional, the willfulness being
characterized by a "wrongful and perverse attitude;" and the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he had
been engaged to discharge.
11
JANUARY 2020
G.R. No. 236020, January 08, 2020
PAPERTECH, INC ., v. PETITIONER, JOSEPHINE P. KATANDO, RESPONDENT.

TOPIC: JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSES

DOCTRINE: the following are considerations in applying the doctrine of strained relations: (1)
the employee must occupy a position where he or she enjoys the trust and confidence of his or
her employer; (2) it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be
generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned; (3) it
cannot be applied indiscriminately because some hostility is invariably engendered between the
parties as a result of litigation; and (4) it cannot arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's
right.
FACTS: Papertech to filed a Complaint for Illegal Strike against Katando and the other
participants in the picket on May 24, 2008. The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of Katando and
her fellow employees. Katando received a memorandum from Papertech stating that due to
urgency of business, she will be transferred to its Makati office. The memorandum states that she
will still be under the same employment terms and conditions but will be tasked to clean the area.
Three days later, Katando received another memorandum asking her to explain why she should
not be subjected to disciplinary action for failing to sign the December 14, 2013 memorandum,
for her refusal to transfer to the Makati office, and for shouting at Papertech's representative.
Katando served her suspension. However, she was suspended yet again for one week for her
disobedience or refusal to transfer as directed. Katando then filed a complaint for illegal
suspension before the NLRC.
Papertech issued a memorandum dated February 6, 2014 to Katando reiterating her transfer to its
Makati office.25 Thereafter, Papertech issued a notice to Katando re4uiring her to explain within
48 hours why she refused to receive the February 6, 2014 memorandum. Katando submitted her
explanation.
 
Papertech issued another notice to Katando on February 17, 2014 directing her to explain why
she should not be administratively charged for refusing to transfer to its Makati office. Despite
submitting her explanation, Papertech issued a notice on February 24, 2014 dismissing Katando
for her insubordination. Katando filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees against Papertech 27 and its Chairman of the Board of Directors,
Alexander Wong, and Human Resource Manager Joan M. Balde.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of Katando instead of granting her
separation pay
RULING: Yes. We clarified that the doctrine of strained relatons cannot apply when the
employee has not indicated an aversion to returning to work, or does not occupy a position of
trust and confidence in, or has no say in the operation of, the employer's business. 52 In addition,
strained relations between the parties must be proven as a fact.

Although Katando does not occupy a position of trust and confidence as a machine operator, the
circumstances of this case nonetheless calls for the application of the doctrine of strained
relations. It is true that litigation between the parties per se should not bar the reinstatement of an
employee. However, as observed by the NLRC, this is not the only case involving Papertech and
Katando. They have been in conflict since 2008, or for 11 years now. In the case of Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v. Digitel Employees Union, We held that the length of
time from the occurrence of the incident to its resolution and the demonstrated litigiousness of
the parties showed that their relationship is strained. Similarly, the protracted litigation between
the parties here sufficiently demonstrate that their relationship is strained. It is notable that
Papertech has not even bothered to appeal the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, and even stated that
"in order not to prolong the proceedings, and for both parties to peacefully move on from this
unwanted situation, Papertech is willing to pay the judgment award of separation pay." Clearly,
Papertech does not want Katando back as its employee.

12
G.R. No. 216132, January 22, 2020
AL-MASIYA OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. AND ROSALINA ABOY,
PETITIONERS, v. HAZEL A. VIERNES, RESPONDENT.

TOPIC: CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL

DOCTRINE: In cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility, unreasonableness, or
unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee with no other viable recourse
but to terminate his or her employment.56 "An employee is considered to be constructively
dismissed from service if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an
employer has become so unbea[r]able to the employee as to leave him or her with no option
but to forego his or her continued employment." 57 From this definition, it can be inferred
that various situations, whereby the employer intentionally places the employee in a
situation which will result in the latter's being coerced into severing his ties with the
former, can result in constructive dismissal
FACTS: On January 5, 2011, respondent left the Philippine Embassy after a certain Mr. Mutlaq
offered to give her a job at a chocolate factory. However, this chocolate factory turned out to be
inexistent. Then, the employees of Al Rekabi, an employment agency, told her that they would
be bringing her to Hawally at night. She refused to take the trip as it was cold and drizzling. She
then attempted to report the matter to Atty. Merginio using her cellular phone, but the employees
of Al Rekabi confiscated it. Mr. Hassan, the Manager of Al Rekabi, did not accede to her request
to postpone the trip to the following day. It came to a point where Mr. Hassan scolded
respondent, and forced her to make a written admission that her employers treated her well. On
February 7, 2011, respondent was asked to affix her signature on a letter that she copied
purportedly showing that she admitted having pre-terminated her contract of employment and
that she no longer had any demandable claim as she was treated well. Respondent's execution of
this letter of resignation was made as a precondition to the release of her passport and plane
ticket which were in the possession of petitioners.
Respondent arrived in the Philippines on February 12, 2011.16
In response to respondent's complaint, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss . Respondent executed
an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Desistance, Sworn Statement, and Receipt and Quitclaim before
Ofelia M. Castro-Hudson, Assistant Labor Attaché in Kuwait, where she allegedly stated that she
voluntarily agreed to release Al-Masiya and Saad Mutlaq, et al., from all her claims arising from
her employment abroad. They also presented her handwritten statement where she expressed that
her cause for terminating her employment was her own personal reasons.

ISSUE: Whether respondent was constructively dismissed.

RULING: Yes. First, Saad Mutlaq, respondent's foreign employer, never secured a working visa
for her, in violation of the categorical requirement for an employer's accreditation with the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency. Second, respondent was not properly paid in
accordance with the terms of her employment contract. During her three-month stay, she was
only paid US$227.75 instead of the stipulated pay of US$400 per month. Third, respondent was
not assigned to a permanent employer abroad for the entire contractual period of two years. Upon
her arrival in Kuwait, she was consistently promised job placements which were found to be
inexistent. As noted by the NLRC, it was clear that Saad Mutlaq intended to use respondent as an
entertainer of some sort in places of ill repute; and she would have fallen victim to human
trafficking "were it not for some favorable providence." Finally, similar to the case of Torreda,
herein respondent was made to copy and sign a prepared resignation letter and this was made as
a condition for the release of her passport and plane ticket. In light of these, the Court finds that,
indeed, it was logical for respondent to consider herself constructively dismissed. The
impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment has left respondent
with no other viable recourse but to terminate her employment.
G.R. No. 227175, January 08, 2020
NEREN VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, v. GANCO RESORT AND RECREATION,
INC., PETER MARASIGAN, BENJIE MARASIGAN, LUZ MARASIGAN, BOYA
MARASIGAN, AND SERGE BERNABE, RESPONDENTS.

TOPIC: DISMISSAL; JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSES

DOCTRINE: In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to prove that
the employee's dismissal was for a valid cause.39 A valid dismissal requires compliance with both
substantive and procedural due process40 - that is, the dismissal must be for any of the just or
authorized causes enumerated in Article 297 [282] and Article 298 [283], respectively, of the
Labor Code, and only after notice and hearing
FACTS:. petitioner was charged with violating company policies, i.e., abuse of authority,
when she rejected walk-in guests without management approval, and threat to person in
authority, when she threatened the assistant resort manager, respondent Serge Bernabe
(respondent Bernabe), with physical harm. After serving her suspension petitioner resumed
her task as a receptionist. Thereafter, through the Notice to Transfer, they were informed of the
reorganization and were advised that they would be laterally transferred to another department
effective immediately. Petitioner was transferred from the Reception Department to Storage
Department without diminution in rank and benefits.
However, petitioner refused to sign the Notice to Transfer and remained at the reception area for
two days before reporting to her new station. GRRI's Human Resource (HR) department issued
petitioner another Memorandum directing her to report to the HR department within 24 hours
and to explain her absences without leave. Upon reporting thereat, petitioner was handed the
Termination Notice dated March 21, 2014 advising her that the management found her guilty of
"inhuman and unbearable treatment to person in authority; abuse of authority; serious
misconduct - insubordination by not accepting her memorandum of re-assignment by the
Executive Committee; and gross and habitual neglect of duties AWOL" and had decided to
terminate her from employment effective immediately. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: whether petitioner was validly dismissed.
RULING: Yes. The records of the case show that petitioner was charged with two
infractions, i.e., (1) insubordination for her failure to sign the Notice to Transfer and (2) habitual
neglect for her absences without leave from March 22 to March 26, 2014, as shown by the two
memoranda served on her.
As stated by petitioner in her handwritten explanation, she withheld her signature on the Notice
to Transfer because she was awaiting answers to the questions she raised to the
management via e-mail. She cannot be forced to affix her signature thereon if she does not really
fully understand the reasons behind and the consequences of her transfer. While her action is
willful and intentional, it is nonetheless far from being "wrongful and perverse." In addition,
respondents failed to prove that there is indeed an order or company procedure requiring a
transferee's written conformity prior to the implementation of the transfer, and that such order or
procedure was made known to petitioner. Thus, there is no basis to dismiss petitioner on the
ground of insubordination for her mere failure to sign the Notice to Transfer.

Anent the charge of habitual neglect for petitioner's absences without leave, jurisprudence
provides that in order to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, the neglect of duties must be both
gross and habitual. Gross negligence has been defined as "the want or absence of or failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard
of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them." On the other hand, habitual neglect
"imparts repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time, depending on the
circumstances." A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the
dismissal of the employee. Petitioner's four-day absence without leave is not gross nor habitual
G.R. No. 219419, April 10, 2019
CAROLINA'S LACE SHOPPE, LOURDES RAGAS AND CLAUDINE MANGASING,
PETITIONERS, v. GLORIA MAQUILAN AND JOY MAQUILAN, RESPONDENTS.

Topic: Dismissal as a Penalty of Last Resort

Case Doctrines:

1. Rule in Illegal Dismissal Cases. “In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when
an employer interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer”

2. How an employee’s act of severing employment may be measured. “x x x. The act of the
employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered to determine whether in
fact, he or she intended to relinquish such employment. If the employer introduced evidence
purportedly executed by an employee as proof of voluntary resignation and the employee
specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of said document, the employer is
burdened to prove the due execution and genuineness of such

Facts: Gloria and Joy Maquilan (Respondents) were employed by Carolina’s Lace Shoppe
(CLS) as sales clerk and beader respectively. In April 2008, the DOLE inspected CLS. Upon
inspection, one of the latter’s employees, Santiago Espultero reported that he was receiving a
below minimum wage. Thereafter, he was terminated and was made to sign a quitclaim in order
to receive his separation pay. A month after, Gloria and Joy were terminated under the same
circumstances, submitting a resignation letter and forced to sign a quitclaim. Gloria and Joy then
filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims against CLS. In response, CLS alleged that
they were not illegally dismissed, evidenced by their resignation letter.

Issue: Whether or not Gloria and Joy were illegally dismissed.

Ruling: Yes, they were illegally dismissed. The SC held that “the act of the employee before and
after the alleged resignation must be considered to determine whether in fact, he or she intended
to relinquish such employment.” In this regard, there was no clear intention on the part of Gloria
and Joy to relinquish their employment, evidenced by their act of filing a case of illegal dismissal
with money claims. Such act of filing said complain is difficult to reconcile with voluntary
resignation.

18
ELPIDIO T QUE VS ASIA BREWERY, INC. AND/OR MICHAEL G. TAN
GR 202388 April 10, 2019

Topic: Illegal Preventive Suspension Amounting to Constructive Dismissal

Doctrine: Redundancy exists when the service of an employee is in excess of what is reasonably
demanded by the actual requirements of the business. A redundant position is one rendered
superfluous by any number of factors, such as over-hiring of workers, decreased volume of
business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or
phasing out of a service activity formerly undertaken by the enterprise.

Facts:

Petitioner [Elpidio T. Que] had been the Regional Sales Manager (RSM) of Asia Brewery Inc.
("private-respondent") for eight (8) years and stationed in Northern Luzon covering the areas of
Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, Abra, Cagayan, Kalinga Apayao, Isabela, Nueva Vizcaya, Ifugao and
Quirino Province. As RSM, his compensation package consisted of a monthly salary amounting
to P67,000.00 and P250.00 a day per diem allowance. He also contributed to the retirement plan
of private respondent, the Employees Investment and Savings Plan (EISP).

On May 2, 2005 or one year and three months after the split of the NCLR, Raymundo T.
Gatmaitan, the vice president for sales of private-respondent made an evaluation of the
experimental split of the NCLR and recommended the reversion to the old set up of putting the
NCLR under one RSM. He opined that the decision did not achieve any gain. He further
recommended that since the re-merger would result to redundancy in the office of a Regional
Sales Manager the office of the petitioner should be abolished on the ground of redundancy.

Issue: Whether there was a valid employment termination.

Ruling:

NO.

The SC held that article 298 of the Labor Code states that an employer may terminate the
employment of an employee on the ground of redundancy. As defined, redundancy exists when
the service of an employee is in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the business. A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any number of
factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping of particular
product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing out of a service activity
formerly undertaken by the enterprise.

The Court likewise ruled that "[t]he determination of the continuing necessity of a particular
officer or position in a business corporation is a management prerogative, and the courts will not
interfere unless arbitrary or malicious action on the part of management is shown." As the Court
further ruled in Lowe: "It is also within the exclusive prerogative of management to determine
the qualification and fitness of an employee for hiring and firing, promotion or reassignment.
Indeed, an employer has no legal obligation to keep more employees than are necessary for the
operation of its business." In determining who among the employees should be retained or
separated, the Court explained in Lowe that preferred status, efficiency, and seniority are among
the accepted criteria in implementing a redundancy program

Essentially, Que questions the validity of Asia Brewery's claim that his position had become
redundant, which is a question of fact. This, however, cannot be done in the present petition
given the limited nature of the review under a petition for review under Rule 45 arising from
labor cases. As the Court held in San Fernando Coca-Cola Rank-and-File Union (SACORU) v.
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (CCBPI), CA decisions in labor cases "will be examined
only using the prism of whether it correctly determined the existence of grave abuse of
discretion". This follows the Court's ruling in Montoya v. Transmed Manila Corp.,24 where the
Court held that:

x x x Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed
CA decision. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same
context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it; we have to examine the
CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC
decision on the merits of the case was correct. x x x

Absent proof of malicious and arbitrary conduct of Asia Brewery, there can be no basis for a
finding that Que was constructively dismissed.
G.R. No. 240254
RODESSA QUITEVIS RODRIGUEZ, Petitioner vs.
SINTRON SYSTEMS, INC. AND/OR JOSELITO CAPAQUE, Respondents

Topic: Evidence of Abandonment of Employment

Doctrine: Abandonment of employment is a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to

resume his employment, without any intention of returning.While it is not expressly enumerated
under Article 297 of the Labor Code as a just cause for dismissal of an employee, it has been
recognized by jurisprudence as a form of, or akin to, neglect of duty. It requires the concurrence
of two elements: 1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and
2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship as manifested by some overt
acts.

