IN THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA

CLUBBED Cr. WRIT PETITION U/A 226/227

In The Matter of:

VEER SINGHANIA

(PETITIONER)

VS.

UNION TERRITORY, CHANDIGARH & ORS.

(RESPONDENT)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE JUDGES OF THE HIGH COURT

OF PUNJAB & HARYANA

Counsels for Petitioners-

1.

2.

3.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1
S.No. CONTENTS PAGE NUMBER

1. TABLE OF ABBREVIATION 3-4

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 5-6
3. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 7
4. STATEMENT OF FACTS 8-9
5. ISSUES PRESENTED 10
6. WRITTEN PLEADINGS 11-19
7. PRAYER 20

LIST OF ABBREVIATION
ABBREVIATION FULL-FORM
& And
AIR All India Reporter
art. Article

2
 ed. Editor
Hon’ble Honourable
id. Ibidem
LJ Law Journal
Del Delhi
No. Number
Ors. Others
p. Page
SCC Supreme Court Cases
pt. Point
SCR Supreme Court Reports
U/S Under Section
U.A.E. United Arab Emirates
Cr. P.C. Criminal Procedure Code
Cri. Criminal
Dt. Dated

3
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES
 Mohammed Sajeed K. v. State of Kerala, 1995 Cri.L.J.3313 (India)

 Ajay Agarwal vs Union of India And Ors. 1993 AIR 1637, 1993 SCR (3) 543 (India)

 Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur (1990 Supp SCC 157: AIR 1990 SC 307) (India)

 Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhthija v. Collector, Thane (AIR 1991 SC 1893) (India)

 Hari Singh v. State Of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114 (India)

 Purushottam Das Dalmia v. State of West Bengal 1962 2 SCR 101, (India)

 Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India And Ors, 1993 AIR 1637, 1993 SCR (3) 543 (India).

 Subramanium Sethuraman v. the State of Maharashtra 2005 SCC (Crl) 242.

 Monica Bedi v. State of AP, (2011) 1 SCC 284 (India)

 Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India 2020 SCC Online SC

275.

STATUTES

 The Constitution of India, 1950

 Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
 Indian Penal Code, 1860
 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973
 Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956
 Criminal Penal Code of UAE (Federal Law No. 3 of 1987)
 Combat Human Trafficking, Federal Law No. 51 of 2007
 General clause Act 1897
 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947
 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
4
  Banning of Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2019
 Indian Evidence Act, 1872
 The Coinage Act, 2011

CIRCULAR

 RBI/2017-18/154. DBR.No.BP.BC.104 /08.13.102/2017-18. April 6, 2018

BOOKS
1. Double jeopardy William Bernhardt
2. Lexis Nexis Twentieth Edition of code of Criminal Procedure
3. Taxmann Foreign exchange Management Manual
4. Universal’s Bare act of Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (FEMA)
5. Constitution of India by B.R. Ambedkar

REPORTS REFERRED

1. International Conventions for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the
Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others, 1949 (Signed by India on May 9, 1950).
2. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW)- Convention enforced with effect from 3rd September 1981.
3. United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh
Guidelines), 1990, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1990, complement the
previously adopted Beijing Rules.
4. The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, 1993
5. The International Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO Convention 182), 1999-
Convention enforced with effect from 19th November 2000.
6. The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children (Trafficking Protocol), 2001.

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 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The counsel humbly submits to the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of
The Constitution of India. This Article mentions the Appellate Jurisdiction of The High Court in
relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in
appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including
writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibitions, quo warranto, and certiorari, or
any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III.

Also, the inherent powers of the High Court for Quashing the F.I.R./ Chargesheet/ Complaint
and is more prevalent than 482 Cr.P.C. in interfering in the arbitrary police investigation and also
to prevent the abuse of the court process.

The Counsels for the Petitioner most respectfully submit to this jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High

Court.

