Assigned Cases in Civ Rev II (1st Batch)

1. Makati Stock Exchange vs Campos, GR #138814, 16 Apr 2009

FACTS:

            Respondent Miguel V. Campos filed a petition with the Securities, Investigation and Clearing Department
(SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the petitioners Makati Stock Exchange, Inc.
(MKSE) The petition sought: (1) to nullify the Resolution dated 3 June 1993 of the MKSE Board of Directors,
which allegedly deprived him of his right to participate equally in the allocation of Initial Public Offerings (IPO) of
corporations registered with MKSE; (2) the delivery of the IPO shares he was allegedly deprived of, for which he
would pay IPO prices;.

SICD granted the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin petitioners from implementing or
enforcing the resolution of the MKSE. they also issued a writ of preliminary injunction for the implementation or
enforcement of the MKSE Board Resolution in question.

On March 11,1994, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) Petition became
moot due to the cancellation of the license of the MKSE (2) The SICD had no jurisdiction over the petition and (3)
the petition failed to state a cause of action. However, the SICD denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

ISSUE:
           Whether or not the petition failed to state a cause of action.

HELD:
           The petition filed by respondent Miguel Campos should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.

It contains three essential elements: 1) the legal right of the plaintiff 2) the correlative obligation of the
defendant and 3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If these elements are absent,
the complaint will be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.  Furthermore, the petition filed
by respondent failed to lay down the source or basis of respondent’s right and/or petitioner’s obligation.

Article 1157 of the Civil Code, provides that Obligations arise from: law, Contracts, Quasi Contracts,
Acts or omissions punished by law and quasi delicts. Therefore an obligation imposed on a person and the
corresponding right granted to another, must be rooted in at least one of these five sources.

The mere assertion of a right and claim of an obligation in an initiatory pleading, whether a Complaint or
Petition, without identifying the basis or source thereof, is merely a conclusion of fact and law. A pleading should
state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions
of fact or conclusions of law.

The Respondent merely quoted in his Petition the MKSE Board Resolution, passed sometime in 1989,
granting him the position of Chairman Emeritus of MKSE for life. However, there is nothing in the said Petition
from which the Court can deduce that respondent, by virtue of his position as Chairman Emeritus of MKSE, was
granted by law, contract, or any other legal source, the right to subscribe to the IPOs of corporations listed in the
stock market at their offering prices.

2. Asuncion vs CA, 238 SCRA 602 (1994)

Obligations and Contracts

Sources of an Obligation, Lis Pendens, Art. 1156, Civil Code
FACTS:
A complaint for Specific Performance was filed by Ang Yu Asuncion et al.,
against Bobby Cu Unjieng and Jose Tan. The plaintiffs were tenants or lessees of
residential and commercial spaces owned by defendants in Binondo. On several
conditions defendants informed the plaintiffs that they are offering to sell the
premises and are giving them priority to acquire the same.

During negotiations, Cu Unjieng offered a price of P6- million while plaintiffs

made a counter of offer of P5-million. Plaintiff thereafter asked the defendants to
put their offer in writing to which the defendants acceded. In reply to defendants’
letter, plaintiffs wrote, asking thatthey specify the terms and conditions of the
offer to sell. When the plaintiffs did not receive any reply, they sent another letter
with the same request. Since defendants failed to specify the terms and conditions
of the offer to sell and because of information received that the defendants were
about to sell the property, plaintiffs were compelled to file the complaint to
compel defendants to sell the property to them.

The court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the parties did not agree
upon the terms and conditions of the proposed sale, hence, there was no contact of
sale atall. The Cu Unjieng spouses executed a Deed of Sale transferring the
property inquestion to Buen Realty and Development Corporation. Buen Realty,
as the new owner of the subject property, wrote to the lessees demanding the
latter to vacate the premises. In its reply, it stated that Buen Realty and
Development Corporation brought the property subject to the notice of lis
pendens.

ISSUE:
Can Buen Realty be bound by the writ of execution by virtue of the notice of lis
pendens?

RULING:
No. An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156,
Civil Code).
The obligation is upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof, viz:
(a) the vinculum juris or juridical tie which is the efficient cause established by
the various sources of obligations;
(b) the object which is the prestation or conduct, required to be observed; and
(c) the subject-persons who, viewed demandability of the obligation are the active
(oblige) andthe passive (obligor) subjects.

Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157), which is a meeting

of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the
other, to give something or to render some service.
A contract undergoes various stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its
perfection and, finally, its consummation. Until the contract is perfected, it cannot,
as an independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation. In
sales, particularly, to which the case at bench belongs, the contract is perfected
when a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver
and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another, called the buyer, over
which the latter agrees.

The registration of lis pendens must be independently addressed in appropriate

proceedings. Therefore, Buen Realty cannot be held subject to the writ of
execution issued by the respondent Judge, let alone ousted from the ownership
and possession of the property, without first being duly afforded its day in court.

3. Francisco vs Chemical Bulk Carriers, GR #193577, 09 Sep 2011

Physical handicap in determining the required degree of care

DOCTRINE:
One who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of care that a
reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would use.
Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated as
part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the
standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is
blind.

FACTS:Since 1965, Petitioner Francisco has been the owner and manager of a
Caltex station. In 1978, he completely lost his eyesight due to sickness. In 1993
four persons, including Gregorio Bacsa (Bacsa), came to Francisco’s Caltex
station and introduced themselves as employees of CBCI.

Bacsa introduced himself as a radio operator and confidential secretary of a

certain Mr. Inawat (Inawat), CBCI’s manager for operations.
Bacsa offered to sell to Francisco a certain quantity of CBCI’s diesel fuel at a
lower price.

Francisco was hesitant to buy the fuel, thinking that the same are stolen property.
He asked his son to read and verify the documents which Basca would present. To
verify the authority of Besca, he asked him to present his identification card.
Because of the above reasons, Francisco agreed to the sale.The deliveries started
on 5 April 1993 and lasted for ten months, or up to 25 January 1994. There were
17 deliveries to Francisco and all his conditions were complied with.The
transaction was covered receipts which were typewritten on a half sheet of plain
bond paper to remove doubts as to his legitimacy as a seller.It turned out that
Basca was not authoritzed by CBCI to sell the diesel fuel.

In February 1996, CBCI sent a demand letter to Francisco regarding the diesel
fuel delivered to him but which had been paid for by CBCI. CBCI demanded that
Francisco pay CBCI P1,053,527 for the diesel fuel or CBCI would file a
complaint against him in court. Francisco rejected CBCI’s demand.

RTC Rulling: The trial court ruled that Francisco was not liable for damages in
favor of CBCI because the 17 deliveries were covered by original and genuine
invoices. The trial court declared that Bacsa, as confidential secretary of Inawat,
was CBCI’s authorized representative who received Francisco’s full payment for
the diesel fuel

CA Rulling: The Court of Appeals set aside the trial court’s Decision and ruled
that Bacsa’s act of selling the diesel fuel to Francisco was his personal act and,
even if Bacsa connived with Inawat, the sale does not bind CBCI.

The Court of Appeals declared that since Francisco had been in the business of
selling petroleum products for a considerable number of years, his blindness was
not a hindrance for him to transact business with other people. With his condition
and experience, Francisco should have verified whether CBCI was indeed selling
diesel fuel and if it had given Bacsa authority to do so.

Hence, this rule 45 petition1. Heirs of Francico argue that since Francisco was
blind, the standard of conduct that was required of him was that of a reasonable
person under like disability

ISSUE/S:

WON Francisco exercised the required diligence of a blind person in the conduct
of his business

HELD/RATIO: NO

Standard of conduct is the level of expected conduct that is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the person, time and
place. The most common standard of conduct is that of a good father of a family
or that of a reasonably prudent person. To determine the diligence which must be
required of all persons, we use as basis the abstract average standard
corresponding to a normal orderly person.
1
However, one who is physically disabled is required to use the same degree of
care that a reasonably careful person who has the same physical disability would
use. Physical handicaps and infirmities, such as blindness or deafness, are treated
as part of the circumstances under which a reasonable person must act. Thus, the
standard of conduct for a blind person becomes that of a reasonable person who is
blind.

We note that Francisco, despite being blind, had been managing and operating the
Caltex station for 15 years and this was not a hindrance for him to transact
business until this time. In this instance, however, we rule that Francisco failed to
exercise the standard of conduct expected of a reasonable person who is blind.

First, Francisco merely relied on the identification card of Bacsa to determine if

he was authorized by CBCI. Francisco did not do any other background check on
the identity and authority of Bacsa.

Second, Francisco already expressed his misgivings about the diesel fuel, fearing
that they might be stolen property, yet he did not verify with CBCI the authority
of Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel.

Third, Francisco relied on the receipts issued by Bacsa which were typewritten on
a half sheet of plain bond paper.

If Francisco exercised reasonable diligence, he should have asked for an official

receipt issued by CBCI. Fourth, the delivery to Francisco, as indicated in Petron’s
invoice, does not show that CBCI authorized Bacsa to sell the diesel fuel to
Francisco. Clearly, Francisco failed to exercise the standard of conduct expected
of a reasonable person who is blind

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 31 May 2010 Decision

and 31 August 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals

4. Nakpil vs Manila Towers Dev’t Corp, 502 SCRA 470 (2006)

Topic: Nature and Effects; Requisites/Elements of an Obligation; Not to do
Petitioner: Bonifacio Nakpil Respondent: MTDC
DOCTRINE: Art. 1168. When the obligation consists in not doing, and the
obligor does what has been forbidden him, it shall also be undone at his expense.

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.  A 14-storey high rise building 777 Ongpin St., Sta. Cruz,
Manila Owned by Cheon Kiao Ang Leased to 200 Filipino Chinese tenants 
Among those tenants was Atty. Bonifacio Nakpil (Petitioner)  Property was
mortgaged to Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) as security for loan
Ang obtained  Ang failed to pay the loan, so the real estate mortgage was
foreclosed and sold at public auction where GSIS was the winning bidder GSIS
sold the property to Centertown Marketing Corporation (CMC)  CMC
assigned all its rights to sister-corporation Manila Tower Development
Corporation (MTDC)
Tenants formed House International Building Tenants Association (HIBTAI)
HIBTAI protested the auction, claiming that they had priority to buy the property
 Tenants refused to pay their rentals and instead remitted them to HIBTAI 
City Engineer wrote to MTDC requesting that the defects of the building be
corrected  City Engineer warned that the defects were serious and would
endanger the lives of the tenants  Before MTDC could make the necessary
repairs, HIBTAI filed a complaint v. GSIS for injunction and damages – it was
dismissed  Filed another complaint for annulment of contract and damages-
likewise dismissed  HIBTAI appealed the decision – also dismissed 
HIBTAI assailed the decision before the SC - dismissed 
HIBTAI 8 years later, new request was made for the an immediate ocular
inspection of the building City Building Official granted the request and
scheduled an ocular inspection  Tenants were illegally occupying the building
 Tenants were ordered to vacate and for the building to be repaired  A
Group of men entered the building and commenced the repairs and tore down
some of the structure  At the time Atty. Nakpil was overseas and upon his
return, he discovered his room was destroyed, the walls were hammered down,
and his electricity was cut off  He then filed a complaint against MTDC 
RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled in favor of MTDC  Nakpil failed to
prove that MTDC had anything to do with the demolition/repairs and the loss of
his personal property  It was done by the employees of the cityengineer of
manila not the MTDC  Nakpil appealed to the CA which reversed the decision
of the TC
RESPONDENT’S MAIN ARGUMENT Respondent in a separate civil action
avers that it cannot be made liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages
because it had not been remiss in its duty to make the necessary repairs; it was
prohibited from taking possession of the property by the tenants who had filed
several suits against it. It alleged that it acquired the building from the GSIS in
1981, and it was the HIBTAI that had been managing the affairs of the said
building and collected the rentals from the tenants. It pointed out that in CA-G.R.
No. 04393, the CA ruled that the HIBTAI had no right to collect the rentals.
Moreover, HIBTAI did not use the rentals to make the necessary repairs but used
it instead to pay its accounts and obligations. By their own actions, the tenants of
the subject building prevented MTDC from performing its duty to maintain them
in their peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property. Moreover, Nakpil
failed to prove that it had anything to do with the demolition/repairs and the loss
of his personal property.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Nakpil is entitiled to damages

HELD:

NO.  SC do not agree with the ruling of the CA that the MTDC committed a
breach of its lease contract with Nakpil when it failed to comply with its
obligation as lessor, and that the MTDC is liable for nominal damages. 
Breach of contract is the failure without legal reason to comply with the
terms of a contract. It is also defined as the failure, without legal excuse, to
perform any promise which forms the whole or part of the contract. 
There is no factual and legal basis for any award for damages to respondent. 
The duty to maintain the lessee in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the
lease for the duration of the contract is merely a warranty that the lessee shall not
be disturbed in his legal, and not physical, possession. In the early case of
Goldstein v. Roces, the court pointed out that the obligation to maintain the lessee
in the peaceful and adequate enjoyment of the leased property seeks to protect the
lessee not only from acts of third persons but also from the acts of the lessor, thus:
The lessor must see that the enjoyment is not interrupted or disturbed, either
by others' acts [save in the case provided for in the article 1560 (now Article
1664)], or by his own. By his own acts, because, being the person principally
obligated by the contract, he would openly violate it if, in going back on his
agreement, he should attempt to render ineffective in practice the right in the thing
he had granted to the lessee; and by others' acts, because he must guarantee the
right he created, for he is obliged to give warranty in the manner we have set forth
in our commentary on article 1553, and, in this sense, it is incumbent upon him to
protect the lessee in the latter's peaceful enjoyment.  When the act of
trespass is done by third persons, it must be distinguished whether it is
trespass in fact or in law because the lessor is not liable for a trespass in fact
or a mere act of trespass by a third person.  In the Goldstein case, trespass
in fact was distinguished from legal trespass, thus: if the act of trespass is not
accompanied or preceded by anything which reveals a juridic intention on
the part of the trespasser, in such wise that the lessee can only distinguish the
material fact, stripped of all legal form or reasons, we understand it to be
trespass in fact only (de mero hecho).  Further, the obligation under Article
1654(3) arises only when acts, termed as legal trespass (perturbacion de
derecho), disturb, dispute, object to, or place difficulties in the way of the
lessee's peaceful enjoyment of the premises that in some manner cast doubt
upon the right of the lessor by virtue of which the lessor himself executed the
lease.  What is evident in the present case is that the disturbance on the leased
premises on July 19, 1996 was actually done by the employees under the City
Engineer of Manila and the City Building Official on orders of the City Mayor
without the participation of the MTDC.
DISPOSITION Petition Denied. Reversed the CA decision

