LAWYER OWES CANDOR AND FAIRNESS TO THE COURTS After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals

fter November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining
COBB PEREZ V. LANTIN,24 SCRA 291 (1968) Damaso Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent
proceedings interposed alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic
Republic of the Philippines maneuvers expected to be overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution
SUPREME COURT long overdue.
Manila
EN BANC Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners, were conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the
vs. latest, in CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, coverage, in order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents. to attack the execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners. projected execution sale six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents. have passed, and the same has yet to be satisfied.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by
their counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of
CASTRO, J.: the final judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and
which would, as expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, Damaso Perez bowed out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the
specifically directed against the following observation therein made: aforementioned Court of Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez,
intruded into the controversy and asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with
petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case 39407 was decided by the
alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the respondent Judge Lantin),
execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the execution. Judge
executory. Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-
The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those 14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice. restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte
writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the
execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have
counsel.".
jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall
of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of
petitioners, while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the
decision in so far as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very
them to pay the treble costs adjudged against their clients. same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during
deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
firmer conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of
our decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning
counsels in this adventure is patent. for hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had
been duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes
 that he is waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and
recall or lift writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted regularity of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent
for resolution. Sheriff. In this regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent
action to enjoin the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a action the conjugal nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis
disclaimer of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by for the subsequent issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a
another tribunal), Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted litigation, the
comeback, prayed for the issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only
the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous, devices
writ of execution), in connection with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and
their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be
denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others, that he had no branded as having been instituted for delay.
power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez, as if The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement
expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy," must not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had
as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an already availed of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and
"Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his 55292 were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of
wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution. stocks in question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their
incessant search for devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of stumbled on the suggested remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the
October 19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was "proper remedy" in so far as they sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction
not even a party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch
wife alone), was merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed respectively, for the said courts did
dividends due to the Perez spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of execution issued by the
of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled doctrines that Courts are
Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash dividends within five days, but the without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the
promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5 However, the
denied the said motion for reconsideration. recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and 55292
did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have
negates the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she
bar has any particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil
the enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case,
antecedent events, the fact becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own
their counsels, had sallied forth on a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when
execution of a simple money judgment. It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their they instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction
own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to adopt, such that even before, one based on the same grounds proffered in the said civil case — until the latter was also
remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until the case reached this Court dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency
for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more than one member of then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be
and 55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that. condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must CHAVEZ VS. VIOLA, 196 SCRA 10 (1991)
be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. THIRD DIVISION

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and [A.C. No. 2152. April 19, 1991.]
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's
cause is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and TEODORO I. CHAVEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. ESCOLASTICO R.
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and VIOLA, Respondent.
caprices of his client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to
uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
SYLLABUS
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the
participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court
ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by 1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; NOT A RIGHT BUT A
their counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in PRIVILEGE. — It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a
construction, so that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
petitioners who were responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.
judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its
aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are 2. ID.; ID.; DUTY OF ATTORNEYS; FIRST DUTY OF LAWYERS IS NOT TO THEIR
such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the CLIENTS BUT TO THE COURTS. — It cannot be gainsaid that candidness, especially
case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of justice. Courts are
Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and
Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty to satisfy
petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice would gravely suffer if indeed it
Case No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first
Alikpala although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all officers of court
filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are
signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to
for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court.
discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of
the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532. 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in
an earlier pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved. In his
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May later pleading, he stated that the very same clients were owners of the same property.
22, 1968 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, One of these pleadings must have been false; it matters not which one. What does
Jr. shall pay jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners. matter is that respondent, who, as a member of the ancient and learned profession of the
law, had sworn to do no falsehood before the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur. upon respondent to explain how or why he committed no falsehood in pleading two (2)
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration. incompatible things; he offered no explanation, other than that he had not originated but
Fernando, J., took no part. merely continued the registration proceedings when he filed the Amended Application,
and that he really believed his clients were entitled to apply for registration of their rights.
Footnotes Respondent’s excuses ring very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the
complainant that those excuses do not exculpate the Respondent.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAWYER’S OATH AND CANON 22 OF THE CANONS OF

PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, VIOLATED BY RESPONDENT. — It is clear to the Court that registered in the name of the spouses Alvendias. Respondent alleged in the Amended
respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon 22 of the Canons of Application that the applicant Alvendias were the owners of the land, they having
Professional Ethics which stated that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer before the court and acquired the same from one Teresita Vistan by sale sometime in 1929.
with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness" (now Canon 10 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that" [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness It is petitioner’s contention that respondent, in filing the Amended Application for Original
and good faith to the courts"). He has been deplorably lacking in the candor required of Registration of Title in LRC No. 3711-M stating that his clients were the owners of the
him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his apparent zeal to secure the property applied for despite his full knowledge of the fact that his clients were mere
title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded his overriding duty to the court lessees of the land in controversy as so described in the complaint respondent had filed
and to the law itself. in Civil Case No. 3330-M, had willingly aided in and consented to the pursuit, promotion
and prosecution of a false and unlawful application for land registration, in violation of his
RESOLUTION oath of office as a member of the Bar.
PER CURIAM:
In his Answer, 10 respondent alleged that the Application for Original Registration of Title
In a letter-complaint dated 9 May 1990 1 addressed to this Court, complainant Teodoro I. was originally instituted by one Atty. Montesclaro, and when said lawyer withdrew his
Chavez prayed for the disbarment of or other appropriate penalty upon respondent appearance therein, respondent filed the Amended Application for Original Registration
Escolastico R. Viola, a member of the Philippine Bar, for gross misconduct or of Title; that he believed his clients had the right to apply for the registration of the land;
malpractice. and that assuming his clients did not in fact have any such right, the court where the
Application for Original Registration of Title was filed had not yet passed upon it; hence,
The letter-complaint stated that respondent Viola was engaged by Felicidad Alvendia, this complaint for disbarment was filed prematurely
Jesus Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia, Jr. as their counsel in connection with Civil Case
No. 3330-M 2 filed sometime in 1966 with the then Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Complainant filed a Reply to the Answer.
Bulacan against Teodoro Chavez (herein complainant), Lucia dela Cruz, Alpon dela Cruz
and Eugenio dela Cruz. In the complaint, 3 respondent alleged, on behalf of the In a Resolution dated 29 October 1980, the Court resolved to refer the case to the
Alvendias (plaintiffs therein), that Felicidad Alvendia and Jesus Alvendia were the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
holders of Foreshore Lease Applications Nos. V-1284 and 2807 covering portions of
public land situated in Barrio Baluarte, Municipality of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, and On 11 March 1981, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 12 the complaint for
that lease contracts 4 had been executed in their favor by the Secretary of Agriculture disbarment. In said Motion, he alleged — for the second time — that he was not the
and Natural Resources. Respondent prayed in the complaint that his clients (the original lawyer who filed the application in the land registration case, but a certain Atty.
Alvendias) be declared "bona fide lessees of the land in controversy . . . ." 5 In an Order Montesclaro. Respondent further alleged:
dated 2 October 1969, 6 the CFI dismissed the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 3330-M
for non-appearance of the Alvendias. ". . . Your respondent, not content with just having conferred with Atty. Montesclaro when
he took over, even went to the extent of verifying from the Bureau of Lands if the
On 18 June 1966, Congress passed Republic Act No. 470, which provides: jgc:chanrobl es.c om.ph

