Slide - Session 13 - Political Culture and Socialization
Slide - Session 13 - Political Culture and Socialization
POLITICAL CULTURE
&
POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
POLITICAL CULTURE
■ Each society teaches its norms and values to its people, who pick up distinct
notions about how the political system is supposed to work and about what the
government may do to them and for them.
■ These beliefs, symbols, and values about the political system are the
POLITICAL CULTURE of a nation—and it varies considerably from one nation
to another.
■ The political culture of a nation is determined by its history, economy, religion,
and folkways. Basic values , laid down early, may endure for centuries.
■ Political culture is a sort of collective political memory.
■ America was founded on the basis of “competitive individualism,” looking out
for oneself, which is still very much alive.
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POLITICAL CULTURE
As defined by political scientist Sidney Verba, POLITICAL CULTURE is
“the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values, which
defines the situation in which political action takes place.”
Americans always liked minimal government.
In Japan, where the residues of a traditional feudal class system still exist, those who
bow lower indicate they are of inferior status. The Japanese still tend to submit to the
authority of those in office, even when they dislike their corruption and incompetence.
Americans, who traditionally do not defer to anyone, consider it their democratic
birthright to criticize the way the country is governed, even if they know little about the
issues.
In political culture, Japan and the United States are vastly different.
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TYPES OF POLITICAL CULTURE
■ Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba did the pioneering study of cross-national
differences in political beliefs and values.
■ The researchers interviewed some 1,000 people each in five countries in 1959
and 1960 to measure underlying political views.
■ From the data, Almond and Verba detected three general political cultures:
PARTICIPANT, SUBJECT, and PAROCHIAL.
■ Every country, they emphasized, is a varied mixture of all three of these ideal
types.
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PARTICIPANT POLITICAL CULTURE
■ In a PARTICIPANT POLITICAL CULTURE, such as the United States and Britain,
people understand that they are citizens and pay attention to politics.
■ They are proud of their country’s political system and are willing to discuss it. They
believe they can influence politics and claim they would organize a group to protest
something unfair.
■ Accordingly, they show a high degree of political competence and political efficacy.
■ They say they take pride in voting and believe people should participate in politics.
They are active in their communities and often belong to voluntary organizations. They
are likely to trust other people and to recall participating in family discussions as
children.
■ A participant political culture is clearly the ideal soil to sustain a democracy.
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SUBJECT POLITICAL CULTURE
■ Less democratic than the participant political culture is the SUBJECT POLITICAL
CULTURE, predominant at that time in West Germany and Italy, in which people still
understand that they are citizens and pay attention to politics, but they do so more passively.
■ They follow political news but are not proud of their country’s political system and feel little
emotional commitment toward it.
■ They are uncomfortable discussing politics and feel they can influence politics only to the
extent of speaking with a local official. It does not ordinarily occur to them to organize a
group.
■ Their sense of political competence and efficacy is lower; some feel powerless. They say they
vote, but many vote without enthusiasm. They are less likely to trust other people and to recall
voicing their views as children.
■ Democracy has more difficulty sinking roots in a culture where people are used to think of
themselves as obedient subjects rather than as participants.
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PAROCHIAL POLITICAL CULTURE
■ Still less democratic is the PAROCHIAL POLITICAL CULTURE, where many
people do not much care that they are citizens of a nation, as in Mexico at the time of
the survey.
■ They identify with the immediate locality, hence the term parochial (of a parish).
■ They take no pride in their country’s political system and expect little of it.
■ They pay no attention to politics, have little knowledge of it, and seldom speak about
it.
■ They have neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics. They have no
sense of political competence or efficacy and feel powerless in the face of existing
institutions.
■ Attempting to grow a democracy in a parochial political culture is very difficult,
requiring not only new institutions but also a new sense of citizenship.
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CIVIC POLITICAL CULTURE
■ Although Almond and Verba accepted that a participant culture came closest to
the democratic ideal, they argued that the ‘CIVIC CULTURE’ IS A BLEND OF
ALL THREE, IN THAT IT RECONCILES THE PARTICIPATION OF
CITIZENS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS WITH THE VITAL NECESSITY
FOR GOVERNMENT TO GOVERN.
■ Democratic stability, in their view, is strengthened by a political culture that is
characterized by a blend of activity and passivity on the part of citizens, and a
balance between obligation and performance on the part of government.
■ The civic-culture approach to the study of political attitudes and values has,
however, been widely criticized. In the first place, its model of the psychological
dispositions that make for a stable democracy is highly questionable.
