Reprinted from Technology Reviow, Volume 80, Number 7, June/July 1878 Copyright 1978, alumi Association of the Massachusetts Institute of Techrology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Patterns of Industrial Innovation William J. Abernathy James M. Utterback@: Innov* tion “The changing character of innovation, and ls changing raia in corporate aovanct re Seeking tounderstanc the variables that ay determine succeselul strategies tor pester innovation, the authors focus on three stages inthe evolution ofa successful fnlarpree’ te period of fexiolly.n whieh the enterprise Seeks to captalize on fis advantages where ihey cles greatest ‘advantages: isintermeciate years, in which ‘aj produers aro uso mote widely: and 4s full maturity, when prosperty is assured ‘by leaderehia n severe! arncipal procucte ‘and technologies. Process Eee Fluid pattern Transitional pattern Specific pattern ‘Competitive emphasis on Funetional product (Cost reduction performance Innovation stimulated by ‘formation on users Pressure to recuce cost and feeds and users technica! Improve quality ‘puts Predominant type ot innovation ‘Frequeni major changes ‘ajo process changes Tnoremental for product and fn products requred by rising volume process, with cumulative t= roverentin productvity Sand quality Product line Dwvarse, ote incudng __Incluges at east one Most unatterentisted custom designs Production processes ‘Flexbia and ineticent, major changes ensly ao- commodatan Equipment Genera purpose, requ ing highly stiled labor Materials Inputs are emited 10 general avaiable Prant ‘Small-scale, eatae near User or source of tec nology Informal and entre preneurah Product design stable ‘Enough to have significant roducton volume Becoming more gi, with ehanges occurring in major Steps ‘Some sunprocessas auto mated, creating “islands of ‘automaton ‘Specializes matenais may be demanded item some suppliers CGenora-purpose wit specaized sections Through laison elation ships, proc and task groups standard products Etficiont capitalntensiva, ‘and noid cost of change is righ ‘Special purpose, mosty ‘utmate wit aor tasks ‘mainly montorg and conta Large-scale, hight specie 1 parboular products Through emphasis on struc ture, goals. and rulesPatterns of Industrial Innovation William J. Abernathy James M, Utterback How does a company’s innovation — and its response to innovative ideas — change as the company grows and matures? Are there circumstances in which a partern generally associated with successful innovation is in fact more likely to be assoviated with failure? Under whar circumstances will newly available tech- nology, rather than the mazket, be the critical stimulus for change? When is concentration on incremental innovation and, productivity gains likely to be of maximum value to a firm? In what situations does this strategy instead cause instability and potential for crisis in an organization? Incrigued by questions such as these, we have examined how the kinds of innovations attempted by productive units apparently change as these units evolve, Our goal was a model relating patteras of innovation within a unit to that unit’s competitive strategy, production. capa: bilities, and organizational characteristics. This article summarizes our work and presents the basic characteristics of the model to which it has led us. We conclude that a productive unit's capacity for and methods of innovation depend critically on its stage of evolution from a small technology-based enterprise to a ‘major high-volume producer. Many characteristics of in- novation and the innovative process correlate with such an historical analysis; and on the basis of our model we can now attempt answers to questions such as those above. [A Spectrum of Innovators Past studies of innovation imply that any innovating unit sees most ofits innovations as new products, But that ob- servation masks an essential difference: what is a product innovation by a small, technology-based unic is often the process equipment adopted by a large unit to improve its high-volume production ofa standard product. We argue thar these two units — the small, entrepreneurial organi zation and the larger unit producing standard products in high volume — are at opposite ends of a spectram, in a sense forming boundary conditions in the evolution of a unit and in the character of its innovation of product and process technologies. ‘One distinctive pattern of technological innovation is evident in the case of established. high-volume products ‘A new model suggests how the character of its innovation changes as a successful enterprise matures; and how other companies may change themseives to foster innovation as they grow and prosper. such as incandescent light bulbs, paper, steel, standard chemicals, and internal-combustion engines, for exam- ples, The markets for such goods are well defined; the prod- uct characteristics are well understood and often