application was proper. The Legal Department of the Bureau of Lands assured your
respondent that it was. He was informed that judicial application for registration is one of
"SECTION 1. The parcel of public domain comprising a portion of the foreshore fronting the methods of acquiring such lands, said lands being ‘alienable and disposable.’ There
the Manila Bay along the Province of Bulacan . . . is hereby withdrawn from sale or are, however, other means of obtaining the said lands, but the applicants (with Atty.
settlement and reserved for communal fishing ground purposes which shall hereafter be Montesclaro) chose the present action for land registration.
called the Bulacan Fishing Reservation." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Undersigned wishes to point out that he merely took over from the original lawyer when
It appears that the foreshore land being occupied by the Alvendias was part of the said counsel withdrew his appearance. Your respondent, hence, was in good faith when
communal fishing ground reserved by Republic Act No. 470. he took over the land registration case, subject matter of this present administrative
On 8 November 1977, respondent filed, on behalf of the Alvendias, Amended Application investigation."
cralaw virtua1aw librar y

for Original Registration of Title 8 in Land Registration Case ("LRC") No. 3711-M with the
then CFI of Bulacan praying that the land covered by Psu-141243, Amd. 2 9 be
The Court, in a Resolution dated 8 June 1981, forwarded the Motion to Dismiss to the very hollow; we agree with the Solicitor General and the complainant that those excuses
Solicitor General. do not exculpate the Respondent.
It is clear to the Court that respondent Viola violated his lawyer’s oath and as well Canon
In a Report 13 dated 28 February 1990, the Solicitor General stated that: 22 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which stated that" [t]he conduct of the lawyer
before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness"
"In his answer to the letter complaint, respondent avers that his clients, i.e., the (now Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prescribing that" [a] lawyer
Alvendias, have the right to apply for registration of the land in question. However, owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts"). He has been deplorably lacking in
respondent does not deny that he prepared and signed the Amended Application for the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the court. In his
Original Registration of Title in Land Reg. Case No. 3711-M wherein he alleged that the apparent zeal to secure the title to the property involved for his clients, he disregarded
Alvendias are the owners of the land covered by Psu 141243, Amd. 2. Respondent does his overriding duty to the court and to the law itself.
not offer any explanation at all as to why his submission in said application was
diametrically opposite to his allegations in the complaint in the earlier Civil Case No. WHEREFORE, finding respondent Escolastico R. Viola guilty of committing a falsehood
3330-M that the Alvendias were permittees and later the lessees of the same property. in violation of his lawyer’s oath and of the Canons of Professional Ethics (now the Code
of Professional Responsibility), the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the
It is evident, then, that respondent has knowingly made a false statement to the court in practice of law for a period of five (5) months, with a WARNING that commission of the
the land registration case. As proven by complaint, respondent has willingly aided and same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
consented in the filing and prosecution of a groundless, if not false, application for land A copy of this Resolution shall be spread on the personal record of respondent in the
registration, in violation of his oath as a lawyer and member of the bar. Office of the Bar Confidant.

It is well to stress again that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. 15 One of those
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It cannot be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration
of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the PANGAN V. RAMOS, 93 SCRA 87 (1979)
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the
fundamental duty to satisfy that expectation. Otherwise, the administration of justice SANTA PANGAN, complainant
would gravely suffer if indeed it could proceed at all. It is essential that lawyers bear in vs.
mind at all times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,
are above all officers of court sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and
sundry, and only secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979
For this reason, he is required to swear to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court. RESOLUTION
ANTONIO, J.:
In the instant case, respondent Viola alleged in an earlier pleading that his clients were
merely lessees of the property involved. In his later pleading, he stated that the very
This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent
same clients were owners of the same property. One of these pleadings must have been
Dionisio Ramos for contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and
false; it matters not which one. What does matter is that respondent, who, as a member
March 13, 1979, the hearings in this administrative case were postponed on the basis of
of the ancient and learned profession of the law, had sworn to do no falsehood before
respondent's motions for postponement. These motions were predicated on respondent's
the courts, did commit one. It was incumbent upon respondent to explain how or why he
allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing before Branch VII, Court of
committed no falsehood in pleading two (2) incompatible things; he offered no
First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No. 35906).
explanation, other than that he had not originated but merely continued the registration
Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro
proceedings when he filed the Amended Application, and that he really believed his
D.D. Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he
clients were entitled to apply for registration of their rights. Respondent’s excuses ring
used the name of "Pedro D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal
Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right to do so because in his Birth Certificate
(Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his parents are Pedro Ramos
and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of
"Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname. PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK V. KING, 172 SCRA 60 (1989)

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Republic of the Philippines
Attorneys" is "Dionisio D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record SUPREME COURT
containing the names and signatures of those who are authorized to practice law. A Manila
lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one inscribed in the Roll of FIRST DIVISION
Attorneys in his practice of law. PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner,
vs.
The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As ANGELO KING, KEN SUY WAT JOSE FERRER, JR., QUINTIN CALDERON, FE
an officer in the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, SARINO and DOMINGO K. LI, respondents.
candor and frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct G.R. No. 78252 April 12, 1989
of the lawyer at every stage. This has to be so because the court has the right to rely
upon him in ascertaining the truth. In representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. GANCAYCO, J.:
Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has violated his solemn oath.
The rule on service of summons in this jurisdiction is too well-known. In civil cases, the
The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the service of summons on a defendant is made by handing a copy thereof to the defendant
causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. Such service of summons
overempahisized. These injunctions circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of may be made at the defendant's dwelling house or residence or at his office or regular
the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I nigh vocation is to correctly inform the place of business. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy
court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at of the summons to the defendant himself.
correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office, when he resorts to deception or
permits his client to do so." 2 However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time,
substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
he was authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of
deception. The demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance business with some competent person in charge thereof.
that this is his first aberration in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe
penalty. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that
substituted service maybe resorted to. The impossibility of prompt service should be
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such
REPRIMANDED and warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his efforts failed. This statement should be made in the proof of service. This is necessary
suspencion or disbarment from the practice of law. because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been
held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law; it is a method
It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
this Court is directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory
possible. The request of complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any
by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is hereby granted. substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.

SO ORDERED The application of the foregoing rules is the issue in this petition for review by certiorari of
a decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No. 03386 entitled "Paluwagan ng Bayan
Savings Bank vs. Mercantile Financing Corporation, et al." dated January 27, 1987, and 100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983
its resolution dated April 22, 1987.
100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983
The facts are undisputed. Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and
private respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the recovery of money market 100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983
placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly and solidarily in
accordance with Section 31 of the Corporation Code which provides as follows: 100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983

Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.- Directors or trustees 100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984.
who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of
the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in
2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claim against
directing the affairs of the corporation shall be liable jointly and severally
the defendants.
for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its
stockholders or members and other persons.
3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by the
defendants provided that in case the latter fail to pay, jointly and
Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents
severally, two or more successive monthly installments, the plaintiff is
at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati, Metro Manila, which is the
entitled to secure from the Court a writ of execution for the collection of
stated office address of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario
the unpaid account of the defendants.
S. Najomot Jr. who acknowledged receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the
private respondents. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San
Juan dated May 11, 1983. On July 18, 1983, a decision was rendered by the trial court approving the said
Compromise Agreement and enjoining the parties to comply with the terms and
conditions embodied therein. Partial payments were made under the compromise
On May 24, 1983, the law firm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion
judgment. Upon failure of private respondent to make the other payments, petitioner filed
for extension of time to file a responsible pleading and/or motion to dismiss. The said
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The trial court granted the
motion was signed by Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones as counsel for the defendants. The
motion on December 16, 1983.
motion was granted in an order dated May 26, 1983 giving the defendants an extension
of twenty (20) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the
responsive pleading and/or motion to dismiss. On June 13, 1983, said counsel for On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification"
defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of the action for a period of sixty (60) thereby seeking a correction of the compromise judgment on the ground that he
days on the ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact
the case between the parties. The motion was denied. On June 27, 1983, counsel for he was the counsel for MFC only. On January 17, 1984, said counsel filed a "Motion To
plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file an answer. This Correct Compromise Agreement" attaching thereto a copy of the resolution of the Board
motion was granted in an order dated June 29, 1983. On July 14, 1983, the parties, of Directors of MFC of July 6,1983 showing that he was the attorney-in-fact of MFC only,
assisted by their counsel, submitted a compromise Agreement for the approval of the and praying for the correction of the judgment, accordingly. The motion for clarification
court. It reads as follows: was denied on January 20,1984.