6
 STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background facts, in a nutshell, are as follows:

1. That Petitioner, Veer Singhania targeted Rohini Singh through her Tinder profile, and only
after 2 weeks of conversation Petitioner trapped Rohini and coax her to marry him on dated
30.12.2018.
2. Petitioner with the malicious intention choose the honeymoon destination like Dubai, for
easy abduction and sexual exploitation of Rohini via Human trafficking after marriage; and
they flew for Dubai on 05.01.2019. According to the petitioner’s version during the travel
Petitioner along with his wife met Sheikh Abdul Tayyar.
3. Rohini's family were unable to contact her and fearing for the safety of their daughter who
married a suspicious man, Petitioner’s father in law, Bhisham Singh i.e. Respondent No 5
arrived in Dubai, in search of Rohini. Petitioner narrated the filmy story of the disappearing
of Rohini on Sheikh’s Villa and also that all the present members denied the fact of Rohini’s
presence with the petitioner.
4. It is to be noted here that Petitioner has neither informed the Rohini’s Family i.e. Respondent
No. 4 & 5 about her disappearance nor he feels any emergency to file a missing complaint of
Rohini. Instead, he was residing at the same hotel, who was lying about the fact and
disappeared all the belongings of the petitioner’s wife.
5. Respondent No. 5 got worried about the Rohini and has no belief in the filmy story of the
Petitioner and that’s why he filed a complaint about the search of his daughter in the Dubai
(UAE) Police station.
6. Dubai Police arrested the petitioner and the investigation was carried out under Article 344 of
the Penal Code and Article 2 of the Federal Law on combating Human Trafficking. They
contacted Chandigarh’s police and Immigration and Custom Bureau.
7. During the investigation, Dubai police came to know the fact that Rohini came along with
Veer in Dubai and also that the petitioner has the same pattern the petitioner had dissolved
his first marriage in 2017, on the ground that his wife had disappeared during his
honeymoon, 6 years ago i.e. in 2012 and at that time also investigation yielded no results.

7
8. During the trial in Dubai Court petitioner stated that the Sheikh invested 7,000 Bitcoins in the
mobile payment gateway that the petitioner was building. It is to be noted here that the
daughter of respondent no. 4 & 5 disappeared in the House of the same person, i.e. Sheikh
Tayyar. Then also the petitioner did not return the Bitcoins as alleged.
9. Respondent no. 5 believes that the Bitcoins were the consideration after trafficking his
daughter to Sheikh Tayyar in the name of Investigation.
10. After trial (U.A.E.) Dubai Court acquitted Petitioner, and on 21st Dec 2019, petitioner flew
back to India and was arrested by the Chandigarh police at I.G.I Airport and due effect of
FIR No. 920/2019 under Cognizable Sections 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 of I.P.C. and
Section 5, 8 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act,1956 registered by Swapna Singh
petitioner’s mother-in-law on 16th Dec 2019.
11. Petitioner was granted bail on 29th Dec 2019, on the bail bond of Rs. 28 Lakhs. During while
petitioner exchanged the 5000 Bitcoins under his possession by currency broker Rahamat
Saeed in 46,00,000/- cash.
12. On reacting over this transaction, the Chandigarh Police arrested the petitioner & Rahamat
Saeed and filed an FIR No. 923 of 2019; dated January 1, 2019; under Section 4 of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and Sections 3, 4, 7 and 13 of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act, 1999.

8
 ISSUES PRESENTED
1. WHETHER A COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY
THE PRESENT CASE?

2. WHETHER TRIAL OF VEER BY THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR THE SAME

CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, AS THAT WOULD
AMOUNT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

3. WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE AND ALSO UNDER SECTION 5, 8 OF THE IMMORAL
TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956?

4. WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS

EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA?

5. WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?

9
 ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER A COMPETENT COURT IN INDIA HAS JURISDICTION TO TRY
THE PRESENT CASE?

It is humbly submitted that a competent court in India has jurisdiction to try the case in F.I.R.
No.: 920/2019 as the petitioner is a citizen of India and believes in the law of land. But no such
offence that is committed outside India, shall be inquired into or tried by any competent court in
India except with the previous sanction of the Central Government i.e. Respondent No. 2, as per
Section 188 of Cr. P.C.1 In the present case, the respondents have no prior sanction from the
central government, not even till the present. As the alleged offence of Human Trafficking is
committed outside the Indian territory as per the respondent’s version. That’s why the competent
authorities can only do the investigation, but no inquiry or trial against the petitioner. 2 In
Mohammed Sajeed K. v. State of Kerala,3 (India) the apex court said that “The proviso to Sec.
188 of the Code3 is mandatory and the absence of sanction is an absolute bar to the inquiry or
trial of a case to which the provisions contained in that section apply.” Direct arresting the
petitioner, based on bogus F.I.R. by respondent no. 4, without any additional evidence in a
violation of this. In the landmark judgment of Ajay Agarwal vs Union of India And Ors.4, that the
consequence of conspiracy and cheating took place in India, thus the offence was not committed
outside the country. In the present matter, the term ‘act’ i.e. Actus Reus is committed outside the
territory of India. Even none of the responding parties tried for the Extradition proceedings, as
respondent no. 5 itself started the proceedings in the foreign territory and respondent no. 5 failed
in his mala-fide intentions then the wife of respondent no. 5 i.e. respondent no. 4, started the
criminal proceedings against the petitioner in India. Also, the mistake of law 5 is not valid as per
many supreme court judgments,6 we have to read law as per legislation.7

