Plaza II vs Cassion

FACTS
The City of Butuan, through its Sanggunian, passed SP Resolution 427-92 authorizing the City Mayor to
sign the “Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan”. Pursuant
to the MoA, Mayor Plaza issued EO No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office
(CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 additional DSWD employees headed by Virginia Tuazon as
Officer-in-charge. Its office was transferred from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building.
Aggrieved by the development, Respondents refused to recognize Tuazon as their new head & to report
at the DSWD building contending that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 & Tuazon’s designation as the
CSSDO’s Officer-in-charge are illegal. Respondents failed to report for work despite Mayor Plaza’s series
of orders directing them to do so. Thereafter, they were administratively charged for grave misconduct
& insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60 days.

Upon expiration of their suspension, the respondents informed the Mayor that they are willing to return
to work but only to their old office, not the DSWD building. They also failed to report to Tuazon at the
DSWD building despite the Mayor’s instructions to do so.

Mayor Plaza then dropped the respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular
No. 38, Series of 1993 which provides that “officers & employees who are absent for at least 30 days
without approved leave…may be dropped from the service without prior notice.”

ISSUE
1. Whether EO No. 06-92 directing the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the city DSWD to
be headed by petitioner Tuazon should be upheld as valid.
2. Whether private respondents were denied due process when they were dropped from the rolls.

HELD
1. Sec.17 of the LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets & liabilities, records basic services,
and facilities of a national government agency to LGUs. Under this Code, the term “devolution” refers
to the act by which the government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform
specific functions & responsibilities.

Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the
LGC. As the local chief executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved
personnel & may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a
regular head.

EO No. 06-92 did not violate respondents’ security of tenure as they were not transferred to another
office without their consent. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of
equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service & may be imposed as an administrative
penalty. The change of respondents’ place of work from the CSSDO to the DSWD building is not a
transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service.

2. Dropping from the rolls is not an administrative sanction. Thus, private respondents need not be
notified or heard. Their assertion that they were denied due process is, therefore, untenable.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS YU JULY 31, 2012

Doctrine: Personnel of national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which they belong
or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable determined by the
oversight committee: Provided, that the rights accorded to such personnel pursuant to civil service law,
rules and regulations shall not be impaired:

Facts:
A devolution program was implemented by the national government pursuant to R.A. No. 7160
devolving to the local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and
facilities.
Prior to the devolution, the position of Provincial Health Officer II of the DOH Regional Office
No. IX in Zamboanga City was held by Dr. Fortunato Castillo as well as being the head of the
Basilan Health Hospital and Public Health Services. Dr. Agnes Ouida Yu, on the other hand is PHO
I.
After the devolution, the Governor of Basilan, Governor Gerry Salapuddin, refused to accept Dr.
Castillo as the incumbent PHO II, so she was retained by DOH until her retirement in 1996. In
1994, Dr. Yu was appointed by the Governor as PHO II.
In 1998, by virtue of R.A. No. 8543, the Basilan Provincial Hospital was converted to a tertiary
hospital, and the hospital positions previously devolved to the LGU of Basilan were re-
nationalized and reverted to the DOH. The position of PHO II was reclassified to Chief of Hospital
II.
While Dr. Yu is among the reverted personnel, she was made to retain her original item of PHO II
and the Secretary of DOH appointed Dr. Domingo Dayrit to the position of CHO II. Dr. Yu filed a
letter of protest before the Civil Service Commission.
The Civil Service Commission issued a resolution granting the protest, revoking the appointment
of Dr. Dayrit and directing the DOH Secretary to appoint Dr. Yu. On motion for reconsideration,
however, the CSC reversed its resolution, contending that PHO was never devolved as it was
retained by the DOH, that the PHO II position of Dr. Yu was newly-created and therefore she did
not have a vested right to the CHO II position. The motion for reconsideration being dismissed,
she filed a petition of review to the CA to which the CA reversed and set aside the resolution of
CSC.
The CSC now files this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not acceptance of personnel devolved form the agencies is mandatory.
Whether or not there was abandonment of office when Dr. Castillo failed to assert her rights.

Held:
Yes. Devolution is an act by which the national government confers power and authority upon
the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Section
17(i) of the Local Government Code prescribes the manner of devolution, as follows:
o (i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to LGUs of the
records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of the national agencies and offices
corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.
Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the LGUs to which they
belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent that it is administratively viable as
determined by the said oversight committee: Provided, that the rights accorded to such
personnel pursuant to civil service law, rules and regulations shall not be impaired: Provided
further, that the regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers
of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the LGU shall be retained
by the National Government, without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure.
E.O. No. 503 is the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the said section. Section 2 thereof
states:
o Section 2. Principles and Policies Governing Transfer of Personnel.
o a. Coverage, Tenure, Compensation and Career Development. – xxx
o 2. The absorption of the National Government Agency Personnel by the LGU shall be
mandatory, in which case, the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected
personnel except when it is not administratively viable.
o 3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions
unless the LGU opts to absorb the personnel concerned.
o 4. The national personnel who are not absorbed by the LGUs under no. 3 above, shall be
retained by the NGA concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.Xxx
o 12. Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be
automatically reappointed by the LCE concerned immediately upon their transfer which
shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.
Hence, as stated in E.O. 503, the absorption of Dr. Castillo by the LGU is mandatory. The
Governor’s refusal, without showing that it is not administratively viable, is invalid and
whimsical.
No. Abandonment of office is the voluntary relinquishment of an office by the holder with the
intention of terminating his possession and control thereof. In order to constitute abandonment
of office, it must be total and under such circumstance as clearly to indicate absolute
relinquishment. There must be a complete abandonment of duties of such continuance that the
law will infer a relinquishment. Abandonment of duties is a voluntary act; it springs form and is
accompanied by deliberation and freedom of choice. The two essential elements of
abandonment are: (1) an intention to abandon; (2) an overt or external act by which the
intention is carried into effect (Canonizado vs Aguirre).
In the case at bar, there is no voluntary abandonment because of the refusal of the governor to
accept the devolved NGA personnel. The fact that Dr. Castillo did not question the refusal which
is seemingly a lackadaisical attitude towards protecting her rights is not tantamount to
abandonment. This is because, according to the Supreme Court, “the risk of incurring the ire of a
powerful politician effectively tied her hands and “it has become quite understandable that she
could not don her gloves and fight even if she wants to.”
In the concurring opinion of Justice Leonardo-De Castro, it was however contended that there
was an abandonment since there was an acquiescence of the officer in her wrongful removal or
discharge, coupled with her acceptance of he re-absorption by the DOH.
Badua vs. Cordillera Bodong Administration

