1. University of the East vs Romeo A.

Jader, GR#132344, 02/17/2000

2. Arturo P. Valenzuela et. al. vs CA, et.al GR83122 10/19/1990

3. De Jesus vs Sequia 58 phil 866

4. Wassmer vs Velez 12SCRA 648

5. Kim vs Phil Aerial Taxi, Co 58 Phil 838

#1 UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, VS. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent

GR No. 132344. February 17, 2000.

FACTS:

Romeo Jader, a law student of the University of the East, failed to take his regular examination in Practice
Court I in his first semester of his last school year. However, he was able to remove the incomplete mark
when the Dean of his college approved his application to take a removal examination.

In the 2nd semester, his name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Decree
of Bachelor of Laws and in the invitation for the 35th Investiture and Commencement Ceremonies, the
plaintiff’s name appeared. Thus, he attended the investiture ceremonies and graduated.

On April to September 1998, he took a leave of absence from his work and enrolled at the pre-bar
review class in Far Eastern University. To his dismay upon knowing that he incurred a deficiency, he
dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar examinations.

He then filed a suit against UE praying for moral and exemplary damages arising from the latter’s
negligence. The trial court ruled in his favor and was granted for actual damages. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. The CA awarded moral damages. On account of
suffering moral shock, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and
sleepless nights and ultimately for not having to take the bar exam.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Romeo Jader can validly claim for moral damages.
RULING:

In view of the foregoing issue, the Supreme Court emphatically enunciated that moral damages cannot
be awarded to Romeo Jader. It cannot believe that he suffered shock, trauma, and pain.

Along this vein, the Supreme Court held Jader negligent. It opined that as a student, he should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, especially those appertaining to his academics, are
in order. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon himself
by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements. While the Court held the University of the East
negligent and therefore liable for actual damages in favor of Jader, the latter was also held liable for
negligence thereby no moral damages can be awarded in his favor. The decision was affirmed with
modification.

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.

G.R. No. 132344. February 17, 2000.

FACTS:

Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants’ College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his
last year (School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for
which he was given an incomplete grade . He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law
student and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given
him by Professor Carlos Ortega which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after payment of the
required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos Ortega
submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5).

The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was
scheduled on the 16th of April 1988, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff
appeared as one of the candidates. At the foot of the list of the names of the candidates there is an
annotation stating that the same is a tentative list.

The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies and he was thereafter handed by Dean Celedonio a
rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. He tendered a blow-out that evening which
was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good luck in the forthcoming bar
examination. He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence
without pay from his job from April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 and enrolled at the pre-bar review
class in Far Eastern University . Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not
able to take the bar examination.

Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not
able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter’s negligence. He prayed for an award of
moral and exemplary damages, unrealized income, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

RTC’s Decision:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid,
the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees and the cost of suit.

CA’s Decision:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court’s Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of
plaintiff-appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) PESOS for moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not UE has liability to Romeo Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of
the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his own negligence in not verifying from the
professor concerned the result of his removal exam.

RULING:
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a
time when he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in
good faith.

Article 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.
Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to them, for without the
latter, the former are useless.

Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination
and in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course.

“It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had been
informed during the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing
grade. Yet, defendant-appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the
requirements for the degree nor did they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university, despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in
Practice Court I, again included plaintiff-appellant’s name in the “tentative” list of candidates for
graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and which became the basis for the
commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant’s name was allowed
to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able
to remedy the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did
not explain how plaintiff-appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if
defendant-appellee university did not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in
Practice Court I.

However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter’s actual
damages, we hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree
with the Court of Appeals’ findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was
informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very
least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary
requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, respondent should have
been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining to his academic
achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have
suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and
not being able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar,
he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school
records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does
not only entail a mental preparation on the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of
documentation and submission of requirements which the prospective examinee must meet.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner
is ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos
(P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until
fully paid; the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney’s fees; and the costs of the suit.
The award of moral damages is DELETED.

#2 Valenzuela v CA G.R. No. 83122 October 19, 1990

J. Gutierrez Jr.

Facts:

Petitioner Valenzuela, a General Agent respondent Philamgen, was authorized to solicit and sell all kinds
of non-life insurance. He had a 32.5% commission rate. From 1973 to 1975, Valenzuela solicited marine
insurance from Delta Motors, Inc. in the amount of P4.4 Million from which he was entitled to a
commission of 32%. However, Valenzuela did not receive his full commission which amounted to P1.6
Million from the P4.4 Million. Premium payments amounting to P1,946,886.00 were paid directly to
Philamgen. Valenzuela’s commission amounted to P632,737.00.

