ARTICLE 9. Grave Felonies, Less Grave Felonies and Light Felonies.

— Grave felonies
are those to which the law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which in any of
their periods are afflictive, in accordance with article 25 of this Code.

Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their
maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the abovementioned article.

Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 40,000 pesos or both, is provided.

ARTICLE 10. Offenses Not Subject to the Provisions of this Code. — Offenses which are
or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions
of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.

Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. — The following do not incur any

criminal liability:
 
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur;
 
First. Unlawful aggression. chanrobles virtual law library

Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or

repel it. chanrobles virtual law library

Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

defending himself. chanrobles virtual law library

2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first
and second requisites prescribed in the next preceding circumstance
are present, and the further requisite, in case the revocation was
given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no
part therein. chanrobles virtual law library

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger,

provided that the first and second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this Art. are present and that the person defending
be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. chanrobles virtual law library

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act
which causes damage to another, provided that the following
requisites are present;
 
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it. chanrobles virtual law library

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful

exercise of a right or office. chanrobles virtual law library

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior

for some lawful purpose. chanrobles virtual law library

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO OLARBE Y

BALIHANGO, Accused-Appellants.

Accused Rodolfo Olarbe was charged with the crime of murder.

FACTS:
 May 7, 2006 (12am) – the accused, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery with the use of a rifle converted to caliber .22 and a bolo, shoot and hack
Romeo Arca with the said weapons.
 The victim sustained a gunshot wound and hacking wounds on different parts of his body
which resulted to his death.
Version of the DEFENSE:
 He and his wife were sleeping in their house in Laguna. Suddenly they were awakened by
the sound of a gunshot and shouting from Arca who appeared to be drunk.
 Arca was holding a rifle and shouted “mga putang ina ninyo, pagpapatayin ko kayo”.
 Then Arca forcibly entered their house and aimed the gun at them. Olarbe immediately
grabbed the gun from him and they grappled for its possession.
 Olarbe managed to wrest the gun away from Arca.
 In a jiff, Olarbe shot Arca causing the latter to lean sideward. But that didn’t stop the
latter from getting his bolo and continuing to attack them.
 When they reached the outer potion of the house, Olarbe was able to wrestle the bolo and
instantly hacked Arca.
 After the incident, Olarbe voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities.
RTC: rejected Olarbe’s defense. Pronounced him GUILTY of MURDER and employing
treachery. But because he voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities after immediately
killing the victim, he is entitled to the said mitigating circumstance.
CA: AFFIRMED the judgement of the RTC.
ISSUES:
WON the justifying circumstance of self-defense and defense of a stranger may be upheld in
favor of the accused. - YES
RULING:
SC: REVERSED and SETS ASIDE the CA’s decision. ACQUITS accused on the grounds of
SELF-DEFENSE and DEFENSE OF A STRANGER.
RATIO:
In order for Olarbe to exonerate himself on the ground of self-defense under Article 11,
paragraph 1,9 of the Revised Penal Code, he must establish the following facts, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.

Olarbe also invoked defense of stranger under Article 11, paragraph 3,10 of the Revised Penal
Code because Arca was likewise attacking his common-law spouse. Defense of stranger requires
clear and convincing evidence to prove the following, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression by the
victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending
be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.11

The indispensable requisite for either of these justifying circumstances is that the victim must
have mounted an unlawful aggression against the accused or the stranger. Without such
unlawful aggression, the accused is not entitled to the justifying circumstance.
People v. Nugas
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no justified killing in
defense of oneself. The test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances
is whether the aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself; the peril must not be an imagined or imaginary
threat. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b)
imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the
aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be
merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at another
with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand
to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming
to throw a pot.
The CA's rejection of Olarbe's pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger was unwarranted.
Olarbe's conduct following the killing of Arca - of voluntarily surrendering himself to the police
authorities immediately after the killing (i.e., at around 12:30 o'clock in the early morning of
May 8, 2006), and reporting his participation in the killing of Arca to the police authorities -
bolstered his pleas of having acted in legitimate self-defense and legitimate defense of his
common-law spouse. Such conduct manifested innocence.

