R A N D - I N I T I AT E D RESEARCH

CHILD POLICY This PDF document was made available

CIVIL JUSTICE from www.rand.org as a public service of
EDUCATION
the RAND Corporation.
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT

HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE Jump down to document6

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

NATIONAL SECURITY The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit

POPULATION AND AGING
research organization providing
PUBLIC SAFETY

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

objective analysis and effective
SUBSTANCE ABUSE solutions that address the challenges
TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY
facing the public and private sectors
TRANSPORTATION AND around the world.
INFRASTRUCTURE

Support RAND
Purchase this document
Browse Books & Publications
Make a charitable contribution

For More Information

Visit RAND at www.rand.org
Explore RAND-Initiated Research
View document details

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law
as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic
representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-
commercial use only. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or
reuse in another form, any of our research documents.
This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series.
RAND monographs present major research findings that address the
challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND mono-
graphs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for
research quality and objectivity.
THE UN’S ROLE IN
NATION-BUILDING
FROM THE CONGO
TO IRAQ

James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell,

Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina
This research in the public interest was supported by the RAND
Corporation, using discretionary funds made possible by the generosity
of RAND’s donors and the fees earned on client-funded research.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The UN’s role in nation-building : from the Congo to Iraq / James Dobbins ... [et al.].
p. cm.
“MG-304.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8330-3589-4 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Democratization—Case studies. 2. United Nations—Peacekeeping forces—Case
studies. 3. United Nations—Military policy—Case studies. 4. United Nations—
Economic assistance—Case studies. 5. United Nations—Technical assistance—Case
studies. 6. Peace-building—Case studies. I. Dobbins, James, 1942–

JZ4984.5.U534 2005
341.5'84—dc22
2004027669

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing

objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges
facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s
publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients
and sponsors.
R® is a registered trademark.

Cover design by Stephen Bloodsworth

© Copyright 2005 RAND Corporation

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any
form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying,
recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in
writing from RAND.
Published 2005 by the RAND Corporation
1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138
1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
201 North Craig Street, Suite 202, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-1516
RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/
To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact
Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;
Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The first volume of this series dealt with the American experience with
nation-building, defined therein as the use of armed force in the aftermath
of a crisis to promote a transition to democracy. It examined eight instances
in which the United States took the lead in such endeavors. This volume
deals with the United Nations’ experience with comparable operations,
examining eight instances in which the United Nations led multinational
forces toward generally similar ends.

For the United States, post–Cold War nation-building had distant precur-
sors in the American occupations of Germany and Japan in the aftermath of
World War II and its role in fostering the emergence of democratic regimes
there. For the United Nations, the comparable precursor was in the early
1960s in the newly independent Belgian Congo.

The Republic of the Congo failed almost from the moment of its birth.
Within days of the Congo’s independence its army mutinied, the remaining
white administrators fled, the administration and the economy collapsed,
Belgian paratroops invaded, and the mineral-rich province of Katanga
seceded. These developments cast a serious shadow over the prospects for
the successful and peaceful completion of Africa’s decolonization, at that
point just gathering momentum. On July 14, 1960, acting with unusual
speed, the Security Council passed the first of a series of resolutions autho-
rizing the deployment of UN-led military forces to assist the Republic of the
Congo in restoring order and, eventually, in suppressing the rebellion in
Katanga.

Given the unprecedented nature of its mission and the consequent lack
of prior experience, existing doctrine, designated staff, or administrative
structure to underpin the operation, the United Nations performed remark-
ably well in the Congo. Significant forces began to arrive within days of the
Security Council’s authorization—performance matched in few subsequent
UN peacekeeping missions. The United Nations was quickly able to secure

xv
xvi The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

the removal of Belgian forces. Over the next three years, UN troops forced
the removal of foreign mercenaries and suppressed the Katangan secession
while civil elements of the mission provided a wide range of humanitar-
ian, economic, and civil assistance to the new Congolese regime. Mea-
sured against the bottom-line requirements of the international commu-
nity—that decolonization proceed, colonial and mercenary troops depart,
and the Congo remain intact—the United Nations was largely successful.
Democracy did not figure heavily in the various Congo resolutions passed
by the UN Security Council; there was, in any case, no agreement during the
Cold War on the definition of that term. The Congo never became a func-
tioning democracy, but large-scale civil conflict was averted for more than
a decade following the United Nations’ departure, and the country more or
less held together for two more decades, albeit under a corrupt and incom-
petent dictatorship.

UN achievements in the Congo came at considerable cost in men lost,

money spent, and controversy raised. For many people, the United Nations’
apparent complicity in the apprehension and later execution of Prime Min-
ister Patrice Lumumba overshadowed its considerable accomplishments.
As a result of these costs and controversies, neither the United Nations’
leadership nor its member nations were eager to repeat the experience. For
the next 25 years the United Nations restricted its military interventions
to interpositional peacekeeping, policing ceasefires, and patrolling disen-
gagement zones in circumstances where all parties invited its presence and
armed force was to be used by UN troops only in self-defense.

HEALING COLD WAR WOUNDS

The conclusion of the Cold War ended this hiatus in nation-building and
presented the United Nations with new opportunities and new challenges.
By the end of the 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union had begun
to disengage from proxy wars in Latin America, Africa, and Asia and were
finally prepared to work together in pressing former clients to resolve their
outstanding differences.

