NATO STANDARD

AASTP-5

NATO GUIDELINES FOR THE

STORAGE, MAINTENANCE AND
TRANSPORT OF AMMUNITION ON
DEPLOYED MISSIONS OR
OPERATIONS
Edition 1 Version 3

JUNE 2016

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

ALLIED AMMUNITION STORAGE AND TRANSPORT PUBLICATION

Published by the
NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)
© NATO/OTAN
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NATO GUIDELINES FOR THE

STORAGE, MAINTENANCE AND
TRANSPORT OF AMMUNITION ON
DEPLOYED MISSIONS OR
OPERATIONS

DISCLAIMER

The NATO Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication AASTP-5, “NATO Guidelines for the
Storage, Maintenance and Transport of Ammunition on Deployed Missions or Operations”, is a NATO
document involving NATO property rights.

The guidelines and techniques given in this document, in the opinion of the Group of Experts, among
the best available at the time of publication.

Adherence to these guidelines should provide an acceptable level of safety of ammunition and
explosives operations. It does not ensure or guarantee a risk-free situation; neither can the guidelines
cater for every possible situation, which could be encountered. Because of the inherent danger in
handling ammunition and explosives, the Group of Experts cannot be held responsible for any mishap
or accident resulting from the use of this document.
 NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO)

NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION

20 June 2016

1. The enclosed Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication AASTP-5,

Edition 1, Version 3, NATO GUIDELINES FOR THE STORAGE, MAINTENANCE
AND TRANSPORT OF AMMUNITION ON DEPLOYED MISSIONS OR
OPERATIONS, has been approved by the nations in the CNAD AMMUNITION
SAFETY GROUP (CASG - AC/326), is promulgated herewith. The agreement of
nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 4657.

2. AASTP-5, Edition 1, Version 3 is effective upon receipt and supersedes

AASTP-5, Edition 1, Version 2, which should be destroyed in accordance with local
procedures for the destruction of documents.

3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,

used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the
publisher. With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member or
partner nations, or NATO commands and bodies.

4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60.

Edvardas MAZEIKIS
Major General, LTUAF
Director, NATO Standardization Office
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RESERVED FOR NATIONAL LETTER OF PROMULGATION

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RECORD OF RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS

[nation] [detail of reservation]

Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of
promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document
Database for the complete list of existing reservations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1 AWARENESS GUIDE FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER ...................... 1-1

1.0 NATO EXPLOSIVES SAFETY AND MUNITIONS RISK MANAGEMENT (ESMRM) POLICY 1-1
1.1 GENERAL .................................................................................................................................. 1-1
1.2 MANAGEMENT ......................................................................................................................... 1-2
1.3. EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PROGRAM ......................................................................................... 1-3
1.4. RECONNAISSANCE ................................................................................................................. 1-3
1.5. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES .................................................................................................. 1-4
1.6. IMPLEMENTATION ................................................................................................................... 1-4
1.7. THREATS AND PROTECTION ................................................................................................. 1-5
1.7.1 FIRE PROTECTION ....................................................................................................... 1-5
1.7.2 DISTANCE TO TRANSMITTING STATIONS ................................................................ 1-5
1.7.3 SECURITY ...................................................................................................................... 1-5
1.7.4 BARRICADES AND APPROVED STRUCTURES ......................................................... 1-6
1.7.5 WEATHER AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION ................................................................ 1-6
1.8. TRANSPORT ............................................................................................................................. 1-6
1.9. RESERVED ................................................................................................................................ 1-6
1.10. ACCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION .................................................................... 1-7
1.11. AMNESTY PROGRAM .............................................................................................................. 1-7
1.12. MISSILE INSTALLATIONS ....................................................................................................... 1-7
1.13. CONCLUDING A MILITARY OPERATION OR MISSION ........................................................ 1-7
ANNEX A CHECKLIST FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER .................................................A-1
CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES FOR THE SPECIALISTS ............................................................ 2-1
2.1. GENERAL .................................................................................................................................. 2-1
2.1.1 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................... 2-1
2.1.2 DEVIATIONS .................................................................................................................. 2-1
2.1.3 RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................................................................... 2-2
2.1.4 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS................................................................................... 2-3
2.2. MULTINATIONAL (MN) INSTALLATION OPERATIONS ........................................................ 2-6
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2-6
2.2.2 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY BOARD (ESB) .......................................................................... 2-6
2.2.3 CRITICAL EXPLOSIVES SAFETY ELEMENTS ............................................................ 2-7
2.3. PLANNING RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING DESIGN FOR A COMPOUND ............... 2-9
2.3.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 2-9
2.3.2 PLANNING ...................................................................................................................... 2-9
2.3.3 RECONNAISSANCE .................................................................................................... 2-11
2.3.4 DESIGN PHASE ........................................................................................................... 2-12
2.3.5 BARRICADES............................................................................................................... 2-13
2.3.6 SITE PLAN DOCUMENT PREPARATION AND APPROVAL ..................................... 2-16
2.4. OPERATIONAL AMMUNITION ON SAFETY PROCEDURES .............................................. 2-16
2.4.1 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................ 2-16
2.4.2 STORAGE CG .............................................................................................................. 2-16

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2.4.3 TRANSPORT AND STORAGE OF CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION (CEA) ........ 2-18
2.4.4 DESTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION (INCLUDING EMERGENCY DESTRUCTION) ... 2-18
2.4.5 AMMUNITION PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS ........................................................ 2-19
2.4.6 SURVEILLANCE .......................................................................................................... 2-19
2.4.7 STORAGE OF LIMITED QUANTITIES ........................................................................ 2-20
2.4.8 PARKING OF UP-LOADED VEHICLES ....................................................................... 2-21
2.5. PROTECTION .......................................................................................................................... 2-22
2.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION ..................................................................................................... 2-22
2.5.2 ELECTRO-MAGNETIC (EM) RADIATION PROTECTION .......................................... 2-26
2.5.3 WEATHER PROTECTION ........................................................................................... 2-26
2.5.4 ELECTRICAL SAFETY…………………………………………………………………...2-28
2.5.5 SECURITY .................................................................................................................... 2-28
2.6. FIELD DISTANCES ................................................................................................................. 2-28
2.6.1 GENERAL ..................................................................................................................... 2-28
2.6.2 THE STORAGE OF READINESS AMMUNITION ........................................................ 2-34
2.6.3 AIRFIELDS USED DURING DEPLOYED MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS ................ 2-35
2.6.4 FORWARD AMMUNITION AND REFUELLING POINT (FARP) ................................. 2-37
2.7. RISK MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................. 2-37
2.7.1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 2-37
2.7.2 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS ................................................................................ 2-38
2.7.3 QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS................................................................................ 2-48
2.7.4 RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT ....................................................................................... 2-52
2.8. TRANSPORT ........................................................................................................................... 2-53
2.9. ACCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION .................................................................. 2-57
2.10. MUNITIONS AMNESTY PROGRAM ....................................................................................... 2-58
2.11. MISSILE INSTALLATIONS ..................................................................................................... 2-62
2.12. CONCLUDING A MILITARY OPERATION ............................................................................. 2-63
2.12.1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 2-63
2.12.2. CONSOLIDATION AND COLLECTION (RECEPTION) ................................................. 2-64
2.12.3. STORAGE ........................................................................................................................ 2-64
2.12.4. TRANSPORTATION ........................................................................................................ 2-65
2.12.5. DISTRIBUTION / COLLECTION ..................................................................................... 2-65
2.12.6. MAINTENAN0CE ............................................................................................................. 2-66
2.12.7. RETROGRADE ................................................................................................................ 2-66
2.12.8. DISPOSAL ....................................................................................................................... 2-66
2.12.9. POST-OPERATION ACTIVITIES .................................................................................... 2-66
ANNEX B EXPLOSIVES SAFETY OFFICER .....................................................................................B-1
B.1. COMPETENCIES OF AN EXPLOSIVES SAFETY OFFICER ..................................................B-1
ANNEX C AMMUNITION SAFETY INSPECTIONS ...........................................................................C-1
ANNEX D TABLES FOR QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS ..............................................................D-1
D.1. CONSEQUENCE TABLES ........................................................................................................D-1
ANNEX E CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS TOOL .................................................................................. E-1

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E.1. WEBLINK TO THE TOOL ......................................................................................................... E-1

E.2. BACKGROUND AND USER’S MANUAL ................................................................................. E-1
E.3. APPENDIX - USER’S MANUAL ............................................................................................ 1-E-1
ANNEX F ES STRUCTURE CLASSES FOR CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS....................................... F-1
ANNEX G EXPLOSIVES LICENCE (SAMPLE ) ................................................................................. G-1
ANNEX H VERSION 2 – LIST OF REFERENCES .............................................................................H-1

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CHAPTER 1 AWARENESS GUIDE FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

1.0 NATO EXPLOSIVES SAFETY AND MUNITIONS RISK MANAGEMENT

(ESMRM) POLICY

a. NATO commanders and NATO nations participating in NATO

operations shall comply with NATO explosives safety requirements of
AASTP-1 or AASTP-5, as applicable.
b. When NATO explosives safety requirements cannot be met, the risk
management process given in Allied Logistics Publication – 16 (ALP-
16) shall be followed.
c. Munitions and munitions-related risk decisions by appropriate senior
decision makers are both NATO commander and national
responsibilities.
(1) For risk assessments with high and medium risk levels within
operational plans, a general or flag officer within the NATO chain of
command is responsible for making the risk decision.
(2) For risk assessments with high and medium risk levels at an MN
base requiring a risk decision at a higher level within the chain of
command, operational NATO commanders shall endorse and
forward to the appropriate NATO commander with risk decision
authority.
(3) Risk assessments with a low risk level do not require approval
delegation and can be approved by operational commanders.
(4) Risk decisions affecting other nations’ personnel, assets, or
missions, as well as any unrelated personnel to the munitions
operation, shall always be made by a general or flag officer within
the NATO operational chain of command.

1.1 GENERAL

1. AASTP-5 will assist the planning, transport, reconnaissance, establishment and

management of ammunition in the deployed environment.

2. AASTP-5, Chapter 1, is intended to serve as an awareness guideline for

Operational Commanders. Chapter 2 of this publication is intended for use by the
Operational Commander’s Specialist.

3. AASTP-5 establishes minimum Field Distances (FD) for Net Explosive Quantity
(NEQ) not to exceed 4,000 kg beyond which AASTP-1 Quantity Distances (QD)
shall apply.

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4. AASTP-5 is effective upon receipt. AASTP-5, like other AC/326 AASTPs and
AOPs, will be revised periodically. Comments from users of this publication are
invited. Comments should be directed to the Secretary of the AC/326 at NATO
HQ; Brussels, Belgium.

5. Annex H is a list of technical documents that were significant in the development

of version 2 of AASTP-5.

1.2 MANAGEMENT

1. The Operational Commander has overall responsibility for munitions safety.

2. Commanders are accountable for striking a balance between safety and

operational requirements using the information available. They must be informed
when minimum explosives safety standards cannot be met and must understand
the hazards and consequences, and accept the risk of any deviation from those
standards.

3. The risk and consequences of an accidental explosion of ammunition stockpiles

must be considered as part of the force protection assessment. Analysing the
risk can be very complex, particularly when multiple nations are occupying the
base camp/airfield. Therefore, it is recommended that during the operational
planning process, provision should be made to involve those personnel
responsible for the storage and management of ammunition.

4. The requirement to establish an Explosives Safety Board (ESB) on a MN

installation shall be formally addressed in NATO planning and operational
documentation. The ESB Chair position should periodically be rotated among
Nations to spread management responsibilities.

5. A competent person(s) of an appropriate rank/grade shall be appointed as the

Explosives Safety Officer (ESO), to be responsible for advising on all explosives
matters. In a MN setting, and for the safety of all participants, it is especially
important that nations co-located on a MN installation select a Lead ESO to
coordinate the execution of critical explosives safety elements on that installation.
The Lead ESO shall also address matters that threaten the force if an explosive
storage facility or operation is not properly managed and provide explosive safety
input to the G3/J3 Force Protection Assessment. Critical explosives safety
elements are further discussed in AASTP-5, paragraph 2.2.3.

6. If deviations to explosives safety requirements are necessary implement the risk

management process given in paragraph 2.7.

7. In a MN environment, risk decisions must be coordinated and communicated with

other nations impacted by such decisions, as one nations risk acceptance cannot

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be assumed to reflect other nations' acceptance. (See paragraph 2.1.2.3)

Item Checked 
1.3. EXPLOSIVES SAFETY PROGRAM

1. The Operational Commander is responsible for initiating and maintaining an

Explosives Safety Program (ESP). ESP is a functional program combining
occupational safety training with operational and support activities of the Force.
The aim of the program is to prevent accidental bodily harm, and damage or loss
of materiel or facilities (i.e. military and civilian) from the hazardous effects of
accidental explosions.

2. The primary effects to be considered are blast overpressure, ammunition

fragments, debris from the storage facility, crater ejecta, ground shock, and
thermal effects. Each of the explosion effects can cause injuries to personnel
and damage to assets. The level of injuries or damage is dependent on the
Potential Explosion Site (PES), the location of all ammunition activities (storage
and operations).

3. The PES shall clearly identified on a map. The map shall include the safety arcs
associated with each PES in order to define hazardous areas and land restricted
from use.

4. Generally the NEQ, type of storage facility and its orientation towards the
Exposed Site (ES) and the stand-off distance of the ES has a direct effect on the
consequences, and therefore the risk(s) of an explosive accident.

Item Checked 

1.4. RECONNAISSANCE

1. Site selection should be based on a reconnaissance which examines all relevant

ammunition safety factors. Annex A of Chapter 1 provides a Reconnaissance
checklist for the Operational Commander.

2. The aim of the reconnaissance is to find an appropriate site for the storage of the
unit’s ammunition. Main factors include:

a. The size of the storage area;

b. Safety distances to accommodation and maintenance area of the camp
and neighbouring camps;
c. Safety distances to civilian buildings, roads, airfields, railroads;
d. General suitability (ground quality, topography, etc.);

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e. Availability of technical utilities.

See also Chapter 2 Annex C for more details.

3. The results of the reconnaissance process is to be documented, checked for

compliance with the provisions in this document and submitted to the appropriate
channels, such as G3, G4 of the operating nation as well as the host nation. The
appropriate authority must approve the reconnaissance report.

Item Checked 

1.5. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES

1. The principle objective of the Field Storage concept is the dispersion of

ammunition to minimize the loss in the event of fire, accidental explosion, or
enemy action. Separate areas must be established for storing, marshalling and
examining ammunition, for parking ammunition vehicles and for storing
returned/found/captured ammunition.

2. An ammunition storage site may be used to store containers, flat racks or stacks
separately or in combination. The minimum distance requirements specified in
AASTP-5 must be met for both internal (inside the storage site) and external (off-
post).

3. Ammunition shall be stored in accordance with the FD’s outlined in paragraph

2.6. The use of barricades will reduce the amount of space needed for storing
ammunition.

4. Captured ammunition shall be stored separately from own ammunition (see

paragraph 2.4.3 for details).

5. Roads in, and leading to, explosive facilities are to be maintained in a good state
to reduce the risk of vehicle accidents.
Item Checked 

1.6. IMPLEMENTATION

1. Personnel controlling or supervising the handling of munitions at field depots

must be appointed by the Commander. The person designated must be
thoroughly familiar with the operation, and clearly understand the hazards and
risks.

2. Any relaxation in safety standards requires a risk management process. This

process is a systematic procedure that will determine if an acceptable level of
protection is provided. Acceptance of risk is to be made by the appropriate

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authority (see paragraph 1.0.c).

Item Checked 
1.7. THREATS AND PROTECTION

1.7.1 FIRE PROTECTION

1. Fire represents a significant threat to a munition storage area and every effort
shall be taken to reduce the threat of fire.

2. Fire protection plans must be prepared for each facility used to store munitions.

3. An emergency water supply must be provided for fire fighting purposes.

4. Fires in the vicinity of munitions should be fought until munitions stacks become
involved in the fire.

Caution: Fires of munitions Hazard Divisions (HD 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.6) shall
not be fought!

5. Each PES shall be identified by the prescribed fire division symbol of the most
hazardous material present. However, an updated and central key plan of the
PESs contents is the preferred method to posting symbols in a tactical
environment.

6. Munitions which have been exposed to fire are considered unsafe to handle and
transport. Qualified personnel must be consulted in deciding on future action.
Item Checked 

1.7.2 DISTANCE TO TRANSMITTING STATIONS

1. Minimum distances must be maintained from transmitting stations, dependent on

the transmission power, see paragraph 2.6.
Item Checked 

1.7.3 SECURITY

1. The presence/movement of the stocks should be advertised as little as possible

(by signing, placarding etc), whilst safety practices, and the expectations of the
host nation and visiting troops. The number of personnel with access to the
storage, both in the physical sense and to the stock register should be limited to
the minimum.

2. Possible security measures:

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a. A personnel access list;

b. Surveillance system;
c. Intrusion barricades;
d. Physical and electronic security measures;
e. Security response plans.
Item Checked 

1.7.4 BARRICADES AND APPROVED STRUCTURES

1. Barricades function by stopping ammunition fragments, and protecting stored

ammunition against external threats, such as enemy fire.

2. Effective barricades between ammunition modules prevent sympathetic

detonations. Barricades around PESs protect personnel and material from
horizontal high velocity fragments.

3. Barricades can be provided by sloped terrain, sandbags, gabion mounds for

earth-covered buildings and elevations (see paragraph 2.3.5 for more details).
Item Checked 

1.7.5 WEATHER AND LIGHTNING PROTECTION

1. Ammunition should not be exposed unnecessarily to inclement weather or direct

sunlight and should be protected from sand, mud and water which can all have a
serious impact on reliability as well as safety. Ammunition should not be
unpacked except for operational necessity.

2. Storage of ammunition under cover is preferred. Ammunition must not touch the
walls or ceiling of a structure in order to allow proper ventilation.

3. If ammunition is stored in closed and properly grounded ISO containers it can be

considered protected from lightning (see paragraph 2.5.3.3).
Item Checked 

1.8. TRANSPORT

1. STANAG 4441 and requirements of Allied Movement Publication -6 (AMovP-6)

shall be followed.
Item Checked 
1.9. RESERVED

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1.10. ACCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION

1. A national accident reporting and investigation process shall be established for

reporting, investigating and analyzing explosives accidents with the aim to
prevent a like occurrence thus improving safety, and not to allocate blame (not a
criminal investigation). A report shall be prepared and communicated that
includes recommendations for corrective action(s) and lessons learned.(See
paragraph 2.9).
Item Checked 

1.11. AMNESTY PROGRAM

1. Sole nation on a NATO base shall implement an Munitions Amnesty program.

2. Two or more nations on a NATO base, as an integral part of a NATO Base’s

explosives safety and munitions risk management (ESMRM) program, support the
NATO base´s Munitions Amnesty Program.

3. Further details can be found in paragraph 2.10.

Item Checked 

1.12. MISSILE INSTALLATIONS

1. Mobile missile systems (e.g., Patriot) positioned around or in the vicinity of a

NATO base and which are being used in a static, defensive role shall be treated
as PES and require additional special consideration due to inherent hazards they
present to their surrounding environment.

2. When determining locations for missile systems, the threats posed by such
systems to its surroundings need to be understood, considered, and coordinated
with the Lead ESO before missile locations are selected (See paragraph 2.11).
Item Checked 

1.13. CONCLUDING A MILITARY OPERATION OR MISSION

1. Support and implement the activities associated with concluding a military

operation or mission (see paragraph 2.12.)
Item Checked 

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AASTP-5

ANNEX A CHECKLIST FOR THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDER

1. What are the explosives safety threats for the mission.

2. Is there an up-to-date reconnaissance report available?

3. Is there sufficient knowledge available in the reconnaissance party concerning

ammunition safety and ammunition risk management (storage, handling &
maintenance)?

4. Is there an officer responsible for ammunition safety and risk management during
this operation?

5. Are there enough qualified personnel for the safe handling of ammunition?

6. Is there enough space for the safe storage, handling and maintenance of the
ammunition i.a.w. the recommendations of AASTP-5? If not what are the effects
and the risks for the own troops and material?

7 Are the explosive risks known and communicated?

8. Are the effects/consequences known if a PES explodes?

9. Has risk decision been made where FD / QD distances can not be met?

10. Is it necessary to store ammunition in climatized containers/storage locations?

11. Is there a location available for the storage of damaged/enemy ammunition?

12. If it’s necessary to have ammunition directly available for use on the camp:
a. Where is this ammunition stored?
b. How is this ammunition stored?
c. What are the risks of this kind of storage for the own troops?
d. Is there a lightning protection system applied for the explosive storage and
operating location?

13. What firefighting arrangements are in place?

14. Is there a surveillance plan available (condition of the ammunition). Is there a

response plan for security issues?

15. Has an Amnesty Program been established? Item Checked 

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CHAPTER 2 GUIDELINES FOR THE SPECIALISTS

2.1. GENERAL

2.1.1 SCOPE

1. AASTP-5 Chapter 2, establishes NATO guidelines for the storage, maintenance

and transport of ammunition during deployed missions and operations. It assists
in the planning, reconnaissance, and establishment of an Ammunition Area in a
deployed environment and then for the management of the ammunition. It is
intended for use by the Operational Commander's specialist.

2. AASTP-5 Chapter 2 establishes minimum requirements that are based on

reducing the Maximum Credible Event (MCE) to no greater than 4,000 kg Net
Explosive Quantity (NEQ), to avoid/reduce loss of personnel and material,
minimize the effects of unintended detonations/reactions during storage,
transportation and handling or as a result of enemy action. If the 4,000 kg MCE
is exceeded, then requirements of AASTP-1 shall apply.

3. The Field Distances (FD) provided in AASTP-5, Chapter 2, provide the same
level of protection to non-related personnel and the public as that found in
AASTP-1. With regards to the protection of in-camp personnel and structures,
the FD consider the hazards associated with blast, fragments, debris, and
building collapse, as well as the PES and ES construction, to provide a level of
protection to ensure personnel will still be capable of continuing their mission.
However, it should be emphasized that even with adherence to Field Distances
(FD) tables provided herein, damages to structures and injuries (even lethality) to
personnel could still occur. It is important to note that this would also be the case
with AASTP-1 QD. Field Distances (FD) within AASTP-5, Chapter 2 do not
consider asset protection.