We find that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and
his common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and
brandished his gun until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Such armed
assault was not a mere threatening act. Olarbe was justified in believing his and his common-
law spouse's lives to be in extreme danger from Arca who had just fired his gun in anger
outside their home and whose threats to kill could not be considered idle in the light of his
having forced himself upon their home. The imminent threat to life was positively strong
enough to induce Olarbe to act promptly to repel the unlawful and unprovoked aggression.
For Olarbe to hesitate to act as he had done would have cost him his own life. Arca's being
dispossessed of his gun did not terminate the aggression, for, although he had been hit on the
head, he quickly reached for the bolo and turned his assault towards Olarbe's common-law
spouse. Olarbe was again forced to struggle for control of the bolo. The swiftness of the action
heightened Olarbe's sense that the danger to their lives was present and imminent.

In judging pleas of self-defense and defense of stranger, the courts should not demand that the
accused conduct himself with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. He
had no time to reflect and to reason out his responses. He had to be quick, and his responses
should be commensurate to the imminent harm.

Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the unlawful aggression does not mean
absolute necessity. It must be assumed that one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient
tranquility of mind to think, calculate and make comparisons that can easily be made in the
calmness of reason. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need.

In determining the reasonable necessity of the means employed, the courts may also look .at and
consider the number of wounds inflicted. A large number of wounds inflicted on the victim can
indicate a determined effort on the part of the accused to kill the victim and may belie the
reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor.20 Here,
however, although Arca sustained several wounds, the majority of the wounds were lacerations
whose nature and extent were not explained. The lack of explanations has denied us the means to
fairly adjudge the reasonableness of the means adopted by Olarbe to prevent or repel Arca's
unlawful aggression.
The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the
sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in
emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has
reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in
law for the consequences.

People vs. Alfredo Dulin

charged of MURDER.
FACTS:
Version of the PROSECUTION:
TAMAYAO:
 Tamayao was on Tamayao Street at about 10pm of August 22, 1990 when a young man
came running from the house of Danao towards the house of Batulan, shouting that his
Uncle Batulan had been stabbed.
 Tamayao rushed towards Danao’s house and there he saw Dulin stabbing Batulan. Dulin
was on top of Batulan, as if kneeling with his left foot touching the ground.
 Dulin was holding Batulan by the hair with his left hand, and thrusting the knife at the
latter with his right hand.
 Tamayao ran towards Batulan’s house to inform Estelita, the victim’s wife, about the
incident. He went home afterwards.
 Tamayao mentioned of a long standing grudge between Batulan and Dulin. Recalled
Dulin uttering: He will soon have his day and I will kill him.
CABALZA (barangay tanod):
 Was in his house around 10pm when he heard a commotion in Danao’s house. It was
Carolina, Danao’s daiughter, screaming for help.
 He went to the scene of the crime and found Batulan at the door of Dana’s house, with
Dulin wielding a sharp pointed instrument.
ESTELITA:
 Testified as well that she knew that there was bad blood between her husband and the
accused.
MEDICAL FINDINGS: victim sustained 12 wounds on his body. (hands, feet, elbow, forearm).
Cause of death was Hypovolemic shock secondary to Massive Hemothorax secondary to
Multiple stab wounds:
Version of the DEFENSE:
 He testified that Batulan was the one who stabbed him first on the right side of his body
and in the left hand.
 He grappled for the weapon until he was able to wrest it from Batulan.
 He stabbed Batulan with the weapon, and they struggled until Dulin felt weak, eventually
falling to the ground.
 Dulin regained consciousness only the next day at the hospital.
 Insisted that there was no grudge between him and Batulan.
RTC: convicted Dulin of the crime of MURDER, appreciating the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense and no aggravating circumstance.
CA: AFFIRMED with modification of the penalty and awards of damages.
ISSUES:
WON the justifying circumstance of self-defense should be appreciated in favor of the accused.
- NO
RULING:
He’s guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
RATIO:
I. There was no self-defense
The burden of proving self-defense rests entirely on him, that he must then prove by clear and
convincing evidence the concurrence of the following elements of self-defense, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.[19] The most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression,[20] which is the
condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense as a justifying circumstance. Unless the victim
committed unlawful aggression against the accused, self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, should not be appreciated, for the two other essential elements of self-defense would
have no factual and legal bases without any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel.
We uphold the finding and holding of the CA. Batulan, albeit the initial aggressor against
Dulin, ceased to be the aggressor as soon as Dulin had dispossessed him of the weapon.
Even if Batulan still went after Dulin despite the latter going inside the house of Danao, where
they again grappled for control of the weapon, the grappling for the weapon did not amount to
aggression from Batulan for it was still Dulin who held control of the weapon at that point.
Whatever Dulin did thereafter – like stabbing Batulan with the weapon – constituted retaliation
against Batulan. In this regard, retaliation was not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the
aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-
defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the aggressor.[23] As such,
there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Batulan to justify his fatal stabbing by Dulin.