1
Code Crim. Proc. § 188.
2
Mohammed Sajeed K. v. State of Kerala, 1995 Cri.L.J.3313 (India)
3
Mohammed Sajeed K. v. State of Kerala, 1995 Cri.L.J.3313
4
Ajay Agarwal vs Union of India And Ors. 1993 AIR 1637, 1993 SCR (3) 543 (India)
5
Shridhar v. Nagar Palika, Jaunpur (1990 Supp SCC 157: AIR 1990 SC 307) (India)
6
Sundarjas Kanyalal Bhthija v. Collector, Thane (AIR 1991 SC 1893) (India)
7
Hari Singh v. State Of Haryana, (1993) 3 SCC 114 (India)

10
In Purushottam Das Dalmia v. State of West Bengal 8 the Supreme Court held that “when the
appellant was charged with offenses punishable under Sections 120-B, 466 and 477, the
appellant contended that offence of conspiracy was entered into at Calcutta, the offences of using
the forged documents was committed at Madras. Therefore, the court at Calcutta had no
jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 471 read with Section 466 IPC, even though
committed in pursuance of the conspiracy and course of the same transaction. This Court held
that the desirability of trying the offences of all the overt acts committed in pursuance of a
conspiracy together is obvious and sections 177 and 239 of the code leave no manner of doubt
that the court which has the jurisdiction to try the offence of criminal conspiracy has also the
jurisdiction to try all the overt acts committed in pursuance of it even though outside its
territorial jurisdiction.”9 Thus, the incident of disappearance of the petitioner’s wife took place in
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Indian Penal Code i.e. Dubai (U.A.E.).

The Hon’ble High Court has complete jurisdiction under the extraordinary powers granted to it
by Article 226/227 of the Indian Constitution. Also, as per the sec. 482 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, It is worth pointing out here as to what the Apex Court has held in the case of
Subramanium Sethuraman v. the State of Maharashtra10 that, “The case involving a summons
case is covered by Chapter XX of the Code which does not contemplate a stage of discharge like
Section 239 which provides for a discharge in a warrant case” Thus quashing of the F.I.R. No.
920/2019 that is based on false and bogus facts, and after the acquittal of the petitioner from the
other court of the foreign land; is necessary on this stage because after framing of charge, it will
not be in the ambit of the Hon’ble court to quash the F.I.R. as per Subramanium Sethuraman.
That’s why if the present court will not quash the F.I.R., then the petitioner has to suffer from
trauma and mental agony again by undergoing the prosecution. This will not be in the interest of
justice.

8
Purushottam Das Dalmia v. State of West Bengal 1962 2 SCR 101, (India)
9
Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India And Ors, 1993 AIR 1637, 1993 SCR (3) 543 (India).
10
Subramanium Sethuraman v. the State of Maharashtra 2005 SCC (Crl) 242.

11
 2. WHETHER TRIAL OF VEER BY THE COURT IN INDIA, FOR THE SAME
CHARGES THAT HE HAD ALREADY FACED IN DUBAI, AS THAT WOULD
AMOUNT TO DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

Double jeopardy is a principle of natural justice. Petitioner has both constitutional right under
Article 20(2) and statutory right under section 300 of Cr.P.C., where the code states about both
the autrefois convict and autrefois acquit. Also, the Apex court extends the right against Double
Jeopardy to the foreign courts as well.11 The meaning of ‘Double Jeopardy’ as per the American
Heritage Dictionary as, “The act of putting a person through a second trial of an offense for
which he or she has already been prosecuted ‘or’ convicted.” Moreover, the State of Mind of the
Respondent no. 5 is suspicious, it is important to mention here that Respondent no. 5 is an
influential government servant, serving as Central Excise, Chandigarh, not a layman, who
haven’t tried for Proceedings of Extradition Treaty between the Government of the Republic of
India and the United Arab Emirates. These acts and conduct by respondent no. 5 clearly show
that respondent no. 5 in corroboration with respondent no. 4, have complete faith in the judicial
system of Dubai (U.A.E.), as respondent no. 5 itself registered the Police complaint against the
petitioner in the Dubai police station; he has complete freedom to initiate the proceedings in his
choice of jurisdiction. These all evidence clearly show the state of mind of the respondent no. 4
& 5, and these are relevant evidence as per Section 14 Indian Evidence Act. No cause of action
arises after the acquittal of the petitioner from the Dubai (U.A.E.) court in India, moreover in the
present case the F.I.R. No. 920/2019 has been registered after the acquittal of the petitioner and
even after about a year of the incident, which shows the ill intentions of respondent no. 4 i.e.
Mother-in-law of the petitioner. Respondent no. 1 is itself involved in the proceedings of the
Dubai Court, and they even conjointly took part in the ‘inquiry’ along with the Dubai Police.
Even on a diplomatic front, without having any additional evidence, it will against the principles
of natural justice to try the present case again in India after acquittal in Dubai. As per the 6 test
points mentioned in 13 C.P.C. it is crystal clear on a prima facie basis that the parties to the

