Epicureanism

C. Ethics
The philosophy of Epicurus moves towards the ethics as to its term. In the letter to
Menoeceus, recorded by Diogenes Laertius, the ethical doctrines are preceded by a
general statement concerning the pursuit of wisdom. There follow considerations
which will aid one in the pursuit of happiness. First, Epicurus warns against accepting
the usual view of the gods which makes of these vindictive entities, angered by our
misdeeds, pleased by our virtues. Nor must we entertain any fear of death. Death is
neither good nor evil, since these can be said only of things sensed and death is the
end of sentience for us.
For life has no terrors for him who has thoroughly apprehended that there are no
terrors for him in ceasing to live. Foolish therefore is the man who says that he fears
death, not because it will pain when it comes, but because it pains in the prospect.
Whatsoever causes no annoyance when it is present, causes only a groundless pain in
the expectation. Death, therefore, the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that,
when we are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. (X,125)
The wise man neither deprecates life nor fears death. Those who say that it were best
for a man not be born are wrong as well as inconsistent; if they believed themselves,
they should quit talking and commit suicide.
We must also reflect that of desires some are natural, others are groundless; and that
of the natural some are necessary as well as natural, and some natural only. And of the
necessary desires some are necessary if we are to be happy, some if the body is to be
rid of uneasiness, some if we are even to live. (X,127)
For the end of all our actions is to be free from pain and fear, and, when once we have
attained all this, the tempest of the soul is laid; seeing that the living creature has no
need to go in search of something that is lacking, nor to look for anything else by
which the good of the soul and of the body will be fulfilled. (X,128)
Pleasure is the beginning and the fulfillment of a happy life. Epicurus takes a genetic
view of human life. The standard of choice and aversion of the child, of man, that is,
in a natural state, is clear and obvious. In this sense feeling is a criterion of choice, not
that every pleasure is pursued and every pain avoided; rather, there is a calculus, an
art of perspective, whereby some pains are sustained in view of a future pleasure
which outweighs them; some pleasures are ignored because they would lead to a pain
incommensurate with the pleasure. "it is, however, by measuring one against another,
and by looking at the conveniences and inconveniences, that all these matters must be
judged." (X, 130) The mark of this hedonism is not a surplus of bodily goods and
pleasures, but contentment with a minimum. Indeed, the Epicurean ideal is
indifference to external goods, an effort whereby one habituates himself to simple
fare, to the necessities of life. Despite the connotation "epicure" has taken on, sensual
pleasure is discounted. "When we say, then, that pleasure is the end and aim, we do
not mean the pleasures of the prodigal or the pleasures of sensuality, as we are
understood to do by some through ignorance, prejudice, or wilful misrepresentation."
(X, 131)
As the canonic indicates, Epicurus wants to make nature the guide; he seeks the
fundamental indication of nature and, in ethics, the drive of our own nature towards
certain goals. Having rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian views according to which
the soul is capable of existence apart from the body, Epicurus must secure his ethical
doctrine within the confines of birth and death. There has been no previous state, there
will be no state subsequent to that in which we now find ourselves. The great good
then is life. When he wants to indicate what the good, what pleasure is, Epicurus
speaks of narrowly escaping death. The pleasure we then feel indicates that the radical
good is to be alive. Pleasure is the fulfilment of life, but life itself is the fundamental
good. Paradoxically, this placing of ultimate value in life is coupled with an
exhortation to indifference towards death. Tranquility of mind is impossible when one
fears death; death is quite simply the end, should not be feared; to know this is to be
on the way towards peace of mind. How can nature be a guide if everything is atoms
and void? In accepting the Democratean physics, Epicurus has adopted a world which
is not the product of intelligence as is the world of Anaxagoras or Aristotle; it is the
result of a chance collision of atoms. And yet, Epicurus introduces a doctrine of a
"swerve" in the perpetual movement of the atoms, which is supposed to allow for
spontaneity, freedom and consequently responsibility. Contrary to what we might
think his atomism would suggest, Epicurus says the wise man will not be fatalistic.
Destiny, which some introduce as sovereign over all things, he laughs to scorn,
affirming rather that some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others
through his own agency. For he sees that necessity destroys responsibility and that
chance or fortune is inconstant; whereas our own actions are free, and it is to them
that praise and blame naturally attach. (X,133)
Better to accept the myths about the gods than the philosophical doctrine that all is
determined.