Facts
Petitioner Rodessa Rodriguez (Rodriguez) was hired by respondent Sintron Systems, Inc. (SSI)
as Sales Coordinator on July 4, 2001.4 Her duties included the following: 1) communicating with
sales engineers, customers and event organizers; 2) preparing invoices and delivery receipts for
delivery schedules; and 3) arranging goods in the stockroom upon the instructions of SSI's
president, respondent Joselito Capaque (Capaque).
The conflict between the parties arose when SSI received an invitation letter for a factory visit
with training from its supplier in Texas, USA scheduled on October 22-24, 2013.6 The parties
had different versions of the events succeeding this.

Issues
1) Whether the CA erred in finding that there was neither illegal dismissal nor abandonment; and
2) If so, whether the CA committed reversible error in finding that reinstatement of Rodriguez is
no longer feasible, hence, the parties must just bear their own losses.

Ruling
The petition must be denied.

In a Rule 45 petition of Rule 65 labor case decisions of the CA, the Court cannot address
questions of facts, except in the course of determining whether the CA erred in ruling that the
NLRC did or did not commit grave abuse of discretion in its assailed decision.62 This is because
first, the Court is not a trier of facts as it generally resolves only questions of law, and, second,
the NLRC's decision was final and executory and can be reviewed by the CA only when the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction

SESTOSO VS. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES, INC.,

GR 237063, July 24, 2019

Topic: Dismissal Penalty of Last Resort

Doctrine: Permanent disability is the inability of a worker to perform his job for more than one
hundred 120 days regardless of whether he loses the use of any part of his body. Total disability,
on the other hand, means the disablement of an employee or earn wages in the same kind of
work of similar nature that he was trained for, or accustomed to perform or any kind of work
which a person of his mentality and attainments could do.
Facts:

On July 2014, respondent UPLI in behalf of its foreign principal Carnival Cruise Lines hired him
as Team Headwaiter on board M/V Carnival Inspiration for a period of 6 months. On October
31, 2014, he did his usual task of cleaning the dining table. But this time, when he knelt to clean
the dining table, a sharp pain radiated down his right knee. Hence, as soon as the vessel docked
at Los Angeles, California, he underwent a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at a shore side
clinic.

The result showed a complex tear of the medial meniscus and degenerative joint changes. It also
revealed the arthroscopy or knee surgery he had in February 2014. He, nevertheless, continued
working while on pain relievers until he finished his contract and got repatriated on February 13,
2015.

Upon his arrival in the country, company-designated physician Dr. Mylene Cruz-Balbon
subjected him to a series of examinations and treatments and eventually referred him to
orthopedic surgeon Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr., for further evaluation and management. On June
25, 2015, Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. recommended him for surgery and suggested a disability rating of
Grade 10 – stretching of knee ligaments. Dr. Chuasuan, Jr. opined he had already reached the
maximum medical improvement level.

Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it denied the award of total and
permanent disability benefits to petitioner?

Ruling:
In More Maritime Agencies, Inc. v. NLRC the Court held that compensability of an illness or
injury does not depend on whether the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of
employment but rather on whether the injury or illness is work-related or has aggravated the
seafarer's condition
This brings to fore the following question: Who has the burden of proving that petitioner's illness
is work-related or has aggravated his condition at work?

Under the 2010 POEA-SEC, "any sickness resulting in disability or death as a result of an
occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein
satisfied" is deemed to be a "work-related illness." Section 20 (A) (4) further provides that
"Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work
related." This provision speaks of a legal presumption of work-relatedness in favor of the
seafarer. As such, the employer, and not the seafarer, has the burden of disproving the
presumption by substantial evidence. Romana v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation is in point

It must be emphasized, though, that the presumption under Section 20-B (4) is only limited to
"work-relatedness" of an illness and does not cover or extend to "compensability."

Unlike "work-relatedness," no legal presumption of compensability is accorded to the seafarer.

As such, the seafarer bears the burden to prove substantial evidence that the conditions of
compensability have been satisfied. This applies for both listed occupational disease and non-
listed illness.

If the employer fails to successfully dispute the work-relatedness of the seafarer's illness, and the
latter, in turn, has established compliance with the conditions for compensability, the issue now
shifts to a determination of the nature of the disability (i.e., permanent and total or temporary and
total) and the amount of disability benefits due the seafarer.

There is no showing that he had been re-employed by respondents or in any vessel for that
matter. Indeed, petitioner's continued unemployment until this very day clearly indicate his total
and permanent disability. Verily, by operation of law, petitioner's disability became total and
permanent for which he is entitled to the corresponding benefits.

24
SM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL VS ANG
GR 220434 July 22, 2019

Topic: Breach of Trust Loss of Confidence

Doctrine: Loss of trust and confidence is a ground for dismissal. To justify a valid dismissal
based on loss of trust and confidence, the concurrence of 2 conditions must be satisfied: (1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; and there must be an act
that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. These two requisites are present in this case.
Facts:
This case arose from a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims by Respondent against
the Petitioners. Respondent was hired by SMDC as its Project Director since December 2006.
Sometime in January 2012, he applied for a two-week vacation leave, from March 30, 2012 to
April 15, 2012, which was approved by Qua. On March 7, 2012, he received a Notice to Explain
from Atty. Ojeda, Jr., concerning the cost status of one of his assigned projects and on March 13,
2012, he submitted his explanation on the various issues and concerns. On March 20, 2012, Atty.
Ojeda, Jr. and Hizon called him for a meeting where he was informed that the management,
without stating specific reasons, wants him to resign from his current work. Respondent went on
his scheduled vacation and reported back to work on April 16, 2012. After office hours,
respondent received Memorandum with subject Show Cause Notice, which contained, among
others, a statement informing him of a 30-day preventive suspension without pay. On May 17,
2012, he informed Hizon that his suspension was over and he will report back to work; but he
received a phone call from the HRD Manager that he does not need to report to work because he
was already dismissed. Respondent received a termination letter dated May 15, 2012. He was
surprised to learn of an alleged May 7 and 9, 2012 administrative hearing mentioned in the said
termination letter because he was never given any notice or even notified of the said hearings.
Consequently, he filed a case for illegal dismissal with money claims against the petitioners. The
LA dismissed the complaint. The LA found that there were substantial documentary evidence
showing that there was a just and valid cause for respondent's dismissal on the grounds of
incompetence and gross and habitual neglect of duties. Upon appeal, the NLRC dismissed
respondent’s appeal and affirmed the LA. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari  with the CA
which granted the petition and reversed and set aside the ruling of the labor tribunals. The CA
found that respondent has been illegally dismissed and that the allegation of gross and habitual
neglect of duty is not supported by any substantial evidence.

ISSUE whether respondent may be dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence.

HELD:

YES. An employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to
his interests. This is more so in cases involving managerial employees or present case,
respondent was holding an executive position in SMDC as Project Director and there is no doubt
that respondent is a managerial employee. As such, he should have recognized that such intricate
position requires the full trust and confidence of his employer. Due to the nature of his
occupation, respondent's employment may be terminated for willful breach of trust under Article
297(c) of the Labor Code. To justify a valid dismissal based on loss of trust and confidence, the
concurrence of two (2) conditions must be satisfied: (1) the employee concerned must be holding
a position of trust and confidence; and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust
and confidence. These two requisites are present in this case. The first requisite has already been
determined. Respondent, as SMDC's project director, is holding a position of trust and
confidence. As to the second requisite, that there must be an act that would justify the loss of
trust and confidence, however, the degree of proof required in proving loss of trust and
confidence differs between a managerial employee and a rank and file employee: In terminating
managerial employees based on loss of trust and confidence, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required, but the mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the
trust of his employer suffices.

Set against these parameters, the Court holds that respondent was validly dismissed based on loss
of trust and confidence. Respondent was not an ordinary company employee. His position as one
of SMDC's Project Director is clearly a position of responsibility demanding an extensive
amount of trust from petitioners. The entire project account depended on the accuracy of the
classifications made by him. It was reasonable for the petitioners to trust that respondent had
basis for his calculations and specifications. Respondent's failure to properly manage these
projects clearly is an act inimical to the company's interests sufficient to erode petitioners' trust
and confidence in him. He failed to perform what he had represented or what was expected of
him, thus, petitioners had a valid reason in losing confidence in him which justified his
termination. The right of an employer to freely select or discharge his employees is subject to the
regulation by the State in the exercise of its paramount police power. However, there is also an
equally established principle that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment
an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer and justifying loss of
confidence in him.

25 G.R. No. 226369, July 17, 2019

ISABELA-I ELECTRIC COOP., INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS GENERAL MANAGER,

ENGR. VIRGILIO L. MONTANO, PETITIONER, v. VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, JR.,
RESPONDENT.

Topic: Illegal Preventive Suspension Amounting to Constructive Dismissal

Doctrine:
Constructive dismissal occurs when there is cessation of work because continued employment is
rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely as when there is a demotion in rank or diminution
in pay or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes
unbearable to the employee leaving the latter with no other option to quit.

Facts:

On January 29, 1996, petitioner Isabela-I Electric Cooperative, Inc. hired respondent Vicente B.
Del Rosario, Jr. as Financial Assistant. The latter quickly rose from the ranks. After just three (3)
months, on April 26, 1996, he got promoted as Acting Management Internal Auditor and on
October 26, 1996, as Management Internal Auditor at petitioner's main office.

As Management Internal Auditor, respondent was receiving a basic monthly salary of

P30,979.00 exclusive of representation allowance and other emoluments and benefits.
[6] Petitioner never raised any issue regarding his performance and capacity to lead his
department.

In January 2011, petitioner approved a reorganization plan declaring all positions in the company
vacant. Respondent, along with other employees signed a Manifesto to oppose the
reorganization. Despite this opposition, petitioner proceeded to implement the reorganization in
June 2011.Additionally, petitioner informed its employees in writing, that they were on a "hold-
over capacity."

Together with other employees, respondent was made to fill out a prescribed application form.
There, respondent listed "Internal Auditor Manager A," his current position, as his first
preference, and "Finance Services Department Manager A" as his second.
While on vacation leave in October 2012, respondent received two (2) letters from petitioner.
The first referred to his appointment as probationary Area Operations Manager. The second
contained four (4) office memoranda which (a) indicated his area of assignment; (b) ordered him
to cease acting as petitioner's management internal auditor; (c) directed him to turn over his
current post and pertinent documents to his successor; and (d) appointed his subordinate Arlene
B. Boy as officer-in-charge of the Auditing Department.[11] Although respondent had issues
about this new appointment, including the fact that his successor was not even a Certified Public
Accountant (CPA) as he was the only CPA among petitioner's employees, he begrudgingly
accepted his appointment.

Three (3) months later, in January 2013, respondent sent a letter to petitioner's general manager
Virgilio L. Montano, voicing out his concern that the new position given him was a demotion. In
the same letter he requested to be reinstated to his former position, especially since he was the
only CPA among petitioner's employees. Petitioner, however, did not act on his letter.
Issue

Was respondent constructively dismissed when he got appointed to the new position of Area
Operations Management Department Manager in lieu of his former position as Management
Internal Auditor?

Ruling

In Philippine Industrial Security Agency Corporation vs. Percival Aguinaldo,[36] We held that
the "Court is fully aware of the right of management to transfer its employees as part of
management prerogative. But like all rights, the same cannot be exercised with unbridled
discretion. The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be exercised without grave
abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic element of justice and fair play." The Court then
emphasized:

While it is true that an employer is free to regulate, according to his own discretion and
judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments, working methods,
time, place and manner of work, tools to be used, processes to be followed, supervision of
workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, layoff of workers and the
discipline, dismissal and recall of workers (San Miguel Brewery Sales vs. Ople, G.R. No. 53515,
February 8, 1989), and this right to transfer employees forms part of management prerogatives,
the employee's transfer should not be unreasonable, nor inconvenient, nor prejudicial to him. It
should not involve a demotion in rank or diminution of his salaries, benefits and other privileges,
as to constitute constructive dismissal. (Emphasis supplied)

Demotion involves a situation in which an employee is relegated to a subordinate or less

important position constituting a reduction to a lower grade or rank, with a corresponding
decrease in duties and responsibilities, and usually accompanied by a decrease in salary. This
was exactly what happened to respondent.
  ABANDONMENT OF WORK

JS UNITRADE MERCHANDISE, INC., PETITIONER, V. RUPERTO S. SAMSON, JR., RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 200405, February 26, 2020

Doctrine: Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his
employment. It constitutes neglect of duty and is a just cause for termination of employment under
the Labor Code. To constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and deliberate intent
to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two elements
must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.

Facts:

Respondent Ruperto Samson, Jr. filed a complaint for constructive dismissal, unused service
incentive leave credits, 13th month pay, actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees against respondent JS Unitrade Merchandise, Inc. (JS Unitrade) and its officers,
namely, Samuel Po (President), Edwin Bargan (Sales Director) and Luisito Morales (HR Manager).

On February 14, 2005, Samuel Po hired him as Key Account Manager with a monthly salary of
P28,000.00 and guaranteed bonuses. He became a regular employee on August 14, 2005 and
granted a salary of P30,000.00. On February 1, 2006 his salary was increased to P31,500.00. Effective
July 1, 2006, he got promoted to Senior Key Account Manager with a monthly salary of P35,000.00.
After a year, he netted a 104% growth in sales. He was even given an award for his achievement.

But things changed in mid-2007. Edwin Bargan started to single him out by not appraising his
performance from January to June 2007. He was one of the two (2) Key Managers who did not enjoy
the performance appraisal bonus. He got faulted for alleged gaps and executional flaws in the selling
areas though the same were not his fault. He was offered the option of being demoted to Senior Key
Account Manager or receiving remuneration upon his exit from the company.

He got replaced by a certain Joy Lim. On September 6, 2007, he was assigned to office work without
field and personnel supervisory functions. He performed only clerical work. He felt harassed,
shamed, and humiliated. On September 18, 2007, he stopped reporting for work and filed a
complaint before the National Labor and Relations Commission (NLRC). On September 19, 2007, he
returned his company-issued items. On September 20, 2007, the company issued a show cause
memo pertaining to the company vehicle and abandonment. On October 18, 2007, he
received via registered mail a Notice of Dismissal dated October 8, 2007.

He claims he was constructively dismissed because he was illegally eased out from his employment
by demoting him in an oppressive and malicious manner.

Issue:
WON the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when it found that respondent did not
abandon his employment and that he is entitled to separation pay.

Ruling:

First. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his

employment. It constitutes neglect of duty and is a just cause for termination of employment under
the Labor Code. To constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and deliberate intent
to discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two elements
must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a
clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.

Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned
their work. A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The filing thereof is proof enough of one's desire to return to work, thus
negating any suggestion of abandonment. On this score, the Court of Appeals keenly ruled:

Nonetheless, petitioner cannot also be said to have abandoned his job. Although petitioner failed to
report for work and surrendered his work tools to private respondent company, these were
obviously done on the mistaken belief that he was singled out and demoted by private respondents.
Hence, petitioner's acts cannot be construed as abandonment of his job, as he immediately filed a
complaint for constructive dismissal a week after he stopped reporting for work.

Clearly, what happened was a case of misunderstanding between management and employee. This
being the case, the Court holds that although there was no constructive dismissal by private
respondents, neither was there any abandonment of work by petitioner. Both parties must
therefore bear the consequences of their respective actions.