Facts: Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own farm land from which they were forcibly ejected
through the decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, with the case entitled David Quema v.
Leonor Badua. The background of this case reveals that David Quema owns the parcels of land
evidenced by Tax Declarations 4997 and 4998. The parcels of land were purchased from Dr. Erotida
Valera. Twenty-two (22) years later, he was able to redeem the parcels of land through payment of
10,000 to the vendor's heir, Jessie Macaraeg. Quema was prevented from tilling the land by Rosa Badua.
Prompted by such turn of events, David Quema filed a case in the Baranggay Council but failed to have
the dispute settled. A judge advised Quema to file his case in the provincial courts. However, Quema did
not, and filed it in the tribal court of the Maeng Tribe. Due to several warnings from the tribe, spouses
Badua filed a petition for special relief, with the following to be settled: a. That the respondents be
enjoined from enforcing the decision of the tribal court in the pending case. b. The respondents be
prohibited from usurping judicial power. c. That the legal personality of the Cordillera Bodong
Administration be clarified. The Baduas also allege that they were denied due process (or hearing) and
that the tribal court has NO jurisdiction over the case, since neither they nor the respondent are
members of the Maeng tribe. The respondents contend that the SC has no jurisdiction over the case
since the tribal court is NOT a part of the judicial system.

Issue: Whether the tribal court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held: No. Tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of the Supreme
Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in
the barangays, they are advisory and conciliatory bodies whose principal objective is to bring together
the parties to a dispute and persuade them to make peace, settle, and compromise. An amicable
settlement, compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated,
has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be enforced only
through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon transmits the compromise
settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D.
1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D.
1508, may be enforced or set aside, in and through the regular courts today.
JAMAR KULAYAN v . GOV. ABDUSAKUR TAN, in his capacity as Governor of Sulu,

The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba,
were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized
by three armed men who were later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local
Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to
investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent
Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series
of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the kidnapping
incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human
Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160),
which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-
made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement
agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and
the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and
seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.

Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus
null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President
sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the
Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President

HELD:
It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the
President of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of
the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section 7, Article VII
thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nation’s
supreme military leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is
that a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The
Constitution does not require that the President must be possessed of military training and talents, but
as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the armed forces to
military experts; but the ultimate power is his.

Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his
own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he
declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the
President. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may
not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION vs.

SPOUSES ROGELIO LAZO and DOLORES LAZO,

DOCTRINE: The projects and programs mentioned in the provision of the law should be interpreted to
mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit,
those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of
non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may
eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs
that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be
implemented. Preliminarily, it appears that the present case does not fall under any of these instances;
ergo, there is neither a need for prior consultations of concerned sectors nor prior approval of the
Sanggunian.

FACTS
Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo are the owners and developers of Monte Vista
Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision located in Barangay Paing, Municipality of Bantay, Ilocos
Sur. Sometime in 2006, they voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of
Monte Vista for the construction of an open irrigation canal that is part of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation
Project (BPIP). The consideration of the negotiated sale was in a total amount of P27,180,000.00 at the
rate of P2,500.00 per square meter. Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr. Donno G.
Custodio, retired Chief Geologist of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, to conduct a geohazard study on the possible effects of the BPIP on Monte Vista.
Engr. Custodio later came up with a Geohazard Assessment Report (GAR), finding that ground shaking
and channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that could affect the NIA irrigation canal traversing
Monte Vista.
On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved Resolution No. 34, which
adopted the recommendations contained in the GAR. Among others, it resolved that the GAR
recommendations should be observed and implemented by the concerned implementing agency of the
NIA BPIP.

-Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought to NIA’s attention Resolution No. 34.

-He specifically asked for the implementation of the GAR recommendations and the payment of just
compensation for the entire buffer zone.
-When respondents’ demands were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint for just
compensation with damages against NIA.
-The trial court found that petitioner violated R.A. No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991.

The petitioner, by reason of its failure to abide by the required consultation, had effectively deprecated
the function, authority and power of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bantay.
Consequently, without the prior approbation of the Sanggunian the irrigation project cannot be
absolutely declared as representative of the consent of the local government. Hence, it must be
enjoined until compliance by petitioner on consultative requirement or clear and convincing proof of
incorporation of the Sanggunian Resolution in the project design of the irrigation project has been
adduced.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioners violated R.A. No. 7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991.

RULING
No, the petitioners did not violate R.A. No. 7160 of the Local Government Code, Section 2(c) of the Local
Government Code declares the policy of the State “to require all national agencies and offices to
conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and
people’s organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions.”

This provision applies to national government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance
of the particular community implementing the project. Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code requires prior consultations with the concerned sectors and the prior approval of the
Sanggunian. It was said that the Congress introduced these provisions to emphasize the legislative
concern “for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment.
Binay vs Domingo Case Digest
Equal Protection Clause, General Welfare Clause, Police Power, Powers of Municipal Corporations

Facts:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which extends P500
burial assistance to bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed P2,000.00 a month.
The funds are to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the municipal treasury. The
Metro Manila Commission approved the resolution. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000.00 for the implementation of the program. However, the Commission on
Audit disapproved said resolution and the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof for the
following reasons: (1) the resolution has no connection to alleged public safety, general welfare, safety,
etc. of the inhabitants of Makati; (2) government funds must be disbursed for public purposes only; and,
(3) it violates the equal protection clause since it will only benefit a few individuals.

Issues:
1. Whether Resolution No. 60 is a valid exercise of the police power under the general welfare clause
2. Whether the questioned resolution is for a public purpose
3. Whether the resolution violates the equal protection clause

Held:
1. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born
with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas and
"Salus populi est suprema lex. Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people. Use your property as not to impair other

Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation
may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the
repository of the inherent powers of the State.

Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause. Pursuant thereto they are
clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and
proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve
public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and insure the protection of property therein.

2. Police power is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to
underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in
a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a
wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting
public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort
of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.

Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services, the promotion of
the general welfare, social justice as well as human dignity and respect for human rights." The care for
the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted
exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

3. There is no violation of the equal protection clause. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different
groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to
the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of
the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a
relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and
it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the
very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in
law." This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or
otherwise. (Binay vs Domingo, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991)
De la Cruz vs Paras

Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84,
Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the
said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out
their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with
customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing
declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING
MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to
promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful
trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing
hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly
the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with
the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or
policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue
could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and
desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the
ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO

FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June
1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of
Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled–

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN

FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).