The passage quoted earlier about the differences between desires contains a doctrine
which led Epicurus to conclude that nature has set a limit to pleasures. If we have a
natural desire for food, this does not mean that nature prompts us to eat always or in
any amount. The distinction of desires is not to be taken as implying that some
pleasures are better than others. Epicurus recognizes a gradation among the atoms, a
difference of body and soul, but he will not allow that pleasure, any pleasure, is other
than good. Pursuit and avoidance are decided on the basis of consequences, but each
pleasure is a good in itself, each pain an evil in itself. The emphasis on mental
pleasure, the joy of contemplation, by Plato and Aristotle is not unconnected with
their conviction of the destiny of the soul after this life; Epicurus tends to reduce
pleasures to a kind of sameness, although, according to Diogenes Laertius, he differs
from the Cyrenaics by holding that mental pain is worse than bodily. Nevertheless, the
keynote of the Epicurean ethics is to be found in ataraxy, the mental state of
tranquility which differs from kinetic pleasures in being a state of repose and rest.
Perhaps it is this state of mind that is envisaged when Epicurus denies that virtue is its
own reward, that it can somehow be justified apart from the pleasure it brings.
Pleasure is the end or fulfilment of life, not virtue seen as possibly opposed to
pleasure.
The role played by friendship in the Epicurean ethics deserves emphasis. The
foregoing should have indicated that the ideal that Epicurus sets for man is, in effect,
to make the best of a bad situation. The goal is to acquire a trouble-free state of mind,
to avoid the pains of the body and mental anguish. The Epicurean wants to be let
alone by society and by chance, good as well as bad. If a fortune should come his
way, he ought to distribute it and win friends, thereby securing the double advantage
of ridding himself from a possible source of anguish and gaining esteem and gratitude.
The political order is to be avoided, since it brings little but trouble. Is this a repetition
of the Platonic and Aristotelian view that the philosopher is superior to the politician?
Epicurus rejects the paideia which for Plato and Aristotle would lead into the life of
wisdom. If Epicurus has a Canon and a Physics, these are rigorously subjected to the
pursuit of happiness. He goes so far as to say that if men had no fear of the gods and
of celestial phenomena, there would be no need of physics. That science, then, has as
its sole function to remove impediments to happiness. To conceive of mathematics
and physics as goods in themselves is wrong; they are of no use in helping us live
well. If the Epicurean is not interested in the honor and renown the political life can
bring, he is no more interested in the praise knowledge can elicit: his only reason for
doing philosophy is to attain peace of soul. It is because Epicurus did not feel that the
spirit could be healed in solitude that friendship is important for him, that the society
in his garden was indeed a gathering of friends. They were of mutual help to one
another in understanding the teaching of the master and the discrimination present in
other schools was largely absent there; women were allowed, even courtesans, and the
love they bore one another is said to have remained the most attractive thing about the
Epicurean way of life during the centuries it flourished. However, while friendship as
well as pleasure was said to be desirable for its own sake, it is difficult not to see a
selfish motivation in this mutual love. The friend, finally, would seem to be one who
is eminently useful for attaining one's tranquility of spirit; if the friend used you in the
same way and the advantage was mutual, this does not necessarily seem to broaden
the motivation for friendship.
A final word on Epicurus' attitude towards religion. We have seen that Epicurus was
intent on freeing men from fear of the gods. Nevertheless, he held that there were
gods -- they were material beings living in the rare spaces between the numberless
worlds, blessed beings whose happiness was in no way affected by the deeds of men.
Since it is a false notion of the gods which leads to unhappiness, a true notion of what
they are should be conducive to happiness. Epicurus feels that we have natural
knowledge that the gods exist and that if we would stick to that, make it the criterion
of statements we make about them, we must inevitably arrive at views contrary to the
common ones. The gods are immortal and happy; to think of them as concerned with
man or assigned the task of keeping the heavenly spheres moving is to attribute to
them something inconsonant with the freedom from worry and care which is
happiness. Nor are the gods in any need of our praise or sacrifice. Nevertheless, and
this is an important fact, it is natural for us to honor them. This explains the way in
which Epicurus himself was so devout, observing pious practises, inaugurating in his
school religious feasts. Epicurus' vigorous rejection of the ordinary fears of the gods
did not lead to atheism or impiety. Once more, however, there is the paradox. Since
the gods do not need our praise, the justification for praising them becomes the
happiness this affords us.
It is difficult to take a view of Epicureanism which does not grant a good deal to the
traditional criticism of this school of philosophy. The goal is a practical one, and a
severely limited one, the achievement of freedom from pain and worry. In this
achievement, in ataraxy, happiness consists. Perhaps the best way to judge it is on its
own assumptions, namely that birth is the beginning and death the end. On that basis,
what would be the best human ideal? Doubtless happiness here and now, but this is
not to be sought in sensual orgies nor in abstract science for its own sake. Epicurus
wants to make nature the guide and he finds indications to the effect that good and bad
are synonymous with pleasure and pain. But if pleasure is the fulfilment of life, there
are natural bounds set to pleasure and he is issuing no call for a riotous existence.
Quite the contrary. It seems to be a matter of hedging one's bets, sticking to the
possible, being content with a minimum that will not be the cause of envy or care.