1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, then account with On January 24, 1984, the Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo
the plaintiff as of June 15, 1983, in the sum of P707,500.01 with 20% King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr., filed a motion to set aside
interest per annum as follows: the decision dated July 18,1983, the Compromise Agreement and the writ of execution
dated December 21, 1983 on the ground that there was no service of summons upon
each of them as the corporate address of the corporation was not their address as they
P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983
were no longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent
them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were not served copies of the
100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983
decision of the court; that they learned about the same only when it was being executed; FROM JUDGMENT' FILED JANUARY 25, 1984, AND (ii) MOTION TO
and that they did not participate as directors or officers of MFC in the subject transaction. SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH
EXECUTION FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
On January 26,1984, private respondent Domingo F. Li filed a petition for relief from ANGELO KING, KING SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON and JOSE
judgment with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction alleging therein FERRER, JR. and (b) DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY APPEAL FROM TRIAL
that there was no service of summons upon him and that Atty. Aragones was not COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19,1983 APPROVING THE
authorized to represent him or to enter into the Compromise Agreement. After an COMPROMISE AGREEMENT WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL
opposition to said motion was filed by the petitioner, the lower court denied the same in AND EXECUTORY.
its order dated April 6, 1984. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by the private
respondents were also denied on May 4,1984. (B) THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY
IGNORED THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER (a) PRIVATE
Thus, private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, reiterating that RESPONDENT DOMINGO K. LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
there was no service of summons upon each of them as service of summons was made JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 25,1984, and (b)'THE MOTION TO SET
at the address of the firm with which they had severed connections; that the counsel of ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH
record of MFC has no authority to represent them in the case and in the Compromise EXECUTION' FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
Agreement; that they have not ratified the same by a partial payment of the compromise ANGELO KING, KENG SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON AND JOSE
judgment; and that they were no longer connected with MFC at the time they were sued. FERRER, JR., WERE FILED OUT OF TIME.
In due time, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on January 27, 1987, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows: (C) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE SUED AS
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF MFC WERE PROPERLY SERVED
In view of the foregoing, the other errors assigned by the appellants need WITH SUMMONS.
not be resolved: Wherefore:
The petition is devoid of merit.
(1) the decision dated July 18, 1983 approving the compromise
agreement rendered by the lower court as well as the writ of execution Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of
issued pursuant thereto as against appellants Angelo King, Keng Suy MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the obligation subject of the
Wat, Quintin Calderon, Jose Ferrer, Jr., and Domingo Li are hereby SET litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of
ASIDE; and summons must be observed in that summons must be served personally on private
respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them.
(2) the case is remanded to the court of origin which is hereby ordered to
direct proper service of summons on the aforesaid individual appellants The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of
at their respective correct addresses and thereafter to proceed in summons was effected. The office address of the corporation as indicated in the
accordance with law. complaint does not appear to be the office address of private respondents as they were
no longer connected with the corporation then. Personal service of summons should
SO ORDERED. have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff effected
A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by petitioner was denied by the substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of
appellate court on April 22, 1987. Hence, the instant petition predicated on the following MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private
grounds: respondents were no longer connected. Such substituted service is not valid. There was
no compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal
service and a failure to effect the same before substituted service could be resorted to.
(A) THAT THE CASE AT BAR (a) PERTAINS TO (AN) APPEAL FROM
As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons, the trial court
ORDER OF TRIAL COURT DATED APRIL 6,1984, DENYING (i)
never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF
It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC and private
respondents, sought an extension of time to file an answer or a responsive pleading, and
a suspension of the proceedings pending a possible settlement of the case; that
thereafter, he signed a Compromise Agreement in behalf of MFC and private
respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis of which a compromise
judgment was rendered; that said judgment was partially complied with but upon default BEREGUER V. CARRANZA, 26 SCRA 673 (1969)
in the payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought from and granted by the
trial court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informed the court that he Republic of the Philippines
committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of private SUPREME COURT
respondents when it was only MFC which hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly Manila
authorized to appear in behalf of the defendants, his voluntary appearance in their behalf EN BANC
by the filing of the aforementioned pleadings and the Compromise Agreement would EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant,
constitute a waiver of the defect in the service of summons. However, the lack of vs.
authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the resolution of the Board PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent.
of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of said counsel was in behalf of said A.C. No. 716 January 30, 1969
corporation only and not in behalf of the private respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:
Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of the private
respondents without their authority, the same is null and void in so far as they are
The law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the bar, as so appropriately put, is a
concerned. By the same token, the compromise judgment is also null and void as to
private respondents. The ruling of the lower court that the motion to set aside the privilege burdened with conditions. 1 A lawyer is called upon by virtue of his oath of office
to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; ... [and to] conduct (himself)
judgment and the petition for relief from judgment were filed beyond the reglementary
as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
period is untenable. An action to declare the nullity of a void judgment does not
prescribe. ... to the courts ..." 2 The question, one that has an element of novelty, is whether
respondent Pedro B. Carranza, duly admitted to the practice of the law, did get entangled
in the complexity of the strands in the web of obligation such an oath imposes? More
One last word, Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the specifically, did he manifest the utmost fealty to the trust reposed in him as an officer of
performance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case. He represented the Court by taking all necessary measures to avoid the court being misled, even if such
himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the private respondents not only in were the result not of design but of inadvertence?
the motions he filed but also in the Compromise Agreement he submitted. It was only
after the writ of execution of the compromise judgment was being enforced that he
A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July 15, 1966, for
perked up by saying that he committed an oversight and that he was not authorized by
the private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in the Compromise deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity
of an Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the
Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer.
To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a transgression of this imperative. effect that her own mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other
heirs except herself, when, as a matter of fact, the deceased was survived by four other
Counsel should be made to account before his peers.
daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he introduced the same in evidence. 3
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966, to file an answer.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative investigation, report