On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all
kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.

HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the
City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC,
known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution

The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and
repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the
people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the
law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.

Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met

To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for
the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must
exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for
even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.

The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral
values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are
within the scope of the City Council’s police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment
thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the community’s social ills can be
achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions
rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses “allowed” under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of
its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect
and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded
social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that
reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a
mere likelihood or a naked assumption.

If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can
instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation
of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their
licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are
other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.

It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes,
the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a person’s
fundamental right to liberty and property.

Modality employed is unlawful taking

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.

There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A “possessory” taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A “regulatory” taking occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if
it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the “prohibited” establishments three (3) months
from its approval within which to “wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the
Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area.” The
directive to “wind up business operations” amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to
accommodate an “allowed” business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left
empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable
use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert
into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of
subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a “taking” of private
property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance,
although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a “wholesome” property to a use which can not
reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed
without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The
police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation
cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.

Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon
no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city
authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The
Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly,
the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments “tend to disturb the
community,” “annoy the inhabitants,” and “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community.”

The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide
the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.

Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the
due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on
their business.

B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause

In the Court’s view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels,
lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments
providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting
motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a
just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.

The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the
Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less
noxious if located outside the area.
The standard “where women are used as tools for entertainment” is also discriminatory as
prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive to women.
Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is
invalid.

C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires

The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to
regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to
suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance
per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily
abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of
property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens
it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting
its summary abatement without judicial intervention.

Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499.
As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into
a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an
ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council
to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal
privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and
unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the
enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to
enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

Petition Denied.
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATIONvs CITY OF MANILA

Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled
“An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City
of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a
day.

The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila,
filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the
ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the
ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.

RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of the individual
guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the
right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the
Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels,
motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides
and transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the
power to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances.

Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy
and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held
that the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time stays. Second, the
virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a
lawful method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities.
There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect
on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.

Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is
unconstitutional.

The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967
decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity
of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view
of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This
could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case
about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens

The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform
to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2)
must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.

The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate
admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in
the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.

Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect
itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments
for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and
certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.

SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as
to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law
that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they
also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons
– those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question. The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty.
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist
and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere
freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man
to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as
are necessary for the common welfare,

Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be
justified by a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.

An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.

Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be
diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of
prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation.
So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate
merchants. Further, it is apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the
whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of
the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.

SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be
required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that
must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned the
ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the
establishments as well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day
with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.

Parayno vs Jovellanos

Subject: Public Corporation

Doctrine: Police power

Facts:
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of
Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the
station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police,
Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the
Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner’s
gasoline station. In Resolution No. 50, it declared that the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation
and disregard of existing law.
According to the Resolution, 1) the gasoline filling station is in violation of The Official Zoning Code of
Calasiao, Art. 6, Section 44, the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary School and
church, the distances are less than 100 meters. (No neighbors were called as witnesses when actual
measurements were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989); 2) it remains in thickly
populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each other which still
endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire; 3) residents of our barangay always complain
of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which tend to expose
residents to illness, and 4) It hampers the flow of traffic.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the resolution but was denied by the SB. Hence she filed a
case before the RTC claiming that the gasoline filling station was not covered under Sec 44 of the
mentioned law but is under Sec 21. Case was denied by the court and by the CA. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by respondent municipality was
an invalid exercise of the latter’s police powers

HELD:
The respondent is barred from denying their previous claim that the gasoline filling station is not under
Sec 44. The Counsel in fact admitted that : “That the business of the petitioner *was+ one of a gasoline
filling station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code and not as a service station as
differently defined under Article 42 of the said official zoning code;”
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the municipality, the party making
them. hence, because of the distinct and definite meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning
ordinance, respondents could not insist that “gasoline service station” under Section 44 necessarily
included “gasoline filling station” under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a “gas service
station” did not automatically embrace those in a “gas filling station.”

As for the main issue, the court held that the respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in
ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner’s gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to
take actions and enact measures to promote the health and general welfare of its constituents, it should
have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.

A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement
refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50.
While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the
nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the
distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual
violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an
investigation never conducted such measurement either.

Moreover, petitioner’s business could not be considered a nuisance which respondent municipality
could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without
judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one
affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence, it cannot be closed down or transferred
summarily to another location.

On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and properties of the people of
Calasiao, we again note: “Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being hazardous to life
and property is more perceived than factual. For, after all, even the Fire Station Commander..
recommended “to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the requirements of PP 1185.” It is further
alleged by the complainants that the proposed location is “in the heart of the thickly populated
residential area of Calasiao.” Again, findings of the *HLURB+ staff negate the allegations as the same is
within a designated Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning Ordinance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the Court of the Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist
from enforcing Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer her
gasoline station to another location.

Fernando vs St. Scholastica’s College

GR 1611107, 12 March 2013

Facts: Respondent SSC’s property is enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence. Marikina City enacted
an ordinance which provides that walls and fences shall not be built within a five-meter allowance
between the front monument line and the building line of an establishment.
The City Government of Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to demolish, replace,
and move back the fence. As a response, the respondents filed a petition for prohibition with an
application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order before the Regional Trial
Court of Marikina. The RTC granted the petition and the CA affirmed. Hence, this certiorari.

Issue: Is Marikina Ordinance No. 192, imposing a five-meter setback, a valid exercise of police power?

Ruling: No. “Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances
to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
people.” Two tests have been used by the Court – the rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny
test:

Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites:
(1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The real intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking space free for use by the
public and not for the exclusive use of respondents. This would be tantamount to a taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment
of unlawful acts and “un-neighborliness” due to the walls and fences, the parking area is not reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of these goals. The Court, thus, finds Section 5 of the Ordinance to be
unreasonable and oppressive. Hence, the exercise of police power is not valid.
ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance

City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has
not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the
smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant
made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said
factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing
for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the
supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as
nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special circumstances
and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private individuals however the
latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law
or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal
charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or
motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such
by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution is
obviously not enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.
THE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION OF EL DEPOSITO, BARRIO CORAZON DE JESUS, SAN JUAN RIZAL VS
LOOD

FACTS: Petitioners filed motions for of a writ of preliminary injunction to stay the demolition and
removal of their houses and structures on a parcel of public land in barrios Corazon de Jesus and Halo
Halo in San Juan, Rizal, (more popularly known as "El Deposito" from the Spanish times), which was
denied by the repondent court. Petitioners' action below was one for declaratory relief to declare as null
and void as ex post facto legislation, municipal ordinance No. 89, as amended, of respondent
Municipality of San Juan, prohibiting squatting on public property and providing a penalty therefor,
under which ordinance, petitioners claimed, respondents were summarily demolishing and removing
their houses and improvements.