Second. Since there is no illegal dismissal nor abandonment to speak of here, the logical step would
have been to allow respondent to resume his position as Associate Area Sales Manager for South
Luzon. As it was, respondent's reinstatement is no longer feasible because of the parties' strained
relation. Labor Arbiter Riofloriod aptly observed "(i)t is unthinkable that any productive working
relationship could be restored. Certainly, reinstating complainant would no longer be in his best
interest."

Indeed, in case the reinstatement is no longer feasible, as in this case, an award of separation pay, in
lieu of reinstatement, is justified. The Court has ruled that reinstatement is no longer feasible: (a)
when the former position of the illegally dismissed employee no longer exists; or (b) when the
employer's business has closed down; or (c) when the employer-employee relationship has already
been strained as to render the reinstatement impossible. The Court likewise considered
reinstatement to be non-feasible because a "considerable time" has lapsed between the dismissal
and the resolution of the case.
G.R. No. 237036. July 8, 2020

ABOITIZ POWER RENEWABLES, INC./TIWI CONSOLIDATED UNION (APRI-TCU) ON BEHALD OF FE R.

RUBIO, MA. VICTORIA A. BELMES, ELEANORE D. DALDE, RICARDO B. COMPETENTE, and VICENTE A.
MIRANDILLA; APRI-TIWI EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION (APRI-TIELU) ON BEHALF OF VIRGILIO G. MACINAS,
ROY D. DACULLO, ARNEL C. REPOTENTE, and JAIME B. SARILLA; and APRI-TIWI GEOTHERMAL POWER
PLANT PROFESSIONAL/TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES UNION-DIALOGWU (APRI-TGPPPTEU-D) ON BEHALF OF
VENER I. DELA ROSA, ARVID G. MUNI, ALVIN Y. SALONGA, ALVIN M. ENGUERO, MA. BLANCA I. FALCON,
and SALVE V. LIZARDO, Petitioners,

vs.

ABOITIZ POWER RENEWABLES, INC., MICHAEL B. PIERCE, ATTY. MARTIN JOHN YASAY, JUAN FELIPE
ALFONSO, ARNEL SUMAGUI, WILFREDO G. SARMAGO, and ROBERTO L. URBANO, Respondents.

DOCTRINE:

Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment under Article 298 of the Labor Code.
It exists when “the services of an employee are in excess of what reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise.”

FACTS:

On September 16, 2013, APRI called for a town hall meeting, wherein the employees were informed that
the company will implement a redundancy program that would result in the removal of around twenty
percent (20%) of its current employees. The program was being carried out in light of the declining
steam production in the Tiwi Plant. With this, APRI’s representatives began to individually meet the
employees to inform them that their positions are redundant, and that their employment is only until
October 20, 2013. They were made to sign the Notice of Redundancy as the written notice of their
inclusion in the program, as well as a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. The affected employees were given
two (2) manager’s checks, one for the separation pay, and another amounting to Php 400,000 as special
assistance.

Feeling aggrieved, the said employees alleged that they were forced to resign in their petition for illegal
dismissal against APRI. They contended that (1) APRI failed to comply with the notice requirement for
redundancy; (2) the Notice of Redundancy given to them and the notice to the DOLE contained self-
serving allegations without any evidence that justified the program; (3) APRI failed to show that it was
overmanned; and (4) APRI failed to show the criteria used to determine which employees will be
removed.
APRI countered that the removal of the employees was a valid exercise of its prerogative to declare
redundant positions for (1) the decline in the steam production, and (2) the use of an upgraded version
of Oracle Business Enterprise. They emphasized that the notices to the employees and DOLE were
compliant to the requirements of the law.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints of the employees for illegal dismissal for lack of merit. The
LA found that (1) APRI complied with the requisites for a valid redundancy program; (2) employees were
given separation pay and an additional Php 400,000.00 as an act of grace; (3) APRI used fair and
reasonable criteria in choosing who will be affected; and (4) there was good faith on the part of APRI in
abolishing the redundant positions.

The employees filed an appeal before the NLRC which affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It ruled
that the dismissal of the employees on the basis of redundancy was valid. The petitioners failed to prove
that the employer committed unfair labor practice under the Labor Code.

Upon appeal to the CA, the CA held that the Decision of the NLRC was already final to them.

ISSUE:

WON the redundancy program of APRI was valid.

RULING:

The Court denies the petition.

Redundancy is an authorized cause for termination of employment under Article 298 of the Labor Code.
It exists when “the services of an employee are in excess of what reasonably demanded by the actual
requirements of the enterprise.” It can be due to “a number of factors, such as the overhiring of
workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the dropping of a particular line or service previously
manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise.”

To ensure that the dismissal is not implemented arbitrarily, jurisprudence requires the employer to
prove its good faith in abolishing the redundant positions as well as the existence of fair and reasonable
criteria in the selection of employees who will be dismissed from employment due to redundancy.
In unfolding the legality of the employees’ dismissal, the NLRC ruled that the evidence submitted by
APRI showed compliance to all the four (4) requisites for a valid implementation of the redundancy
program: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the DOLE one (1) month prior to the
intended date of dismissal; (2) payment of separation pay and the addition Php 400,000.00; (3) fair and
reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant; and (4) good faith in
abolishing the redundant positions.

In sum, this Court finds that the rulings of the LA, the NLRC, and the CA were predicated on the evidence
on record.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

 , February 19, 2020 G.R. No. 231859

Gerardo Roxas vs. Baliwag Transit, Tengco

Topic: Constructive Dismissal, reduced work week

Doctrine: Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a
diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by
an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by
him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh,
hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a
reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his
employment/position under the circumstances.

Facts:

Petitioner Gerardo C. Roxas was employed as bus driver by respondent Baliwag Transit Inc. since March
24, 1998 and paid on commission basis. In 2012, the bus to which he was assigned was phased out
pursuant to Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) Resolution 2013-01.
Consequently, he became a reliever for Baliwag’s other remaining buses and his work assignment was
reduced from his regular three-week work duty to only two weeks per month.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed on June 5, 2014 a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of
holiday pay, holiday premium, service incentive leave and 13th month pay, illegal suspension, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Baliwag and its owner Tengco. He claimed he was
constructively dismissed due to his reduced work assignment which consequently affected his pay and
other benefits.

Issue: Whether Roxas was constructively dismissed.

Ruling: No.

In this case, while Roxas’ reduced work assignment did effectively result in the diminution of his pay and
other benefits, the same did not amount to a clear act of discrimination, insensibility or disdain on the
part of Baliwag so as to force him out of employment. This is because the reason for the said work
reduction was due to the phase out of Baliwag’s old buses as imposed by a government regulation,
leading Baliwag to, in the exercise of its management prerogative, adjust the previous work assignments
of its employees assigned to the affected buses. As pointed out by the CA, “the reduced work week
which Baliwag implemented in 2012 was in relation to the government’s directive to remove from the
roads, public utility vehicles which are 15 years old and above, for the safety of the riding public. The
decision to phase out Baliwag’s old buses was therefore not done out of the company’s whims and
caprices only but instead, a means on the part of Baliwag to cope with the downsizing of their business
operation as a consequence of the strict implementation of LTFRB Resolution 2013-01.” As such, this
exercise of Baliwag’s management prerogative appears to have been done in good faith, and hence,
should be upheld.
G.R. No. 216132, January 22, 2020
AL-MASIYA OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. AND ROSALINA ABOY,
PETITIONERS, v. HAZEL A. VIERNES, RESPONDENT.

TOPIC: CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL

DOCTRINE: In cases of constructive dismissal, the impossibility,
unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of continued employment leaves an employee
with no other viable recourse but to terminate his or her employment. 56 "An
employee is considered to be constructively dismissed from service if an act of
clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so
unbea[r]able to the employee as to leave him or her with no option but to forego
his or her continued employment." 57 From this definition, it can be inferred that
various situations, whereby the employer intentionally places the employee in a
situation which will result in the latter's being coerced into severing his ties with
the former, can result in constructive dismissal
FACTS: On January 5, 2011, respondent left the Philippine Embassy after a certain Mr.
Mutlaq offered to give her a job at a chocolate factory. However, this chocolate factory
turned out to be inexistent. Then, the employees of Al Rekabi, an employment agency,
told her that they would be bringing her to Hawally at night. She refused to take the trip
as it was cold and drizzling. She then attempted to report the matter to Atty. Merginio
using her cellular phone, but the employees of Al Rekabi confiscated it. Mr. Hassan, the
Manager of Al Rekabi, did not accede to her request to postpone the trip to the following
day. It came to a point where Mr. Hassan scolded respondent, and forced her to make a
written admission that her employers treated her well. On February 7, 2011, respondent
was asked to affix her signature on a letter that she copied purportedly showing that she
admitted having pre-terminated her contract of employment and that she no longer had
any demandable claim as she was treated well. Respondent's execution of this letter of
resignation was made as a precondition to the release of her passport and plane ticket
which were in the possession of petitioners.
Respondent arrived in the Philippines on February 12, 2011. 16
In response to respondent's complaint, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss . Respondent
executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Desistance, Sworn Statement, and Receipt and
Quitclaim before Ofelia M. Castro-Hudson, Assistant Labor Attaché in Kuwait, where
she allegedly stated that she voluntarily agreed to release Al-Masiya and Saad
Mutlaq, et al., from all her claims arising from her employment abroad. They also
presented her handwritten statement where she expressed that her cause for
terminating her employment was her own personal reasons.
ISSUE: Whether respondent was constructively dismissed.
RULING: Yes. First, Saad Mutlaq, respondent's foreign employer, never secured a
working visa for her, in violation of the categorical requirement for an employer's
accreditation with the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency. Second, respondent
was not properly paid in accordance with the terms of her employment contract.  During
her three-month stay, she was only paid US$227.75 instead of the stipulated pay of
US$400 per month. Third, respondent was not assigned to a permanent employer
abroad for the entire contractual period of two years. Upon her arrival in Kuwait, she
was consistently promised job placements which were found to be inexistent. As noted
by the NLRC, it was clear that Saad Mutlaq intended to use respondent as an
entertainer of some sort in places of ill repute; and she would have fallen victim to
human trafficking "were it not for some favorable providence." Finally, similar to the
case of Torreda, herein respondent was made to copy and sign a prepared resignation
letter and this was made as a condition for the release of her passport and plane ticket.
In light of these, the Court finds that, indeed, it was logical for respondent to consider
herself constructively dismissed. The impossibility, unreasonableness, or unlikelihood of
continued employment has left respondent with no other viable recourse but to
terminate her employment.
 , January 22, 2020 G.R. No. 230005

. Seventh Fleet Security Services, Inc. vs. Loque

Topic: Constructive Dismissal vs. Abandonment of Employment

Doctrine:

 The placement of an employee on "floating status" must not exceed six months.
Otherwise, the employee may be considered constructively dismissed. The burden of
proving that there are no posts available to which the security guard can be assigned rests
on the employer.
 Abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.
Facts:

Loque is a hired security guard of Seventh Fleet. He alleges that he was treated with hostility after he
filed a complaint for underpayment of wages and other money claims against Seventh Fleet. He was
relieved from his post upon request of the corporation he was assigned in. Later he was suspended for
10 days. After the lapse of his 10-day suspension, he allegedly reported for duty but he was informed
that he was on “floating status” and was advised to wait for a call from Seventh Fleet. More than 6
months later, he received a letter on a Friday, directing him to report within 48 hours from receipt. He
went to Seventh Fleet on a Monday but he was not allowed to enter and was made to wait outside.
Before leaving the premises, he handed a letter to the security guard informing Seventh Fleet that he
was ready to report for duty. Seventh Fleet wrote a second letter saying that Loque failed to report for
work despite the return to work order. In a letter, he inquired with Seventh Fleet on the status of his
employment stressing that he was refused to return to work even though he obeyed the return to work
order. Loque filed a complaint for constructive dismissal.

Seventh Fleet denied all of Loque’s allegations. Seventh Fleet also added that it received a report from
the security guards regarding an offense committed by Loque – when he was no longer on duty, he rode
a motorbike with a guard from another agency, returned at midnight, entered through the backdoor of
the agency, took a key from the guard’s table, opened the building’s basement so the guard from
another agency can enter without passing through the guards on duty, and stayed there overnight. To
avoid argument, the guards on duty did not confront him but decided to report him instead. This act of
Loque is not authorized by Seventh Fleet nor Second Midland’s Code of Disciplinary Rules and
Regulations. Loque reasoned the inclement weather forced him to ask the building administrator if he
could stay in the building overnight and he even offered help to the other guards in case of emergency
or flooding in the area. In order to avoid getting involved, the building manager requested that Loque be
replaced. That’s when he was relieved and suspended. Seventh Fleet alleged that on May 14, 2014, they
sent Loque a letter directing him to report for posting, but Loque did not comply with the directive. On
May 28, 2014, Seventh Fleet sent Loque another letter reiterating the instruction to report for posting.
However, Seventh Fleet still received no word from Loque. Seventh Fleet was surprised to learn that
Loque had filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, and payment of separation pay and full backwages.
LA found Seventh Fleet guilty of illegal constructive dismissal. NLRC reversed LA. CA reaffirmed the LA.

Issue:

3. Whether Loque was constructively dismissed.

4. Whether Loque abandoned his employment.
Ruling:

3. Yes.
In security services, the "floating status" or temporary "off-detail" of an employee may take place when
there are no available posts to which the employee may be assigned. While there is no specific provision
in the Labor Code governing the "floating status" or temporary "off-detail" of employees, the Court,
applying Article 301 of the Labor Code by analogy, considers this situation as a form of temporary
retrenchment or lay-off, which shall not terminate employment and in all such cases, the employee shall
be reinstated to his former position if he indicates his desire to resume his work not later than one (1)
month from the resumption of operations of his employer or from his relief from the military or civic
duty. The placement of an employee on "floating status" must not exceed six months. Otherwise, the
employee may be considered constructively dismissed. The burden of proving that there are no posts
available to which the security guard can be assigned rests on the employer. However, the mere lapse of
six months in "floating status" should not automatically result to constructive dismissal. The peculiar
circumstances of the employee's failure to assume another post must still be inquired upon.

To avoid liability for constructive dismissal, Seventh Fleet asserted that it had directed Loque to report
to their office for posting within forty-eight (48) hours. Seventh Fleet faulted Loque for not complying
with its directive. On the other hand, Loque claimed that he went to Seventh Fleet's office to report for
work on two occasions, as shown by his even dated letters. Loque further alleged that he was barred
from entering the premises of Seventh Fleet on those dates and, thus, was constrained to write those
letters instead. Other than bare denials, Seventh Fleet was not able to show that Loque was not barred
from entering its premises. Thus, Loque could not be faulted for merely leaving the letter with security
guard Amores, and for sending the second letter through private courier. Seventh Fleet did not dispute
the second letter or its contents but merely attempted to discredit Loque by saying that the letter was
merely "crafted" in preparation to the filing of the complaint. The general return to work orders will not
absolve Seventh Fleet since jurisprudence requires not only that the employee be recalled to the
agency's office, but that the employee be deployed to a specific client before the lapse of six months.
The correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did not report
to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually received the
letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed because none of these letters indicated his
reassignment to another client.

