8.

Ty vs CA
GR No. 127406, November 27, 2000

FACTS:

Private respondent, Edgardo Reyes, was married with Anna Villanueva in a civil ceremony in March
1977 in Manila and subsequently had a church wedding in August 1977.  Both weddings were
declared null and void ab initio for lack of marriage license and consent of the parties.  Even before
the decree nullifying the marriage was issued, Reyes wed Ofelia Ty herein petitioner on April 1979
and had their church wedding in Makati on April 1982.  The decree was only issued in August 1980. 
In January 1991, Reyes filed with RTC a complaint to have his marriage with petitioner be declared
null and void.  AC ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage with Anna must
first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted.  However, SC found that
the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case for doing so
would prejudice the vested rights of the petitioner and of her children.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to Ofelia Ty.

HELD:

SC is in the opinion of the lower courts that no damages should be awarded to the wife who sought
damages against the husband for filing a baseless complaint causing her mental anguish, anxiety,
besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents.   Aside from the fact,
that petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.  She is likewise
suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife.  To grant her petition for damages would result to a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds.  To do so,
would make the application of the law absurd.  Moreover, Philippine laws do not comprehend an
action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.
Hence, the petition was granted.  Marriage between Ty and Reyes is declared valid and subsisting
and the award of the amount of P15,000 is ratified and maintained as monthly support to their 2
children for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

9. VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The parties were divorced in
Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then re-married also in Nevada, this time to
Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay, stating that Alice’s
business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
Alice be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada
Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had “no
community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the MTD in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is
now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD: Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint…
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the
property relations between Alice and Richard, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained
jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during
the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations.

As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law

firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer,
appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and
public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the

Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent
from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

Torts And Damages Case Digest: Gashem

Shookat Baksh V. CA, Et Al (1993)
G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
Laws Applicable:  Art. 21, Art. 23 and Art. 2176 of the Civil Code
Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
 Gashem Shookat Baksh (Gashem), a medical student in Lyceum Northwestern
Dagupan City, courted and proposed to marry 22 years old, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community
 she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married after
the end of the school semester (October that year)
 Gashem visited her parents in Pangasinan for approval for marriage
 August 20 1987: Gashem forced her to live with him when she was still a virgin
then he started to maltreat and threatened to kill her resulting into injuries
 would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, and he even
gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
and night until the following day
 she became pregnant, but Gashem gave her some medicine to abort the
fetus
 Gashem continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him
of his promise to marry her  until he asked her not to live with him anymore as he is
already married to someone living in Bacolod City
 he lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff
 resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal 
 Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, already looked for sponsors for the wedding,
started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even
already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding.
 prayed for judgment ordering Gashem to pay her damages 
 Gashem: never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport
 RTC: favored private respondent and against Gashem
 gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony because, inter alia,
she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her
honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false
 CA: affirmed RTC
 Gashem's acts are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good
customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying
the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in
one of our institutions of learning
 Gashem criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not
conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem,
he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had
made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the
basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral
 character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as
their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As
to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even
if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement
 promised to marry her would not be actionable since mere breach of promise is
not actionable
ISSUE: W/N damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis
of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

HELD: YES.  Petition is denied.

 existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry  per se  is not an actionable
wrong
 Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of
age
 Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
 Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict  thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

 Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law

concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts  is much
broader than culpa aquiliana  because it includes not only negligence, but
international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. 
 intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the
Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article
2176 of the Civil Code
 Article 21 fills that vacuum and has greatly broadened the scope of the
law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts
 acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
 congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21
 It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
 In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode
for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all,
she left him. She is not, therefore, in  pari delicto  with the petitioner. Pari
delicto  means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." 
 let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents
in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after
giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the
honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and
dignity.

11. Ninal v. Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778, 14 March 2000

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children
namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the
latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of EngraceNinal. 1 year and
8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted
an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said
marriage was void for lack of marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the
validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.Norma filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for “annulment of marriage” under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?

2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?

RULING:
1. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. The two marriages
involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of
their celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio. However, there are several
instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with, one of which is
that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at
least five years before the marriage.

In this case, they cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time
of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has
already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.

2. No. Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to
establish the nullity of a marriage. “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the
parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be
absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all
concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the
decree of a court of competent jurisdiction. Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties is as though no marriage
had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of
either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage
void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts.” It is not like a voidable marriage
which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio.
But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the
nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heir
ship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.
This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.

12. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380           October 5, 2005
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They were
blessed with a with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido.
Lady Myros left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer in 1986.
After few years, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.

Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree sometime in
2000 and then married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in California.

He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit
in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari on the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

Held:
Yes. The Court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family
Code be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse
who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

The article should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on,one of them became
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtained a divorce decree.

The instant case was one where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties
were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and
indeed, she remarried an American citizen while residing in the US. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at
the time of the solemnization of the marriage.

However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact his wife’s naturalization, he
was still barred from remarrying.

13.