stan dardized; unit profit margins are typically low; produc- tion technology is efficient, equipment-intensive, and specialized ro a particular product; and competition is primarily on the basis of price. Change is costly in such highly integrated systems because an alteration in any one attribute of process has ramifications for many others. In this environment innovation is typically incremental in nature, and it has a gradual, cumulative effect on pro- ductivity. For example, Samuel Hollander has shown that more than half of the reduction in the cost of producing rayon in plants of E. 1. du Pont de Nemeurs and Co. has, been the result of gradual process improvements which could not be identified as formal projects or changes. A similar study by John Enos shows that accumulating, in cremental developments in petroleum refining processes resulted in productivity gains which often eclipsed the gain from the original innovation. Incremental innova- tions, such as the use of larger railroad cars and unit trains, have resulted in dramatic reduetions in the cost of moving large quantities of materials by rail In all these examples, major systems innovations have been followed by countless minor product and systems improvements, and the latter account for more than half of the total uitimare economic gain due to their much greater number. While cost reduction seems to have been the major incentive for most of these innovations, major advances in performance have also resulted from such small engineering and production adjustments. Such incremental innovation typically results in an in- creasingly specialized system in which economies of scale in production and the development of mass markets are extremely important. The productive unit loses its Nexi- bility, becoming increasingly dependent on high-volume production to cover its fixed costs and increasingly vul- nerable to changed demand and technical obsolescence. Major new products do not seem to be consistent with this pattern of incremental change. New products which require reorientation of corporate goals or production facilities tend to originate outside organizations devored to a “specific” production systems or, if originatedMajor innovations usually go through countless minor product and systems improvements... .Such incremental innovations typically produce a highly specialized system that depends upon economies of scale and mass marketing for success. within, to be rejected by them: A more fluid partern of product change is associated with the identification of an emerging need or a new way to meet an evisting need: it is an entrepreneurial act ‘Many studies suggest that such new product innovations share common traits. They aceur in disproportionate numbers in companies and units located in or neat affluent markets with stcong science-based universities oF other research institutions and entrepreneutially oriented financial institutions. Their competitive advantage over predecessor products is based on superior funcional per~ formance rather than lower initial cost, and so these radi «al innovations tend to offer higher unit profit margins. When a major product innevation first appears, per formance criteria are typically vague and little under- stood, Because they have a more intimate understanding of performance requirements, users may play a major role in suggesting the ultimate form of the innovation as well as the need see “Users as Irovators,” by Eric A, vom Hippel, January, pp. 30-34). For example, Kenneth Knight shows thae three-quarters of the computer models which emerged between 1944 and 1950, usually those produced as one or two of a kind, were developed by us It is reasonable that the diversity and uncertainty of performance requirements for new products give an ad- vantage in their innovation to sinall, adaptable organiza tions with flexible technical approaches and good exter- nal communications, and historical evidence supports that hypothesis. For example, John Tihon argues that new enterprises led in the pplication of semiconductor technology, often transferring into practice technology from more established firms and laboratories, He argues that economies of scale have not been of prime impor- tance bectuse products have changed so rapidly that pro: duction technology designed for a particular product is, rapidly made obsolete, And R. O. Schlaifer and S. D. Heron have argued that a diverse and responsive group of enterprises struggling against established units to enter the industry contributed greatly to the early advances in jet aircraft engines. A Transition from Radical to Evolutionary Innovation ‘These ewo partems of innovation may be taken to repre- sent extreme types — in one case involving ineremental change to a rigid, efficient production system specifically designed to produce a standardized product, and in the other case involving radical innovation with product characteristics