11
Monica Bedi v. State of AP, (2011) 1 SCC 284 (India)

12
present case are also involved in the judicial proceedings of Dubai (U.A.E.) Court and they failed
to present any evidence against the petitioner in any of the cases.

3. WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE

PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 363, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371 OF THE
INDIAN PENAL CODE AND ALSO UNDER SECTION 5, 8 OF THE IMMORAL
TRAFFIC (PREVENTION) ACT, 1956?

It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner has not committed any of the alleged offence, because
the petitioner has already been acquitted by the Dubai (U.A.E.)’s court after being tried under the
same offences, i.e. Article 344, Penal Code of U.A.E. and also under Federal Law i.e. Combat
Human Trafficking, punishable under the penal code of a Reciprocating Authority. Section 366,
of the Indian Penal Code, is ‘Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage,
etc’, whereas in the present matter the petitioner and Rohini is the legally wedded husband and
wife. There is no reason to compel Rohini, who is already a legally wedded wife of the petitioner
to undergo kidnapping and abduction. In Section 367, under which there is kidnapping for
‘Slavery’. This section is self-contradictory from the version of respondents itself, as no one will
reward the seller of a slave with a huge amount of 7000 Bitcoins. That’s why all the sections
imposed on the petitioner is baseless, as the majority of sections are concerned with trafficking
with the purpose of slavery. Any act of Human Trafficking as in the Immoral Trafficking Laws
requires the recovery of the Victim and also the consideration of money. The present matter
lacks both of these elements, as respondent no. 5 already knows about the 7000 Bitcoins, then
also the respondent no. 1 didn’t involve the Investigating authority i.e. Respondent No. 1 & 5
was part of the investigation and trial proceedings held at Reciprocating Authority of Dubai
(U.A.E.). It is evidentiary to mention that the Witnesses from the hotel staff [Dubai (UAE)], that
had seen the couple together. They were examined and they testified that petitioner, Veer and his
wife, Rohini looked like a couple very much in love. Petitioner’s wife had left to Dubai with her
Consent and there was no element of harassment, coercion, or undue influence on his wife,
Rohini by the petitioner. Dubai court acquitted the petitioner after trying the case on merits,
looking on all the circumstantial evidence, and after complete pieces of evidence, even when the
respondent no. 1 & 4, 5 are involved in the proceedings in the foreign land. They have a
complete opportunity to produce any evidence and also to perform the Extradition proceedings to

13
transfer the case and the alleged person in India as per the Extradition Treaty between the
Government of the Republic of India and the United Arab Emirates. In reality both of the parents
of the petitioner’s wife, Rohini, i.e. Respondent no. 4 & 5 are upset with the love marriage of
their daughter with the petitioner and the marriage is without their consent. That’s why they want
to maliciously prosecute the petitioner in false allegations. There is a list of circumstantial
evidence that shows the state of mind of the petitioner and is thus completely relevant under
section 14 of the Indian Evidence Act.

14
 4. WHETHER ALLEGED TRANSACTION THROUGH BITCOINS AND ITS
EXCHANGE INTO INDIAN CURRENCY IS CONTRARY TO LAW IN INDIA?

Transaction through Bitcoins and its exchange into Indian Currency is not contrary to the law in
India. There are no laws regulating transactions through Bitcoins. Cryptocurrency is not
considered as currency under Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 12 (FEMA) and therefore
cryptocurrency or virtual currency VCs are neither foreign currency nor foreign exchange. RBI
has not notified Virtual Currency as currency and bitcoin buying, selling, trading, or mining is
not illegal by any law in India. None of the government instrumentalities in India has declared
that the cryptocurrencies are per se illegal.