The early post–Cold War UN-led operations in Namibia, Cambodia, El Sal-

vador, and Mozambique followed a similar pattern. The international com-
munity, with U.S. and Soviet backing, first brokered a peace accord. The
Security Council then dispatched a UN peacekeeping force to oversee its
implementation. In each case, the UN mission’s responsibilities included
initiating an expeditious process of disarmament, demobilization, and
 Executive Summary xvii

reintegration; encouraging political reconciliation; holding democratic

elections; and overseeing the inauguration of a new national government.
Operations in each of these countries were greatly facilitated by war-weary
populations, great-power support, and the cooperation of neighboring
countries. The United Nations became adept at overseeing the disarmament
and demobilization of willing parties. The reintegration of former combat-
ants was everywhere more problematic, for nowhere did the international
community provide the necessary resources. Economic growth accelerated
in most cases, largely as a result of the cessation of fighting. Peace, growth,
and democracy were often accompanied by an increase in common crime,
as old repressive security services were dismantled and demobilized for-
mer combatants were left without a livelihood.

All four of these operations culminated in reasonably free and fair elec-
tions. All four resulted in sustained periods of civil peace that endured af-
ter the United Nations withdrawal. Cambodia enjoyed the least successful
democratic transformation and experienced the greatest renewal of civil
strife, although at nothing like the level that preceded the UN intervention.
Cambodia was also the first instance in which the United Nations became
responsible for helping govern a state in transition from conflict to peace
and democracy. The United Nations was ill prepared to assume such a role.
For its part, the government of Cambodia, although it had agreed to UN ad-
ministrative oversight as part of the peace accord, was unwilling to cede
effective authority. As a result, UN control over Cambodia’s civil adminis-
tration was largely nominal.

Despite the successes of these early post–Cold War operations, a number of

weaknesses in the United Nations’ performance emerged that would crip-
ple later missions launched in more difficult circumstances. Deficiencies
included

• the slow arrival of military units

• the even slower deployment of police and civil administrators

• the uneven quality of military components

• the even greater unevenness of police and civil administrators

xviii The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

• the United Nations’ dependence on voluntary funding to pay for such

mission-essential functions as reintegration of combatants and ca-
pacity building in local administrations

• the frequent mismatches between ambitious mandates and modest

means

• the premature withdrawal of missions, often following immediately

after the successful conclusion of a first democratic election.

COPING WITH FAILED STATES

During the early 1990s, the United Nations enjoyed a series of successes.
This winning streak and a consequent optimism about the task of nation-
building came to an abrupt end in Somalia and were further diminished
by events in the former Yugoslavia. In both instances, UN-led peacekeep-
ing forces were inserted into societies where there was no peace to keep. In
both cases, UN forces eventually had to be replaced by larger, more robust
American-led peace enforcement missions.

Although the Cold War divided some societies, it provided the glue that held
others together. Even as former East-West battlegrounds, such as Namibia,
Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique, were able to emerge as viable
nation states with UN assistance, other divided societies, such as Somalia,
Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan—which had been held together by one super-
power or the other, and sometimes by both—began to disintegrate as ex-
ternal supports and pressures were removed. Not surprisingly, the United
Nations had a harder time holding together collapsing states than brokering
reconciliation in coalescing ones.

The original UN mission in Somalia was undermanned and overmatched

by warring Somali clan militias. The U.S.-led multinational force that re-
placed it was built on a core of 20,000 American soldiers and marines. This
force was quickly able to overawe local resistance and secure the delivery
of famine relief supplies, its principal mission. Washington then chose to
withdraw all but 2,000 troops. The United States passed overall responsi-
bility back to the United Nations and supported a radical expansion of the
UN’s mandate. The previous UN and U.S. forces had confined their mission
to securing humanitarian relief activities. Even as the United States with-
drew 90 percent of its combat forces and saw them replaced by a smaller
number of less well equipped UN troops, it joined in extending the mission
of those remaining forces to the introduction of grass-roots democracy, a
 Executive Summary xix

process which would put the United Nations at cross purposes with every
warlord in the country. The result was a resurgence of violence to levels that
residual U.S. and UN troops proved unable to handle.

Insuperable difficulties also arose in the former Yugoslavia, where UN

peacekeepers were again deployed to an ongoing civil war without the
mandate, influence, or firepower needed to end the fighting. UN deficien-
cies contributed to the failure of its efforts in Bosnia, as they had in Soma-
lia, but at least equal responsibility lies with its principal member govern-
ments: with Russia, for its stubborn partisanship on behalf of Serbia; with
the United States, for its refusal to commit American forces or to support
the peacemaking initiatives of those governments that had; and with Brit-
ain and France, the principal troop contributors, for failing to enforce the
mandate they had accepted to protect the innocent civilians entrusted to
their care.

The failure of UN missions in both Somalia and Bosnia, when contrasted

with the more robust American-led multinational efforts that succeeded
them, led to a general conclusion that, although the United Nations might
be up to peacekeeping, peace enforcement was beyond its capacity. This
conclusion, not uncongenial to the United Nations’ own leadership, is be-
lied by that organization’s performance 30 years earlier in the former Bel-
gian Congo. Its subsequent conduct of small, but highly successful peace
enforcement missions in Eastern Slavonia from 1996 to 1998 and in East
Timor beginning in 1999, suggested that the United Nations was capable of
executing a robust peace enforcement mandate in circumstances where the
scale was modest, the force included a core of capable First World troops,
and the venture had strong international backing.