5. MCC Industrial Sales Corp vs Ssyangyog Corp, 536 SCRA 408

Facts:
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila,
is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products
One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong),[4] an international trading
company[5] with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City,
Philippines.
he two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or... telecopy
transmissions
On April 13, 2000, Ssangyong Manila Office sent, by fax, a letter[9] addressed to Gregory
Chan, MCC Manager [also the President[10] of Sanyo Seiki Stainless Steel Corporation], to
confirm MCC's and Sanyo Seiki's order of 220 metric... tons (MT) of hot rolled stainless steel
under a preferential rate of US$1,860.00 per MT. Chan, on behalf of the corporations,
assented and affixed his signature on the conforme portion of the letter.
Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTSO401[12] containing the
terms and conditions of the transaction.  MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice
bearing the conformity signature... payment for the ordered steel products would be made
through an irrevocable letter of credit
Because MCC could open only a partial letter of credit, the order for 220MT of steel was split
into two,... On June 28, 2000,... Ssangyong sent another facsimile letter to MCC stating that its
principal in Korea was already in a difficult situation[25] because of the failure of Sanyo Seiki
and MCC to open the L/C's
MCC failed to open a letter of credit.
On August 17, 2000, MCC finally opened an L/C with PCIBank for US$170,000.00 covering
payment for 100MT of stainless steel coil under Pro Forma Invoice No. ST2-POSTS080-2.[34]
The goods covered by the said invoice were then... shipped to and received by MCC
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory Chan before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence[40] alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based.
RTC rendered its Decision[43] on March 24, 2004, in favor of Ssangyong.
he subject transaction was evidenced by Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and
ST2-POSTS0401-2
CA rendered its Decision[48] affirming the ruling of the trial cour
Issues:
The principal issues that this Court is called upon to resolve are the following:
I    -   Whether the CA decision dated 15 August 2005 is already final and executory;
II  -   Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such;
III -   Whether there was a perfected contract of sale between MCC and Ssangyong, and, if in
the affirmative, whether MCC breached the said contract; and
IV -   Whether the award of actual damages and attorney's fees in favor of Ssangyong is
proper and justified.
Ruling:
we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within
the coverage of R.A. No. 8792
Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro forma invoices presented by respondent
Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in
evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as...
the best evidence the original fax transmittal.
The copies of the said pro-forma invoices submitted by the appellee are admissible in
evidence, although they are mere electronic facsimile printouts of appellant's orders. Such
facsimile printouts are considered Electronic Documents under the New Rules on Electronic
Evidence,... An electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original
document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it is a printout or output readable by sight
or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately
The Rules on Electronic Evidence[66] regards an electronic document as admissible in
evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and
related laws, and is authenticated in the... manner prescribed by the said Rules.
An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence
Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data
accurately... hus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be
considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule,
the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
While "data message" has reference to information electronically sent, stored or transmitted, it
does not necessarily mean that it will give rise to a right or extinguish an... obligation,[74]
unlike an electronic document... s an original printout of a facsimile transmission an electronic
data message or electronic document?
DATA" MEANS REPRESENTATION, IN ANY FORM, OF INFORMATION
OR CONCEPTS.
o data on magnetic strips on cards or in Smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes
or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United Nations model law on electronic
commerce. It would also... not apply to regular digital telephone conversations since the
information is not recorded.
not all data recorded or stored in digital form is covered. A computer or a similar device has to
be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices
that create or store data in digital form.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system such as printouts are
themselves electronic records being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the
record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper record subject to the usual rules about...
copies, but the original printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this bill.
printouts that are used only as paper records and whose computer origin is never again called
on are treated as paper records... electronic data message," it was consonant with the
explanation of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago that it would not apply "to telexes or faxes,
except computer-generated faxes, unlike the United
Nations model law on electronic commerce.
Electronic record" fixes the scope of the Act. The record is the data. The record may be any
medium. It is "electronic" because it is recorded or stored in or by a computer system or similar
device. The Act is intended to apply, for example, to data on magnetic... strips on cards, or in
smart cards. As drafted, it would not apply to telexes or faxes (except computer-generated
faxes), unlike the United Nations Model Law on Electronic Commerce.
not all data recorded or stored in "digital" form is covered. A computer or similar device has to
be involved in its creation or storage. The term "similar device" does not extend to all devices
that create or store data in digital form.
This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes,
except... computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus
on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach
Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paper-based.
an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data
that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that
in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress... intended virtual or paperless
writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based
documents.
electronic document," could not... have included facsimile transmissions, which have an
original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received.
n the present case, therefore,... Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax
transmittals, are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the
appellate courts... espite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court finds
that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected
contract of sale.
The burden of proof rests on the party who advances a proposition affirmatively.[95] In other
words, a plaintiff in a civil action must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, that
is, evidence that has greater weight, or is... more convincing than that which is offered in
opposition to it.
that respondent Ssangyong did not rely merely on Exhibits E and F to prove the perfected
contract. It also introduced in evidence a variety of other documents, as enumerated above,
together with the testimonies of its witnesses.
This initial contract was perfected
Notably, the conduct of both parties sufficiently established the existence of a contract of sale,
even if the writings... of the parties, because of their contested admissibility, were not as
explicit in establishing a contract.
With our finding that there is a valid contract,... finds that the award of actual damages is not in
accord with the evidence on record
From the foregoing, we find merit in the contention of MCC that Ssangyong did not adequately
prove that the items resold at a loss were the same items ordered by the petitioner. Therefore,
as the claim for actual damages was not proven, the Court cannot sanction the award.
the Court finds that petitioner knowingly breached its contractual obligation and obstinately
refused to pay despite repeated demands from respondent.
MCC must be held liable for nominal damages. "Nominal damages are `recoverable where a
legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated... against an invasion that has
produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract and
no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED
Principles:
Electronic document' refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by which a
right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may... be proved and
affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout or output, readable by
sight or other means, which accurately reflects the electronic data message... or electronic
document. For purposes of these Rules, the term electronic document' may be used
interchangeably withelectronic data message'.

(e) "Electronic Data Message" refers to information generated, sent, received or stored by
electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI),
electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic...
data message" shall be equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic
document."... x x x x
(h) "Electronic Document" refers to information or the representation of information, data,
figures, symbols or other modes of written expression, described or however represented, by
which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved...
and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically. Throughout these Rules, the term "electronic document" shall be
equivalent to and be used interchangeably with "electronic data message."
This Act focuses on replacing the search for originality, proving the reliability of systems
instead of that of individual records, and using... standards to show systems reliability.
Paper records that are produced directly by a computer system, such as printouts, are
themselves electronic records, being just the means of intelligible display of the contents of the
record. Photocopies of the printout would be paper records subject to the usual rules about...
copies, but the "original" printout would be subject to the rules of admissibility of this Act.
Verily, evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may... be validly considered by the
court in arriving at its judgment.[104] Issues not raised on appeal are deemed abandoned.

6. Lao vs Special Plans, Inc. vs CA, 234 SCRA 78 (1994)

Facts:
The Petioners Lao and Manansala entered into a Contract of Lease with Special Plans Incorporated (SPI).
Upon expiration of the contract, it was further renewed for another eight months. Petitioners did not pay the
allotted rental fees which prompted SPI to send a demand letter asking for full payment of rentals in arrears.
Petitioners did not give payment, giving the reason that SPI failed to deliver the leased premises for their intended
use and because of this they incurred expenses for necessary repairs as well as expenses for the repair of structural
defects.. They counterclaimed SPI to pay the sum of 422,000 pesos as actual damages against the claim of SPI of
118,000 for accumulated unpaid rentals.
The Metropolitan Court found that the unpaid rentals only amounted to 95,000 pesos and declared SPI
responsible for repairing the structural defects of the leased premises and thus dismissed SPI’s case. SPI then
appealed to the Regional Trail Court of Quezon City which then modified the decision of the lower court,
disagreeing on the off-setting of the amount allegedly spent by the petitioners for the repairs of the structural
defects of subject property with their unpaid rentals and ordered the Petitioners to pay 95,000 for unpaid rentals.
The petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein they asserted that the amount of 545,000.00 that
they spent for repairs, P125,000.00 of which was spent on structural repairs, should be judicially compensated
against the said unpaid rentals amounting to 95,000.00.
Issue:
Whether or not the unpaid rentals should be judicially compensated with the expenses incurred by the
Plaintiffs?
Held: Petition Dismissed.
In order that compensation to take place two persons, in their own right, should be creditors and
debtors of each other. In order for compensation to be proper, it is necessary that:
1. Each one of the obligors be bound principally and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of
the other;
2. Both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are consumable, they be of the same
kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has been stated;
3. The two debts are due:
4. The debts are liquidated and demandable;
5. Over neither of them be any retention or controversy, commenced by third parties and
communicated in due time to the debtor. 

The Petitioners failed to properly discharge their burden to show that the debts are liquidated and
demandable. A claim is liquidated when the amount and time of payment is fixed. If acknowledged by the debtor,
although not in writing, the claim must be treated as liquidated. When the defendant, who has an unliquidated
claim, sets it up by way of counterclaim, and a judgment is rendered liquidating such claim, it can be
compensated against the plaintiff’s claim from the moment it is liquidated by judgment. Compensation takes
place only if both obligations are liquidated.

7. Leano vs CA, 369 SCRA 36 (2001)

FACTS:
Respondent Fernando and petitioner entered into a contract to sell with respect to a lot of
Respondent in 1985.

The contract provided that in case the petitioner failed to pay the monthly installments
beyond the grace period, the respondent can rescind the contract and the prior payments
made by the petitioner shall be considered as rent.

In 1989, the petitioner failed to pay her installments. This prompted the respondent to file
an ejectment suit in the MTC. The lower court ruled that there was already a rescission of
the contract as stipulated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid rescission of contract of sale pursuant to the Maceda
Law

HELD:
No. The Maceda Law requires that there must be (1) notice of rescission through a
notarial act and (2) return of the cash surrender value.

The respondent complied with the first requisite as the decision in the ejectment case can
be considered as a valid notice of cancellation under the Maceda Law. However, the
respondent failed to comply with the second requirement of giving the cash surrender
value.

Thus, the contract to sell is not properly canceled. However, since the petitioner incurred
delay, she shall pay additional penalties. Thus, the contract to sell exists where the
petitioner shall pay damages.

8. International Corporate Bank vs Gueco, 351 SCRA 716 (2001)

FACTS: The respondent Gueco Spouses obtained a loan from petitioner (now
UnionBank) to purchase a car. Hence, the Spouses executed promissory notes which
were payable in monthly installments and chattel mortgage over the car to serve as
security for the notes.

The Spouses defaulted in payment. The Bank, therefore, filed a civil action for "Sum of
Money with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin" before the MTC. The car was detained inside
the Bank’s compound.

Dr. Gueco delivered a manager's check in amount of P150,000.00 but the car was not
released because of his refusal to sign the Joint Motion to Dismiss for they had not yet
filed their Answer. The Bank insisted that the joint motion to dismiss is standard
operating procedure in their bank to effect a compromise and to preclude future filing
of claims, counterclaims or suits for damages.

After several demand letters and meetings with bank representatives, the spouses
initiated a civil action for damages. The RTC held that there was a meeting of the
minds between the parties as to the reduction of the amount of indebtedness and the
release of the car but said agreement did not include the signing of the joint motion to
dismiss as a condition sine qua non for the effectivity of the compromise.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not there was an agreement with respect to the execution of

the joint motion to dismiss as a condition for the compromise agreement; and (2)
Whether or not the spouses are entitled for damages arising from fraud.

RULING: (1) No. Being an affirmative allegation, petitioner has the burden of

evidence to prove his claim that the oral compromise entered into by the parties
included the stipulation that the parties would jointly file a motion to dismiss. This
petitioner failed to do. Notably, even the Metropolitan Trial Court, while ruling in favor
of the petitioner and thereby dismissing the complaint, did not make a factual finding
that the compromise agreement included the condition of the signing of a joint motion
to dismiss.

(2) No. The Court failed to see how the act of the petitioner bank in requiring the
respondent to sign the joint motion to dismiss could constitute as fraud.

Fraud has been defined as the deliberate intention to cause damage or prejudice.
Petitioner may have been remiss in informing Dr. Gueco that the signing of a joint
motion to dismiss is a standard operating procedure of petitioner bank. However, this
cannot in any way have prejudiced Dr. Gueco.

The whole point of the parties entering into the compromise agreement was in order
that Dr. Gueco would pay his outstanding account and in return petitioner would
return the car and drop the case for money and replevin before the Metropolitan Trial
Court. The joint motion to dismiss was but a natural consequence of the compromise
agreement and simply stated that Dr. Gueco had fully settled his obligation, hence, the
dismissal of the case.

Hence, petitioner's act of requiring Dr. Gueco to sign the joint motion to dismiss
cannot be said to be a deliberate attempt on the part of petitioner to renege on the
compromise agreement of the parties.