4. No.
Since Loque was constructively dimissed, it follows then that Loque could not have abandoned his
employment with Seventh Fleet, for abandonment is incompatible with constructive dismissal.

Abandonment, as a just cause for termination, requires "a deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his work, coupled with a clear absence of any intention of returning to his or her
work." The following elements must therefore concur: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some
overt acts.

There is no showing that Loque intended to sever his employment with Seventh Fleet. On the contrary,
there is strong indication that Loque wanted to resume work.
CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL ON THE BASIS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT

LBC EXPRESS-VIS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. MONICA C. PALCO, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020

Doctrine: An employee is considered constructively dismissed if he or she was sexually harassed by her
superior and her employer failed to act on his or her complaint with prompt and sensitivity.

Facts:

The case initiated to be mere flirting coming from an immediate supervisor escalated into a full-blown
sexual harassment. The victim-employee filed a complaint with the Head Office of the employer but this
was not acted upon promptly.

In 2009, Monica C. Palco, the victim-employee (Palco), started working with LBC Express-Vis Inc. (LBC) as
a customer associate in its Gaisano Danao Branch (LBC Danao). The Branch's Team Leader and Officer-in-
Charge, Arturo A. Batucan (Batucan), endorsed her application for the post and acted as her immediate
supervisor. It must be noted that Batucan is married.

While employed at LBC, Palco initially noticed that Batucan would often flirt with her; this, of course,
made her feel uncomfortable. Later, Batucan started sexually harassing her. Batucan directed toward
Palco uncomfortable smiles, stares, offers of loan, gifts of chocolate, unsolicited and unconsented
touches on the lap, hand and shoulders, kisses on the cheek, pulling of the straps of her bra, jokes about
having children with her, and jokes about having threesome with her and her future husband.

The final straw happened at around 8:00AM on May 01, 2010. That morning, Batucan sneaked in on
Palco while she was in the corner counting money. She was surprised. Batucan then held her on the hips
and attempted to kiss her lips. However, Palco was able to shield herself. 

For a second time, Batucan tried to and was able to kiss Palco on the lips; this time, she was not able to
react fast enough. He told her he was just happy that day and that made him kiss her. He then
proceeded to wipe her lips. After that, Batucan started acting as if they were in a romantic relationship.
For example, he even asked her permission to go to the LBC Camotes Branch.

Due to the Head Office's lack of prompt in acting on her complaint, she no longer felt safe and
comfortable going to work. As a result, she filed a resignation letter and, on the same day, filed a labor
complaint with the Labor Arbiter which held that she was illegally dismissed. This was affirmed by the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) on appeal.

Issue:

WON there was constructive dismissal.

Ruling:

Constructive dismissal occurs when an employer makes an employee's continued employment

impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, or has made an employee's working conditions or environment
harsh, hostile and unfavorable, such that the employee feels obliged to resign from his or her
employment, Common examples are when the employee is demoted, or when his or her pay or benefits
are reduced. However, constructive dismissal is not limited to these instances. The gauge to determine
whether there is constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person would feel constrained to resign
from his or her employment because of the circumstances, conditions and environment created by the
employer for the employee. (G.R. No. 217101)

Constructive dismissal does not always involve forthright dismissal or diminution in rank, compensation,
benefit and privileges. There may be such dismissal when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility
[insensitivity?] or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that the
employee is left with no choice but to forgo his continued employment. (Saudia v. Rebensencio, 750
Philippine Reports 791, 839, 2015. Per J. Leonen, Second Division)

One of the ways by which hostile or offensive work environment is created is through the sexual
harassment of an employee. This is punished by Republic Act No. (RA) 7877, otherwise known as the
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act.

LBC's argument that it should not be made liable because the sexual harassment was committed by
Batucan cannot hold water. Batucan is not a mere co-employee of Palco. He is a part of the managerial
staff. In fact, at the very least, he held a supervisory position when he perpetrated those criminal acts
again Palco.

Although the company cannot be held liable solely by reason of Batucan's act, RA 7877 states that  there
shall be solidary liability if the employer, head of office or institution was informed and no immediate
action was taken thereon. (Section 5) It took LBC two (2) months to resolve the matter.

Given this, the delay of the employer in acting on the victim-employee's case showed the former's
insensitivity, indifference and disregard for its employees' security and welfare. It even appears that LBC
belittled Palco's allegations.

In addition to RA 7877, RA 11313, otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act, strengthens protection
against gender-based sexual harassment. It states that complaints shall be investigated and resolved
within ten (10) days or less upon its reporting. It must be noted, however, that RA 11313 had not yet
taken effect when Batucan committed his crimes against Palco.
35.

February 05, 2020 G.R. No. 245258,

Metro Psychiatry, Inc. (MPI) vs Llorente

Topic: Substantial Evidence in determining the legality of dismissal

Doctrine: Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. As opposed to proof beyond reasonable doubt required in
criminal cases, labor cases require only substantial evidence to prove validity of dismissal.

Facts:

Llorente was hired as a nursing attendant at MPI. She was served a memorandum requiring him to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for continuously refusing to perform
certain tasks assigned to him by his immediate supervisor. In his explanation letter, he bewailed how he
was being treated by MPI. Another memorandum was served to him for falsely reporting to the parents
of a patient that the patient was being maltreated by the hospital (his voice was recognized by co-nurses
on the speaker phone when he talked to the parent) and for failing to comply with the assistant nursing
attendant head’s instruction to clean the facility and to attend endorsement meetings. He also copied
information from patients’ charts and placed it in his pocket. He was also place on preventive
suspension. He denied the allegations and also said that cleaning was not his job. He later received a
notice of termination informing him of his dismissal for loss of trust and confidence and willful
disobedience. He then filed for constructive dismissal against MPI. He alleged that because of a previous
labor case, MPI harassed and discriminated him through reducing his work days, assigning him to refill
water and to clean, accusing him of calling the patient’s parents. MPI added to his misdeeds as sleeping
on duty, absence without official leave, was also discourteous and disrespectful to patients, and being
tardy. MPI was finally compelled to terminate him for his false report to the patient’s parents.

LA ruled he was not constructively dismissed and there was no illegal dismissal. NLRC affirmed LA. CA
overturned LA and NLRC holding that evidence by MPI were inadequate to cause his termination which
was too harsh of a penalty as he should have been subjected to simple reprimand only.

Issue: Whether Llorente was illegally dismissed.

Ruling: No.

It appears that the CA overlooked that the quantum of proof required in determining the legality of an
employee is only substantial evidence which is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. The co-nurses who recognized his voice were not
shown to be impelled by ill-motive. And when he was caught copying information from the patients’
chart, that was the same day the parent received a call about her son. Even if he denied the accusations,
he never alleged that copying of information from the charts is something regularly done by nursing
attendants. And he also hid the piece of paper where he copied information inside his pocket. This is
substantial evidence of Llorente’s wrongdoing which amounts to misconduct. Llorente’s acts of copying
a patient’s information and using it to malign MPI are indicative of wrongful intent. The act of using the
information for a deceitful purpose could have exposed MPI to a lawsuit as it destroys a facility’s
reputation. Thus, MPI is justified in terminating his employment.

As opposed to proof beyond reasonable doubt required in criminal cases, labor cases require only
substantial evidence to prove validity of dismissal, which is satisfied where the employer has reasonable
ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein
renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position.
34.

, February 12, 2020 G.R. No. 219059

Gaudioso Iso, Jr. and Joel Tolentino vs. Salcon Power Corp., and Dennis Villareal

Topic: Misconduct as ground for dismissal

Doctrine: Union officers have the freedom as officers to do acts in furtherance of their right to self-
organization, but they do not have the freedom to malign and make statements that would destroy the
business’ reputation. Libel is an act constituting serious misconduct which warrants dismissal from
employment.

Facts:

While the case by Iso, et al against Salcon (1 st case) was ongong in the CA, their co-petitoners entered in
a Compromise Agreement with Salcon in which Iso did not join. The SC approved the Compromise
Agreement dismissing the case. Iso filed a motion for reconsideration saying the dismissal of the case
should not affect him as he was not part of the Compromise Agreement. In response, Salcon said that
the Compromise Agreement does not concern him as a validly dismissed petitioner as his monetary
claims are directly connected with his continued employment. Iso replied asserting that since his case
for illegal dismissal with Tolentino (2 nd case) against Salcon is still pending with the Court, it is premature
to render his claims moot, as there is a possibility that his dismissal would be declared illegal, entitling
him to the benefits he claims. In the 2 nd case, Iso and Tolentino act as officers of Salcon union which
Salcon refuses to recognize, prompting them to file a certification election which they won. They then
submitted a proposed CBA which Salcon countered. Salcon refused to bargain with the union pending its
appeal with the BLR concerning their union registration. BLR dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, the union
filed a notice of strike on the ground of refusal to bargain. Salcon then gave in and agreed to bargain.

Iso and Tolentino contend that Salcon’s petition for cancellation of the union’s registration and the
petition to remove supervisory employees from the union was part of a plot to remove them from the
union. The union then called a press conference. Salcon alleges that during the press conference,
petitioners uttered false and malicious accusations against it. These were even published in a newspaper
of general circulation. Later, Salcon filed a criminal complaint for libel and a civil case for damages
against them. It issued show-cause notices to them charging them with serious misconduct, dishonesty,
breach of trust and serious disobedience. Hearing were conducted where petitioners were found guilty
which prompted their dismissal. Then Iso and Tolentino filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA found
that they were not illegally dismissed. NLRC affirmed. CA also affirms saying that libel is an act
constituting serious misconduct which warrants dismissal from employment.

Issue: Whether Iso and Tolentino were illegally dismissed.

Ruling: No.

Misconduct has been defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established
or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer. The elements
are: 1) must be serious; 2) must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties showing that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer; 3) performed with wrongful intent.

Their termination was not because of union activities, but because of their utterances of libelous
statements. The publishers, even with the insistence of petitioners that they did not make libelous
statements, destroyed whatever smokescreen the petitioners have created. Even when they contend
that they were not the authors of the article, or that they did not have control over the said article, they
were pointed as the source of the news item by the publishers. The writer was in no position to
personally come up with the figures which appeared on the news item. The writer had no knowledge of
the alleged anomalies. The writer merely wrote the information fed to him by the petitioners.

While Iso and Tolentino have the freedom as officers to do acts in furtherance of their right to self-
organization, they do not have the freedom to malign and make statements that would destroy the
business reputation of Salcon. These acts then constitute serious misconduct.

As employees upon whom trust an d confidence were reposed by Salcon, petitioners were expected to
discharge their functions with utmost professionalism and uprightness. However, they betrayed this
expectation. Iso was hired for a supervisory position as Head of the Maintenance-Electrical Section
wielded actual direction and control over his subordinates as well as assigned electricians and ensured
that the assigned tasks ete properly implemented on time. Tolentino, as Engineering Contract
Administrator, was entrusted with vital and confidential company documents, data and information. He
was also a member of due diligence teams tasked to conduct investigation, thus, exposed to highly
confidential and classified documents. In fact, they were in positions involving trust and confidence,
which they violated.
 , February 19, 2020 G.R. No. 160090

Del Pilar, et. al. vs. Batangas II Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BATALEC II)

Topic: Payment of Backwages for dismissal cases; Nominal damages for legal dismissals

Doctrine: The final and executory decision does not fix the exact amount of the awarded separation pay
and full backwages. It leaves the same still to be computed with the right to due process being afforded
to both parties in the process.

Facts:

Del Pilar et al were employees by BATALEC II. They held rallies to denounce the alleged corrupt,
anomalous and irregular activities of some BATALEC II officials. They were dismissed for participating in
an illegal strike. They then file a case for illegal dismissal. LA renders judgment in Del Pilar et al’s favor.
They were then reinstated in the payroll and paid backwages. BATALEC II filed a manifestation to the LA
that it is impossible to reinstate them because a major reorganization and streamlining are being
undergone which resulted in the abolition of some positions. It offered to pay one-month salary for
every year of service. The LA then ordered BATALEC II to pay their separation pays. NLRC denied appeal
but modified decision of MR saying they were arbitrarily dismissed for an authorized cause which
warranted the payment of indemnity. Del Pilar et al filed certiorari to CA. During Pendency, they reached
an amicable settlement, hence, their case was dismissed. CA ordered BATALEC II to pay separation pay
and full backwages for failure to observe procedure for the termination of employment (relying on
Serrano vs. NLRC). SC upheld CA ruling on full backwages. A Motion to approve computation was filed by
Del Pilar et al which the LA approved. BATALEC II refuted backwages as said amount is only awarded to
illegally dismissed employees and not to those whose former positions have been abolished and
reinstatement is no longer possible. NLRC partially granted the appeal modifying the computation with
base pay as the basic pay plus allowances. CA modified the ruling base pay of only basic salaries, saying:
“It is more sensible to consider that the backwages contemplated as a penalty where termination is
legal, should be confined to the employee's salary, not allowances and other benefits. This is because
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which provides for full backwages, inclusive of allowances and other
benefits, explicitly refers to an employee who is unjustly or illegally dismissed from work. Jurisprudence
is not clear on the coverage or scope of backwages when the termination is not illegal.”

Complainants claim that the CA gravely erred in entertaining the appeal, more so because not only did it
disturb the computation of the LA, it also revived controversies already adjudicated upon. Complainants
add that instead of an appeal to the CA, BATELEC II should have filed a petition for injunction with the
NLRC questioning the computation of the award pursuant to Rule XI, Section 1 of the New Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC. Complainants also challenge the base figure proffering that since Article 279 of
the Labor Code provides for full backwages, inclusive of allowances in the case of an employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work, the same treatment should be given to an employee who is dismissed for
an authorized cause.
BATELEC II insists that it had fully complied with the 30-day notice rule under Article 283 of the Labor
Code. BATELEC II asserts that complainants were aware of their impending retrenchment on account of
redundancy when BATELEC II filed a manifestation and motion to the effect and complainants were
accorded due process when they filed their opposition thereto. BATELEC II avers that the difference in
the factual settings of this case and Serrano did not make it legally feasible to apply the latter's doctrine.

Issue:

1. Should the CA have entertained such appeal?

2. What is the amount of backwages when the dismissal is legal?
Ruling:

1. Yes.
It has been settled that no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary
consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. By the
nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction thereof. The
recomputation of the awards stemming from an illegal dismissal case does not constitute an alteration
or amendment of the final decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the
computation of the monetary consequences of the dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the
principle of immutability of final judgments.

The putting-up of a cash bond was not required in perfecting the instituted appeal, for the order
appealed from is not an original decision of the LA affecting the whole spectrum of the instant case. It is
only an order involving a mere incident, an isolated segment of that entire extent of the case at bar. It
merely resolves, at the execution stage of the proceedings, the issue of whether or not the benefits be
integrated in the base pay for use in computing separation pay and full backwages. The law and the
NLRC Rules on the matter do not require the posting of a bond in orders of this nature. The Court has
invariably ruled that Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring bond in appeals involving monetary awards,
must be liberally construed, in line with the desired objective of resolving controversies on their merits.
Procedural rule may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Even their failure to do so was
merely a legal technicality which the Court could ignore to serve the ends of substantial justice. Also, to
prevent unjust enrichment of Complainants-Appellees at the expense of BATELEC II, all due to the
unquenchable monetary hunger of Complainants-Appellees, the appeal has to be entertained regardless
of whether or not the corresponding appeal bond was posted.