in flux, They are notin fact rigid, indepen: dent categories, Several examples will make ir clear that ‘organizations currently considered in the “specific” care- — where incremental innovation is now motivated by cost reduction — were at their origin small, units intent on new product innovation Joba Tilton’s study of developments in the sem ductor industry from 1950 through 1968 indicates that the rate of major innovation has decreased and that the type of innovation shifted, Eight of the 13 product iano- vations he considers to have been most important during that period occurced within the first seven years, while theindustry was making less than 5 per cent of its total 18- year sales. Two types of enterprise can be identified i this early period of she new industry — established units thac came into semiconductors from vested positions in vac tuum ube mazkers, and new entries such as Fairchild Semiconductor, [BM., and Texas Inscruments, Ine. The established units responded to competition from the new- comers by emphasizing process innovations. Meanwhile, the latter sought entey and strength through product in- novation, The three very successful new encrants just listed were responsible for half of the major product in- novations and only one of the nine process innovations which Dr, Tilton identified in that 18-year period, while three principal established units (divisions of General Electric, Philco, and R.C.A.) made only one-quarter of the product innovations bur three of the nine major pro «ess innovations in the same period. In this case process innovation did nor prove to be an effective competitive stance; by 1966 the three established units together held oniy 18 per cent of the marker while che three new units held 42 per cent. Since 1968, however, the basis of com- petition in the industry has changed; as costs and pro- ductivity have become more important, the rate of major product innovation has decreased, and effective process innovation has become an important factor in competi tive success. For example, by 1973 Texas Instruments which had been a flexible, new entrant in the industry two decades earlier and had contributed no major process in ovations prior to 1968, was planning 4 single machine that would produce 4 per cent of world requirements for its integrated:-circuit unit. Like the transistor in the electronics industry, the DC-3 stands out as a major change in the aircraft and airlines industries. Alain Phillips has shown thar che DC-3 was, in fact a cumulation of prior innovations. It was not the largest, or fastest, oF longest-range aireraft: it was the most economical large, fast plane able to fly long dis: tances, All the features which made this design so com pletely successful had been introduced and proven in prior sireraft. And the DC-3 was essentially the first commercial product of an entering firm (the C-1 and. DC-2 were produced by Douglas only in small numbers). Just as the transistor put the clectronics industry on a new plateau, so the DC-3 changed the character of inno- vation in the aircraft industry for the nest 15 years, No major innovations were introduced into commercial air- cafe design from 1936 until new jet-powered aircraft ap- peared in the 1950s, Instead, there were simply many refinements to the DC-3 concept — stretching the design and adding appointments; and during the period of these incremental changes airline operating cost per pas senger-mile dropped an additional SD per cent The Unit of Analysis AAs we show in this atl, ingovacion within an exab- lished indasey is offen. limited co incremental improve- ments of both products and process. Major product ‘hange is often inceoduced from outside an established ustry and is viewed as disruptive; Is source is typically the sarrap of a new, smal her, mvasion of markets by leading firms in other industeies, oF govemnment sponsor ship of change ether as an inital purchaser or through di reat regulation “These circimstances mean that dhe stondaed unity of analysis of industry — firm and product type — are of it de tse in understanding Inaovation.. Technological hhange causes these terms to change their meanings And the ery shape of the production process is altered “Thos the questions raised inthis article requite hat a product line and its associated production proces be {Bken together ap the unis of analysis. This we term 9 “productive wnt,” For a simple firm orem devoted to a single product, the prodactve unit and the fem Gone and the same, In the ease of a divesifid firth. pro- duceive unit would usually report to a single operating fmanagee and normally be s separate operating dstsion ‘The extreme of a bighly feagrented production process right mean that several separate fing takes eogether ‘would be 2 productive unit For example, analssis of change in the textile industry rogeies dhe producuve units in the chemical, phstic, ‘ied equipment industries he