This materialistic ethic does little to stretch the aspirations of men, but its concern for
the individual at a period of history that saw the Greek political order disappearing
and giving way to empires of a scale such that the old ideal of the political life became
meaningless, would seem to account for its steady appeal over a period of seven
centuries.
The Stoics
C. Ethics
Before turning to the Stoic doctrines on human conduct, its goal and the means to
achieve the goal, we must take notice of their teaching on the nature of man. The
world soul was spoken of on an analogy with the human soul and the latter as well as
the former is considered to be material by the Stoics. The materiality of the soul is
proved by remarking that it is affected by bodies, and that it is three-dimensional,
extending through the obviously dimensional body. The soul is spoken of as fire or as
breath diffused throughout the body so as to form with it one thing. The Stoics speak
of seven parts of the soul, the five senses, the power of reproduction and the power of
speech. Speech and reasoning are almost equated and the reasoning part of the soul is
the ruling part with the others reduced to it as to their origin. Personal identity is
located in the ruling part of the soul. This is not to say that the Stoics taught personal
immortality. Finally all souls will be consumed in the fiery destruction of the cosmos,
though some Stoics thought some souls would continue after death until this
conflagration. In other words, the human soul is a part of a determined universe, a
view which would seem to preclude any ethical theory. Nevertheless, the Stoics had a
moral philosphy and, indeed, it was to be the most influential part of their doctrine.
How can there be freedom and responsibility in a world from whose determined
course the soul is not excepted? Doubtless, we must recall the manner in which the
Stoic could retain the notion of chance by an appeal to ignorance. More important is
the Stoic view that the individual must see resignation to the law of the universe as the
great goal and this resignation is seen as one to a higher reason than man's. This ideal
is expressed in Cleanthes' hymn to Zeus and it is one to which we must return as to
the culmination of any presentation of the Stoic ethics.
Harmony with nature. The goal of conduct is happiness and this is achieved in rational
activity or virtue. Every creature has a natural impulse to act in accordance with its
nature, and happiness will be sought in that which is conformable to nature. This
remark has a meaningful ambiguity in Stoic doctrine, since "nature" may be taken to
refer to man's nature or to the cosmos; both are intended. Every creature must willy-
nilly be in accord with the law of the cosmos; a rational creature has a natural impulse
to become conscious of this law and to live in recognition of it. Virtue will consist in
action in conformity with the recognized course of the world. Only virtue is a good for
the Stoics; only vice is evil. They will not allow that riches and honor or pleasure are
goods, though of a lesser order, than the good of reason. Best not to call them goods at
all, but rather indifferent to the distinction of good and evil. Stoic happiness becomes,
accordingly, a rather austere affair; it can consist only in the good of reason, the
rational good and nothing else can increase or diminish happiness. The only pleasure
that can be considered a good is that which is the concomitant of righteousness, the
inner peace of the virtuous man. This ought not to be made into the object of action,
however; some Stoics toyed with the idea that every pleasure was contrary to nature.
If pleasure cannot be constitutive of happiness, pain cannot be destructive of it. The
Stoic ideal is to rise above the gifts and blows of fortune and to place happiness where
it is unassailable, the rectification of reason, bringing it into conscious conformity
with the course of the world. The conformity was a conformity with law, with the law
of nature and consequently the divine law; human law is at best an attempt to give
expression to this law. Obedience to human law thus gains a foundation in the divine
and the guidance of law is an expression of our natural call to a life of morality and
virtue.
We have remarked that the Stoic ideal of virtue is an austere one. It seems to give
little heed to the emotions and passions. The Stoics, however, were not silent on these
matters. Emotions and passions are movements contrary to nature; they result from
the rational part of the soul, indeed, but from its abuse, for they follow from
precipitous judgments. Emotion, then, is not looked upon as something which may
sway judgment wrongly, but as a consequent of wrong judgment. This puts the
emotions in our power and makes virtue apathy, a state of being free from all
emotions. In short, virtue is simply a matter of knowledge, vice of ignorance, and the
Stoics had no hesitation in saying the virtue could be taught and learned. The
knowledge involved is, of course, ordered to action and cannot be taken as an end in
itself.
To complete this picture of the ethical idea, the Stoics drew a hard and fast line
between the virtuous and vicious and place the vast majority of men in the latter class.
A man was either wholly good or wholly bad, there being such a connection between
the virtues that to possess one is to possess them all and to lack one is to lack them all.