The final and executory decision does not fix the exact amount of the awarded separation pay and full
backwages. It leaves the same still to be computed with the right to due process being afforded to both
parties in the process. Since the right amount has not yet been judicially fixed with finality, it is most
unfair that Respondents-Appellants should be required to post a bond to perfect their appeal
questioning, in the exercise of their right to due process.

2. The backwages should be deleted. Nominal damages shall be given instead.

Pursuant to Serrano which the appellate court hesitantly applied, complainants were entitled to
separation pay and backwages up to September 13, 2001. However, in the subsequent cases of Agabon
v. National Labor Relations Commission (Agabon) and Jaka Food Processing Corporation v. Pacot (Jaka)
the Court now orders payment of nominal damages for valid dismissals due to just or authorized cause
but not compliant to statutory due process.

The Court has already deemed it to be the wise judicial course to let its abandonment of Serrano be
retroactive as its means of giving effect to its recognition of the unfairness of declaring illegal or
ineffectual dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not complying with statutory due process. The
Agabon Court plainly saw the likelihood of Serrano producing unfair but far-reaching consequences,
such as, but not limited to, encouraging frivolous suits where even the most notorious violators of
company policies would be rewarded by invoking due process; to having the constitutional policy of
providing protection to labor be used as a sword to oppress the employers; and to compelling the
employers to continue employing persons who were admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance
and whose continued employment would be patently inimical to the interest of employers. The amount
of such indemnity would be addressed to the sound discretion of the labor tribunal upon taking into
account the relevant circumstances.
 , February 12, 2020 G.R. No. 184452

Lufthansa Technik Philippines, Inc. vs. Roberto Cuizon

Topic: Loss of Trust and Confidence and Neglect of Duty as Ground for Dismissal

Doctrine:

 The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: (1) the
employee concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be
an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence; and (3) such loss of trust relates
to the employee's performance of duties.
 Neglect of duty to be a ground for dismissal must be both gross and habitual. Gross
negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or
the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform
one's duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances.
Facts:

Cuizon, who has worked there for 32 years in the Maintenance and Engineering Department of PAL,
then later on absorbed by Lufthansa where he held the position of MA2 Duty Manager, was dismissed
by Lufthansa for gross negligence because of his involvement in an accident that resulted in substantial
losses to Lufthansa. Lufthansa points out loss of trust and confidence due to numerous violations and
blatant disregard of their standards in the workplace committed in two separate incidents: 1)
concealment of accidental light-up of PAL Aircraft, and 2) failure to observe safety guidelines and
precautions with respect to aircraft towing causing damage to PAL Aircraft.

In the first incident, a co-employee suggested to Cuizon to follow the Handbook on standard operating
procedure apprising the Maintenance Control Center (MA4) regarding the situation. He however opted
to tow the aircraft to the hangar and continued the scheduled check prior to informing the MA4. And
instead of informing them with the accidental light-up, he reported that an engine fan blade was found
hard to rotate upon arrival. His report was then found inconsistent with the other reports filed by his co-
employees so he amended his report, and tried to make excuses like he verbally reported it.

In the second incident, Cuizon performed the tasks assigned to another without authority to do so and
despite having no expertise on such matters. He then assigned someone else who is inexperienced and
unqualified. He then left them in the hands of the inexperienced one. He allowed the wing walkers and
tail guides to leave their positions before towing of the aircraft was completed. He even disregarded the
safety precautions under the Boeing Maintenance Manual regarding towing of an aircraft. He failed to
wait for the clearance from the Mactan International Tower prior to towing. As a consequence, the
aircraft was grounded for repair due to damage sustained upon its collision with a four-foot high utility
post, amounting to USD21,000.00 plus USD14,470.00 as lease charge for when it was grounded.

He was then served show cause memorandums.

Cuizon claims that he is being singled out due to event prior to the accidental light-up and towing
incidents. He alleged that there was a letter circulating about a co-employee’s (manager) handling of the
company in Cebu and his other culpabilities inimical to Lufthansa’s interest. And in the same letter,
Cuizon was praised for his work and better person as holding the manager position. As a result, he is
receiving cold treatment. He further points that he was the only one terminated despite the
involvement and admissions of other personnel. He claims that Lufthansa railroaded his efforts to
procure documents necessary to defend himself such as transcripts of the investigation. He argues that
he did not conceal information, rather he could not immediately conclude the finding that there was an
accidental light-up because the same had to be confirmed using a boroscope. With regard to the towing
incident, Cuizon claims that he did not abandon the towing crew but only proceeded to do other tasks to
support the leak check that was meant to be conducted on the aircraft's engine.

After proper notice and hearing, Cuizon was dismissed. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
LA. LA decided for Lufthansa. NLRC affirmed LA. CA set aside NLRC decision saying that Lufthansa failed
to establish that Cuizon intentionally, willfully, knowingly and purposely breached his duty. CA also said
that Cuizon could not be guilty of deliberately giving false, inaccurate, misleading, incomplete or delayed
information to LTP regarding the accidental aircraft engine light-up incident since: firstly, he indeed
submitted a copy of the incident report to manager and secondly, the report was based on his personal
findings and appreciation of the facts and were substantially corroborated and confirmed by the
reports70 of his fellow employees involved in the incident. The towing precautions that he allegedly did
not follow and which were made as the basis for his alleged negligence, were for the tow tractor
operator, brake rider and radio operator to comply with. Thus, Cuizon could not be faulted if in the
course of the towing operation, some members of the crew left. Granting that Cuizon should be
responsible as the supervisor of the crew, petitioners failed to prove that Cuizon consented or had full
knowledge that said crew members left their posts. Moreover, the CA gave credence to Cuizon's
argument that he did not abandon the towing job but only proceeded to do other tasks to support the
leak check that was meant to be conducted on the aircraft's engine.

Issue:

3. Whether Cuizon was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
4. Whether Cuizon is guilty of gross neglect of duty.
Ruling:

3. No.
The requisites for dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence are: (1) the employee
concerned must be holding a position of trust and confidence; (2) there must be an act that would
justify the loss of trust and confidence; and (3) such loss of trust relates to the employee's performance
of duties. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees
– those vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively recommend such
managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. They are
defined as those who in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of money or property. Loss of trust and confidence as a valid ground for dismissal is premised
on the fact that the employee holds a position whose functions may only be performed by someone
who enjoys the trust and confidence of the management. Such employee bears a greater burden of
trustworthiness than ordinary workers, and the betrayal of the trust reposed is the essence of the loss of
trust and confidence that becomes the basis for the employee's dismissal.

In the instant case, the Court finds that petitioners failed to substantially prove the second requisite. For
loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must be based on a willful breach of trust
and founded on clearly established facts. Such breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely, without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly,
heedlessly or inadvertently. Lufthansa failed to prove that Cuizon willfully, intentionally, knowingly,
purposely and without justifiable excuse disregarded LTP's rules and regulations in the workplace. On
the contrary, this Court finds that Cuizon has substantially refuted petitioners' claim on the alleged
concealment of the accidental lightup and the towing incident.

4. No.
In termination cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the employee's dismissal was for a
valid and authorized cause. Lufthansa failed to discharge the burden. Firstly, petitioners miserably failed
to show that Cuizon did not exercise even a slight care or diligence which caused the grounding of and
damage to the aircraft during the towing operation. Moreover, Lufthansa failed to prove that it as
Cuizon’s act that directly or solely caused the grounding of and damage to the aircraft during the towing
incident. Lufthansa also failed to prove that Cuizon was negligent in his job when he allegedly concealed
the accidental light-up incident or allegedly provided false information thereon. On the contrary, he
performed his task in accordance with the rules and procedures of LTP. He immediately informed his
supervisor, through a phone call, about his findings. He had timely submitted/furnished a copy of his
incident report. Moreover, he did not rely on hearsay information on what happened with the aircraft
but he acted based on his personal findings and appreciation of facts of the accidental aircraft engine
light-up incident. Considering Cuizon's untainted 32 years of service, the Court finds that it is
incongruous for him to deliberately act recklessly on his job, especially since his employer's line of
business involves the lives and safety of airline passengers.
 Loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is
premised on the fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility,
trust and confidence or that the employee concerned is entrusted with confidence
with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling or care and protection of the
property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the
offense for which an employee is penalized.

G.R. No. 214294 September 30, 2020

JR HAULING SERVICES vs SOLAMO

FACTS: Respondents, drivers/helpers of JR Hauling, were required to make two trips per day, however,
that considering that the broiler farms are located in remote and distant areas, they could only
accomplish, on the average, one trip per day. They further alleged that from the time they were
engaged by JR Hauling, they were not paid their respective 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay
for holiday and rest day, and SIL. Respondents claimed that they were illegally dismissed. The petitioners
refuted respondents’ claims. It alleged that respondents incurred shortages in their deliveries of
broilers, supported of a copy of a summary of short broilers delivery supposedly issued. And upon
further investigation, they discovered that respondents are involve in the sale of excess broilers and
crates. Considering the foregoing circumstances, petitioners insisted that respondents' transgressions
amounted to serious misconduct, and constituted fraud or willful breach of trust and confidence, which
justified their dismissal. from employment. Petitioners also averred that respondents were field
employees and/or workers who are paid by the results, and therefore, were not entitled to their
monetary claims for underpayment of salaries, 13th month pay, holiday pay, premium pay for holiday
and rest day, and SIL.

ISSUE: WON the respondent are illegally dismissed.

HELD: No. Loss of trust and confidence as a ground for dismissal of employees covers employees
occupying a position of trust who are proven to have breached the trust and confidence reposed on
them. In addition, loss of confidence as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the
fact that the employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and confidence or that the
employee concerned is entrusted with confidence with respect to delicate matters, such as the handling
or care and protection of the property and assets of the employer. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized." In this regard, it is not the job title but the
nature of the work that the employee is duty-bound to perform which is material in determining
whether he holds a position where greater trust is placed by the employer and from whom greater
fidelity to duty is concomitantly expected.

Petitioners, as drivers/helpers, were entrusted with the custody, delivery and transportation of the
broilers and broiler crates, including their proper handling and protection, in accordance with the
directives of JR Hauling and instructions of its clients. To stress, respondents are performing the core
business of JR Hauling. Thus, even on the premise that respondents were not occupying managerial or
supervisory positions, they were, undoubtedly, holding positions of responsibility. As to respondents'
transgressions i. e., the unauthorized sale of broilers and broiler crates, the same are clearly
work.related
as they would not have been able to perpetrate the same were it not for their positions as
drivers/helpers of JR Hauling. In fine, the Court hold that there is just cause for respondents' dismissal
from the service.

DISMISSAL DUE TO REDUNDANCY

ANNA MAE B. MATEO, PETITIONER, v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS. INC., RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 226064, February 17, 2020

Doctrine: A petitioner dismissed due to redundancy, is entitled to receive, under the law, a separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of service.

Facts:

Petitioner was previously employed by Philippine Beverage Partners, Inc., (PhilBev) as Sales Supervisor.
In 2007, PhilBev ceased operations, and, as a result, petitioner was separated from service. Petitioner
received the corresponding separation benefits from PhilBev. Thereafter, petitioner was hired by
respondent, also as Sales Supervisor, and was eventually promoted as District Team Leader.

In February 2012, petitioner was informed by respondent that it is enhancing its Route to Market (RTM)
strategy to improve sales force effectiveness, her position was considered redundant. She was also
informed that her employment will be terminated effective March 31, 2012. Further, she was to receive
an amount tentatively computed at P676,657.15, as a consequence of her separation from service.

On April 21, 2012, respondent released to petitioner two checks for the total amount of P402,571.85.
Upon verification, petitioner discovered that her outstanding loan balance and the amount of
P134,064.95, representing withholding tax, were deducted from the originally computed amount.

Petitioner sought clarification as regards said deductions and was informed that the retirement benefit
she received is no longer tax exempt because she previously availed of such tax exemption upon her
separation from service with PhilBev.

Petitioner wrote a letter to the Bureau of Internal Revenue The Regional Director briefly quoted Section
32(B)(6)(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended, and referred the query
to the Revenue District Officer for their appropriate action. 8 Petitioner also referred to a BIR Ruling
concerning respondent's former employee who was similarly terminated due to redundancy, to the
effect that separation benefits received as a result of redundancy are exempt from income tax, and
consequently, from withholding tax. 9

Despite these, petitioner's claim for reimbursement of the deducted amount representing tax withheld
was denied by respondent.

Issue:
The pivotal issue is whether respondent is liable for illegal deduction when it withheld tax from the
amount received by petitioner as a consequence of her involuntary separation from service.

Ruling:

Petitioner's main contention is that the amount she received from respondent was her separation pay,
and was not her retirement pay, which she received as a consequence of the termination of her
employment due to redundancy. Because it was a separation pay, it should not have been subjected to
income tax. We find this contention meritorious.

There is no dispute that petitioner was separated from service due to redundancy pursuant to Article
283 of the Labor Code

As petitioner was dismissed clue to redundancy, she is entitled to receive, under the law, a separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay for every year of her service.

It is likewise undisputed that petitioner was a member of respondent's Retirement Plan (Plan) duly
approved by the BIR. The Plan expressly provides that a member who was involuntary separated from
service for any cause beyond the member's control shall receive "in lieu of any other retirement
benefits, a separation benefit computed in accordance with the retirement formula" or the termination
benefit mandated by law, whichever is higher.

The Plan clearly indicates that an employee who was involuntarily separated from service, although not
having reached the compulsory or optional retirement age nor having met the tenurial requirement, like
herein petitioner, is entitled to receive an "involuntary separation benefit" to be computed using the
retirement benefit formula, or the separation pay under the law, whichever is higher. Plainly, petitioner
has the right to demand to be paid the separation benefit as computed under the Plan or separation pay
in accordance with Article 283 of the Labor Code, and shall be entitled to receive the higher amount.

Here, it is clear that petitioner received her separation pay computed under the formula used for
determining retirement pay. The fact that petitioner's separation pay was computed in accordance with
the formula for computing retirement pay does not thereby convert the character of the benefit
received into a retirement benefit. The retirement formula was used because it was, in fact, more
advantageous for the petitioner. Thus, there should be no confusion as regards the character of the
benefit which petitioner received considering that Section 3 of the Plan unequivocally characterizes the
benefit to be received due to involuntary separation from service as a separation benefit.

Neither was there any showing that petitioner voluntarily opted to retire so as to treat the amount she
received as her retirement pay. Not being a retirement pay, it was likewise plain error on the part of the
CA to have applied the four conditions under Section 32(B)(6)(a) of the NIRC for tax exemption of
retirement benefits.
G.R. No. 204555. July 6, 2020

PEDRITO R. PARAYDAY and JAIME REBOSO, Petitioners,

vs.

SHOGUN SHIPPING CO., INC., Respondent.

TOPIC: Illegal Dismissal

DOCTRINE:

An indispensable precondition of illegal dismissal is the prior existence of an employer-employee

relationship.