Eastern Slavonia was the last Serb-held area of Croatia at the end of the con-
flict between these two former Yugoslav republics. The United Nations once
again became responsible for governing a territory in transition, in this case
from Serb to Croat control. The UN operation in Eastern Slavonia was gener-
ously manned, well led, abundantly resourced, and strongly supported by
the major powers, whose influence ensured the cooperation of neighboring
states. Not surprisingly, given these advantages, the UN peace enforcement
mission in Eastern Slavonia was highly successful.

American-led multinational missions in Somalia and Bosnia contrasted

positively with the UN missions that had preceded them, primarily be-
cause they were better resourced and more determined in the employment
of those larger capabilities. Had the United States been willing to pro-
xx The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

vide a military commander and 20,000 American troops to the UN-led

operations in Somalia or Bosnia, those earlier efforts would likely have
fared better, perhaps obviating the need for the subsequent multinational
interventions.

NATION-BUILDING IN THE NEW DECADE

In the closing months of 1999, the United Nations found itself charged with
governing both Kosovo and East Timor. The latter operation proved an ideal
showcase for UN capabilities. Like Eastern Slavonia, East Timor was small
in both territory and population. International resources, in terms of mili-
tary manpower and economic assistance, were unusually abundant. Major-
power influence secured the cooperation of neighboring states. A multina-
tional coalition, in this case led by Australia, secured initial control of the
territory and then quickly turned the operation over to UN management.
Remaining combatants were disarmed, new security forces established, a
local administration created, elections held, and a democratically elected
government inaugurated in less than three years.

Even this showcase operation exhibited certain chronic UN deficiencies.

International police and civil administrators were slow to arrive and of
variable quality. Once ensconced, UN administrators were a trifle slow to
turn power back to local authorities. These were minor blemishes, however,
on a generally successful operation.

In less benign circumstances, such weaknesses continued to threaten the

success of UN operations. In Sierra Leone, inadequate UN forces were in-
serted in 1999 as part of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UN-
AMSIL) under unduly optimistic assumptions. They encountered early re-
verses and eventually suffered the ultimate humiliation of being captured
and held hostage in large numbers. Poised on the verge of collapse, the Sierra
Leone operation was rescued by the United Kingdom and turned around
thanks in large measure to extraordinary personal efforts by the UN Sec-
retary-General. British forces arrived, extricated UN hostages, intimidated
insurgent forces, and began to train a more competent local military. The
United States threw its logistic and diplomatic weight behind the operation.
The regime in neighboring Liberia, highly complicit in Sierra Leone’s civil
war, was displaced. Additional manpower and economic resources were se-
cured. Thus bolstered, the United Nations was able to oversee a process of
disarmament and demobilization and hold reasonably free elections.
 Executive Summary xxi

QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE COMPARISONS

Nation-building can be viewed in terms of its inputs—which, broadly
speaking, are manpower, money, and time, and its desired outputs—which
are peace, economic growth and democratization. Needless to say, outputs
depend on much more than the inputs. Success in nation-building depends
on the wisdom with which such resources are employed and on the suscep-
tibility of the society in question to the changes being fostered. Neverthe-
less, success is also in some measure dependent on the quantity of inter-
national military and police manpower and external economic assistance,
and of the time over which these are applied.

The first volume of this study compared inputs and outputs for seven U.S.-led
nation-building missions: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo,
and Afghanistan. Drawing on that earlier work, this volume compares data
from the eight UN missions described herein, the eight U.S. missions from
the previous volume, and data from the current operation in Iraq.

Military Presence
Military force levels for UN missions ranged from nearly 20,000 UN troops
deployed in the Congo and 16,000 in Cambodia to 5,000 in Namibia and
El Salvador. UN missions have normally fielded much smaller contingents
than American-led operations, both in absolute numbers and in relation to
the local population. The largest UN mission we studied is smaller than the
smallest U.S. mission studied.

Duration
UN forces have tended to remain in post-conflict countries for shorter pe-
riods of time than have U.S. forces. In the early 1990s, both U.S. and UN-
led operations tended to be terminated rather quickly, often immediately
following the completion of an initial democratic election and the inau-
guration of a new government. In this period, the United States and the
United Nations tended to define their objectives rather narrowly, focusing
on exit strategies and departure deadlines. As experience with nation-
building grew, however, both the United Nations and the United States
came to recognize that reconciliation and democratization could require
more than a single election. By the end of the decade, both UN- and U.S.-led
operations became more extended and peacekeeping forces were drawn
down more slowly, rather than exiting en masse following the first national
election.
 a
Number of years G Soldiers per thousand inhabitants
er
m
G an

10
15
20
25

0
5

0
1
2
3
4
6
7
8
9

5
10
er y
m Ja (19

RAND MG304-S.2
RAND MG304-S.1
an pa 45
y n )

8
C (
101

Ja on 19
p an go 45
N )

8
C

Ongoing operation
on a (
El mi 196
go b 1
N

1
Sa ia

4
a lva (1 )
El mi C d 9

3
Sa bia am or 89)

1
lva bo (19
C d d 91
am or )

4
So ia
M

0.07
bo m (19
9
UN-led cases

di oz al
U.S.-led cases

S a

2
3)

2
am ia
M om bi (19
oz al qu 92
5

e )

3
am ia
(

UN-led cases
U.S.-led cases
bi H 19
qu Ea a 9
e iti 3)

2
NOTE: See Figure 12.2 for source information.
0.38
st

NOTE: See Figure 12.3 for source information.

