The cases herein cover two topics – doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies and modes of judicial review.

Under the first topic the doctrine posits that before one can seek for court
intervention, he must first avail himself of all the administrative processes available to
him. That if an administrative body has a remedy that he can use, he must allow the
administrative officer therein all the opportunities to decide on the matter within his
jurisdiction. And only after that can he go to court to seek for its power of judicial review.
As shown in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Secretary of
Justice,

1. Metropolitan Cebu Water District (respondent) received a Preliminary Assessment

Notice from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for alleged tax deficiencies for the
year 2000. Respondent filed a formal protest with the Regional Director, BIR Revenue
Region No. 13. CIR however failed to act on the protest within 180 days from
submission of the supporting documents. Filed a Petition for Review before the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA). CIR however opposed the said petition on the ground that the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) has jurisdiction over the dispute considering that respondent
is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) filed a Petition for Arbitration
before the SOJ.

The petition should be dismissed for failure of the CIR to exhaust administrative remedies
a. Furthermore, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is mandated that
where a remedy before an administrative body is provided by statute, relief must be sought by
exhausting this remedy prior to bringing an action in court in order to give the administrative body
every opportunity to decide a matter that comes within its jurisdiction.

the court ruled that in the ordinary course of law, the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) is to appeal to the
Office of the President instead of seeking the court. Here, CIR failed to exhaust all the
available administrative remedies before moving onto judicial review.
 There are, however, exceptions. In the following instances, the doctrine shall not
apply:
1. there is a violation of due process;
2. the issue involved is a purely legal question,
3. the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to want or excess of
jurisdiction;
4. there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. there will be irreparable injury;
6. the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. the rule does not provide a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and
11. the circumstances of the case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention

But if one plans to invoke the exceptions, they have to successfully show that the
exceptions shall apply.
In the case of Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. Court of Appeals,

Petitioner argues that the case qualifies as an exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies based on the unconstitutionality and arbitrariness of the
imposition of the charges
the court ruled that the petitioner failed to show that the case falls under any of the
exceptions. The court said that mere allegation of arbitrariness is not enough to vest the
trial court the power that has been granted by law to administrative agencies or special
government agencies.

Also, in the case of Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Seludo, Jr.,

the basic issue in the case is not whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for
prohibition filed by Seludo; rather, the issue is who between the RTC and the NEA has
primary jurisdiction over the question of the validity of the Board Resolution issued by
SAMELCO II.
Alleged: it is covered by the exception - where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to
be decided by the courts of justice;

But Seludo failed to show that the case falls under any of the exceptions. The questions
raised in this case were not purely legal questions
the issues raised in the petition for prohibition, particularly the issue of whether or not there are valid
grounds to disallow respondent from attending SAMELCO's Board meetings and to disqualify him from
running for re-election as a director of the said Board, are not purely legal questions.
 Instead, they involve a determination of factual matters which fall within the competence of the NEA to
ascertain.

Invoking the same exception - the issue involved is a purely legal question – the
ruling in Dueñas v. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association stated that the
doctrine shall not apply because the questions posed are purely legal such as whether
or not the right is included in the Presidential Decree and whether the action has
prescribed under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Also, the case of Rubio, Jr. v. Paras, involves the same exception,
Relative to the second exception, the ruling in this case emphasized the diff between
the 2.
there is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts. There is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as
to the truth or the falsehood of the alleged facts
Even though the court said that the proper remedy is for the petitioner to file an MR in
the Office of the Administrator or appeal to the CSC. But the doctrine shall not apply
because the issue raised is purely legal. All the other issues that were not subejct to
inquiry and investigation by COA special audit tem are considered to be legal questions.
The trial court sustained the contention of the petitioner, and declared in its April 15, 2002 Resolution that
the charges in paragraphs (a) and (e) of the formal charge were not included in the complaint of Ibañez
against the petitioner; hence, the latter was deprived of his right to be informed of the charges against
him and to respond thereto. The trial court also declared that the charges of oppression of the employees
mentioned in charge no. 2 (except that of Jaya) had already been dismissed and yet were still included in
the formal charge filed by the respondent with the Committee on Discipline, while the other charges were
the subject of an inquiry and investigation by the COA special audit team .

the court ruled that there are no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy
available for the petitioner since the charges are already pending under the Civil Service
Commission who has the jurisdiction and that the other charge was also dismissed by
the same commission.