incaded. Ary ig the electronics indatey requires 3 revi ofthe hanging roe of component, eter, and software pro- dlucer 2 hey Become more crucial to change in the ia assembled product. Major change atone level works Is ‘way up and down the chain, because of the interdep Aes pros an proces change win and atone productive units. Knenelge ofthe protuction process as system of linked productive units a prerequisite ro Un derstanding innovation in an industrial “context. — WA, PALO. ‘The elecric light bath also has 2 history of a long series of evolutionary impeosements which started with a few major innovations and ended in a highly standardized commodicy-like product. By 1909 the initial tungsten filament and vacuum bulb innovations were in places from then until 1955 there came a series of incremental changes — better metal alloys for the filament, the use of “gorters” to assist in exhausting the bulb, coiling the fla ments, “frosting” the glass, and many more. In the same period the price of a 6l-wate bull decreased (even with no ination adjustment) from $1.60 t0 20 cents each, the lumens output increased by 175 per cent, the direct labor content was reduced more than an order of magnitude, from 3 40 0.18 minutes per bull, and the production pro exss evolved from a flexible job-shop configuration, in-volving more than 11 separate operations and a heavy re- ance on the skills of manual labor, to 2 sing attended by a few workers Product and process evolved in a similar fashion in the automobile industry. During a four-year period before Henry Ford produced the renowned Model T, his com pany developed, produced, and sold five different en sanging from two to six eylinders. These were made in a factory that was flesibly organized much as a job shop, relying on trade eraftsmen working with general-purpose machine tools not nearly so advanced as the best then available, Each engine tested 2 new concept. Out of this experience came a dominant design — the Model T; and within 15 years 2 million engines of this single basic de ‘were being produced each year {about 15 million all told) in a facility then recognized as the most efficient and Ioghly-integratedin the world, During that 15-year period there were incremental — but no fundamental — innova tions in the Ford product. In yet another case, Robert Buzzell and Robert Nourse, tracing innovations in processed foods, show that new products such as soluble coffees, frozen vegetables, dry pet foods, cold breakfast cereals, canned foods, and pre- sooked rice came fist from individuals and small organi- zations where research was in progress ot which relied heavily upon information from users. As cach product won acceptance, its productive unit increased in size and concentrated its innovation on improving manufacturing, marketing, and distribution methods which extended rather than replaced the basic technologies. The major source of the latter ideas is now each firm’s own research and development organization The shift from radical to evolutionary product innova: sion is a common thread in these examples, Itis related to the development of a dominant product design, and itis accompanied by heightened price competition and in- creased emphasis an process innovation, Small-scale uniss that are flexible and highly reliant on manual labor and craft skills utilizing general-purpose equipment develop into units that rely on automated, equipment-intensive, high-volume processes. We conclude that changes in in novative pattern, production process, and scale and kind of production capacity all occur together in a consistent, sedictable way. ‘Though many observers emphasize new-product inno- vation, process and incremental innovations may have ‘equal or even greater commercial importance. & high rate of productivity improvement is associated with process improvement in every case we have studied. The cost of incandescent light bulbs, for example, has fallen more than 80 per cent since their introduction. Airline operat- ing costs were cut by half through the development and improvement of the DC-3. Semiconductor prices have been falling by 20 to 30 per cont with each doubling of cumulative production, The introduction of the Model T Ford resulted in a price reduction from $3,000 to less than $1,000 (in 1958 dollars), Similar dramatic redus tions have been achieved in the costs of computer core memory and television picture tubes. Managing Technological Innovation Ifit is true thar the nature and goals of an industeial unit's innovations change as that unit matures from pioneering to large-scale producer, what docs this imply for management of technology? We believe that some significant managerial concepts ‘emerge from our analysis — or model, if you will — of the characteristics of innovation as production processes and primary competitive issues differ. As a unit moves toward large-scale production, the goals of its innova- tions change