H er Bos (19
n
Ea a
a S nia
94
4

iti )

3
st
er Bos Si lavo (19
n n er n 9 5
a
S ia ra ia
19

9+
L (1 )
xxii The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

Si lavo Ea eo 99
er 6)
ra nia

2
34

st ne
a L Ti (2

Figure S.2—Duration of Operations

Ea eo m 00
3

or 0)
st ne K (

5+
Ti
m Af oso 199

Figure S.1—Peak Military Presence Per Capita

a or gh vo 9)
10

5+
a o an (
Af so is 200
gh vo ta 0
n
20

5+
an (2 )
is
ta I ra 0 04
1

n q )

3+
a (2
00
Ira
7

q 3)

1+
 Executive Summary xxiii

3.14 2.02
2.0
1.8 U.S.-led cases 1.65
Police per thousand inhabitants

1.6 UN-led cases

1.4
1.12 1.16
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4 0.32

0.2 0.11 0.13

0.02 0.07 0.02
0 0 0.01 0 0
0
y

lva (1 )
am or 90)

4)

(1 )

Ko r (2 4)
vo 02)

q
go an

8)
)

an )
5

96

95

95

0
92

gh 01
an

ta

Ira
El mi 196

m 00
99
on a p

is
9

m (19

bi (19

H 19

er Bos (19

Si lavo (20

0
bo (19

0
m

Ti (2

(2
J
er

(
Sa bia

So ia

am ia

ti

st ne
ia
G

o
ai
qu

i
d

al

n
d

so
Ea eo

Af
C

L
a
N

ra
S
C

oz

er
n
M

st
Ea

NOTE: See Figure 12.5 for source information.

RAND MG304-S.3
Figure S.3—Peak Civilian Police Presence Per Capita

Civilian Police
International civilian police are an increasingly important component of
most UN nation-building operations, in some cases representing 10 percent
or more of the overall force. UN civilian police forces usually left with the
troops. However, in El Salvador, Haiti, and Eastern Slavonia they stayed
a year or more after the military component withdrew. The United States
pioneered the use of armed international police in Haiti but looked to the
United Nations to supply police for the NATO-led operations in Bosnia
and Kosovo. The United States did not include civilian police in its last two
nation-building operations, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Combat-Related Deaths
Casualties suffered are a good measure of the difficulties encountered in
an operation. Missions with high casualty levels have been among the least
successful. Among UN cases, the Congo had the highest number of casu-
alties, reflecting the peace enforcement nature of the operation. After the
Congo, the Cambodian operation, lightly manned as a proportion of the
population, had the highest casualty level, followed by Sierra Leone.
xxiv The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

Following the loss of 18 U.S. soldiers in Somalia in 1993, the United States
took great precautions through the rest of the decade to avoid casual-
ties. The United Nations was slightly less risk averse. Through the end of
the 1990s, casualty rates in UN-led operations were consequently a little
higher than American. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, American sensitivity to casualties diminished. At the same time,
the United States abandoned its strategy of deploying overwhelming force
at the outset of nation-building operations. Significantly lower force-to-
population ratios in Afghanistan and Iraq than in Bosnia or Kosovo have
been accompanied by much higher casualty levels.

135 143+ 1,106+

50
43
Post-conflict combat casualties

40 U.S.-led cases
UN-led cases

30
25

20

10 8+
4 3 4+
0 0 1 0 1 0+ 0+
0
y

Co n
N go
Sa ibia

a
am ia

ti

ia

ra nia

st ne

Ko r
ha vo
an

q
Ca ado

o
an

di

qu
a

Ira
ai
al

sn

fg so
p

Ea eo

st
n

bo

Si avo

a
H
m

M om
am
Ja

bi

er Bo

Ti

ni
lv

L
er

a
Sl
S
G

er
oz

n
El

A
a
a
st
Ea

aOngoing operation
NOTE: See Figure 12.7 for source information.
RAND MG304-S.4

Figure S.4—Post-Conflict Combat Deaths

 Executive Summary xxv

Sustained Peace
Peace is the most essential product of nation-building. Without peace, nei-
ther economic growth nor democratization are possible. With peace, some
level of economic growth becomes almost inevitable and democratization
at least possible. As Table S.1 illustrates, among the 16 countries studied in
this and the preceding volume, eleven remain at peace today, five do not. Of
the eight UN-led cases, seven are at peace. Of the eight U.S.-led cases, four
are at peace; four are not—or not yet—at peace. These categorizations are
necessarily provisional, particularly for the ongoing operations in Afghani-
stan and Iraq. Peace in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Sierra Leone has
been sustained but so far only with the ongoing presence of international
peacekeepers.
Table S.1
Sustained Peace
Country At Peace in 2004
Germany Yes
Japan Yes
Congo No
Namibia Yes
El Salvador Yes
Cambodia Yes
Somalia No
Mozambique Yes
Haiti No
Bosnia Yes
Eastern Slavonia Yes
Sierra Leone Yes
East Timor Yes
Kosovo Yes
Afghanistan No
Iraq No
 xxvi The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