Thereafter, on August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging as the truth of the matter that the
and recommendation on Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floor of
aforesaid Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer was introduced in evidence only to prove
the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. This decision
the fact of such transfer of the property in question to his client, respondent having "no
is immediately executory.
hand in the making of said affidavit nor of the petition, both of which were prepared in
Pasay City." 4
SO ORDERED.
 On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor General for respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves that he did not properly inform himself of
investigation, report and recommendation. Such investigation was had wherein both the evidence he was going to present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof
complainant and respondent were duly heard. The issue in the opinion of the then inconsistent with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to
Solicitor General, the Honorable Antonio Barredo, now a member of this Court, as set confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a petition for
forth in his report of March 18, 1968, is whether respondent "consented in violation of his Relief...." 12
oath, to the doing of any falsehood in court."
It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the violation of his oath
It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with the preparation of against respondent be instituted. Such complaint was filed by the two above officials on
the Petition or of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his participation does not appear from the March 18, 1968. Respondent was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having]
evidence presented in this case. The Petition was subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City caused confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting evidence therein
before one Atty. A. Mendoza, while the Affidavit was subscribed under oath in Pasay containing a false statement inconsistent with facts he definitely knows by reason of the
before Notary Public Ernesto V. Ventura. The foregoing documents were posted from family litigations between his client and complainant herein, which are rooted in
Pasay to the Clerk of Court, Sorsogon...." 5 successional rights [and that] respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer
consistent with his oath of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised Rules of
It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not "very meticulous Court."
about the petition" because there was neither private nor government opposition thereto;
that if he had intended to deceive the court by virtue of the documents, he could have Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to the facts. He
told his client to answer his questions at the cadastral hearing to conform to the would allege in justification however "that while it is true that the ... respondent was the
controverted paragraph in the Affidavit of Adjudication concerning the statement counsel who appeared for the petitioner in Cadastral Case No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record
reproduced from the tax declaration that the decedent left no legitimate ascendants or No. 869 of Sorsogon Cadastre, yet he had nothing to do with the making of the petition
descendants or any other heirs except the affiant...." 6 and the annexes thereto attached; for the same were made in Pasay City and that when
(he) accepted to represent the petitioner in the Cadastral Case mentioned above, there
There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the evidence stands, there is was no opposition from anybody ... not even from the Bureau of Lands nor from the
no apparent causal link between the falsehood and the fact that respondent is the lawyer Honorable Solicitor General, making, therefore, the hearing therein a mere formality.
handling the cadastral case at the Sorsogon end." 7 Nonetheless, while recognizing the Such being the case, the [respondent] presented the petitioner's case on January 17,
absence of evidence that such falsehood in the Affidavit of Adjudication could be traced 1966, without meticulously going over the documents, and the alleged Affidavit of
to respondent, the report would hold him liable for discretionary action as the Adjudication and Transfer was presented to show the fact of transfer of the land
circumstance that various estates are involved "certainly warranted a greater exercise of described therein from the affiant to her son. The stenographic notes in that proceeding
diligence on respondent's part." 8 will bear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the existence of an incorrect
statement in the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It was not [wilful], for he has not
Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even bother to read the consented to the doing of the falsity therein made, since the same was prepared by
entirety of the affidavit runs counter to respondent's inescapable duty to clear up doubts petitioner's lawyer in Pasay City; nor did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the
and inconsistencies." 9 For he could have been aware of the family litigations between his hearing mentioned above; ..."
client and complainant which are rooted in successional rights...." 10 If only for the above
fact then, as stated in the report, "he should precisely have taken the bother to read the There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of the then Solicitor
entirety of the Affidavit of Adjudication when the cadastral case was heard on January General Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the conduct pursued by respondent in
17, 1966...." 11 thus introducing in evidence the Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to
be false, in the preparation of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of
From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then Solicitor General deliberate deception obviously cannot be sustained.
Antonio Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Frine Zaballero: "If he did not,
he cannot be relieved from the consequences of his acts as a lawyer, and disclaim Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The answer must be
responsibility therefor. To allow respondent relief from his duty is to ignore what is in the negative. As was correctly pointed out in the complaint, his failure to exercise
obvious from the nature of the litigations in which he entered his appearance.... Actually, greater care did result in the "confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the
circumstances, it would be to err on, the side of undue leniency if he would be held
blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity to his oath as attorney was less than The instant case stemmed from an Administrative Complaint1 dated June 6, 2005 filed by
entire. Atty. Florita S. Linco (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
against Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal for disciplinary action for his failure to perform his duty as
Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight or inadvertence, a notary public, which resulted in the violation of their rights over their property.
the way he conducts his case or the evidence he presents could conceivably result in a
failure of justice. Time and time again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that The antecedent facts are as follows:
they are officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of complete
fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to strict accountability insofar as Complainant claimed that she is the widow of the late Atty. Alberto Linco (Atty. Linco),
candor and honesty towards the court is concerned. the registered owner of a parcel of land with improvements, consisting of 126 square
meters, located at No. 8, Macopa St., Phase I-A, B, C & D, Valley View Executive
Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose conduct, as in this Village, Cainta, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 259001.
case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not be allowed to free himself from a
charge thereafter instituted against him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful Complainant alleged that Atty. Jimmy D. Lacebal (respondent), a notary public for
and that he has not consented to the doing of the falsity. Mandaluyong City, notarized a deed of donation2 allegedly executed by her husband in
favor of Alexander David T. Linco, a minor. The notarial acknowledgment thereof also
A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must not be taken stated that Atty. Linco and Lina P. Toledo (Toledo), mother of the donee, allegedly
lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There would be a failure of justice if personally appeared before respondent on July 30, 2003, despite the fact that
courts cannot rely on the submission as well as the representations made by lawyers, complainant’s husband died on July 29, 2003.3
insofar as the presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned. If, as
unfortunately happened in this case, even without any intent on the part of a member of Consequently, by virtue of the purported deed of donation, the Register of Deeds of
the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable event did occur, he must not be allowed to Antipolo City cancelled TCT No. 259001 on March 28, 20054 and issued a new TCT No.
escape the responsibility that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable. 292515 in the name of Alexander David T. Linco.

WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and warned that a Aggrieved, complainant filed the instant complaint. She claimed that respondent's
repetition of an offense of this character would be much more severely dealt with. The reprehensible act in connivance with Toledo was not only violative of her and her
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, through any of the district judges, is hereby directed children's rights but also in violation of the law. Respondent's lack of honesty and candor
to administer in public the reprimand thus imposed on respondent Pedro B. Carranza. is unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.
The complainant, Eduardo J. Berenguer, must be duly informed of the date when such
reprimand is to be administered. In his Answer,6 respondent admitted having notarized and acknowledged a deed of
donation executed by the donor, Atty. Linco, in favor of his son, Alexander David T.
Linco, as represented by Lina P. Toledo.

ATTY. FLORITA LINCO VS ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, A.C. NO. 7241, OCTOBER Respondent narrated that on July 8, 2003, he was invited by Atty. Linco, through an
17, 2011 emissary in the person of Claire Juele-Algodon (Algodon), to see him at his residence
located at Guenventille II D-31-B, Libertad Street, Mandaluyong City. Respondent was
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO, Complainant, then informed that Atty. Linco was sick and wanted to discuss something with him.
vs.
ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, Respondent. Respondent pointed out that Atty. Linco appeared to be physically weak and sickly, but
A.C. No. 7241 October 17, 2011 was articulate and in full control of his faculties. Atty. Linco showed him a deed of
donation and the TCT of the property subject of the donation. Respondent claimed that
DECISION Atty. Linco asked him a favor of notarizing the deed of donation in his presence along
with the witnesses.
PERALTA, J.:
However, respondent explained that since he had no idea that he would be notarizing a 678 dated December 11, 2008, denying complainant's motion for reconsideration and
document, he did not bring his notarial book and seal with him. Thus, he instead told affirming the assailed resolution, the Court resolved to require complainant to file her
Algodon and Toledo to bring to his office the signed deed of donation anytime at their comment.12
convenience so that he could formally notarize and acknowledge the same.
In her Compliance,13 complainant maintained that respondent has not stated anything
On July 30, 2003, respondent claimed that Toledo and Algodon went to his law office new in his motion for reconsideration that would warrant the reversal of the
and informed him that Atty. Linco had passed away on July 29, 2003. Respondent was recommendation of the IBP. She maintained that respondent violated the Notarial Law
then asked to notarize the deed of donation. Respondent admitted to have consented as and is unfit to continue being commissioned as notary public; thus, should be sanctioned
he found it to be his commitment to a fellow lawyer. Thus, he notarized the subject deed for his infractions.
of donation, which was actually signed in his presence on July 8, 2003.
On August 16, 2011, in view of the denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, the
During the mandatory conference/hearing on September 7, 2005, it was established that Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court, recommended that the instant complaint is
indeed the deed of donation was presented to respondent on July 8, 2003.7 Respondent, now ripe for judicial adjudication.
likewise, admitted that while he was not the one who prepared the deed of donation, he,
however, performed the notarization of the deed of donation only on July 30, 2003, a day RULING
after Atty. Linco died.81avvphi1
The findings and recommendations of the IBP are well taken.
On November 23, 2005, in its Report and Recommendation,9 the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violating the Notarial Law and the There is no question as to respondent's guilt. The records sufficiently established that
Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent notarized the deed of donation on July
30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew that Atty. Linco died a day before
The IBP-CBD observed that respondent wanted it to appear that because the donor he notarized the deed of donation. We take note that respondent notarized the document
appeared before him and signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, it was just after the lapse of more than 20 days from July 8, 2003, when he was allegedly asked to
ministerial duty on his part to notarize the deed of donation on July 30, 2003, a day after notarize the deed of donation. The sufficient lapse of time from the time he last saw Atty.
Atty. Linco died. The IBP-CBD pointed out that respondent should know that the parties Linco should have put him on guard and deterred him from proceeding with the
who signed the deed of donation on July 8, 2003, binds only the signatories to the deed notarization of the deed of donation.
and it was not yet a public instrument. Moreover, since the deed of donation was
notarized only on July 30, 2003, a day after Atty. Linco died, the acknowledgement However, respondent chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to
portion of the said deed of donation where respondent acknowledged that Atty. Linco accommodate the alleged need of a colleague. The fact that respondent previously
"personally came and appeared before me" is false. This act of respondent is also appeared before him in person does not justify his act of notarizing the deed of donation,
violative of the Attorney's Oath "to obey the laws" and "do no falsehood." considering the affiant's absence on the very day the document was notarized. In the
notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent attested that Atty. Linco
The IBP-CBD, thus, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet obviously, Atty. Linco
law for a period of one (1) year, and that his notarial commission be revoked and he be could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter died on July 29,
disqualified from re-appointment as notary public for a period of two (2) years. 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
On April 27, 2006, in Resolution No. XVII-2006-215,10 the IBP-Board of Governors
resolved to adopt and approve the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD. We will reiterate that faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the
oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct.14 Respondent should not notarize a
Respondent moved for reconsideration, but was denied.11 document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who
executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of
On July 29, 2009, considering respondent's petition for review dated May 19, 2009 of IBP what are stated therein.15
Resolution No. XVII-2006-215 dated April 27, 2006 and IBP Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
Time and again, we have repeatedly reminded notaries public of the importance attached SO ORDERED.
to the act of notarization. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document; thus, making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon OBSERVING AND MAINTAINING RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.16 JUDICIAL OFFICERS
ZALDIVAR V. GONSALEZ, 166 SCRA 316 (1988)
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in
the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
this form of conveyance would be undermined.17 Hence, again, a notary public should vs.
not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987
truth of what are stated therein. Constitution, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
This responsibility is more pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer. A graver
responsibility is placed upon him by reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
no falsehood or consent to the doing of any. He is mandated to the sacred duties vs.
appertaining to his office, such duties, being dictated by public policy and impressed with HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman
public interest.18 Respondent's failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
only in damaging complainant's rights over the property subject of the donation but also G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
in undermining the integrity of a notary public. He should, therefore, be held liable for his
acts, not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer.
PER CURIAM:
19
In Lanuzo v. Atty. Bongon, respondent having failed to discharge his duties as a notary
public, the revocation of his notarial commission, disqualification from being The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
commissioned as a notary public for a period of two years and suspension from the
practice of law for one year were imposed. We deem it proper to impose the same 1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique
penalty. A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan)
Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and
WHEREFORE, for breach of the Notarial Law and Code of Professional Responsibility, 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul
the notarial commission of respondent ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL, is REVOKED. He Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
is DISQUALIFIED from reappointment as Notary Public for a period of two years. He is subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
also SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year, effective
immediately. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be I
dealt with more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of receipt of this Decision in
order to determine when his suspension shall take effect. The pertinent facts are as follows:

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
Bar of the Philippines, and all courts all over the country. Let a copy of this Decision 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
likewise be attached to the personal records of the respondent. Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted
the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and
(originally TBP Case No. 86-00778). five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's
lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, the same. Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No.
Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the 79690-707.
Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner
assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the
the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in second petition: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2)
TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly,
Motion to Quash the criminal informations filed in those cases by the from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
"Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
vested with power and authority independently to investigate and to institute
criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees, and In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by
hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163- this Court of a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the
12177 were all null and void. Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued
on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read: Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the
following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable
Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for
Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari
urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
Resolved, without giving due course to the petition, to require the restraining order is GRANTED.
respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING party-respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the
ORDER, effective immediately and continuing until further orders Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and
from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987
DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST
and 12163 to 12177 insofar as petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled, "Commission on
concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the
motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987. criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary
investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
The parties later filed their respective pleadings. effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and CEASE and DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570,
Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and
M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987 from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said
Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases
required the petitioner to submit a Reply 10 thereto. even if they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been
restraining me. Gonzalez said.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in
Contempt 11 directed at respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft
respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner cases against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-
in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good
contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim
In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, Affairs and Cultural Communities.
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the
"Philippine Daily Globe:" While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the
Supreme Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case the thinking of some people that affluent persons can prevent the
progress of a trial, he said.
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme
Court order stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the
Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent weekend and that while she symphatizes with local officials who are
persons "an prevent the progress of a trial." charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be a
disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that candidates.
while rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme
Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during
due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview. election time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a
right of every citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because
the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988
fishes go scot-free." required respondent Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days
from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
Zaldivar petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating
graft cases filed against him. WHEREFORE, We hereby:

Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations (1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and
because the latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend hereby NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the
from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan. Sandiganbayan; and

Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from (2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from
investigating a graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any conducting investigations and filing criminal cases with the
complaint with the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.

SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and
1988. In his Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either
in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion: (a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the
position he had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the suit or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a desire
court ... and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or
on him;' " friends;"

2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the (b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and
COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will on behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or
embarass the Court;" and sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues
and friends;"
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called
over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to (c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and
dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)." not to be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the
Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed Court because it will embarass the Court;
were sent by "some members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending
before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for (d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against
Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the two Associate Justices; and
above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried
long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May (e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and
1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions: disbarred lawyers 'without due process.

G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et 3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of
al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc). and circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public
respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court further
under date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution
petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof. copies of said sworn statements and the annexes thereto appended, and
to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public same period of ten (10) days.
statements to the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but
also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its individual 4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not
disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to
administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require respondent CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE
Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, the latter to comply therewith.
why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus
the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the Motion for Extension and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted
"Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have overturned that presumption [of
innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the contempt
impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading
Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second
Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on
the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and 22 July 1988.
resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
II
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the
and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the
immediately executory. legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to
discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record: the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
1988; administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
the Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988 including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against
an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant. 34
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
before us here; the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt
power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than
(a) For Extension of Time the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers
and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer,
(b) For Inhibition and the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into play
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer,
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play
139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter whether or not the misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes
dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope
Supreme Court and addressed to respondent): of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988; admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court
and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to
obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988. professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and
contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent
Gonzalez submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as
offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof But in the
case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate
themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently
little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act
involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real
this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the
Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as well as the people
function of the members of the Court in such proceeding. themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would
be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
(later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
following lucid manner:
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a
xxx xxx xxx necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By
constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce
authority in the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the
the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone
all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power
not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the
also of our role therein. power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the
inexistent.
present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but
is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not xxx xxx xxx. 38
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias
therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its or prejudice against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance
primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for
not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the
profession and the property and honest administration of justice by Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists
themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had
the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on his
parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus
need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been
other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues. invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.