It is notable, too, that the results of the medico-legal examination indicating Batulan to have
sustained twelve stab wounds[25] confirmed the cessation of the attack by Batulan. The
numerosity and nature of the wounds inflicted by the accused reflected his determination to kill
Batulan, and the fact that he was not defending himself.

SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of
his deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.

Petitioner was charged with the crime of HOMICIDE

FACTS:
Version of the PROSECUTION:
 At around 2:30pm, petitioner went to the office of Skyes Asia Inc. located in Makati City.
 When petitioner was already inside the building, he went to the work station of the
deceased victim, Jeffrey.
 As petitioner approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun
pointed at the back of Jeffrey’s head.
 At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner holding the gun, and
a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter.
 Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then
pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally
discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him.
 Finally, after shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
Version of the DEFENDANT:
 Petitioner claimed that he went to Skyes Asia, the workplace of his wife, with his
children to fetch her.
 When he reached Darlene’s office, the latter was not on her table. He approached a
Jeffrey and casually introduced himself as the husband of Darlene.
 Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he answered,
"Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response given by Jeffrey shocked and appalled
petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"
  Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up something in his
chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s face followed by a
clicking sound. The gun, however, did not fire.
 Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of
the gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the
gun did not fire.
 Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any
further confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s
path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire
extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the same on petitioner’s head.
 petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the act of parrying, the
gun accidentally fired and the single bullet discharged hit the forehead of Jeffrey, which
caused the death of the latter.
 Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship when he
received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
RTC: convicted the accused of the crime of HOMICIDE.
CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS the RTC’s decision.
ISSUES:
WON the justifying circumstance of self-defense should be upheld in favor of the accused. - NO
RULING:
Petition was DENIED. SC AFFIRMED with modifications the CA’s ruling.
RATIO:

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression;
and (3) lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.10 In other
words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing
reasonable means to resist the attack.11

Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence, his
petition must be denied.

First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful aggression
was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
15
 There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to his
life.16 The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely speculative.17 In
the case at bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not adduce evidence to show
that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions or initiated the confrontation
before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from his chair and tried to shoot petitioner
but failed — an assault which may have caused petitioner to fear for his life.

the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by
wresting the gun from the latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer
any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey.

Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to
self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be sure, when the
present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his
attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal
self-defense on the part of the offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went beyond the call of self-
preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even
when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased.

We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey aimed
and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioner’s head. Alternatively, the
prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield himself
from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon.
People vs. Dela Pena

Charged the accused-appellant of the crime of MURDER.

FACTS:

Version of the PRSECUTION:

 Ernie, the son of the victim Olipio, testified that in the afternoon of December 14, 2006,
he went to their nipa hut after tending to their carabaos.

 He saw the accused enter the nipa hut where his father was sleeping.

 Olipio was lying face down when the accused stabbed him at the back with a bolo
(pinuti).

 He watched the accused stab his father several times.

 The accused then threatened to kill Ernie prompting him to run towards home to tell his
mother about the incident.

Version of the DEFENSE:

 Accused appellant alleged that while he was on his way home, Olipio called and
motioned him to come near him.

 Olipio then told the accused about the banana plants that were uprooted.

 The accused inquired as to the reason for Olipio’s action, but the latter simply told him
not to get angry otherwise he would kill him.
  When the accused answered “no”. Olipio pulled out his bolo and thrust towards him
(stomach).

 They wrestled for the bolo and when the accused got a hold of it, he stabbed Olipio.

RTC: convicted him of the crime of MURDER.

CA: AFFIRMED the ruling RTC.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:

WON the justifying circumstance of self defense may be upheld in favor of the accused. - NO

RULING:

SC DENIED the petition. AFFIRMED the ruling of the CA.