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CRITICISM TO CIVIC CULTRE APPROACH
■ SECOND, THE CIVIC-CULTURE THESIS RESTS ON THE UNPROVEN
ASSUMPTION THAT POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES SHAPE
BEHAVIOUR, AND NOT THE OTHER WAY ROUND. In short, a civic
culture may be more a consequence of democracy than its cause. If this is the
case, political culture may provide an index of the health of democracy, but it
cannot be seen as a means of promoting stable democratic rule.
■ FINALLY, ALMOND AND VERBA’S APPROACH TENDS TO TREAT
POLITICAL CULTURE AS HOMOGENEOUS; THAT IS, AS LITTLE MORE
THAN A CIPHER FOR NATIONAL CULTURE OR NATIONAL
CHARACTER. In so doing, it pays little attention to political subcultures and
tends to disguise fragmentation and social conflict. In contrast, radical
approaches to political culture tend to highlight the significance of social
divisions, such as those based on class, race and gender. 9
OPINION GATHERED ON BANGLADESH
Democracy projects the idea that state functions would be governed
reflecting the desires of the people. In that true sense, democracy has
never been practiced in Bangladesh.
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Socially people had been identified in the past into two distinct classes, Feudal Lords and
Subjects. Feudal Lords were the ruling class and the Subjects were the working class.
Though the feudal system has been abolished quite some time back, still the society remained
divided between rich elites with wealth and influence and the poor hapless working class. The
elites having wealth and influence are considered as ruling class, with the poor commoner being
their subject.
Bangladesh remained a feudalistic society long after the departure of feudal lords. Even during
subsequent democratic systems, political power used to be handled mostly by the elites.
Presence of a growing middle class is too insignificant to make any impact on the feudalistic
social outlook. So, in fact, true democratic culture was never practiced here. The so-called
democratic system of the People's Republic which was in practice may be termed “feudal
democracy”.
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Now a commoner who has ambition for political power tries to look like a
king/queen/prince in the eyes of the other commoners to have their acceptance. For
achieving that it becomes necessary for that person to acquire sufficient wealth by
hook or by crook.
It is difficult for people at large to perceive any person other than from elite class,
identified these days with wealth and influence including muscle power, to become
a part of ruling class. Only the rich or the rogue is considered fit to be a political
leader in the eye of a commoner.
Political parties or other political institutions have also been developed following
the same culture for similar reasons. Leader being considered as master and the
other rank and file being the servant to serve as per order has been evolved.
Decision making is being kept confined within top leadership with no participation
from the common members.
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Bangladesh has been in the grip of power politics since it
emerged as a sovereign state. Coups have been common, the
military has infiltrated the political process, and the political
scene is marked by a patron-client culture, one in which black
money plays a major role in elections.
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Holding party council every two years is a good democratic norms
that can bring some balance in the party leadership. The existing
practice of making the chief of the party a permanent position is a
bad example for democratic political culture.
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Constitutional bodies such as Human Rights Commission,
Anti Corruption Commission, Election Commission,
Information Commission have limitations to work
independently without state intervention.
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CIVIL SOCIETY
■ The concept of “civil society” is closely related to political culture. Hobbes used the term to
indicate humans after becoming civilized; Hegel used it to designate associations bigger than
the family but smaller than the state—churches, clubs, businesses, and so on.
■ Edmund Burke called these the “little platoons of society” that form the basis of political life.
They encourage cooperating with others, rule of law, restraint, and moderation—what
Tocqueville called “habits of the heart.” Without them, politics becomes a murderous grab for
power.
■ With the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the concept attracted
new interest to explain the growth of democracy—or the lack of it. The Communist regimes
had attempted to stomp out civil society and control nearly everything.
■ A vibrant and developed civil society is the bedrock of democracy. Without a civil society,
democracy may not take root.
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THE DECAY OF POLITICAL CULTURE
Why the question of decay?
• Recent democracies have grown more cynical
• Voter turn out has declined
• Citizens see politicians as corrupt and government institutions are ineffective
Examples: Vietnam War, War against Iraq, Economy stagnant, Decline trust in
government, Unemployment etc.
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POLITICAL SUBGROUPS
ELITE AND MASS SUBCULTURES
■ The political culture of a country is not uniform and monolithic.
■ One can usually find within it differences between the mainstream culture and
SUBCULTURES as well as differences between elite and mass attitudes.
■ Elites—used here more broadly than the “governing elites”. It means those with better
education, higher income, and more influence.
■ Elites are much more interested in politics and more participatory.
■ They are more inclined to vote, to protest injustice, to form groups, and to run for
office.
■ One consistent finding of the Civic Culture study has been confirmed over and over:
The more education people have, the more likely they are to participate in politics.
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POLITICAL SUBGROUPS
ELITE AND MASS SUBCULTURES
■ The differences in participation in politics between elites and masses are one of the
great ironies of democracy.