2.1.2 DEVIATIONS

1. Before the Operational Commander makes any decision to deviate from AASTP-
1 or AASTP-5 as applicable, it is advisable that specialists are consulted (for
example fire fighting, ammunition safety, security, transport) and asked to
highlight any possible consequence of relaxation of certain rules. Any advice
provided to the Operational Commander must be documented and properly
recorded.

2. Where the requirements of this document cannot be met, a consequence and/or

risk analysis must be conducted before making a decision to deviate from these
guidelines. This analysis is a systematic procedure that will determine if an

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acceptable level of protection is provided. Acceptance of risk must be made only

after considered judgment of the balance of risk after development,
implementation and enforcement of control measures to mitigate negative effects
whilst maintaining operational effectiveness. Any request for deviation must be
approved by the appropriate authority.

3. Coordination
(1) Coordinate with National Representatives.
Coordinate all risk decisions with affected nations and obtain their
concurrence with the ESMRM assessment, thereby informing affected
nations of the associated munitions-related risks and encouraging their
participation in the risk mitigation process.
(2) Lack of Response from National Authorities.
In the event that a nation chooses not to engage in the ESMRM process,
NATO ESMRM requirements shall still apply and the ESMRM risk-decision
shall be made by a general or flag officer delegated risk-decision authority
within the NATO chain of command. The risk decision package shall
document that a particular nation chose not to participate in the ESMRM
process and their reason for doing so.

4. Prior to an Operational Commander authorizing a deviation to this manual, it

must be recognized that it may have a follow on effect to other nations in the
event that they take over the compound. Further, prior to endorsing or approving
a deviation , the Operational Commander must recognize that they may not only
be putting own nation's personnel at risk but potentially also other nations
personnel (See 1.0).

2.1.3 RESPONSIBILITIES

1. The ESO is responsible for managing the Operational Commander ESMRM

Program. The Operational Commander is accountable for striking a balance
between safety and operational requirements using the information available and
must therefore be made aware of the consequences of any deviation from safety
criteria.

2. It is recommended that during the planning, reconnaissance and construction

processes, provision should be made to involve those personnel responsible for
the storage and management of ammunition. During the operational phase, an
Explosives Safety Officer (ESO) shall be appointed. The ESO is responsible for
advising the Operational Commander on all explosives safety matters. The
competencies required by an ESO are detailed at Annex B together with a
checklist for inspections by an ESO.

3. Access to an Ammunition Area is the Operational Commander’s responsibility.

Access decisions should be based upon J2/J3 advice.

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4. It is a responsibility of the Commander to ensure that an adequate Munitions

Surveillance Program is being carried out, and any deviations that affect safety or
operational capability must be immediately reported to the Commander.

5. Assume responsibility for the management of the the Commander’s Munitions

Amnesty Program and supports the NATO Base’s Munition Amnesty Program as
applicable.

2.1.4 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

1. Key Terminology
MUST Indicates a technical requirement which is vital for the safety of a depot
and the avoidance of a catastrophe.
SHOULD Indicates a safety requirement which is important but not
essential.
MAY/CAN Indicates optional courses of action and possibilities.
IS/ARE Indicates a fact or a valid technique. (from AASTP-1)

2. Acronyms
AASTP Allied Ammunition Storage and Transport Publication
ADR European Agreement on the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods
AE Ammunition and Explosives
AIS Accident Information Sheet
AMOVP Allied Movement Procedure
AOP Allied Ordnance Publication
BLAHA Basic Load Ammunition Holding Area
BLSA Basic Load Storage Area
CALA Combat Aircraft Loading Area
CAPA Combat Aircraft Parking Area
CEA Captured Enemy Ammunition
CG Compatibility Group
ECM Earth Covered Magazine
EM Electro-Magnetic
EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ES Exposed Site(s)
ESMRM Explosive Safety and Munitions Risk Management
ESO Explosives Safety Officer
ESP Explosives Safety Program
EWD Emergency Withdrawal Distances
FARP Forward Ammunition and Refueling Point
FD Field Distance
FEP Fire and Emergency Plan
FPO Fire Protection Officer
HD Hazard Division
IATA International Air Transport Association

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IBD Inhabited Building Distance

IMDG International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code
ISO International Standardization Organization
MAB Munitions Amnesty Box
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MCE Maximum Credible Event
NEQ Net Explosive Quantity
OHP Overhead Protection
PES Potential Explosion Site
POD Point of Debarkation
POE Point of Embarkation
QD Quantity Distance
RID Regulations on the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Rail
RP Rearming Pads
SG Sensitivity Groups
SsD Storage sub-Division
SOP Standard Operating Procedure
WP White Phosphorus

3. Definitions
Ammunition Area A group of PES at a minimum of FD from each other.
Cargo Aircraft An aircraft, other than a passenger or a
passenger/cargo carrying aircraft, carrying freight or
cargo. (from the guidance document to STANAG
4441)
Combat Aircraft A military aircraft designated to carry combat-
configured munitions.
Combat Aircraft Parking Any area specifically designated for:
Area a. Aircraft loading or unloading of combat-configured
munitions.
b. Parking aircraft loaded with combat-configured
munitions.
Compound An area that incorporates functions, facilities, and
operations necessary for the accomplishment of a
mission.
ESMRM ESMRM is a systematic approach that integrates risk
assessment into operations planning, military training
exercises, and contingency operations with the goal
of identifying potential consequences associated with
munitions operations, risk reduction alternatives, and
risk decision criteria for key decision makers.
ESMRM permits NATO commanders to deliver

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operational effect at tolerable levels of risk, and must

be done on a recurring basis to be effective.
External Safety Distance Distance applied from PES in a compound to ES
located outside the compound.
Field Distance Distances applied from a PES to other PES or ES
located within a compound.
Forward Arming and Refuel A temporary arming and refueling location that is
Point organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation
unit.
Gabion A cage within which can be placed various fill
materials (e.g. gravel, sand, rock), and which is used
for building walls, barricades and protective barriers.

Heavy Armoured Combat Vehicles constructed so that they protect the crew
Vehicles against the hazards of the main guns, anti-tank
weapons and artillery ammunition.
Hot Refuelling Refuelling of an aircraft whilst engines are still
running.
Light Armoured Combat Vehicles constructed so that they protect the crew
Vehicles against the hazards of small arm ammunition,
machine guns and fragments.
Non-Armoured Combat Vehicles constructed without armour protection.
Vehicles
Non-Robust Munitions A munition that does not meet criteria as a Robust
Munition, see below.
Outside Compound An object influenced by the explosive effects from a
PES. An ES containing explosives, in this publication,
is considered to be a PES.
Personnel People within the compound.
Prompt Sympathetic Propagation of an explosion (e.g. munition to munition
Detonation or stack to stack), without sufficient time delay
between reactions, with the result being coalescence
(e.g. joining) of the two or more blast pressure waves
into a single pressure wave similar to one that would
have been generated by a single explosion involving
the combined NEQ at all the reacting munitions. FD
in such situations is based on the combined NEQ.
Sympathetic Detonation Propagation of an explosion (e.g. munition to munition
or stack to stack), with sufficient time delay between
reactions, with the result being that coalescence (e.g.

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joining) of blast pressure waves does not occur. The

result is that each explosion is viewed as a separate
event, with its own FD. Using appropriate FD should
assure that prompt sympathetic detonation does not
occur, though use of FD cannot rule out that
subsequent sympathetic reactions might occur.
Rearming Pads Element of the FARP.
Robust Munitions AE that meet two of the following criteria:

1. Have a ratio of the explosive weight to empty

case weight less than 1.
2. Have a nominal wall thickness of at least 10 mm.
3. Have a case thickness/NEQ1/3 >0.165 cm/kg1/3.

Examples of Robust Munitions include 20 mm, 25

mm, and 30 mm cartridges, GP bombs, artillery
projectiles, and penetrator warheads

2.2. MULTINATIONAL (MN) INSTALLATION OPERATIONS

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION

1. This Section outlines the principles that should be used to properly integrate
ammunition safety guidelines into Multi-National (MN) operations. The critical
explosives safety elements that must be accomplished and managed are
identified. Addressing those elements provides coalition forces the ability to
conduct operations and manage storage areas involving coalition and/or
multinational AE in a safe manner and gives Commanders the flexibility to share
AE resources and capabilities with co-located coalition and/or multi-national
partners

2.2.2 EXPLOSIVES SAFETY BOARD (ESB)

1. It is necessary in a MN environment to collectively address ESMRM. This is best

accomplished by establishing a safety committee/board. The ESB forms a
framework for managing all explosives safety related Elements. The ESB
provides a platform on which to address issues and concerns and to ensure
critical explosives safety matters are not ignored. The ESB should be chaired by
a senior officer on the Base Camp/Airfield HQ Staff, managed by the Lead ESO
and attended by an appropriate AE representative from every
Nation/Unit/Organization. The roles and responsibilities of the Chair, the ESB
Manager plus the Board Members shall be recorded.

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2. All Nations/Units/Organizations co-located on the MN Base must be represented

at the Explosive Safety Board Meetings. The frequency of the board meetings is
dependent on the Operational Tempo, but should occur no less than once per
month. Minutes of the meetings should be recorded and distributed to all ESB
Members. It may be necessary at times to bring in specialists from other related
fields such as engineering, medical, security and emergency response

2.2.3 CRITICAL EXPLOSIVES SAFETY ELEMENTS

1. Lead Explosives Safety Officer
Ideally one nation should be assigned as the Lead Nation, and the ESO from that
Nation would serve as the principal explosive safety advisor for the base
camp/airfield Commander and manage the ESB. However the formal assignment of
a Lead Nation does not always occur; therefore, in the common interest of all, a Lead
ESO must be appointed amongst the co-located nations in order to manage the
overall Explosive Safety Program.

2. Explosives Safety Criteria

The first order of business for the ESB should be to agree on what explosives safety
criteria will be used by Nations co-located at the MN base/airfield. It is expected that
all participating Nations would agree to use NATO explosives safety criteria found in
AASTP-5.
3. Current National Points of Contact (POC)
It is vital that all Nations/Units/Organizations co-located on a base maintain a current
communication network of contacts for their Nation and provide contact details to the
Nation assuming Command and Control and to the Lead ESO. Nations should also
provide up to date listings of their installation command staff and key explosives-
safety related personnel to the ESB.
4. Land Use and Construction Management
The Nation responsible for land use and construction management should manage
installation real estate/facility use, to ensure compliance with explosives safety
requirements. Because of the consequences associated with an accidental explosion
of munitions, mapping correct safety arcs, based on the Nations’ listings must be
annotated on the installation map, and all planned construction within and on the
periphery of safety arcs must be closely managed and coordinated. The ESB should
serve as the final decision-making authority for land use/construction requests and it
must ensure that appropriate consideration is given to construction standards and AE
siting.
5. Safety Arcs for FDs/Mapping
Safety arcs define the AE hazardous areas on an installation and the land restricted
from use. Therefore all AE activities (storage, maintenance and operations) with their

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safety arcs must be consolidated onto one master FD map. The map must identify
the available land for use and identify activities at risk that are located within the
safety arcs, i.e. Exposed Sites (ES). Each Nation should maintain current listings of
structures/locations that contain their AE, and the hazard classification (e.g., 1.1D,
1.2.1E) and NEQ present (kg) at each of those facilities/locations.

6. Explosive Site Planning/Licensing

a. All facilities/activities inside the safety arcs must be covered by an
approved explosives site plan, license, or deviation.
b. NATO does not have an explosives safety/licensing organization, so
these matters shall be carried out at the National level.
c. Even if issued through a Nation’s process, coordination for explosive
site planning /licensing and any planned construction has to be
centralized and coordinated with the Lead ESO.
7. Risk Management
When explosive safety standards cannot be met, a risk management process must
be carried out (see paragraph 2.7).
8. Surveys of the AE Stocks
Conducting inventories of ammunition stock on hand should be routine and an
inventory of ammunition by Hazard Classification, quantity and Net Explosive
Quantity (NEQ) are to be submitted to the ESB on a periodic basis, but not less than
once per month. Knowledge of types and quantities of AE located on the base/airfield
is necessary to respond to requests of users, but also necessary to plan and to
license every AE storage and processing facility and to keep the installation safety
arc map current.
9. AE Hazard Classification
AE brought together in a MN environment may raise concerns regarding its
classification. The UN hazard classification system should be used to resolve any
conflicts. Nations that have not classified their AE using the UN System may be
required to apply a more conservative approach (e.g. greater separation distances).
10. Explosives Safety Continuity
The rotation of personnel presents many issues. With regards to explosives safety
elements, it is particularly important that continuity be maintained. For that reason,
Commands should try and arrange turnovers/rotations in a manner that allows a
handover of some sort. This will greatly minimize the amount of time needed to learn
the status of critical explosives safety elements.
11. Surveillance/Serviceability (See also Par 2.4.6 - Surveillance)
It must not be assumed that all Nations participating in MN operations will have well

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managed stockpile surveillance and/or propellant stability test programs that monitor
the safety of their ammunition stocks. If a Nation does not have those programs,
then there may be an increased likelihood of an accidental detonation/reaction (e.g.,
auto-ignition of propellant) occurring due to the “unknown condition” of their
ammunition stockpile. This increases the risk to surrounding ammunition stocks,
personnel, facilities, and other resources.

2.3. PLANNING RECONNAISSANCE AND PLANNING DESIGN FOR A

COMPOUND

2.3.1 INTRODUCTION

1. Consideration shall be given to different functions needed within a compound to

accomplish a mission (e.g. administrative buildings, fuel storage, sleeping
accommodation, ammunition storage, maintenance facilities, ammunition truck
holding locations, inspection stations, airfield, port, demolition grounds and other
similar areas/operations). Each PES within a compound must be defined
considering that different ammunition Hazard Division (HD) and Storage sub-
Divisions (SsD) react differently when initiated.

2. FD are provided for the separation of ES from PES and between different PES.

3. An output from the planning, reconnaissance and design phase will be a site plan
document, which must be approved by the appropriate authority. This document
forms the basis for the compound layout and design and will be transferred as
the user of the compound changes.

2.3.2 PLANNING

1. The aim of the planning phase is to find an appropriate area of the right size for
the storage of the unit’s ammunition. The following information is necessary
before starting the reconnaissance operation:
a. Maps of the area
b. Environmental and weather information of the area. It must be
remembered that high temperatures and high humidity can effect the
lifetime, quality and safety of some kinds of ammunition, such as rocket
systems, flares, White Phosphorus (WP), etc. Further details can be
found in paragraph 2.4.2.
c. Type of mission and operation (e.g. peace keeping, peace enforcing),
both present and future, and acceptable losses of materiel.
d. Ammunition type, NEQ and HD.

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e. For flexibility in the use of the storage, all planning should be based
upon HD 1.1 material only.
f. Required activities in the Ammunition Area such as maintenance,
handling of captured ammunition, package, etc.
g. Any Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between partners and the
host nation.
h. Designation of the lead nation. The lead nation may change during
different phases.
i. People in the area and possible threats.
j. Important infrastructure including military structures.
k. General suitability of terrain (e.g. flood-prone, swampy, vegetation,
ground quality, gradient)
l. Requirement for specialized buildings (i.e. workshops, receipt & issues,
salvage and office buildings)
m. Availability of utilities (e.g. power, water).
n. Any Ammunition Area should be at least 100 meters from a switching
station i.e., Power station, RF station or large transformer station since
these stations can introduce high uncontrollable currents. Electrical
Supply Lines such as service lines that provide power to an explosives
facility must be run underground for at least 15 meters to the facility.
Aboveground service lines not serving power to an AE facility or to an
open PES will not be closer than 15 meters.

NOTE: Given the information above, the main considerations for defining the layout
of an Ammunition Area will be the required FD and Inhabited Building Distance (IBD).

2. During the planning of operational ammunition storage facilities, decisions are

made that may be difficult to rectify at a later date. It is therefore of prime
importance that the planning is focused and conducted by highly qualified
personnel. It is recommended that during the planning process, provision should
be made to involve those personnel responsible for the storage and management
of the ammunition that will be stored in the site. The ESO, engineers and troops
from other arms and services should cooperate closely in the planning phase.

3. High priority must always be given to the safety associated with the storage,
maintenance and transport of munitions during deployment. During deployment,
allowance must be made for varying logistic procedures in the planning process
(pallets, containers). The planning should also include the handling equipment
required.

4. It is important to remember that the IBDs applicable in the country of deployment

must be observed whenever they are more stringent than the IBDs applicable in
the country of origin.

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5. The total NEQ of ammunition in each PES should be determined by adding the
sum of the NEQ of all energetic compositions contained in all the ammunition
excluding HD 1.4 which may be disregarded, see paragraph 2.6. The NEQ in any
PES should never exceed a loading capacity of 4,000 kg.

6. Since building debris can contribute to additional hazards in case of an accident,

building type must be taken into consideration prior to use as a storage building.
Ammunition may only be stored on the lowest floor of a building and only if no
personnel occupy floors above the designated storage floor.

7. The following should be considered for ammunition storage:

a. Total gross weight
b. Total NEQ
c. HD and Compatibility Group (CG)
d. Sensitivity Group (SG)
e. Storage limitations of the individual items to be stored (e.g. temperature
limitations for missiles, WP)
f. Size of the package(s)
g. Security Classification

With this information the number of PES can be calculated. The required footprint for
the Ammunition Area can then be determined by taking into account the required
separation distances, as provided in paragraph 2.6, from all PES to all ES.

2.3.3 RECONNAISSANCE

1. A well performed reconnaissance mission is the basis of a successful layout of

an Ammunition Area. Missing or inaccurate information may lead to an unsafe
situation. In the reconnaissance phase, technical specialists (e.g. engineers,
ESO) should visit the area to determine if it meets mission requirements. Annex
C, the Site Survey Check List, lists subjects and topics that should be evaluated
to help determine the size of an Ammunition Area and compound. Some key
points to consider when evaluating the Ammunition Area are:
a. The adequacy of existing roads and bridges. These may need to be
upgraded.
b. Distances to infrastructure from the planned Ammunition Area must be
calculated. Considerations of infrastructure must also take into account
civilian use of facilities such as hospitals, schools, airfields, etc.
c. Cultural facilities: An awareness of cultural sites such as graveyards,
religious buildings or other cultural sites must be maintained.
d. Public facilities/utilities: Exposing AE hazards to public facilities and
utilities such as Radio Towers, Chemical/Oil Storage Tanks should be

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avoided.
e. Availability of local materials (e.g. fill for barricades and Overhead
Protection (OHP)).
f. Availability and capacity of existing utilities.
g. Weather patterns and Lightning protection (see paragraph 2.5.3).

2. The results of the reconnaissance process must be documented, checked for

compliance with the provisions in this document and submitted to the appropriate
authority. The approved reconnaissance report will become the basis for the
preparation and establishment of the planned compound.

2.3.4 DESIGN PHASE

1. A number of factors should be assessed as part of the design phase, including:

a. The number of ammunition containers to be stored at the Ammunition
Area.
b. The types and numbers of PES needed (e.g. ammunition process
buildings, ammunition truck holding locations, limited quantity storage
locations, inspection stations, ammunition loading and unloading sites,
disposal and detonation grounds, and other area/operations).
c. The NEQ for each PES.
d. The configuration lay-outs for the various HD and CG in the Ammunition
Area.
e. The requirements for and types of OHP construction needed.
f. The types/thicknesses, to include fill material, of barricades and OHP.
g. The required FD between different PES.
h. The effects of a PES MCE and implication on construction inside the
compound.
i. When applicable, the orientation of an Ammunition Area and individual
PES with respect to ES (e.g. adjacent Ammunition Areas, mission critical
assets, the public, hospitals, schools) and from external threats.
j. The required FD of PES to ES (e.g. Ammunition Areas, mission critical
assets, etc.).
k. The required IBD of PES to ES (e.g. the public, hospitals, schools).
l. Window use.
(1) In Ammunition Area. Windows must not be used in the Ammunition
Area because of the dangers from glass shards injury/lethality in the
event of an explosion.
(2) In the compound but outside of the Ammunition Area. Windows use
is not encouraged, but if used should be limited. To minimize
injuries/lethality due to glass breakage, windows should face away

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from PES and protective measures (internal curtains and wire

mesh) taken to stop glass shards from entering the facility.
(3) Taping of and placement of specially designed plastic film on
windows can improve their performance when exposed to explosive
effects and should be used when possible. Special attachment
techniques may also be required to keep the window glazing from
presenting a blunt trauma risk to occupants of the building.

2.3.5 BARRICADES

1. The proper use of barricades can decrease the magnitude of a detonation event
and increase the explosives capacity of limited areas. A barricade at a PES will
stop low angle high velocity fragments, which are the primary mechanism for
prompt detonation propagation. They also may protect the PES from enemy fire.
The use of proper barricades at PES and/or ES is necessary for the
implementation of the FD contained in this document.

2. The barricade should be thick enough and the material must have enough
penetration resistance to stop high-velocity fragments. The barricade must be
stable over time and should not be susceptible to environmental factors.

3. The fill material of a barricade should not be hazardous to personnel or other

ammunition modules when it is launched by an explosion. The preferred type of
fill material is free of organic and hazardous materials and should consist of sand
or gravel with a maximum diameter of 20 mm.
a. A proper barricade between PES will allow the use of reduced FD. Gabion
configurations of 1, 2+1, 2+2 or 2+2+1 (see Figure 2-1) (or equivalent)
between adjacent storage containers should be used as the standard for
Ammunition Areas in theatres of operations. Note that in the event of an
explosion, the barricade may impact on an adjacent PES. Gabion
configurations of 3+2 or 3+2+1 do not provide more protection than the 2+2
or 2+2+1 mentioned previously, but can produce more mass movement
onto the adjacent storage container, which may not be necessarily
advantageous. For this reason, these larger barricades are not
recommended between PES located at FD but are more suitable in front of
the container opening.