9. Phil Banking Corp vs Dy, 685 SCRA 567 (2012)

Facts:
The spouses Delgado entered into an agreement with a certain Cecilia Tan for the
purchase of the former’s property by the latter to be paid in installment, or from time to time,
until the Sps. Delgado are ready to execute a deed of sale and transfer the title to Tan upon full
payment. Tan however later on found out that the property had already been transferred to the
name of the Dys and had been mortgaged to Philbank. Tan filed an action for specific
performance and annulment of the title of the Dys. The Delgados contend that there was no
perfected sale between them and Tan as she did not agree on the selling price and that the sale
and transfer of the property of the Dys was fictitious and was only made in order for the Dys to
enable the Delgados to mortgage the property and obtain a loan from PhilBank. The Delgados
contend that PhilBank is not a mortgagee in good faith as it was aware of the fictitious nature of
the sale of the porerty. While PHilBank avers that they are a mortgagee in good faith and
should not be held liable to any of the parties for damages. Tan subsequently abandoned her
claim on the property and the sale between the Dys and Delgados have been rules as void which
has become final and executory.
Issue:
Is PhilBank a mortgagee in good faith?
Ruling:
A finding of negligence must always be contextualized in line with the attendant
circumstances of a particular case. As aptly held in Philippine National Bank v. Heirs of
Estanislao Militar, "the diligence with which the law requires the individual or a corporation at
all times to govern a particular conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which one is
placed, and the importance of the act which is to be performed." Thus, without diminishing
the time-honored principle that nothing short of extraordinary diligence is required of banks
whose business is impressed with public interest, Philbank's inconsequential oversight should
not and cannot serve as a bastion for fraud and deceit.
To be sure, fraud comprises "anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and
concealment involving a breach of legal duty or equitable duty, trust, or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious
advantage is taken of another." In this light, the Dys' and Sps. Delgado's deliberate simulation
of the sale intended to obtain loan proceeds from and to prejudice Philbank clearly constitutes
fraudulent conduct. As such, Sps. Delgado cannot now be allowed to deny the validity of the
mortgage executed by the Dys in favor of Philbank as to hold otherwise would effectively
sanction their blatant bad faith to Philbank's detriment. As the Dys and Delgados conspired
together to induce PhilBank in mortgaging the property through fraud, PHilBank cannot be
considered as negligent or a mortgagee in bad faith.

10. Uniwide Holdings Inc. vs Jandecs Transportation, 541 SCRA 158

Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does
not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the
complain may be brought before other venues.
Uniwide Holdings, Inc. entered into a franchise agreement with Alexander M. Cruz
granting the latter a five-year franchise to adopt and use the ―Uniwide Family Store
System‖ for the establishment and operation of a ―Uniwide Family Store‖ in Marikina
City.
The contract stipulated that Cruz will pay a monthly service fee of P50,000.00 or three
percent of gross monthly purchases, whichever is higher to UHI, payable within five
days after the end of each month without need of formal billing or demand from UHI.
In case of any delay in the payment of the monthly service fee, Cruz would, under
Article 10.3 of the agreement, be liable to pay an interest charge of three percent per
month. Cruz thereafter purchased goods from UHI’s affiliated companies First Paragon
Corporation (FPC) and Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, Inc. (USWCI).
FPC and USWCI subsequently executed Deeds of Assignment in favor of UHI assigning
all their rights and interests over Cruz‘s accounts payable to them. Cruz had
outstanding obligations with UHI, FPC and USWCI in the amount of P1, 358,
531.89.00. UHI sent a letter demanding for the payment of such amount but it was not
settled.
Thus, UHI filed a complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial
Court of Parañaque against Cruz praying for payment of service fee, accounts payable
to FPC and USWCI and attorney‘s fees and litigation expenses.
Cruz filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue. He invokes Article
27.5 of the agreement which provides that exclusive jurisdiction is vested with
the courts f Quezon City. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a case based on several causes of action is dismissible on the ground of
improper venue where only one of the causes of action arises from a contract with
exclusive venue stipulation
HELD:
In this case, UHI contended that nowhere in the agreement is there a mention of FPC
and USWCI, and neither are the two parties thereto, hence, they cannot be bound to
the stipulation on ―exclusive venue.‖ The Court found merit in this contention.
The Supreme Court cited Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which provides that all
other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or
in the case of a nonresident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff.
The forging of a written agreement on an exclusive venue of an action does not,
however, exclude parties from bringing a case to other venues.
Where there is a joinder of causes of action between the same parties one of which does
not arise out of the contract where the exclusive venue was stipulated upon, the
complaint, as in the one at bar, may be brought before other venues provided that such
other cause of action falls within the jurisdiction of the court and the venue lies therein.
It bears emphasis that the causes of action on the assigned accounts are not based on a
breach of the agreement between UHI and Cruz. They are based on
separate, distinct and independent contracts-deeds of assignment in which UHI is the
assignee of Cruz‘s obligations to the assignors FPC and USWCI. Thus, any action
arising from the deeds of assignment cannot be subjected to the exclusive venue
stipulation embodied in the agreement.

11. NPC vs Ibrahim, GR #175863, Feb 18, 2015

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner
vs.
LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR, G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G. MARUHOM,
BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G. MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM,
ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G. MARUHOM,
SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM

G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007

Facts:
Respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heirs instituted
an action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession
of land and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.

In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of
land. Sometime in 1978, NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’
knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the sub-terrain area of their lands and
constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only discovered
sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by
NAPOCOR itself through a memorandum issued by the latter’s Acting Assistant Project
Manager. The tunnels were apparently being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake
Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR.

Respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to
construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his
request was turned down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives
and property. On October 7, 1992, respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and
vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter refused to vacate much less pay
damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground tunnels has
endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic
activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety
and shock thereby entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the
public good, NAPOCOR must be held liable for exemplary damages.

Disputing respondents’ claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the
material allegations of the complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely
that (1) there is a failure to state a cause of action since respondents seek possession of the sub-
terrain portion when they were never in possession of the same, (2) respondents have no cause of
action because they failed to show proof that they were the owners of the property, and (3) the
tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such
easement as may be necessary for the same.
Ibrahim, joined by his co-heirs, filed an Urgent Motion for Execution of Judgment Pending
Appeal. On the other hand, NAPOCOR filed a Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, NAPOCOR filed a
vigorous opposition to the motion for execution of judgment pending appeal with a motion for
reconsideration of the Decision.

NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing its Notice of Appeal purposely to give
way to the hearing of its motion for reconsideration.

The RTC issued an Order granting execution pending appeal and denying NAPOCOR’s motion
for reconsideration.
NAPOCOR filed its Notice of Appeal by registered mail which was denied by the RTC on the
ground of having been filed out of time. Meanwhile, the Decision of the RTC was executed
pending appeal and funds of NAPOCOR were garnished by respondents Ibrahim and his co-heirs.

The RTC granted the petition and rendered a modified judgment.

Subsequently, both respondent Ibrahim and NAPOCOR appealed to the CA.

The CA set aside the modified judgment and reinstated the original decision amending it further
by deleting the award of moral damages and reducing the amount of rentals and attorney’s fees,

Issue:
Whether respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area
occupied by petitioner.

Ruling:
Petitioner maintains that the sub-terrain portion where the underground tunnels were constructed
does not belong to respondents because, even conceding the fact that respondents owned the
property, their right to the subsoil of the same does not extend beyond what is necessary to enable
them to obtain all the utility and convenience that such property can normally give. In any case,
petitioner asserts that respondents were still able to use the subject property even with the
existence of the tunnels, citing as an example the fact that one of the respondents, Omar G.
Maruhom, had established his residence on a part of the property. Petitioner concludes that the
underground tunnels 115 meters below respondents’ property could not have caused damage or
prejudice to respondents and their claim to this effect was, therefore, purely conjectural and
speculative.

The contention lacks merit.

In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the
application of the exceptions to the above rule. Consequently, the CA’s findings which upheld
those of the trial court that respondents owned and possessed the property and that its substrata
was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be disturbed.
Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the
property similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil
Code which provides:

ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of
everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain
of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation.

Thus, the ownership of land extends to the surface as well as to the subsoil under it. In Republic
of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, this principle was applied to show that rights over lands
are indivisible and, consequently, require a definitive and categorical classification, thus:

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is “no conflict of interest” between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather strange
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its
surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height.
Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the
surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its
practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the mining operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the
crops above.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural.

Registered landowners may even be ousted of ownership and possession of their properties in the
event the latter are reclassified as mineral lands because real properties are characteristically
indivisible. For the loss sustained by such owners, they are entitled to just compensation under the
Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings.

In this regard, the trial court found that respondents could have dug upon their property motorized
deep wells but were prevented from doing so by the authorities precisely because of the construction
and existence of the tunnels underneath the surface of their property. Respondents, therefore, still had
a legal interest in the sub-terrain portion insofar as they could have excavated the same for the
construction of the deep well. The fact that they could not was appreciated by the RTC as proof that
the tunnels interfered with respondents’ enjoyment of their property and deprived them of its full use
and enjoyment.

Petitioner contends that the underground tunnels in this case constitute an easement upon the
property of respondents which does not involve any loss of title or possession. The manner in which
the easement was created by petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of respondents as it
was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings.
Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the
easement over respondents’ property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation
of title to and possession of the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a
mere burden upon the owner of the condemned property. Significantly, though, landowners cannot be
deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The
court must then see to it that the taking is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation
and that there is due process of law.

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize respondents’ ownership of the sub-terrain
portion, petitioner took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must
be emphasized that the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels
impose limitations on respondents’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprive them of
its ordinary use. Based upon the foregoing, respondents are clearly entitled to the payment of just
compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies the sub- terrain portion, it is
liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is so because
in this case, the nature of the easement practically deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use.
Respondents, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just compensation
which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property.

12. NPC vs CA, 225 SCRA 415 (1993)

Rule Synopsis

If a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God, the whole event

is humanized and the person causing damage to another cannot
exempt himself from liability.

Case Summary

National Power Corporation (NPC) maintains a hydroelectric plant in

the Angat River, Benjamin Chavez was the plant supervisor.
Meanwhile Rayo et al were residents of Norzagaray, Bulacan.

On the evening of October 26, 1978, NPC allegedly caused the

inundation of a town in Norzagaray when it released water through
the spillways of the Angat Dam at the height of typhoon “Kading” as
the Dam’s water level went beyond the maximum limit. The flooding
resulted to the drowning of the members of the household of Rayo,
together with their animals; their properties were also washed away.
The release of water was made despite NPC’s knowledge of the
impending typhoon, as early as October 24 and its monitoring of the
water level.

Rayo et al filed four separate complaints for damages against NPC.

In its answer, NPC argued that the damage caused to Rayo was due
to a fortuitous event, among others.

The CFI absolved NPC for lack of sufficient and credible evidence.
The CA reversed, holding NPC and Chavez jointly and severally
liable to Rayo et al. The SC affirmed, NPC liable.

Issues Resolved –

What was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by Rayo et al?

HELD – NPC’S NEGLIGENCE.

Procedural note: This issue was already raised in an earlier case involving the same incident, whereby the SC held that the
proximate cause of the damage was NPC’s negligent act. This ruling was binding on the Court. Also, the Court found to reason
to review the factual findings of the CA.

Citing the CA decision:

Circumstances leading to the conclusion of NPC’s negligence: the unholiness of the hour, the extent of the opening of the
spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, the inundation even of areas 1 km away from the Angat river bank.

Factual findings of NPC’s negligence: NPC was duly warned of the typhoon as its coming was published in headlines of a
newspaper of national circulation. There were also radio announcements regarding the same. Yet NPC maintained a water
level beyond maximum despite its knowledge of the safe level. From October 24, until the Dam’s water release on the evening
of October 26, the water level was maintained at maximum with very little opening of the spillways. Furthermore, the “early
warning notice” given by NPC were also found insufficient: 1) it did not prepare or warn the residents of the volume of water to
be released, they should have been advised to evacuate, and 2) it was not given to the proper municipal officials for
dissemination, but rather to a policeman.

On the merits, the SC held that NPC cannot invoke the force majeure
or the act of God doctrine to exempt itself from liability since it was
not entirely free from fault – one of the requisites for the application of
Art. 1174 CC, to wit: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation
must be independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event must be
either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be such as to
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in,
or aggravation of the injury to the creditor.

If upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, there

concurs a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or
contravention in any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided
for in Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or damage,
the obligor cannot escape liability. The principle embodied in the act
of God doctrine strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
exclusively by the violence of nature and all human agencies are to
be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of the mischief.
When the effect, the cause of which is to be considered, is found to
be in part the result of the participation of man, whether it be from
active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the whole occurrence
is thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the rules
applicable to the acts of God.

Petition dismissed.

13. Sps Poon vs Prime Songcoavings Bank, GR #183794, June 13, 2016
This case is a contract of lease wherein Spouses poon as the lessor and Prime Savings Bank as the lessee,
they executed the contract in a 10-year period and agreed at a monthly rental of Php 60,000.00 per month,
there is also an advance payment for the first 100 months in the amount of Php 100,000.00. However the
Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) placed Prime Savings Bank under receivership of the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) and ordered its litigation. Prime Savings Bank vacated the
premises and PDIC demanded the return of the advance rentals, Spouses Poon refuses hence Prime
Savings Bank commences an action for rescission of contract and recovery of sum of money. Spouses
Poon invoked that in their contract provided a provision which states that should the leased premises be
closed, deserted or vacated by the LESSEE, the LESSOR shall have the right to terminate the lease.

What have we learned about the topic?

Art. 1229 The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has been partly or
irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be
reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.

Art. 1381. The following contracts are rescissible:

(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever the wards whom they represent suffer
lesion by more than one-fourth of the value of the things which are the object thereof;

(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if the latter suffer the lesion stated in the
preceding number;

(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot in any other manner collect the
claims due them;

(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they have been entered into by the defendant
without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority;

(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be subject to rescission.

Art. 1382. Payments made in a state of insolvency for obligations to whose fulfillment the debtor could
not be compelled at the time they were effected, are also rescissible.
Art. 1191 The power to rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors
should not comply with what is incumbent upon him.