On April 20, 1970, upon issuance of summons requiring respondents to answer the petition, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order restraining respondents, until further orders, "from proceeding
with the summary destruction, removal and demolition of all other houses found in the premises of the
land in barrio Corazon de Jesus and barrio Halo Halo, San Juan, Rizal, by reason of Ordinance No. 89-
Amd. as amended, passed by the Municipal Council of San Juan, Rizal, on April 26, 1968 ... ."
Respondents filed their answer in due course and the case was thereafter submitted for decision with
the filing by the parties of their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument. Hence this action for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether respondent judge "exceeded his authority and jurisdiction and gravely abused his
discretion" in issuing the questioned orders of February 9, and March 30, 1970, denying the preliminary
injunction sought to stay demolition and removal of petitioners' houses and structures.

SUPREME COURT’S DECISION: On the main issue at bar, the Court is satisfied that by no means may
respondent court be said to have exceeded its authority or gravely abused its discretion in issuing its
questioned orders denying petitioners' motion below for a writ of preliminary injunction allegedly "to
maintain the status quo" and stay demolition and removal of their illegal constructions found to be
public nuisances per se and serious hazards to public health, by virtue of the following principal
considerations:

1. As found in respondent court's extended two-page order of February 9, 1970 and ten-page order of
March 30, 1970 denying reconsideration, petitioners' motions to maintain the alleged status quo were
based on the same grounds already reiterated before and denied by then Judge (now appellate
associate justice) Andres Reyes who was then presiding over respondent court in an order dated
September 19, 1968, which was upheld in a similar action for certiorari by the Court of Appeals in its
decision of February 4, 1969.

2. In both said proceedings before Judge Reyes and the Court of Appeals, petitioners succeeded in
obtaining restraining orders or preliminary writs of injunction to stay demolition, which were dissolved
upon said court's handing down their order or decision on the merits of the injunction petitions
submitted by petitioners. With petitioners definitely having lost their bid to reopen the cadastral
proceedings to pursue their alleged claims of ownership over the lands occupied by their constructions,
supra, no further reason or justification exists to continue the stay order against the removal and
demolition of their constructions.

3. As was well stated in then Judge Reyes' order of September 19, 1968, petitioners failed after several
hearings "to show that they have even a color of title to entitle them to exercise the right of possession
to the premises in question. On the other hand, the land is admittedly public land and consequently the
petitioners have no right to possession thereof....."

4. Petitioners' lack of right to the injunction sought by them was further shown in the Court of Appeals'
decision of February 4, 1969, where it noted that "their very evidence, their documentary proof, would
justify that their houses were built upon land of the Metropolitan Water District, that is to say, of the
Philippine Government, therefore, such tax declarations of petitioners' houses themselves are the best
proof of their admission that their possession of the lands they occupy was not and could not be
adverse" and that "their shanties pose a veritable danger to public health."

5. No error, much less abuse of authority or discretion, could be attributed to respondent court's
statements and reasons for denying the injunction sought by petitioners, as per its order of March 30,
1970, denying reconsideration, as follows: ... The issues raised by the pleadings to determine whether or
not the petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction, or a status quo, in the words of the
petitioners, had been resolved several times not only by this Court but also by the Court of Appeals, and
this Court believes that insofar as the same grounds are concerned, they are res judicata xxx xxx xxx
Lastly, the Court does not lose sight of the fact that the land in question is public land, in the sense that
it is untitled. However, as the government now contends, the land in question is clothed with a public
purpose to be utilized for public service by the government. This fact has not been denied and as a
matter of fact, the petitioners admit that the land in question is public land. ...

6. The question of validity or unconstitutionality of municipal ordinance No. 89- Amended need not be
resolved in this proceeding, as it should first properly be submitted for resolution of the lower court in
the action below. Suffice it to note that the Solicitor General appears to have correctly stated the actual
situation in that petitioners do not dispute the authority of the San Juan council to pass ordinances
providing for the summary abatement of public nuisances, and that the ordinance in question may not
be faulted for being ex post facto in application since it "does not seek to punish an action done which
was innocent before the passage of the same. Rather, it punishes the present and continuing act of
unlawful occupancy of public property or properties intended for public use." At any rate, the decisive
point is that independently of the said ordinance, petitioners' constructions which have been duly found
to be public nuisances per se (without provision for accumulation or disposal of waste matters and
constructed without building permits contiguously to and therefore liable to pollute one of the main
water pipelines which supplies potable water to the Greater Manila area) may be abated without
judicial proceedings under our Civil Code.
As stated in Sitchon vs. Aquino, the police power of the state justifies the abatement or destruction by
summary proceedings of public nuisances per se. No error, much less any abuse of discretion, grave or
otherwise, may therefore be attributed against respondent court in having issued its orders denying for
imperative reasons of public health and welfare the preliminary injunction sought again by petitioners
to allow them to continue occupying the land in question with their condemned constructions and
structures.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the petition. The temporary restraining order
heretofore issued on April 20, 1970 is hereby dissolved and such dissolution is declared immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC v. CA

G.R. No. 94759, Jan. 21, 1991, 201 SCRA

FACTS:
Technology Developers, a corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of charcoal briquette,
received a letter from acting mayor Pablo Cruz: 1) ordering the full cessation of its plant in Guyong, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan until further order, and 2) requesting its Plant Manager to bring before the office of
the mayor its building permit, mayor's permit, and Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit.

Technology Developers undertook to comply with the request to produce the required documents. It
sought to secure the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit
although prior to the operation of the plant, a Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation
was issued to it. Petitioners also sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure amayor’s
permit but were not entertained.

Eventually, the acting mayor ordered that the plant premises be padlocked, effectively causing the
stoppage of operation. This was done without previous and reasonable notice.

Technology Developers then instituted an action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction against the acting mayor with Bulacan RTC, alleging that the closure order was
issued in grave abuse of discretion.

The RTC found that the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was proper, ordering
the acting mayor to immediately revoke his closure order and allow Technology Developers to resume
its normal business operations until the case has been adjudicated on the merits.