FACTS:

Petitioners Parayday and Reboso alleged that they were employed as fitter/welders by Oceanview which
is a corporation engaged in the business of ship building sometime in October 1996 and March 1997,
respectively. They presented an Oceanview Identification Card and Certificate of Employment dated
February 5, 2001 to support their allegation.

Sometime in 2003, Oceanview changed its corporate name to “Shogun Ships Inc.” In May 2006, the
petitioners were assigned to do a welding job on a barge of Shogun Ships, M/T Daniela Natividad
wherein an explosion occurred causing grave injuries to petitioners. They were hospitalized until June
2006, so they were not paid their salaries while in hospital confinement. After they were discharged
from the hospital, the respondent discontinued providing for medical expenses of the petitioners, but
resumed payment of their salaries.

On May 1, 2008, the petitioners were verbally dismissed by the respondent due to lack of work as
fitters/welders. Hence, they filed a petition for illegal dismissal. The respondent denied its employer-
employee relationship with the petitioners, pointing out that Shogun Shops is a corporation engaged in
domestic cargo shipping, and was only incorporated in 2002. The respondent maintained that
Oceanview was a separate and distinct entity from Shogun Ships.
The Labor Arbiter held that the petitioners were regular employees considering that they (1) performed
tasks necessary and desirable, and (2) rendered more than one year of service at the time of their
dismissal. On the issue of illegal dismissal, the respondent failed to prove that the petitioners were
dismissed for just or authorized reasons. NLRC dismissed the appeal, taking note of the 2006 explosion
wherein they reported back for work in August 2006, and with this, it would appear that the petitioners
have already rendered more than one year of service with Shogun Ships, a sufficient evidence of the
necessity if not indispensability of their functions, thus making them regular employees.

The CA reversed the decision of LA and NLRC, and concluded that the petitioners failed to adduce
substantial evidence to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship, hence, there was no
dismissal to speak of. Hence, the petitioners filed a motion before this court.

ISSUE:

WON the petitioners were regular employees of Shogun Ships.

WON the petitioners were validly dismissed from employment.

RULING:

The Court grants the petition.

On the issue of an employer-employee relationship

The Court ruled that an employer-employee relationship did exist between the petitioners and Shogun
Ships by applying the four-fold test. This Court has time and again applied the “four-fold test” which has
the following elements, to wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power to discipline and dismiss; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

It is worth noting that in May 2006, the petitioners were engaged by herein respondent to work on
repairs on one of the barges of Shogun Ships. The respondent did not deny that petitioner worked for
Shogun Ships until they were supposedly verbally dismissed from employment on May 1, 2008, they
even admitted that the petitioners were called in to do repairs on the barges. The respondent also
admitted that Shogun Ships provided petitioners financial assistance when they were hospitalized, and
resumed to pay their salaries after getting discharged from the hospital.
With this, the Court ruled that Shogun Ships (1) engaged them as its employees; (2) paid their salaries
for services rendered; and (3) had ultimate discretion to dismiss their services after the needed repairs
were carried out.

As regards to power of control, this Court held that an employer’s power of control is deemed inferred
from the petitioners working alongside regular employees of Shogun Ships and taking orders from its
engineers as to the required specifications on how the barges should be repaired.

On the issue of illegal dismissal

The Court ruled that the petitioners were illegally dismissed as they are deemed regular employees of
the respondent. The records of the case show that the petitioners were not duly informed of the nature
and status of their engagement, the absence of which gives rise to the presumption of regular
employment.

Moreover, the petitioners were performing activities which are necessary or desirable in the business of
Shogun Ships. It is essential for the respondent that it must continuously conduct vital repairs for the
proper maintenance of its barges. And lastly, the respondent was unable to discharge the burden of
proof required to establish petitioners’ dismissal from employment was legal and valid. They also failed
to show that the respondent afforded the petitioners due process prior to their dismissal, as in fact, they
were merely verbally dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED.

  ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

MELCHOR A. CUADRA, MELENCIO TRINIDAD AND SERAFIN TRINIDAD, PETITIONERS, v. SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION, RESPONDENT

G.R. No. 194467

July 13, 2020

Doctrine: When there is no evidence to the contrary, an employee's period of service is presumed
continuous and its reckoning point shall be the day the employee first came under the emp16y of the
employer. However, if in the interim, the employer-employee relationship was validly severed, returning
to the same employer for work shall be considered a rehiring, and the length of service shall be
reckoned from the day the employee was rehired.

Facts:

Melchor, Melencio, and .Serafin were among the 606 complainants · who filed an illegal dismissal case
before the National Labor Relations Commission against Lippercon Services, Inc. and San Miguel.
According to Labor Arbiter Caday, Lippercon Services was a mere labor-only contractor and that San
Miguel was the true employer of complainants. Therefore, it was San Miguel who was ordered to
reinstate the complainants to their former positions as regular employees, their regular status.

Petitioners maintain that the date of their reinstatement cannot be deemed the reckoning date for
computing the length of their service in San Miguel. Petitioners defined the term "length of service'\ as
"the period that an employee rendered service and it commences what the employee was hired and
that "reinstatement," on the other hand, means "restoration to a state which one has been removed or
separated."

Issue:

WON the petitioners were illegally dismissed

Ruling:

We grant the Petition as to petitioners Melchor Cuadra and Melencio Trinidad. Their length of service
should be reckoned from the time they first came under the employ of respondent, i.e., 1985 for
Melchor and 1988 for Melencio. However, given Serafin Trinidad's waiver of his claims against
respondent, the Petition is deemed m6ot and academic as to him. The parole evidence rule provides
that "when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement."74 In this case, the parties entered into
a compromise agreement to put an end to the litigation between them.

Carandang, Sta. Catalina College, and Philippine Village Hotel all illustrate how an employee who returns
to work for the same employer is considered a new hire if prior employment was validly terminated,
either voluntarily or under any of the just and authorized causes provided in the Labor Code. Therefore,
the reckoning point of the length of service, for purposes of security of tenure, begins on the date the
employee was re-hired.

However, if an employee returns to work upon an order of reinstatement, he or she is not considered a
new hire. Because reinstatement presupposes the illegality of the dismissal, the employee is deemed to
have remained under the employ of the employer from the date of illegal dismissal to actual
reinstatement. Further, there is no "prior employment" to speak of, and the payment of back wages is
compensation for the time the employee was illegally depriveµ of work. In the latter case, the reckoning
point of the length of service must be the date the employee first began working for the employer, not
when he or she returned for work.
  Illegal Dismissal

SPC POWER CORPORATION, JOCELYN O. CAPULE, and ALFREDO S. BALLESTEROS, Petitioners, vs.
GERARDO A. SANTOS, Respondent.

GR No. 202379

July 27, 2020

DOCTRINE:

In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just or authorized cause. A lawful dismissal must meet both the substantive and procedural
requirements, that is, it must be for just or authorized cause and must comply with the rudimentary due
process of notice and hearing.

FACTS:

Gerardo Santos was hired by SPC Power Corporation (SPC) in 1997 as a stock keeper. In 2002, the
petitioners offered him thrice the position of security officer, which he eventually accepted the position.
SPC regularized Santos in 2005 as a security officer, despite not informing the latter of his job description
to guide him in his duties. With this, his tasks were unrelated to his job as a security officer, like being a
personal aide of Raul Estrelloso.

From 2005 to 2007, SPC ordered the respondent and other officers to undermine employees from
forming a union, however, they failed to prevent the union certification. After the union was formed, his
immediate supervisor (Estrelloso) was forced to take a leave of absence, and later on was terminated.
Alfredo S. Ballesteros (Ballesteros), the Senior VP for Finance and Administrator of SPC, issued to
respondent a show cause letter, and eventually placed the respondent under preventive suspension
from January 16, 2008 which lasted until May 31, 2008 wherein he received a Notice of Dismissal dating
May 30, 2008 on the grounds of (a) gross and habitual neglect of duty, (b) serious misconduct, (c) willful
disobedience, and (d) violation of the company’s Uniform Code of Conduct.
Upon receiving the notice of termination, the respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the petitioners. The petitioners argued that (1) the respondent was validly dismissed due to several
infractions he caused, (2) due to the gravity of the charges against him, he was placed under preventive
suspension, and (3) after being found guilty, the respondent was terminated from services.

The LA ruled in favor of the respondent, finding that the respondent was not afforded the procedural
due process, and likewise ruled that the petitiones miserably failed to prove the substance aspect of
termination. The petitioners appealed to the NLRC, in which the latter reversed the decision of the LA.
They found that the respondent failed to perform his duty in accordance with the standards expected of
him as a security officer, several incidents of which were caused due to the incompetence of the
respondent.

The respondent appealed before the CA which reversed the ruling of the NLRC. The CA found that the
substantive aspect of due process was not observed as it found that the respondent was not negligent in
his duties as security officer. The alleged crimes committed inside the company premises cannot be
attributed to the fault of the respondent as there was no single piece of evidence proving that he
committed the lapses.

The petitioners then filed the instant petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent’s dismissal is legal.

RULING:

The petition is without merit.

Article 294 of the Labor Code protects the employee’s security of tenure by mandating that in cases of
regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just or
authorized cause. A lawful dismissal must meet both the substantive and procedural requirements, that
is, it must be for just or authorized cause and must comply with the rudimentary due process of notice
and hearing.
The Court finds that the petitioners failed to afford the respondent of the substance aspect of due
process in terminating his services. All of the grounds of his illegal dismissal were premised on his
alleged failure to prevent, investigate, and resolve the issues on the stolen equipment inside the
company premises which rooted from the admission of the respondent that he was not aware of the
duties and responsibilities of a security officer as he was not oriented, guided, and even given the job
description of his position.

The Court ruled that if he really was incompetent, the respondent should not have been regularized. If
he really committed infractions from 2006 to 2007, the petitioners should have investigated
immediately the violations. The Court also found it suspicious that the petitioners only acted upon the
violations in 2008, despite the charges happening between 2005 to 2007. There was no explanation
given from the petitioners why a period of two years lasted without investigation regarding these
violations.

The petitioners cannot deny the union busting efforts as it is supported by evidence. There was a letter
from the SVP Ballesteros containing the detailed strategies they should employ to sway the employees
vote for “NO” in the certification election. The document reveals the different activities done by the
petitioners to counter the moves of the union.

In view of these findings, the Court is convinced that the respondent, a regular employee entitled to
security of tenure, was illegally dismissed due to the failure of the petitioners to comply with the
substantive aspect of due process.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 220935/G.R. No. 219868. July 28, 2020

ARIEL ESPINA, ANALY DOLOJAN, DARIA DONOR, ROEL DONOT, ET AL., Petitioners,

vs.

HIGHLANDS CAMP/RAWLINGS FOUNDATION, INC. AND JAYVELYN PASCAL, Respondents.

TOPIC: Illegal Dismissal

DOCTRINE:

Regular employees cannot be terminated from employment without any just and/or authorized cause.
The petitioners are entitled to the rights and benefits due to illegally dismissed employees under Article
294 of the Labor Code.

FACTS:

On March 24, 2011, two (2) groups of employees filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, and 13th month pay, with claims for moral and exemplary
damages against respondents Highlands Camp/Rawlings Foundation, Inc. and Jayvelyn Pascal.

Petitioners essentially averred that in 2000, Highlands hired them as cooks, cook helpers, utility workers,
and service crew in its camping site in Iba, Zambales. For ten (10) years, they regularly reported for work
from January to June. They were on call from July to September. They were required in October to
report daily as it was the peak season for campers. In November or December, they were also on call.
But Highlands' business was open to the public the whole year round. Every year, employees are
required to submit their biodata, medical clearances, health card, and Social Security number. In 2011,
after submitting the requirements for rehiring, Highlands informed them they will be called once the
campers arrive. But Highlands never did as they employed new employees.

The petitioners alleged that their annual rehiring since 2001 and the services they rendered, which were
necessary and desirable to Highlands' business, conferred them the status of regular employees. Thus,
Highlands' failure to rehire them in 2011 without valid cause constituted illegal dismissal.
On the other hand, the respondent contended that Highlands' camp operations were not a whole year-
round business. Petitioners were seasonal employees whose work was only for a specific season.
Moreover, Petitioners cannot be considered regular seasonal employees because their employment was
terminated after every seasonal year. To be reemployed, they had to apply anew. The petitioners also
contended that their services as cooks, cook helpers, etc., were not necessary and desirable, and were
not directly related to its main purpose of evangelization as it can continue to operate even without it

The Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioners were regular employees, not mere seasonal workers, as
Highlands did not totally stop its operations during off-season. The petitioners were still on-call during
off-season and were not separated from the service. Upon appeal to the NLRC, it affirmed the LA’s
decisions as Highlands failed to present petitioners’ employment contracts which raised a serious
question whether they were properly informed of their employment status.

The respondents appealed to the CA wherein it reversed both the decisions of LA and NLRC. It ruled that
the petitioners were seasonal employees whose tenure of work was for a specific season only as the
employees only worked for an average of less than three (3) months in a given year. The petitioners now
seek this Court’s discretion.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioners are seasonal or regular employees.

WON their dismissal was valid.

RULING:

The Court finds merit in the petition.

On this issue of the employment status of the petitioners

The Court finds that the petitioners are regular employees of Highlands. Records show that Highlands’
business is not seasonal. Highlands may have high or low market encounters within a year, or by its own
terms, "peak and lean seasons", but its camping site does not close at any given time or season. The
Court emphasized that an employer's continuous operation throughout the year negates the claim that
its business is seasonal in nature.
Moreover, the petitioners did not perform work or services that are seasonal in nature, nor for just a
specific period. They served as cooks, cook helpers, utility workers, and service crew in Highlands'
camping site regardless if it was the peak or lean season for campers. In addition, records are bereft of
any evidence showing that petitioners freely entered into an agreement with Highlands to perform
services for a specific period or season only. Highlands failed to present petitioners' employment
contracts, employee files, payrolls, and other similar documents to prove they hired petitioners as
seasonal employees and they rendered services for a specific season only.

The fact that Highlands required petitioners to apply for reemployment every year does not bar them
from being regularized. Their repeated hiring for the same services for the past ten (10) years confers
upon them the status of regular employment. It is undisputed that respondents repeatedly hiring is
testament to their necessity and desirability in its business.

On the issue of illegal dismissal

As regular employees, petitioners cannot be terminated from employment without any just and/or
authorized cause. The petitioners are entitled to the rights and benefits due to illegally dismissed
employees under Article 294 of the Labor Code. We, therefore, uphold the labor tribunals' award of full
backwages to petitioners. We likewise affirm the award of 13th month pay due to them for respondents'
failure to show that the same had been paid.

ACCORDINGLY, the PETITIONS are GRANTED.

 Where the employee alleges that he involuntarily resigned due to
circumstances in his employment that are tantamount to constructive dismissal, the
employee must prove his allegations with particularity.