RATIO:

By invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, accused-appellant thus admits

committing the acts constituting the crime for which he was charged and the burden of proof is
on him to establish that (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

The appearances of the wounds on the victim’s heart, his internal organ, and large intestine
contradict accused-appellant’s defense that he had only hit Olipio twice in the stomach and that
after the second blow, both of them fell and rolled on the ground which caused the wounds at the
back.

Assuming that Olipio was the aggressor, it is nevertheless apparent that at the time he was killed,
the danger of the accused-appellant had already ceased. Notably, even after taking full control of
the bolo, he attacked the victim several times and stabbed him to death. Settled is the rule that
when the unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound
the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense committed.
ISIDRO MIRANDA y PARELASIO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Petitioner was charged with the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.

FACTS:

Version of the PROSECUTION:

 Evening of August 14, 2011, victim Pilo attended the party of his niece at Brgy.
Binonoan, Quezon.

 After the party, he and his friend (Damaso) left. On their way home, they passed by the
house of Miranda and threw stoned at the latter’s home.

 While Pilo was on his way home, Miranda suddenly went outside and started hacking
Pilo. He hit pilo’s right forehead.

 In an attempt to stop Miranda, Damaso threw a stone at him. Thereafter, Damaso grabbed
possession of the bolo.
Version of the DEFENSE:

 Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice, but claimed that his acts were
done in self-defense.

RTC: convicted Miranda of the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE. Further held that
Miranda failed to prove that his act of hacking Pilo was legally justified.

CA: AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIO the RTC’s judgement.

ISSUES:

WON the justifying circumstance of self-defense may be upheld in favor of the petitioner.

RULING:

SC DENIED the petition for lack of merit. AFFIRMED with modifications the CA’s decision.

RATIO:

the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the attack was accompanied by the
following circumstances: (i) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (ii) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (iii) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.31 The accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution, for even if the
prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted
his acts.32

Significantly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (i) there must have been a physical or material attack or assault; (ii) the
attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (iii) the attack or assault must be
unlawful.34 To be sure, the accused must show that the aggression caused by the victim in fact
put his life or personal safety in real and grave peril. This danger must not be a mere imagined
threat.

Equally important, imminent unlawful aggression means that the attack against the accused is
impending or at the point of happening. This scenario must be distinguished from a mere
threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively
strong.35

The evidence on record does not support Miranda's contention that Pilo employed unlawful
aggression against him. It must be remembered that Pilo was merely throwing stones at the house
of Miranda. Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo did not throw stones at him,
much less, utter any invectives, or threatening words against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw
merely hit Miranda's roof and door.36
Equally telling is the fact that when Miranda asked Pilo why he was throwing stones, the latter
did not respond but simply remained mum, and threw a stone at Miranda's iron door. Miranda
even further narrated that after throwing stones, Pilo even approached him, which made him
believe that Pilo was trying to make peace with him.37 This certainly belies an impending threat
to Miranda's life.

It is all too apparent that Miranda's life was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed
against Miranda. More than this, Miranda even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with
him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any actual, sudden, unexpected or
imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself.

Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when the
latter was completely defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force beyond
what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant's attack-and is certainly unjustified.

Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Pilo stooped down to the ground,
which Miranda perceived as a threat that Pilo was going to pick up a stone, there is absolutely
nothing life-threatening in such a situation. It must be emphasized that imminent unlawful
aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim.41 Undoubtedly, Pilo's act of
simply stooping down to the ground was in no way a threat to Miranda's life.

The Court elucidated that although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased to
be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the accused did
thereafter is no longer self-defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-defense. In
retaliation, the aggression that the victim started already ceased when the accused attacked him,
but in self-defense, the aggression was still continuing when the accused injured the
aggressor.43 In the instant case, Miranda continued to hack Pilo even after the latter stopped
throwing stones. Plainly, Miranda's act constituted a retaliation against Pilo. Certainly at this
point, Miranda was no longer motivated by the lawful desire of defending himself, but of the evil
intent of retaliating and harming Pilo.

The Court, likewise, notes that the means employed by Miranda was not reasonably
commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. The means
employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel
an unlawful aggression."45 Here, the victim Pilo was armed with a stone, in contrast to the 1½-
inch bolo that Miranda was brandishing.
NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Petitioner was charged with HOMICIDE.

FACTS:

Version of the PROSECUTION:

 September 16, 1995 – appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo.