Upon MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented evidence as to the allegation that "Due to the
manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming from the factory may
contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company
should cease operating until such a time that the proper air pollution device is installed and
operational."

Reassessing the evidence, the RTC set aside its order granted the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The CA denied Technology Developer's petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

ISSUE: W/N the acting mayor had a legal ground for ordering the stoppage of Technology Developer

HELD:
YES. The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction
sought by petitioner:

1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the matter of determining whether there is
a pollution of the environment that requires controlif not prohibition of the operation of a business is
essentially addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town has as much responsibility to protect
its inhabitants from pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the application for a
permit to operate a business or otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are taken
to controland/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of the community from theemissions in the
operation of the business.

2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant
whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the health of the residents in
the area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further orders.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the complaint of the residents of Barangay
Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through channels.

4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after an investigation was made by Marivic
Guina who in her report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has been installed.

5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead
presented a building permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.

6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to operate by the then National
Pollution Control Commission on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May 25, 1988.
Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or validate its permit much less to install any device
to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the residents of the community.

Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge investment in this dollar-earning industry.
It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to
the growth of the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very
lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
● The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse
of its discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary reliefmay recall or dissolve
the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

Petition denied.

ESTATE OF GREGORIA FRANCISCO v CA

Quick facts: Quonset used for copra storage demolished by virtue of Ordinance No. 147 which states
that structures that do not conform to the Zoning regulations should be relocated and failure to do so
would entail condemnation or removal at owner’s expense.

Nature: Petition to review the judgment of the CA.

Ponente: J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts:
A Quonset in Basilan – constructed in 1944 by the American Liberation Forces; purchased by
Gregoria Francisco (died in 1976) in 1946; stands on land owned by the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) – was ordered demolished by the Municipal Mayor, Valencia.
Proc. No. 83 issued by Pres. Quirino declared land for the exclusive use of port facilities.
January 10, 1989: PPA issued to Tan Gin San, the husband of deceased Francisco, a permit to
occupy the building for a year, until December 31, 1989.
May 8L Mayor notified Tan Gin San by mail to relocate or remove his Quonset by virtue of
Zoning Ord. 147 stressing the “clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary
surroundings along Strong Boulevard.”
May 19, another notice was sent. May 24: demolition was ordered by Mayor.
Petitioner filed with RTC suit for a Writ of Prohibition with Injunction and damages.
RTC: denied writ, upheld power of Mayor to order demolition without judicial authority
Sept. 6: Quonset was completely demolished
CA (1st decision): reversed TC; Quonset not a nuisance per se; Mayor needed judicial decision
CA (2nd decision): reversed itself; deficiency (lack of judicial declaration) cured when petitioner
filed the petition for prohibition and was heard on oral argument.

Issue: WON Mayor could summarily, without judicial process, order the demolition of petitioner’s
Quonset building.

Held/Ratio:
NO. There is no doubt that the Quonset is a non-conforming structure as per the Municipal Ordinance;
and that in the event that an immediate relocation of the building cannot be accomplished, section 16
of the Ordinance provides that “… the non-conforming use may be condemned or removed at the
owner’s expense.”
 a. This provision does not empower the Municipal Mayor to order a summary removal of the
structure. If it does, it must be struck down for being in contravention to the requirements of
due process.
b. Violation of the ordinance neither empowers the Municipal Mayor to avail of extra-judicial
remedies.

The Local Government Code imposes upon the Mayor the duty “to cause to be instituted judicial
proceedings in connection with the violation of ordinances.”

NOT ABATEMENT OF NUISSANCE (police power) without judicial proceedings.

a) Only applies to nuisance per se – affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may
be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity (Monteverde v Generoso).
b) Storage of copra in the Quonset is a legitimate business, cannot be said to be injurious to rights
of property, of health or of comfort of the community.
c) If it is a nuisance per accidens, it must be proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose.
d) Sanguniaang Bayan cannot DECLARE a particular thing as a nuisance per se – can ONLY BE
adjudged by judicial determination.

Judgment set aside. CA (1st decision) reinstated, remanded to RTC to determine just compensation for
petitioner for the demolished Quonset.

AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corp.

SCRA Citation: 506 SCRA 625

DOCTRINE: Private and public nuisance; definition – The term “nuisance” is so comprehensive that it has
been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the rights of the citizens, either in person,
property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is one which violates only
private rights and produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when it
interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property or by causing a
common injury, an unreasonable interference with the right common to the general public. In this case,
the noise generated by an airconditioning system is considered a private nuisance.

Noise emanating from air-con units not nuisance per se – Noise becomes actionable only when it passes
the limits of reasonable adjustment to the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to
the needs of the listener; Injury to a particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive
characteristics will not render the noise an actionable nuisance. Whether or not the noise is a nuisance
is an issue to be resolved by the courts.
Test to determine noise as a nuisance – The test is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort
are so injuriously affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual
Physical Discomfort]which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of
living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of
noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of
property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with reasonable regard for the rights
of those affected by it.

Action to abate private nuisance; incapable of pecuniary estiation – an action to abate private nuisance,
even wehere the plaintiff asks for damages is one incapable of pecuniary estimation

FACTS: AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey building in Makati City. Frabelle
(Respondent) is a condominium corporation who's condominium development is located behind
petitioner. Respondent complained of the 'unbearable” noise emanating from the blower of the air-
conditioning units of petitioner.

ISSUES:
(1) Is it a nuisance as to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings or a nuisance
per se?
(2) Is an action for abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically noise generated by the blower of
an air-conditioning system, even if the plaintiff prays for damages, one incapable of pecuniary
estimation?
(3) What is the determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint?

HELD:
(1) It is a nuisance to be resolved only by the courts in the due course of proceedings; the noise is not a
nuisance per se. Noise becomes actionable only whenn it passes the limits of reasonable adjustment to
the conditions of the locality and of the needs of the maker to the needs of the listener. Injury to a
particular person in a peculiar position or of especially sensitive characteristics will not render the house
an actionable nuisance–– in the conditions, of present living, noise seems inseparable from the conduct
of many necessary occupations.

(2) Yes, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other
than the right to recover a sum of money.