Philamgen wanted to cut Valenzuela’s commission to 50% of the amount. He declined.

When Philamgen offered again, Valenzuela firmly reiterated his objection.

Philamgen took drastic action against Valenzuela. They: reversed the commission due him, threatened
the cancellation of policies issued by his agency, and started to leak out news that Valenzuela has a
substantial debt with Philamgen. His agency contract was terminated.

The petitioners sought relief by filing the complaint against the private respondents. The trial court
found that the principal cause of the termination as agent was his refusal to share his Delta commission.

The court considered these acts as harassment and ordered the company to pay for the resulting
damage in the value of the commission. They also ordered the company to pay 350,000 in moral
damages.

The company appealed. The CA ordered Valenzuela to pay the entire amount of the commission. Hence,
this appeal by Valenzuela.
Issue:

1. WON the agency contract is coupled with interest on the part of agent Valenzuela.

2. Whether or not Philamgen can be held liable for damages due to the termination of the General
Agency Agreement it entered into with the petitioners.

3. WON Valenzuela should pay the premiums he collected.

Held: Yes. Yes. Petition granted

Ratio:

1. In any event the principal's power to revoke an agency at will is so pervasive, that the Supreme Court
has consistently held that termination may be effected even if the principal acts in bad faith, subject only
to the principal's liability for damages.

The Supreme Court accorded great weight on the trial court’s factual findings and found the cause of the
conflict to be Valenzuela’s refusal to share the commission. Philamgen told the petitioners of its desire to
share the Delta Commission with them. It stated that should Delta back out from the agreement, the
petitioners would be charged interests through a reduced commission after full payment by Delta.

Philamgen proposed reducing the petitioners' commissions by 50% thus giving them an agent's
commission of 16.25%. The company insisted on the reduction scheme. The company pressured the
agents to share the income with the threat to terminate the agency. The petitioners were also told that
the Delta commissions would not be credited to their account. This continued until the agency was
terminated.

Records also show that the agency is one "coupled with an interest," and, therefore, should not be freely
revocable at the unilateral will of the company.

The records sustain the finding that the private respondent started to covet a share of the insurance
business that Valenzuela had built up, developed and nurtured. The company appropriated the entire
insurance business of Valenzuela. Worse, despite the termination of the agency, Philamgen continued to
hold Valenzuela jointly and severally liable with the insured for unpaid premiums.

Under these circumstances, it is clear that Valenzuela had an interest in the continuation of the agency
when it was unceremoniously terminated not only because of the commissions he procured, but also
Philamgen’s stipulation liability against him for unpaid premiums. The respondents cannot state that the
agency relationship between Valenzuela and Philamgen is not coupled with interest.
There is an exception to the principle that an agency is revocable at will and that is when the agency has
been given not only for the interest of the principal but also for the mutual interest of the principal and
the agent. The principal may not defeat the agent's right to indemnification by a termination of the
contract of agency. Also, if a principal violates a contractual or quasi-contractual duty which he owes his
agent, the agent may as a rule bring an appropriate action for the breach of that duty.

2. Hence, if a principal acts in bad faith and with abuse of right in terminating the agency, then he is
liable in damages. The Civil Code says that "every person must in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties act with justice, give every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith:
(Art. 19, Civil Code), and every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damages to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same (Art. 20, Civil Code).

3. As to the issue of whether or not the petitioners are liable to Philamgen for the unpaid and
uncollected premiums which the appellate court ordered Valenzuela to pay, the respondent court erred
in holding Valenzuela liable.

Under Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the remedy for the non-payment of premiums is to put an end
to and render the insurance policy not binding.

Philippine Phoenix- non-payment of premium does not merely suspend but puts an end to an insurance
contract since the time of the payment is peculiarly of the essence of the contract.

Section 776 of the insurance Code says that no contract of insurance by an insurance company is valid
and binding unless and until the premium has been paid, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary

Since the premiums have not been paid, the policies issued have lapsed. The insurance coverage did not
go into effect or did not continue and the obligation of Philamgen as insurer ceased. Philam can’t
demand from or sue Valenzuela for the unpaid premiums.

The court held that the CA’s giving credence to an audit that showed Valenzuela owing Philamgen
P1,528,698.40 was unwarranted. Valenzuela had no unpaid account with Philamgen. But, facts show that
the beginning balance of Valenzuela's account with Philamgen amounted to P744,159.80. 4 statements
of account were sent to the agent.