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Figure 2-1 : Gabion (for each min width 1m) arrangements, 1 (up to 100 kg NEQ), 2+1 (up
to 1000 kg NEQ) and 2+2, 2+2+1, 3+2, 3+2+1 (up to 4000 kg NEQ).

b. A proper barricade with a configuration of 2+2+1 or 3+2+1 (or equivalent)

placed no more than 10 m in front of a PES opening should be used in
theatres of operations. The closer the barricade is to the PES the better it
will be for stopping/collecting fragments.
c. The barricade between PES should be made a minimum of 0.3 m higher
than the tallest of the adjacent stacks, see Figure 2-2.

≥ 0.3 m

Figure 2-2: Determining minimum barricade height

d. It should be noted, however, that a barricade does not necessarily prevent

subsequent propagation or damage caused by blast, lobbed items, debris
or secondary fires.

4 OHP for barricaded PES construction can, under certain circumstances, be

utilized to reduce explosion effects, protect the stocks from enemy fire and
maintain a constant temperature. Suggestions for construction, and an example

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design (see Figure 2-3) of a barricaded PES with OHP design follows:
a. In a row of PES separated by Gabion barricades with OHP, each PES
should have its own independent roof.
b. Combustible materials should not be used to construct the OHP.
c. The fill material for OHP should not be hazardous to surrounding ES when
it is launched. The preferred type of fill material is free of organic
material and should consist of sand or gravel with a maximum diameter of
20 mm.
d. The fill material must be at least 60 cm deep and must cover the entire roof
area of each PES.
e. Columns used as support for the sectional roof may be inserted within the
Gabion. Also, a minimum 60 cm ventilation gap may be provided between
the top of the Gabion and the OHP to allow for rapid venting of blast
overpressure. A secondary benefit is ventilation.

Figure 2-3: Example design of a barricaded PES with OHP

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2.3.6 SITE PLAN DOCUMENT PREPARATION AND APPROVAL

1. A Site Plan is required prior to construction of the compound. The Site Plan
document, which must be approved by the appropriate authority, should consist
of:
a. Layout drawings of the proposed compound.
b. A description of use and occupancy of each facility within the compound.
c. The NEQ and HD at each PES and its associated FD and IBD.
d. Anticipated number of personnel in each facility on the compound.
e. Approved construction drawings to include: materials used, barricades,
structural hardening, OHP, lightning protection system, static grounding
systems, windows.
f. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP).
g. A topography map, with contours (when terrain features are considered to
provide natural barricading) or topography that otherwise influences the
layout of facilities on the compound.
h. Identified deviations from safety standards caused by local conditions.

2.4. OPERATIONAL AMMUNITION ON SAFETY PROCEDURES

2.4.1 DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS

1. Once a site has been selected, the following documentation (where required)
should be prepared and approved by the appropriate authority:
a. MOU
b. Site plan document
c. Explosives licence. Annex G
d. Deviations

2.4.2 STORAGE CG

1. Ammunition should be stored per Table 2-1 based on its assigned CG. To
preserve operational capability and to reduce the risk of loss of the total stockpile
of an item in the event of a fire or explosion, it is recommended that not more
than 50% of any CG, and associated non-explosives components, are stored in
any one PES. Where reasonably practicable, this stock is to be further
dispersed.

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Compatibility A B C D E F G H J K L N S
Group
A X
1 1 1 1 1
B X X
1 2 3 5
C X X X X
1 2 3 5
D X X X X
1 2 3 5
E X X X X
1 2 2 2 2, 3
F X X
1 3 3 3 2, 3
G X X
H X X
J X X
K X
4
L
5 5 5 7 6
N
6
S X X X X X X X X X

Table 2-1: Mixing of Compatibility Groups

Legend:
X = Mixing permitted

Notes:
1. Compatibility Group B fuzes may be stored with the articles to which they
will be assembled, but the NEQ must be aggregated and treated as
Compatibility Group F.
2. Storage in the same building is permitted if effectively segregated to
prevent propagation.
3. Mixing of articles of Compatibility Group G with articles of other
compatibility groups is at the discretion of the National Competent
Authority.
4. Compatibility Group L articles must always be stored separately from all
articles of other compatibility groups as well as from all other articles of
different types of Compatibility Group L.
5. Articles of compatibility N should not in general be stored with articles of
other Compatibility Groups except S. However if such articles are stored
with articles of Compatibility Groups C, D and E, the articles of
Compatibility Group N should be considered as having the characteristics

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of Compatibility Group D and the compatibility groups mixing rules apply

accordingly.
6. A mixed set of munitions HD 1.6N and HD 1.4S may be considered as
having the characteristics of Compatibility Group N.
7. It is allowed to mix HD l.6N ammunition. The Compatibility Group of the
mixed set remains N if the ammunition belongs to the same family or if it
has been demonstrated that, in case of a detonation of one munition, there
is no instant transmission to the munitions of another family (the families
are then called “compatible”). If it is not the case the whole set of
ammunition should be considered as having the characteristics of
Compatibility Group D and the compatibility groups mixing rules apply
accordingly.

2. Determining NEQ at a PES

The NEQ of all ammunition (except HD 1.4) at a PES, regardless of HD, should be
added together for determining the NEQ at a PES

2.4.3 TRANSPORT AND STORAGE OF CAPTURED ENEMY AMMUNITION

(CEA)

1. The following rules apply to CEA:

a. Before transporting CEA into the Ammunition Area, it must have been
certified as safe for transport and storage by a qualified individual (e.g.
Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialist).
b. Because of uncertainties of its safety status (i.e. increased risk of fire and
accidents), CEA must be isolated from own ammunition by the greatest
distance possible, but no less than FD.
c. CEA storage in a PES should not exceed an NEQ greater than 500 kg.
d. If positive identification is not possible, CEA must be treated as HD 1.1.
When its NEQ is unknown the total weight of the CEA (less package) must
be used.
e. CEA should be stored by CG mixing rules.
f. An inventory list, to include NEQ, should be kept of CEA in each PES.
Copies of the list must be kept at the PES, with the EOD team on duty (if
available), and the fire-fighting unit.

2.4.4 DESTRUCTION OF AMMUNITION (INCLUDING EMERGENCY

DESTRUCTION)

1. A destruction ground may be required for disposing of ammunition that is in a

dangerous and/or unserviceable condition. The location chosen must be a
sufficient distance away from all surrounding ES so that it presents no additional
danger. Destruction is to be carried out according to AASTP-1 Part IV chapter 7

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and national regulations governing such operations. During operations, it is

essential that any dangerous and/or un-serviceable ammunition is destroyed as
soon as possible as accumulations of this ammunition presents an unnecessary
and additional danger.

2.4.5 AMMUNITION PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS

1. Personnel controlling or supervising the handling of ammunition at an

Ammunition Area must be identified/appointed by the Operational Commander.
The designated personnel, normally the ESO, must be thoroughly familiar with
ammunition operations being conducted and must clearly understand the
hazards and risks involved. The competencies required by an ESO are detailed
in Annex B.

2.4.6 SURVEILLANCE

1. Ammunition surveillance and serviceability programs are a national responsibility.

Knowing the condition and the serviceability status of ammunition stocks is an
important part of ensuring user safety and functional reliability. In Service
Surveillance programs will help in the early detection of degradation in
ammunition stocks, which could lead to an increased probability of an explosive
accident or other unsafe reaction occurring with those stocks, as well as ensure
the munitions will function properly when needed.

2. Both a propellant stability test program and an ammunition surveillance program

are necessary to accomplish the above, and they must consider the conditions
under which ammunition will be stored and used (e.g., high and low
temperatures, high and low humidity), as environmental conditions can aggravate
ammunition degradation issues and create serious safety and operational
capabilities consequences.

3. Ammunition stored at the Ammunition Area requires a qualified AE expert to

check and manage the serviceability of the assets. Determining the condition of
AE should be made by type, model and lot number assigned at time of
manufacture. Ammunition carried by soldiers and/or stored in vehicles are
subject to extreme conditions and requires special attention. Screening by the
user however is limited to the detection of damage/contamination.

4. Unfavourable storage conditions in an operational environment should be

avoided. Servicing measures must be performed regularly to help ensure
ammunition is kept clean, dry and complies with their respective unique
requirements. For example it is recommended that White Phosphorus
Ammunition is stored and transported in a nose up configuration because the
filler may melt or change position in high temperatures, and can cause poor
ballistics.

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5. Unless necessary for operational reasons, “unknown condition” ammunition

should not be stored in the same storage location (e.g., cell, magazine) as
“known condition” ammunition from Nations that have surveillance and propellant
stability test programs. Such stocks should be stored separately, at a minimum
of the required FD given in the FD Table in paragraph 2.6, to prevent prompt
propagation.

6. NATO guidelines for conducting in-service surveillance (ISS) of non-nuclear

munitions can be found in STANAG 4675 and its AOPs.

2.4.7 STORAGE OF LIMITED QUANTITIES

1. For reasons of operational necessity, limited quantities not to exceed allowable

NEQ of 45 kg NEQ of HD 1.3 or 1.4 or 23 kg NEQ of HD 1.2.2. may be stored
without regard to FD.

2. Such storage shall meet NATO Base requirements, as well as nationally-defined

procedures and are restricted to limited quantities of HD 1.2.2 (40 mm and
below), HD 1.3 (e.g., document destroyers, signaling devices, riot control), and
HD 1.4 (e.g., small arms, riot control) munitions may be stored at locations (e.g.,
hangars, arms rooms, security alert force rooms),. NATO base procedures shall
address items such as allowable NEQ, documentation requirements, approval
process, and LPS requirements, as necessary.

3. Each location to which this paragraph applies shall have a risk assessment
conducted which assesses the operational necessity, the risk involved, and
identifies proposed mitigation / limitations / conditions to minimize that risk. The
risk assessment shall be prepared by the national ESO. As part of its
development, the risk assessment shall be coordinated with the base ESO, as
well as logistics, security, fire protection, and ammunition surveillance personnel.

4. The national commander, to which the munitions belong, shall make the risk
decision, based on operational necessity, for such storage and/or operations.

5. Each approved limited quantity storage/operations location shall be licensed by

the national ESO. The license shall specify the exact location, the HD and
quantity of each permitted, NSN, any time restrictions (e.g., one year, 6 months),
and any required mitigation / limitations / conditions associated with the
commander’s risk decision.

6. Fragment barriers shall be provided when HD 1.2.2 is stored in inhabited

buildings such as barracks or office buildings. Minimum acceptable fragment
barriers are: 6 mm of mild steel plate, one layer of sand bags, 30 cm of loose
sand or dirt, or equivalent protection.

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7. Munitions must remain stored in their original container with original packaging,
as the munition hazard classification process designation (e.g., HD 1.3) is based
on testing of that munition in its packaged configuration. Removing the
packaging potentially could result in a more significant reaction which could
increase risk substantially. The only exception is for an arms rooms that
supports guard forces or military police, which are permitted to have one outer
pack of each caliber of small arms ammunition open for use.

8. The appropriate fire and/or chemical hazard symbols shall be properly posted on
the door to the storage area. Appropriate symbols need not be posted on the
exterior of the building if only storing HD 1.4 ammunition.

9. At least two fire extinguishers shall be available for immediate use at each
location. Each fire extinguisher shall be:
a. Kept in a fully charged, operable condition.
b. Placed in a conspicuous and readily accessible location.

10. Approved locations shall meet all safety, security, and fire protection
requirements; however, small amounts of flammable or combustible liquids
necessary for weapons cleaning and maintenance can be stored in approved
storage containers placed as far as possible from the munitions.

11. Training ammunition stored in the same room must be separated and
distinguishable from operational ammunition and listed separately on the arms
room inventory.

12. Munitions shall be stored in accordance with storage compatibility requirements

given in paragraph 2.4.2.

2.4.8 PARKING OF UP-LOADED VEHICLES

1. All vehicles containing munitions (e.g., transport; armored, light-armored, non-

armored vehicles preparing for / returning from missions or training), shall be
parked in locations that meet the FD given in Table 2-2. Any deviation from this
requirement requires the conduct of a risk assessment, as detailed in paragraph
2.7.2, by the national ESO to include any mitigation, restrictions, and limitations,
and in coordination with the Base’s Lead ESO. The risk assessment package
will be presented to the NATO Base Commander for their risk decision

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2.5. PROTECTION

2.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION

1. Protecting against fires involves three important principles:

a. Prevention.
b. Hazard identification.
c. Fire fighting.

2. Responsibilities and Organization.

a. The Operational Commander is responsible for the protection of
ammunition against fire, as well as for the protection of personnel from fire
hazards involving ammunition. The Operational Commander along with
his designated specialists (i.e. ESO, Fire Protection Officer (FPO)) will
develop necessary plans as described below. All personnel working at the
Ammunition Area must be aware of their responsibilities/expected actions
in the event of an emergency.
b. A Fire and Emergency Plan (FEP) should be developed at each
compound. Emergency response and evacuation provisions must be
developed for each PES located in the Ammunition Area. An exercise of
the FEP should occur at least once during each rotation of the operational
commander or a minimum of once every six calendar months.
c. The FEP shall require that the fire department knows the hazards
associated with each ammunition fire division. In addition, the fire
department must know what Fire Division is associated with every PES
(see below). The fire department should be notified each time a Fire
Division symbol is changed.
d. Layout plans for the Ammunition Area including content/type/Fire Division
plans and evacuation plans are to be prepared and kept accessible
outside the Ammunition Area at all times.
e. Emergency Withdrawal Distance (EWD) for non-essential personnel
(those not directly involved in fire fighting) are intended for use in
emergency situations only and are not to be used for facility siting
purposes. In the event of a fire no personnel other than those directly
involved in fire fighting shall be permitted entrance to the Ammunition
Area.
f. The same EWD applies to the local population.
g. The EWD is governed by the HD involved in the fire. The EWD for
essential personnel at accidents shall be determined by on-site
emergency authorities. Emergency authorities shall also determine who
are considered as essential personnel.
h. At a minimum, FEP shall address the following:

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(1) Specific sections and guidance that address emergency

preparedness, contingency planning and safety. For safety, those
plans shall limit access to trained and authorized personnel. These
plans shall identify the number and location of specific locations (i.e.
protective structure(s), or other safe location(s)), for personnel to
take shelter.
(2) Procedures that minimize the possibility of an unintentional
detonation, release, discharge or migration of military munitions or
explosives out of any storage unit when such release, discharge or
migration may endanger human health or the environment.
(3) Provisions for prompt notification to emergency response and
environmental agencies and the potentially affected public for an
actual or potential detonation or uncontrolled release, discharge or
migration (that may endanger human health or the environment).
(4) First aid instruction and use of fire fighting equipment.
(5) Emergency map.
i. The Operational Commander along with the designated specialists (i.e.
ESO, FPO) is responsible to produce the necessary plans. He/she also
has to ensure that all plans and emergency plans are accessible to the
Emergency Authorities and Rescue Forces.

3. Prevention
a. Fire prevention plans should be included in the SOP for the compound.
b. Fire prevention measures are to be organized within the scope of general
fire prevention taking into account the following areas:
(1) Order and cleanliness as well as strict observance of safety
precautions count among the most effective fire prevention
measures, equal to the prohibition of smoking and the use of open
flames, fire and naked lights.
(2) Handling of flammable substances.
(3) Prevention of the accumulation of additional fire hazards such as
stacking material, packaging material and the like.
(4) Fire hazards associated with machines, equipment and tools used
during ammunition operations or the overloading of electrical
cables.
(5) The use of oil or gas filled lighting, heating or burning appliances
and all flame, spark or fire producing appliances should be
minimized.
(6) Remove flammable undergrowth and lay out fire lanes.
(7) Clear zones around PES, trimming of branches, etc.

4. Hazard Identification

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a. The four Fire Divisions symbols are shown below. The number and shape
of each symbol serves to identify its fire hazard for fire fighting personnel
approaching a scene of a fire. These are:
(1) Fire Division 1 - Mass explosion
(2) Fire Division 2 - Explosion with fragment hazard
(3) Fire Division 3 - Mass fire
(4) Fire Division 4 - Moderate fire.

Figure 2-4: Fire Division Symbols. (From AASTP-1).

b. Supplementary symbols are used to identify which locations contain

specific types of pyrotechnic material as these munitions give
supplementary hazards. For this reason, the ESO should advise the FPO
of any supplementary hazards and the specific emergency measures for
such ammunition.
Supplementary symbols shown below can be displayed at a PES to
indicate the following precautions that must be taken if fighting fires:
(1) Wear full protective suit.

(2) Wear respirator face piece.

(3) Apply no water.

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c. The Operational Commander may, for security purposes, permit the

removal of the Fire Division symbols or a change in the colors used. In
these situations, the Operational Commander should give prompt and
precise information to the fire department about the changes and condition
of the ammunition.

5. Fire Fighting
a. Fire-fighting principles and procedures for field operations are the same as
those given for permanent depots in AASTP 1.
b. All fires in the vicinity of the ammunition should be fought until stacks of
ammunition or explosives become involved in the fire or the fire is
extinguished. If ammunition becomes involved in a fire, it is critical to
remove personnel immediately from the site to safe locations/distances.
c. Ammunition fires involving other than Fire Division 4 must not be
fought. When fighting fire involving ammunition in Fire Division 4, the
minimum distance should be 25 meters.
d. Personnel whose duties require them to fight secondary fires must not
approach within 300 m of any fire involving explosives other than Fire
Division 4.
e. All unprotected personnel not involved in the fire fighting activities should
be ordered to withdraw to protected positions (inside protective shelters)
and/or should be evacuated to at least 800 meters or to IBD, whichever is
the greater.
f. After an ammunition fire has been extinguished, personnel must wait at
least six hours before entering the area.
g. No one must touch ammunition involved in a fire or accidental explosion
without being directed to do so by a qualified person.
h. The following additional provisions could be necessary:
(1) Fire Division 4 ammunition may be stored near the entrance to the
Ammunition Area. (Note: If a fire does break out in this ammunition,
it is possible to fight it and there is a realistic chance of saving
ammunition in this Fire Division, while there is no chance of saving
ammunition in the other Fire Divisions when fire breaks out.).
(2) The area in which ammunition from Fire Divisions 1, 2 and 3 is
stored must be delineated very clearly.
(3) Empty packaging and combustible material are to be stored
separately from the PES.

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2.5.2 ELECTRO-MAGNETIC (EM) RADIATION PROTECTION

1. Transmitting devices (cellular phones, pagers, vehicle transmitters, etc.) must not
be used within 20m from any PES unless specifically authorized. Use of
transmitters within the Ammunition Area must be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis and a license to operate such equipment at a specified safe distance
should be provided by the National Technical Authority and approved by the
ESO.

2. Care must be exercised to protect electrically initiated ordnance from stray

electrical currents. STANAG 1380/AECP-2 provides a calculation methodology
for determining safety distances and managing the effects of EMR on munitions
and weapon systems containing electrically initiated devices (EIDs).

3. Rocket, Rocket Motors or Missiles in a propulsive state should be stored in the

direction that least endangers personnel or equipment, preferably stored pointed
down. They are not to be pointed upward or toward the door. If pointing down is
not an option, or the propulsive state is unknown, point rockets or missiles in the
direction of an earth berm or natural barrier.

2.5.3 WEATHER PROTECTION

1. Environmental Conditions
a. Temperature
(1) High temperatures (>40°C), and large variations in temperatures
can degrade the performance and safety of a variety of munitions
(in particular those containing WP) and propellants. Every effort
should be made to reduce this effect, through the use of covered
storage, correct stacking procedures for provision of adequate
ventilation and, if possible, the use of an air-conditioned
environment. Proper surveillance of munitions (see Paragraph
2.4.6) is necessary to maintain the operational capability of the
munitions.
(2) Ammunition stored in the open should be shaded with light coloured
tarpaulins in order to reduce the effects of radiant heat. These
coverings should not be in direct contact with the ammunition (or
ammunition container) as this can lead to increased temperatures in
the ammunition and containers. A minimum air gap of 30 cm should
be maintained between the top of the explosives stack/container
and any covering material to provide adequate ventilation.
(3) Tarpaulins and camouflage nets should be erected so that
ammunition can be removed rapidly at night without taking the
covering down. This allows replacement ammunition to be inserted
into the location with a minimum of work. However, the tarpaulins

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and camouflage nets must be capable of being lowered quickly or

be made secure against the possibility of high winds or tropical
storms, where these are a threat.
(4) A light paint colour on a container may significantly reduce
temperature inside the container.

b. Humidity
(1) The effects of moisture at higher temperatures are worse than the
effects of moisture at low temperatures. These increased effects
resulting from high moisture and high temperature can lead to
failure of initiation systems, reduction in propellant efficiency, and
degradation of various munitions fills. Alternatively, low humidity
environments can result in an increased risk from electrostatic
discharge hazards and may also dry out critical seals and other
components.

2. Environmental Controls
a. Every effort is to be made to reduce the effects of high temperatures and
moisture on explosives held by units and in Ammunition Areas. All excess
vegetation and combustible material shall be removed from open storage
sites and within a radius of 20 m of such sites when munitions are present.
Ammunition shall not be located immediately adjacent to reservoirs or
sewers.
(1) Storage on the Ground
Ammunition should not to be stored directly on the ground in any
situation but should be placed on pallets that provide a minimum of
75 mm clear distance from the ground to ensure ventilation. It is
important that sand, earth and vegetation should not be allowed to
build up around the base of pallets preventing the free passage of
air.
(2) Improvised Structures
Local improvised structures and shelters may prove useful for
providing cover over ammunition. Alternatively, tents, galvanized
iron shelters or ISO-containers can be used where available.

3. Lightning Protection
a. In order to mitigate the adverse effects of a lightning strike (accidental
initiation, damage), all PES should be provided with lightning protection.
In addition, PES should be located no less than 15 m from trees, telegraph
poles, pylons in order to reduce side flash. The resistance to earth of any
lightning protection system should be less than 10 Ohm or as low as
possible given the existing soil conditions.