The injured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the
payment of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has chosen fulfillment, if
the latter should become impossible.

The court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.

This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third persons who have acquired the thing, in
accordance with Articles 1385 and 1388 and the Mortgage Law.

Art. 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the
parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.

What does the case teach us?

First issue is whether the respondent may avail the remedy of rescission.

Yes. Prime Savings Bank are entitled rescission. Legal remedy of rescission is not limited to situations
under art. 1381 and 1382. The Civil Code uses it to two different contexts. The first refers to breach of
contract under Art. 1191, also known as the remedy of “resolution”; the second is rescission by reason of
lesion or economic prejudice under Art. 1381. The first is a principal action based on breach of a party,
while the second is a subsidiary action. In the case at bar the allegations of the complaint, it is clear that
respondent’s right of action rests on the alleged abuse of petitioner’s right under the contract on the theory
that petitioner tenaciously enforced their right to forfeit the advanced rentals which was in bad faith since
they knew that respondent was already insolvent. Hence, respondents are seeking rescission under Art.
1191 not Art 1381 and 1382 of the New Civil Code.

Second issue is whether the foreclosure

of respondent’s business is a
fortuitous event.
No. The closure was neither a fortuitous or unforeseen event. Here in order it to be considered a fortuitous
event, there has to be bad faith or arbitrariness on the part of the BSP. Instead, its decision to place
respondent under receivership and liquidation. Moreover Prime Savings Bank was partially accountable
for closure of its banking business. Neither it is also an unforeseen event under Art. 1267. The requisites
for the application of the provision are first the event could not have been foreseen at the time of the
execution of the contract; second it makes performance
of the contract extremely difficult but not impossible; third it must not be due to the act of any of the
parties; and fourth the contract is for a future prestation. The case explains that mere inconvenience,
unexpected impediments, increased expenses or even pecuniary inability to fulfill an engagement will
not relieve the obligor from an undertaking that it has knowingly and freely contracted. Here, the first
and third requisites are lacking. Since the lease was for 10 years, the parties should have considered
the possibility of closure of business. Therefore Prime Savings Bank cannot invoke that there is a
fortuitous or unforeseen event.

Third issue is the forfeiture of the

advance rentals a penal clause.
Yes The forfeiture clause in the contract is penal in nature. A provision is a penal clause if it calls for
the forfeiture of any remaining deposit still in the possession of the lessor without prejudice to any
other obligation still owing, in the event of the termination or cancellation of the agreement by reason
of the lessee’s violation of any of the terms and conditions thereof. Here it is evident that the
stipulation on the forfeiture of advance rentals is a penal in the sense that it provides for liquidated
damages. The penalty was to compel respondent to complete the 10-year term of the lease.
Petitioners, too were similarly obliged to ensure the peaceful use of the building by respondent for the
duration of the lease under paid of losing the remaining advance rentals paid by the respondent.
Hence the provision the parties stipulated is a penal clause.

Fourth issue is whether the penalty

may be equitably reduced under art.
1229
Yes. The general rule is that courts have no power to ease the burden of obligations voluntarily
assumed by parties, just because things did not turn out as expected at the inception of the contract. As
Article 1229 of the Civil Code provides that Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may
also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. In the present case it must be noted
that this case was initiated by the PDIC in furtherance of its statutory role as the fiduciary of Prime
Savings Bank. Stake in this case are not just the rights of petitioners and the correlative liabilities of
respondent lessee. Over and above those rights and liabilities is the interest of innocent debtors and
creditors of a delinquent bank establishment. Therefore Strict adherence to the doctrine of freedom of
contracts, at the expense of the rights of innocent creditors and investors, will only work injustice
rather than promote justice in this case.

14. Republic vs Unimex , GR #s 166309 to 166310, March 9, 2007

Doctrine: Interest may be paid only either as compensation for the use of money (monetary interest) 24 or as
damages (compensatory interest). -Kinds of Interest Distinguished Accdg to Purpose

FACTS:
Sometime in April 1985, respondent Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and 171
cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote controllers, parts and accessories to
Handyware Phils., Inc. (Handyware). Don Tim Shipping Corporation transported the goods with Evergreen Marine
Corporation as shipping agent.

After the shipment’s arrival, the Bureau of Customs (BOC) discovered that the Unimex’s shipment to Handyware did
not tally with the description appearing on the cargo manifest. Hence, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against
Handyware and later issued a warrant of seizure and detention against the shipment. In 1987, the Collector of
Customs (Collector) issued a default order and forfeiture decree against Handyware.

Unimex filed a motion to intervene in the seizure proceedings which was granted by the Collector.

Ruling of the Collector: default order and the forfeiture of the goods are already final and executory.

Unimex filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

CTA Ruling: In 1992, Reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the subject
shipment to Unimex subject to the payment of customs duties.

WHEREFORE, the decree of forfeiture of [petitioner] Commissioner of Customs is hereby reversed and the
subject shipment is hereby ordered released to [respondent] subject to the condition that the correct duties, taxes, fees
and other charges thereon be paid to the Bureau of Customs based on the actual quality and condition of the
shipments at the time of the filing of the corresponding import entry in compliance with this decision and further
subject to the presentation of Central Bank Release Certificate.

Unfortunately, the respondent failed to secure a writ of execution to enforce the CTA decision.
In 2001, Unimex filed with the CTA a petition for the revival of the 1992 decision and prayed for the immediate
release of its shipment or, in the alternative, payment of the shipment’s value plus damages. During the
presentation of evidence, the BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at its
warehouses.

CTA Ruling: Ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay respondent the commercial value of the goods based on the
prevailing exchange rate at the time of their importation

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly,

[petitioner] is ORDERED to PAY [respondent] the amount of P8,675,200.22 representing the commercial value of the
shipment at the time of importation subject, however, to the payment of the proper taxes, duties, fees and other
charges thereon. The payment shall be taken from the sale or sales of the goods or properties seized or forfeited
by the Bureau of Customs.

Both parties filed their respective MRs which were both denied by the CTA. Hence, both filed separate petitions in the
CA which were consolidated.

CA Ruling: Dismissed the BOC Commissioner's appeal and granted respondent's.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision, dated 19 September 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION in that the Bureau of Customs is adjudged liable to Unimex for the value of the subject shipment in
the amount of $466,885.54. The Bureau of Customs' liability may be paid in Philippine currency, computed at the
exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6 per annum from 19
September 2002 up to its finality. Upon finality of this Decision, the rate of legal interest shall be 12 per annum
until the value of the subject shipment is fully paid.

Both parties again filed their respective MRs of the CA’s decision.

CA Ruling: Denied the BOC Commissioner's MR and granted respondent's

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision, dated 19 September 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION in that the Bureau of Customs is adjudged liable to Unimex for the value of the subject shipment in
the amount of Euro 669,982.565. The Bureau of Custom's liability [may be] paid in the Philippine currency,
computed at the exchange rate prevailing at the time of actual payment with legal interests thereon at the rate of
6 per annum from 15 June 1987 up to the finality of this Decision. In lieu of the 6 interest, the rate of legal
interest shall be 12 per annum upon finality of this Decision until the value of the subject shipment is fully paid.

Republic represented by BOC Commissioner filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 in the SC.

Issue: WON, Legal Interest may be imposed

for use of money or as compensatory damage
Held: Petitioner argues that the CA erred in imposing the 6 p.a. legal interest. According to petitioner, the
obligation to pay legal interest only arises by virtue of a contract or on account of damages due to delay or failure to
pay the principal on which the interest is exacted. It added that since the June 15, 1992 CTA decision did not
 involve a monetary award but merely the release of the goods to respondent, there was no basis for the
computation and/or imposition of the 6 p.a. legal interest.

We agree with petitioner.

Interest may be paid only either as compensation for the use of money (monetary interest) 24 or as damages
(compensatory interest). 25 We quote in agreement the CTA's disquisition in its decision dated September 19, 2002:

Interest may be paid either as compensation for the use of money (monetary interest) referred to in Article 1956 of the
New Civil Code or as damages (compensatory interest) under Article 2209 above cited. As clearly provided in [Article
2209], interest is demandable if: a) there is monetary obligation and b) debtor incurs delay. This case does not involve a
monetary obligation to be covered by Article 2209. There is no dispute that this case was originally filed
questioning the seizure of the shipment by the Bureau of Customs. Our decision subject of this action for revival [of
judgment] did not refer to any monetary obligation by [petitioner] towards the [respondent]. In fact, if there was any
monetary obligation mentioned, it referred to the obligation of [respondent] to pay the correct taxes, duties, fees
and other charges before the release of the goods can be had. In one case, the Supreme Court held: "In a
comprehensive sense, the term "debt" embraces not merely money due by contract, but whatever one is bound to render
to another, either for contract or the requirement of the law, such as tax where the law imposes personal liability
therefore.

Therefore, the government was never a debtor to the petitioner in order that [Article] 2209 could apply. Nor was it in
default for there was no monetary obligation to pay in the first place. There is default when after demand is made
either judicially or extrajudicially. In other words, for interest to be demandable under Article 2209, there should be a
monetary obligation and the debtor was in default. . . In the instant case, [petitioner] was never under monetary obligation
to [respondent], no demand can be made either judicially or extrajudicially. Parallel thereto, there could be no default.
No doubt, the present case does not fall within the first situation. Neither can it be considered as one involving
interest based on damages under the second situation.

More importantly, interest is not chargeable against petitioner except when it has expressly stipulated to pay it or when
interest is allowed by the legislature or in eminent domain cases where damages sustained by the owner take the form of
interest at the legal rate. 27 Consequently, the CA's imposition of the 12 p.a. legal interest upon the finality of the
decision of this case until the value of the goods is fully paid (as forbearance of credit) is likewise bereft of any
legal anchor.

Disposition: WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 75359 and 75366 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.

15. First Metro Investment vs Este Del Sol, 369 SCRA 99

FACTS
            FMIC granted Este del Sol a loan to finance a sports/resort complex in Montalban, Rizal. Under the
agreement, the interest was 16% pa based on the diminishing balance. In case of default, an acceleration
clause was provided and the amount due is subject to 20% one-time penalty on the amount due and such
amount shall bear interest at the highest rate permitted by law. respondent executed a REM, individual
continuing suretyship and an underwriting agreement whereby FMIC shall underwrite the public offering of one
P120,000 common shares of respondent’s capital stock for one-time underwriting fee of P200,000. For failure
to pay its obligation, FMIC caused the foreclosure of the REM. At the public auction, FIC was the highest
bidder. Petitioner filed to collect for alleged deficiency balance against respondents since it failed to collect from

Page 27 of 54
the sureties, plus interest at 21% pa. the trial court ruled in favor of FMIC. Respondents appealed before the
CA which held that the fees provided for in the Underwriting and Consultacy Agreements were mere
subterfuges to camouflage the excessively usurious interest charged. The CA ordered FMIC to reimburse
petitioner representing what is ue to petitioner and what is due to respondent.

ISSUE
            Whether or not the interests are lawful

HELD
            No. an apparently lawful loan is usurious when it is intended that additional compensation for the loan
be disguised by an ostensibly unrelated contract for the payment by the borrower for the lender’s services
which re of little value or which are not in fact to be rendered. Article 1957 clearly provides: contracts and
stipulations, under any cloak or device whatever, intended to circumvent the law agaistn usury shall be void.
The borrower may recover in accordance with the laws on usury.

17. Chua vs Timan, GR #170452, Aug 13, 2008; 562 SCRA 146
G.R. No. 170452 – 562 SCRA 146 – Civil Law – Credit Transactions – Interest
Rate – Usurious Rates – 12% Per Annum Interest Rate – Central Bank
Circular No. 905-82 – Legal Rate

In February and March 1999 Salvador Chua and Violeta Chua loaned
Rodrigo, Ma. Lynn, and Lydia (all surnamed Timan) 6 loans amounting to
P864k. The interest rate agreed upon was 7% per month. The Timans paid
at that rate until September 1999. In October 1999, the monthly interest
rate was reduced to 5%. In March 2000, the Timans offered to pay P764k.
Chua did not accept payment as they wanted the full amount of P864k.
The Timans then consigned with the court the amount of P864k.

The RTC ruled that the 7% and the reduced rate of 5% stipulated rate is
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant (equivalent to 84%
and 60% per annum rate). Chua averred that by virtue of CB Circular 905,
the ceiling on interest rate has been removed hence the 5-7% rate is valid
and in the first place, the Timans agreed to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rate is valid.

HELD: No. As has been ruled by the Supreme Court in a multitude of

cases, interest rates of 3% and higher are already excessive. The rate
should then be reduced to 12% per annum or 1% per month (then the
prevailing legal rate). The Usury Law has been rendered ineffective by the
said CB Circular but it has not repealed the law, it merely suspended it.
Note that only laws can repeal laws, not circulars.

Page 28 of 54
While C.B. Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983,
effectively removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and
unsecured loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could
possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise
interest rates to levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead
to a hemorrhaging of their assets.

18. Sps Mallari vs Prudential Bank, GR #197861, June 5, 2013

DOCTRINE:
Unconscionable interest rates – The SC has ruled in the following cases that the interest is unconscionable:
3% and 3.81% per month on a P10 Million loan (Toring vs. Sps. Ganzon-Olan, 2008); 66% per annum or 5.5%
per month on a P500 thousand loan (Medel vs. Court of Appeals, 1998) and; 7% and 5% or 84% and 60% per
annum (Chua vs. Timan, 2008).  The Court has also ruled affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated
interest rates of 3% per month and higher are excessive, unconscionable and exorbitant.

Conscionable interest rates – In this case 23% per annum or 2% per month as agreed upon by petitioner and
respondent bank is NOT unconscionable.  It is much lower than the above mentioned unconscionable interest
rates and there is no similarity of factual milieu.