(3) The determining factor is not its intensity or volume; it is that the noise is of such character as to
produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities rendering
adjacent property less comfortable and valuable.
ROBERT TAYABAN y CALIPLIP vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
The project proposal of then Mayor Tayaban of Tinoc Ifugao to the provincial governor for the
construction of the Tinoc Public Market was approved to be funded by the Cordillera Executive Board
(CEB). The contract was awarded to Lopez Pugong with the CEB as the project owner. Actual
construction commenced on June 1989 and on August 15, 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc
adopted Resolution No. 20 to demolish the erected structures for the purpose of erecting the Public
Market on the allegation that it was constructed on the wrong site. The said Resolution was passed only
in the afternoon of August 15, 1989, after the subject demolition was conducted in the morning of the
same day.

Issue:
Whether the Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 20 is valid and whether the demolition was a valid
exercise of police power.

Ruling:
The court ruled in the the negative.

Petitioners acted in bad faith in passing Resolution No. 20 having been passed only after the demolition
and their memorandum addressed to the laborers of Pugong directing the stoppage of the construction
was not to be considered as an evidence of good faith because the project owner was the CEB, thus, it
should have been the latter who should be duly notified. No evidence would show that petitioners
informed the CEB or the Governor of the alleged mistake in the location. By causing undue injury to the
government in demolishing the structures and with evident bad faith, the court ruled that the
petitioners are guilty of violation of the provisions of Sec. 3(e) of RA No. 3019. Petitioner’s claim that the
adoption of Resolution No. was a valid exercise of police power because Pugong failed to obtain the
required building permit pursuant to PD 1076 and Letter of Instruction No. 19, is not persuasive because
the said resolution did not mention such violation. A careful reading of the resolution shows that the
only basis for the demolition was the alleged mistake in the location of the building construction.

The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law
of the land, or an act of the legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common right. In the present case, the acts of
petitioner have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the
abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per se, or those
which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. Petitioners should have made known their concerns to the CEB or to the
Governor.

The assailed decision was affirmed.

Emilio Gancayco vs City Government of Quezon City and MMDA
Ponente: Sereno

Facts:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956,
Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for commercial
buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904 was
passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by the national legislature. Thus, the
regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local government units. Under
this particular ordinance, the city council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing the
wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the
building owner is not allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating
a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use
as an arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own purposes.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice
Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from the
application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued
Resolution No. 7161, S-66, “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner
shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense when public
interest so demands.”

Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA, in
consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of his building
violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for TRO with the RTC Quezon City to
prohibit the MMDA from demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30 September
2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling
that it allowed the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. The RTC said that
because 67.5 square meters out of Justice Gancayco’s 375 square meters of property were being taken
without compensation for the public’s benefit, the ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It
likewise held that the ordinance violated owners’ right to equal protection of laws.

MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it demolished the
subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks, streets, avenues,
alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancayco’s private
property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or
abate nuisances.
Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 2904.
(2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A PUBLIC NUISANCE.
(4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO.

Ruling:

(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it made the undertaking to comply with all
issuances of the BIR, which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not commit any false
misrepresentation or misleading act.

(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the ground of equal protection when he also
benefited from the exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself requested for an
exemption from the application of the ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover, he
was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition as there was yet no valid notice from the
city engineer. Thus, while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different treatment of
properties that appears to be similarly situated, Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.

(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an
arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do
not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a nuisance. Clearly,
when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or the city engineer
did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and
property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.

Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It
does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when such thing is not a
nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved
in the ordinary courts of law.

MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN,

DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order
the closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We
believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted,
which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a
forestland under the administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly
speaking, is not an issue on environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological balance, but the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this
as an environmental issue then, focus should not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle
compliance.

FACTS
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance
with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already operating a resort in
the area, and the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a
three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes
(FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay
West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was
ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s
hotel.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the
order was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of Malay,
Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has
the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings.
ISSUE Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.

RULING
Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.

Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses
and occupations to promote the general welfare.

Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the
mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also
been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out
with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which
empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for
failing to secure the necessary permits.

American Mail Line v City of Basilan

G.R. No. L-12647 (May 31, 1961)

American Mail Line and other foreign shipping companies filed a petition for declaratory relief, asking
the Court to determine the validity of anchorage fees being collected by the City Government of Basilan
pursuant to the local “Port Area Ordinance.” Said ordinance imposed a fee of ½ centavo (P0.005) per
registered gross ton of the vessel for the first twenty-four (24) hours, or part thereof, and for succeeding
hours, but not to exceed seventy-five pesos (P75.00) per day, irrespective of the greater tonnage of the
vessels. At the time, the harbor fee being imposed by the National Government was fifty pesos (P50.00).
The City argues that the ordinance in question was enacted in the exercise of its police power and that
the fees imposed therein are for purely regulatory purposes.

ISSUE: Whether the City of Basilan had authority to enact the questioned ordinance and to collect the
anchorage fees prescribed therein?

RULING: Under its Charter, the City of Basilan had the authority, among others, (1) to levy and collect
taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with law; and (2) to fix the charges to be paid by all
watercraft landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places.

It is clear from the foregoing that the City of Basilan was not granted a blanket power of taxation. The
use of “in accordance with law” clearly discloses the legislative intent to limit the taxing power of the
City. The power to regulate as an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose fees
for revenue purposes. Fees for purely regulatory purposes may only be of sufficient amount to include
the expenses of issuing the license and the cost of the necessary inspection or police surveillance,
taking into account not only the expense of direct regulation but also incidental expenses.

The fees herein, being based upon the tonnage of the vessels, have no proper or reasonable relation to
the cost of issuing the permits and the cost of inspection or surveillance. In fact, the fee imposed
exceeds even that imposed by the National Government. All these circumstances point to the conclusion
that the fees were intended for revenue purposes, in excess of the authority conferred upon the City by
law.

ZOOMZAT v PEOPLE

FACTS:
December 20, 1991: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed Resolution No. 261 which
resolved “to express the willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and operate a
cable TV system.” Petitioner applied for a mayor’s permit but the same was not acted upon by the
mayor’s office.
April 6, 1993: respondents enacted Ordinance No. 19 which granted a franchise to Gingoog
Spacelink Cable TV, Inc. to operate a cable television for a period of ten (10) years, subject
 to automatic renewal.
July 30, 1993: petitioner filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against
respondents for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019. The complaint alleged that in
enacting Ordinance No. 19, the respondents gave unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to Spacelink, to the prejudice of petitioner who was a prior grantee-applicant.
December 20, 1994: Graft Investigation Officer I Virginia Tehano-Ang, recommended the
indictment of the respondents under Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, which recommendation
was affirmed on review by Special Prosecution Officer II Rolando Ines.
A criminal information for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, was filed against the
respondents before the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon directive by the Sandiganbayan to restudy the instant case, Special
Prosecution Officer II Antonio Manzano recommended the dismissal of the case and the
Information withdrawn for lack of probable cause. On further investigation, Special
Prosecution Officer III Victor Pascual also recommended that the case be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
June 17, 1998: the Sandiganbayan approved the dismissal of the case and ordered the
withdrawal of the Information against the respondents.
September 9, 1998: the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions.
1) Petitioner assailed Special Prosecutor Pascual’s findings that, under Executive Order No.
205, it is the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and not the local
government unit, that has the power and authority to allow or disallow the operation of
cable television.