100 U.S.-led cases

100 98
UN-led cases 90
Percent of refugees returned after 5

90 83 85
years (or most recent year)

80 73 72
70
60 53 50
50
39
40
30 22
20 13 12
10
0
ia

ia

ti

ia

or

q
ia
am r

gh vo
do

ai
di

qu

on

ta

Ira
ib

al

sn

on

o
H
bo
am

is
lva

s
bi

Le

Ti
Bo

av

an
Ko
So

am
Sa
N

st
Sl

ra

Ea
C

oz

er
n
El

Af
er

Si
M

st
Ea

NOTE: See Figure 12.8 for source information.

RAND MG304-S.5
Figure S.5—Refugee Returns After Five Years
Refugee Return
Success in stemming the flow and facilitating the return of unwanted refu-
gees is one of the chief benefits provided to the international community
by nation-building and often a major incentive to launch such operations.
Most nation-building missions have been highly successful in this regard.
Low rates of refugee return are often a sign of continued conflict in the so-
ciety in question (e.g., Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan) but are sometimes
indicative of the significantly better living conditions in the places of refuge
(e.g., the United States for Salvadoran and Haitian refugees).

Democratization
Below, we characterize each of the sixteen societies studied as democratic
or not based on codings from Freedom House and the Polity IV Project at
the University of Maryland. Among the U.S.-led cases, Germany and Japan
are clearly democratic; Bosnia and Kosovo are democratic but still under
varying degrees of international administration; Somalia and Haiti are
not democratic; and Afghanistan and Iraq are seeking to build democratic
structures in exceptionally difficult circumstances. Among the UN-led
cases all but the Congo and Cambodia remain democratic, some of course
more than others.
 Executive Summary xxvii

Table S.2
Democractic Development
Polity IV Freedom House
Country Democracy in 2004 (0 low, 10 high) (0 low, 10 high)
Germany Yes 10.0 10.0
Japan Yes 10.0 10.0
Congo No 0.0 2.9

Namibia Yes 6.0 8.6

El Salvador Yes 7.0 8.6
Cambodia No 3.0 2.9
Somalia No – 2.9
Mozambique Yes 6.0 7.1
Haiti No 1.0 2.9
Bosnia Yes – 5.7
Eastern Slavoniaa Yes 7.0 8.6
Sierra Leone Yes 5.0 5.7
East Timor Yes 6.0 7.1
Kosovo Yes – –
Afghanistan No – 2.9
Iraq No 0.0 1.4
a
Since neither Polity IV nor Freedom House had data for Eastern Slavonia, we used Croatia
as a proxy.

External Assistance
UN-led operations have tended to be less well supported with international
economic assistance than U.S. operations, in both absolute and propor-
tional terms. This reflects the greater access of the United States to donor
assistance funds, including its own, and those of the international finan-
cial institutions to which it belongs. In effect, the United States can always
ensure the level of funding it deems necessary. The United Nations seldom
can. Many UN operations are consequently poorly supported with eco-
nomic assistance.

Economic Growth
The presence of international peacekeepers and their success in suppress-
ing renewed conflict, rather than the level of economic assistance, seem to
be the key determinants of economic growth. As the present situation of
Iraq illustrates, security is a prerequisite for growth, and money is no sub-
 xxviii The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

679
600
526
U.S.-led cases
Annual per capita assistance

500
UN-led cases

400
( 2000 US$)

290
300
233
206
200
129 132
100 85 90 73 57
29 24 28 25
0
y

go

Sa bia

am ia

it i

S nia

Ko r

q
st ne
C n

ra nia
am or

gh vo
o
an

qu

ta

Ira
pa

a
d

m
d

so
on

Ea eo
H
i

bo

er Bos

Si lavo

is
lva
am
m

bi
Ja

Ti

an
L
er

N
G

oz

er
n
El

Af
M

st
Ea

NOTE: See Figure 12.10 for source information.

RAND MG304-S.6

Figure S.6—Annual Per-Capita Assistance After First Two Years

25
21.3
U.S.-led cases
20
UN-led cases
Economic growth (%)

14.4
16

10 7.9 7.1
5.7
5 3.9 3.1
1.7 2.1 1.9
1.0
-0.2
0

–1.7
–5
y

go

ia

ti

ia

or

n
n

am r

gh vo
do
an

ai
di

qu

on

ta
pa

ib

sn

so
on

H
bo

is
lva
am
m

bi

Le
Ja

Ti
Bo

an
Ko
C
er

am
Sa

st
N

ra
G

Ea
C

oz

er
El

Af
Si
M

NOTE: See Figure 12.11 for source information.

RAND MG304-S.7

Figure S.7—Average Annual Growth in Per Capita GDP During First Five Years
After Conflict
 Executive Summary xxix

stitute for adequate manpower in providing it. Indeed, security without

economic assistance is much more likely to spur economic growth than is
economic assistance without security.