FACTS:
[Decided 2013] In 1984, Petitioner Florentino Mallari obtained a loan from respondent Prudential Bank in
the amount of P300,000.00. It was subject to an interest rate of 21% per annum and, in case of default,
a penalty of 12% per annum of the total amount due and attorneys fees equivalent of 15% of the total
amount due. This was secured by a Deed of Assignment (DOA) over petitioner's time deposit account. In
1989, Spouses Florentino and Aurea Mallari obtained another loan from respondent for P1.7 million,
stipulating interest of 23% per annum with the same penalties in case of default. This was secured by
Real Estate Mortgage (REM).

Petitioners defaulted. When computed in 1992, the total debt was P571,218.54 and P2,991,294.82 for
the first and second loans respectively.

Respondent tried to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. Petitioners on the other hand tried to nullify
the mortgage claiming that the Bank imposed onerous terms and conditions and that the bank was
unilaterally increasing its charges and interest over and above those stipulated. The Bank claimed that
the basis for its computation was all written in the Promissory Notes.

The RTC ruled in favor of respondent bank. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not an interest rate of 23% per annum and 12% per annum penalty is
unconscionable.

HELD:
No. The Court has also ruled affirmed in a plethora of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per
month and higher are excessive, unconscionable and exorbitant. thus, the 23% per annum interest rate
imposed on petitioners’ loan in this case can by no means be considered excessive or unconscionable.
And neither is the 12% per annum penalty charge unconscionable as the counrt found in DBP vs. Family
Foods (2009) and Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals  (2003).

Page 29 of 54
Villanueva vs CA, GR #163433, Aug 22, 2011

FACTS: On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial
court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with
Pacita, Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and
Pacita of several properties (subject properties), claiming that such are her conjugal
properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is the legal wife of defendant Nicolas,
having been married on October 7, 1926.  Out of the lawful wedlock, they begot
five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During their marriage,
they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City, and
Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in
Mandaue City which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina
Solon as well as the purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8)
parcels of land in Mandaue City. Some of the properties earn income from
coconuts leased to corporations

In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with
defendant, Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate
son.  Nicolas, then, was the only person who received the income of the properties.
Pacita, from the time she started living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no
occupation. She had no properties of her own from which she could derive income.
From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his illegitimate son is
already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties

Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia
Natuya. Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs.
CA upheld trial court’s decision

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage
between Eusebia and Procopio are conjugal

HELD: YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed

RATIO: The Family Code provisions on conjugal partnerships govern the property
relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if they were married before the
effectivity of Family Code.

Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall
apply to conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws.

Page 30 of 54
Thus, under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired during the marriage,
the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden of proof is on the party
claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced by the requirement
that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the marriage
before they are presumed conjugal.

Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started
cohabiting in 1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were
married on 16 December 1996. Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was
purchased on 4 October 1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly
during the marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia.

Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the
marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family
Code is that all these are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.

19. Crismina Garments vs CA, GR #128721, March 9, 1999

Facts:
Crismina Garments entered into a contract for a piece of work for 20,762 girl’s denim pants with D’ Wilmar Garments, through its sole
proprietress Norma Siapno (PR). The contract amounted to Php76,410. From Feb 1979- May 1979, PR sent 13 various deliveries to comply with
the Petitioner’s orders. The delivery receipts are accepted and acknowledged to be in good order condition. Later, Crismina informed PR of the
defective pants delivered. PR offered to take delivery of the defective pants, however Crismina’s rep said the goods were good and PR just have
to send back her check for P76,410. Because PR was actually then unpaid, PR sent a demand letter for the P76,410 and payment within 10 days
from receipt of such notice. Crismina countered that PR was liable for the value of the 6,164 damaged pants amounting to P49,925.51. PR filed a
collection suit against Crismina. RTC favored PR. CA affirmed RTC order but deleted the Atty’s fees.
Issues:
Whether or not it is proper to impose interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum for an obligation that does not involve a loan or
forbearance of money in the absence of stipulation of the parties?
Ruling:
INTEREST RATE for obligation not involving a loan or forbearance of money is 6%.
• Guidelines for the application of the proper interest rates:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can be
held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on ‘Damages’ of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual
thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum (pa) to be computed from default, i.e., from

judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded MAY
be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or
damages except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with
reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when
such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is
made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall,
in any case, be xxx the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. Because the amount due in this case arose from a contract for a piece of work, not from a
loan or forbearance of money, the legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum should be applied. Furthermore, since the amount of the
demand could be established with certainty when the Complaint was filed, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the filing of the

Page 31 of 54
said Complaint. But after the judgment becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the interest should be reckoned at
twelve percent (12%) per year.
CA decision modified. 6% interest (pa) from filing of complaint and 12% legal interest (pa) after the judgment has become final and executory
until satisified.(Ritz)

20. Medel vs CA, 359 Phil 820 (1998)

(Credit Transactions – Loans, Usury Law, Interest Rates)

Facts: Defendants obtained a loan from Plaintiff in the amount P50, 000.00, payable in 2 months and executed a
promissory note. Plaintiff gave only the amount of P47, 000.00 to the borrowers and retained P3, 000.00 as advance
interest for 1 month at 6% per month.

Defendants obtained another loan from Defendant in the amount of P90, 000.00, payable in 2 months, at 6% interest
per month. They executed a promissory note to evidence the loan and received only P84, 000.00 out of the proceeds
of the loan.

For the third time, Defendants secured from Plaintiff another loan in the amount of P300, 000.00, maturing in 1
month, and secured by a real estate mortgage. They executed a promissory note in favor of the Plaintiff. However,
only the sum of P275, 000.00, was given to them out of the proceeds of the loan.

Upon maturity of the three promissory notes, Defendants failed to pay the indebtedness.

Defendants consolidated all their previous unpaid loans totalling P440, 000.00, and sought from Plaintiff another loan
in the amount of P60, 000.00, bringing their indebtedness to a total of P50,000.00. They executed another promissory
note in favor of Plaintiff to pay the sum of P500, 000.00 with a 5.5% interest per month plus 2% service charge per
annum, with an additional amount of 1% per month as penalty charges.

On maturity of the loan, the Defendants failed to pay the indebtedness which prompt the Plaintiffs to file with the RTC
a complaint for collection of the full amount of the loan including interests and other charges.

Declaring that the due execution and genuineness of the four promissory notes has been duly proved, the RTC ruled
that although the Usury Law had been repealed, the interest charged on the loans was unconscionable and
“revolting to the conscience” and ordered the payment of the amount of the first 3 loans with a 12% interest per
annum and 1% per month as penalty.

On appeal, Plaintiff-appellants argued that the promissory note, which consolidated all the unpaid loans of the
defendants, is the law that governs the parties.

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the Plaintiff-appellants on the ground that the Usury Law has become legally
inexistent with the promulgation by the Central Bank in 1982 of Circular No. 905, the lender and the borrower could
agree on any interest that may be charged on the loan, and ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiffs the sum of
P500,000, plus 5.5% per month interest and 2& service charge per annum , and 1% per month as penalty charges.

Defendants filed the present case via petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: WON the stipulated 5.5% interest rate per month on the loan in the sum of P500, 000.00 is usurious.

Held: No.

Page 32 of 54
A stipulated rate of interest at 5.5% per month on the P500, 000.00 loan is excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and
exorbitant, but it cannot be considered “usurious” because Central Bank Circular No. 905 has expressly removed the
interest ceilings prescribed by the Usury Law and that the Usury Law is now “legally inexistent.”

Doctrine: A CB Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law.

Jurisprudence provides that CB Circular did not repeal nor in a way amend the Usury Law but simply suspended the
latter’s effectivity (Security Bank and Trust Co vs RTC).  Usury has been legally non-existent in our jurisdiction.
Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon.

Law: Article 2227, Civil Code

The courts shall reduce equitably liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty if they are
iniquitous or unconscionable.

Note: While the Usury Law ceiling on interest rates was lifted by the CB Circular 905, nothing in the said circular
could possibly be read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to levels which would
either enslave their borrowers or lead to a haemorrhaging of their assets (Almeda vs. CA, 256 SCRA 292 [1996]).

21. 22. Toring vs Sps Ganzon-Olan, GR #168782, Oct 10, 2008; 568 SCRA 376
Facts:
On September 4, 1998, petitioner Jovenal Toring obtained from respondents a loan
amounting to P6,000,000 at 3% interest per month. The loan was secured by a
mortgage on a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
27418,4 as evidenced by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage5 dated September 8,
1998.
On September 23, 1998, the parties executed a Deed of Absolute Sale6 conveying
the mortgaged property in favor of respondents. Subsequently, respondents gave
petitioners an exclusive option to repurchase the land for P10,000,000. This was
embodied in a document denominated as an Option to Buy7 dated September 28,
1998. On this same document, respondents acknowledged receipt of a total sum of
P10,000,000 as consideration for the purchase of the land.8 The Option to Buy
provided that if the option is exercised after December 5, 1998, the purchase price
shall increase at the rate of P300,000 or 3% of the purchase price every month until
September 5, 1999 and thereafter at the rate of P381,000 or 3.81% of the purchase
price every month, with the fifth of every month as the cut-off date for said
increases.9
On July 28, 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint10 docketed as Civil Case No. 00-
137 for reformation of instruments, abuse of rights and damages against
respondents.
The Trial court ruled in favor of the Sps. Olan, ordering Sps. Toring to pay 20
million.

Page 33 of 54
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, Sps. Toring brought the case before
the Court of Appeals, but to the Sps. Toring’s dismay, the former affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Should the stipulated interest rates of 3% and 3.18% be considered
unconscionable?

Ruling:
Petitioners contend that they are not liable to pay interest as the stipulated monthly
rates of 3% and 3.81%17 are unconscionable. Petitioners further contend that the
reformed instrument, i.e., the Option to Buy dated September 28, 1998, did not
mention any rate of interest chargeable to the loan but rather, an escalation18 of the
purchase price.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that petitioners are liable to pay interest
based on the Deed of Absolute Sale and Option to Buy executed by the parties.
Respondents assert that the P300,000 and P381,000 differences per month as stated
in the Option to Buy represents the 3% or 3.81% interest to be charged on the loan.
Respondents further assert that the 3% or 3.81% interest is not usurious since
Central Bank Circular No. 905-8219 removed the ceiling on interest rates on
secured and unsecured loans.
While the parties are free to stipulate on the interest to be imposed on monetary
obligations, the Court will temper interest rates if they are unconscionable.23 Even
if the Usury Law has been suspended by Central Bank Circular No. 905-82, and
parties to a loan agreement have been given wide latitude to agree on any interest
rate, we have held that stipulated interest rates are illegal if they are
unconscionable.24 Consequently, in our view, the Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the trial court's decision upholding the stipulated interest of 3% and
3.81%. Thus, we are unanimous now in our ruling to reduce the above stipulated
interest rates to 1% per month, in conformity with our ruling in Ruiz v. Court of
Appeals.25 For as well stressed in that case:
... Nothing in the said circular [CB Circular No. 905, s. 1982] grants lenders carte
blanche authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.

23. Eastern Shipping vs CA, 234 SCRA 78

FACTS
            Two fiber drums were shipped owned by Eastern Shipping from Japan. The shipment as insured with a
marine policy. Upon arrival in Manila unto the custody of metro Port Service, which excepted to one drum, said
to be in bad order and which damage was unknown the Mercantile Insurance Company. Allied Brokerage
Corporation received the shipment from Metro, one drum opened and without seal. Allied delivered the
shipment to the consignee’s warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum which contained spillages while the

Page 34 of 54
rest of the contents was adulterated/fake. As consequence of the loss, the insurance company paid the
consignee, so that it became subrogated to all the rights of action of consignee against the defendants Eastern
Shipping, Metro Port and Allied Brokerage. The insurance company filed before the trial court. The trial court
ruled in favor of plaintiff an ordered defendants to pay the former with present legal interest of 12% per annum
from the date of the filing of the complaint. On appeal by defendants, the appellate court denied the same and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE
(1)   Whether the applicable rate of legal interest is 12% or 6%.

(2)   Whether the payment of legal interest on the award for loss or damage is to be computed from the
time the complaint is filed from the date the decision appealed from is rendered.

HELD
(1)           The Court held that the legal interest is 6% computed from the decision of the court a quo.
When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damaes awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest shall
be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty.

When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executor, the rate of
legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to
be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of money.

The interest due shall be 12% PA to be computed fro default, J or EJD.

(2)           From the date the judgment is made. Where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or EJ but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shll begin to run only from
the date of judgment of the court is made.

(3)   The Court held that it should be computed from the decision rendered by the court a quo.

24. Manzano vs Lazaro, 669 SCRA 209 (2012)

DOCTRINE

The civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a

finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.

FACTS

Respondent was charged with the crime of Estafafor allegedly failing to

account for the money she received. Respondent then filed a Demerrur to
Evidence, praying for the dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution
to establish the essential elements of Estafa. The RTC granted the Motion and
dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the RTC denied. Hence, petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case before
the CA.The CA denied petitioner’s appeal, declaring that the prosecution also
failed to prove the alleged civil liability of Manzano. The petitioner sought
reconsideration, but the CA denied it. Hence, the petitioner filed a petition
for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

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 ISSUE

Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner’s appeal on the civil

liability ex delicto of Manzano.

HELD

No. It is a fundamental rule that the acquittal of the accused does not
automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case.
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused, or the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where the accused
did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. The Court further
clarified that whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that
the delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any
civil liability arising from the estafacannot be awarded in the criminal case.
This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil
liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting
the crime. Civil liability ex delictois the liability sought to be recovered
in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case.