G.R. No. 221411 September 28, 2020

ITALKARAT 18, INC. vs GERASMIO

FACTS: During 2008, the Company had repeatedly informed its employees of its proposed retrenchment
program as it was suffering from serious business losses. In particular, Gerasmio, who was designated as
the Maintenance Head and Tool and Die Maker, claimed that Noel San Pedro (San Pedro), the then
Officer-In-Charge (OIC)/Manager of the Company, informed him that the Company was planning to
retrench a substantial number of workers in his Section; and that if he opts to retire early, he will be
given a sum of P170,000.00. San Pedro then allegedly cautioned Gerasmio that if he will not accept the
offer to retire early, the Company would eventually retrench or terminate him. from his employment, in
which case, he
might not even receive anything. In light of the foregoing, Gerasmio accepted the offer and resigned. He
was then informed to return to get his check worth Pl 70,000.00. However, to his dismay, Gerasmio was
later informed by San Pedro that he would be receiving P26,901 34. Thus, Gerasmio, through his lawyer,
demanded the amount of P170,000.00 he was allegedly promised earlier. Since the Company did not
respond, Gerasmio filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal. On the other hand, the Company
essentially alleged that Gerasmio voluntarily resigned from his job, thus, his claims are baseless. Labor
Arbiter sustained Gerasmio’s allegations while the NLRC found that Gerasmio voluntarily resigned from
his job.

ISSUE: WON Gerasmio was illegally dismissed.

HELD: No. In Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., the Court held that, “since…submitted a resignation
letter, it is incumbent upon him to prove with clear, positive, and convincing evidence that his
resignation was not voluntary but was actually a case of constructive dismissal; that it is a product of
coercion or intimidation. He has to prove his allegations with particularity.

It is therefore not enough for Gerasmio to allege that he was threathened and thereafter misled to
resign in order for the tribunals and courts to rule that he was constructively dismissed. Gerasmio must
prove with particularity the alleged acts of coercion and intimidation which led him to resign. This,
Gerasmio failed to do. Furthermore, the Court observe that the evidence on record show that Gerasmio
had already intended to resign in 2008, even earlier than October. The evidence presented by the
Company would show that Gerasmio in fact requested for multiple leaves on various occassions, usually
for processing of
his papers for work abroad. Gerasmio's allegation that the Company was already considering
retrenching its employees during the last quarter of 2008 or earlier, which Gerasmio would want to
impress upon this Court to be the catalyst that prompted San Pedro to make the alleged offer of
resignation to Gerasmio, would not have made any difference in view of the fact that Gerasmio was
already in the process of applying for a job overseas or at the very least, intending to go abroad.
11
JANUARY 2020
G.R. No. 236020, January 08, 2020
PAPERTECH, INC ., v. PETITIONER, JOSEPHINE P. KATANDO, RESPONDENT.

TOPIC: JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSES

DOCTRINE: the following are considerations in applying the doctrine of strained
relations: (1) the employee must occupy a position where he or she enjoys the trust and
confidence of his or her employer; (2) it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of
antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and
productivity of the employee concerned; (3) it cannot be applied indiscriminately
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a result of
litigation; and (4) it cannot arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right.
FACTS: Papertech to filed a Complaint for Illegal Strike against Katando and the other
participants in the picket on May 24, 2008. The NLRC ordered the reinstatement of
Katando and her fellow employees. Katando received a memorandum from Papertech
stating that due to urgency of business, she will be transferred to its Makati office. The
memorandum states that she will still be under the same employment terms and
conditions but will be tasked to clean the area. Three days later, Katando received
another memorandum asking her to explain why she should not be subjected to
disciplinary action for failing to sign the December 14, 2013 memorandum, for her
refusal to transfer to the Makati office, and for shouting at Papertech's representative.
Katando served her suspension. However, she was suspended yet again for one week
for her disobedience or refusal to transfer as directed. Katando then filed a complaint for
illegal suspension before the NLRC.
Papertech issued a memorandum dated February 6, 2014 to Katando reiterating her
transfer to its Makati office.25 Thereafter, Papertech issued a notice to Katando re4uiring
her to explain within 48 hours why she refused to receive the February 6, 2014
memorandum. Katando submitted her explanation.
 
Papertech issued another notice to Katando on February 17, 2014 directing her to
explain why she should not be administratively charged for refusing to transfer to its
Makati office. Despite submitting her explanation, Papertech issued a notice on
February 24, 2014 dismissing Katando for her insubordination. Katando filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees
against Papertech 27 and its Chairman of the Board of Directors, Alexander Wong, and
Human Resource Manager Joan M. Balde.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ordering the reinstatement of Katando instead of
granting her separation pay
RULING: Yes. We clarified that the doctrine of strained relatons cannot apply when the
employee has not indicated an aversion to returning to work, or does not occupy a
position of trust and confidence in, or has no say in the operation of, the employer's
business.52 In addition, strained relations between the parties must be proven as a fact.

Although Katando does not occupy a position of trust and confidence as a machine
operator, the circumstances of this case nonetheless calls for the application of the
doctrine of strained relations. It is true that litigation between the parties per se should
not bar the reinstatement of an employee. However, as observed by the NLRC, this is
not the only case involving Papertech and Katando. They have been in conflict since
2008, or for 11 years now. In the case of Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v.
Digitel Employees Union, We held that the length of time from the occurrence of the
incident to its resolution and the demonstrated litigiousness of the parties showed that
their relationship is strained. Similarly, the protracted litigation between the parties here
sufficiently demonstrate that their relationship is strained. It is notable that Papertech
has not even bothered to appeal the ruling of the Labor Arbiter, and even stated that "in
order not to prolong the proceedings, and for both parties to peacefully move on from
this unwanted situation, Papertech is willing to pay the judgment award of separation
pay." Clearly, Papertech does not want Katando back as its employee.
G.R. No. 227175, January 08, 2020
NEREN VILLANUEVA, PETITIONER, v. GANCO RESORT AND RECREATION, INC.,
PETER MARASIGAN, BENJIE MARASIGAN, LUZ MARASIGAN, BOYA
MARASIGAN, AND SERGE BERNABE, RESPONDENTS.

TOPIC: DISMISSAL; JUST AND AUTHORIZED CAUSES

DOCTRINE: In an illegal dismissal case, the onus probandi rests on the employer to
prove that the employee's dismissal was for a valid cause. 39 A valid dismissal requires
compliance with both substantive and procedural due process 40 - that is, the dismissal
must be for any of the just or authorized causes enumerated in Article 297 [282] and
Article 298 [283], respectively, of the Labor Code, and only after notice and hearing
FACTS:. petitioner was charged with violating company policies, i.e., abuse of
authority, when she rejected walk-in guests without management approval, and
threat to person in authority, when she threatened the assistant resort manager,
respondent Serge Bernabe (respondent Bernabe), with physical harm. After
serving her suspension petitioner resumed her task as a receptionist. Thereafter,
through the Notice to Transfer, they were informed of the reorganization and were
advised that they would be laterally transferred to another department effective
immediately. Petitioner was transferred from the Reception Department to Storage
Department without diminution in rank and benefits.
However, petitioner refused to sign the Notice to Transfer and remained at the reception
area for two days before reporting to her new station. GRRI's Human Resource (HR)
department issued petitioner another Memorandum directing her to report to the HR
department within 24 hours and to explain her absences without leave. Upon reporting
thereat, petitioner was handed the Termination Notice dated March 21, 2014 advising
her that the management found her guilty of "inhuman and unbearable treatment to
person in authority; abuse of authority; serious misconduct - insubordination by not
accepting her memorandum of re-assignment by the Executive Committee; and gross
and habitual neglect of duties AWOL" and had decided to terminate her from
employment effective immediately. Thus, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: whether petitioner was validly dismissed.
RULING: Yes. The records of the case show that petitioner was charged with two
infractions, i.e., (1) insubordination for her failure to sign the Notice to Transfer and (2)
habitual neglect for her absences without leave from March 22 to March 26, 2014, as
shown by the two memoranda served on her.
As stated by petitioner in her handwritten explanation, she withheld her signature on the
Notice to Transfer because she was awaiting answers to the questions she raised to the
management via e-mail. She cannot be forced to affix her signature thereon if she does
not really fully understand the reasons behind and the consequences of her
transfer. While her action is willful and intentional, it is nonetheless far from being
"wrongful and perverse." In addition, respondents failed to prove that there is indeed an
order or company procedure requiring a transferee's written conformity prior to the
implementation of the transfer, and that such order or procedure was made known to
petitioner. Thus, there is no basis to dismiss petitioner on the ground of insubordination
for her mere failure to sign the Notice to Transfer.

Anent the charge of habitual neglect for petitioner's absences without leave,
jurisprudence provides that in order to constitute a valid cause for dismissal, the neglect
of duties must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence has been defined as "the
want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence
of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort
to avoid them." On the other hand, habitual neglect "imparts repeated failure to perform
one's duties for a period of time, depending on the circumstances." A single or isolated
act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Petitioner's four-day absence without leave is not gross nor habitual
  SERIOUS MISCONDUCT

ADAMSON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND EMPLOYEES UNION, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, AND
ORESTES DELOS REYES, PETITIONERS, v. ADAMSON UNIVERSITY, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 227070, March 09, 2020

Doctrine: The use of expletives as a casual expression of surprise or exasperation is not serious
misconduct per se that warrants an employee's dismissal. However, the employee's subsequent acts
showing willful and wrongful intent may be considered in determining whether there is a just cause for
their employment termination.

Facts:

Delos Reyes was a university professor and the assistant chairperson of the Social Sciences Department
of Adamson University (Adamson). 5 He was also the president of the Adamson University Faculty and
Employees Union (the Union), a duly registered labor union and the sole and exclusive bargaining agent
of Adamson's faculty and non-academic personnel. 6

Adamson received an administrative complaint against Delos Reyes. Josephine Esplago (Josephine) had
apparently sued him on behalf of her daughter, 17-year-old Paula Mae Perlas (Paula Mae), a third year
psychology student at Adamson. Josephine claimed that Delos Reyes violated the University Code of
Conduct and Republic Act No. 7610 for abusing her child, a minor.

Petitioner also contends that "anak ng puta" per se is neither defamatory nor constitutive of gross
misconduct and unprofessional behavior. He argues that there was no proof that he had perverse or
corrupt motivations in violating the school policy. 39

Should he be found guilty, petitioner asserts that dismissal was too harsh a penalty for the alleged
infraction, especially since it would have been his first offense after 20 years of service. 40 He attests that
he was well loved by his students and that he had been professional throughout his stint, mindful of
others' feelings.41

Petitioner further contends that his dismissal constitutes unfair labor practice as it was done on account
of his union activities, which involved taking a stand against the school's K-12 policies. He claims that
respondent saw the complaint as an opportunity to get rid of him for being critical of the school's
actions. He also asserts that the dismissal was done at the time the Union was mourning the death of its
secretary.42

Issue:

First, whether or not petitioner Orestes Delos Reyes was validly dismissed from employment; and

Second, whether or not his dismissal constitutes unfair labor practice.

Ruling:

The Court found that petitioner was validly dismissed.

Misconduct is defined as improper or wrong conduct. It is the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error of judgment. The misconduct to be serious within the meaning of the act must
be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Such misconduct,
however serious, must nevertheless be in connection with the work of the employee to constitute just
cause from his separation.

Misconduct is not considered serious or grave when it is not performed with wrongful intent. If the
misconduct is only simple, not grave, the employee cannot be validly dismissed. 76

A teacher exclaiming "anak ng puta" after having encountered a student is an unquestionable act of

misconduct. However, whether it is serious misconduct that warrants the teacher's dismissal will
depend on the context of the phrase's use. "Anak ng puta" is similar to "putang ina" in that it is an
expletive sometimes used as a casual expression of displeasure, rather than a personal attack or insult.

In determining whether an act of unfair labor practice was committed, the totality of the circumstances
must be considered.89 In Great Pacific Life Employees Union v. Great Pacific Life Assurance
Corporation,90 this Court discussed that if the unfair treatment does not relate to or affect the workers'
right to self-organize, it cannot be deemed unfair labor practice. A dismissal of a union officer is not
necessarily discriminatory, especially when that officer committed an act of misconduct.
TOPIC: CONSTRUCTIVE DISMISSAL

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

Elesio Mejares v. Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc.

G.R. Nos. 242364 & 242459 June 17, 2020

Abandonment is defined as the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is
a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding
of abandonment, two factors should be present: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. The second is the more
determinative factor and becomes manifest through overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees
have no more intention to work; the intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified. The burden falls upon the employer to offer substantial evidence and to establish
that its employee deliberately and unjustifiably refused to resume his employment without any intention of
returning.

FACTS:

Mejares applied as a taxi driver with Hyatt in November 2007. At the end of every shift, Hyatt's taxi drivers would
remit their boundaries including a daily cash bond of P30.00 collected purportedly to cover deficiencies in
boundaries and costs of repairs. Hyatt also started deducting P70.00 per shift day without any written authorization
from their taxi drivers to cover the cost of the drivers' two-way radio system, P50.00 to allegedly defray for the cost
of the Denzo air-conditioning units, Pl 50.00 for the conversion of the taxis from gas to LPG. Additional P100.00 to
cover the cost of recalibrating the taxi's meters, P50.00 for the installation of antenna repeaters.

Mejares' ordeal began on March 7, 2016, when he was late to park his car at Hyatt’s garage, he apologized to
Mercader for being late, paid his daily boundary, and went home. The following day, Mercader told him he was
suspended effective that day. Mejares still returned to the garage several times until March 11, 2016 in the off-
chance that he would get to drive his unit again. On April 25, 2016, Mejares filed the complaint below for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of benefits, reimbursement of illegal deductions, and damages against Hyatt.

ISSUE AND RULING:

Was Mejares constructively dismissed?

YES. Constructive dismissal is a cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible,
unreasonable or unlikely, when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay or both; or when a clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. The test of
constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give
up his position under the circumstances.

Here, as found by both the labor arbiter and the Court of Appeals, the events which transpired between Mejares and
Mercader from March 7 to 11, 2016 rendered Mejares' continued employment with Hyatt not only unbearable but
impossible, hence, amounted to constructive dismissal. Evidently, Mejares was willing and was even begging for
work. He showed up at Hyatt's garage every single day from March 7 to 11, 2016, only to be ignored by Mercader.
When asked when Mejares can drive his taxi unit again, Mercader did not answer. Truly, Mercader's hostile
treatment against Mejares forced the latter to forego his employment with Hyatt. Under these circumstances,
therefore, Mejares was undoubtedly constructively dismissed from service.

Are Mejares money claims subject to the three (3)-year prescriptive period?

YES. The fees imposed are illegal deductions.

Article 306 of the Labor Code provides:

Article 306. Money claims. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise they
shall be forever barred.

Arriola v. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. et. al. explicitly declared that Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay,
holiday pay,service incentive leave pay, bonuses, salary differentials, and illegal deductions by an employer. Thus,
Mejares may only claim those amounts which were deducted from them within three (3) years from the time the
complaint below was filed; all other claims for prior deductions have already prescribed.

TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT VS. SEPARATION

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

NIPPON EXPRESS PHILIPPINES CORPORATION v. MARIE JEAN DAGUISO,

G.R. No. 217970, June 17, 2020

The doctrine of strained relations should not be applied indiscriminately to cause the non-reinstatement of a
supervisory employee who is dismissed without just cause and without due process by the employer due to an
altercation caused by its senior officer who bypassed the dismissed employee. An employee's occupation is
his/her means of livelihood, which is a precious economic right; hence, it should not just be taken away from the
employee by applying the exception of "strained relations" that is not justified. The State guarantees security of
tenure to workers; thus, all efforts must be exerted to protect a worker from unjust deprivation of his/her job.