THE U.S. AND UN WAYS OF NATION-BUILDING

Over the years, the United States and the United Nations have developed
distinctive styles of nation-building derived from their very different na-
tures and capabilities. The United Nations is an international organization
entirely dependent on its members for the wherewithal to conduct nation-
building. The United States is the world’s only superpower, commanding
abundant resources of its own and having access to those of many other
nations and institutions.

UN operations have almost always been undermanned and under-

resourced. This is not because UN managers believe smaller is better,
although some do. It is because member states are rarely willing to com-
mit the manpower or the money any prudent military commander would
desire. As a result, small and weak UN forces are routinely deployed into
what they hope, on the basis of best-case assumptions, will prove to be post-
conflict situations. Where such assumptions prove ill founded, UN forces
have had to be reinforced, withdrawn, or, in extreme cases, rescued.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States adopted the opposite approach
to sizing its nation-building deployments, basing its plans on worst-case
assumptions and relying on overwhelming force to quickly establish a stable
environment and deter resistance from forming. In Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia,
and Kosovo, U.S.-led coalitions intervened in numbers and with capabili-
ties that discouraged significant resistance. In Somalia, this American force
was drawn down too quickly. The resultant casualties reinforced the Ameri-
can determination to establish and retain a substantial overmatch in any
future nation-building operation. In the aftermath of the September 2001
terrorist attacks, American tolerance of military casualties significantly in-
creased. In sizing its stabilization operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
new American leadership abandoned the strategy of overwhelming pre-
ponderance (sometimes labeled the Powell doctrine after former Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell) in favor of the “small foot-
print” or “low profile” force posture that had previously characterized UN
operations.
xxx The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

In both cases, these smaller American-led forces proved unable to establish

a secure environment. In both cases, the original U.S. force levels have had
to be significantly increased, but in neither instance has this sufficed to es-
tablish adequate levels of public security.

It would appear that the low-profile, small-footprint approach to nation-

building is much better suited to UN-style peacekeeping than to U.S.-style
peace enforcement. The United Nations has an ability to compensate, to
some degree at least, for its “hard” power deficit with “soft” power attributes
of international legitimacy and local impartiality. The United States does
not have such advantages in situations where America itself is a party to
the conflict being terminated, or where the United States has acted with-
out an international mandate. Military reversals also have greater conse-
quences for the United States than for the United Nations. To the extent
that the United Nations’ influence depends more on moral than physical
power, more on its legitimacy than its combat prowess, military rebuffs do
not fatally undermine its credibility. To the extent that America leans more
on “hard” than on “soft” power to achieve its objectives, military reverses
strike at the very heart of its potential influence. These considerations,
along with recent experience, suggest that the United States would be well
advised to resume supersizing its nation-building missions and to leave the
small-footprint approach to the United Nations.

The United Nations and the United States tend to enunciate their nation-
building objectives very differently. UN mandates are highly negotiated,
densely bureaucratic documents. UN spokespersons tend toward under-
statement in expressing their goals. Restraint of this sort is more difficult for
U.S. officials, who must build congressional and public support for costly
and sometimes dangerous missions in distant and unfamiliar places. As a
result, American nation-building rhetoric tends toward the grandiloquent.
The United States often becomes the victim of its own rhetoric when its
higher standards are not met.

UN-led nation-building missions tend to be smaller than American opera-

tions, to take place in less demanding circumstances, to be more frequent
and therefore more numerous, to have more circumspectly defined objec-
tives, and—at least among the missions studied—to enjoy a higher success
rate than U.S.-led efforts. By contrast, U.S.-led nation-building has taken
place in more demanding circumstances, has required larger forces and
more robust mandates, has received more economic support, has espoused
more ambitious objectives, and—at least among the missions studied—has
fallen short of those objectives more often than has the United Nations.
Table S.3 summarizes nation-building operations since 1945.
 Table S.3
Major Nation-Building Operations: 1945 –Present
Country Years Peak Troops Lead Actors Assessment Lessons Learned
West Germany 1945–1952 1.6 million Led by U.S, British, Very successful. Within 10 Democracy can be transferred.
and French years an economically stable Military forces can underpin
democratic and NATO member democratic transformation.
state.
Japan 1945–1952 350,000 U.S.-led Very successful. Economically Democracy can be exported
stable democratic and regional to non-Western societies.
security anchor within a decade. Unilateral nation-building can
be simpler than multilateral.
Congo 1960–1964 19,828 UN-led Partially successful, costly Money and manpower demands
and controversial. UN ensured almost always exceed supply.
decolonization and territorial Controversial missions leave
integrity, but not democracy. legacies of “risk aversion.”
Namibia 1989–1990 4,493 UN-led Successful. UN helped ensure Compliant neighbors, a
peace, democratic development, competent government, and a
and economic growth. clear end state can contribute to
successful outcome.
El Salvador 1991–1996 4,948 UN-led Successful. UN negotiated lasting UN participation in settlement
peace settlement and transition negotiations can facilitate