25. Fil-Estate vs Sps Ronquillo, GR #185798, Jan 13, 2014

FACTS:
                Petitioner Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. is the owner and developer of the Central
Park Place Tower while co-petitioner Fil-Estate Network, Inc. is its authorized
marketing agent. Respondent Spouses Conrado and Maria Victoria Ronquillo purchased
from petitioners an 82-square meter condominium unit for a pre-selling contract price
of P5,174,000.00. On 29 August 1997, respondents executed and signed a Reservation
Application Agreement wherein they deposited P200,000.00 as reservation fee. As
agreed upon, respondents paid the full downpayment of P1,552,200.00 and had been
paying the P63,363.33 monthly amortizations until September 1998.
                Upon learning that construction works had stopped, respondents likewise
stopped paying their monthly amortization. Claiming to have paid a total of
P2,198,949.96 to petitioners, respondents through two (2) successive letters, demanded
a full refund of their payment with interest. When their demands went unheeded,
respondents were constrained to file a Complaint for Refund and Damages before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Respondents prayed for
reimbursement/refund of P2,198,949.96 representing the total amortization payments,
P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages, attorney’s fees and other litigation
expenses.
                On 13 June 2002, the HLURB in favor of herein respondents.
The Arbiter considered petitioners’ failure to develop the condominium project as a
substantial breach of their obligation which entitles respondents to seek for rescission
with payment of damages. The Arbiter also stated that mere economic hardship is not
an excuse for contractual and legal delay.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Asian financial crisis constitute a fortuitous event which would
justify delay by petitioners in the performance of their contractual obligation;

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2. Assuming that petitioners are liable, whether or not 12% interest was correctly imposed
on the judgment award

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: NO
                The Supreme Court held that the Asian financial crisis is not a fortuitous event
that would excuse petitioners from performing their contractual obligation.
                The Court ruled that “we cannot generalize that the Asian financial crisis in
1997 was unforeseeable and beyond the control of a business corporation. It is
unfortunate that petitioner apparently met with considerable difficulty e.g. increase cost
of materials and labor, even before the scheduled commencement of its real estate
project as early as 1995. However, a real estate enterprise engaged in the pre-selling of
condominium units is concededly a master in projections on commodities and currency
movements and business risks. The fluctuating movement of the Philippine peso in the
foreign exchange market is an everyday occurrence, and fluctuations in currency
exchange rates happen everyday, thus, not an instance of caso fortuito.”
SECOND ISSUE: NO
                The Court held that 6% is the proper legal interest rate.
                The resulting modification of the award of legal interest is, also, in line with our
recent ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames, embodying the amendment introduced by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board in BSP-MB Circular No. 799 which pegged
the interest rate at 6% regardless of the source of obligation.
FALLO:
                WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT
(6%) on the amount due computed from the time of respondents’ demand for refund on
8 October 1998.

26. Buenviaje vs Sps Salonga, GR #216023. Oct 5, 2016

NATURE OF ACTION: Petition for review on certiorari are the Decision and the Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93422, essentially upholding the Decision and
the Resolution of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) Board of
Commissioners (HLURB-BOC)

FACTS: Jebson, an entity engaged in the real estate business, through its Executive Vice
President, Bañez, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Sps. Salonga for the
construction ten (10) high-end single detached residential units in the latter’s lot. They assumed
to subdivide the property into individual titles upon which Jebson shall assume the liability to
pay their mortgage loan with the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company.

On the other hand, Jebson undertook to construct the units at its own expense, secure the
building and development permits,and the license to sell from the HLURB, as well as the other
permits required. Out of the ten (10) units, seven (7) units, will belong to Jebson while the

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remaining three (3) unitswill correspond to Sps. Salonga's share. The units allocated to Sps.
Salonga were to be delivered within six (6) months after Jebson's receipt of the down payment
for the units allocated to it. Jebson was also allowed to sell its allocated units under such terms as
it may deem, fit, subject to the condition that the price agreed upon was with the conformity of
Sps. Salonga.

However. Jebson entered into a Contract to Sell with Buenviaje over one of the units(Unit 5)
without the conformity of Sps. Salonga. Out of the purchase price, P7,800,000.00 was paid
through a "swapping arrangement”. Despite full payment of the contract price, Jebson was
unable to complete the said unit in violation of its contractual stipulation to finish the same
within twelve (12) months from the date of issuance of the building permit. Jebson cited the
1997 financial crisis as the reason for the delay but even granted an extension to complete the
unit, it still failed to do so. Thus, Buenviaje filed before the HLURB-RIV a Complaint for
Specific Performance with Damages and Attorney's Fees against all the respondents. Jebson
and Bañez claimed that they were ready to comply with all their contractual obligations but were
not able to secure the necessary government permits because Sps. Salonga stubbornly refused to
cause the consolidation of the parcels of land covered by TCT No. T-9000, and their partition
into ten (10) individual lots.

Sps. Salonga averred that they were not liable to the complainants since there was no privity of
contract between them, adding that the contracts to sell were unenforceable against them as they
were entered into by Jebson without their vvconformity, in violation of the JVA.

HLURB-RIV found that respondents were not legally authorized to sell Brentwoods as they have
not secured the necessary Registration CertiGcate and License to Sell. Furthermore, they failed
to complete the construction of the units as well as to deliver the units to the complainants on
time, entitling the latter to the refund of their payments, including interests. It further found Sps.
Salonga solidarily liable with Jebson and Bañez as joint venture partners liable to the general
buying public. Aggrieved, Sps. Salonga appealed to the HLURB-BOC which reversed the
appealed decision. OP and CA affirmed the ruling of the HLURB-BOC.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Spouses Salonga are solidarily liable with Jebson and Bañez to
Buenviaje for the completion of the construction and delivery of the unit

RULING: No. There is no perceptible legal basis to hold them solidarily liable under Articles
1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code to wit:
Article 1822. Where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary
course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is
caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, or any penalty is incurred, the
partnership is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner so acting or omitting to act.
xxx xxx xxx
Article 1824. All partners are liable solidarily with the partnership for everything chargeable to
the partnership under Articles 1822 and 1823.

Evidently, the foregoing legal provisions pertain to the obligations of a co-partner in the event
that the partnership to which he belongs is held liable. In this case, Buenviaje never dealt with

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any partnership constituted by and between Jebson and Sps. Salonga. As previously mentioned,
the subject CTS, which was the source of the obligations relative to the completion and delivery
of Unit 5, solely devolved upon the person of Jebson. As there was no partnership privy to any
obligation to which Buenviaje is a creditor, Articles 1822 and 1824 of the Civil Code do not
apply.

While Jebson, as developer, and Sps. Salonga, as land owner, entered into a joint venture, which
— based on case law — may be considered as a form of partnership, the fact remains that their
joint venture was never privy to any obligation with Buenviaje; hence, liability cannot beimputed
against the joint venture based on the same principle of relativity as above-mentioned. Besides, it
should be pointed out that the JVA between Jebson and Sps. Salonga was limited to the
construction of the residential units under the Brentwoods Project and that Jebson had the sole
hand in marketing the units allocated to it to third persons, such as Buenviaje. In fact, under the
express terms of the JVA, Jebson, as the developer, had even stipulated to hold Sps. Salonga free
from any liability to third parties for non-compliance with HLURB rules and regulations.
As things stand, only Jebson should be held liable for its obligations to Buenviaje under the
subject CTS.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED

27. Anchor Savings Bank vs Furigay, GR #191178, March 13, 2013

Facts:
1.

The amount of Eight Million Six Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Two Hundred Two
pesos and Fifty Nine centavos (Php8,695,202.59) as PRINCIPAL OBLIGATION as of 12
April 1999;

2.
3.

An INTEREST of Twelve per cent (12%) per annum until fully paid;

4.
5.

PENALTY CHARGE of Twelve per cent (12%) per annum until fully paid;

6.
7.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES of Ten (10%) per cent of the total amount due;

8.

Page 39 of 54
 9.

One Hundred Thousand pesos as reasonable ATTORNEY'S FEES;

10.
11.

Costs of suit.

12.

While Civil Case No. 99-865 was pending, respondent spouses donated their registered
properties in Alaminos, Pangasinan, to their minor children, respondents Hegem G. Furigay and
Herriette C. Furigay. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 21743,[7] 21742,[8]
21741,[9] and 21740[10] were issued in the names of Hegem and Herriette Furigay.
That Ciudad Transport Services, Inc., Henry H. Furigay and Gelinda C. Furigay obtained a loan
from Anchor Savings Bank and subsequently the former defaulted from their loan obligation
which prompted Anchor Savings Bank to file the case entitled "Anchor Savings Bank vs.
Ciudad Transport Services, Inc., Henry H. Furigay and Gelinda C. Furigay" lodged before
Makati City Regional Trial Court Branch 143 and docketed as Civil Case No. 99-865. On 7
November 2003 the Honorable Court in the aforesaid case issued a Decision the dispositive
portion... of which reads as follows:
That defendants Sps. Henry H. Furigay and Gelinda C. Furigay are the registered owners of
various real properties located at the Province of Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. 19721, 21678, 21679, and 21682. x x x
That on 8 March 2001 defendants Sps. Henry H. Furigay and Gelinda C. Furigay executed a
Deed of Donation in favor of their children herein defendants Hegem C. Furigay and Herriette C.
Furigay donating to them all of the above-mentioned properties.
That the donation made by defendants Sps. Henry H. Furigay and Gelinda C. Furigay were
done with the intention to defraud its creditors particularly Anchor Savings Bank. Said transfer or
conveyance is the one contemplated by Article 1387 of the New Civil Code,... In the instant
case, Sps. Furigay donated the properties at the time there was a pending case against them.
Plaintiff suffered actual and compensatory damages as a result of the filing of the case the bank
has spent a lot of man-hours of its employees and officers re-evaluating the account of
defendant Sps. Furigay. Such man-hour when converted into monetary consideration...
represents the salaries and per diems of its employees particularly the CI/Appraiser, Head
Office Lawyer and Bank Auditor;
Issues:
FINDING THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT IT HAS RESORTED TO ALL LEGAL
REMEDIES TO OBTAIN SATISFACTION OF ITS CLAIM, WITHOUT GIVING PETITIONER
THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD OR THE CHANCE TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ITS ACTION, THEREBY DEPRIVING THE LATTER OF
THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Ruling:

Page 40 of 54
Clearly, the Donation made by defendants Sps. Furigay was intended to deprive plaintiff Anchor
Savings Bank from going after the subject properties to answer for their due and demandable
obligation with the Bank. The donation being undertaken in fraud of creditors then the... same
may be rescinded pursuant to Article 1381 of the New Civil Code.
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21743, 21742, 21741, and 21740 issued under the names of
defendants Herriette C. Furigay and Hegem C. Furigay should likewise be cancelled and
reverted to the names of co-defendants Henry and Gelinda Furigay.
Accordingly, the basis for determining the correct docket fees was the fair market value... of the
real property under litigation as stated in its current tax declaration or its current zonal valuation,
whichever was higher.
) That the plaintiff asking for rescission, has a credit prior to the alienation, although
demandable later;
1.

That the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a patrimonial benefit to a
third person;

2.
3.

That the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim, but would benefit by
rescission of the conveyance to the third person;

4.
5.

That the act being impugned is fraudulent; and

6.
7.

That the third person who received the property conveyed, if by onerous title, has been
an accomplice in the fraud.

8.

Principles:
the following elements must concur: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant
to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or... omission on the part of such defendant
in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant
to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.[19] In other words, "a cause of action arises when that should have been
done is not done, or that which should not have been done is done."
"before an action can properly be commenced, all the essential elements of the cause of action
must be in existence, that is, the cause of action must be... complete. All valid conditions

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precedent to the institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by
agreement of the parties or implied by law must be performed or complied with before
commencing the action, unless the conduct of the adverse party has... been such as to prevent
or waive performance or excuse non-performance of the condition."
Failure to make a sufficient allegation of a cause of action in the complaint warrants its
dismissal.[23]
The creditors, after having pursued the property in possession of the debtor to satisfy their
claims, may exercise all the rights and bring all the actions of the latter for the same purpose,
save those which are inherent in his person; they may also impugn... the actions which the
debtor may have done to defraud them.
a creditor would have a cause of action to bring an action for rescission, if it is alleged that the
following successive measures have already been taken: (1) exhaust the properties of the
debtor through... levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the debtor,
except such as are exempt by law from execution; (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the
debtor, save those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the
contracts... executed by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).[25]
Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply provides that, 'The action to claim rescission must be
commenced within four years.' Since this provision of law is silent as to when the prescriptive
period would commence, the general rule, i.e, from the moment the cause of action accrues,...
therefore, applies. Article 1150 of the Civil Code is particularly instructive:

28. Direct Funders Holdings vs Lavina, 373 SCRA 645 (2002)

Facts:
The petition at bar[1] seeks to review the decision... of the Court of Appeals[3] dismissing  the
petition assailing the ruling of the trial court issuing a writ of preliminary injunction that restrained
a... writ of possession issued by a coordinate court... the action a quo is for annulment of
documents, reconveyance, recovery of possession, damages with application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order.
the property in question was occupied by the petitioner by virtue  of  a  writ  of  possession
issued by  the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig
, Branch 157
Despite the lawful order... respondent Judge, presiding Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 71, issued the questioned orders to restore possession to private respondent
Chan,... petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing
the trial court's issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition ruling that the trial court had
jurisdiction to issue the injunction that did not interfere with the writ of possession of a
coordinate court.
Issues:

Page 42 of 54
whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling issuing a writ of injunction
restraining a writ of possession in another case to place respondent back in possession of the
subject property.
Ruling:
We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.
conditional sale agreement was the only document that the respondent presented during the
summary hearing of the application for a temporary restraining order... the conditional sale
agreement is officious and ineffectual. First, it was not consummated.  Second, it was not
registered and duly annotated on the Transfer Certificate of Title (No. 12357) covering the
subject property.  Third, it was executed about... eight (8) years after the execution of the real
estate mortgage over the subject property.
The conditions of the conditional sale agreement were not fulfilled, hence, respondent's claim to
the subject property was as heretofore stated ineffectual.  Article 1181 of the Civil Code reads:
"Art. 1181.  In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishments or
loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes
the condition."
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals[15] and the
order denying reconsideration.
Principles:
It is a fundamental axiom in the law on contracts that a person not a party to an agreement
cannot be affected thereby.  Worse, not only was the conditional sale... agreement executed
without the consent of the mortgagee-creditor, United Savings Bank, the same was also a
material breach of the stipulations of the real estate mortgage over the subject property.
"Art. 1181.  In conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishments or
loss of those already acquired, shall depend upon the happening of the event which constitutes
the condition."
In Soriano v. Bautista,[13] the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated May 30, 1956 executed by
the mortgagors contained a stipulation giving the mortgagee the option to purchase the land
subject of the mortgage on any date within the 2-year period of the... mortgage.  The mortgagee
subsequently decided to buy the land pursuant to this stipulation.  We ruled:
"Appellants contend that, being mortgagors, they cannot be deprived of the right to redeem the
mortgaged property, because such right is inherent in and inseparable from this kind of
contract.  The premise of the contention is not entirely accurate.  While... the transaction is
undoubtedly a mortgage and contains the customary stipulation concerning redemption, it
carries the added special provision aforequoted, which renders the mortgagors' right to redeem
defeasible at the election of the mortgages.  There is nothing illegal... or immoral in this.  It is
simply an option to buy, sanctioned by Article 1479 of the Civil Code, which states:  "A promise
to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon the promisor if the promise
is supported by a consideration distinct from... the price." [14]

29. Heirs of Sps Sandejas vs Lina, 351 SCRA 183

Page 43 of 54
Facts:

The facts of the case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a
petition, in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate
of his wife, Remedios Sandejas, who died on April 17, 1955.