 When he went home to Romblom late in the afternoon, appellant saw the group of Lani
Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte frinking gin at the house of
spouses Guarte.

 Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise.
  Thereupon, appellant proceeded inside the house and went to sleep.

 Around 9pm, Gerardo Faminia arrived at the Guarte house and asked for left-over food.

 Eliza prepared dinner for him and after Gerardo finished eating he went home to
accompany Ricky.

 Minutes later, Ricky came back and together with Lani, Rex and Michael, went to sleep
at the Guarte house.

 They had not laid down for long when they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the
house. The stoning was made three (3) times.

 Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant stoning their house.

 Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellant’s house. Ricky asked appellant,
his uncle, why he was stoning their house.

 Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (appellant’s) house and,
without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo.

 Lani saw Ricky leaning on the ground and supporting his body with his hands. Lani
helped Ricky stand up and brought him to the main road.

 He was brought to the hospital and where he died while being operated.

MEDICAL FINDINGS: sustained 1 stab wound on his chest. Died due to massive blood loss.

Version of the DEFENSE:

 He was awakened at around 9:30 p.m. by loud noises coming from Ricky and his three
companions. He peeped through the window grills of his house and admonished them not
to make any loud noises. Ricky, who was then already inebriated, was incensed; he
pulled out a balisong, pushed the door, and threatened to stab the petitioner. The
petitioner pushed their sala set against the door to block the entry of Ricky, but the latter
continued to push the door open with his hands and body. The petitioner ran to the upper
portion of their house and got his bolo.5 He returned to the door and pushed it with all his
might using his left hand. He then pointed his bolo, which was in his right hand, towards
Ricky. The bolo accidentally hit Ricky on the stomach, and the latter lost his balance and
fell to the floor. The petitioner, thereafter, surrendered to the barangay captain.

RTC: GUILTY of HOMICIDE with MC of voluntary surrender.

CA: AFFIRMED with modifications RTC’s ruling.

ISSUES:
WON the justifying circumstance of self-defense should be upheld in favor of the petitioner.

RULING:

SC DENIED the petition. AFFIRMED the CA’s decision.

RATIO:

It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said
defenses are intrinsically antithetical.11 There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the
realm of criminal law.

Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily implies a
deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of
another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the
consequences of his deliberate acts. The defense is based on necessity which is the supreme and
irresistible master of men of all human affairs, and of the law. From necessity, and limited by it,
proceeds the right of self-defense.

The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on
his part to cause it.

To prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof,
namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on
the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the
aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.23 Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.24 We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete:

The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While
it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant’s house which would give
a semblance of verity to appellant’s version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the
fact that Ricky arrived at appellant’s house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to
ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky’s) house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or
defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky’s arrival at appellant’s doorstep.
Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act that
may have imperiled appellant’s well-being. Ricky’s want of any weapon when he arrived at
appellant’s doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and
that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus,
appellant’s version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression.

People vs. Pletado, the Supreme Court held:

 "xxx (F) or aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
[un]expected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude (People vs. Pasco, Jr., supra, People vs. Rey, 172 SCRA 149
[1989]) and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real
aggression (Pacificar vs. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 716 [1983]). Unlawful
aggression must be such as to put in real peril the life or personal safety of the
person defending himself or of a relative sought to be defended and not an
imagined threat."

Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant’s life
necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be
an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant’s claim of self-defense must fail.

Those circumstances if present or attendant in the commission of a felony would serve to exempt
the offender from criminal liability but not from civil liability.

In this case, the offender acted without voluntariness. There is absence of either criminal intent/
freedom of action or intelligence.

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the

following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval. chanrobles virtual law library

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which

the law defines as a felony (delito), the court shall order his
confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the same court. chanrobles virtual law library

2. A person under nine years of age. chanrobles virtual law library

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has
acted with discernment, in which case, such minor shall be
proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of
this Code. chanrobles virtual law library

When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the

court, in conformably with the provisions of this and the preceding
paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his family
who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise,
he shall be committed to the care of some institution or person
mentioned in said Art. 80. chanrobles virtual law library

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention
of causing it.
chanrobles virtual law library

5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force. chanrobles virtual law library

6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear

of an equal or greater injury. chanrobles virtual law library

7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when

prevented by some lawful insuperable cause. chanrobles virtual law library