Executive Summary xxxi

to democracy after 12-year civil smooth transition.
war.
Cambodia 1991–1993 15,991 UN-led Partially successful. UN Democratization requires long-
organized elections, verified term engagement.
withdrawal of foreign troops and
ended large-scale civil war. But
democracy did not take hold.
 Table S.3—Continued

xxxii The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

Country Years Peak Troops Lead Actors Assessment Lessons Learned
Somalia 1992–1994 28,000 UN-led Not successful. Little Unity of command can be
peacekeeping accomplished other than some important in peace as in combat
mission, followed humanitarian aid delivered to operations. Nation-building
by US-led coalition, Mogadishu and other cities. objectives must be scaled to
followed by UN available resources.
led peacekeeping
mission
Mozambique 1992–1994 6,576 UN-led Mostly successful. Transition Cooperation of neighboring
to independence was peaceful states is critical to success.
and democratic. But negative Incorporation of insurgent
economic growth. groups into political process is
key to democratic transition.
Haiti 1994–1996 21,000 U.S.-led entry, Initially successful but ultimately Exit deadlines can be
followed by UN- not. U.S. forces restored counterproductive. Need time to
led peacekeeping democratically elected president build competent administrations
mission with large but U.S. and UN left before and democratic institutions.
U.S. component democratic institutions took
hold.
Bosnia 1995– 20,000 U.S./NATO–led Mixed success. Democratic Nexus between organized crime
present military elections within two years, but and political extremism can be
component, ad government is constitutionally serious challenge to enduring
hoc coalition civil weak. democratic reforms.
component, largely
U.S. and EU
 Table S.3—Continued
Country Years Peak Troops Lead Actors Assessment Lessons Learned
Eastern 1995–1998 8,248 UN-led Successful. Well-resourced UN can successfully conduct
Slavonia operation and clear end state small peace enforcement
contributed to peaceful and missions with support from
democratic transition. major powers.
Sierra Leone 1998– 15,255 UN-led, parallel UK Initially unsuccessful, then Lack of support from major
present force in support much improved. Parallel British powers can undermine UN
engagement helped stabilize operations. But even a badly
mission. compromised mission can be
turned around.
East Timor 1999– 8,084 Australian-led entry Successful. UN oversaw Support of neighboring states
present followed by UN- transition to democracy, peace, is important for security. Local
led peacekeeping and economic growth. actors should be involved as early
mission as possible in governance.
Kosovo 1999– 15,000 U.S./NATO–led Mostly successful. Elections Broad participation, and
present entry, followed within 3 years and strong extensive burden sharing
by NATO-led economic growth. But no final can be compatible with unity
peacekeeping, resolution of Kosovo’s status. of command and American
UN-led civil leadership.
governance,

Executive Summary xxxiii

OSCE-led
democratization,
and EU-led
reconstruction
 Table S.3—Continued

xxxiv The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

Country Years Peak Troops Lead Actors Assessment Lessons Learned
Afghanistan 2001– 20,000 U.S.-led entry and Too soon to tell. Democratic Low initial input of money and
present counterinsurgency, elections and decline as a troops yields a low output of
UN-led base for terrorism. But little security, democratization, and
democratization, government control beyond economic growth.
and NATO-led Kabul, and rising drug and
peacekeeping insurgency challenges.

Iraq 2003– 175,000 U.S.-led entry, Too soon to tell. Overthrow of Postwar planning is as important
present occupation, and Saddam Hussein’s brutal regime. as planning for the conflict.
counterinsurgency But insurgency has slowed
reconstruction efforts.
 Executive Summary xxxv

There are three explanations for the better UN success rate. The first is that
a different selection of cases would produce a different result. The second
is that the U.S. cases are intrinsically more difficult. The third is that the
United Nations has done a better job of learning from its mistakes than has
the United States. Throughout the 1990s, the United States became steadily
better at nation-building. The Haitian operation was better managed than
Somalia, Bosnia better than Haiti, and Kosovo better than Bosnia. The U.S.
learning curve was not sustained into the current decade. The administra-
tion that took office in 2001 initially disdained nation-building as an un-
suitable activity for U.S. forces. When compelled to engage in such mis-
sions, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, the administration sought to
break with the strategies and institutional responses that had been honed
throughout the 1990s to deal with these challenges.

The United Nations has largely avoided the institutional discontinuities

that have marred U.S. performance. The current UN Secretary-General,
Kofi Annan, was Undersecretary-General for Peacekeeping and head of
the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia throughout the first half of the
1990s, when UN nation-building began to burgeon. He was chosen for his
current post by the United States and other member governments largely on
the basis of his demonstrated skills in managing the United Nations’ peace-
keeping portfolio. Some of his closest associates from that period moved
up with him to the UN front office while others remain in the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations. As a result, UN nation-building missions have
been run over the past 15 years by an increasingly experienced cadre of
international civil servants. Similarly in the field, many UN peacekeeping
operations are headed and staffed by veterans of earlier operations.

The United States, in contrast, tends to staff each new operation as if it were
its first and destined to be its last. Service in such missions has never been
regarded as career enhancing for American military or Foreign Service
officers. Recruitment is often a problem, terms tend to be short, and few in-
dividuals volunteer for more than one mission.

