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SMS - A Tool To Standardize Flight Safety

The document discusses the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) within an air force. Some key points: 1. An SMS establishes standardized safety policies, assigns responsibilities, and plans for hazard prevention and risk management to help ensure safe flight operations. 2. The basic components of an SMS include establishing safety policies and objectives, defining roles and responsibilities, implementing planning/training, evaluating performance through incident reporting, and continually improving the system. 3. Elements of an SMS for an air force include establishing a safety vision and goals, incorporating SMS principles into flight procedures, developing an incident reporting system, implementing risk management, providing safety training, and appointing Flight Safety Officers for each unit.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
98 views10 pages

SMS - A Tool To Standardize Flight Safety

The document discusses the implementation of a Safety Management System (SMS) within an air force. Some key points: 1. An SMS establishes standardized safety policies, assigns responsibilities, and plans for hazard prevention and risk management to help ensure safe flight operations. 2. The basic components of an SMS include establishing safety policies and objectives, defining roles and responsibilities, implementing planning/training, evaluating performance through incident reporting, and continually improving the system. 3. Elements of an SMS for an air force include establishing a safety vision and goals, incorporating SMS principles into flight procedures, developing an incident reporting system, implementing risk management, providing safety training, and appointing Flight Safety Officers for each unit.

Uploaded by

Mário Mineiro
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM: A TOOL FOR


STANDARDIZING FLIGHT SAFETY
Group Captain Md Shafiqul Alam, GD(N)

Introduction

1. Aviation has a number of inherent risks not found in normal life activities. For
example, while a car with an engine problem can simply coast to the side of the road in
relative safety, an aircraft with the same problem may have to complete a forced landing.
This extra degree of risks has made aviation one of the most safety conscious disciplines
since its inception in 1903. Aviation safety has come a long way since the early days.
Whilst modern aircraft and aircraft systems are extremely reliable, there remains a need
for all aviators and aviation organisations to create and maintain an active culture of safety
in every facet of their operations. This includes the operations and members of the flying
agencies overseen by the Air Forces or other military aviation agencies. All these flying
agencies - be it military or non-military have their individual accepted and established
safety management system. A comprehensive and well coordinated system can surely act
as a safeguard against any flight safety breach activities. Air Force being a military
oganisation flying activities has to be more concerned regarding a sound management
system and in Bangladesh Air Force is not an exception. This article would specify the
basic concept and fundamental requirement of integrating a Safety Management System
(SMS) in aviation with a special emphasis on Air Force flying.

WHAT IS A SMS?

2. Definition of SMS. An SMS is an integrated set of work practices, beliefs and


procedures for monitoring and enhancing the safety of all aspects of the organization. It is
the bedrock to a good “Safety Culture”. One of the widely accepted definition of SMS is -
“An SMS is an integrated collection of processes, procedures, and programs that ensures
a formalized and proactive approach to system safety through risk management.” Risk
analysis is required for all activities or process changes to identify safety impacts. The
SMS is a closed-loop system ensuring corrective actions or process changes are
documented and all problems or issues are tracked to resolution”. An SMS will not stop
mistakes. However, it will recognize that human error is inevitable and attempts to put

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defences in place for these inevitable errors before they occur. Where the SMS does not
prevent an incident or accident, the SMS will capture the lessons learnt from that event
and improve itself. As such, an SMS is a dynamic system.

3. Impact of Operations. An SMS is not an impediment to the conduct of efficient


operations or to take the sparkle out of our hobby. The SMS operates under the principle
of risk management. By managing risk, the SMS allows the organisation to conduct their
normal operations, but in a more controlled and safer manner than before.

4. Cost of the SMS. An SMS is free in monetary terms, however, it is not free from
effort. The SMS requires a degree of effort by all members of the organisation to first
establish the system and then to maintain the system. The effort required by the members
is for them to make a commitment to the SMS and to adopt and practice the principles
inherent in the SMS in all facets of the operations. The establishment of the SMS requires
staff effort to draft and design the system. This will be followed by an education process
for all members. Adherence of the SMS requires the appointment and the efforts of a
dedicated Flight Safety Officer (FSO) to oversee and manage the processes. For all Air
Forces it is a regular practice to appoint a FSO and BAF also follows that.

Basic Safety Management Components

5. Although the SMS models use different terminology, the process and workflow for
safety management systems is always the same. Since there are many models to choose
from to outline the basic components of a safety management system, the one chosen
here is the international standard promoted by the International Labour Organisation
(ILO). In the ILO document ILO-OSH 2001 Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health
Management Systems, the safety management basic components are:

a. Policy – All organization must formulate or practice an established policy


statements what would define the requirements for the organisation in terms of
resources, define management commitment and define Organisational Safety
Hazards (OSH) targets.