FACTS:

An altercation between Daguiso and Aguirre transpired due to the fact that De Vera bypassed Human Resource
Supervisor Daguiso when she directly ordered Human Resource Specialist Aguirre (who is the immediate
subordinate of Daguiso) to send an electronic mail to all Department Heads informing them that "all attendance
monitoring and other DTR concern shall be directed to Ms. Honeylet Suaiso x x x effective June 01, 2012. On the
same day, Daguiso was simply called to an informal meeting where she was told, point blank, of her dismissal. She
was stripped of her pass codes and company properties and unceremoniously led out of the premises. She was not
furnished a copy of the charges made against her nor was she given an opportunity to explain. Hence, on June 4,
2012, Daguiso filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against NEPC and its officers. The labor tribunals did not
reinstate Daguiso but ordered payment of her separation pay, as the NLRC applied the doctrine of strained relations
between the parties. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC and ordered the reinstatement of Daguiso.

ISSUE AND RULING:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the reinstatement of respondent Daguiso

No. The Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that Daguiso should be reinstated.

The Labor Code assures the security of tenure of workers, particularly the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed
employee. Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement
as a matter of right. Over the years, however, the case law developed that where reinstatement is not feasible,
expedient or practical, as where reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the
parties, or where the relationship between the employer and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their
irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in
the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement. The doctrine of
strained relations, however, should not be used recklessly, applied loosely and/or  indiscriminately, or  be based on
impression alone; otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably
engendered between the parties as a result of litigation.

As reinstatement is the rule, for the exception of strained relations to apply, it should be proved that the employee
concerned occupies a position where he/she enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that
if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism would be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency
and productivity of the employee concerned. Strained relations must be of such nature or degree as to preclude
reinstatement. Moreover, strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact, adequately supported by evidence on
record. Since the application of this doctrine will result in the deprivation of employment despite the absence of just
cause, the implementation of the doctrine of strained relations must be supplemented by the rule that the existence of
strained relations is for the employer to clearly establish and prove in the manner it is called upon to prove the
existence of a just cause.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, BURDEN OF PROOF

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

INTER CONTINENTAL BROADCASTING CORPORATION, v. ANGELINO B. GUERRERO

G.R. No. 229013 July 15, 2020

To be a valid ground for dismissal, neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual. Gross negligence implies
want of or failure to exercise slight. care or diligence in the performance of one's duties. It evinces a thoughtless
disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. Habitual neglect, on the other hand, implies
repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time.

To constitute a valid cause for dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code, the employee's misconduct must be
serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Further, it is required
that the act or conduct must have been performed with wrongful intent.

FACTS: Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation hired respondent Angelino B. Guerrero as Technician in its
Technical Operation Center (TOC). In 2009, IBC 13 's switcher equipment for logos superimposition developed
technical problems. To remedy the situation, the management transferred this task to the TOC. It became an
additional, nay, temporary task of the TOC personnel on top of their primary tasks. TOC Supervisor Arthur Guda
and the Engineering Department agreed that should there be a conflict between the regular functions of the TOC
personnel and their additional task, their regular TOC functions shall prevail.

Respondent committed infractions when he made mistakes in superimposing logos and reported late for work on
November 12, 2012. Petitioner then terminated respondent’s employment. Respondent thus sued for illegal
dismissal, unpaid wages, damages, and attorney's fees. He argued that petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that
he was grossly negligent or that he committed gross misconduct in the performance of his duties. Too, his
termination due to his alleged lapses was unwarranted, if not too harsh a penalty considering his dedicated service
for twenty-seven (27) years.

ISSUE AND RULING:

WON Guerrero have been illegally dismissed from employment?

Yes. In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just and
valid cause. Failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. For this purpose, the employer
must present substantial evidence to prove the legality of the employee's dismissal. Substantial evidence is defined
as "such amount of relevantevidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."
Here, we concur in the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioner failed to establish by substantial evidence that
respondent committed gross negligence or serious misconduct in the performance of his duties.

In fact, none of the so-called lapses pertain to his primary tasks as TOC Technician. Respondent was not shown to
have willfully or wrongfully intended to cause harm to his employer when he made mistakes in superimposing logos
during commercial breaks. Respondent cannot be guilty of gross negligence or gross misconduct just because he
reported late for work on November 11, 2012, not due to his fault but due to petitioner's failure to give him notice of
the change in his work shift schedule.While we recognize that respondent committed infractions as an employee
when he made mistakes in superimposing logos and reported late for work on November 12, 2012, the ultimate
penalty of dismissal from service is too harsh a penalty considering that these infractions do not constitute gross
negligence or serious misconduct. Too, we have to consider that respondent has been employed with petitioner for
twenty-seven (27) long years, without any record of previous infraction or misbehavior. Thus, we agree with the
Court of Appeals that a suspension of six ( 6) months would suffice.
TOPIC: TWIN NOTICE RULE

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

J' MARKETING CORPORATION v. FERNANDO S. IGUIZ

G.R. No. 211522, September 04, 2019

The law and the rules provide that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before
dismissal from employment: (1) notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which the
dismissal is sought, and (2) subsequent notice to inform him of the employer's decision to dismiss him. In
addition to the notices, the employer must set a hearing or conference to give the employee an opportunity to
present evidence and rebut the charges against him. The requirement of two notices and a hearing is mandatory;
otherwise the order of dismissal is void.

FACTS:

JMC sent Iguiz the first notice - a memorandum dated 8 February 2007 asking Iguiz to explain why he should not be
reprimanded for loss of trust and confidence for receiving payments of P15,300 and $29 without issuing official
receipts. Iguiz received this notice on 9 February 2007. On 12 February 2007, before Iguiz could file an explanation
for the memorandum dated 8 February 2007, Iguiz received another memorandum dated 9 February 2007 from
Estrellan asking him to sign the administrative investigation report within 12 hours; otherwise it would mean that
Iguiz is waiving his right to be heard and JMC would be constrained to evaluate his case based on the evidence on
hand. JMC then sent Iguiz another notice - a memorandum dated 7 March 2007 terminating his employment. Iguiz
received the termination notice on 12 March 2007. Aggrieved, Iguiz filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
money claims.

ISSUE AND RULING:

WON Iguiz was illegally dismissed from his employment and is entitled to backwages, separation pay, damages
and attorney's fees.

YES. At first glance, it seems that JMC complied with the two-notice requirement. However, the succession of
events would show that JMC actually railroaded the termination of Iguiz from the start.

First, JMC, through Estrellan, issued the first written notice - the memorandum dated 8 February 2007 stating "you
are instructed by the undersigned to explain within 24 hours why you should not be reprimanded for loss of trust and
confidence." The notice clearly says reprimand and not termination from employment. Also, the 24 hour notice does
not give Iguiz ample time to study the accusation against him, consult a union official or lawyer, gather data, and
decide on what defenses to raise.
Second, even before Iguiz could file an explanation to the first notice, Iguiz received another memorandum dated 9
February 2007. No formal investigation and hearing were conducted by JMC where he could have an opportunity to
defend himself, present evidence in support of his defense and confront the witnesses against him. The period of 12
hours given by JMC to Iguiz is again not the "reasonable opportunity" contemplated by the rules. Without any
chance for Iguiz to know the basis for the investigation and to defend himself personally, with the assistance of a
representative or counsel of his choice, the 12-hour notice is evidently deficient.

Accordingly, given the illegality of Iguiz's dismissal without just cause and the non-observance of procedural due
process, Iguiz is entitled to reinstatement and backwages. However, since reinstatement is no longer feasible, such
as in the case of a clearly strained employer-employee relationship (limited to managerial positions and contracts of
employment predicated on trust and confidence, such as in this case) or when the work or position formerly held by
the dismissed employee simply no longer exists, separation pay can substitute for reinstatement.
TOPIC: ILLEGAL DISMISSAL

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

DOMINGO P. GIMALAY v. COURT OF APPEALS, GRANITE SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, INC.

G.R. No. 240123 & G.R. No. 240125 June 17, 2020

The Court reiterated that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for just and valid cause. Failure to do so necessarily means that the dismissal was illegal. The
employer's case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the employee's
defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter.

FACTS:

Granite Services) hired petitioner Domingo P. Gimalay as mechanical technician/rigger. On January 25, 2012,
petitioner was deployed to Ghana, Africa for a two (2) month contract on a monthly salary of USD900.00. While in
Africa, petitioner was charged with three (3) violations of safety procedures, viz.: (a) He stood on top of the
compressor casing on the back of a trailer, when he should have been working from the trailer; (b) He was
responsible for unclear communication between him and the crane operator which caused a casing to swing towards
another employee; and ( c) He stood on top of a turbine with no safety harness.

Upon returning in Manila, on March 5, 2012, Service Manager Quedi called petitioner to a meeting and asked him
to explain why he should not be dismissed for gross misconduct. On March 7, 2012, a formal notice of termination
was served on petitioner. Petitioner claimed that even assuming that the alleged incidents were true, the penalty of
dismissal was not commensurate to his so-called infractions. LA and NLRC declared petitioner to have been
illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was validly dismissed on ground of gross misconduct
for flagrantly disregarding safety processes and procedures which endangered not only himself but others.

ISSUE AND RULING:

WON Gimalay was validly dismissed.

NO. As for the first infraction, no evidence other than Outage Excellence Leader Carruth's e-mail and the
termination letter was presented to show that petitioner indeed stood on top of the compressor. With regard to the
second infraction, it shows that petitioner took the necessary precautions before he gave the signal to the crane
operator. True, an accident could have occurred, but this does not necessarily mean that petitioner failed to take the
proper precautions or that the incident was due to his fault. As for the third and last incident, petitioner repeatedly
avers that there was no available line to which the safety harness could be attached; private respondents insists such
available line was in place. Verily, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the charges against
petitioner for violation of company safety procedures were substantiated by concrete and substantial evidence.

As for procedural due process, all three (3) tribunals below were unanimous in declaring that private respondents did
not comply with the twin-notice rule. Private respondents did not send a written notice to petitioner informing him
of his alleged infractions, nor was there an investigation where petitioner could have been given the chance to
explain his side. All told, the absence of both substantive and procedural due process in effecting petitioner's
dismissal renders it illegal.
TOPIC: ILLEGL DISMISSAL, ABANDONMENT

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

ANTHONEL M. MINANO vs. STO. THOMAS GENERAL HOSPITAL and DR. NEMESIA ROXAS-PLATON
GR NO. 226338 JUNE 17, 2020

Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot logically be said to have abandoned their
work. A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for
illegal dismissal. The filing thereof is proof enough of one’s desire to return to work, thus negating any
suggestion of abandonment.

FACTS:
Petitioner was a nurse at Sto. Thomas. On May 4, 2011, a regular meeting with the hospital nurses was
held but he failed to attend because he was off-duty. When he returned to work on May 7, 2011 based
on his work schedule, he found out that he was not listed in the work schedule of duty nurses and was
told that Dr. Platon did not like him anymore. On May 9, 2011, a hospital staff informed him he was
placed under suspension from May 5 to May 18, 2011. He was neither given prior notice, nor a reason of
his suspension. On May 19, 2011, after his suspension, he reported for work, however, the nursing
department told him that he was already dismissed from work. Hence, on May 30, 2011, petitioner sued
respondents for illegal dismissal.

On June 6, hospital sent him a letter requiring him to explain within 5 days why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him. On July 7, 2011 was again sent to petitioner to appear before the hospital’s
disciplinary committee on July 12, but petitioner did not show up. Thus, on July 28, 2011, the hospital
terminated petitioner’s employment on ground of abandonment.

ISSUE AND RULING:

Was petitioner illegally dismissed?

Yes. Petitioner had all the reason to believe that he had been dismissed from employment due to the
events that transpired prior to and after his illegal suspension. Respondents also failed to prove that he
was validly dismissed on ground of abandonment. Respondent’s supposed administrative investigation
is clearly an afterthought. The letters dated June 6, 2011 and July 7, 2011 were only made after
petitioner sued them for illegal dismissal. By then, respondents may have already realized that
petitioner’s termination was illegal. If indeed petitioner had not yet been terminated and respondents
still considered him an employee, they could have sent him a return to work order but they never did.
Too, petitioner’s immediate filing of the complaint is a clear indication that he had desire to continue
with his employment.
TOPIC: BREACH OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE

CASE TITLE AND DOCTRINE:

PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK v. HAZEL THEA F. GENOVE

G.R. No. 202049 June 15, 2020

Significantly, loss of confidence is, by its nature, subjective and prone to abuse by the
employer. Thus, the law requires that the breach of trust - which results in the loss of
confidence - must be willful. The breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly,thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently.

FACTS:

Spouses Basubas went to petitioner's branch to purchase a cashier's check in the amount of
Pl,358,000.00. The spouses however did not prepare a denomination breakdown. After all the
denominations inside the second bag were counted and tallied by respondent, she found that the
total amounted only to Pl,345,000.00 or a difference of P13,000.00 from the amount of the
cashier's check issued to them. Tago then instructed respondent to make an incident report
regarding the events that transpired that day. Soon after, Tago noticed a piece of paper with
money under a cabinet near the teller's cage. Tago requested respondent to pick it up, and it
turned out to be a deposit slip with P12,000.00 folded and taped together like a fan or a flattened
cone. Moments later, the janitor reports that he found one piece of Pl ,000.00 bill taped inside the
sliding door cabinet under the old and discarded bill arranger.

On August 5, 2004, petitioner sent a show-cause letter to respondent, directing the latter to
submit a written explanation on why her services should not be terminated for dishonesty and/or
qualified theft, gross negligence and violation of the bank's policies and Code of Conduct. Thus,
on November 12, 2004, petitioner issued its Memorandum notifying respondent of its decision to
terminate her employment. Aggrieved, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE AND RULING:

WON RESPONDENT’S ACTION CONSTITUTED DISHONESTY AND WILLFUL

BREACH OF TRUST.

NO. Petitioner had failed to prove that respondent’s action constituted dishonesty and willful
breach of trust resulting to loss of confidence.

To justify the employee's dismissal on the ground of willful breach of trust ( or loss of
confidence as interchangeably referred to in jurisprudence), the employer must show that the
employee indeed committed act/s constituting breach of trust, which act/s the courts must gauge
within the parameters defined by the law and jurisprudence. To reiterate, it is the breach of the
employer's trust, to the specific employee's act/s which the employer claims caused the breach,
which the law requires to be willful, knowingly and purposefully done by the employee to justify
the dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. Thus, it must be shown that the
employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct or infraction and that the nature of his/her
participation therein rendered him/her absolutely unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded
by his/her position.

The culmination of the facts from the time when the spouses Basubas left the bags of money to
respondent and leading up the discovery of the missing Pl3,000.00 in her cubicle is insufficient
to prove that respondent took and hid the money. Leaving the guesswork on how Sg. Misal and
Tago both did not see the said missing money when they searched respondent's cubicle earlier,
aside from mere suspicions or speculations, petitioner had no basis at all to support its claims.