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b. ISO containers used to store ammunition are to be considered a “Faraday

cage” thereby not requiring additional lightning protection. However, they
must be effectively grounded as described in AASTP-1.

2.5.4 ELECTRICAL SAFETY

1. In a multinational (MN) base, many Nations could be co-located, and each may
be using a different electrical standard. This could present problems with regards
to electrical safety. However, the threat will most likely be related to personnel
safety (e.g., shocking, short-circuits, electrocution) rather than issues related to
hazardous environments involving explosives dusts or vapours and munitions.
The reason for this is that any explosives operations will very likely involve all-up
weapons.
2. Some exceptions could result from long exposure or munitions to high
temperatures/high humidity, which might cause certain munitions filled (e.g.,
TNT-based fills) to exude explosive content or off-gas which could present risk of
a fire or explosion. If these conditions occur, such munitions should be moved to
a location away from good ammunition stocks and disposed of as quickly as
possible. Placing ammunition in a covered structure or covering munitions with
non-static generating material and providing circulation around the munitions will
keep temperatures lower and should prevent exudation and off-gassing from
occurring.

2.5.5 SECURITY

1. Since enhanced security is a prerequisite to improved explosives safety,

sufficient coordination between security specialists and the ESO must be
maintained.

2.6. FIELD DISTANCES

2.6.1 GENERAL

FD are introduced to make a distinction between distances used in AASTP-1 and

AASTP-5. A FD is a distance between two PES whereby prompt sympathetic
detonations will be avoided or the distance between a PES and an ES where the FD
are to maintain adequate protection levels

1. The use of FD
a. FD depend on the PES, ES, NEQ, HD and the type of ammunition. The
FD can be reduced by using appropriately designed barricades. When
using FD all ammunition is calculated as HD 1.1, (HD 1.4 must not be
included).

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b. The FD also depends on the required protection level against prompt

sympathetic propagation. By using the FD given below, a high level of
protection against prompt sympathetic propagation is achieved. This
implies that other types of reaction, such as mass-burning (HD 1.3),
occasional explosions of single articles (HD 1.2) and delayed mass
explosions, may occur.
c. For practical purposes (loading and unloading, inspection, fire fighting), a
minimum distance of 0.5 m is required between the outside of the
ammunition container/stack and an adjacent barricade.
d. FD, as a function of NEQ, are given in Table 2-2. These FD assume that
barricades in use are designed according to paragraph 2.3.5.

2. Field Distances
a. The FD are based on the following explosion effects on personnel in the
open and on structures:
(1) Blast
(2) Fragment impact.
The resulting FD are given below in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3.
b. For PES and ES different structures can be used. Figure 2-5 shows
examples of hardened structures, Figure 2-6 shows examples of semi-
hardened structures and Figure 2-7 shows examples of light structures.
Different structures can also be used as PES and ES (see Annex F).

Figure 2-5. Examples of hardened structures.

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Figure 2-6. Examples of semi-hardened structures.

Figure 2-7. Examples of light structures.

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Matrix for Ammo Field Storage Distances for Deployed Missions or Operations

PES
STRUCTURES
AASTP-5 VEHICLES
(notes 11 & 12)
Table 2-2 HEAVY
ARMOURED LIGHT ARMOURED NON-ARMOURED
HARDENED
SEMI-HARDENED OPEN/LIGHT
(note 5)
(notes 1 & 5)

BARRICADED UN-BARRICADED BARRICADED UN-BARRICADED BARRICADED UN- BARRICADED BARRICADED UN-BARRICADED

ES APPLICABLE FD's

NO FD NO FD NO FD
FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
HEAVY ARMOURED
(note 6) (note 6) (note 6)
(note 5)

NO FD NO FD NO FD
FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
LIGHT ARMOURED
(note 6) (note 6) (note 6)
(note 5)
ES CONTAINING EXPLOSIVES

BARRICADED
FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
UN-
BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD3
NON ARMOURED
(note 2 and 12)

FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
HARDENED (note 5)

BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
UN-
BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD2 FD1 FD2 FD1 FD1 FD2 FD1 FD2
SEMI-HARDENED

BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
UN-
BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD3
OPEN/LIGHT STRUCTURE

BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1 FD1
AMMO WORKSHOP
(note 4)
UN-
BARRICADED FD1 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD1 FD3 FD1 FD3
EXPOSED SITES WITHOUT EXPLOSIVES

FD10 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4
HARDENED
(notes 5 and 10)

BARRICADED FD10 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4 FD4
UN-
FD10 FD5 FD6 FD5 FD6 FD5 FD5 FD6 FD5 FD6
(notes 3, 9 and 12)

BARRICADED
SEMI-HARDENED (note 10)
FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7
BARRICADED FD10
LIGHT (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7)
STRUCTURE
UN- FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7 FD8/FD7
BARRICADED FD10 FD9 FD9 FD9 FD9
(note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7) (note 7)

OPEN -
PERSONNEL FD10 FD8 FD9 FD8 FD9 FD8 FD8 FD9 FD8 FD9
MISSION RELATED

FD9/FD8 FD9/FD8 FD9/FD8

FD10 FD9 FD9 FD9 FD8 FD9 FD9
UNPROTECTED PEOPLE (note 08) (note 08) (note 08)
OUTSIDE COMPOUND

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Notes (Table 2-2)

(01) It can be assumed that heavy armour will contain fragments and not generate
debris for NEQ up to 150kg and is therefore an effective barricade. For NEQ <
150 kg, the FD10-distances are based on blast impulse only. For NEQ >
150kg, the generation of vehicle debris increases and FD10 address the
sudden increase above 150 kg NEQ.

(02) For these ES the aim is to avoid prompt propagation - one barricade is
considered sufficient.

(03) For these ES the aim is to ensure personnel protection and structural integrity
(survivability).

(04) Only ammo related personnel. For Ammo workshop as PES use the relevant
PES column . For personnel and facility protection, apply the FD given below
for ES without explosives, for the type of structure housing the ammunition
workshop.

(05) Hardened structures and Heavy Armoured Vehicles are by definition

considered barricaded. Light Armoured Vehicles acting as an ES also are
considered barricaded.

(06) No FD means 0 m; 2 m is recommended in order to allow space for

maneuvering vehicles.

(07) If provided OHP or the structural integrity protects against free falling
fragments then FD7 may be applied.

(08) FD9 is to be used except for robust artillery shells stored in a vertically position
where FD8 may be applied.

(09) The FD do not address fatalities and injuries associated with flying glass.

(10) The FD are based on having structures that control blast ingress (through
entrances and windows) to limit internal pressures.

(11) Non earth covered buildings that can generate debris like structures of
concrete or bricks may not be used as PES.

(12) Reduced distances may be implemented if the nationally approved structures

have been validated.

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AASTP-5 FIELD DISTANCES (FD's) (AASTP-5 Criteria)

Table 2-3 PES to ADJACENT PES PES to ES (NON PES)

NEQ FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10

25 4 7 14 12 18 23 23 100 130 13
50 4 9 18 15 22 30 33 100 212 21
75 4 10 20 17 25 34 40 100 260 27
100 4 11 22 19 28 37 46 100 294 32
150 4 13 26 21 32 43 56 100 342 42
250 4 15 30 25 38 51 73 100 400 400
500 4 19 38 32 48 64 103 155 400 400
750 4 22 44 37 55 73 118 203 400 400
1000 4 24 48 40 60 80 130 235 400 400
1500 7 28 55 46 69 92 149 283 400 400
2000 8 30 61 51 76 101 164 320 400 400
2500 8 33 65 54 82 109 177 352 400 400
3000 9 35 69 58 87 116 188 381 400 400
4000 10 38 76 64 95 127 207 400 400 400

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2.6.2 THE STORAGE OF READINESS AMMUNITION

1. The following guidelines apply to locations where combat units hold their
readiness basic load ammunition in shipping containers, armoured vehicles,
trucks, trailers, structures, or on combat aircraft or re-arming pads. Provisions
given can be used for the storage of ammunition in readiness in the theatre of
operations or at home stations during training exercises.

2. Readiness ammunition explosives safety criteria do not apply to combat positions

(such as artillery or mortar firing positions) or to ammunition needed at
checkpoints.

3. Readiness ammunition storage criteria should not be used for the storage of
training ammunition unless there is no other option available. When basic load
ammunition and training ammunition are in the same storage, the training
ammunition should be in a separate storage container if possible and where this
is not possible the training ammunition must be clearly marked as such.

4. Readiness ammunition can be stored in a Basic Load Ammunition Holding Area

(BLAHA) or in uploaded/combat vehicles, combat aircraft, etc. Any combination
of BLAHA with combat loaded vehicle / combat aircraft or multiple BLAHA are
called Basic Load Storage Areas (BLSA). An area with only multiple combat
loaded aircraft is called a Combat Aircraft Loading / Parking Area (CALA /CAPA).

a. For the purposes of BLAHA criteria combat vehicles can be heavy

armoured, light armoured or non-armoured.
b. Field Distances are given in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3. If total NEQ exceeds
4000 kgs, AASTP-1 distances apply.
c. In a BLAHA, ammunition of all HD and all CG may be stored together
without regard to the requirements of the mixing rules in Table 2-1.
d. FD can be computed from individual vehicles or groups of vehicles. If the
distance between two or more vehicles does not meet the distances
required then the explosive quantity of all vehicles must be summed and
this total value used for FD computations.
(1) Heavy Armoured Combat Vehicle
Heavy armoured combat vehicles are expected to contain most of
the blast and fragments from an internal explosion and they are well
protected against the effects of an external explosion.

The hatches of heavy armoured combat vehicles must be kept

closed and locked; otherwise, the vehicles are considered as light
armoured combat vehicles.

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(2) Light Armoured combat Vehicles

Light armoured combat vehicles are considered to be well protected
from an external blast but will probably not contain the blast and
fragments from an internal detonation of the stored ammunition.

Light armoured combat vehicles can be considered as being

barricaded as an ES and un-barricaded as a PES.

(3) Non-Armoured Vehicles and Stationary Storage Sites

Non-Armoured Vehicles and stationary storage sites provide
minimal to no protection from an external explosion.

5 POL separation. Small quantities (not exceeding 100 litres) of petroleum, oils,
and lubricants (POL) held as immediate reserves for operational purposes, and
that contained in vehicle fuel tanks and/or necessary equipment (i.e. climate
control unit) requires no specific quantity distance from buildings or munition
stacks. Bulk quantities of POL in steel tanks, drums or bladders should be sited
at IBD with a minimum distance of 400 m separation.

6. Barracks, headquarters, maintenance facilities and other important facilities (e.g.,

water tower in a desert environment) within a military installation should be
separated in all cases from the BLAHA.

7. Non-armoured vehicles, storage locations or administrative buildings can be

protected by a combination of adequate barricades and OHP.

2.6.3 AIRFIELDS USED DURING DEPLOYED MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

1. General
a. Deployed missions and operations introduce unique safety issues as a
result of the rapid movement of large amounts of munitions, generally a
higher tempo of operations, and the necessary concentration of mission
critical assets.
b. With regards to the storage of munitions, the assumption is made that
ECM will not be available and munitions will be stored in the open under
cover, in light-weight structures, or in barricaded above ground structures
with or without OHP.
2. Combat and Cargo Aircraft Loading, Unloading, and Parking
a. Aircraft carrying explosives should be armed, loaded, unloaded and/or
parked only in designated areas that meet required FD as indicated in

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Table 2-2 and Table 2-3. This does not apply to aircraft containing only
installed explosives and safety devices such as authorized signals in
survival kits, egress systems components, engine starter cartridges, fire
extinguisher cartridges and other such items necessary to flight
operations.
b. FD can be computed from individual aircraft or groups of aircraft. If the
distance between two or more aircraft does not meet the distances
required in Table 2-2 and Table 2-3 then the explosive quantity of all
aircraft must be summed and this total value used for FD computations. If
an explosion should occur, aircraft within this group will be lost and aircraft
in adjacent groups may be damaged by fragments; however, the explosion
is unlikely to propagate simultaneously. Subsequent explosions may be
caused by fragments, debris and/or secondary fires.
c. Combat-loaded aircraft should face the direction involving least exposure
of personnel, equipment, facilities and civilian population to the line of fire
of forward-firing armament.
d. Proper barricades placed between adjacent aircraft will prevent prompt
sympathetic propagation due to high velocity, low angle fragments.
e. Lesser distances may be used for specific weapons where trials have
shown that such distances are adequate to minimize the probability of
propagation. For example, certain missile loads on fighter aircraft (i.e. F16,
F15, Tornado) may use known, reduced FD that is based on testing.
f. Freefall munitions may be armed/de-armed on the aircraft parking ramp.
Forward firing munitions should be armed/de-armed in an area specifically
designated as a forward-firing area with a safe aircraft heading established
by airfield operations.
g. Ammunition should be positioned in designated storage areas near the
flight line in order to be readily available in adequate time for safe aircraft
loading. Such areas should be barricaded to further reduce separation
distances.
h. In most cases an existing airfield will be used for operations. The FD used
will depend on the availability of infrastructure, their construction and their
function in relation to the mission. For example:
(1) Central airport support facilities
(2) Aircraft-maintenance
(3) Crew support
(4) Runways and taxiways
Special care must be taken when the airfield is also in use by civilians.

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2.6.4 FORWARD AMMUNITION AND REFUELLING POINT (FARP)

1. FD criteria for FARP

a. The FARP criteria apply only to units conducting attack/rotary and/or fixed
wing missions. A FARP is a temporary arming and refuelling point
organized, equipped and deployed by an aviation unit to support tactical
operations. It is usually located closer to the Area of Operations than the
combat service support area of an aviation unit. It provides fuel and
ammunition for aviation units in combat situations. The situation on a
modern battlefield demands that the FARP be flexible, transitory and able
to support specific mission objectives. It should be flexible enough to self
deploy or to be aerially inserted. It must meet the fuel and ammunition
needs of mission aircrafts..
b. Aircraft parking should be in accordance with paragraph 2.6.3.
c. Due to the situation, special care must be taken with the
grounding/earthing procedures.
d. FD from Table 2-3 will be used for separation of FARP PES and
surrounding mission-related ES.

2. Rearming/Refuelling Pad (RP)

a. The minimum distance for RP separation is based on rotor clearance or
FD with a 40 m minimum separation required. The greater distance should
be used.
b. The quantity of ammunition allowed at each RP should be limited to one
aircraft load plus one aircraft re-supply. The minimum FD separation
between pads should be based on 2 aircraft loads.
c. Aircraft maintenance and munitions loading should not be conducted
concurrently.
d. Fueling of fixed wing aircraft should not be carried out at RP. Hot refueling
(motors running) with ammunition on board should be limited to
operational necessity.

2.7. RISK MANAGEMENT

2.7.1 INTRODUCTION

1. In general, safety in handling of munitions during all phases of a deployed

operation, (e.g., storage, handling, transportation, demilitarization) shall be
assured by applying the rules and procedures based on the FDs as described in
this manual.

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2. Situations may occur where the FDs from a PES to an ES not containing
explosives cannot be met, e.g.,
a. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical mission requirements
b. lack of available area
c. lack of structural measures (e.g. missing barricades)
d. lack of personnel
e. security reasons.
For these situations the danger to exposed assets: personnel (all individuals
inside the camp, mission related) and the public (all individuals outside the camp,
non-related, third party people); materiel (including munitions); and infrastructure
must be assessed based on a risk analysis.

3. A risk analysis is a systematic process that will determine the actual level of the
hazard of a given situation. It takes into account possible adverse effects
(consequences) of an explosion or fire in a storage site as well as how often such
effects may occur (frequency/probability).

4. Paragraph 2.7.2 provides a risk management process which utilizes a five step
process in order to identify a level of hazard. This process is generally a
combination of quantitative calculation where the data and tools are available
and a qualitative assessment of this information, taking into account other factors
such as operational requirements.

5. Paragraph 2.7.3 provides a description of a quantitative risk analysis method

which was developed by AC/326 Sub-Group C for the storage of ammunition on
deployed missions. This quantitative method can also be used to support the risk
management process introduced above, but can be used independently. The
Consequence Tables for this method are provided in Annex D. An example of an
automated Consequence Analysis Tool including a manual is provided in Annex
E.

6. Determining if a calculated or estimated risk is acceptable depends not only on

the level of the risk to personnel, people and assets, but also on operational
requirements, possible measures to reduce or mitigate a risk (and associated
costs), and other factors. Therefore, no general rules on the acceptability of a
risk can be given for Deployed Missions or Operations. However, a balanced
decision must always take into account all relevant factors.

2.7.2 RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

This paragraph provides the basis for applying risk management on Multi-National
operations in the form of an Explosives Safety Case (ESC).

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1. General
a. The process can be applied in order to enable decision-making in
situations where the minimum acceptable safety standards cannot be
met. The appropriate authority accepting the risk of an undesired
explosive event must be well informed.
b. The Risk Assessment Team shall consist of personnel capable of
assessing munitions-related processes and their associated risks.
c. The following diagram (Figure 2-8) shows the five steps that will be
followed in the risk management process:

Figure 2-8 Risk Management Process Steps

2. Step 1 – Hazard Identification

a. The details of the scenario must be defined. That is, the circumstances
around which it is thought that an undesired explosive event may occur.
Typically, the scenario and circumstances do not meet minimum

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acceptable safety standards. The Explosives Safety Officer (ESO) refers

to the standards and determines at this point that the formal examination
of risk should begin.
b. The following provides an outline of the factors involved, for which the
ESO must have a sound understanding:
(1) The minimum Net Explosive Quantity (NEQ) to be held at the site
for operational purposes, by nature, quantity, Hazard Division (HD)
and Compatibility Group (CG).
(2) The estimated destructive power of the total NEQ at the site, more
commonly referred to as effective NEQ (those natures or
components which will contribute to an event).
(3) The geographical layout of the site including natural features which
could affect hazards. These could result in a reduction of hazards,
but also could increase the hazards – an example would be if the
ammunition is stored in a location where nearby walls are steep,
such as a ravine.
(4) The accurate positioning (mapping) of all personnel, equipment and
infrastructure permanently exposed to the hazard and located at the
site. These are known as Exposed Sites (ES). Similarly, those
personnel and equipment temporarily exposed to the hazard, or any
structure temporarily erected, must be considered.
(5) The operational roles of all personnel, equipment and infrastructure
at the site and expected duration of occupancy.
(6) The construction and structural strength of all equipment and
infrastructure at the site.
(7) All local Secondary Hazards present which could contribute to or
initiate an event.
(8) All existing contingency plans held by Theatre HQ and units at the
site for emergency service response times and damage
replacement/repair plans.
(9) Occupied dwellings, public utilities, buildings and public traffic
routes external to the site, which could influence the positioning of
stocks. These are also ES.
c. Factors for Consideration:
(1) Stock Levels, Quantities and NEQ Held
(a) Knowledge of the specific natures, physical quantities and
NEQ required at the site is imperative to the overall
assessment of risk. The Explosives License limits shall be
established in coordination with G2 (Intelligence), G3
(Operations), and G4 (Logistics) Headquarters staff.
(b) When the Operational Commander believes that the likely
usage of ammunition has fallen to a level that cannot justify
the associated storage risk, he must be prompted by the ESO

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to call for a reduction of ammunition stored at the site. This is

a risk reduction measure that must always be considered.
(c) It should be noted that each storage site may usually hold
significantly more stock than it needs at any one time, due to
the difficulties of re-supply. Constant monitoring must
therefore be maintained on all sites to prompt a reduction in
the quantities of ammunition stored whenever the operational
tempo lessens.

(2) Geographical Layout of the Site

The geography of any storage site may assist or hinder the
protection of personnel, equipment and infrastructure in and around
a storage site. This must be taken into account when analyzing the
expected effects of an explosion, which are fragmentation, blast,
secondary debris and thermal effects.
(3) Regular Dispositions of Personnel, Equipment and Infrastructure
For the purpose of compiling data needed to complete the ESC,
personnel, equipment and infrastructure are to be regarded as an
ES.Since many of these ES's are mobile, particularly the personnel,
it is not possible to draw up an ESC that will predict exactly where
everyone or everything will be at all times. It is therefore necessary
to estimate where personnel, equipment and infrastructure are most
of the time.
(4) Operational Roles of all Personnel, Equipment and Infrastructure
(a) Injuries to any of the personnel or damage to equipment and
infrastructure assets must be expressed in terms of
operational capability loss. To this end, it is vital that the ESO
understands the operational role of all assets.
(b) The ESO must be in a position to advise the Operational
Commander of the consequences of a worst-case undesired
explosive event and the potential extent of loss of assets. To
this end, the ESO should consult with other subject experts
as necessary when advising whether an asset will remain
operationally fit for role or otherwise.
(c) A good understanding of the structural strength of all
equipment and infrastructure is important for an accurate
prediction of the operational capability loss following an
undesired explosive event. For example, while armoured
vehicles may not receive any significant damage to their hulls
at a given distance, the same might not be true for their
peripherals such as communication aerials, sighting systems
and related equipment.
(5) Secondary Hazards

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A Secondary Hazard is something that will enhance the destructive

effects of an explosion either immediately or over a longer period of
time. It is important to consider the effects of all potential Secondary
Hazards and take these into account when assessing the area that
will be affected should an undesired explosive event occur. An
obvious example is the storage of fuel.
(6) Contingency Plans
The state of preparedness to the contingency plans can have a
significant effect on the consequences due to loss of assets or
resources The loss of operational capability due to an undesired
explosive event, is imperative for the ESO to assess, e.g.:
(a) A replacement for the damaged asset based on a time frame.
(b) The re-orientation of forces to cover any irreplaceable
capability loss.
(c) The total repair by a suitable agency of a damaged asset,
again based on a time frame.
(7) Exposed Sites (ES)
(a) The ESO will need to take into account the distances to both
the internal and external Exposed Sites. In particular, the
proximity and occupancy levels of all onsite accommodation,
nearby public dwellings, public utilities and public traffic route
usage.
(b) Terrain features can also influence the facility’s layout. An
examination of the topography must be conducted in order to
determine if the existing terrain features offers risk mitigation,
for example natural barricading can be used to protect
personnel and material from the effects of an explosion, but
storing ammunition near water reservoirs must be avoided.
(c) Identifying hazards is a continuous process and examination
of mitigation possibilities must be conducted in order to
reduce the risk to a more acceptable level, while not affecting
operational capability.

