decision which in the movant’s view, are not supported by law or the evidence.

The movant,
CONTINENTAL CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and therefore, is very often confined to the amplification on further discussion of the same issues
MUNICIPALITY OF NORZAGARAY, Respondents. already passed upon by the court. Otherwise, his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the
decision but a new trial or some other remedy. Conformably, we must hold that the motion for
Gil Venerando R. Racho for Petitioner. reconsideration was not pro forma. Hence, it did have the effect of suspending the reglementary
period of appeal until the denial of the motion was notified to the petitioner.
Ponciano G. Hernandez for Private Respondent.
5. ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; VESTED WITH POWER TO DETERMINE QUESTIONS OF
FACTS. — The rest of the petition deals with the substantive issue of whether the respondent
SYLLABUS Municipality of Norzagaray has the power to impose business taxes on the petitioner as a
manufacturer and distributor of cement. This issue involves not only legal but also factual
considerations that have not been fully examined because the petitioner was not given its day in
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO DISMISS; SEASONABLY FILED IN CASE AT court. A fair resolution of this issue requires a healing where both parties will be given an
BAR. — The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been sustained on appeal. opportunity to present their respective sides in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the
There is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within the period of the Rules of Court. No less than full compliance with procedural due process will suffice. Hence, It is
second extension granted by the trial court. It is true that such a motion could not be considered imperative that this case be remanded to the court a quo for a full trial on the merits.
a responsive pleading as we have held in many cases. Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section
1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that "within the time for pleading, a motion to
dismiss the action may be made" on the grounds therein enumerated, including the grounds
invoked by the petitioner.
DEC ISION
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIME TO PLEAD FROM DENIAL THEREOF. — It is clearly provided in Section 4 of
the same Rule that: Sec. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination
thereof is deferred, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11,
CRUZ, J.:
computed from the time he received notice of denial or deferment, unless the court provides a
different period. The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the
expiration of the second extension. Notice of its denial was served on the petitioner on July 29,
1985. From that date, the petitioner had 15 days within which to file its answer, or until August The question involved in this case is quite simple and not even new. A little research could have easily
13, 1985. It was unable to do so, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court resolved it and avoided this litigation that has come up all the way to this Court. If we are rendering a
on August 2, 1985. On that date, the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration of the full-blown decision instead of disposing of the issue by a short resolution, it is not only because we
15-day reglementary period during which the petitioner was supposed to file his answer. see the need to reiterate certain basic rules that should be well-settled by now. What we especially
intend is to impress upon bench and bar the value of keeping abreast of the doctrines announced by
3. ID.; ID.; ORDER OF DEFAULT; NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUE BEFORE AN ANSWER the Court in the interpretation of its Rules.
WAS FILED. — We hold that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the period for
the filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its The facts are easily recounted.
defense. The judgment by default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the
plaintiff, was therefore also invalid. We do not agree with the respondent court that the petitioner On February 1, 1985, the Municipality of Norzagaray filed a complaint for recovery of taxes against the
should have first filed a motion to set aside the default order before challenging the judgment by petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan. Before the expiration of the 15-day
default on appeal. The evidence that the default order was not served on the petitioner has not reglementary period to answer, the petitioner filed two successive motions for extension of time to file
been refuted. It is not explained why the default judgment was served on the correct counsel of responsive pleadings, which were both granted. The last day of the second extension was May 28,
the petitioner but the default order was not. At any rate, the default order was a total nullity and 1985. On May 25, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of the
produced no legal effect whatsoever because it was issued even before the petitioner could file its plaintiff’s lack of capacity to sue and lack of a cause of action. The motion was denied on July 16,
answer. This was clearly a violation of due process. 1985, "both for lack of merit and for having been improperly filed." On July 25, 1985, the plaintiff
moved to declare the petitioner in default for having filed only the motion to dismiss and not a
4. ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; SUSPENDS THE RUNNING OF REGLEMENTARY responsive pleading during the extension granted. This declaration was made on August 2, 1985, and
PERIOD TO APPEAL. — The record shows that the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered evidence for the plaintiff was thereafter received ex parte, resulting in a judgment in its favor on
on April 7, 1989, and notice thereof was served on the petitioner on April 17, 1989. On April 28, February 4, 1986. The judgment was affirmed by the respondent court in its decision dated April 7,
1989, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on June 1, 1989. Notice 1989, 1 which is the subject of the present petition.
of the denial was served on June 8, 1989, and on June 21, 1989, the petitioner asked this Court
for a 30-day extension within which to file the present petition. The extension was granted up to Our ruling follows.
July 23, 1989. The private respondent contends that the petition was filed late because the 15-
day reglementary period should be counted from April 17, 1989, when the decision of the The default order was clearly erroneous and should not have been sustained on appeal. There is no
respondent court was served on the petitioner. Its reason is that the motion for reconsideration question that the motion to dismiss was filed seasonably, within the period of the second extension
was pro forma and did not suspend the running of the said period, which thus expired on May 3, granted by the trial court. It is true that such a motion could not be considered a responsive pleading
1989. While mindful of the decision cited by the private respondent, we call attention to our later as we have held in many cases. 2 Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules
pronouncement on this matter, in the case of Siy v. Court of Appeals: In the first place, the very of Court, it is provided that "within the time for pleading, a motion to dismiss the action may be
purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to point out the findings and conclusions of the made" on the grounds therein enumerated, including the grounds invoked by the petitioner.
 of private respondents’ evidence ex parte, the decision rendered thereon, and the writ of execution,
Moreover, it is clearly provided in Section 4 of the same Rule that: c h a n ro b 1 e s v irtu a l1 a wlib ra ry having been predicated on a void order of default.

