Philosophy of Cognitive Science (5 credits) 2015-16

570633

APhil / CCiL
First Semester

Manolo Martínez: mail@manolomartinez.net

UAB
Daniel Morgan: daniel.morgan@ucl.ac.uk
UB
Josefa (Pepa) Toribio: jtoribio@icrea.cat
ICREA / UB

What are perceptual experiences? Is the content of perceptual experiences the same
kind of content as the content of e.g. beliefs? Does the content of perceptual
experiences have the same direction of fit as the content of e.g. beliefs? Which
theories of contents warrant content attributions to perceptual experiences? What kind
of properties do we represent in visual experiences? Can visual experiences be
influenced by other non-perceptive cognitive states? What is the nature of that
influence, if there is one? How can belief be justified and knowledge accounted for on
the basis of perceptual experiences?
In this course, we will examine central problems in the philosophy of perception and
critically assess influential responses to them. We will also examine questions in
psychosemantics with the help of the special case of perception. Special emphasis is
given to the contribution of cognitive science to the ways in which these problems are
framed.

The course will be taught in English. All material subject to assessment must be
written in English. Classes begin on October 8th.

Course Aims and Objectives: The course aims to provide an understanding of some
central problems in the study of perception—especially as these problems are framed
by the cognitive sciences.

Readings: Primary class readings are the required readings to be completed before
the class they are assigned for. All primary readings will be provided electronically
and are listed below. Sometimes, secondary readings will be provided during the
course. The instructors will not assume familiarity with these other readings.

Main Discussant: All students taking the course for credit will be required to act as
main discussant at least twice during the course (whether it is compulsory to occupy
this role more times will depend on the number of students).
The main discussant is expected to ask one question regarding a particular aspect of
one of the required readings for the day. The discussant should aim at the standards
operative in the discussion of communications at professional philosophy
conferences, or research seminars: their evaluation will depend on how well the target
thesis is summarised, how clearly the objection is presented, and how relevant it is.

1
The question should not take more than 2 or 3 minutes to formulate, follow-ups on the
question will be allowed (from the main discussant or other attendees) at the
discretion of the instructor. No supporting materials (handouts, slides) will be
allowed. See (http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/03/how-to-ask-
questions-at-conferences-and-colloquia.html) for more advice on question asking at
academic conferences.

Participation: Apart from the main discussant, all other students are expected to ask
questions about the papers and the discussion in class, and meet the same standards as
the main discussant. Participation (that meets the standards) will have a very real
impact on the final grade.
Everyone should come to the seminar ready to participate. Take notes while you are
reading. Write down any aspect of the reading that you find interesting. This would
help force you to engage the reading in a serious way so that you’ll be primed to
participate actively in the discussion.

Essay. All students taking the course for credit will have to write a 3.000 word essay
on any of the topics of the course, broadly construed: a detailed reply to one of the
papers, a paper that connects an item in the syllabus to new empirical work, one that
applies tools studied in the course to different philosophical problems, are all valid
approaches. See below for a bunch of useful link on how to write a philosophy paper.
Although the essay will be due by the end of the semester, students will be expected
to start preparing drafts, and submitting them to the instructors for feedback, as soon
as possible. At least one long abstract (~1.000 words) must be submitted for approval
and feedback before the last week of the course.
We will follow a no student left behind policy: we will welcome back-and-forth
rework of drafts as frequently as the student wishes, and only the final version of the
essay will have an impact on the student’s grade. On the other hand, we will grade the
final version under the presupposition that the essay has undergone this process of
polishing. If a student decides not to take advantage of it, they should expect to meet
the same exacting standards.

Assessment: 20% for in-class activity, 30% for the discussant question(s), 50% for
the final essay, which will be due on January 19th by 12 (noon).

(Guidelines on evaluation and marking, including a note on originality and

plagiarism, are available at http://www.ub.edu/aphil/?q=en/content/guidelines-
evaluation-and-marking).

Deadlines

• December 3rd: Long abstract of essay to be agreed with the instructor(s).

• January 7th (optional): Last draft, in order to receive feedback by the instructor(s).
• January 19th: Final version of the essay.

Deadlines are final. In particular, no late submissions of the final version of the essay
will be accepted.
Please also note that essays more than 10% over the maximum recommended essay
length (3000 words, not including footnotes and references) will be penalized.

2
Week 1 will be dedicated to an overview of the course and organisational matters. We
shall proceed to assign main discussant slots. Please do not miss this meeting.