(8) Explosive Safety Case

The formalized study of the risk is referred to as an ESC, which
documents the examination of the risk activity. Annex C may be
used to record the risk process. Nations may choose to present
their ESC in a different format and examples.

3. Step 2 – Risk Analysis

a. Probability
(1) The probability of an event can be determined in two ways (or a
combination of both): by historical record of events or by an

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analytical examination by ESO based upon their experience and

knowledge. Quantitative values, as well as the relation between
quantitative values and qualitative levels are given in Table 2-7.
(2) Probability of an event. There are a number of possible causes of
an undesired explosive event. Listed below are some of the
potential causes that should be considered when developing an
ESC 1:
(a) Accidental fire - vehicle or storage container.
(b) Human Error – vehicle accident, handling, fatigue.
(c) Intruder – sabotage, theft, other subversive activity.
(d) Enemy Action- Improvised Explosive Device, Indirect or
Direct Fire.
(e) Environmental - lightning strike, weather.
(f) Condition of the Ammunition – deteriorated (material fatigue
or chemical breakdown), damaged, lower standard of
manufacture (captured).
(3) In consideration of the above, the ESO would also consider the
time aspects of the factors. For example, when considering indirect
fire, the ESO should consider how many indirect fire attacks have
occurred on the FOB during various periods of time.

Table 2-4: Event Probability (qualitative values)

LEVEL2 QUALITATIVE DEFINITION

Likely Will occur frequently

Occasional Will occur several times

Seldom Unlikely, but can reasonably be expected to occur

1 The potential causes can be grouped differently under “influences on probability” such as Enemy Action,
Human, Handling, Maintenance, Ammunition, and Environment. Those listed here are thought to relate
more directly to the purpose of this Section.

2 The terms used here and their alternatives reflect the variety that are used by Nations (semantics) in
their risk management processes. Some Nations’ processes may vary from three to five levels,

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Unlikely Unlikely to occur, but possible

Very unlikely So unlikely it may be assumed it will never occur

(4) On deployed operations, for example, the probability of an event is

considerably higher by the potential threat of deliberate enemy
action in addition to field-expedient methods of storage, exposure
of the ammunition to extreme climate conditions and frequent
handling.
b. Exposure
(1) The critical aspect of the consequence – injury or death to people –
is affected by the degree to which those persons are exposed to
the hazard. This can be calculated based upon the likelihood of
those persons being present when an undesired event occurs.
Consideration is given to whether persons are always present,
sometimes present or just passing through.
(2) Some risk assessment processes will also consider types of person
in a variety of categories such as “related”, “non-related”, or “public”
where there is a capability to calculate probabilities quantitatively
and compare it to accepted risk thresholds.
c. Physical Effects
(1) The ESO must determine the magnitude of the physical effects in
terms of blast, primary fragmentation/secondary debris and thermal
effects. AASTP-4 Explosives Safety Risk Analysis includes more
detail on physical effects.
(2) The ESO preparing the ESC will use a variety of tools in order to
determine the probable results of the physical effects, primarily
existing guidelines for safety distances which have been
established based on trials, tests, and modeling. The expert(s)
individual experience(s) with explosives is a vital ingredient in this
assessment.
d. Consequences
(1) In every case the physical effects of the undesired explosive events
will have consequences for exposed personnel, materiel and
infrastructure. Although the normally accepted critical measure is
the number of fatalities, the aspects of injuries, and loss or damage
to materiel and infrastructure cannot be ignored. This is particularly
true for munitions as a supply in itself whereby its loss or
unavailability could affect operational capability. There may also be
a significant EOD clean- up challenge.

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(2) In order to properly staff an ESC to the appropriate approving

authority for a decision, the ESO preparing it must be able to
summarize all of the above information as to the severity of the risk.
A procedure to calculate consequences quantitatively is given in
Paragraph 2.7.3. Based on the quantitative analysis the
commander determines the appropriate qualitative consequence
level according to Table 2-6. Further details on consequences may
be found in AASTP-4.

Table 2-5: Consequence Table (qualitative values)

Category Definition

• Severe consequences unacceptable in all but the most

Catastrophic urgent of operational requirements
• Multiple deaths and/or serious injury
• Significant loss or damage to mission critical materiel &
infrastructure

• Critical consequences and acceptance implies operational

Major imperatives
• Some deaths and/or injury
• Loss or damage to mission critical materiel & infrastructure

• Consequences are not expected to significantly disrupt operations

Minor • Minor injuries
• Minimal impact on materiel & infrastructure

Negligible Negligible or insignificant effects

(3) It should be noted that the Definition column in the above table
includes descriptions of generic, basic criteria. A Nation may wish,
for example, to include under each definition specific numbers or
percentages of dead or serious injury and monetary figures relating
to damage or loss of materiel and infrastructure.
e. Risk
Risk may be expressed in terms of quantitative or qualitative values. A
way to calculate quantitative values in terms of persons killed or injured
and possible damage to material and buildings/structures shown in
Paragraph 2.7.3. In the absence of quantitative data the following
qualitative procedure can be used.

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Once the Level of probability and the Category of hazard consequence

have been determined, Table 2-6 below provides a summary of the Risk
Level. It is recognized that this table may vary depending on national
requirements, but its intent is to provide a common, basic risk
identification and acceptance framework, which nations participating in
NATO multinational operations can use, understand, and work
cooperatively.

Table 2-6: Risk Index Table

Consequence
Catastrophic Major Minor Negligible
Probability

Likely High High Medium Low

Occasional High Medium Medium Low

Seldom Medium Medium Low Low

Unlikely
Medium Low Low Low

Very unlikely Low Low Low Low

4. Step 3 – Risk Control Plan

a. A Control Plan is developed to assure that all the mitigation techniques to
reduce and/or eliminate the Risk Level identified in STEP 2 are
documented. The Control Plan should address the probability and
consequence of every hazard identified before counter measure(s) is/are
applied, plus the probability and consequence after the
countermeasure(s) are applied. However, If the initial Risk Level is
acceptable, no mitigation techniques need to be applied. The Control
Plan must be completed and presented to the Appropriate Authority for
STEP-4 Risk Approval. The Control Plan is also the basis for STEP 5-
Risk Tracking.

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b. The spectrum of risk ranges from high to low. In terms of accepting risk
the approach is often referred to as As Low As Reasonably Practicable
(ALARP) – the aim being to mitigate a hazardous situation to an
acceptable level by considering the following:
(1) Quantity of ammunition stocks.
(2) Numbers and types of exposed persons.
(3) Criticality of the activity to support operations.
(4) Construction type of the Potential Explosion Site (PES) or Exposed
Site (ES).
(5) Type and location of barricades.
(6) Determination of the Maximum Credible Event (MCE).
(7) Training, qualification and experience of personnel.
(8) Availability and use of additional real estate.
(9) Security measures.
(10) Force Protection considerations.

5. Step 4 – Risk Approval and Implementation

a. Having determined the level of risk and considered possible mitigation
the ESO must present the risk assessment case to the appropriate
authority (e.g., Operational Commander).
b. Make Risk Decision. A key element of the risk decision is determining if
the residual risk is justified. The appropriate authority, based upon the
level of risk associated with the mission, must compare and balance the
risk against mission expectations. The Operational Commander decides
if controls are sufficient and acceptable and whether to accept the
resulting residual risk. If the Operational Commander determines the risk
level is too high, they can direct the development of additional or
alternate controls, or they can modify, change, or reject the course of
action.
c. Coordination and communication. It is important to coordinate and
communicate with adjacent units and organizations to ensure they
understand the hazards identified and the controls to be implemented,
especially if they will encounter the same hazards or play a role in
implementing the required controls. In a Multi-National context this
coordination is more complex, but all the more important to ensure it is
completed.
d. Implementation of the risk begins after the appropriate authority
approves the Explosive Safety Case and after the mitigation efforts that
were identified in the Risk Control Plan (Step 3) are applied.

6. Step 5 – Risk Tracking

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a. In order to complete the risk management process, the specific risk

situation must be periodically monitored:
(1) If the hazard exposure to personnel and/or assets has changed.
(2) Whether the risk owner has changed.
b. The monitoring of the implied mitigation techniques is an important aspect
of the above, which is an important role of the ESO as an on-going
activity.
c. It is also important to ensure that the risk management process itself is
monitored for effectiveness and ways in which it could be improved. The
ESO must also monitor this aspect and report to NATO and/or National
authorities which are responsible for instituting the risk management
process.
d. Elements of managing a risk decision include, but are not limited to:
(1) Tracking the implementation of the risk-reducing actions.
(2) Need for reassessment of the ESMRM risk decision based on
conditions specified in paragraph 7.3.
(3) Recommending when the ESMRM risk decision is no longer
needed due to the conclusion of a munitions-related operation.

2.7.3 QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

1. General
a. A quantitative explosives safety risk analysis of an ammunition storage
site consists of calculating the consequences (to people and assets) of a
possible event in a PES and the estimation of the frequency of event. In
general, the following main steps have to be performed:
(1) Definition of the situation and survey of the relevant data of
possible PESs and exposed ESs such as:
(a) type of PES, barricaded/unbarricaded
(b) NEQ stored in PES
(c) distance between PES and ES
(d) type of ES and number of exposed persons in it
(2) Calculation of the consequences based on the data above for a
given PES – ES relationship
(3) Aggregation of the consequences for all ESs (= Risk in case of
event)
(4) Calculation or estimation of the frequency of event
(5) Calculation of the total risk in terms of the number of personnel
killed, injured, the amount of material damage/loss of assets, and
the Operational Mission Impact.

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b. This procedure is further outlined below in paragraph 2. The consequence

and risk aggregation is explained in detail and the technical models are
described for the quantitative calculation of the consequences from
explosions in out of area/field storage sites for personnel occupying a wide
range of structures used on deployed missions. Further, quantitative and
qualitative information is given about the frequency of event in such
storage sites.
c. For cases that cannot be treated with the models provided below in
paragraph 2, e.g. due to lacking models for the PESs, or for cases where
a more detailed risk analysis must be performed, e.g. due to the severity of
the expected consequences, procedures are given in AASTP-4. Applying
those procedures, however, requires special knowledge and education. In
addition those procedures require much more detailed knowledge about
the PESs and the ESs. Therefore, ample time is needed to collect and
process those data.

2. Procedure
a. Introduction
(1) The procedure for calculating consequences described in the
following paragraphs is applicable to operational storage situations.
It allows performing a simple yet quantitative risk analysis within a
short time and with minimal technical support.
(2) The consequences of an event as a function of Distance, NEQ and
PES / ES types are given in the tables in Annex E. The indicated
consequences consider the combined effects of blast, debris and
primary fragments.
(3) The consequences in the tables are given in terms of:
(a) probability of fatality [%]
(b) probability of injury [%]
(c) structural damage [%]
Remark: Injury values in the consequence tables are defined as "at
least injured", meaning that they include the probability of a fatality.
To obtain the value for injury only, the lethality has to be deducted
from the injury value taken from the table.
(4) For structural damage also the following qualitative measures
apply:
(a) < 20 % damage = superficial damage
(b) 20 % - 80 % damage = considerable damage
(c) > 80 % damage = complete loss of structure and/or asset
(5) The tables are applicable for field storage structure classes as
defined in Annex F.
(6) Instead of using the manual calculation procedure listed below, the

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AASTP-5 Consequence Analysis Tool described in Annex E could

be used.
b. Calculation of Consequences
(1) In this paragraph it is described how the consequences for a given
situation can be calculated manually, using the consequence
Tables and the calculation template in Annex D. First, the relevant
data for the PES and all ESs needs to be collected. The following
steps have to be taken (an example of a filled in calculation
template is also provided):
Col A: List every ES in the column labeled using a brief description.
Col B: Identify the ES type using Annex F, Overview of ES Structure
Classes.
Col C: Identify Yes or No if the PES or ES is barricaded.
Col D: Identify Yes or No if Normal Windows are in the ES.
Col E: Identify Yes or No if the ES has Overhead Protection.
Col F: Fill in the number of exposed persons for each ES. To
calculate the maximum consequences for a given situation put
in the maximum number of persons staying in the ES. For the
calculation of the average consequences use the average
number of persons staying in an ES.
Col G: Fill in the actual distance between the PES and ES.
Col H: Fill in the Case No. provided in the applicable table in Annex D
for lethality. Tables are given for NEQ's between 100 kg and
4000 kg. In general the NEQ may not be exactly equal to the
NEQ values given in the tables. If this is the case, the user
should select the larger NEQ (this also applies to columns L
and R).
Col J: Fill in the Lethality percentage provided at the intersection of
the case number and distance in the applicable table. In
general the distance from an ES to a PES may not be exactly
equal to the distances given in the tables. If this is the case,
the user should select the shorter distance (this also applies to
columns M and S)..
Col K: Fill in the number of Persons Killed by calculating Col F times
Col J divided by 100 (K=FxJ/100).
Col L: Fill in the Case No. provided in the applicable table in Annex D
for injury.
Col M: Fill in the Injury percentage provided at the intersection of the
case number and distance in the applicable table.
Col N: Fill in the number of Persons at least injured by calculating Col
F times Col M divided by 100 (N=FxJ/100).
Col P: Fill in the number of Persons Injured by calculating Col N
minus Col K. (P=N-K).

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Col Q: Fill in the number of Persons Unharmed by calculating Col F

minus Col N. (Q=F-N).
Col R: Fill in the Case No. provided in the applicable table in Annex D
for Damage.
Col S: Fill in the Damage percentage provided at the intersection of
the case number and distance in the applicable table.
Remarks:
(a) Round up the total values for lethality and injury to the
next whole number.
(b) The total number of exposed persons should be
approximately equal to the sum of total number of killed,
injures and unharmed persons.
(c) The total numbers of personnel and asset damage allows a
commander to make a judgment about the impact on the
mission.
c. Probability of Event
(1) Whereas reliable technical models exist for the calculation of the
consequences from explosion in out of area / field storage sites, for
the probability of events there are only limited quantitative values
available, as e.g. the ones documented in AASTP-4.
(2) For more peace-time like situations - where no enemy attack is
imminent - the probability of event is mainly driven by the following
factors:
(a) type of stored ammunition
(b) frequency of handling of the ammunition
(c) environmental conditions (climate)
Some information about quantitative probabilities for such
situations is given in Table 2 . 7 . More detailed information about
probabilities of event during peace-time like situations can be found
in AASTP-4.
(3) For war-time like situations - where a storage site could get under
attack - the probability of event is mainly driven by the:
(a) enemy activities in general
(b) active and passive defence measures taken
(c) military value of a possible target
This implies that the probability of event in war-time like situations
strongly depends on factors that can only be influenced up to some
degree. Probabilities for such situations may vary many orders of
magnitude. Therefore, it is nearly impossible to give a
quantitative number for the probability in war-time like situations
without the knowledge of the tactical situation at hand.

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(4) As a general rule, in cases where it is not possible to determine a

quantitative value for the probability of event of an operational
storage site, the qualitative values given in Table 2-5 may be used.

Table 2-7: Probability of Event for Operational Storage

Location Probability Probability

Type of Enemy
Case of of Event of Event
Ammunition Influence
Storage (qualitative) (quantitative)

own ammo in 1*10-5/y

no enemy
1 good Home Very unlikely according to
attack imminent
condition AASTP-4

own ammo in equal to approx.

no enemy
2 good Field Unlikely 1*10-4/y according to
attack imminent
condition AASTP-4 1)

captured equal to approx.

no enemy
3 ammo Field Seldom 1*10-3/y according to
attack imminent
or UXO AASTP-4 1)

own ammo in
storage under not defined, see
4 good Field Occasional
enemy attack 7.3.2.3.c.
condition

captured
storage under not defined, see
5 ammo Field Likely
enemy attack 7.3.2.3.c.
or UXO
1) For normal situations, without special influences from extreme climate or excessive handling times

2.7.4 RISK ASSESSMENT REPORT

1. The risk assessment shall be documented in a report that includes the following
(See Appendix G for the summary form);
a. Executive summary
b. Purpose.
c. Scope (with signatures and modifications).
d. Methodology used to determine risk (e.g AASTP-5 paragraph 2.7,
AASTP-4, national process)
e. Explosives safety supporting information (e.g., site plans, deviations,
exposures).
f. Identification of munitions and munitions-related processes.

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g. Infrastructure analysis based on risk to and from munitions and munitions-

related processes as applicable.
h. Overall risks to and from munitions and munitions-related processes.
i. The Control Plan (see paragraph 2.7.2).
j. Organizations/agencies/units responsible for implementing and managing
risk-reduction actions.(see 2.7.2 step 5 Risk Tracking)
k. Organizations/agencies/units responsible for overseeing approved risk
reduction actions.
l. Estimated duration of the ESMRM risk decision.

2.8. TRANSPORT

1. The purpose of this section is to provide expert advice to operational

commanders assigned to out of area operations about the requirements for the
transport of dangerous goods including munitions. This Section does not address
the use of roads, road permission, etc., which are included in the guidance
document to AMovP-6.
2. International regulations such as ICAO, IMDG, ADR, RID, and the guidance
document to implement AMovP-6 plus local national regulations should be
followed wherever possible. Deviations from these rules are possible, depending
on the transport requirements and the operational situation. Refer to AMovP-6 for
more information.

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Transport
Deviation from Deviation from Remarks
situation international rules national rules

From home country No deviations Up to home country Logistic transport

to POD and return
(POE)
From POD to Deviations are possible (2) Up to home country Tactical or logistic transport.
Staging Area1) Deviations depending of the
security risk
From Staging Area Deviations are possible Up to home country Tactical or logistic transport.
to POE2) (see Table 2-9) Deviations depending of the
security risk
Inside the operational Deviations are possible Up to home country Tactical transport. Deviations
area1) (see note and Table 2-9) depending of the security risk
Captured/found Not applicable (see notes) Up to home country Captured/found ammunition
ammunition inside the must be classified for transport
operational area3) or storage by Munitions Specialist
Notes:
(1) For logistic transport, international regulations and local national regulations must be applied.
(2) Special care is necessary when a tactical transport changes into a normal logistic transport. In this situation the international regulations and
local national regulations have to be followed.
(3) See paragraph 2.4.3. CEA is to be certified by an EOD expert as safe for transport to a demolition place or for temporary storage.
Table 2-8 Examples of Deviations from Transport Regulations

3. The use of harbors, ports and airfields as a Point of Debarkation (POD) for
loading and unloading dangerous goods and deviations from international rules
should be, if possible, approved in agreement with the host nation.
4. This document provides guidance for those situations where deviations from the
rules are required due to operational necessity. Every effort must be made to
observe the minimum safety and risk requirements for the transport mode
selected. For example:
a. The use of CG.
b. For air transport, the ammunition must be certified as air transportable and
must meet criteria for (under)pressure, vibration, temperature, static
electricity, and electro-magnetic radiation (type classification).
c. Stuffing and stowing packaging and containers in accordance with IMDG
Code for sea transportation.
d. Securing of the load.
e. Use of transmitters (radio, radar, mobile phone, etc.).

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DELETE THIS TABLE Table 2-9 In the operational area

Operational area: Deviations from (Inter)national rules do not affect the ammunition safety

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DELETE THIS TABLE Table 2-9 Deviations from (Inter)national rules for transport in Operational Area Explanations Table 2-9
Deviations and Definitions

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2.9. ACCIDENT REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION

1. All explosives accidents shall be reported, investigated and analyzed with the aim
to prevent like occurrences and improve safety.

2. The term explosives accident refers to any incident involving ammunition or

explosives that results in, or has potential to result in, death or injury to a
person(s) and/or damage to equipment and/or property, military or civilian.

3. Analyzing the accident investigation results may establish lessons learned that
can serve as a future preventive measure. Such measures may include the
revision of operating systems and procedures, suspension of ammunition,
eliminate the use of faulty material handling equipment, or disposal of the
ammunition type involved.

4. Reporting explosive accidents include:

a. An unplanned explosion or functioning of a device containing explosives,
propellants, pyrotechnics, or other similar substances associated with
these items which present real or potential hazards to life or property.
Included are:
(1) Accidents occurring during the explosives or pyrotechnics handling
such as maintenance or surveillance process.
(2) Off-range impacts of projectiles, bombs, missiles, or their
fragments/components, during range operations.
(3) Accidents occurring during disposal; reclamation and
demilitarization.
(4) Accidents involved with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
Operations.
(5) The inadvertent actuation, jettisoning, release, or launching of
explosive devices.
b. Explosives accidents do not include the accidental discharge of small
arms weapons (in unit arms rooms, on guard duty,) and hunting or
recreational shooting accidents.

5. The national authority or the organization responsible for the munitions shall
ensure that a system of reporting ammunition accidents is developed, and all
users are aware of the procedures. Users shall be instructed to immediately
report an ammunition accident through their chain of command and inform the
lead ESO. The following information is provided as a guide for the initial report:
a. name of individual submitting the report;

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b. user unit;
c. user unit contact person;
d. date and time of explosives accident;
e. probable cause, if known;
f. details regarding fatalities, injuries and damage and their location
indicated on the map;
g. location where the explosives accident occurred, including map grid
reference;
h. type and quantity (NEQ) of munitions involved (full technical name);
i. weapon type involved (full technical name);
j. batch, lot and/or serial number of the munitions involved;
k. description of accident and type of activity (e.g. loading, transport);
l. weather conditions;
m. action(s) taken by user unit.

6. Investigating the accident:

a. Explosives accident investigations shall be led by an individual of the
appropriate rank appointed by the national authority. The team shall
determine the cause of the accident, contributing factors and lessons
learned.
b. In a situation where other factors may have contributed to the accident,
additional assistance from specialists may be essential in determining the
cause.
c. The team lead shall submit a full technical report in a timely manner
through their chain of command to their national authority and the lead
ESO. A preliminary report shall be provided to the base commander and
to the lead ESO as soon as possible if there is a need for urgent action to
immediately improve safety.