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b. Organizing – The organization must specify - How is the organisation


structured to address the safety issue? Where responsibilities and accountabilities
are defined, who reports to whom and who is responsible for what?

c. Planning and Implementation – There must be specific guideline regarding-


What legislation and standards apply to the organisation, what OSH objectives are
defined and how are these reviews, hazard prevention and the assessment and
management of risk.

d. Evaluation – The system must include - How is OSH performance measured


and assessed, what are the processes for the reporting of accidents and incidents
and for the investigation of accidents and what internal and external audit
processes are in place to review the system.

e. Action for Improvement – How are preventative and corrective actions


managed and what processes are in place to ensure the continual improvement
process. There is a significant amount of detail within each of these sections and
these should be examined in detail from the OSH Guidelines document.

ELEMENTS OF A SMS

6. An SMS is made up of the following elements:

a. The establishment of a safety vision. It is the policy of the authority to


give as much practical encouragement as possible to flying units. The object of
such units is to provide personnel with flying instruction to fly the aircraft as safely
as possible. Safety Vision is established to facilitate the Air Force objective whilst
still maintaining the highest levels of safety and engendering a positive flight safety
culture.

b. The development of safety goals and objectives. Air Force safety department will
achieve its safety vision through the achievement of the specific goals. Each goal is
further broken down into objectives that assist in reaching that goal.

(1) Goal 1. The conduct of safe flight operations on the ground and
in the air.

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a. Objective 1. All flying units are to ensure that their


personnel are educated in the operation.

b. Objective 2. All unit’s FOBs are to be reviewed at


least annually to incorporate safety lessons learnt.

(2) Goal 2. The generation and maintenance of a strong and


positive safety culture in all unit personnel.

a. Objective 1. All units are to ensure that their pilot members


are educated in risk management by a certain time limit.

b. Objective 2. All units are to ensure that their pilot members


are to be educated in the operation of the SMS of Air Force.

(3) Goal 3. The routine conduct of operations over a significant


period of time without any safety incidents or accidents.

a. Objective 1. The Unit FSO is to institute a formal reporting


system of aircraft safety incidents.

b. Objective 2. The Unit FSO is to monitor the type and number


of safety incidents reported by members and provides regular reports
to the Flight Safety Directorate and prepare an annual report to the
Air Force authority.

c. The incorporation of the SMS principles into Unit FOBs and SOPs.

d. The development of a safety incident reporting system. An important


part of any safety system is the ability to record and analyse the number and type
of safety incidents that occur during the organisation’s operations. This requires the
organisation to have a safety reporting system. A successful SRS must engender
the trust of those for whom it works. To do this the SRS must:

(1) Record all relevant data,

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(2) Have a system for actioning reports received,


(3) Be reliable and can be audited,
(4) Be easily accessed by those who need access, and
(5) Not apportion blame or fault

e. The introduction of risk management to the Air Force Unit operations and
decision making.

f. The introduction of an education system for Air Force Personnel.

g. The appointment of a Flight Safety Officer at every unit to manage the


principles of the SMS. FSO is not responsible for the safety of individual unit
operations. The safety of the unit’s operations is the responsibility of the Officer
Commanding of the unit or Base Commander, which may be partly delegated to the
unit FSO.

SMS Implementation Steps

7. Five steps are recommended to phase in SMS:

a. First Step:

(1) Gather information

(2) Evaluate corporate goals and objectives

(3) Determine the viability of committing resources to an SMS


implementation effort

b. Second Step:

(1) Top management commits to providing the resources necessary for


full implementation of SMS throughout the organization.

(2) Conduct Gap Analysis - An initial step in developing an SMS is to


analyze and assess existing programs, systems, processes, and activities
with respect to the SMS functional expectations found in the SMS
Framework. “Gaps” being those elements required by the SMS Framework
that are not already being performed by the service provider.

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(4) Create an implementation plan. The implementation plan is simply a


“road map” describing how the service provider intends to close the existing
gaps by meeting the objectives and expectations in the SMS Framework.

c. Third Step:

(1) Develop and implement a basic safety risk management (SRM)


process and plan

(2) Organize and prepare the organization for further SMS development.

(3) Information acquisition, processing, and analysis functions are


implemented and a tracking system for risk control and corrective actions
are established.

(4) Known deficiencies in safety management practices and operational


processes are corrected.

(5) An awareness of hazards develops and the appropriate systematic


application of preventative or corrective action(s) occurs. This allows for
reaction to unwanted events and problems as they occur and to develop
appropriate remedial action(s)

d. Fourth Step:

(1) Safety risk management (SRM) is applied to initial design of systems,


processes, organizations, and products, development of operational
procedures, and planned changes to operational processes.