Content of the Course

Week 1: Course overview. Assignment of presentations

Week 2: Introduction to the Science of Vision
Week 3: Psychosemantics. The fundamentals
Week 4: Psychosemantics of perceptual contents
Week 5: Formal Models of Content
Week 6: The content of perception. Imperatival aspects
Week 7: The content of perception. The conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism debate
Week 8: The content of perception. The liberalism vs. conservatism debate
Week 9: Cognitive Penetration
Week 10: The relational view of perception
Week 11: Perception and knowledge

General Web Resources

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

http://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html

Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind

http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/

Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Selected bibliography:

http://www.phil.mq.edu.au/staff/jsutton/CogSciIndex.html

PhilPapers: Philosophy of Mind:

http://philpapers.org/browse/philosophy-of-mind

Useful websites on how to write philosophy papers:

Writing a Philosophy Paper (Peter Horban):

http://www.sfu.ca/philosophy/writing.htm

Guide to the Study of Philosophy (Garth Kemerling):

http://www.philosophypages.com/sy.htm

Tips on Writing a Philosophy Paper (Douglas Portmore):

www.public.asu.edu/~dportmor/tips.pdf

Guidelines on Writing a Philosophy Paper (James Pryor):

http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/guidelines/writing.html

Avoiding and Detecting Plagiarism (CUNY Guidelines)

3
https://www.gc.cuny.edu/CUNY_GC/media/CUNY-Graduate-
Center/PDF/Publications/AvoidingPlagiarism.pdf

Useful readings collections:

Tim Crane (ed.). The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1993. [Crane]
A. Noë & E. T. Thompson (eds.). Vision and Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press,
2002. [Noë]
T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.): Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. [Gendler]

COURSE OUTLINE:

Week 1: Course overview. Assignment of main discussant slots

Week 2: Introduction to the Science of Vision

• Frisby, J. and Stone, J. V. (2010), Seeing: The Computational Approach to

Biological Vision, 2nd Ed., The MIT Press (Chapter 1)C. L. Hardin (1988) 'Color
Perception and Science', in Color for Philosophers, Hackett

Week 3: Psychosemantics. The fundamentals

• F. Dretske, chapter 3 from Explaining Behavior (1988)

• R. Millikan (2009). Biosemantics. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman
(eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.

Week 4: Psychosemantics of perceptual contents

• M. Tye, chapter 3 of Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT

Press.
• M. Matthen, chapter 10 of Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory
of Sense Perception. OUP

Week 5: Formal models of content

• B. Skyrms, chapter 3 of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information, Oxford

University Press 2010.
• Egan, A., (2006). “Appearance Properties?” Noûs , 40 (3): 495–521.

Week 6: The content of perception: Imperatival Aspects

• S. Siegel (2014). “Affordances and the Contents of Perception”, forthcoming in

Does Perception Have Content? Ed. B.Grogaard, OUP.

4
• M. Martínez (2011). “Disgusting Smells and Imperativism”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies 22(5-6):191-200

Week 7: The content of perception: The conceptualism vs. nonconceptualism

debate.

• J. McDowell (2009). “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”. In John McDowell:

Experience, Norm, and Nature (ed. J. Lindgaard), Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
Oxford, UK. doi: 10.1002/9781444306736. Chapter 1.
• C. Peacocke, (2001) “Does perception have a nonconceptual content?” Journal of
Philosophy 98: 239-64.
Background reading:
• J. Toribio (2007). ‘Nonconceptual Content’. Philosophy Compass 2/3: 445–460.

Week 8: The content of perception: The liberalism vs. conservatism debate.

• Susanna Siegel, “Which properties are represented in perception?” In [Gendler]

• B. Nanay, (2011) “Do we see apples as edible?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
92: 305–322.

Further bibliography on the topic can be found here:

http://consc.net/mindpapers/3.11e

Week 9: Cognitive Penetration.

• Pylyshyn, Z. (1999). Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive
impenetrability of visual perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22: 341–365.
• F. Macpherson (2012) “Cognitive Penetration of Colour Experience: Rethinking
the Issue in Light of an Indirect Mechanism”. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 84(1): 24-62.
• J. Zeimbekis (2013) “Color and cognitive penetrability”, Philosophical Studies
165: 167–175.

Week 10: The relational view of perception.

• J. Campbell ‘The relational view of experience’, chapter 6 in Reference and

Consciousness 2002 (OUP).
• B. Brewer (2006). ‘Perception and content’, European Journal of Philosophy 14
(2): 165-181.

Week 11: Perception and Knowledge.

• J. Pryor (2000). ‘The skeptic and the dogmatist’, Noûs, 34 (4): 517-549
• R. White (2006). ‘Problems for dogmatism’ Phil Studies 13: 525-57.