Anaya vs Palaroan

G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya filed a complaint for annulment of marriage against Fernando Palaroan

wherein she alleged the following: she and Fernando were married in 1953; after one
month of their marriage, Fernando filed an action for annulment against her; the trial
court dismissed the complaint, upholding the validity of their marriage and granting her
counterclaim; while the amount of the counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando
divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had pre-marital relationships
with a close relative of his; and the non-divulgement to her of the aforementioned pre-
marital secret constituted fraud that would have precluded her from going through the
marriage. Aurora prayed for the annulment of the marriage and for moral
damages. Fernando denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative and
having committed any fraud against Aurora. He did not pray for the dismissal of the
complaint but for its dismissal with respect to moral damages. The trial court dismissed
the complaint, holding that Aurora’s allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.

ISSUE:

Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another

woman a ground for annulment of marriage?

HELD:

No. Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not

one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment (Art. 85, Civil Code; Art. 45, Family Code) ; and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph of the article (Art. 86, Civil Code; Art. 46, Family Code) , providing that
“no other misrepresentation or deceit as to … chastity” shall give ground for an action
to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given,
for upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent being plain, the Court’s duty is to give effect
to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not. (Anaya vs Palaroan, G.R. No. L-
27930, November 26, 1970)

Buccat v Buccat de Mangonon GR No. 47101 April 25, 1941

GODOFREDO BUCCAT, plaintiff-appellant,vs.

LUIDA MANGONON DE BUCCAT,

defendant-respondent.

HORRILLENO, J.:

FACTS:1.It was established before the trial court:a. The Plaintiff met the defendant in March
1938b.After several interviews, both were committed on September 19 of that yearc.On November 26
the same year, the plaintiff married the defendant in aCatholic Cathedral in Baguiod.They, then,
cohabited for about eighty-nine dayse.Defendant gave birth to a child of nine months on February 23,
1939f.Following this event, Plaintiff and Defendant separated.2.On March 20, 1939 the plaintiff filed an
action for annulment of marriage before theCFI of Baguio City. The plaintiff claimed that he consented
to the marriage becausethe defendant assured him that she was virgin.3.The trial court dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this appeal.BASICALLY: Godofredo Buccat (Plaintiff) and Luida Mangonon (Defendant)
got married onNovember 26, 1938. Luida gave birth after 89 days and on March 20, 1939 Godofredo
filedfor annulment of marriage before the CFI because he was led to believe by Luida that shewas a
virgin. The trial court dismissed the complaint, so Godofredo appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was fraud in obtaining the consent of Plaintiff to the marriage?

DECISION: There is no fraud because: The Supreme Court states that: “We see no reason to overturn the
ruling appealed.” It isunlikely that the plaintiff, Godofredo, had not suspected that the defendant, Luida,
waspregnant. (As she gave birth less than 3 months after they got married, she must havelooked very
pregnant even before they were married.) Since Godofredo must have knownthat she was not a virgin,
the marriage cannot be annulled. The Sacred Marriage is an institution: it is the foundation on which
society rests. To cancel it,reliable evidence is necessary.*Consent freely given: ARTICLE 4 and 45 FC.

Almelor v. RTC-Las Pinas, G.R. No. 179620, Aug. 26, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married
on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel
was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in his private life. At home,
Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a
couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for
his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught
him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found
several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man
on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At
this point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests
on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that
Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even
before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s
hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the
ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per
se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses.
Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting
that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it
alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been
vitiated by such.

Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 132955 October 27, 2006

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision dated January 12,
1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-
92 (a) dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage to private respondent and (b)
ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs. Also assailed is the March
5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:
In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge in Puerto
Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then
pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable
and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing
phone calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand Lilia
denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage and
she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE:

(a) Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45
of the Family Code; and

ANSWER:

No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case. Therefore, the petition for
annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should be
dismissed.

REASONING:

The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is obvious
that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed bigamy
case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.

On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is not
convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of
the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly
being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is
reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the
proper way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made
to bear upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel
of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did
he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised
as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is
incredible and is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a
sexual relationship with Lilia.
HOLDING:

Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary damages is
deleted for lack of basis.