2.10. MUNITIONS AMNESTY PROGRAM

1. All NATO bases that include tenants and transient units who issue ammunition to
their personnel shall implement a Munitions Amnesty Program. The Amnesty
Program is intended to ensure maximum recovery of ammunition and explosives
outside the supply system. The Program is not intended to circumvent normal
turn-in procedures.

2. The NATO Base’s Munitions Amnesty Program shall consist of four integrated
components:

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a. A turn-in capability at the NATO Base’s ammunition storage area for turn-
in of munitions that do not fit into the MABs described below.
b. A process (e.g., a 24 hour telephone number), whereby anyone wanting to
turn in munitions under the Amnesty Program, has access to directions on
how to do so.
c. A system of MABs placed throughout the NATO Base. The purpose of
these MABs is to provide personnel with a safe, tamperproof receptacle
into which small amounts of ammunition and explosives, which may have
been accidentally forgotten in clothing, personal equipment, vehicles, and /
or was collected somewhere, can be deposited anonymously for collection
and disposal.
d. Close coordination / cooperation between the NATO Base ESO, national
ESOs and Ammunition Supply Issuing Activities, EOD, and other
supporting elements.

3. Lead ESO Responsibilities.

a. Assume primary responsibility for the management of the NATO Base
Munitions Amnesty Program and its components.
b. Propose locations for MABs and their required mitigation for NATO Base
Commander review / approval. Approved locations shall be identified in
the Base SOP detailed below, and as such, no licensing of MABs is
required. The placement of MABs must be strategic and well thought out,
to assure maximum collection potential at locations where there is an
increased potential for personnel having such items (e.g., airfields, near
hospitals – personnel airlifted in for medical care), where personnel
congregate or reside (e.g., quarters, dining facilities), and at other
locations where such items may turn up (e.g., the ammunition storage
area entrance, post office, laundry facility).
c. Review and accept all MAB designs for compliance with the requirements
given below. A number of nations have existing MAB designs which will
meet those requirements and can be used if accepted.
d. Develop a NATO Base SOP which describes the purpose of the Amnesty
Program, its components, details specific functional responsibilities and
highlights explosive safety requirements for handling Amnesty Program
items. The SOP shall identify approved MAB locations and the process
for their safe operation.
e. Establish and manage the MAB key control process. Keys shall be kept
under strict control to prevent unauthorized access to MABs contents.
f. Participate in the MAB collection activities as described in paragraph g
below, and brief the members of the Explosive Safety Board on the types
and amounts of munitions being turned in.
g. Maintain accurate inventories of items collected as part of the Amnesty
Program. The sole purpose for this is for awareness purposes and trend

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assessments. : Trends can point to weaknesses in national or NATO Base

procedures and operations that can be rectified to eliminate or minimize
MAB usage (e.g., troops are not turning in ammunition at their ammunition
supply point upon return from training / operations because they are too
tired or the supply point closes too early).
h. Publicize the Base’s Amnesty Program and post the SOP throughout the
base camp/airfield. All personnel on the NATO Base should be aware of
all MAB locations and their purpose.

4. Responsibilities of Nations on a NATO Base.

a. It is incumbent on nations that own / issue / use munitions to properly
account for it and to prevent the collection of non-issued (e.g., found or
enemy) munitions by their personnel. Proper accountability and sound
leadership can go far towards managing the quantity of amnesty items that
are turned in.
b. For everyone’s safety, it is important that all nations, whether or not they
have / use munitions, educate their personnel about the hazards of
abandoned, lost, or enemy munitions, what steps to take if they find such
materials on-base, and the role the Base’s Amnesty Program plays in
mitigating the hazards and in disposal of those items.
c. Support the NATO Base Commander and NATO Base’s ESO in
implementation of the Base’s Amnesty Program.

5. MAB shall meet the following minimum requirements:

a. Be of robust construction to prevent breakage and pilfering. Some photo
examples of MABs are given below and construction details are provided
in the NATO D-Document on Nationally Approved Construction.

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b. Provided with a funnel or slot suitably large enough for users to deposit
items intended to be collected. The opening shall be configured in such a
manner so that items cannot be removed from the box once deposited.
c. Provided with a door / access panel for removal of deposited munitions.
The door / access panel shall be secured by a robust hasp / padlock or
keypad.
d. Secured to prevent them being stolen or their unauthorized removal.
e. MABS shall be prominently identified so that they are clearly visible to all
personnel. They shall be painted red or yellow (or any highly visible color)
and associated signage shall be in contrasting white or black letters.
f. For risk mitigation, the MAB shall be surrounded by gabions that are
capable of being filled with fine earth or sand. The bastion to the rear of
the MAB shall have sufficient separation from the MAB enough to allow
easy access to the box for the collection of munitions contained therein.

6. Collection of items from MABs.

a. MABs shall be visited and emptied at a minimum once a week by qualified
weapons / explosives specialist. This may need to be increased if trends
are observed that dictate the need for more frequent visits (e.g., larger
items being placed outside the container because they don’t fit in the slot
provided).
b. If there is any doubt as to the safety of the items contained within the MAB
or found at a MAB (i.e., it was too large for the MAB slot and was placed
next to the MAB), then Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) shall be
contacted to assess the item(s) and to remove the contents. Prior to their
arrival, an initial evacuation zone of 50 m, increased out to 100 m, shall be
established if possible. Upon the arrival of EOD personnel, the EOD on-
site commander shall establish the required evacuation distance needed
to ensure the safety of surrounding personnel.
c. Munitions collected from MAB shall be disposed of by qualified personnel
in accordance with national and AASTP-1 requirements.

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2.11. MISSILE INSTALLATIONS

1. For the purposes of AASTP-5, this paragraph pertains specifically to mobile

missile systems (e.g., Patriot) positioned around or in the vicinity of a NATO base
and which are being used in a static, defensive role.

2. When determining locations for missile systems, the threats posed by such
systems to its surroundings need to be understood, considered, and coordinated
with the Lead ESO before missile locations are selected. Generally, missile
replacement, missile storage, and other missile system functions occur at the
immediate missile installation site. Because of this, missile installations present
potential hazards to surrounding operations, personnel, and facilities from:
a. The explosion effects from an accident involving the munitions associated
with missile installation.
b. Electromagnetic radiation being emitted by the system (see AASTP-1, Part
II, chapter 7 for additional information related to hazards of
electromagnetic radiation to munitions containing electrically initiated
devices).
c. Backblast generated during the launch of a missile, which may place
nearby facilities at risk of collapse or damage from backblast pressures;
windows may break and generate hazardous glass fragments; personnel
within backblast distance may be severely injured.

3. Required FD shall be the greater of a. or b. below;

a. Treat each missile system and each of its associated, separate
operations, as an aboveground PES and apply the FD given in paragraph
2.6, based on the HD and NEQ involved. Where minimum FD cannot be
met, aggregate all NEQ and treat as a single PES.
b. Missile system technical documentation (e.g., field manual, pamphlet,
standard operating procedures (SOP)) specify required safety distances,
for technical and/or operational reasons, applicable to each system.
Missile systems/installations shall be deployed in accordance with their
specific implementation documentation.

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2.12. CONCLUDING A MILITARY OPERATION

2.12.1. INTRODUCTION

1. This chapter identifies general requirements related to the conclusion of a NATO

military operations and NATO bases as part of the redeployment and
disestablishment stage of missions or operations. Specific requirements are
found in chapter 6 of NATO’s Explosives Safety and Munitions Risk Management
(ESMRM) publication ALP-16.

3. Preparing for the conclusion of munitions-related activities at operational

locations must be planned for during the initial analysis of the desired end state,
together with the means to achieve it.

3. All munitions operation associated with the 7 activities identified below must meet
NATO explosive safety requirements of AASTP-1 or AASTP-5 as applicable or
have a ESMRM risk assessment and risk decision by the appropriate approval
level.

4. The following munitions and munitions-related processes and activities are

associated with the redeployment and disestablishment stages of concluding a
military operation. All activities described below must be assessed for hazards
that potentially risk personnel, property and mission.
(1) Consolidation and Collection (Reception) involving the relocation of
munitions to central locations for further action.

(2) Storage of munitions in preparation for retrograde or disposal (e.g.,

transfer, sale, demilitarization, destruction). Storage is likely to be
temporary in nature and care must be exercised since munitions
turned in will be done by a large number of units.

(3) Transportation associated with redeployment and disestablishment

stages.

(4) Distribution of munitions back to consolidation, collection, and

storage locations as part of unit turn-ins.

(5) Maintenance of munitions to include packaging and preparation by

units prior to turn-in.

(6) Retrograde of munitions by units through lines of communication

(LOC) to the country of origin or final destination.

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(6) Disposal of munitions (e.g., transfer, sale, demilitarization, and

destruction).

2.12.2. CONSOLIDATION AND COLLECTION (RECEPTION)

1. Consolidation and collection is the equivalent of reception during the

redeployment and disestablishment stages at the conclusion of a NATO military
operation.

2. ESMRM risk assessments are an integral part of managing the potential risks
during the consolidation and collection phase and may need to be performed for
these locations. Actions typically associated with consolidation and collection
include:
a. Reception of all munitions at munitions storage areas. Munitions not
returned in their original packaging shall be assumed to be in an
“unknown” condition.
b. Inspection of munitions to determine condition. During inspection of
returned munitions, a qualified technical expert shall assess the condition
of returned munitions with special regard to it being safe to move on the
imminent retrograde movement.
c. Repacking of serviceable munitions. Munitions requiring repackaging must
be packaged into containers that meet United Nations and International
Organization for Standardization requirements for storage and transport.
d. Arrangements for any required disposal (e.g., transfer, sale,
demilitarization, destruction).

2.12.3. STORAGE

1. Storage of munitions is the same throughout the deployment, redeployment, and

disestablishment stages of a NATO military operation. Storage during the
redeployment and disestablishment stage is likely to be temporary and dynamic
due to unforeseen munitions turn-ins. Assessments of munitions storage
locations shall also focus on the following prior to redeployment:
a. Condition of munitions
b. Condition of packaging
c. Hazard classification
d. Expected munitions throughput. During retrograde, significant quantities
of munitions may be delivered to a storage location at a rate far beyond
the capabilities of that location. Increased throughput will likely cause
licensed explosives limits to be exceeded, resulting in violations of
established quantity-distance and may exacerbate or worsen safety cases.
Increasing throughput will likely require a new ESMRM Storage Risk
Assessment.

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2. Previously approved ESMRM risk assessments and risk decisions will likely need
to be updated during the redeployment and disestablishment stage due to the
dynamically changing operational environment.

3. Refer to AASTP-1 for detailed storage information for depleted uranium

munitions stored during the redeployment and disestablishment stage.

2.12.4. TRANSPORTATION

1. Additional hazards during the redeployment and disestablishment stages may

require modifications of existing ESMRM assessments or performance of new
assessments. Examples of modifications include but are not limited to:
a. Hazard classification if repackaged in other than original packaging. A
munition’s assigned hazard classification is only valid in its tested,
packaged configuration. If not in that configuration, the hazard
classification is no longer valid and the munitions may actually present a
very different threat (e.g., hazard division (HD) 1.3 or storage sub-division
(SsD) 1.2.1 may now be HD 1.1).
b. Foreign munitions and weapons systems requiring intelligence
exploitation.
c. Munitions locations (e.g., safe haven, unforeseen delays, temporary
holding) during the redeployment and disestablishment.
d. Movement of munitions shall comply with AMovP-6 Allied Multi-Modal
Transportation of Dangerous Goods Directive.

2.12.5. DISTRIBUTION / COLLECTION

1. During the Distribution / Collection stage, the focus is on units returning munitions
(e.g., excess, unaccounted for, or other types of munitions) to consolidation and
storage locations in preparation for transportation.

2. A major challenge during the redeployment and disestablishment stage at the

unit level is munitions returned in unknown condition, and in varying
configurations (e.g., unpackaged, improper packaging, flares without safety caps,
taped grenades). To preclude hazardous conditions during the redeployment
and disestablishment stage, munitions personnel must make every effort
throughout the operational stage to maintain original munitions packaging
materials.

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2.12.6. MAINTENANCE

1. During the redeployment and disestablishment stage, maintenance of munitions

will shift from preparing munitions for employment to inspecting, repackaging,
and unit return in preparation for demilitarization, sale, transfer, or retrograde.
Munitions maintenance during the redeployment and disestablishment stage may
be done at a separate munitions operating location or as part of a storage
operation.

2. A separate ESMRM assessment may need to be developed or the existing

ESMRM Maintenance Risk Assessment may need to be modified during the
maintenance stage.

2.12.7. RETROGRADE

1. Munitions may also be removed from the area of operations (AOO) in which case
NATO explosives safety requirements of AASTP-1, AASTP-3, AASTP-5,
ESMRM, and national requirements also apply.

2. Retrograde during the redeployment and disestablishment stage involves

returning munitions from the AOO. During the redeployment and
disestablishment stage, retrograde involves transporting munitions from LOC
nodes (e.g., airport of debarkation, seaport of debarkation, railhead) to their final
destination.

2.12.8. DISPOSAL

1. Complying with NATO or National Requirements. During the redeployment and

disestablishment stage, disposal of munitions (e.g., transfer, sale,
demilitarization, and destruction) within the AOO becomes a major function. See
AOP-38. Standardization Agreement 4518, “Safe Disposal of Munitions, Design
Principles and Requirements, and Safety Assessment” provides information
related to demilitarization that does not involve destruction. Part IV of AASTP-1
provides specific NATO explosives safety requirements for destruction areas
(i.e., open burning (OB) and open detonation (OD)).

2. Some nations’ regulations do not allow destruction of surplus munitions by OB or

OD. In this case, munitions must meet transportation requirements and risk
assessments/decisions, as applicable.

2.12.9. POST-OPERATION ACTIVITIES

1. Post-operation activities may include munitions-related processes and activities

that require further hazard assessments. Examples include:

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a. Infrastructure. The potential transfer or destruction of any munitions

operations infrastructure built by NATO member nations in support of the
mission. Any residual munitions-related risks should be removed or
communicated and accepted by the receiving nation.
b. Removal of explosive remnants of war. Any residual munitions-related
risks from explosive remnants of war should be removed or communicated
and accepted by the receiving nation.
c. Closing or transferring training ranges. Any residual munitions-related risks
from ranges where munitions were used should be removed or
communicated and accepted by the receiving nation.

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 ANNEX B TO
AASTP-5

ANNEX B EXPLOSIVES SAFETY OFFICER

B.1. COMPETENCIES OF AN EXPLOSIVES SAFETY OFFICER

He/She should:
(1) Have knowledge and understanding of NATO Standards and
Guidelines regarding Storage, Maintenance and Transport of
Ammunition.
(2) Be able to identify FD applied from PES to PES and to ES.
(3) Be able to plan an Ammunition Area (e.g. number of PES required,
barricade requirements, appropriate FD).
(4) Be able to organize an ammunition field depot based on economical
storage principles and procedures.
(5) Have knowledge and understanding of lightning protection system and
fire prevention requirements.
(6) Be able to visually identify explosive safety standard shortcomings
during a survey of ammunition storage and maintenance operations.
(7) Be knowledgeable of accident reporting procedures.
(8) Be able to develop SOP.
(9) Be able to determine the risk and consequences of deviations from the
regulations and communicate with the Operational Commander the
mitigating efforts necessary to reduce or eliminate hazards.
(10) Be able to prepare draft explosives licences

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ANNEX C AMMUNITION SAFETY INSPECTIONS

Checklist Quarterly - Scheduled

The purpose of scheduled explosives safety inspections is to detect hazards to life,
materiel and facilities.
Inspections will provide positive accident prevention measures by:
(a) Detecting unsafe conditions and personnel operating errors.
(b) Highlighting the need for specific safeguards for personnel, materiel and
facilities.
(c) Encouraging individuals to increase their overall explosives safety
awareness within their own operating or training areas and to cultivate
improvement.

Quarterly
HQ authorities should conduct explosives safety inspections of all areas and
operations under their control.
Commander :
Officer in charge :
Explosives Safety Officer (ESO)
Fire Protection Officer (FPO)

Verification
(1) Are SOPs existent and current,
(2) Do SOPs contain required elements,
(3) Are magazine inspections current,
(4) Are deficiencies properly reported,
(5) Are corrective actions completed in a timely manner,
(6) Are corrective actions verified,
(7) When was last inspection by a responsible institution?

Storage Situation

(1) Are installation maps accurate,

(2) Is the Quantity limit to each PES verified and documented,
(3) Are IBD fixed and respected,
(4) Are calculated origin distances from PES to
ES/accommodations/facilities in the field camp respected,

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(5) Are there any deviations to the current storage regulations,

(6) Are barricades in good condition,
(7) Can it be verified at any time which people are in ammo area,
(8) Are the workers authorized within a proper described working area,
(9) Are the ammo workers well instructed to handle the ammo,
(10) Are the ammo workers properly following the procedures,
(11) Is the equipment and the tools they use in good condition and
permissible,
(12) Is electrical installation correct and permissible for use with explosives,
(13) Is non-standard ammunition separated from own ammo,
(14) Is the storage area restricted to regular traffic?

Ammunition Stacks

(1) Stacks in good condition,

(2) Stacks under weather protection,
(3) Allowed quantity in stack,
(4) Compatibility groups respected,
(5) Packaging correct,
(6) Clean area?

Lightning protection

(1) Containers earthed,

(2) Lightning Protection System (LPS) effective,
(3) Are checks of LPS documented?

Fire Protection

(1) Fire protection rules established,

(2) No open fire,
(3) Vegetation control practiced,
(4) Are fire breaks adequate,
(5) Do alarm systems exist and signals understood
(6) Is an ESO notified if ammo is involved in fire,
(7) Is/are the assembly point/-s planned and known,
(8) Fire hazard symbols,
(9) Fire fighting equipment in place,
(10) Cooperation between ESO and Fire Protection Officer,
(11) Are fire fighting procedures clarified with FPO and rescue forces,

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(12) Are all people in camp informed about reaction in case of an ammo
fire?

Ammo loaded vehicles

(1) Safety distances to accommodation and buildings,

(2) Parking area min 25 m away from ammo stacks,
(3) Parking places barricaded?

Drivers

(1) Do drivers know the standard hazard distances of their load in case of a
fire,
(2) do they know basic emergency and alert behaviours?

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 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
AASTP-5

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX C

SITE SURVEY CHECK LIST

Subject Topic Points

1. General Type of Mission Humanitarian Mission
Peace keeping
Peace enforcement
Other:
Host Nation Rules with demands of Ammo
Safety
MOU with demands of Ammo Safety
Population De
Attitude: Friendly Hostile
2. Climate Temperature High:
Average :

Weather Dry
Average humidity
Rainy seasons:
3. Infrastructure Airports Traffic density:
Distance to tower
to dispatch building
to runway
Harbours Availability of:
Temporary storage / parking
Access roads
Rail
Waterways Depth Width
Railways Bridges
Tunnels
Highways / Mainstreets Traffic density:
Bridges
Tunnels
Sensitive structures Hospitals
Chem. Industry
Nuclear Power Station
Agriculture and stockbreeding
Cultural Facilities
4. Forces Type of unit: Combat Force
Combat Support Force

Combat loaded platforms (Airplanes, vehicles, vessels)

Number:
Number of military personnel Own Troops:
Other Troops:

1-C-1 Edition 1 Version 3

 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
AASTP-5

Subject Topic Points

5. Ammunition Refer to Tables 2-2 and 2-3.

6. Additional Risks Defence against terrorism Threat

Civil Organisation NGO
Natural disaster Earthquake Zones
Risk zones Flood Zones
Avalanche Zones
Hurricane
“Don’t use dry riverbeds!”
Contamination of
dangerous goods
UXO /Mines
7. Ammo Storage Distances to infra structure Field camp structures incl. ammo storage
Sites and type of buildings Other military infrastructure
Area Usable storage area in general:
incl. Protection zone Total area including hazard zones:
Maximum Storage Quantity in NEQ (kg)
Internal roads Pass ability (two way roads)
Turning possibility for trucks with lorries
Loading and unloading
Environment Hilly/Flat
Vegetation
Usable Barricades ? Natural Barricades
Ground strength: Gabion
Height: Sand sack

Soil Usable for Barricades

Existing storage areas: Shelter:
number, capacity, quality Open stacks:
Container:
Other:
Free storage areas
Storage areas in use for Ammo,
for other hazard goods
Drainage systems

1-C-2 Edition 1 Version 3

 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX C TO
AASTP-5

Subject Topic Points

continued Electric Support Availability
7. Ammo Storage Sites Illumination Availability
Inside magazines
Outside
Level of protection
Lightning protection Availability
Grounding Availability
Climate systems Availability
Fire protection Availability of water
Explosive working facility
Parking space for Cars
Trucks
Hazard good vehicles
Combat loaded vehicles
Distance to gas station Internal (military or civil):
External (civil):
Radar/Radio station, antennas Power:
Frequency:
Antenna sector:
Communication Availability of Telephone
Radio
8. Guarding of the storage site Guarded by: Own troops
Allied troops
Local troops
Existing fence Distance
9. Field camp Ammunition in the compound NEQ 1.1 – 1.3
total number NEQ 1.4
Location of ammo storage Necessity and availability
Distance to and structure of camp accommodation
Parking of combat loaded vehicles
Fire Protection