It argued that the NTC’s authority to grant the franchise to operate a cable television is
not exclusive, because, under the Local Government Code, the city council also has the
power to grant permits, licenses and franchises in aid of the local government unit’s
regulatory or revenue raising powers.

2) Petitioner also contended that the grant of exclusive franchise to Spacelink subject to
automatic renewal, contravenes Section 2 of Executive Order No. 205, which provides
that “a certificate of authority to operate a CATV by the Commission shall be on a nonexclusive
basis and for a period not to exceed 15 years.”

Thus, petitioner asserted that respondents gave Spacelink undue or unwarranted

advantage and preference, because it stifled business competition. This makes
respondents liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE:
1) WON LGUs are authorized to allow or to disallow the operation of cable television
2) WON petitioner can claim to have suffered injury due to respondents’ issuance of Ordinance No. 19
HELD/RULING: (Davide, Jr., C.J., [Chairman], Quisumbing, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ.)

HELD 1:
No. Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC can grant certificates of authority to
cable television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise,
Executive Order No. 436, vests with the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry
in the Philippines. The Court’s pronouncement in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is pertinent:

There is no law specifically authorizing the LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV system. Whatever
authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when President Marcos issued P.D. No.
1512 “terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for the operation of CATV system previously
granted by local governments.” Today, pursuant to Section 3 of E.O. No. 436, “only persons,
associations, partnerships, corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of
Authority by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area.”

The protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not
extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.

Also, although LGUs have not been stripped of their general power to prescribe regulations under the
general welfare clause of the Local Government Code (i.e. Respondent, like other local legislative bodies,
has been empowered to enact ordinances and approve resolutions under the general welfare clause of
B.P. Blg. 337, the Local Government Code of 1983, and under the new law, R.A. No. 7160, the Local
Government Code of 1991.), the local government unit can regulate the operation of cable television
only when it encroaches on public properties, such as the use of public streets, rights of ways, the
founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these parameters, its acts, such as the
grant of the franchise to Spacelink, would be ultra vires.

Plainly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the bounds of its
authority when it usurped the powers of the NTC with the enactment of Ordinance No. 19.

HELD 2:
Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did not confer any right nor vest any privilege to Spacelink.
As such, petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or suffered injury thereby. Incidentally,
petitioner’s claim of undue injury becomes even more baseless, because Spacelink did not commence to
operate despite the grant to it of a franchise under Ordinance No. 19.

In addition, petitioner could not impute manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence on the part of the respondents when they enacted Ordinance No. 19. A perfunctory reading
of Resolution No. 261 shows that the Sangguniang Panlungsod did not grant a franchise to it but merely
expressed its willingness to allow the petitioner to install and operate a cable television. Had
respondents intended otherwise, they would have couched the resolution in more concrete, specific and
categorical terms. In contrast, Ordinance No. 19 clearly and unequivocally granted a franchise to
Spacelink, specifically stating therein its terms and conditions. Not being a bona fide franchise holder,
petitioner could not claim prior right on the strength of Resolution No. 261.
Petition was denied. The assailed Resolutions of the aSndiganbayan were affirmed

U.S. v. Pompeya

FACTS:
This case is regarding the complaint filed by the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Iloilo, charging
Silvestre Pompeya with violation of the municipal ordinance of Iloilo for willfully, illegally, and criminally
and without justifiable motive failing to render service on patrol duty, required under said municipal
ordinance.

Upon arraignment, Pompeya presented a demurrer, stating that the acts charged in the complaint do
not constitute a crime and that the municipal ordinance is unconstitutional for being repugnant to the
Organic Act of the Philippines, which guarantees the liberty of the citizens.

The trial judge sustained said demurrer and ordered the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
W/N the facts stated in the complaint are sufficient to show a cause of action under the said law
W/N said law is in violation of the provisions of the Philippine Bill in depriving citizens of their rights
therein guaranteed

HELD:
Is the assailed municipal ordinance a violation of the Philippine Bill?

The municipal ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 1309, the specific purpose of
which is to require each able-bodied male resident of the municipality, between the ages of 18 and 55,
as well as each householder when so required by the president, to assist in the maintenance of peace
and good order in the community, by apprehending ladrones, etc., as well as by giving information of
the existence of such persons in the locality. The amendment contains a punishment for those who may
be called upon for such service, and who refuse to render the same.

The question asked by the Supreme Court is whether there is anything in the law, organic or otherwise,
in force in the Philippine Islands, which prohibits the central Government, or any governmental entity
connected therewith, from adopting or enacting rules and regulations for the maintenance of peace and
good government?

In answering this, the Supreme Court cited the tribal relations of the primitive man, the feudal system,
the days of the "hundreds" -- all of which support the idea of an ancient obligation of the individual to
assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community.

The Supreme Court held that the power exercised under the provisions of Act No. 1309 falls within the
police power of the state and that the state was fully authorized and justified in conferring the same
upon the municipalities of the Philippine Islands and that, therefore, the provisions of the said Act are
constitutional and not in violation nor in derogation of the rights of the persons affected thereby.

Is there a cause of action? The complaint is unable to show (a) that the defendant was a male citizen of
the municipality; (b) that he was an able-bodied citizen; (c) that he was not under 18 years of age nor
over 55; nor (d) that conditions existed which justified the president of the municipality in calling upon
him for the services mentioned in the law.

"For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs. So
ordered."

US vs TURIBIO

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen in the province of
Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a
carabao without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered,
in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and
slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other
draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in
the municipal slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he
contends that the municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his carabao in
his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the right of
eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
property.
Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is
an undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal
liberties. To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the
interest of the general public requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do
otherwise is to defeat the purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks
to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which
encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an epidemic struck the Philippine islands which
threatened the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces seventy, eighty and even one
hundred percent of their local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This drove the prices of
carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the luxurious
prices of these work animals. Moreover, this greatly affected the food production of the country which
prompted the government to import rice from its neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production
of crops, the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work animals. The
purpose of the law is to stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them
throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was
prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most importantly, the respondent’s carabao was
found to be fit for farm work.