It was only after the filing of the complaint that a radically different statement of accounts surfaced in
court. Certainly, Philamgen's own statements made by its own accountants over a long period of time
and covering examinations made on four different occasions must prevail over unconfirmed and
unaudited statements made to support a position made in the course of defending against a lawsuit.

The records of Philamgen itself are the best refutation against figures made as an afterthought in the
course of litigation. Moreover, Valenzuela asked for a meeting where the figures would be reconciled.
Philamgen refused to meet with him and, instead, terminated the agency agreement.

After off-setting the amount, Valenzuela had overpaid Philamgen the amount of P530,040.37 as of
November 30, 1978. Philamgen cannot later be heard to complain that it committed a mistake in its
computation. The alleged error may be given credence if committed only once. But as earlier stated, the
reconciliation of accounts was arrived at four (4) times on different occasions where Philamgen was duly
represented by its account executives. On the basis of these admissions and representations, Philamgen
cannot later on assume a different posture and claim that it was mistaken in its representation with
respect to the correct beginning balance as of July 1977 amounting to P744,159.80. The audit report
commissioned by Philamgen is unreliable since its results are admittedly based on an unconfirmed and
unaudited beginning balance of P1,758,185.43.

Philamgen has been appropriating for itself all these years the gross billings and income that it took away
from the petitioners. A principal can be held liable for damages in cases of unjust termination of agency.
This Court ruled that where no time for the continuance of the contract is fixed by its terms, either party
is at liberty to terminate it at will, subject only to the ordinary requirements of good faith. The right of
the principal to terminate his authority is absolute and unrestricted, except only that he may not do so in
bad faith.

The circumstances of the case, however, require that the contractual relationship between the parties
shall be terminated upon the satisfaction of the judgment. No more claims arising from or as a result of
the agency shall be entertained by the courts after that date.

#3 De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil 866

FACTS: Antonia Loanco de Jesus, 20 years old, and Cesar Syquia, 23 met in a barber shop where de Jesus
worked as cashier. They had a relationship and Antonia got pregnant with a baby boy. During her
pregnancy, Syquia often visited her. He even wrote a letter to a reverend father saying that he wanted
his name to be given to the child. When he went to Japan and China, he was writing letters to Antonia
reminding her to keep herself in good condition so that their junior would be strong. When she gave
birth, Syquia took her and the child to live in a house in Manila where they lived as a family for a year.
She became pregnant again but Syquia left her to marry another woman. During the christening of the
child which Syquia arranged, he decided to give the child the name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar
Syquia Jr.

ISSUE: W/N there would be damages for breach to marry and W/N Syquia is compelled to recognize
Ismael Loanco as his natural child

HELD: The letter written by Syquia to the Rev Fr serves as an admission of paternity and the other letters
are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. P50.00 to ismael Loanco. The
SC held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages for breach of promise to
marry since this has no standing in court.

De Jesus v. Syquia

G.R. No. L-39110

November 28, 1933

Facts:

Antonia Loanco was hired as cashier in the barbershop of Vicente Mendoza, Cesar Syquia’s brother-in-
law. Cesar then courted Antonia, and the latter became pregnant with a baby boy who was born on June
17, 1931. During Antonia’s pregnancy, Cesar was always visiting her. On February 1931, he wrote a letter
to the priest who was to christen the baby boy, saying

Rev. Father,

The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.

He wrote this on the eve of his departure on a trip to China and Japan. While he was abroad, Cesar
wrote several letters to Antonia Loanco, showing paternal interest in the situation and cautioning her to
keep in good condition in order that junior might be strong. The baby boy, however, was not named
Cesar Syquia, Jr., but Ismael Loanco. After giving birth, Cesar took Antonia to a house in Manila, and they
lived together for about a year in regular family style. Cesar paid for all the household expenses during
their living together. Then Antonia became pregnant for the second time. However, Cesar got married to
another woman.

The purpose of the petition filed by Antonia and her mother is to recover from Cesar Php30,000 as
damages for the breach of promise to marry, to compel Syquia to recognize Ismael and Pacita (Antonia’s
second child) as natural children, and to make him pay for the maintenance of the children worth
Php500 per month.

Issues:
1. Is the note to the priest a proof of acknowledgment of paternity within the meaning of Article 135 (1)
of the (Old) Civil Code?