Sec. 4. Time to plead. — If the motion to dismiss is denied or if determination thereof is deferred, the Manifestly, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he declared the petitioners in
movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he default. (Emphasis supplied.)
received notice of denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period.
On the basis of the above doctrines, the Court recapitulates the rules as follows: c h a n ro b 1 e s v irtu a l1 a wlib ra ry

The motion to dismiss was filed on May 25, 1985, three days before the expiration of the second
extension. Notice of its denial was served on the petitioner on July 29, 1985. From that date, the 1. The trial court may in its discretion and on proper motion extend the 15-day reglementary period
petitioner had 15 days within which to file its answer, or until August 13, 1985. It was unable to do for the filing of responsive pleadings.
so, however, because of the default order issued by the trial court on August 2, 1985. On that date,
the petitioner still had eleven days before the expiration of the 15-day reglementary period during 2. During the original reglementary 15-day period, or any extension of such period, the defendant
which the petitioner was supposed to file his answer. may file a motion to dismiss the complaint.

The respondents are reminded of our ruling in Barraza v. Campos, 3 to wit: c h a n ro b 1 e s v irtu a l1 a wlib ra ry 3. If the motion to dismiss is denied, the defendant is allowed another fifteen days from notice of the
denial to file the responsive pleading. The full 15-day reglementary period starts all over again.
Under the facts of the case at bar, respondent Judge had granted petitioners an extension of fifteen
(15) days to file their answer, or up to November 18, 1978. Instead of filing the answer, petitioners Accordingly, we hold that in issuing the order of default before the expiration of the period for the
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on November 17, 1978, one (1) day before the expiration of filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its defense.
the period as extended by the court. This is clearly allowed under Section 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. The judgment by default thereafter rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the plaintiff, was
A motion to dismiss is the usual, proper and ordinary method of testing the legal sufficiency of a therefore also invalid. c h a n ro b le s la wlib ra ry :re d n a d