from ill-defined and uncertain targets to well-articulated design objectives. In the early stages there is a proliferation of product performance requirementsand design criteria which frequently cannot be stated quantitatively, and their relative importance or ranking may be quite unstable. Ir is precisely under such condi- tions, where performance cequirements arc ambiguous, that users are most likely to produce an innovation and. whee manufacturers are least likely to do so, One way of viewing regulatory constraints such as those governing, auto emissions or Safety is that they add new performance dimensions to be resolved by the engineer — and so may lead to more innovative design improvements. They aze also likely to open market opportunities for innovative change of the kind characteristic of fluid enterprises in areas such as instrumentation, components, process equipment, and 30 on. “The stimulus for inaovation changes as a-unit matures. In the initial thuid stage, market needs ace ilkdefined and can be stated only with broad uncertainty; and the rcle- vane technologies are as yet little explored. So there are ‘ovo sources of ambiguity about the relevance of any par ticular program of research and development — target uncertainty and technical uncertainty. Confronted with both types of uncertainty, the decision-maker has litle incentive for major investments in formal research and development ds the enterprise develops, however, uncertainty about markets and appropriate targets is reduced, and larger re- search and development investments are justified. At some point before the increasing specialization of the unit makes the cost of implementing technological innova- tions prohibitively high and before increasing cost com- petition erodes profits with which to fund large indirect expenses, the benefits of research and development efforts would reach a maximum, Technological opportunities for improvements and additions to existing product lines will then be clear, and a strong commitment to research and development will he characteristic of productive units in the middle stages of development. Such firms will be seen as “science based” because they invest heavily in formal research and engineering departments, with em phasis on process innovarion and product differentiation through funcional improvements ‘Although data on research and development expendi tures aze nor readily available on the basis of productive units, divisions, o lines of business, an informal review of the activities of corporations with large investments in re- search and development shows that they tend to support business lines thae fall neither near the uid nor the spe cific conditions but are in the technologically-active mid- dle range. Such productive units tend to be large, to be inceprated, and to have a large share of their mazkets. A sinall, fluid entrepreneurial unie requires genecal- purpose process equipment which is typically purchased. AAs it develops, such a unit is expected to originate some process-equipment innovations for its own use; and when itis fully matured its entire processes are likely to be de- signed as integrated systems specific to particular prod ucts. Since the mature firm is now fully spectalized, at is ‘major process innovations are likely eo originate outside the unit, Bue note that the supplier companies will now see themselves as making product — not process — innova tions. From a different perspective, George Stigler finds stages of development — similar to those we describe — in firms that supply produstion-provess equipment. They differ in the markee structure they face, in the specializa- tion of their production processes, and in the respor- sibilities they must accept in innovating to satisfy their own needs for process technology and materials, ‘The organization's methods of coordination and con trol change with the increasing standardization of its products and production processes. As task uncertainty confronts a productive unit early in its development, the unit must emphasize its capacity to process informationwz = by investing in vertical and lateral information systems and in liaison and project groups. Later, these may be ex- tended to the creation of formal planning groups, organi- ational manifestations of movement from a. product oriented to a transitional states controls for regulating, process functions and management controls such as job procedures, job descriptions, and systems analyses are aio extended ro become a more pervasive fearure of the production network As a productive unit achieves standardized products and confronts only incremental change, one would expect ie to deal with complevity by reducing the need for infor: mation processing. The level at which technological change cakes place helps to determine the extent to which organizational dislocations take place. Each of these hypotheses helps to explain the firm's