2. Does the acknowledgment referred to in Article 135 of the Old Civil Code need to be made in a single
document?

3. Can Antonia be granted payment for damages because of breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Article 135 (1) states

ART. 135. The father may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the following cases:

1. When an indisputable paper written by him, expressly acknowledging his paternity, is in existence

A child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a
living person. The problem of the recognition of the child even before he was born is no different from
that when he is already born. The words used by Syquia in his letter are not capable of two
constructions, and the identity of the baby was clear.

2. No. There is no requirement in the law that the writing shall be addressed to one or any particular
individual. The only requirement is that the writing should be indubitable. Thus, the many letters Cesar
Syquia wrote may be made proof to his acknowledgment of Ismael Loanco.

3. No. Such promise to marry was not satisfactorily proved and the action for breach of promise to marry
has no standing in civil law apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by plaintiff upon
the faith of such promise.

#4 BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,

FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

Facts:

Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love decided to get married on
September 4, 1954. Wassmer made the necessary preparations for the wedding including making and
sending wedding invitations, buying of wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding
necessities.

On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left this note for his bride-to-be advising her that he will not be able to attend the
wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding.

And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has
changed and that he will be returning soon. Therefore, Velez did not appear and was not heard from
again.

Wassmer sued Velez for damages and he failed to answer and was declared in default. On April 29, 1955,
judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as
moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney’s fees; and the costs.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.

Issue:
Whether or not breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong in this case.

Held:

This is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only
to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21 which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.”

And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages
is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to
Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the imposition of exemplary
damages against him.

Wassmer v. Velez 12 SCRA 648; December 26,1964

Doctrine: As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a
wedding and go through all the above-described preparation, and publicity, only to walk out of it when
the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.

Facts: On August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued.

Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives,
friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old, simply left a
note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding-My mother opposes it . . ." He enplaned to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon". But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default.

Issue: WON moral damages as recoverable

Ruling:

"Mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. However, that the extent to which acts
not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides
that "Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage".

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation, and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite
different.

This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which defendant must be held
answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the new Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the
cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same
could not be adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the new Civil Code the condition
precedent is that "the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner". The argument is devoid of merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case
defendant clearly acted in a "wanton . . . reckless [and] oppressive manner." This Court's opinion,
however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case, P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
16.) DRILON VS CA
G.R. No. 107019

FACTS:
In a letter-complaint to Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, General Renato de Villa who was
then Chief of Staff of the AFP, requested DOJ to order the investigation of several individuals
named therein, including private respondent Adaza, for their alleged participation in the failed
December 1989 coup d’etat. Assistant State Prosecutor Trampe, the Team Leader, finding
sufficient basis to continue the inquiry, issued a subpoena to the individuals named in the letter-
complaint, Adaza included, and assigned the case for preliminary investigation to a panel of
investigators composed of prosecutors. They held that there is probable cause to hold
respondents for trial for the crime of REBELLION WITH MURDER AND FRUSTRATED
MURDER. Their Resolution became the basis for the filing of information.

Feeling aggrieved by the institution of proceedings against him, Adaza filed a complaint for
damages before the RTC of Quezon City. In his complaint, Adaza charged petitioners with
engaging in a deliberate, wilful and malicious experimentation by filing against him a charge of
rebellion complexed with murder and frustrated murder when petitioners, according to Adaza,
were fully aware of the non-existence of such crime in the statute books. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss but it was denied.

Petitioners filed a petition for Rule 65 before the CA, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent Judge in ruling that sufficient cause of action exists to warrant a full-
blown hearing of the case filed by Adaza. CA dismissed the petition.

Adaza: His claim before the trial court was merely a suit for damages and for violation of RA
3019, and not a suit for malicious prosecution.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the suit filed by Adaza was one for malicious prosecution.

RULING:
Yes. The term malicious prosecution has been defined in Philippine jurisdiction as:

An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other
legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the
termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. The
gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere purpose of
vexation or injury.

The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution are found in the
provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on damages particularly Articles 19,
20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8). To constitute malicious prosecution, however, there
must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a
person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that his charges were false
and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution
does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Thus, in order for a malicious prosecution
suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3) elements: (1) the fact of the prosecution and the
further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor and that the action finally terminated
with an acquittal; (2) that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and
(3) that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or sinister
motive. All these requisites must concur.

17.) Rafael Patricio V. Hon. Oscar Leviste, Et Al., (1989)

FACTS:
May 16, 1976 10 pm: During a benefit dance in celebration of the town fiesta Rafael Patricio, an
ordained Catholic priest together with 2 policemen were posted near the gate of the public
auditorium to check on the assigned watchers of the gate.