1-C-3 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

ANNEX D TABLES FOR QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS

D.1. CONSEQUENCE TABLES

PES WITH Barricade PES NO Barricade PES

ES type Windows OHP Lethality Injury Lethality Injury Damage

Hesco No No 1 1 1 1 1

HRS No No 1 1 3 1 1

RS No No 2 1 6 5 2

No No 3 1 6 5
NS 2
Yes No 4 8 6 5

No No 4 3 6 6

Yes No 4 3 6 6
LS 3
No Yes 4 3 - -

Yes Yes 4 3 - -

No No 3 2 6 6
Tent 2
No Yes 3 2 - -

No No 1 1 6 6
FF -
No Yes 1 1 - -

Yes No 5 4 7 7

No No 2 1 7 7
IB 2
No Yes 2 1 - -

Yes Yes 5 4 - -

Table D1a Case Number Table for NEQ = 100 kg

NEQ = 100 kg
Lethality (with or without barricades) Injury (with or without barricades) Damage
for case number for case number for case number
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3
[m] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
10 0.0 20 35 55 25 100 100 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 100 0 100 100
20 0.0 2.0 20 50 25 100 100 50 100 100 50 100 100 100 90 0 60 100
30 0.0 0.0 5.0 40 25 100 70 5.0 80 100 30 100 100 100 40 0 30 100
40 0.0 0.0 1.0 35 25 95 40 1.0 10 95 25 100 100 90 35 0 20 100
50 0.0 0.0 0.0 30 25 65 30 0.2 0.0 50 25 100 100 50 30 0 15 100
60 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 25 45 20 0.1 0.0 10 25 99 99 35 15 0 10 80
70 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 20 25 15 0.0 0.0 1.0 20 70 70 25 5.0 0 5 60
80 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15 17 10 0.0 0.0 0.1 15 40 40 15 1.5 0 0 40
90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 13 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 30 30 10 0.1 0 0 30
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 20 20 8.0 0 0 20
120 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 5.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 10 15 5.0 0 0 10
140 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 5.0 8.0 3.0 0 0 0
160 0.2 1.0 0.7 0.2 2.0 6.0 1.5
180 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.5 4.0 0.9
200 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 3.0 0.7
250 0.8 0.3
300 0.2 0.1

Table D1b Consequence Table for NEQ = 100 kg

D-1 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

PES WITH Barricade PES NO Barricade PES

ES type Windows OHP Lethality Injury Lethality Injury Damage

Hesco No No 1 1 1 1 1

HRS No No 2 1 3 2 1

RS No No 3 1 6 6 2

No No 3 2 6 6
NS 2
Yes No 4 9 6 6

No No 4 4 6 7

Yes No 4 4 6 7
LS 3
No Yes 4 4 - -

Yes Yes 4 4 - -

No No 3 3 6 7
Tent 2
No Yes 3 3 - -

No No 2 2 6 7
FF -
No Yes 2 1 - -

Yes No 5 5 7 8

No No 3 2 8 8
IB 2
No Yes 3 2 - -

Yes Yes 5 5 - -

Table D2a Case Number Table for NEQ = 250 kg

NEQ = 250 kg
Lethality (with or without barricades) Injury (with or without barricades) Damage
for case number for case number for case number
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3
[m] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
10 0.0 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100
20 0.0 0.0 50 85 70 100 100 100 70 100 100 100 70 100 100 100 100 0 100 100
30 0.0 0.0 10 60 40 100 99 99 20 95 100 100 40 100 100 99 95 0 60 100
40 0.0 0.0 2.0 45 30 99 90 80 2.0 10 95 100 30 100 100 90 70 0 40 100
50 0.0 0.0 0.5 35 27 95 50 33 0.5 1.0 70 100 27 100 100 80 50 0 30 100
60 0.0 0.0 0.1 30 25 85 40 20 0.1 0.7 10 100 25 99 100 65 30 0 22 100
70 0.0 0.0 0.0 25 23 70 35 13 0.0 0.5 0.1 100 24 95 99 45 26 0 15 100
80 0.0 0.0 0.0 20 22 50 30 8.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 90 24 85 90 30 24 0 10 85
90 0.0 0.0 0.0 15 21 35 27 5.5 0.0 0.2 0.0 50 23 65 70 27 20 0 6 55
100 0.0 0.0 0.0 10 20 25 25 4.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 25 23 50 50 25 13 0 3 30
120 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 18 15 20 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 18 30 30 20 5.0 0 1 17
140 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 13 7.0 15 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 13 15 15 15 0.5 0 0 5
160 0.1 9.0 3.0 10 1.0 0.1 9.0 5.0 10 10 0.0 0
180 6.0 1.5 6.0 0.6 0.0 6.0 1.0 7.0 6.0
200 4.0 0.8 4.0 0.4 0.0 4.0 0.2 5.0 4.0
250 0.2 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.2 0.0 3.0 0.7
300 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2
350 0.1 0.1
400

Table D2b Consequence Table for NEQ = 250 kg

D-2 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

PES WITH Barricade PES NO Barricade PES

ES type Windows OHP Lethality Injury Lethality Injury Damage

Hesco No No 1 1 1 1 1

HRS No No 1 1 2 1 1

RS No No 2 2 5 6 2

No No 2 2 5 6
NS 2
Yes No 3 9 5 6

No No 3 4 5 4

Yes No 3 4 5 4
LS 4
No Yes 3 4 - -

Yes Yes 3 4 - -

No No 2 3 5 6
Tent 3
No Yes 2 3 - -

No No 1 1 5 6
FF -
No Yes 1 1 - -

Yes No 4 5 6 8

No No 2 1 7 7
IB 3
No Yes 2 1 - -

Yes Yes 4 5 - -

Table D3a Case Number Table for NEQ = 500 kg

NEQ = 500 kg
Lethality (with or without barricades) Injury (with or without barricades) Damage
for case number for case number for case number
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4
[m] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 30 100 100 100
20 10 30 50 35 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 95 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
30 0.1 20 48 32 100 100 100 50 100 100 100 70 100 100 100 100 0 100 85 100
40 0.0 10 46 28 100 90 90 20 80 100 100 50 100 100 100 95 0 100 65 100
50 0.0 5.0 44 25 100 50 60 5.0 20 100 100 35 100 100 100 70 0 70 50 100
60 0.0 2.0 42 25 100 35 50 2.0 2.0 97 100 30 100 97 96 50 0 45 40 100
70 0.0 0.5 40 25 85 20 40 1.0 0.5 70 100 28 100 70 65 40 0 25 30 100
80 0.0 0.1 38 25 65 12 35 0.4 0.1 20 100 27 100 50 30 38 0 10 25 100
90 0.0 0.0 36 25 55 8.0 32 0.2 0.0 2.0 100 26 90 40 22 36 0 0 21 100
100 0.0 0.0 34 25 45 6.0 30 0.1 0.0 0.1 100 25 60 35 16 34 0 0 18 100
120 0.0 0.0 16 25 30 4.0 28 0.0 0.0 0.0 94 25 40 31 10 25 0 0 12 70
140 0.0 0.0 6.0 25 15 2.5 26 0.0 0.0 0.0 40 25 25 30 6.0 15 0 0 6 40
160 2.0 23 7.0 1.5 24 10 23 12 27 4.0 8.0 2 25
180 0.5 21 4.0 1.0 22 4.0 20 4.0 23 2.5 2.0 0 10
200 0.1 19 2.0 0.7 20 2.0 18 2.0 20 1.7 0.5 0
250 9.0 0.5 0.3 9.0 0.5 9.0 0.2 10 0.7 0.1
300 4.0 0.1 0.1 4.0 0.2 4.0 0.1 4.0 0.3
350 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.2
400 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1

Table D3b Consequence Table for NEQ = 500 kg

D-3 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

PES WITH Barricade PES NO Barricade PES

ES type Windows OHP Lethality Injury Lethality Injury Damage

Hesco No No 1 1 1 1 1

HRS No No 1 1 2 2 1

RS No No 2 2 5 6 2

No No 2 2 5 6
NS 3
Yes No 3 9 5 7

No No 3 4 5 4

Yes No 3 4 5 4
LS 4
No Yes 3 4 - -

Yes Yes 3 4 - -

No No 2 3 5 7
Tent 3
No Yes 2 3 - -

No No 1 1 5 7
FF -
No Yes 1 1 - -

Yes No 4 5 6 5

No No 2 2 7 8
IB 3
No Yes 2 2 - -

Yes Yes 4 5 - -

Table D4a Case Number Table for NEQ = 1000 kg

NEQ = 1000 kg
Lethality (with or without barricades) Injury (with or without barricades) Damage
for case number for case number for case number
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4
[m] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
20 10 50 70 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
30 0.5 35 50 50 100 100 100 70 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
40 0.2 25 48 40 100 95 95 30 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 90 100
50 0.1 15 46 33 100 80 80 15 90 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 0 100 75 100
60 0.0 9.0 44 30 100 55 70 5.0 50 100 100 70 100 100 97 95 0 75 60 100
70 0.0 6.0 42 27 90 30 50 2.0 30 95 100 50 100 100 80 50 0 45 50 100
80 0.0 3.5 40 26 80 20 35 1.0 5.0 85 100 40 100 100 45 40 0 25 40 100
90 0.0 2.0 38 25 70 14 33 0.5 2.0 70 100 35 97 97 35 38 0 10 35 100
100 0.0 1.0 36 25 55 10 31 0.2 1.0 40 100 33 90 90 25 36 0 0 30 100
120 0.0 0.4 34 25 40 6.0 30 0.1 0.4 10 100 31 65 75 15 34 0 0 25 80
140 0.0 0.2 32 25 25 3.0 28 0.0 0.2 2.0 96 29 30 50 8.0 32 0 0 20 55
160 0.0 25 25 15 2.0 26 0.0 0.5 80 27 15 30 5.5 25 15 40
180 15 25 8.0 1.5 26 0.2 40 26 8.0 20 4.0 18 10 30
200 5.0 25 4.0 1.0 25 0.1 10 25 4.0 13 2.5 12 7 22
250 0.2 22 0.5 0.5 22 1.0 22 0.5 4.0 1.0 0.7 0 10
300 18 0.2 0.2 18 0.2 18 0.2 1.0 0.5 0.0 0
350 11 0.1 0.1 10 0.1 11 0.1 0.3 0.2
400 6.0 6.0 6.0 0.1 0.1
450 1.0 1.0 1.0
500 0.2 0.1 0.2

Table D4b Consequence Table for NEQ = 1000 kg

D-4 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

PES WITH Barricade PES NO Barricade PES

ES type Windows OHP Lethality Injury Lethality Injury Damage

Hesco No No 1 1 1 1 1

HRS No No 1 1 1 1 1

RS No No 2 2 6 4 2

No No 2 2 6 4
NS 2
Yes No 4 9 7 7

No No 4 5 7 5

Yes No 4 5 7 5
LS 4
No Yes 4 5 - -

Yes Yes 4 5 - -

No No 3 4 7 7
Tent 3
No Yes 3 4 - -

No No 1 1 7 7
FF -
No Yes 1 1 - -

Yes No 5 6 8 6

No No 3 3 9 8
IB 3
No Yes 3 3 - -

Yes Yes 5 6 - -

Table D5a Case Number Table for NEQ = 2000 kg

NEQ = 2000 kg
Lethality (with or without barricades) Injury (with or without barricades) Damage
for case number for case number for case number
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4
[m] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
20 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 20 100 100 100
30 5.0 40 30 54 60 100 100 100 100 85 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
40 1.0 35 25 52 50 100 100 100 100 60 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
50 0.5 33 20 50 45 100 100 100 100 40 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 85 100
60 0.30 30 16 48 40 100 100 97 97 20 100 95 100 100 99 100 99 100 0 85 70 100
70 0.25 20 12 46 35 100 100 70 70 10 98 70 100 100 80 100 95 100 0 70 55 100
80 0.22 5.0 10 44 30 100 100 45 30 5.0 70 25 100 100 60 100 75 99 0 55 50 100
90 0.20 0.5 8.0 42 28 85 85 40 20 4.0 5.0 15 100 100 50 100 50 80 0 40 45 100
100 0.18 0.1 6.0 40 27 50 70 35 15 3.0 0.3 7.0 99 100 40 100 40 50 0 30 40 100
120 0.16 4.0 38 26 30 60 32 10 2.0 0.0 5.0 80 100 35 96 25 38 0 18 35 100
140 0.14 2.5 36 25 15 50 30 6.0 1.5 3.5 40 100 32 70 15 36 0 5 32 100
160 0.13 1.5 34 25 5.0 40 29 4.0 1.0 3.0 15 100 30 40 11 34 0 30 90
180 0.12 1.0 32 25 1.5 30 28 3.0 0.8 3.0 3.0 98 29 30 8.0 32 29 70
200 0.11 0.7 30 25 0.5 20 27 2.0 0.6 2.5 1.5 90 28 20 6.0 30 28 55
250 0.10 0.3 10 25 0.1 10 26 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 40 27 10 2.5 12 17 30
300 0.1 2.0 25 3.5 25 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 3.5 26 5.0 0.8 5.0 5 20
350 0.5 23 1.0 23 0.1 0.2 0.2 1.0 24 1.5 0.4 0.5 4 10
400 0.1 20 0.3 21 0.1 0.1 0.3 22 0.5 0.2 0.1 3 0
450 15 0.1 15 0.1 16 0.2 0.1 1.5
500 10 10 11 0.1 0
600 2.5 2.5 3.0
700 0.0 0.0 0.0

Table D5b Consequence Table for NEQ = 2000 kg

D-5 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5
PES WITH Barricade PES NO Barricade PES
ES type Windows OHP Lethality Injury Lethality Injury Damage

Hesco No No 1 1 1 1 1

HRS No No 1 1 1 1 1

RS No No 2 2 6 4 2

No No 2 2 6 4
NS 2
Yes No 4 5 7 5

No No 4 6 7 6

Yes No 4 6 7 6
LS 3
No Yes 4 6 - -

Yes Yes 4 6 - -

No No 3 5 7 5
Tent 3
No Yes 3 4 - -

No No 3 3 7 5
FF -
No Yes 1 1 - -

Yes No 5 7 8 7

No No 3 3 9 3
IB 4
No Yes 3 3 - -

Yes Yes 5 7 - -

Table D6a Case Number Table for NEQ = 4000 kg

NEQ = 4000 kg
Lethality (with or without barricades) Injury (with or without barricades) Damage
for case number for case number for case number
Distance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4
[m] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%] [%]
10 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
20 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
30 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
40 2.0 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 90 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
50 0.5 50 50 80 70 100 100 100 100 70 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
60 0.40 45 30 60 50 100 100 97 97 50 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 100 100
70 0.35 40 20 55 45 100 100 85 85 25 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100 95 100
80 0.30 35 15 49 40 100 100 65 55 12 100 100 100 100 100 99 0 100 80 100
90 0.25 20 12 47 35 95 95 55 35 3.0 95 90 100 100 100 80 0 100 75 100
100 0.20 10 10 45 30 80 85 45 28 1.5 70 50 100 100 100 55 0 75 65 100
120 0.15 0.5 7.0 43 28 50 70 40 18 0.15 0.5 20 99 100 100 45 0 45 50 100
140 0.10 0.0 5.0 41 27 20 55 35 10 0.10 0.0 15 80 85 100 35 0 25 40 100
160 3.5 39 26 8.0 45 30 7.0 12 40 50 100 30 10 35 100
180 2.5 37 25 2.0 40 29 4.0 8.0 15 40 100 29 0 32 100
200 2.0 35 25 1.0 35 28 3.5 6.0 3.0 35 100 28 30 100
250 1.5 25 25 0.2 22 27 2.0 4.0 1.5 25 95 27 27 75
300 1.0 18 25 12 26 1.5 3.0 1.0 18 40 26 18 50
350 0.4 8.0 25 6.0 25 0.4 1.0 0.4 8.0 12 25 7 30
400 0.1 2.0 24 2.0 24 0.1 0.2 0.1 3.0 3.0 24 4 20
450 0.1 23 0.5 23 0.1 1.0 1.0 23 3 10
500 22 0.1 22 0.3 0.5 22 2 0
600 17 17 0.1 0.2 17 0
700 7.0 7.0 0.0 7.0
800 2.0 2.0 2.0
900 0.1 0.1 0.1

Table D6b Consequence Table for NEQ = 4000 kg

D-6 Edition 1 Version 3

Calculation Template ANNEX D TO
Location:
AASTP-5
Situation No: Description:
PES No: Analysis by
NEQ [kg] Date: Classification:

Exposed Sites (ES) Lethality Injury - Asset Damage

A B C D E F G H J K L M N P Q R S

Barricade Normal Overhead Exposed Distance Lethality Persons Injury Persons Persons Persons
Name / Damage
No. Type PES or ES Windows Protection Persons PES-ES Case No. [%] killed Case No. [%] at least injured unhar- Case No.
Description [%]
Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No [m] injured med

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
- - - - - TOTAL - - TOTAL - TOTAL - -

Consequence Catagory (from Table 7.2) Probability Level (from Table 7.1) Risk Level (from Table 7.3)

Remarks:

Approved: Date:

Table D7 Calculation Template

D-7 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

Table D8 Sample of completed calculation template

D-8 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

ESMRM - Certificate of Risk Acceptance Page 1 of

……..
Form xxxx
1. Issue Date
Risk Acceptance Form
2. Expiration Date

General Information
3. Location Requiring Certificate 4. Organisation Issuing Certificate
(Name and Address) (Name and Address)

5. Installation (PES) Description 6. PES No.

7.. Mitigation Measures necessary: 8. Total Time to

Yes Implement

No 9.. Total Cost of

Measures $

Risk Summary / Residual Risks to be Accepted (Details see Page 2)

10. Risk Level 11.Fatalities

12.Mission Impact

Risk Acceptance
I have reviewed the risk assessment for the risk I am accepting. I understand the hazard, the risk, the cause and the
consequences of the risk on the mission, personnel, and the environment. I have evaluated the recommended correc- tive
actions and the mission requirements. After careful consideration, I am accepting the risk and its consequences due to the
constraints it imposes on the mission's execution and/or unavailability of a timely, cost effective, corrective action

13. Printed Name 14. Rank 15. Organization 16. Signature 17. Date
(YYYY/MM/DD)

Reviewed By:
18. Printed Name 19. Rank 20. Organization 21. Signature 22. Date

D-9 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

ESMRM - Certificate of Risk Acceptance Page 2 of ……..

Form xxxx 1. Issue Date
Risk Mitigation / Risk Details / Risk Tracking Form
2. Expiration Date

Mitigation Measures Summary 6. PES No.

30. Mitigation Measures to be Implemented (No. and Short Description of all Measures)

31. Type of Measure: permanent 32.Total Time to

interim Implement

mix 33.Total Cost of all

Measures $
Final Residual Risks = Accepted Risks
(After Implementation of all the Mitigation Measures According to Point 30.) Nos. Reduction %

34. Consequence Category 37.Fatalities

35. Probability Category 38.Injured
Personnel
36. Risk Level 39.Buildings
Damaged.
40. Other Risk Relevant Factors (if any)

41. Overall Mission Impact

Risk Tracking / Monitoring

42. Situation to be Checked each ……………….. (Day / Week / Month)
43. Printed 44. Rank 45. 46. 47. Date 48. Concur
Name Organization Signature (YYYY/MM/DD) (Yes/No)

D-10 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

ESMRM - Certificate of Risk Acceptance Page 3 of ……..

Form xxxx 1. Issue Date
Baseline Risk Analysis
2. Expiration Date

General Information
50.Installation (PES) Description Details 6. PES No.

51.Method of Risk Assessment, according to: AASTP-5 Table Based Approach

Other …………………………………. AASTP-5 Consequence Analysis Tool

Risk Analysis Details

General Risk Information
52.Consequence Category 55.No. of Fatalities
(from Table 2.5) (from Table D7, if applied)

53.Probability Category 56.No. of Injured Personnel

(from Table 2.4) (from Table D7, if applied)
54.Risk Level 57.No. Buildings Damaged/Destroyed
(from Table 2.6) (from Table D7, if applied)
(Damage [%] divided by 100)

Mission Impact
58.Mission (general)

59.Personnel

60.Equipment

61.Other (e.g. environment / political )

62.Remarks (any other useful information)

D-11 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX D TO
AASTP-5

ESMRM - Certificate of Risk Acceptance Page 4 of ……..

Form xxxx 1. Issue Date
Risk Mitigation Measures Details
2. Expiration Date

Mitigation Measure No. ……… 6. PES No.

80. Mitigation Measure

81. Type of Measure: permanent 82. Time to Implement

interim 83. Cost of Measure $
Residual Risks Nos. Reduction %

84. Consequence Category 87.Fatalities

85. Probability Category 88.Injured Personnel
66.Risk Level 89.Buildings
Damaged.
Mission Impact
90.General

Approval of Measure
91. Measure Approved Yes 92. Reason for Disapproval
No

Mitigation Measure No. ……… 6. PES No.

80. Mitigation Measure

81. Type of Measure: permanent 82. Time to Implement

interim 83. Cost of Measure $
Residual Risks Nos. Reduction %

84. Consequence Category 87.Fatalities

85. Probability Category 88.Injured Personnel
86.Risk Level 89.Buildings
Damaged.
Mission Impact
90.General

Approval of Measure
91. Measure Approved Yes 22. Reason for Disapproval
No

D-12 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

ANNEX E CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS TOOL

E.1. WEBLINK TO THE TOOL

https://www.msiac.nato.int/weblink/0/fol/478105/Row1.aspx

E.2. BACKGROUND AND USER’S MANUAL

Introduction
As described in paragraph 2.7, the consequence analysis is a central part of the risk
analysis that is needed when Field Distances cannot be met in an operational
situation. Instructions on how to do a consequence analysis using just pen and paper
are also described. The Excel workbook does the same analysis. The only difference
is that the tables in the manual method are compressed to reduce the number and
the size of the tables. The results of the workbook and the manual method will be the
same, within a few percent.
Neither the workbook nor the manual method includes the likelihood of an explosion
or the exposure time of persons. This has to be added by the user if a risk analysis
instead of a consequence analysis is required.
Besides calculating the consequences of an explosion scenario, the Excel workbook
can be used:
 to quickly evaluate improvement options like relocating of the exposed
site, adding protective measures like barricades to the exposed site or
removing windows from the exposed site, or reducing the amount of
stored explosives;
 to assist in the choice of the placement of new buildings in an existing
compound, or possibly even in the design of the entire layout of a new
compound.

Background
The Excel workbook is based on tables that were generated by Risk-NL v5.0, a risk
analysis code for ammunition storage. Each table gives the probability of injury or
lethality for a given combination of PES and ES, as a function of distance between
the PES and ES. A workbook was written that selects the correct table based on user
input, reads the tables, does the consequence calculations and presents the results.
A complete description of the development is given in [Wees, 2011].