These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.

Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not
constitute the taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the
consumption of these private properties for the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus,
the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.
Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:In 1980 President Marcos amended Executive Order No. 626-A which orders that no carabao and
carabeef shall be transported from one province to another; such violation shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit for the
carabeef and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the
case of the carabaos. On January 13, 1984, Petitioner’s 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of
EO 626-A. He issued a writ for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO. The trial court
sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground
that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence, this petition for review
filed by Petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not police power is properly enforced

HELD: NO. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which
both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. As long
as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police
power is not only proper but necessary. In the case at bar, E.O.626-A has the same lawful subject as the
original executive order (E.O. 626 as cited in Toribio case) but NOT the same lawful method. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the
questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.

Solicitor General v Metro Manila Authority

FACTS:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the SC ruled
that (1) the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not
among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605;
and, that (2) even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly
prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission.
 Several complaints were filed in the SC against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's
licenses and removal of license platesfor alleged traffic violations. These sanctions were not
among those that may be imposed under PD 1605.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself
"to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
o The Metropolitan Manila Authority defended the said ordinance on the ground that it
was adopted pursuant to the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. There was no conflict
between the decision and the ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement
and not supplant the latter.
o The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it
represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. It violated PD 1605
which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.

ISSUE & HELD:WON Ordinance No. 11 is valid (NO)

RATIO:
The problem before the Court is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The
question the SC must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
o A municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be
general and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's
licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the decree
authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission, now the Metropolitan Manila Authority, to
impose such sanctions.
Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested
with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local
government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. Here,
the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree,
which has the force and effect of a statute.
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose
sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.
There is no statutory authority for — and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against — the
imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits,
they cannot be imposed by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative
powers.

NOTE: SC emphasized that the ruling in the Gonongcase that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by RA 413 on the Commissioner of
Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction
therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA

FACTS:
In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24 members of
Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the
subject property within the vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was protested and Civil Case
No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the construction of stalls.

While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution No. 29 which declared the
subject area as a parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No.
2040 and held that the subject land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man. The
preliminary injunction was made permanent.

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place. They
were assigned specific areas and were made to pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of
the area.

On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision), the Association ofConcerned Citizens and
Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to
restore the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza.

After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino, officer‐in-charge of the office of
the mayor, issued a resolution ordering the demolition of the stalls in the subject area.

Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was denied.

Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Petitioners argued that they had right to
occupy the area by virtue of lease contracts entered into with the municipal government, and later, by
virtue of space allocations made in their favor for which they paid daily fees. The municipality denied
that they entered into said agreements. It argued that even if the leases were valid, the same could be
terminated at will because rent was collected daily.

ISSUE: Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property.

HELD:
No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any other
contractual undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially
of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law.
Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to
the public in general. They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by
the municipality to private parties.

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to
occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged
lease contracts.

Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the prejudice of the community.
Stalls, being made of flammable materials, became a potential fire trap; access to and from the market
was obstructed; there were aggravated health and sanitation problems; flow of traffic was obstructed;
stallholders in the public market were deprived of a sizable volume of business; the people were
deprived of the use of the place as a public plaza.

The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners arecovered by the police
power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal
council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants
thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This authority was validly exercised in this case
through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated
the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through
the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers
a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power as a postulate of the
existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or
even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an act will not
militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.

The CFI judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for prohibition. Petition
dismissed.

Barangay Sindalan v. CA

Facts
Pursuant to a resolution passed by the barangay council, petitioner Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando,
Pampanga, represented by Barangay Captain Ismael Gutierrez, filed a Complaint for eminent domain
against respondents spouses Jose Magtoto III and Patricia Sindayan, the registered owners of a parcel of
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 117674-R. Petitioner sought to convert a portion of
respondents’ land into Barangay Sindalan’s feeder road. The alleged public purposes sought to be
served by the expropriation were stated in Barangay Resolution No. 6.

Petitioner’s Contention:
Petitioner claimed that respondents’ property "as the most practical and nearest way to the municipal
road. Pending the resolution of the case at the trial court, petitioner deposited an amount equivalent to
the fair market value of the property.
Respondent’s Contention:
Respondents alleged that the expropriation of their property was for private use, that is, for the benefit
of the homeowners of Davsan II Subdivision. They contended that petitioner deliberately omitted the
name of Davsan II Subdivision and, instead, stated that the expropriation was for the benefit of the
residents of Sitio Paraiso in order to conceal the fact that the access road being proposed to be built
across the respondents’ land was to serve a privately owned subdivision and those who could purchase
the lots of said subdivision. They also pointed out that under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 957, it is the
subdivision owner who is obliged to provide a feeder road to the subdivision residents.

Issue Whether the proposed exercise of the power of eminent domain would be for a public purpose

Held
No, the contemplated road to be constructed by the barangay would benefit only the residents of a
subdivision.

In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the taking of private property must be
for a public purpose. In this jurisdiction, "public use" is defined as "whatever is beneficially employed for
the community." The intended feeder road sought to serve the residents of the subdivision only. It has
not been shown that the other residents of Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga, will be
benefited by the contemplated road to be constructed. While the number of people who use or can use
the property is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use or purpose, the factual
milieu of the case reveals that the intended use of respondents’ lot is confined solely to the Davsan II
Subdivision residents and is not exercisable in common. Considering that the residents who need a
feeder road are all subdivision lot owners, it is the obligation of the Davsan II Subdivision owner to
acquire a right-of-way for them. To deprive respondents of their property instead of compelling the
subdivision owner to comply with his obligation under the law is an abuse of the power of eminent
domain and is patently illegal. Without doubt, expropriation cannot be justified on the basis of an
unlawful purpose.

Notes:
There is no precise meaning of ‘public use’ and the term is susceptible of myriad meanings depending on
diverse situations—limited meaning attached to ‘public use’ is ‘use by the public’ or ‘public
employment,’ that ‘a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding property appropriated by
right of eminent domain to furnish public with the use intended, and that there must be a right on the
part of the public, or some portion of it, or some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to
use the property after it is condemned’.

The public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation cannot depend on the ‘numerical count of
those to be served or the smallness or largeness of the community to be benefited.’ The number of
people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public use , provided the use is exercisable
in common and is not limited to particular individuals.