The fourth and sixth exceptions were applied in the case of City Engineer of
Baguio v. Baniqued. Under the fourth exception, the doctrine does not apply when there
is urgent need for judicial intervention. In this case, if Baniqued waiting first for his
house to be actually demolished before seeking protection from the courts, it would
have been an illogical move. The court ruled that the safest course of action is to act on
the earliest opportunity.
Under the sixth exception, the doctrine does not apply when irreparable damage will be
suffered. The court said that that is the case here since the Mayor has already made up
his mind that the house was built illegally and that it is subject to demolition and that if
ever motion for reinvestigation be raised, it will still be denied immediately. Thus,
demolition shall result to irreparable damage.

In Buston-Arendain v. Gil, on the other hand, the ninth exception – when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings – is applied. The requirement
of exhaustion of administrative remedies shall apply to public lands, thus, since the
subject land in this case is private, then the doctrine shall not apply.

According to De Leon, the modes of judicial review have roughly been classified as
direct or collateral and statutory or non-statutory.

First Phil. Holdings Corp. v. Sandiganbayan (non-statutory)

the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against the Sandiganbayan.
Before that, there was a pending case before the Sandiganbayan regarding the
unexplained wealth of the Romualdez spouses. Petitioner filed its own "Motion for
Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint in Intervention" alleging that the
sequestered shares of stock in the PCI Bank were acquired by the respondent spouses by
means of fraud that petitioner asks that said shares be returned to it. However,
Sandiganbayan dismissed the Motion to Intervene.

Here, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari and ruled that the
Sandiganbayan abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s Motion for Intervention
because petitioner is deprived of a remedy in law to recover its property alleged to have
been taken illegally from it. The writ of mandamus was issued to compel it to grant such
motion.

The Court here cited the cases of PCGG vs. Hon. Emmanuel G. Peña, etc., et al
and Republic vs. Sandiganbayan , which provided that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
and original jurisdiction over all cases regarding the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses,
subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the Supreme Court.

The Court also stated that under Rule 12, Sec. 2 (b) of the Rules of Court,
intervention shall be allowed "in the exercise of discretion" by a court. Ordinarily,
mandamus will not prosper to compel a discretionary act. But where there is "gross
abuse of discretion, manifest injustice or palpable excess of authority" equivalent to
denial of a settled right to which petitioner is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, the writ of mandamus shall issue.
Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego (statutory)

In a joint decision, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found respondent
liable for grave misconduct with the penalty of one year suspension from office. Sp
respondent then filed a petition for review on certiorari with a motion for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction before the CA. When the writ of preliminary injunction
was granted, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion for intervention (since it was
not impleaded as a respondent before CA) and to admit the attached motion to recall
the writ of preliminary injunction. However, the motions were denied by CA.

The CA anchored its denial of the motion to recall the writ of preliminary injunction on
its lack of authority over the case. (The Office of the Ombudsman's motion for
intervention was allegedly improper).

The Supreme Court here granted the petition and ordered the CA to allow the
intervention of the Ombudsman. The Court also lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
as the execution of the decision of the Ombudman (the penalty of one year suspension)
was (and still is) stayed by the filing and pendency of the case in the CA.

The applicable provision of law is Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, as amended: provides that “where the penalty imposed is public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one
month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases,
the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory.

However, this rule was clarified in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja:

Only decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases imposing the
penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary shall be final and unappealable hence, immediately
executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the penalty imposed is other than
mentioned, the law gives the respondent the right to appeal. In these cases, the decision
becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if no appeal is
perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order, directive or decision.
The party’s right to appeal generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal.

In this case, the penalty to respondent was suspension for one year without pay. He filed
an appeal on time. By that, the mere filing of an appeal sufficed to stay the execution of
the joint decision against respondent. That’s why the SC lifted the preliminary
injunction because the decision of the Ombudsman was stayed by the mere filing of
appeal to the CA.

ABS-CBN Corp., v. National Telecommunications Commission

 ABS-CBN filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with urgent applications for the
issuance of a TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction claiming that the NTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the CDO.

The Court here ruled that in light of the supervening denial of the pending House bills
for the renewal of ABS-CBN's legislative franchise, the Court finds it appropriate to
dismiss this case on the ground of mootness.

Hence, the supervening denial of these bills means that ABS-CBN cannot any more
invoke the same as basis for continuing the operation of the radio and television
networks covered by the CDO issued by the NTC. Accordingly, the issue on the
"corollary/auxiliary" powers of Congress pending the renewal of these bills had already
been rendered moot.