MACARRUBO v MACARRUBO

Facts: Florence Macarrubo by herself and on behalf of her 2 children files a complaint for disbarment
against Edmundo Macarrubo alleging that Edmundo deceived her into marrying him despite his prior
subsisting marriage with a certain Helen Esparza. Florence further averred that Edmundo entered into a
3rd marriage with Josephine Constantino; and that he abandoned Florence without providing them w/
regular support. Edmundo denied the allegations, insisting instead that complainant Florence was fully
aware of his prior subsisting marriage, but that Florence dragged Edmundo against his will to a 'sham
wedding'. Edmundo submitted the decision of RTC declaring his marriage to complainant void ab initio.
Edmundo claimed that he left complainant and their 2 children w/ her consent. Issue:W/n Edmundo
should be disbarred... Held: Yes. Facts show that while Edmundo has a subsisting marriage w/ Helen
Esparza w/ whom he had 2 children, he entered into a 2nd marriage with complainant. While the
marriage between complainant Florence and Edmundo has been annulled by final judgment, this does
not cleanse his conduct of impropriety. Even assuming arguendo that Edmundo was coerced by
complainant to marry her, the duress has ceased after wedding day. Edmundo having freely cohabited
with her and even begot a 2nd child. The decision of RTC annulling their marriage is not res judicata on
the final resolution of this case. A disbarment case is sui generis for it is neither purely civil nor criminal
but is rather an investigation by the court on the conduct of its officers A.c.no.6148, feb. 27,
2004Florence macarrubo vs. Atty. Edmundo macarrubo Facts: the complainant filed a disbarment case
against the respondent alleging that respondent deceived her into marrying him despite his prior
subsisting marriage with a certain helen esperanza.this was also followed by a third time marriage
transaction with josephine constantino.the respondent anchored his defense on the annullment of the
previous marriage he entered as well as the existing annulment process of the third one.hefurther
proved his constant support of their children in terms of education and their leisure. Issue: is the act of
the respondent in contracting several marriages constitute immorality despite the fact that those
marriages was later declared annulled? Ruling:yes,the courts find the respondent guilty for gross
misconduct reflectingsunfavorably on the moral norms of the profession.the annulment of his marriage
withfinal judgment did not cleanse his conduct of every tinge of impropriety.insum,respondent has
breached the preceipts of the code of professional responsibility particularly,rule 1.01,canon 7.01 rule
7.03 of the same code.the penalty recommended bythe ibp which is 3 months suspension did no

Alcazar v Alcazar

G.R. No. 174451 [October 13, 2009]

Nature:
This is a petition for review on certiorari, which seeks to reverse the decision of the CA in affirming the
decision of the RTC to dismiss petitioner Veronica

Cabacungan Alcazar’s

complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar

Facts:

On October 11, 2000, Rey Alcazar wed Veronica. After the wedding, they lived together for five days in
Mindoro where they consummated their marriage. However, after they went back to Manila, Rey left for
Riyadh to work as an upholsterer for a year and a half. And upon his return, he did not go home to
Veronica nor did he contact her. Thus, Veronica filed a complaint for nullity of

marriage due to Rey’s physical incapability to consummat

e his marriage under Art. 45. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, dismissed this complaint thus, this petition.

Issue:

WON Rey’s physical incapability to consummate their marriage a ground for

annulment?

Held & Rationale

No. Art 45 (5) of the FC refers to the lack of power to copulate. Incapability to consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the part of the spouse to perform act of sexual intercourse. Veronica even
admitted that they had intercourse at least once. Hence, there was no ground for annulment.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 132955             October 27, 2006

ORLANDO VILLANUEVA, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA CANALITA-VILLANUEVA, respondents.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January 26, 1998 Decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the Decision 2 dated
January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case
No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner's petition for the annulment of his marriage to private
respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner Orlando Villanueva and private respondent Lilia Canalita-Villanueva got married on April
13, 1988 in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. On November 17, 1992, Orlando filed with the trial court a
petition for annulment of his marriage alleging that threats of violence and duress forced him into
marrying Lilia, who was already pregnant; that he did not get her pregnant prior to the marriage; that
he never cohabited with her after the marriage; and that he later learned that private respondent's
child died during delivery on August 29, 1988. 4