(2) The activities involved in the SRM process involve careful analysis of
systems and tasks involved; identification of potential hazards in these
functions, and development of risk controls.

(3) The risk management process developed now is used to analyze,


document, and track these activities.

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(4) The processes are used to look ahead as proactive processes.

e. Fifth Step:

(1) This is the final step in SMS implementation.


(2) Processes are in place and the performance and effectiveness have
been verified.

(3) The complete safety assurance (SA) process, including continuous


monitoring and the remaining features of the other SRM and SA processes
are functioning.

(4) A major objective of a successful SMS is to attain and maintain this


continuous improvement status for the life of the organization

SMS Implications

8. A SMS is intended to act as a framework to allow an organization to meet its legal


obligations under occupational health and safety law. The structure of a SMS is generally
speaking, not of itself a legal requirement but it is an extremely effective tool to organise
the myriad aspects of occupational safety and health (OSH) that can exist within an
organisation, often to meet standards which exceed the minimum legal requirement. A
SMS is most effective safety management means that enable to look at all the risks within
the organization as a single system, rather than having multiple, competing, ‘Safety
Management Silos. If safety is not seen holistically, it can interfere with the prioritization of
improvements or even result in safety issues being missed.

Potential Issues/Challenges

9. During the process of implementing or running the SMS few issues and challenges
may appear. Few of those are as follows:

a. Common taxonomy e.g., ‘Safety Risk Management’ is used with SMS. Army
uses – ‘Crew Risk Management’, and Air Force uses ‘ Operational Risk
Management’.

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b. Analysis of systems and tasks are involved. Systems and tasks not being
equal between entities. (e.g., ‘Flight time’, when does it start and end?).

c. Identification of potential hazards. How this is accomplished and to what


level is not specified. (e.g., Source, mechanism, outcome).

d. Are hazards specific enough? (e.g., ‘FOD’ from runway, or maintenance


debris, or lost tools or all of the above?)

e. There is no formal mechanism/department for certification of SMS. Relying


on self certification which may not be accepted globally. Some organizations offer
certification but their inspection criteria is not always directly tied to ICAO, or FAA
requirements.

f. A variety of SMS formats are materializing which could lead to conflicts


between standards and confusion or need for developing multiple SMSs (FAA,
ICAO, JPDO, etc.)

g. Need to review and align regulations, standards, etc. with SMS


requirements/taxonomy

h. Risk assessment matrixes are not standardized

Conclusion

10. The SMS has been developed to ensure that a systematic approach and
framework is available to introduce a positive safety culture. It is to be remembered that
Air Force flying are conducted at various bases under the supervision of the local
Commanders. The squadrons of BAF operate under the direction of delivering the
objectives set by the Air Headquarter and in that, we are bound to ensure that the very
highest standards of safety are instilled and endured by all the operators. This SMS has
been introduced to ensure that the objectives set by the Air HQ and above are delivered
with the very highest standard of safety in mind and that these standards are instilled and
endorsed by all concerned.

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References:

1. Bob Lee, A Common Aviation Risk Management Model for Aviation Agencies’ Bureau of
Air Safety Investigation, 1989-1999.

2. Royal Air Force Flying Clubs’ Association Safety Management System, Ver 3.0 Dated 21
March 11.

3. Christopher Trumble, Safety Management System, US Army Aviation and Missile


Command, August 2012.

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Biography

Gp Capt Md Shafiqul Alam, psc, GD(N) was commission in Bangladesh Air Force in GD(P) branch
on 30 December 1985. He has served in different Command, Staff and Instructional appointments
in BAF and other inter-services organizations. He was Officer Commanding of Command and Staff
Training Institute (CSTI) BAF. At the Air Headquarter, he served as Director Welfare and
Ceremony, Deputy Director Plans, Deputy Air Secretary and Assistant Director of Air Intelligence.
He served as Deputy President at ISSB and GSO-2 (Air) at Armed Forces Division. He has also
served as Directing Staff (Air) at DSCSC, Mirpur and Directing Staff at CSTI BAF. He served in the
UN mission twice at DR Congo. Apart from all mandatory courses, Group Captain Shafiq has
undergone a number of courses at home and abroad. He is a graduate of Defence Services
Command and Staff College, Mirpur and Royal Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College. He has
also obtained Masters of Defence Studies degree from the National University and Masters in
Business Administration from Private University. He has obtained diploma in Strategic Studies
from University Malaya of Kuala Lumpur. Presently, he is serving as Senior Instructor (SI) of Air
Wing at Defence Services Command and Staff College.

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