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AASTP-5

Lethality and Injury tables

The lethality and injury tables form the core of the consequence analysis tool. The
tables were computed with TNO’s risk analysis code Risk-NL v5.0 [Van der Voort et
al., 2009-1]. For ammunition storage out-of-area an adapted version of this code
was written that includes PESs and ESs that are typical of out-of-area operations
[Van der Voort, 2009-2] and [Van der Voort and Kummer, 2010].
The PES is taken as an ISO container with 155 mm artillery shells, which is the
“maximum credible event”. The calculation was done for a series of NEQ: 50, 75,
100, 250, 500, 750, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000 and 4000 kg. Note that although
4000 kg NEQ of 155 mm shells do not fit in one container, AASTP-5 allows several
containers in one storage module, up to 4000 kg NEQ.

Lethality and injury tables were produced for the ES structure types:

 Gabion : Earth-filled Gabion or similar;

 HRS: Heavily Reinforced Structure;
 RS: Reinforced Structure;
 NS: Normal Structure, similar to a steel ISO container;
 LS: Light Structure, similar to a portacabin;
 Tent;
 FF: Free Field, i.e. a person in the open;
 IB: Inhabited Building, a civilian building outside the compound.

Variations to these basic PES-ES combinations were made by considering the

presence of a barricade between the PES and the ES, an overhead protection (OHP)
either above the PES or above the ES, and whether the ES has windows that are
vulnerable to blast. Not all combinations occur in practice. For reference, all
combinations are listed in the Table within Annex E.
The probability was calculated at each metre distance out to distances where the
probability was reduced to 0.1%, which could be 650 m for the most vulnerable
structures.
The tables calculated by Risk-NL give the contribution of each explosion effect (e.g.
fragments, window breakage) to the lethality and injury probability and adds these to
give the total probability. This explains the steps that are visible in the lethality and
injury curves. The effect of a barricade, of overhead protection and of windows is
taken into account by not counting the contribution of horizontal fragments and
debris; vertical fragments and debris, or glass shards from broken windows,
respectively.
In all, the workbook includes 1152 tables, generated by Risk-NL.

E-2 Edition 1 Version 3

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AASTP-5

PES 4000 kg, ES Normal Structure, Lethality Fragments horizontal (0.22 m2)

1 Window failure
Structural response
Lung injury
Head and body impact
PES UBS ES No Windows
PES UBS ES Windows
PES BS ES No Windows
0.1
PES BS ES Windows
Probability (-)

0.01

0.001
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Distance (m)

Example of plots of injury and lethality tables produced by Risk-NL.

Damage

To give the field commander an impression of the amount of damage after an

explosion, and therefore an idea of the state of readiness after an accident, damage
tables were generated.
Damage predictions were taken from [Sibma, 2009], [Baker et al., 1983] and
[CPR 16E, 2000]. The damage prediction is rough; only three damage levels
(undamaged, damaged and collapsed) are considered (except for “inhabited
buildings”, where five levels were used.) Undamaged means that the structure can
be used with little or no repairs. Plugging fragment holes or replacing windows is
considered as little work, so an “undamaged” structure does not mean that personnel
inside will be uninjured or equipment remains undamaged. The exposed site type
“free field” is not a structure and consequently does not have damage levels. The
spreadsheet always gives “undamaged” as output for this exposed site type.

List of Exposed Site types

The list of all exposed site types, combined with OHP, barricade and windows is
given below. In addition, the ballistic resistance and the STANAG 2280 protection
level is specified (without barricade or OHP).
To make the tool also useable for deciding the distance at which a new building has
to be sited, Q-D tables were added. It was decided to only add those Q-D tables that
are applicable to field storage operations: the AASTP-5 field distances and the
AASTP-1 inhabited building distance and public traffic route distance for HD 1.1.
The tables were automated, so that when the PES and the ES are specified, the
required distance is automatically looked up. The distance is compared to the actual

E-3 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

PES-ES distance and a warning is given when the required distance is larger than
the actual PES-ES distance.
The exposed site types in the spread sheet do not match perfectly with the ES types
(classes) in AASTP-5 Table 2-2. The lookup table that is used for the conversion is
listed below. For exposed sites outside the compound (types “free field” and
“inhabited building”), the AASTP-1 public traffic route distance (D11) and inhabited
building distance (D13) for HD 1.1 are given. The spread sheet also gives more
choice in the amount of explosive in the PES than AASTP-5 Table 2-2. For amounts
that do not match, the next higher amount is used.

List of ES types in the spread sheet, conversion to classes used in AASTP-5 Table 2-2

E-4 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

ES type AASTP-5 AASTP-1 Ballistic STANAG 2280

and protection Table 2.2 class HD 1.1 Q-D resistance of ES protection level of ES

FF No OHP Barricaded Open, personnel mission related, barricaded PTRD N/A A0 B0 C0 E0

FF No OHP Unbarricaded Open, personnel mission related, unbarricaded PTRD
FF OHP Barricaded Open, personnel mission related, barricaded PTRD
FF OHP Unbarricaded Open, personnel mission related, unbarricaded PTRD

Gabion No OHP Barricaded Hardened, barricaded N/A 0.8-1 m of sand A4 B2,3 C5 E5

Gabion No OHP Hardened, unbarricaded N/A
Unbarricaded
Gabion OHP Barricaded Hardened, barricaded N/A
Gabion OHP Unbarricaded Hardened, unbarricaded N/A

HRS No OHP Barricaded Hardened, barricaded N/A 2×8 mm armour A2 B3 C4 E5

steel sandwich
HRS No OHP Unbarricaded Hardened, unbarricaded N/A

HRS OHP Barricaded Hardened, barricaded N/A

HRS OHP Unbarricaded Hardened, unbarricaded N/A

Unprotected people outside compound, IBD 230 mm A0 B0 C0 E0
barricaded reinforced
IB No OHP Barricaded
concrete or 300
Unprotected people outside compound, IBD
mm brick
unbarricaded
IB No OHP Unbarricaded
Unprotected people outside compound, IBD
barricaded
IB OHP Barricaded
Unprotected people outside compound, IBD
IB OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
Light structure, not conforming to note 7, N/A 0.75 mm mild A0 B0 C0 E0
LS No OHP Barricaded barricaded steel
Light structure, not conforming to note 7, N/A
LS No OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
LS OHP Barricaded barricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
LS OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A 2 mm mild steel A0 B0 C0 E0
NS No OHP Barricaded barricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
NS No OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
NS OHP Barricaded barricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
NS OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A 5 mm mild steel A0 B0 C0 E0
RS No OHP Barricaded barricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
RS No OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
RS OHP Barricaded Semi-hardened, barricaded N/A

RS OHP Unbarricaded Semi-hardened, unbarricaded N/A

Light structure, not conforming to note 7, N/A none A0 B0 C0 E0
Tent No OHP Barricaded barricaded
Light structure, not conforming to note 7, N/A
Tent No OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
Tent OHP Barricaded barricaded
Light structure, conforming to note 7, N/A
Tent OHP Unbarricaded unbarricaded

E-5 Edition 1 Version 3

 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX E

E.3. APPENDIX - USER’S MANUAL

1. Installation

Requirements

The .xlt version of the tool requires a MS Windows computer with Microsoft Office
Excel 2003 or higher (or another system that can handle Excel 2003 .xls files). The
tool uses macros, therefore the macro security level should be set to medium (Tools|
Options | Security | Macro security). It is possible to use the tool without the macros.
The .xltm version requires Excel 2010.

Copy to directory

Copy the file “AASTP-5 consequence analysis tool ...” to a directory of your choice.

2. Using the tool

The AASTP-5 consequence analysis tool is designed for several situations:

 to analyse the consequences of an explosion of an ammunition storage
module in a compound;
 to quickly evaluate improvement options like relocating of the exposed site,
adding protective measures like barricades to the exposed site or removing
windows from the exposed site, or reducing the amount of stored
explosives;
 to assist in the choice of the placement of new buildings in an existing
compound, or possibly even in the design of the entire layout of a new
compound.

Analyse the consequences of an explosion

The calculation of the consequences of an explosion of one ammunition storage

module on exposed sites is the main purpose of the tool. The effects on other
ammunition storage modules are not calculated; it is assumed that the ammunition
storage is built to regulation and sympathic detonation does not occur.
The properties of the potential explosion site (PES, the ammunition storage module)
and the exposed sites (ESs) must be provided by the user, and the tool automatically
looks up the lethality and injury probability in the appropriate table and calculates the
number of personnel who are killed, injured or unharmed. It also gives the damage to
the ES structure.

It is most efficient to provide all input for the entire compound at once. PES-ES
combinations that give problems quickly become apparent in this way.
To simplify the tool, distances are calculated from the centre of the PES to the centre
of the ES. This is not a conservative approach, it is more accurate to use the
minimum distance between the PES and ES. For large, spread-out ESs, either use

1-E-1 Edition 1 Version 3

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ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

the minimum distance by specifying the corners of the PES and ES instead of the
centres, or split the ES into multiple smaller units.

Evaluate improvement options

The effect of protection measures on PES-ES combinations that give problems can
be quickly tried out, just by clicking and selecting the option. Options that are
possible to evaluate are:
 Add a barricade. Barricades are assumed to be able to stop all
fragments that have a horizontal trajectory. The required thickness
varies with the threat and distance.
 Add an overhead protection (although this is not possible or effective for
all ES types);
 Replace normal windows by blast-resistant windows (this is only
appropriate for ES types LS, NS and possibly IB);
 Replace the structure with a stronger ES type;
 Increase PES-ES distance;
 Reduce the number of personnel inside the ES;
 Reduce amount of explosive in the PES.

Find a safe location

It is possible to find the PES-ES distance at which the consequences meet the user’s
acceptance criteria by trial-and-error, but using the built-in assistance is easier. The
tool provides both the AASTP-5 field distance and the distance at which a user-
defined probability of injury and lethality exists for the PES-ES combination.
The idea is to use AASTP-5 field distances whenever possible. When it is impossible
to use these distances in the operational situation, the commander can decide to
accept distances that have greater consequences.
Note that the AASTP-5 field distances do not correspond exactly to distances with a
certain probability of lethality. This is mainly due to the fact that there are many more
ES types and protection options in the tool than in AASTP-5, so often the match is
not perfect.

Evaluate more than one PES

The tool can, in its current version, only do calculations for one scenario at a time.
For the user’s convenience it is made possible to provide input on all PESs and then
select the PES for which the calculations are to be made. The calculation results for
the PESs can be collected in a single document.

Report and file the work

The results can be printed or saved. The file could be saved as is, but the file size is
fairly large. Also, the input is easily changed which makes it less suitable for
documentation purposes. Therefore it is best to copy the sheet “Input and results” to
a separate worksheet. Macros are provided that does this automatically.

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 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

Reuse old files

Compounds are constantly being modified; therefore make sure that your work is
available for future analyses.
The input data from old files can be copied and reused in a fresh workbook (note:
use Paste special | Values).

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ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

3. Example: camp Elsewhere

Layout of the fictitious camp ‘Elsewhere’

Consequence analysis

The camp ‘Elsewhere’ is modelled by measuring the coordinates of the PESs and
ESs from the map and entering them into the spreadsheet. Note that many ESs, e.g.
‘Housing A’, consist of many units. These are modelled as a single ES in this
example. The example is included in the download as ‘Example camp Elsewhere.
AASTP-1 consequence analysis tool v1.0.xls’.

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 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

Input
Location Camp Elsewhere
Case number 101
Case description Demonstration
Analysis performed by Van der Sluijs
Date 14-06-11
Classification NATO Unclassified

Explosion Location of PES

Explosion of: NEQ / kg probability x-coord / my-coord / m
Container 1 4000 high 70 232

Definition of PES (Potential Explosion Site) and calculation of donor-PES distances

Barricade between Explosion Location of PES
Name PES type donor and PES? NEQ / kg probability x-coord / my-coord / m
Container 1 4000 high 70 232
Container 2 3000 high 92 232
Attack Helicopter 100 high 225 284
PES04
PES05
PES06
PES07
PES08
PES09
PES10

Definition of Exposed Sites (acceptors), calculation of required donor-ES distances and calculation of damage
Barricade between Coordinates of ES
Name Structure donor and ESOHP Windows Persons x-coord / my-coord / m
Parking lot FF Barricaded No OHP No windows 8 190 200
Dining room RS Unbarricaded No OHP No windows 40 146 70
Housing A RS Barricaded No OHP No windows 68 130 44
Canteen RS Barricaded No OHP Windows 20 184 70
Housing B RS Barricaded No OHP Windows 68 208 44
OP1 FF Barricaded OHP No windows 2 20 234
OP2 FF Barricaded OHP No windows 2 316 234
OP3 FF Barricaded OHP No windows 2 20 24
OP4 FF Barricaded OHP No windows 2 316 24
QRA RS Barricaded No OHP No windows 4 176 232
Food storage NS Barricaded No OHP No windows 3 146 84
Ops room RS Barricaded No OHP No windows 6 160 106
Medical facilities RS Barricaded No OHP No windows 10 246 140
Maintenance HRS Barricaded No OHP No windows 10 44 134
Fuel storage NS Barricaded No OHP No windows 0 250 200
Power plant NS Barricaded No OHP No windows 0 220 142
Water plant NS Barricaded No OHP No windows 0 206 80
Work places HRS Barricaded No OHP No windows 10 94 164
PRT/CIMIC HRS Barricaded No OHP Windows 10 120 164
OP5 FF Barricaded OHP No windows 2 156 292
Visitors RS Barricaded No OHP No windows 6 246 100
ES22 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES23 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES24 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES25 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES26 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES27 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES28 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES29 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
ES30 Unbarricaded No OHP No windows
Totals 21 273

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ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

The site plan is shown in a graph, making it easy to spot mistakes in the input.

1-E-6 Edition 1 Version 3

 APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

Definition of Exposed Sites (acceptors), calculation of required donor-ES distances and calculation of damage
Barricade betweenNumber of persons Damage
Name Structure donor and ES killed injuredunharmed level
Parking lot FF Barricaded 0.3 0.4 7.3 Undamaged
Dining room RS Unbarricaded 0.2 0.2 39.6 Undamaged
Housing A RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 68.0 Undamaged
Canteen RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 20.0 Undamaged
Housing B RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 68.0 Undamaged
OP1 FF Barricaded 0.0 1.3 0.7 Undamaged
OP2 FF Barricaded 0.0 0.0 2.0 Undamaged
OP3 FF Barricaded 0.0 0.0 2.0 Undamaged
OP4 FF Barricaded 0.0 0.0 2.0 Undamaged
QRA RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 4.0 Damaged
Food storage NS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 3.0 Damaged
Ops room RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 6.0 Undamaged
Medical facilities RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 10.0 Undamaged
Maintenance HRS Barricaded 0.0 0.1 9.9 Undamaged
Fuel storage NS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 0.0 Damaged
Power plant NS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 0.0 Damaged
Water plant NS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 0.0 Undamaged
Work places HRS Barricaded 0.0 2.2 7.8 Undamaged
PRT/CIMIC HRS Barricaded 0.0 0.8 9.2 Undamaged
OP5 FF Barricaded 0.0 0.0 2.0 Undamaged
Visitors RS Barricaded 0.0 0.0 6.0 Undamaged
ES22 Unbarricaded
ES23 Unbarricaded
ES24 Unbarricaded
ES25 Unbarricaded
ES26 Unbarricaded
ES27 Unbarricaded
ES28 Unbarricaded
ES29 Unbarricaded
ES30 Unbarricaded
Totals 21 0 5 267 4

The results of the consequence analysis show that there is a probability of lethality in
the parking lot and the dining room.
Evaluating the consequences of an explosion in container 2 gives a similar result with
the addition of lethality in the QRA, while an explosion of the attack helicopter causes
no injuries.
Evaluating mitigation measures
Looking at the dining room, it is easily found that adding a barricade will solve the
problem. (In fact, there is already a barricade between the PES and the dining room,
because the entire ammunition storage is surrounded by a barricade. The dining
room was only made ‘unbarricaded’ for demonstration purposes.)
For the QRA (quick reaction force), upgrading to a HRS structure or relocating to a
greater distance would solve the problem. Whether the consequences need to be
accepted or whether mitigation measures need to be taken must be decided by the
national authority.

Finding a location for a new building

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ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

Suppose that a new building is needed, and for comfort a light structure with windows
is desired. The AASTP-5 Field Distance for that structure is quickly evaluated to be
206 m for both container 1 and container 2, and 46 m for the attack helicopter.

Exposed Sites (acceptors) Coordinates of ES

Name Structure Barricade OHP Windows Persons x-coord. / my-coord. / m Distance fromAASTP-5
selectedFD
PES
/ m/ m
New building LS Barricaded No OHP Windows 206

However, when an ES type ‘LS’ is placed at 206 m, it is found that the lethality
probability is actually rather high, because the structure collapses and the windows
are blown in. Upgrading to a ‘normal structure’ with blast resistant windows (i.e.,
option ‘no windows’) fixes the problem.
If the 206 m Field Distance is not available in the compound, one could look at the
‘user defined’ distances. These give the distance at which the injury and lethality
probabilities of the defined PES-ES combination reach a user-defined level. For e.g.
a 1% lethality probability a distance of 140 m is found for this particular PES-ES
combination.

Reporting

The spreadsheet generates a summary for the scenario and these summaries are
easy to collect manually into an overall report for the compound

Summary
location Camp Elsewhere
case number 101
description Demonstration

Explosion of:
name Container 1 Container 2 Attack Helicopter
NEQ / kg 4000 3000 100
probability high high high

Loss of personnel
consequence number number number
killed 0 1 0
injured 5 5 0
unharmed 267 267 273

Loss of assets
consequence number number number
collapsed 0 1 0
damaged 4 3 0
undamaged 17 17 21

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ANNEX E TO
AASTP-5

4. References

[Baker et al, 1983] Baker, W.E.; Cox, P.A.; Westine, P.S; Kulesz, J.J. and
Strehlow, R.A., Explosion Hazards and Evaluation, Elsevier
Scientific Publishing, Amsterdam, 1983.

[CPR16E, 2000] Commissie Preventie van Rampen door Gevaarlijke Stoffen,

Methods for the determination of possible damage to people
and objects resulting from releases of hazardous materials, Sdu
Uitgevers, CPR-16E, 2e druk, Den Haag, 2000.

[Sibma, 2009] Sibma, P.C., Out-of-area structures subjected to blast;

experiemental and numerical data. TNO-DV 2008 A446, March
2009.

[Van der Voort et al, 2009-1]

Van der Voort, M.M. van der, et al., A description of Risk-NL
v5.0, TNO Defence, Security and Safety, TNO-DV 2009 A315,
Rijswijk, December 2009.

[Van der Voort et al, 2009-2]

Van der Voort, M.M. van der, et al., PFP(AC/326-
SG6)(NLD)IWP01-2009, Risk analysis in AASTP-5,
Assumptions, TNO Defence, Security and Safety, November
2009.

[Voort and Kummer, 2010]

A consequence analysis method for out of area field storage,
34th DoD Explosives Safety Seminar, Portland, 2010. Also
published as NATO informal working paper
AC326(SG6)(NLD)IWP01-2010.

[Wees, 2011] Wees, R.M.M. van, Consequence analysis tool for AASTP-5,
TNO, Annex to letter 11PPS/186, Rijswijk, 11 August 2011.

1-E-9 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX F TO
AASTP-5

ANNEX F ES STRUCTURE CLASSES FOR CONSEQUENCE

ANALYSIS

The following table gives an overview of ES structure classes to be used for

consequence analysis. Models for the blast and ballistic resistance of these
structures have been described in AASTP-4, Part II

Structure class Class for table 2-2 Description Structure class example
Tent Light structure No ballistic
resistance

Light Light structure Container with

(LS) walls of 12.5 mm
multiplex or 0.75
mm mild steel

ISO Container Light structure Container with

(NS) walls of 2 mm mild
steel

Reinforced Semi-hardened Container with

(RS) walls of 5 mm mild
steel

Heavily Reinforced Semi-hardened Container with 2*8

(HRS) structure mm armour
steel sandwich

Gabion Hardened structure Structure

consisting of sand
filled
barriers of 0.8 - 1 m
thickness

Inhabited Building Unprotected people Local construction, To be determined at location

(IB) outside compound not rated

Free Field Open-Personnel Not a structure No rating

(FF) mission related

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 ANNEX F TO
AASTP-5

The blast and ballistic resistance of the structures described above can be enhanced
by barricades (for example Gabion) and Over Head Protection. The presence of
windows poses and additional hazard for personnel when window failure takes place.
This can be improved by installing blast resistant windows, or choosing structures
without windows.

F-2 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX G TO
AASTP-5

ANNEX G EXPLOSIVES LICENCE (SAMPLE )

G-1 Edition 1 Version 3

 ANNEX H TO
AASTP-5

ANNEX H VERSION 2 – LIST OF REFERENCES

Date IWP/WP Nation Description

1 Aug 2010 Paper, 34th DDESB NLD/SWI Quantitative Risk Analysis
(TNO/Bienz Kummer)

1 Dec 2010 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2010)002 NLD Custodian Working Group

Meeting, Den Haag

13 May 2011 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2011)002 NLD Technical Working Group

Meeting, Brussels

18 Aug 2011 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2011)004 USA Added Electrical Safety

paragraph 2.5.3.4 to Chapter 2

30 Aug 2011 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2011)83(A) SWI/NLD Section and Annex on

Consequence and Risk
Analysis
7 Sep 2011 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2011)003 NLD Changed the Scope of Work in
Chapter 2

20 Sep 2011 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2011)002 BEL Changed the Field Distance

Tables in Chapter 2

16 Dec 2011 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2010)001,R3 CAN Added a new Section in

Chapter 2 titled Risk
Management
2 Feb 2012 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2011)001, R4 BEL Added a new Section in
Chapter 2 titled Multi-National
Installation Operations
15 Feb 2012 PFP(AC/326-SG6)IWP(2012)001 NLD Custodian Working Group
Meeting, Den Haag

N-document NLD Custodian Working Group

Meeting, Den Haag

H-1 Edition 1 Version 3

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AASTP-5 (1)(3)