In her answer with compulsory counterclaim,5 Lilia prayed for the dismissal of the petition, arguing
that petitioner freely and voluntarily married her; that petitioner stayed with her in Palawan for almost
a month after their marriage; that petitioner wrote letters to her after he returned to Manila, during
which private respondent visited him personally; and that petitioner knew about the progress of her
pregnancy, which ended in their son being born prematurely. Private respondent also prayed for the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

On January 12, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Dismissing the above-entitled case; and

2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendant moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00, plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.6

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the petition and the award of attorney’s
fees and costs, but reduced the award of moral and exemplary damages to P50,000.00 and
P25,000.00, respectively. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,
hence, the instant petition for review based on the following assigned errors:

I. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE THE CONSENT OF
THE PETITIONER HAVING BEEN OBTAINED BY FRAUD, INTIMIDATION AND UNDUE
AND IMPROPER PRESSURE AND INFLUENCE PLUS THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO
COHABITATION WHATSOEVER BETWEEN PETITIONER AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

II. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GROSS ERROR IN

AWARDING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS WELL AS ATTORNEY'S FEES,
SAID AWARDS NOT BEING THOSE ALLOWED BY LAW.7
The issues for resolution are (a) whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of
vitiated consent; and (b) whether petitioner should be liable for moral and exemplary damages as
well as attorney’s fees and costs.

The petition is partly granted.

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of the trial court, as in
the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. 8 We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals
that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and that no threats or intimidation,
duress or violence compelled him to do so, thus –

To begin with, We are at once disturbed by the circumstance that despite the alleged
coerced consent which supposedly characterized his marriage with Lilia on April 13, 1988, it
was only on November 17, 1992 or after a span of not less than four (4) years and eight (8)
months when Orlando took serious step to have the same marriage annulled. Unexplained,
the prolonged inaction evidently finds basis in Lilia’s allegation that this annulment suit was
filed by Orlando solely in the hope that a favorable judgment thereon would bolster his
defense, if not altogether bring about his acquittal in the criminal case for bigamy which was
then already pending against him. Unfortunately, however, let alone the fact that the criminal
case was admittedly decided ahead with a judgment of conviction against Orlando x x x even
the very outcome of the present case disappointed his expectation. At this late, with his
appeal in the bigamy case still pending with this Court x x x Orlando must be hoping against
hope that with a decree of annulment ensuing from this Court, he may yet secure an
acquittal in the same bigamy charge. Viewed in this perspective, the instant appeal is,
therefore, understandable.

But even in terms of merit, the recourse must have to fall.

Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did
not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents that created on
his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life
and safety, to wit: the harassing phone calls from the appellee and strangers as well as the
unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the University of the East after his classes
thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a supposed member of the New
People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by appellee and who
accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her.

The Court is not convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is
not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is reasonable to assume that
appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper way to keep
himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security
personnel of his school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening
him. And neither did he inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their
marriage.

Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by appellee
that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellant’s excuse that
he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection during
their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is bereft of any
reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. His counsel also conceded before the
lower court that his client had a sexual relationship with the appellee x x x. He also narrated
x x x that sometime in January 1988, he and the appellee went to a hotel where "the sexual
act was consummated, with the defendant on top" x x x.

Instead of providing proofs that he was tricked into marrying his wife, appellant resorted to
undermining the credibility of the latter by citing her testimony that her child was born, and
died, on August 29, 1989, a year off from August 29, 1988, the date of fetal death as
appearing in the registry of deaths of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Puerto Princesa City
x x x.

To Our mind, appellant cannot make capital of the lapse because it is inconsequential, as
there is no controversy regarding the date of death of appellee’s fetus. Nevertheless, during
the continuation of the cross-examination of the appellee, she declared that her child was
prematurely born on August 29, 1988, matching the date in the certification of the Civil
Registrar x x x. The Court is not prepared to disbelieve the appellee and throw overboard her
entire testimony simply on account of her confusion as to the exact date of the death of the
fetus, especially when she herself had presented documentary evidence that put August 29,
1988 as the date her fetus died.