Bienvenido Bacalocos, President of the Association of Barangay Captains of Pilar, Capiz and a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan who was in the state of drunkenness was also at the same
gate struck a bottle of beer on the table which injured and caused his own hand to bleed.

Bacalocos then approached Patricio and asked him if he has seen his wounded hand and before
Patricio could respond he hit Patricio's face with his bloodied hand.

Patricio filed a criminal case charging Bacalocos for Slander by Deed but it was dismissed so he
filed for damages in the court a quo.

ISSUE:
Whether Patricio should be entitled to moral damages?

RULING:
YES.
ART. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

The hitting on the face is contrary to morals and good customs and causing mental
anguish, moral shock, wounded feelings and social humiliation. Drunkenness is definitely no
excuse and does not relieve him of his liability
Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code in relation to par. (10) of Art. 2219 of the same
Code, "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage under Art. 21
of the Civil Code is to compensate the injured party for the moral injury caused upon his person
ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Exemplary or corrective damages are required by public policy to suppress the wanton
acts of the offender
The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is
entitled to either moral, temperate or compensatory damages, as the case may be such award
cannot be recovered as a matter of right
In cases where exemplary damages are awarded to the injured party, attorney's fees are
also recoverable.

18.) VELASCO VS. MANILA ELECTRIC CO., ET. AL.

FACTS:
Pedro J. Velasco, the appellant, complained that MERALCO, the appellee company, created a
nuisance, as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, in form of noise from their
substation which was in the same street, next to Velasco’s property/residence, which the
appellant also uses for his Medical Practice as a physician. The claim cannot be proven solely by
testimony however, as the testimonies given by the locals do not corroborate with each other, or
were subjective. To get a more accurate proof, under instructions from the Director of Health, Dr.
Jesus Almonte, noted as an impartial party, used a sound level meter and other instruments
within the compound of the plaintiff-appellant to get a reading on the decibels or sound meter. It
was observed that the readings range from 46-80 decibels, depending on the time and place. The
appellee company also took sound level samplings, with Mamerto Buenafe conducting the
reading within and near the vicinity of the substation, whose readings range from 42-76 decibels.
The readings were compared to Technical charts, which listed the decibels of areas from an
average home: 40, to the noisiest spot of Niagara Falls: 92. Thus, the readings from the impartial
party appeared more reliable. The court concluded that the evidence pointed the noise levels to
be of actionable nuisance, and that the appellant is entitled to relief, as there was a possibility
that it had effect on the appellant’s health. Appellee company contended that the appellant should
not have a ground to complain because of: 1) the intensity inside Velasco’s house was on 46 to
47 decibels; 2) the sound level at the North General Hospital, where silence was observed, was
higher that his residence and did not take action; 3) MERALCO had received no complaint in its
50 years of operations until the case.

ISSUES:
Whether the substation constituted a public nuisance, hence Velasco had the right to claim for
damages?

RULING:
Yes. The court held that the substation constituted a public nuisance in form of noise, of which
they made reference and consideration with cases in the U.S. regarding what level of noise
would constitute as public nuisance as defined in Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The court also contended that the damage claims by the plaintiff-appellant was exaggerated,
taking into consideration that 1) the appellant did not make all the possible measures, for
example to perhaps lease the property to others, 2) as for his health, it was observed that only
Velasco, among the other locals seem to have the ailments as he listed, and therefore lowered it
to a more justifiable amount of 20,000 pesos in damages and 5,000 pesos in attorney’s fees,
payable by the appellee. They also ordered that the appellee should take measures in lowering
the noise within 90 days.

19.) ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints
regarding the smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and
comfort. The defendant made investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that
the smokestacks of the said factory be elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or
suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and
abate the supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING:
NO. There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are
recognized as nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the
special circumstances and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by
private individuals however the latter is different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a
judicial function.

The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts
of law or equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of
municipal charters, cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere
resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been
pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.
20.) HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their
son, Mario. Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of
water, 9 feet deep. The factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the
gates were always open and there was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didn’t
have any barricade or fence. One day when Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank
inside the factory and began playing and swimming inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the
bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a cadaver, having died of ‘asphyxia
secondary to drowning.’ The lower decided in the favor of the parents saying that the petitioner is
liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING:
NO. The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that “One who maintains on his premises
dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who
fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is
liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser
in the premises. American Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally
is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual
condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks
themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the petitioners cannot be held liable for Mario’s
death.