III A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme
Court is that they have improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of
statements set out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory
indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court
are substantially correct. 39 addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of
rendered an erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated the said notes had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578.
27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some substance (at
Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the
had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had,
investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in
investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the
Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. Respondent
Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from
the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination
consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the
assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while
of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad
to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to impose light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also
private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.
cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or
a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without
statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this
disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman last attack is not without relation to the other statements made by respondent against the
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of
early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way
against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying
the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is
the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against unmistakable. Had respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges
petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on and the attorney he later Identified in one of his Explanations, he would have discovered
24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to explain their
Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were
the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there
the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade
the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process
as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made,
proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable respondent sought to heap still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law. Once again, he
defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process. 44 disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent,
emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would
should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any
making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court revolves
the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following other person or group of persons.
allegations:
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the regarded by this Court as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary
contempt and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by examining
of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as
shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
Reconsideration;"
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold accused in a slander case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in
neutrality of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his next appeal to
process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the
charge; provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and
"judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the
prejudiced as it is, respondent has no china man's chance to get fair Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for
hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;" damages before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their
decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated, however, by
compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps
justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some
passion and obfuscation running riot;"
time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the
the entire Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in favor
does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for
he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this
can still act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and Court saying:

(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me
process" and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to with certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court
be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case
original) entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against
the Justices supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the
 Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification xxx xxx xxx.
committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court
and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No.
favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people 46504-R was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific
the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on
them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
supplied) appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court
of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a case under
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of
making the above statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts
following statements: reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that
spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the aid tribunals.
Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all human
efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a highest Court of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in
life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts
deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242) by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his
allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying: ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, xxx xxx xxx
corruption and injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the
government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other ... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a
because there is an alleged existence of rampant corruption, graft and reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney
injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G.R. No. L- owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a
36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247:
committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del emphasis supplied)
Mar's logic ...
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar,
xxx xxx xxx acting as counsel for MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this
Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third Motion for
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them Reconsideration:
that second only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to
Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the the mis-representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last
respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to emphasize
to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a
always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high gimmick (referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by
privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice. vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a
government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light
 of our upbringing and schooling, even under many of the incumbent member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends to create a decision provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and
that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second Antonio Barredo.
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
(31 SCRA at 6) xxx xxx xxx

They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
September 1968 asking abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required
to inhibit themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either
vice-president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation
false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex- of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government
parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits
of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time compensation is made.
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The (31 SCRA at 10-11)
appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board of
Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty of contempt:
the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates
"incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent 1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that for reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected
there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous
authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,'
(31 SCRA at 6-7) but by innuendo would suggest that it is not.

Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July
Motion for Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He
paragraphs: then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this
case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz
borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who
Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto
New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-created
may take part—... . Only those members present when any matter is Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine
submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31,
adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the present 1968 was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would
instance because the member who penned the decision was the very
seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar
guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable to lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a
Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The
lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct
favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the tending to degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty.
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
would be less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a
particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice xxx xxx xxx
and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their
actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the
and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance of World Court and/or the United States government. It must be
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so,
like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a unnecessary statements were in ejected. More specifically, the motion
member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption
'although the process has already begun. of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to
the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
xxx xxx xxx requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis fifty million dollars annually ...
in fact and in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to
inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have decide the case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has
received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency
or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or principals, between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal
including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once from a decision presupposes that a party has already abandoned any
apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the appeal
President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the
favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may
not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof would be to xxx xxx xxx
paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking
havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country.
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected
Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There
where infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than
is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's
punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the
attorney to downgrade this Court.
belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its
dignity, a court of justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so
to discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31
justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he
xxx xxx xxx asserted was "a great injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed
a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken
victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing
Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the more.
people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. xxx xxx xxx
Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967,
the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows: As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members
of this Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
expose the tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed
arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason. sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our self-
sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our
was condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case. Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31
xxx xxx xxx SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court
petition, 'where our Supreme Court is composed of men who are indefinitely suspended Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice
calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution
with impunity.' 4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this
Court, made the following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he this Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes
earns his living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated
responsible to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is
and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' likewise a violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the
or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied) Constitution of the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a ground for
impeachment.
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should
not be taken against him. His explanation, which in part read: ... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected
by all means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and
xxx xxx xxx order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when
the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to
armed force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found
and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the
in all courts and government offices. We have added only two more
Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people
symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense,
 done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted
face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied) by the Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local
daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that
required counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it
him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow
Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many
Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I
above statements contumacious. believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change
the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional
are plainly contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent sessions, will have as its object the complete reorganization of the
killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today
Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said
pleading filed in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court
repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo
vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party
is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and
580- his invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in
requiring him to show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court,
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases through Mr. Justice Feria, said-
with that courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is
his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years
high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to
administration of justice. say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law
and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during
of his client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of
capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and
by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this
respect which the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution,
Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-812; the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
emphasis supplied) their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom
therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and
Law, refused to divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was
disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused
and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty
the publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
 guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the
would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon
emphasis supplied) in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper
Court which contained the following paragraph (in translation): and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to
resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at for resolution.
the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all
the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J.
the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court
some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they
the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because
court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the
But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of
like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust
make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
at 726; emphasis supplied) movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of
which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court
Atty. Francisco responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
the statements made above, the Court held: Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense
of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of
has acted erroneously.
the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded
in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and
and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client, because authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had conferred
the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, 160), of being what he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio
according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor
Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody
132-513). from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the
source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney
protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint
on this matter. In the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this
contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the
different from those made in the cases discussed above: respondent.

1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987); IV

2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978); The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his
constitutional right of free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967); privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.

4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961); Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one
seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956); absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
Promulgated 29 April 1955; orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950); community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:

9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); ... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other;
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself
Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if
necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932). judges their independence is a free press. 50

Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
the past penalized as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary
sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements here made by respondent The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the
deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall
necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to continue in this chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved
wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of liberty of the press and
for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As
through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. That important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free
respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world of exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if
 persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The
purposes, and if such persons are to be permitted by subterranean subjectivities of the respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or
means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential proceedings to the misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and
embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied) plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out
that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court repentance. 56
effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are,
first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has
man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free been shown, and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration
expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52 of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in
its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the
the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions
Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision,
the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public
dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of pressures brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much
justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer. publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to account.
Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at
this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in
however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be
Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those
of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and
confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide
easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
critical for the stability of democratic government.
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of
courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair
criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper
misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. remedy in this case and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel
suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual members of this Court may
well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of
essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion
the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits
of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are
cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
xxx xxx xxx 54
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
(Emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the
practice of law indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the effect immediately.
Court; it is addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in
which it was carried out.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the petition to subdivide lot No. 1639. 2 Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros
Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information Oriental issued an order 3 directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as
and guidance. follows:

a) Hermogenes Olis — lot 1639-A

MAGLUCOT-AW VS. MAGLUCOT, 329 SCRA 78 (2000) b) Pascual Olis — lot 1639-B

c) Bartolome Maglucot — lot 1639-C

GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA
MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO d) Roberto (Alberto) Maglucot — lot 1639-D
SALMA, petitioners,
vs. e) Anselmo Lara — lot 1639-E
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO
and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents. f) Tomas Maglucot — lot 1639-F. 4
G.R. No. 132518 March 28, 2000
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot).
Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of
KAPUNAN, J.: subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Maglucot, petitioners predecessors-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said
Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession and damages. thus filed the complaint a quo.

The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in After trail, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the
1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils
entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D which originally formed (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) 5 as indubitable proof
part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found that Tomas Maglucot,
that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this respondents' predecessors-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it was he, in
case presents a unique situation where there is an order for partition but there is no fact, who commenced the action for partition. 6 The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the
showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is
Instance for its approval or that a decree or order was registered in the Register of rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as
Deeds. against the person relying thereon." Applying said provision of law, it held that while there
was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the
existence of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who claim that there
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages was one. 7 Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations 8 over the houses of
alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the lots of Roberto
of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the ownership of the subject lot
names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot. Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, by the latter. 9
Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19 April 1952, Tomas
Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessors-in-interest, filed a The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
 WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby RECORD, OF WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter: OUTCOME OF THE CASE;

1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the IV

premises thereof and deliver the possession of the same to
Plaintiffs; IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE
APPLICABLE UNDER THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND
attorney's fees: THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED; ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT
BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION HAPPENED DURING
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE; 12
1993 for actual damages representing the amount of unpaid
rentals up to the time they actually vacate the premises in Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided
question; among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the
subdivision. Further, the co-owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred
4. To pay the costs. 10 by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas
Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were
sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence not agreeable to the partition. 14 Petitioners further contend that respondents admitted in
of partition. 11 The CA likewise found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the
Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared that there was no partition of Lot No. land of Roberto Maglucot." 15 Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents
1639. are estopped from claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual
agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation in 1952, and respondents' acquiescence
because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over Lot No. 1639-A
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the
beginning 1952 up to the present. 16
following reversible errors:
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they
I
emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised, or
notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS confirmed the same. 17 Second, they point to the fact that petitioners were unable to
HAVING POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946; show any court approval of any partition. 18 Third, they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain
undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title,
II containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever. 19

IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on
RENTALS AND OFFER TO BUY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT record, we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this
THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D. HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS; case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.