Appellant’s propensity to rely on his perceived weakness of the appellee’s evidence

continues in his argument that if indeed there is truth to her claim that she was impregnated
sometime in December 1987, then she could not have a premature delivery on August 29,
1988, as she had testified during the trial, because the 35-week period of pregnancy is
complete by that time. Whether the appellee’s impression that she had delivered prematurely
is correct or not will not affect the fact that she had delivered a fetus on August 29, 1988. In
the light of appellant’s admission that he had a sexual intercourse with his wife in January
1988, and his failure to attribute the latter’s pregnancy to any other man, appellant cannot
complain that he was deceived by the appellee into marrying her.

Appellant also puts in issue the lower court’s appreciation of the letters allegedly written by
him to the appellee. During his cross-examination, when confronted with thirteen (13) letters,
appellant identified the seven (7) letters that he sent to the appellee, but denied the
remaining six (6) x x x. The letters admitted by the appellant contained expressions of love
and concern for his wife, and hardly the rantings of a man under duress. During the re-direct
examination, however, appellant suddenly changed mind and denied authorship of those
seven (7) letters, claiming that he was forced to admit them because he was threatened with
harm by the appellee. If he was laboring under duress when he made the admission, where
did he find the temerity to deny his involvement with the remaining six (6) letters? The
recantation can only be motivated by a hindsight realization by the appellant of the
evidentiary weight of those letters against his case.

As to the second assignment of error, appellant cannot claim that his marriage should be
annulled due to the absence of cohabitation between him and his wife. Lack of cohabitation
is, per se, not a ground to annul a marriage. Otherwise, the validity of a marriage will depend
upon the will of the spouses who can terminate the marital union by refusing to cohabitate.
The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the perpetration of any
of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to justify his failure to cohabit
with the appellee on any of those grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld. 9
We also agree that private respondent is entitled to attorney’s fees. Article 2208 (11) of the Civil
Code provides that attorney’s may be awarded where the court deems it just and equitable under the
circumstances, as in the instant case.

We, however, delete the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
There is nothing in the records or in the appealed decision that would support an award of moral
damages. In justifying the award, the Court of Appeals merely said thus:

It is not difficult to imagine the suffering of the appellee from the baseless portrayal of her by
the appellant as the perpetrator of fraudulent schemes to trap an unwilling mate. x x x 10

However, the aforesaid finding is only a supposition as it has no reference to any testimony of
private respondent detailing her alleged physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as
would entitle her to moral damages.

In Mahinay v. Velasquez, Jr.,11 we held that:

In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral
suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While respondent alleged in his complaint that
he suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock, he failed to
prove them during the trial. Indeed, respondent should have taken the witness stand and
should have testified on the mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and other
emotional and mental suffering he purportedly suffered to sustain his claim for moral
damages. Mere allegations do not suffice; they must be substantiated by clear and
convincing proof. No other person could have proven such damages except the respondent
himself as they were extremely personal to him.

As private respondent is not entitled to moral damages, a fortiori, she is not entitled to exemplary
damages. This is clear in Article 2234 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court
may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. In
case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof of loss is necessary in
order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the
plaintiff must show that he would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages
were it not for the stipulation for liquidated damages.

Hence, exemplary damages is allowed only in addition to moral damages such that no exemplary
damages can be awarded unless the claimant first establishes his clear right to moral damages. 12 In
the instant case, private respondent failed to satisfactorily establish her claim for moral damages,
thus she is not likewise entitled to exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The January 26, 1998 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832 affirming with modification the January 12, 1996 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172 in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92
dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage with private respondent,
is AFFIRMED. However, the award of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.

Jimenez vs Canizares
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960

FACTS:

Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Remedios
Canizares on the ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation.  It has existed at the time of the marriage and continues to
exist that led him to leave the conjugal home two nights and one day after the marriage.  The court
summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not file any answer.  The wife was ordered
to submit herself to physical examination and to file a medical certificate within 10 days.  She was
given another 5 days to comply or else it will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore
rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with only the testimony of the husband.

HELD:

The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband did not avail of the opportunity to defend
herself and as such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded.  It is a well-known fact that women
in this country are shy and bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a physical
examination unless compelled by competent authority.  Such physical examination in this case is not
self-incriminating.  She is not charged with any offense and likewise is not compelled to be a witness
against herself.  Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be presumed.  The case was
remanded to trial court.