The Apex Court in the case of Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of
India,13 in para 171 pointed out as under: In “The position as on date is that VCs are not banned,
but the trading in VCs and the functioning of VC exchanges are sent to comatose by the
impugned Circular by disconnecting their lifeline namely, the interface with the regular banking
sector. What is worse is that this has been done (i) despite RBI not finding anything wrong about
the way in which these exchanges function and (ii) (ii) despite the fact that VCs are not banned.”

RBI itself is not finding anything wrong in exchanges and functions under which the Virtual
Currency i.e. Cryptocurrency is working. In the landmark judgment of Internet and Mobile
Association of India V. Reserve Bank of India, “the Union of India had already constituted an
Inter-Ministerial Committee on the same issue. It appears that the Committee so constituted,
submitted a report on 28-02-2019 indicating the action to be taken in relation to virtual
currencies. A bill known as the Banning of Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital
Currency Bill, 2019 had also been prepared by then to be introduced in the Lok Sabha. The
contents of the report of the Inter-Ministerial Committee dated 28-02-2019, can be well
understood only if we look at the Record of Discussions of the meetings of the Committee. The
12
The Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999, § 2 (h), The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, sec. 3(i), 1st
June, 2000, vide notification No. G.S.R. 371(E), dated 1st May, 2000.
13
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India 2020 SCC Online SC 275.

15
Record of Discussions held on 27-11-2017 shows that the Inter-Ministerial Committee was of
the initial view that the banning option was difficult to implement and that it can also drive some
operators underground, encouraging the use of such currencies for illegitimate purposes. But it
was generally agreed in the said meeting that VCs cannot be treated as currency.”14

Hence, we can easily conclude that Virtual Currency is not currency under the Money
Laundering Act.

14
Internet and Mobile Association of India v. Reserve Bank of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No. 528 of 2018, Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2018 (India).

16
 5. WHETHER VEER HAS COMMITTED THE ALLEGED OFFENCE
PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE PREVENTION OF MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT, 2002 AND SECTION 13 OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE
MANAGEMENT ACT, 1999?

It is important to note here that Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act 15, is the
punishment for the offence defined under section 316 of the said act. It defines as “Whosoever
directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is
actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting
it as untainted property shall be guilty of the offence of money-laundering.”17 The F.I.R. No.:
923/2019, as clubbed in the present petition has no prima facie evidence to show that the
alleged virtual currency is obtained from any illegal source because the investigating authority
i.e. respondent no. 1 has not charged the petitioner with the Money Laundering Act, for
obtaining the consideration and also Dubai’s (UAE) Court doesn’t consider it as any illegal or
untainted property. It is important to note that, the investigating authority has made out
irrelevant sections on the innocent petitioner. First of them is the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999, which does not regulate cryptocurrency or virtual currency. According
to Section 2 (h) “currency” includes all currency notes, postal notes, postal orders, money
orders, cheques, drafts, travellers, cheques, letters of credit, bills of exchange and promissory
notes, credit cards, or such other similar instruments, but not the Virtual Currency i.e. Bitcoin as
invented in 2009. According to Coinage Act 2011, "coin" means any coin which is made of any
metal or any other material stamped by the Government or any other authority empowered by
the Government on this behalf and which is a legal tender including commemorative coin and
Government of India one rupee note.

15
The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, § 4, The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, 1st July, 2005,
vide notification No. GSR 436(E), dated 1st July, 2005.
16
The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, § 3, The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, 1st July, 2005,
vide notification No. GSR 436(E), dated 1st July, 2005
17
The Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, § 4, The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, 1st July, 2005,
vide notification No. GSR 436(E), dated 1st July, 2005.

17
 Explanation. –"For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that a "coin" does not include
the credit card, debit card, postal order, and e-money issued by any bank, post office, or
financial institution.”18

So, Petitioner cannot be punished under section 13 of FEMA because FEMA does not
regulate it.

PRAYER
18
The Coinage Act, 2011, § 2, The Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, sec. 3 (ii), vide notification No. S.O.
628(E), dated 28th March, 2012.

18
On the Basis of the case merits and as argued above the qua. Veer Singhania as the Petitioner in
Clubbed Criminal Writ Petition (Veer Singhania v. U.T. Chandigarh & Ors.) prays as below:

To exercise the powers of Hon’ble High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India read with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the F.I.R No. 920/2019 and
923/2019 registered by Chandigarh Police as well as investigations initiated in pursuance thereof
stand quashed.

Any other relief Hon'ble Court deems fit may grant accordingly in the interest of justice.

Sd/-

Counsels on behalf of the Respondent

19