■ IN THEORY AND IN LAW, A DEMOCRACY IS OPEN TO ALL. IN
PRACTICE, SOME PARTICIPATE MUCH MORE THAN OTHERS.
■ Because the better educated and better-off people participate in politics far more, they
are in a much stronger position to look out for their interests.
■ The right to vote is a mere starting point for political participation; it does not
guarantee equal access to decision making.
■ A mass political culture of apathy and indifference toward politics effectively negates
the potential of a mass vote.
■ An elite political culture of competence and efficacy amplifies its influence.
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POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
■ In the SOCIALIZATION process, children acquire what are often
lifelong manners and speech patterns.
■ Although some is formally taught, most is absorbed by imitating
others. In the same way, political socialization teaches political values
and specific usages.
■ Learning to pledge allegiance to the flag, to sing the national anthem,
and to obey authority figures from presidents to police officers is
imparted by families, friends, teachers, and television.
■ Political socialization is thus crucial to stable government.
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THE AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
THE FAMILY
■ What children encounter earliest—the family—usually outweighs all other
factors. ATTEMPTS AT OVERT SOCIALIZATION BY GOVERNMENT
AND SCHOOLS GENERALLY FAIL IF THEIR VALUES ARE AT ODDS
WITH FAMILY ORIENTATIONS.
■ Parents influence our political behavior for decades. Most people vote as their
parents did. More basically, the family forms the psychological makeup of
individuals, which in turn determines many of their political attitudes. It imparts
norms, values, beliefs, and attitudes such as party attachment and trust or
cynicism about government.
■ The early years have the strongest effect, especially from ages 3 to 13. Children
accept parental values unconsciously and uncritically and may retain them all
their lives. People often give back to the world as adults what they got from it as
children. 23
THE AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
THE SCHOOL
■ More deliberate socialization occurs in school. Most governments use history to
inculcate children with pride and patriotism.
■ THE AMOUNT OF SCHOOLING ALSO AFFECTS POLITICAL ATTITUDES.
Uniformly, people with many years of education show a stronger sense of
responsibility to their community and feel more able to influence public policy than do
less-educated citizens. PERSONS WITH MORE SCHOOLING ARE MORE
PARTICIPATORY.
■ College graduates are more tolerant and open-minded, especially on questions of race,
than high-school dropouts, who are often parochial in outlook. Education imparts more
open-minded attitudes, and educated people generally enjoy higher incomes and status,
which by themselves encourage interest and participation.
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THE AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
PEER GROUPS
■ Friends and playmates also form political values.
■ For example, working-class children in Jamaica who went to school
with children of higher social classes tended to take on the political
attitudes of those classes, but when they attended school with
working-class peers, their attitudes did not change.
■ The relative strength of peer-group influence appears to be growing.
■ WITH BOTH PARENTS WORKING, CHILDREN MAY BE
SOCIALIZED MORE BY PEERS THAN BY FAMILIES.
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THE AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
THE MASS MEDIA
■ Gaining in influence are the mass media, especially television. Many fear the influence is
negative.
■ HARVARD POLITICAL SCIENTIST ROBERT PUTNAM ARGUED THAT HEAVY TV
WATCHING MAKES PEOPLE PASSIVE AND UNINTERESTED IN COMMUNITY OR
GROUP ACTIVITIES.
■ As American children watch thousands of hours of television a year, they witness myriad
crimes and murders.
■ Some critics charge this tends to make them heartless and violent, but this has not been
proven. TV reaches kids early; even 3-year-olds can recognize the president on television and
understand that he is a sort of “boss” of the nation. Senators and members of Congress receive
much less and less-respectful TV coverage, a view the children may hold the rest of their
lives.
■ As with schools, the mass media may be unsuccessful if their messages are at odds with what
family and religion teach. Mass media alone cannot do everything.
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THE AGENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
THE GOVERNMENT
■ The government itself is an agent of socialization, especially if it delivers rising living
standards.
■ Many government activities are intended to explain or display the government to the
public, always designed to build support and loyalty. Great spectacles, such as the
2008 Beijing Olympics, have a strengthening effect, as do parades with flags and
soldiers, and proclamations of top leaders.
■ The power of government to control political attitudes is limited, however, because
messages and experiences reach individuals through conversations with primary
groups of kin or peers, who put their own spin on messages.
■ ALIENATED GROUPS MAY SOCIALIZE THEIR CHILDREN TO DISLIKE THE
GOVERNMENT AND IGNORE ITS MESSAGES.
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REFERENCES
Roskin, M. G., Cord, R. L., Medeiros, J. A., & Jones, W. S. (2014). Political
Science: An Introduction (14th Edition). Upper Saddle River: Pearson (Chapter
6).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vox_populi#Vox_populi,_vox_Dei 28