On July 1, 1981, Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as
administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas. Likewise on the same date, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. took
his oath as administrator.

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records
of Branch XI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. As a result, he filed a Motion for Reconstitution of the records of
the case on February 9, 1983. On February 16, 1983, the lower court in its Order granted the said motion.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Movant Alex
A. Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity
as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in
their entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas.

It showed that there was receipt of money with promise to sell and to buy with the sum of P100,000.00

Issues:

a) Whether or not Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. is legally obligated to convey title to the property referred to in the subject
document which was found to be in the nature of a contract to sell where court approval was not complied with?

b) Whether or not he was guilty of bad faith despite the conclusion of the CA that he [bore] the burden of proving that
a motion for authority to sell had been filed in court?

c) Whether or not undivided shares of Eliodoro in the subject property is (3/5) and the administrator of the latter
should execute deeds of conveyance within thirty days from receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the
respondent?

d)Whether or not the respondent's petition-in-intervention was converted to a money claim and whether the [trial
court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to execute [a] deed of conveyance
even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr.?

Held:

The Petition is partially meritorious.

Obligation With a Suspensive Condition

Petitioners argue that the CA erred in ordering the conveyance of the disputed 3/5 of the parcels of land, despite the
nonfulfillment of the suspensive condition -- court approval of the sale -- as contained in the "Receipt of Earnest
Money with Promise to Sell and to Buy" (also referred to as the "Receipt"). Instead, they assert that because this
condition had not been satisfied, their obligation to deliver the disputed parcels of land was converted into a money
claim.

The agreement between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent is subject to a suspensive condition -- the procurement of a
court approval, not full payment. There was no reservation of ownership in the agreement. In accordance with
paragraph 1 of the Receipt, petitioners were supposed to deed the disputed lots over to respondent. This they could
do upon the court's approval, even before full payment. Hence, their contract was a conditional sale, rather than a
contract to sell as determined by the CA.

When a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the
condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, the intestate court's grant of the Motion for Approval of the sale filed by
respondent resulted in petitioners' obligation to execute the Deed of Sale of the disputed lots in his favor. The
condition having been satisfied, the contract was perfected. Henceforth, the parties were bound to fulfill what they
had expressly agreed upon.

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Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. Reference to
judicial approval, however, cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of heirs to dispose of their own pro indiviso
shares in the co-heirship or co-ownership. In other words, they can sell their rights, interests or participation in the
property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of
the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis, but only
with the court's permission. It would seem that the suspensive condition in the present conditional sale was imposed
only for this reason.

First Collateral Issue: Jurisdiction of Settlement Court

Petitioners also fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not
merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court;
and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application for
approval of a sale of the property under administration.

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that
obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action --
on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily
prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

Second Collateral Issue: Intervenor's Standing

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to apply for the approval
of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court allegedly erred in entertaining and granting
respondent's Motion for Approval.

Third Collateral Issue: Bad Faith

Petitioners assert that Eliodoro Sr. was not in bad faith, because (a) he informed respondent of the need to secure
court approval prior to the sale of the lots, and (2) he did not promise that he could obtain the approval. However,
Eliodoro Sr. did not misrepresent these lots to respondent as his own properties to which he alone had a title in fee
simple. The fact that he failed to obtain the approval of the conditional sale did not automatically imply bad faith on his
part. The CA held him in bad faith only for the purpose of binding him to the conditional sale. This was unnecessary
because his being bound to it is, as already shown, beyond cavil.

Fourth Collateral Issue: Computation of Eliodoro's Share

Petitioners aver that the CA's computation of Eliodoro Sr.'s share in the disputed parcels of land was erroneous
because, as the conjugal partner of Remedios, he owned one half of these lots plus a further one tenth of the
remaining half, in his capacity as a one of her legal heirs. Hence, Eliodoro's share should be 11/20 of the entire
property. Respondent poses no objection to this computation.

On the other hand, the CA held that, at the very least, the conditional sale should cover the one half (1/2) pro indiviso
conjugal share of Eliodoro plus his one tenth (1/10) hereditary share as one of the ten legal heirs of the decedent, or
a total of three fifths (3/5) of the lots in administration.

Petitioners' correct. The CA computed Eliodoro's share as an heir based on one tenth of the entire disputed property.
It should be based only on the remaining half, after deducting the conjugal share.

Ruling

The proper determination of the seller-heir's shares requires further explanation. Succession laws and jurisprudence
require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or the wife, the decedent's entire estate -
under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving
spouse and the other half to the heirs of the deceased.25 After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the
remaining half of the estate is then distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices. We assume, however, that this
preliminary determination of the decedent's estate has already been taken into account by the parties, since the only
issue raised in this case is whether Eliodoro's share is 11/20 or 3/5 of the disputed lots.

WHEREFORE, The Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision and Resolution are
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that respondent is entitled to only a pro-indiviso share equivalent to 11/20 of the
disputed lots. SO ORDERED.

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30. Buot vs CA, 357 SCRA 846
31. Reyes vs Tuparan, 650 SCRA 283
32. Perez vs CA, 323 SCRA 613
33. Patente vs Omega, 93 Phil 218
34. Lim vs CA, GR #118347, Oct 24, 1996
35. Romero vs CA, GR #107207, Nov 23, 1995
36. Ducusi vs CA, 122 SCRA 280
37. Taylor vs Uy Tieng, 43 Phil 873
38. Int’l Hotel Corp vs Joaquin, Jr., GR #158361, April 10, 2013
39. Gonzales vs Lim, 528 SCRA 507 (2007)
40. BPI Investment Corp vs CA, 377 SCRA 117 (2002)
41. Heirs of Luis Bacus vs CA, 371 SCRA 295 (2002)
42. Agro Conglomerates vs CA, 348 SCRA 450 (2000)
43. Buenviaje vs Sps Salonga, GR #216023, Oct 5, 2016
44. Velarde vs CA, 361 SCRA 56 (2001)
45. Ong vs CA, 310 SCRA 01, (1999)
46. Goldenrod vs CA, 299 SCRA 400 (1998)
47. DBP vs CA, 344 SCRA 492 (2000)
48. PCIC vs CA, 274 SCRA 597 (1997)
49. Sps Barredo vs Sps Leano, GR #156627, June 4, 2004
50. Song Fo & Co vs Hawaiian Phil Co, 47 Phil 821 (1925)
51. Phil Amusement Ent vs Natividad, GR #L-21876, Sept 29, 1967
52. Laforteza vs Machuca, GR #137552, June 16, 2000; 333 SCRA 643
53. Ang vs CA, GR #80058, Feb 13, 1989; 170 SCRA 286
54. Del Castillo vs Nguiat, GR #137909, Dec 11, 2003
55. PNCC vs Mars Construction, 325 SCRA 624 (2000)
56. Heirs of Justice JBL Reyes vs CA, 338 SCRA 282 (2000)
57. Pangilinan vs CA, 279 SCRA 590 (1997)
58. Jison vs CA, 164 SCRA 339
59. Rivera vs Del Rosario, GR #144934, Jan 15, 2004
60. Reyes vs Martinez, 55 Phil 492
61. Reyes vs Zaballero, GR #L-3561, May 23, 1951
62. Phil Credit Corp vs CA, 370 SCRA 155 (2001)
63. Inciong Jr. vs CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)
64. Parot vs Gemora, 07 Phil 94
65. Industrial Management vs NLRC, 331 SCRA 640 (2000)
66. Smith Bell & Co vs CA, 267 SCRA 530 (1997)
67. Phil Integrated Labor Assistance vs NLRC, 264 SCRA 418 (1996)
68. Continental Cement Corp vs Asea Brown Boveri, 659 SCRA 137

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69. Florentino vs Supervalue, 533 SCRA 156 (2007)
70. Int’l Hotel Corp vs Joaquin Jr., GR #158361, April 10, 2013
71. De la Cruz vs Concepcion, 684 SCRA 74 (2012)
72. Panganiban vs Cuevas, 07 Phil 477 (1907)
73. Phil Lawin Bus vs CA, 374 SCRA 332 (2002)
74. Vda de Jayme vs CA 390 SCRA 604 (2012)
75. DBP vs CA, 284 SCRA 14 (1998)
76. Tan Shuy vs Maulawin, 665 SCRA 604 (2012)
77. CF Sharp vs Northwest Airlines, 381 SCRA 314 (2002)
78. BPI vs Sps Royeca, 559 SCRA 207 (2008)
79. Compania General vs Molina, 05 Phil 142
80. NAMARCO vs F.U.N.D., 49 SCRA 238
81. Co vs PNB, 114 SCRA 842
82. Telengtan Bros vs US Lines, 483 SCRA 456 (2006)
83. Huinbonhoa vs CA, 320 SCRA 625 (1999)
84. Filipino Pipe and Foundry vs NAWASA, 161 SCRA 32 (1988)
85. Singson vs Caltex, 342 SCRA 91 (2000)
86 Mobil Oil vs CA, 180 SCRA 651
87. Equitable PCI Bank vs Ng Sheung Ngor, 541 SCRA 223
88. Sps Tan vs China Banking, G.R. #200299, Aug 17, 2016
89. Allandale Sportsline vs Good Dev’t Corp, GR #164521, Dec 18, 2008
90. Sps Bonrostro vs Sps Luna, GR #172346, July 24, 2013
91. Far East Bank vs Diaz Realty, 363 SCRA 359, (2001)
92. Pabugais vs Sahijwani, GR #156846, Feb 23, 2004
93. Cebu Int’l Finance vs CA, 316 SCA 488
94. Zulueta vs Octaviano, 121 SCRA 314
95. Sps Rayos vs Reyes, GR #150913, Feb 20, 2003
96. Soco vs Militante, 123 SCRA 160 (1983)
97. PNCC vs CA, GR #116869, May 5, 1997
98. Osmeña III vs SSS, 533 SCRA 313 (2007)
99. Tagaytay Realty vs Gacutan, GR #160033, July 2015
100. PNB MADECOR vs Uy, 363 SCRA 128 (2001)
101. Heirs of Servando Franco vs Gonzales, 675 SCRA 96
102. Reyes vs CA, 383 SCRA 471 (2002)
103. Quinto vs People, 305 SCRA 708 (1999)
104. PNB vs Soriano, 682 SCRA 243
105. Phil Realty vs Ley Construction, 651 SCRA 719
106. Bautista vs Pilar Dev’t, 312 SCRA 611
107. Molino vs Security Diners, 363 SCRA 358
108. RCJ Bus vs Master Tours, 682 SCRA 143 (2012)

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109. Security Bank vs Cuenca, 341 SCRA 781 (2000)
110. Ligutan vs CA, 376 SCRA 560 (2002)
111. Velasquez vs CA, 309 SCRA 539 (1999)
112. Idolor vs CA, 351 SCRA 399 (2001)
113. Garcia vs CA, 619 SCRA 280
114. Malayan Insurance vs Alberto, 664 SCRA 791
115. Yek Ton Lin Fire vs Yusingco, 64 Phil 1062
116. Sugar Central vs. Barrios, 79 Phil 66
117. Nadela vs. Cebu, 411 SCRA 315
118. P'que King Ent. vs. CA, 269 SCRA 727
119. DBP vs. Pundogar, 218 SCRA 11
120. Teves vs. PHHC, 23 SCRA 1141
121. Custodio vs. CA, 253 SCRA 483
122. Golangco Construction vs. PCIB, 485 SCRA 203
123. Equitable Leasing vs. Suyom, 388 SCRA 445
124. Dreamwork vs Janiola & Hon. Famini, June 30 2009, G.R. #184861
125. Evelyn Yonaha vs. CA, et al. G.R. No. 112346, March 29, 1996
126. Pajarito vs. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275
127. Tomimbang vs. Tomimbang, G.R. No. 165116, August 4, 2009.
128. Sps. Toring vs. Sps. Olan, 589 Phil. 362.
129. Security Bank vs. RTC Br. 61, Makati, 331 Phil. 787 (1996
130. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. CA, G.R., 234 SCRA 78
131. Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 703 SCRA 439
132. Abella vs. Abella G.R. No. 195166, July 8, 2015
133. Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil 607 (1942)
134. Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 (1979)
135. PSBA v. CA, 205 SCRA 729 (1992)
136. Amadora v. CA, 160 SCRA 315 (1988)
137. De Erquiaga v. CA, 178 SCRA 1 (1989)
138. Angeles v. Calasanz, 135 SCRA 323 (1985)
139. Ong v. CA, 310 SCRA 1 (1999)
140. Visayan Sawmill v. CA, 219 SCRA 3 78 (1993)
141. Deiparine v. CA, 221 SCRA 503 (1993)
142. Iringan v. CA, 366 SCRA 41 (2001)
143. Vda. de Mistica v. Sps. Naguiat, 418 SCRA 73 (2003)
144. Khe Hong Seng v. CA, 355 SCRA 701 (2001)
145. Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725 (1999)
146. Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA, 234 SCRA 781 (1994)
147. Cristina Garments v. CA, 304 SCRA 356 (1999)
148. Keng Hua Products v. CA, 286 SCRA 257 (1998)