IS NATION-BUILDING COST-EFFECTIVE?
In addition to the horrendous human costs, war inflicts extraordi-
nary economic costs on societies. On average, one study suggests, civil
wars reduce prospective economic output by 2.2 percent per year for the
duration of the conflict. However, once peace is restored, economic
activity resumes and, in a number of cases, the economy grows. A study
xxxvi The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler looked at the cost and effectiveness
of various policy options to reduce the incidence and duration of civil
wars. It found that post-conflict military intervention is highly cost-
effective—in fact, the most cost-effective policy examined.1

Our study supports that conclusion. The UN success rate among mis-
sions studied—seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left
democratic—substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effec-
tive means of terminating conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence,
and promoting democracy. The sharp overall decline in deaths from armed
conflict around the world over the past decade also points to the efficacy
of nation-building. During the 1990s, deaths from armed conflict were
averaging over 200,000 per year. Most were in Africa. In 2003, the last year
for which figures exist, that number had come down to 27,000, a fivefold
decrease in deaths from civil and international conflict. In fact, despite
the daily dosage of horrific violence displayed in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
world has not become a more violent place within the past decade. Rather,
the reverse is true. International peacekeeping and nation-building have
contributed to this reduced death rate.

The cost of UN nation-building tends to look quite modest compared to

the cost of larger and more demanding U.S.-led operations. At present the
United States is spending some $4.5 billion per month to support its military
operations in Iraq. This is more than the United Nations spends to run all
17 of its current peacekeeping missions for a year. This is not to suggest that
the United Nations could perform the U.S. mission in Iraq more cheaply, or
perform it at all. It is to underline that there are 17 other places where the
United States will probably not have to intervene because UN troops are do-
ing so at a tiny fraction of the cost of U.S.-led operations.

CONTINUING DEFICIENCIES
Even when successful, UN nation building only goes so far to fix the under-
lying problems of the societies it is seeking to rebuild. Francis Fukuyama
has suggested that such missions can be divided into three distinct phases:
(1) the initial stabilization of a war-torn society; (2) the creation of local
institutions for governance; and (3) the strengthening of those institutions
to the point where rapid economic growth and sustained social develop-
1 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil
War,” Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford Univer-
sity, Copenhagen Challenge Paper, April 23, 2004, p. 22.
 Executive Summary xxxvii

ment can take place.2 Experience over the past 15 years suggests that the
United Nations has achieved a fair mastery of the techniques needed to suc-
cessfully complete the first two of those tasks. Success with the third has
largely eluded the United Nations, as it has the international development
community as whole.

Despite the United Nations’ significant achievements in the field of nation-

building, the organization continues to exhibit weaknesses that decades of
experience have yet to overcome. Most UN missions are undermanned and
underfunded. UN-led military forces are often sized and deployed on the
basis of unrealistic best-case assumptions. Troop quality is uneven and has
even gotten worse as many rich Western nations have followed U.S. practice
and become less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operations.
Police and civil personnel are always of mixed competence. All components
of the mission arrive late; police and civil administrators arrive even more
slowly than soldiers.

These same weaknesses have been exhibited most recently in the U.S.-led
operation in Iraq. There, it was an American-led stabilization force that was
deployed on the basis of unrealistic, best-case assumptions and American
troops that arrived in inadequate numbers and had to be progressively re-
inforced as new, unanticipated challenges emerged. There, it was the qual-
ity of the U.S.-led coalition’s military contingents that proved distinctly
variable, as has been their willingness to take orders, risks, and casual-
ties. There, it was American civil administrators who were late to arrive, of
mixed competence, and not available in adequate numbers. These weak-
nesses thus appear to be endemic to nation-building rather than unique to
the United Nations.

CONCLUSIONS
Assuming adequate consensus among Security Council members on the
purpose for any intervention, the United Nations provides the most suit-
able institutional framework for most nation-building missions, one with
a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and
the greatest degree of international legitimacy. Other possible options are
likely to be either more expensive (e.g., coalitions led by the United States,
the European Union, NATO) or less capable organizations (e.g., the African
Union, the Organization of American States, or ASEAN). The more expen-
2 Francis Fukuyama, State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2004), pp. 99–104..
xxxviii The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq

sive options are best suited to missions that require forced entry or employ
more than 20,000 men, which so far has been the effective upper limit for
UN operations. The less capable options are suited to missions where there
is a regional but not a global consensus for action or where the United States
simply does not care enough to foot 25 percent of the bill.

Although the U.S. and UN styles of nation-building are distinguishable,

they are also highly interdependent. It is a rare operation in which both are
not involved. Both UN and U.S. nation-building efforts presently stand at
near historic highs. The United Nations currently has approximately 60,000
troops deployed in 17 countries. This is a modest expeditionary commit-
ment in comparison with that of the United States, but it exceeds that of any
other nation or combination of nations. Demand for UN-led peacekeep-
ing operations nevertheless far exceeds the available supply, particularly
in sub-Saharan African. American armed forces, the world’s most power-
ful, also find themselves badly overstretched by the demands of such mis-
sions. A decade ago, in the wake of UN and U.S. setbacks in Somalia and
Bosnia, nation-building became a term of opprobrium leading a significant
segment of American opinion to reject the whole concept. Ten years later,
nation-building appears ever more clearly as a responsibility that neither
the United Nations nor the United States can escape. The United States and
the United Nations bring different capabilities to the process. Neither is
likely to succeed without the other. Both have much to learn not just from
their own experience but also from that of each other. It is our hope that this
study and its predecessor will help both to do so.