impetus to divide into homogencous productive units as its products and process technology evolve ‘The hypothesized changes in control and coordination imply that the structure of the organization will also change as it matures, becoming more formal and having a greater number of levels of authority. The evidence is Design as a Milestone of Change “The milestone in all the examples of transition in the ac ccoimpanying article is 4 dominant new product sya- thesized from individual technological ianovations intro duced independendy in prior products. This dominant design has the effect of enforcing standacdization so that proditction evonomies cin he sought, Then effective com Petition begins co tke place on the hasis af cost as well as ‘of product pecformance. Sumiar produc design milestones con be idesied fn cother product lines: sealed refrigeration units for hote re- fiigerstars and freezers, effective canrsealing technology in the food canning industry and the standardized diesel locgmusivg fn ke Tacoma an aoa indy. In each case the milestone signals a significant transform. tiv, affecting the type of inno ation which flows iy the source of information, and the size, scope, and use of formal research and development. Tn an cnrlier article in this sories, George R. White (see his “Management Criteria for Effective Lnnovation,” Feb- suary, pp. 14-23) contends that dominant designs can be recognized in the eatly stages of their development. His Snalysis saggests that dominant designs will more key play one oF more of the following qualities “Technologies which lif firdamental teshnical con Strains limiting the prior art while nor imposing stringent 1D Designs which enhance the value of potenti tions in other elements of a product or process. 1D Produces which asaare expansion into new markers. — WA, FALE. ‘{ strong that such structural change is a characteristic of many enterprises and of units within chem. Fostering Innovation by Understanding Transition Assuming the validity of this model for che development of the innovative capacities of a productive unit, how can it be applied to further our capacity for new products and 10 improve our proxtuctivity We predict that units in different stages of evolution will respond to differing stimuli and undertake different types of innovation. This idea can realy be extended t0 the question of harriers 10 innovation; and probably to patterns of success and failure in innovation for units in different situations. The unmet conditions for transition can be viewed as specific barriers which must be over come if transition isto take place We would expect nev, fluid units to view as barriers any factors that impede product standardization and market aggregation, while firms in the opposite category tend to rank uncertainty over government regulation oF vulnerability of existing investments as more important disruptive factors. Those who would promote innovation and productivity in US. industry may find this suggestive. See “Why Innovations Fail,” by Summer Myers std Eldon Sweezy, March April, pp. 40-46.) We believe the most useful insights provided by the model apply to production processes in which features of the products can be varied. The most interesting applica sions are to situations where product innovation is com potitively important and difficale to manage; the model helps to identify the full range of other issues with which the firm is simultaneously confronted in a period of growth and change. Consistency of Management Action Many examples of unsuccessful innovations point 10 @ common explanation of failure: certain conditions neces- sary to support a sought-after technical advance were not present. In such cases our model may be helpful because it describes conditions thar normally support advances at ‘each stage of developments accordingly, if we can com pare existing conditions with those prescribed by the model we may discover how to inevease innovative st cess. For example, we may ask of the model sul questions as these about different, apparently indepen dont, managerial actions. 1 Can a firm increase the variery and diversity of its product line while simuitaneously realizing the highest possible level af efficiency? Gi Isa high rate of product innovation consistent with an cffort to substantially reduce costs through extensive backward integration?eS 1 Is government policy to maintain diversified markets for technologically active industries consistent with a pol- icy thar seeks a high rate of effective product innovation? CT Would a firm's action to restructure its work en ronment for employees so that tasks are more challenging and less repetitive be compatible with a policy af mech- anization designed to reduce the need for labor? Can the government stimulate productivity by forcing 2 young inéustry co standardize its products before a dominant design has been realized? “The model prompts an answer of “no” to each of these ‘questions; each question suggests actions which the model tells us are mutually inconsistent. We believe chat as these ideas are further developed they can be equally cffective in helping to answer many far more subtle {questions about the environment for innovation, produc tivity, and growth, Fanher Readings For readers who wish co explore this subjace ip greater detail the a thors recommen ‘Abernathy, WI, and PL, Townsend, “Teshrology, Prducisite and Process Changes” Technological Porecating wed Soceal Change. Vol Nav duging, 1979, pa 9396 ‘Shersathy, W. J. 26d R, Wass Harcad Busines Reese. Vol. 32 pp in3-115, Linerbick, Jamies My, “Innoeaton in Industry and the Difax of ‘Tecnology Sconce, Vol, 183, Febeuary, 1974, pp. 620-626 Tinerback, James ML and WJ. Abernaehy, “A Dynamic Model of Process and Pradust lnnovation,” Omega, Vol. 3, No. 6, 8 3.886 Limits of che Leatning Cars Nos 8, Seprember-Ocroeer | For the soucac ofthe examples cel and some others se Abernachy, Wiliam Jo Tse Praductinty Drowns, Readok t ino baton tm the Auton Industry Baltenete:Jokas Hoplans Uaiver- sity Tres, 178 righ, James R. Antonine and Management: Boston: Disision of Reward, Craduate School of Business Adounateation, Faetard Us erin, 1958, Buraell Robvet D. and Robert. Nourse, Product Innetasion ot Boral Provessine. 19841964, Boston: Disiton of Ressanch, Harsard Graduate School of fusiies Admiastaanon, 96 Clarke. R “Tensacin im Laud Propeliad Rocket Ergin.” doctoral dissertation, Semfird Gradaate School of Business, 1998 Foon, fo Patou Progess and rifts; Camsbadges MILT, Pres we Fhounn, W.T.,Ecomnie History of de tro and Stet Ite nthe United State, Vol 3 Lexingron. Miss: D.C, Heath Boks, 1971, p Wott Hollander, $. The Sones of Inereased Efcencs: Cambridge MALT, Pres, 145 Senin Reese Wages od Enterprise: Technol and the Aner: car Photographic industry, 1839 to 1925; Bakumores Johes Hopkins Uniserity Press, ‘Knight, Kenneth E.. "A Stody of Technological Innoration: The Evohtion of Digial Computes,” doctoral dissertation, Care Inst tute of Technology, Ptsbarghy 1353, {ities Author D ln ,Paterts and Problems of Technica bosstion in Arneioan Indistrys Report to the Nattmal Seton Foweation, PD 181553. US. Deparment of Commerce, Otice of Technival Semises se & Weshingion, D.C. U.S. Governmene Printing Oi Seprember, 1963. Miller, Ry and D. Saver, The Techni Developers of Mosere Acsation! Peangee Pusher. New York, 1970, Schlaifer, Rs O, and S. D. Herga, Detulopment of Aivnafe Engiees and Pach; Care: Fareard University Pres, 1980. Scgler, Gr Jw The Orgumsation 2) Dubie. Homeood, Una Richard D. lovin, 968, “Titon, john Es International Diffion of Technnlagy: Th Senictductors, Washiogeon, Do Brookings Inston, 1971 case of Before coming to Harvard, where he is ru Professor of Busines Ad rministatinn snl coorenatar af the Harv aed Busnes: School mew de tarsi pmgeam on the rrmigentent of exhnologs. Williast). Abetwathy {aught at the Liusesity of Cabforna (Lon Anaeies} aod Stantard. Fol wing trlergesdaate mark in phoscs at the Univerty of Tennessee IRS. 1955), he seorked au 9 system engineer foe General Dynes Elecranics unt 1963, when he entered graduate seady at Harvard IMLBA. 1964, Ph.D. 195°), James ML. Ceerback pine che Center or Polis terete in Js, 1974 shor he deat research on the pro ef choos! change onion thefts which lose change Prachidinghosn corporate stastgy and guvernment poe, Ae 250 seaches inthe Showy Sef Mansgsmont nd the Shon Engine tig. Dr. Uterbasks does ae im indoor sagineceng rom North trSuwtn Unser (Bs MES) and sn management lr MELT (PD. Teh) chs ought inthe ld of opararine managements Horvaed Aer Schull indunn Caen i research cepted thea wa supports he the Nation Salone Fourdaten Distion wf Poi. Resar ond Aral When Transition is Invisible — or Even Absent Lentfyng the evoltionacy transition from product to proces ishovation is soinetimes trogblesome. In some Eases the transition may have oscrted 30 rpily sto be recognized thie appears to be the cise wih sore Contiavousow process where advanced, elaborate, nd lage scale equipment ie essary to make 2 new produg virally fom iis inital ieroduction. Rapid Transition baba charters of certin produets wih low unit valucs, such as cigarttes and simple plastic and mmetl pars, where the avalabsiof 3 proces technology tnay have nade the product feasible in the ist pate. ‘More intrescing cscs are those where the wanstion fom pric o onion an om ot Bo action ro mass production, though predieed, has Doe Come abour Examples ince home eanstuction, Clear power, and some othr energy sleematves. In each of these examples, experimental programs to sémulate ost reductions, greater stangandiation, or other aspects ftransiion ave een undertaken undet government and Davate sponsorship, bot rone has hod long-run impact "These cases are of special interest becuse the model may felp in Kdnuiying barre and pinpointing appropiate A, IMD.