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149. Security Bank v. RTC Makati, 263 SCRA 453 (1996)
150. Almeda v. CA, 256 SCRA 292(1996)
151. First Metro Investment v. Estate of Del Sol, 420 Phil 902 (2001)
152. Chavez v. Gonzales, 32 SCRA 547 (1970)
153. Tanguling v. CA, 266 SCRA 78 (1997)
154. Song Fo v. Hawaiian Philippines, 47 Phil 821 (1925)
155. Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, 148 SCRA 365 (1987)
156. U.P. v. de los Angeles, 35 SCRA 365 (1970)
157. Juan Nakpil & Sons v. CA,144 SCRA 597 (1986)
158. Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring, 21 SCRA 279(1967)
159. Dioquino v. Laureano, 33 SCRA 65 (1970)
160. Pabugais v. Sahijwani, 423 SCRA 596 (2004)
161. Occena v.CA, 73 SCRA 637 (1976)
162. Naga Telephone Co.v.CA, 230 SCRA 351(1994)
163. PNCC v. CA, 272 SCRA 183 (1997)
164. Yam v. CA, GR 104726, 11 Feb 1999
165. GanTionv.CA, 28 SCRA 235(1969)
166. Silahis Marketing v. lAC, 180 SCRA 29 (1989)
167. BPI v. Reyes, 255 SCRA 571 (1996)
168. PNB v. Sapphire Shipping, 259 SCRA 174 (1996)
169. Mirasol v. CA, 3 51 SCRA 44 (2001)
170. Miller v. CA, 38 SCRA 642 (1971)
171. Dormitorio v. Fernandez, 72 SCRA 388 (1976)
172. Magdalena Estate v. Rodriguez, 18 SCRA 967 (1966)
173. Reyes v. Secretary of Justice, 264 SCRA 3 5(1996)
174. Conchingyan v. RB Surety and Insurance, 151 SCRA 339 (1987)
175. Broadway Centrum Cond Corp v. Tropical Hut, GR 79642, 05 Jul 1993
176. California Bus Lines v. State Investment, GR 147950, 11 Dec 2003
177. Garcia v. Llamas, 417 SCRA 292 (2003)
178. Quinto v. People, GR 126715, 14 Apr 1999
179. Yobido v. CA, 281 SCRA 1 (1997)
180. Austria v.CA, 39 SCRA 527 (1971)
181. NPC v. CA, GRL-47379, 161 SCRA 334 (1988)
182. Bacolod-Murcia Milling v. CA, 182 SCRA 24(1990)
183. Philcomsat v. Globe Telecom, 429 SCRA 153(2004)
184. Arrieta v. NARIC, 10 SCRA 79 (1964)
185. Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 377 (1940)
186. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance v. Macondray, 70 SCRA 122 (1976)
187. Papa v. A.V. Valencia, 284 SCRA 643 (1998)
188. PAL v.CA, 181 SCRA 557 (1990)

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189. Reparations Commission v. Universal Deep Sea Fishing, 83 SCRA 764
190. Paculdo v. Regalado, 345 SCRA 134(2000)
191. DBP v. CA, GR 118342, 05 Jan 1998
192. Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Philippine Acetylene,111 SCRA 421 (1982)
193. De Guzman v.CA,137 SCRA 730 (1985)
194. TLG Int’l Continental Ent. Inc. v. Flores, 47 SCRA 437 (1972)
195. McLaughlin v CA, 144 SCRA 693 (1986)
196. Soco v. Militante,123 SCRA 160(1983)
197. Sotto v. Mijares, 28 SCRA 17 (1969)
198. Meat Packing Corp. v. Sandiganbayan, 359 SCRA 409 (2001)
199. Astro Electronics v. Phil Export FLGc, GR 136729, 23 Sep 2003
200. Licaros v. Ga207aitan, GR 142838, 09 Aug 2001
201. Gaite v. Fonacier, 2 SCRA 830 (1961)
202. Gonzales v. Heirs of Thomas, 314 SCRA 585 (1999)
203. Gonzales v. Heirs of Thomas, 314 SCRA 585 (1999)
204. Coronel v. CA, 253 SCRA 15 (1996) G
205. Parks v. Province of Tarlac, 49 Phil 142(1927)
206. Central Philippines University v. CA, 246 SCRA 511 (1995)
207. Quijada v. CA, 299 SCRA 695 (1998)
208. Lim v.CA, 191 SCRA 156 (1990)
209. NagaTelephone v. CA, 230 SCRA 351 (1990)
210. Osmeña v.Rama, 14 Phil 99 (1909)
211. Hermosa v. Longora, 93 Phil 971 (1953)
212. Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil 873 (1922)
213. Smith Bell v. Sotelo Matti, 44 Phil 875(1922)
214. Rustan Pulp and Paper v.IAC, 214 SCRA 665 (1992)
215. Romero v. CA, 250 SCRA 223 (1995)
216. Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil 873 (1922)
217. Herrera v. Leviste, GR5 5744, 28 Feb 1985
218. Lachica v. Araneta, 47 OG No. 11, 5699, 04 Aug 1949
219. Ponce de Leon v. Syjuco, 90 Phil 311(1951)
220. Buce v. CA, 332 SCRA 151 (2000)
221. Araneta v. Phil Sugar Estate Dev Co., 20 SCRA 330 (1967)
222. Central Philippine University v. CA, 246 SCRA 511 (1998)
223. Ynchausti v. Yulo, 34 Phil 978 (1916)
224. Lafarge Cement Phil. v. Continental Cement, 443 SCRA 522 (2004)
225. Ynchausti v. Yulo, 34 Phil 978 (1916)
226. Alipio v.CA, 341 SCRA 441 (2000)
227. Jauclan v. Querol, 38 Phil 718 (1918)
228. RFC v. CA, O.G. No.6, 2457

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229. Quisumbing v. CA, 189 SCRA 325 (1990)
230. Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996)
231. Makati Dev Corp v. Empire Insurance Co., 20 SCRA 557 (1967)
232. Theis v. CA, GR 126013, 12 Feb 1997
233. Heirs of William Sevilla, et al v. Sevilla, 402 SCRA 503 (2003)
234. Dumasug v. Modelo, 34 Phil 252 (1916)
235. Hemedes v. CA, 316 SCRA 34 7 (1999)
236. Katipunan v. Katipunan, 375 SCRA 200(2002)
237. Martinez v. HSBC, 15 Phil 252 (1910)
238. Songco v. Sellner, 3 7 SCRA 254 (1917)
239. Azurraga v. Gay, 52 Phil 599(1928)
240. Laureta Trinidad v. IAC, 204 SCRA 524 (1991)
241. Mercado & Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil 215 (1917)
242. Tan v. CA, 367 SCRA 571 (2001)
243. Country Bankers Insurance v.CA, GR 85161, 09 Sept 1991
244. GSIS v. CA, 228 SCRA 183 (1993)
245. Dizon v. Gaborro, 83 SCRA 688 (1978)
246. Rosenstock v. Burke, 46 Phil 217 (1924)
247. Malbarosa v. CA, 402 SCRA 168 (2003)
248. Sanchez v. Rigos, 45 SCRA 368 (1972)
249. Adelfa Properties v. CA, 240 SCRA 565 (1995)
250. Jardine Davies v. CA, GR 389 Phil 204 (2000)
251. Asiain v. Jalandoni, 45 Phil 296 (1923)
252. Braganza v. Villa Abrille, 105 SCRA 456 (1959)
253. Tuason v. Marquez, 45 Phil 381(1923)
254. Rural Bank of Sta. Maria v. CA, 314 SCRA 255 (1999)
255. Bias v. Santos, 1 SCRA 899 (1961)
256. Tanedo v. CA, 252 SCRA 80 (1996)
257. Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil 577 (1957)
258. Carantes v. CA, 76 SCRA 524 (1977)
259. Sps. Buenaventura et al v. CA, 416 SCRA 263 (2003)
260. Gutierrez Hermanos v. Orense, 28 Phil 571 (1914)
261. Florentino v. Encarnacion, 79 SCRA 192 ( 1977)
262. Coquia v. Fieldmen's Insurance Co., 26 SCRA 178 (1968)
263. Constantino v. Espiritu, 39 SCRA 206 (1971 )
264. Integrated Packaging Corp. v. CA, 333 SCRA 171 (2000)
265. Daywalt v. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil 587 (1919)
266. So Ping Bun v. CA, 314 SCRA 751 (1999)
267. Manila Railroad Co. v. La Compania Transatlantica, 83 Phil 875 (1918)
268. DKC Holdings Corp. v. CA, 329 SCRA 666 (2000)

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269. Hernaez v. De los Angeles, 27 SCRA 127 6 ( 1969)
270. Gabriel v. Monte de Piedad, 71 Phil 497 (1941)
271. Pakistan International Airlines v. Ople, 190 SCRA 90 (1990)
272. Cui v. Arellano, 2 SCRA 205 (1961)
273. Arroyo v. Berwin, 36 Phil 386 (1917)
274. Filipinas Compania de Seguros v. Mandanas, 17 SCRA 391(1966)
275. Bustamante v. Rosel, 319 SCRA 413 (1999)
276. Borromeo v. CA, 47 SCRA 65 (1972)
277. Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 Phil 217 (1939)
278. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 28 SCRA 229 (1914)
279. Suntay v. CA, 251 SCRA 430 (1995)
280. Blanco v. Quasha, 318 SCRA 373 (1999)
281. Garcia v. Bisaya, 97 Phil 609 (1955)
282. Beutir v. Leande, 330 SCRA 591 (2000)
283. Atilano v. Atilano, 28 SCRA 2232 (1969)
284. Carrantes v. CA, 76 SCRA 524 (1977)
285. Sarming et al v. Dy et al, 383 SCRA 131 (2002)
286. Oria v. Mcmicking, 21 Phil 24 3 (1912)
287. Siguan v. Lim et al, 318 SCRA 725 (1999)
288. Suntay v. CA, 251 SCRA 430 (1995)
289. Universal Food Corp. v. CA, 33 SCRA 1 (1970)
290. Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, 88 SCRA 623 (1979)
291. Caldwallader & Co. v. Smith, Bell & Co., 7 Phil 461 (1907)
292. Velarde v. CA, 361 SCRA 56 (2001)
293. Uy Soo Lim v. Tan Unchuan, 38 Phil 552 (1918)
294. Carbonnel v. Poncio, 103 Phil 655 (1958)
295. PNB v. Philippine Vegetable Oil Co., 49 Phil 857 (1927)
296. Limketkai Sons Milling Inc. v. CA, 261 SCRA 464 (1995)
297. Swedish Match v. CA, 441 SCRA 1 (2004)
298. Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil 577 (1957)
299. Rellosa v. Gaw Cheen Hum, 93 Phil 827 (1953)
300. PNB v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967)
301. Frenzel v. Catitu, 406 SCRA 55 (2003)
302. Ubarra v. Mapalad, AM MT J 91-622 ( 1993)
303. Modina v. CA, 317 SCRA 606 (1999)

Assigned Cases in Civ Rev II (2nd Batch)

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304. Dantis vs Maghinang, Jr., 695 SCRA 599
305. San Fernando Regala, Inc. vs Cargill Phils, 09 Oct 2013
306. Rosaroso vs Soria, 699 SCRA 232
307. Uraca vs CA, 278 SCRA 702
308. Radiowealth vs Palileo, 197 SCRA 245
309. Sta. Fe Realty vs Sison,Mart 31 Aug 2016
310. Sps Domingo vs Sps Manzano, 16 Nov 2016
311. Industrial Textile vs LPJ Enterprise,217 SCRA 322
312. PUP vs Golden Horizons Realty, 15 March 2010
313. Equatorial Realty vs Mayfair Theater, 21 Nov 1996
314. Cruz vs CA, 281 SCRA 491
315. Calimlim-Canullas vs Fortun, 129 SCRA 675
316. Platinum Plans vs Cucueco, 522 Phil 150
317. Velasco vs CA, 151-A Phil 868
318. Lorenzana vs Lelina, 17 Aug 2016
319. Arcaina vs Ingram, 15 Feb 2017
320. Bislig Bay Lumber vs CIR, 28 Jan 1961
321. Misamis Lumber vs CIR, 102 Phil 116
322. Philippine Trust Co vs National Bank, 42 Phil 413
323. Phil Steel Coating Corp vs Quinones, 19 April 2017
324. RCBC Savings Bank vs Odrada, 19 Oct 2016
325. First United Constructors vs Bayanihan Automotive, 15 Jan 2014
326. Isidro vs Nissan Motors, 03 Dec 1999
327. De Guzman vs Toyota Cubao, 29 Nov 2006
328. Levy Hermanos vs Gervacio, 69 Phil 52
329. PCI Leasing vs Giraffe-X, 12 July 2007
330. Nonato vs IAC, 140 SCRA 255
331. Mortel vs KASSCO, 348 SCRA 391
332. Lagandaon vs CA, 290 SCRA 330
333. Danan vs Sps Serrano, 01 Aug 2016
334. Moldex Realty vs Saberon, 695 SCRA 331
335. Cagayan Communities vs Sps Nanol, 14 Nov 2012
336. David vs David, 15 Jan 2014
337. Martinez vs Chua, 694 SCRA 38
338. Barcellano vs Banas, 14 Sept 2011
339. Serfino vs Far East Bank, 683 SCRA 380
340. Fort Bonifacio vs Fong, 25 March 2015
341. Phil Carpet vs Tagyamon, 712 SCRA 489

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