III Preliminary, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become final and
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in executory and cannot be disturbed.
making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is:
the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is
in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the case. 24 An
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record." 20 This case falls under the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. 25
exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that
of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling
based and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, 26 which held that the order of partition is interlocutory,
record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed
whether indeed there was partition. by the trial court are not binding. 27 In this case, both the order of partition and the
unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented
partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree, 28 especially, where, by reason of
proper, and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the
parties or the commissioners appointed by the court, as the case may be. 21 The first commission. 29 Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in
phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the determination of whether accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order
or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas
co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other vs. Cinco. 30 In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties
hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in "to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the
the premises and an accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant from the order appointed two commissioners and directed them merely to approve the sketch plan
real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.
agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the
court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either the action is
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed
dismissed or partition and/or accounting is decreed — the order is a final one, and may
by the court are not binding upon the parties. 31 However, this rule does not apply in case
be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 22 The second phase commences when it
where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision
appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the court. In
plan. The purpose of the court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In
that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not
this case, the parties themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest implemented
more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with the
the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific
rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been
portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case
accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or
was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not
parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in
to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but
question." Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 23
only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of
ratification of the supposedly non-binding sketch/subdivision plan.
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order
decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable. 23 The order of partition is a final
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to
determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of
tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners
the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were applied, the order not having been
occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639.33 It was only in 1952 when the petition to
subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it
Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate if he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective
certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by proceeding as his own. 39 Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of adopts and gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
case arose, or about forty (40) years later. made, which amounts to ratification of what was therefore unauthorized, and becomes
the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. 40
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative
subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that the court The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No.
was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the portions in accordance 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639
with the sketch/subdivision plan. With the factual backdrop, said court ordered the they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to counter this point by
partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole witness to the effect that the
sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the parties amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma was for the
therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. In its quite improbable that the
sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan which parties would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so
would be considered by the commissioners for approval. There is no showing that long a time. Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax declaration for
respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax declarations
objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that respondents would not be aware
of the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan. of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily verified this fact. This they
did not do for a period spanning more than four decades.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition
accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the
not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. 34 It follows that a party to a partition is possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept
also barred from avoiding partition when he has received and held a portion of the of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior
subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed ownership right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong. 41 Since the
rights over their share for a long time. possession of respondents were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without
saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.
possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion
allotted to another party. 35 A person cannot claim both under and against the same Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support
instrument. 36 In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, presumption. 42 Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be
and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all presumed. 43 It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and occupation of land,
or none. 37 Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and acquiescence for 60 years,
subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it. 38 Here, respondents, by themselves furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by deed or by
and/or through their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. 44 And
with the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot where a tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots
now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-owners who has long been known and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there
took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the sketch plan. is no evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred
that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him whose name it
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to bears. 45
mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and
acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing
tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance on the part of the adversary, and any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly
this is called, ratification or election by acceptance or benefits, which arises when a indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument is that unless partition is
shown in the title of the subject property, there can be no valid partition or that the In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be
annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition. sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant
in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which possession in
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were exercised. And a court
interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non- of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual for
registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold
of their obligations thereunder. 46 As originally conceived, registration is merely a species their respective parts in severalty.
of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order to give it legal
effect as between the parties. 47 Requirements for the recording of the instruments are A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,
presumption that recorded instrument exist and are genuine. 48 exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition.
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement
was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or
oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of
of the subject lot. The action for partition was instituted because some of the co-owners the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a
refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the
issuance of the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First,
1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of
of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual partition among the parties. Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that the houses of
The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952 having been discussed respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot.
separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition was
initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after
with the oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very long period respondents were informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging
indicate the permanency and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to
partition is already well-settled. In Espina vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral partition the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. 52 Aida
is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan vs. Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus: Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because they also intend to use the
lot for a residential purpose. 53 This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of respondents, and the CA did not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy
equity have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly has been established by the unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they give
performed. such offer if they claim to be at least a co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents
impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and that they are not co-owners, much less the
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.
enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition has actually
been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of
ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and Constancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the
enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot, 55 Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the
been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida 56 showing that the houses of the above-
the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly mentioned persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot 57 constitute
performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same persons of the ownership of the land
proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty. by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity is
directly attacked, the contents therein are presumed to be true and accurate. 58 The lone RESOLUTION
testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner KAPUNAN, J.:
of the land in their respective declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No.
1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence. This administrative case originated from a sworn affidavit-complaint1 dated 14 March
1997, filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Discipline, by Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor seeking the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita for
Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, disregarding the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the Court of Appeals in
one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said relation to the case entitled Lamberto Villaflor vs. Biyaya Corporation, et al.2 now pending
lot showing the partition into six portions. 59 with the same court.

Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the counsel of Biyaya Corporation, the plaintiff in the
petition for review on certiorari.1âwphi1 Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners ejectment case3 filed against complainant Lt. Lamberto P. Villaflor before the
made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 53, of Kalookan City. Metropolitan Trial Court Judge
records and lack of study of the law "by the researcher." 60 Second, he cited the Romanito A. Amatong decided the ejectment case in favor of Biyaya Corporation.
researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference to the Complainant appealed this decision to the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any 131,4 which affirmed the decision of the MTC. Not satisfied with the decision of the RTC,
partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will complainant brought the case on appeal before the Court of Appeals which was
only show that there was no proper study of the case by the researcher." 62 docketed as CA G.R No. 50623.5 Losing no time, complainant also filed with the Court of
Appeals an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an to prevent the impending demolition of his family home.
institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts
and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is In a Resolution dated 27 December 1996, the Court of Appeals granted the prayer for a
highly improper and unethical for counsel for petitioners to berate the researcher in his TRO, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal
profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, let a restraining order forthwith issue against
and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A defendants-appellees including the public respondent Judge or Sheriff or any person
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior under him from evicting and demolishing the family house of the movant, pending
before the courts. 63 appeal. x x x

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET SO ORDERED.
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.1âwphi1.nêt
The TRO was specifically addressed to, and personally served on, the Presiding Judge
of RTC, Branch 131, Kalookan City; the Sheriff/Deputy Sheriff, RTC Branch 131,
Kalookan City; Atty. Alvin T. Sarita; and Atty. Romeo F. Barza.6 Despite the TRO issued
by the Court of Appeals, respondent on 8 January 1997, filed before the MTC an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the Implementation and/or Enforcement of the Writ of
Demolition7 which had already been issued by the trial court as early as 12 August 1996.
VILLAFOR VS. SARITA, 308 SCRA 129 (1999) In his motion which is quoted hereunder, respondent stated the reason why he did not
heed the TRO:

LT. LAMBERTO P. VILLAFLOR, complainant, vs. ALVIN T. SARITA, Respondent. 1. That last January 7, 1997, plaintiff received a Resolution dated December 27,
[A.C. - CBD No. 471. June 10, 1999] 1996 from the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals granting the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
2. A close scrutiny of the afore-said Resolution including the Notice of Resolution and resolution is no defense otherwise, all lawyers can effectively avoid restraining orders of
the Temporary Restraining Order show that it was directed to the Honorable Presiding the higher court by arguing around the bush.10
Judge (Honorable Antonio J. Fineza) of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
Branch 131 and to the assigned (deputy) sheriff thereon and NOT to this Honorable The Court of Appeals also granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Court and its deputy sheriff. mandatory injunction and ordered Biyaya Corporation and Judge Amatong to
immediately restore the demolished family house of complainant or, return to him the
3. The only conclusion therefrom is that the Honorable Metropolitan Trial Court is not estimated value of the same.
restrained nor prohibited from enforcing and/or implementing its judicial process such as
the subject writ of demolition. Thereafter, complainant filed a case for disbarment against respondent before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. The commissioner11 assigned to investigate the case
XXX issued an order12 dated 3 September 1997, directing respondent to file his answer or
comment to the complaint. The period of time allotted to answer the complaint lapsed
On 9 January 1997, Judge Amatong granted the motion of respondent and issued an without respondent submitting his comment. On 8 December 1997, an order13 was
order8 for the implementation of the writ of demolition. The demolition order was actually issued by the investigating commissioner requiring the parties to attend the hearing of
carried out the next day, or on 10 January 1997, by the deputy sheriff of the lower the case on 10 February 1998. Respondent failed to appear therein. The hearing was
court.9cräläwvirtualibräry postponed and reset to 6 March 1998. A notice of hearing14 was sent to respondent but
again he failed to attend the proceeding. After giving respondent enough opportunity to
In response to the situation, complainant filed before the Court of Appeals an action for face the charges against him, which the latter did not avail, the case was submitted for
Indirect Contempt against respondent, Biyaya Corporation, Judge Amatong, And the resolution on 6 March 1998.15cräläwvirtualibräry
Register of Deeds of Kalookan City.
The commissioners report dated 10 September 1998, recommending the disbarment of
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 20 February 1997, found respondent and Atty. Alvin T. Sarita stated in part:
his co-defendants, Judge Amatong and Biyaya Corporation, guilty of indirect contempt.
The dispositive portion of the resolution states: As clearly established in the resolution of the Honorable Thirteenth Division of the Court
of Appeals in its disquisition on his culpability, Atty, Sarita is liable not only for
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, defendants-appellees Biyaya deliberately misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into violating
Corporation and MTC Judge Ramonito Amatong, and their counsel, Atty. Alvin Sarita are the appellate courts restraining order, but also for making false allegations that led his
hereby adjudged GUILTY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT as they are hereby fined to pay clients to commit a contemptuous act;
the amount of P30,000.00 each, as per SC Administrative Circular No. 22-95, amending
Section 6, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, with a warning that repetition of the same or As a member of the Bar, Atty. Sarita is mandated by his oath to obey the laws as well as
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. the duly constituted authorities therein and not to do any falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court;
Atty. Alvin Sarita is likewise REPRIMANDED for his contemptuous or improvident act
despite receipt of Our Restraining Order, without prejudice to any further administrative In filing his urgent ex-parte motion to implement the writ of demolition issued against the
sanction the injured party may seek in the proper forum. residence of the complainant, Atty. Sarita was well-aware that what he was seeking to do
was specifically restrained by the court of Appeals in no uncertain terms. Even if we were
Describing the unfortunate behavior of respondent, the Court of Appeals said: inclined, in a gesture of utmost liberality, to hold for Atty. Saritas (sic) and resolve any
doubts in his favor, we are simply overwhelmed by the thought that as a lawyer, Atty.
Sarita knew quite well or must have known quite well that what he was asking for in his
Specifically, the Court is convinced that Atty. Alvin Sarita should answer for contempt of
motion was violative not only of an order from the second highest court but more
court for misleading if not deceiving the defendant-appellee MTC Judge into doing a
personally was violative of his own oath as a lawyer;
precipitate act of implementing the writ of demolition of appellants family house which
is restrained by this Court, or for making false allegations that led his clients to commit a
contemptuous act. (Cu Unjieng vs. Mitchell, 58 Phil. 476.) His misinterpretation of the
The findings of the Court of Appeals says it all. What all the more moves the undersigned Moreover, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the TRO issued by the Court of
to recommend the ultimate penalty of disbarment against Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is the Appeals was ambiguous in its phraseology, respondent should have carried out the
evident, even palpable disdain, in which he clearly holds this Office in particular, and the intent and the spirit of the said TRO rather than choose to be narrowly technical in
Integrated Bar in general. Nowhere is this disdain more felt than in Atty. Saritas interpreting and implementing the same. In De Leon vs. Torres,19 this Court said:
deliberate and pointed refusal, not only to file an Answer to the complaint against him but
also his unjustified refusal to appear before this Office despite repeated notices. It We desire to call attention to the fact that courts orders, however erroneous they may be,
appears that Atty. Sarita is beyond caring for whatever sanctions this Office may must be respected, especially by the bar or the lawyers who are themselves officers of
recommend against him. Surely, he cannot turn his back on the possibility that the the courts. Court orders are to be respected not because the judges who issue them
complainants prayer may be granted given the seriousness of his (Saritas) misdeeds. should be respected, but because of the respect and consideration that should be
But then, considering that Atty. Sarita has no compunctions about misleading a judge of extended to the judicial branch of the Government. This is absolutely essential if our
the Metropolitan Trial Court into disregarding and violating an order from the Court of Government is to be a government of laws and not of men. Respect must be had not
Appeals, it is no surprise that he would ignore the Commission on Bar Discipline; because of the incumbents to the positions, but because of the authority that vests in
them. Disrespect to judicial incumbents is disrespect to that branch of the Government to
We recommend for the disbarment of Atty. Alvin T. Sarita. which they belong, as well as to the State which has instituted the judicial system.

In its 4 December 1998 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Not only did respondent disobey the order of the Court of Appeals, he also misled the
findings of the investigating commissioner, to wit: trial court judge into issuing the order to implement the writ of demolition which led to the
destruction of the family home of complainant. In doing so, respondent violated his oath
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the of office and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and finding the court. Surely, such conduct of respondent is starkly unbecoming of an officer of the court.
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, Respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is DISBARRED from the practice of law. Respondents behavior also exhibited his reckless and unfeeling attitude towards the
complainant. By disobeying the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, he inflicted deep
The facts and evidence obtaining in this case clearly reveal respondents failure to live up physical and moral injury upon complainant and his family by making them homeless.
to his duties as a member of the Bar in accordance with the Code of Professional Obviously, it did not matter to him whether complainant and his family would still have a
Responsibility, the Lawyers Oath and Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, place to stay as long as he won the case for his client. We would like to emphasize that a
thus warranting disciplinary sanction. lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant
a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of a lawyer to uphold the dignity and authority of party.20 Respondent failed to live up to this expectation.
the court, to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. It is his foremost
responsibility to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial We find the complaint against respondent fully substantiated by the evidence. However,
officers.16 The highest form of respect to the judicial authority is shown by a lawyers we believe that the penalty of disbarment imposed by the Board of Governors of the
obedience to court orders and processes. Integrated Bar of the Philippines is too severe and, hereby reduce it to suspension for
two (2) years from the practice of law.21cräläwvirtualibräry
Atty. Alvin T. Sarita committed an immeasurable disservice to the judicial system when
he openly defied the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals. By such act, he deliberately ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Alvin T. Sarita is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2)
disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the years from the practice of law and from the enjoyment of all rights and privileges
best of his knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity to the courts. He neglected his appurtenant to membership in the Philippine Bar, effective immediately.
duties to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers,17 and to act with candor, fairness and good faith to the Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
courts.18cräläwvirtualibräry Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.