Qualifications of the Ideal. The foregoing may be seen, as Zeller would have it, as the
general doctrine of morality with subsequent modifications and qualifications as the
special theory; or, as Hicks would have it,{47} the Stoics first set up a moral ideal,
impossible of realization, and then went on to talk of action in terms of a striving for
this ideal. In either case, we find qualifications of the doctrine just sketched, a
bringing of it into line with the possible. Thus, while only the good of reason is said to
be a good, the Stoics came to recognize that other than rational impulses are also part
of our nature and thus intended. The objects of such impulses are then described as
analogous to true goods and a scale among them spoken of. This tends to diminish the
scope of objects indifferent to the dichotomy of good and evil. Now things which are
conducive to virtue or tend to distract one from its pursuit are made objects of pursuit
or avoidance and things of little relation to virtue or vice or none at all are called
indifferent. The Stoics continue to insist on the difference between what is truly good
and what is good only because it is conducive to the true good. By the same token, the
Stoics come to recognize a role for the emotions or passions. While the ideal would
seem to call for a complete eradication of emotions, the Stoics come to speak of the
affections of the wise man and, indeed, it is difficult to read the hymn of Cleanthes
without experiencing the deep-seated emotion which suffuses his statement of the
need to be subject to the will of God, to the law of nature. Moreover, while the ideal
permits of no intermediate stage between good and evil, the Stoics speak of a progress
towards the good, the acquisition of virtue, of imperfection and perfect possession of
virtue. They were led to this because of the difficulty of citing any concrete example
of the virtuous man. Would Socrates be such? No, he was only tending in the right
direction. Now this implies that Socrates, not being wholly good, was not wholly evil
either and there is, consequently, an intermediate stage, perhaps the best any of us can
make of our lives.
There is little point in emphasizing the contradictions which can be pointed up
between the theory and its qualifications. Rather let us underline what was influential
in Stoicism and gave it, in the days of the Roman empire, an undisputed primacy
among the philosophical schools inherited from the Greeks. The Stoic made it
incumbent on every man, as a law of nature, to seek after virtue, to bring himself into
conformity with the will of God which is equated with the course of the cosmos. It is
this rational consciousness of and assent to the law of fate that is the peculiar demand
of Stoicism. Its equivocal attitude towards the goods of this world does not obscure
the fact that it created a general climate in which the good of man was identified with
the rational direction of his life, a life which was not to be the plaything of the
emotions or passions, but whose affective side consists of the peace which follows on
the ordering of one's life in conformity with the law of nature. The generality of this
demand made the individual's pursuit of virtue the pursuit of the common ideal, a
matter of social consequence. Moreover, it lifted the moral ideal to a cosmopolitan
level and the Stoic looked upon himself as a citizen of the world.
A seemingly paradoxical feature of Stoicism is found in its attitude towards suicide.
We have already seen that legend has it that the founders of Stocism ended their own
lives. This is regarded, not as an escape, but as an expression of a man's triumph over
circumstances, his indifference to pleasure. To die for one's country, to avoid
being forced to do something unlawful, to avoid poverty, illness or the weakening of
the mind -- all these are cited as reasons for suicide. Now we notice that these are
things, which, from the standpoint of the Stoic ideal, would seem to be matters of
indifference. Zeller would resolve the paradox by saying that life and death are
equally indifferent to the Stoic and that in themselves they cannot constitute an act as
moral or immoral. How the acceptance of suicide conforms with the Stoic goal of
resignation to the course of events is a problem apparently incapable of solution.
We must also notice the way in which the Stoic explained the existence of evil. For
the Stoic, the world is governed by reason, and we should therefore expect that
everything happens for the best. And yet there is evil rampant in the world, both
physical and moral evil. Physical evil, pain and suffering, would present little
difficulty for the Stoic since these are not truly evils, but moral evil is something else
again. Moral evil is real evil and, by the Stoic account, there is much more of it in the
world than moral good. Why does God permit it? Is he perhaps impotent to prevent it?
The Stoic explanation was one which would have a long history. God's ways are not
our ways. If the world is governed by reason it is a reason a good deal more perfect
than ours and if evil is permitted it is for the sake of the good. Virtue is acquired by
resisting vice, and if vice did not exist, how would we know how to act? Thus, moral
evil plays a role with reference to moral good and finds its justification in this. This
enables us to return to something we posed as a problem at the outset of this
presentation of a sketch of the ethics of the Stoics. If ours is a deterministic universe
and men are but parts of the universe, how can one man be virtuous and another
vicious? There seems to be no room for responsibility and freedom if all men are fated
to act as they do. Now the Stoics quite clearly want to make a man responsible for his
actions and to retain a qualitative difference between good actions and bad. This
difference is had by speaking of a conscious direction of actions in accord with the
law of nature. As in the case of moral evil, the Stoic will have it that every element of
the whole is governed by the law of the whole, that evil may be conducive to the good
of the whole although it is not thereby the good of the individual guilty of it. There is,
then, a responsiblity to be resigned to the law of nature, freely and consciously.
Whatever we may think of this as a solution, it seems to have been considered one by
the Stoics.