complaint. The issue raised by a motion to dismiss is similar to that formerly raised by a demurrer
under the Code of Civil Procedure. (Zobel v. Abreu, 98 Phil. 343). A motion to dismiss under any of We do not agree with the respondent court that the petitioner should have first filed a motion to set
the grounds enumerated in Section 1, Rule 8 (now Section 1, Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must be aside the default order before challenging the judgment by default on appeal. The evidence that the
filed within the time for pleading, that is, within the time to answer. (J.M. Tuason v. Rafor, L-15537, default order was not served on the petitioner has not been refuted. It is not explained why the
June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 478.) default judgment was served on the correct counsel of the petitioner but the default order was not. 6
At any rate, the default order was a total nullity and produced no legal effect whatsoever because it
Private respondents’ argument that although a motion to dismiss interrupts the running of the period was issued even before the petitioner could file its answer. This was clearly a violation of due process.
within which to file an answer, this refers to the original period of fifteen (15) days within which to file
the responsive pleading and not to the extension of time within which to file the answer, is without We come finally to the timeliness of the present petition.
merit. There is nothing in the Rules which provides, directly or indirectly, that the interruption of the
running of the period within which to file an answer when a motion to dismiss the complaint is filed The private respondent contends that it was filed out of time on July 22, 1989, because the appealed
and pending before the court, refers only to the original period of fifteen (15) days and not to the decision had already become final and executory before that date.
extension of time to file the answer as granted by the court. It may be true that under Section 4 of
Rule 16, if the motion to dismiss is denied or if the termination thereof is deferred, the movant shall The record shows that the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered on April 7, 1989, and notice
file his answer within the time prescribed by Rule 11, computed, from the time he received notice of thereof was served on the petitioner on April 17, 1989. On April 28, 1989, the petitioner filed a
the denial or deferment, unless the court provides a different period. motion for reconsideration, which was denied on June 1, 1989. Notice of the denial was served on
June 8, 1989, and on June 21, 1989, the petitioner asked this Court for a 30-day extension within
This Section 1 of Rule 11 in relation to Section 4 of Rule 16 allows the defendant to file his answer not which to file the present petition. The extension was granted up to July 23, 1989.
only within the original fifteen (15) days period but also within "a different period (as) fixed by the
court." (Emphasis supplied.) c h a n ro b le s .c o m:c ra la w:re d The private respondent contends that the petition was filed late because the 15-day reglementary
period should be counted from April 17, 1989, when the decision of the respondent court was served
The above ruling was a reiteration of Mandac v. Gumarad, 4 where we also set aside a default order on the petitioner. Its reason is that the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and did not
upon a showing that the motion to dismiss was filed before the expiration of the extension granted suspend the running of the said period, which thus expired on May 3, 1989. The basis of this
by the trial court for the filing of the answer. argument is the wording of the denial, which ran as follows: c h a n ro b 1 e s v irtu a l1 a wlib ra ry

As for the period allowed the defendant to file its answer following the denial of the motion to dismiss, The issues raised and the arguments contended in the Motion for Reconsideration of defendant-
the Court clearly held thus in Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam: 5 appellant are the same issues and arguments presented in the appellant’s brief, reply brief and
supplemental reply brief, which have been discussed in plaintiff-appellee’s brief and resolved in the
. . . the period for filing a responsive pleading commences to run all over again from the time the decision of this Court dated April 7, 1989.
defendant receives notice of the denial of his motion to dismiss.
After close scrutiny of the Motion for Reconsideration, We find no cogent reason to reverse Our
In the case at bar, the petitioners received the notice of the denial of their motion to dismiss on decision.c h a n ro b le s .c o m.p h :v irtu a la wlib ra ry

September 24, 1975. Hence, they had fifteen (15) days from said date or up to October 9, 1975,
within which to file their answer. The petitioners were declared in default on September 29, 1975, i.e., WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. 7
ten (10) days before the expiration of the time for filing their answer. Obviously, the order of default
made on September 19, 1975, was premature and is, therefore, null and void as well as the reception While mindful of the decision cited by the private respondent, 8 we call attention to our later
pronouncement on this matter, in the case of Siy v. Court of Appeals: 9

In the first place, the very purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to point out the findings and
conclusions of the decision which in the movant’s view, are not supported by law or the evidence. The
movant, therefore, is very often confined to the amplification on further discussion of the same issues
already passed upon by the court. Otherwise, his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the
decision but a new trial or some other remedy.

Conformably, we must hold that the motion for reconsideration was not pro forma. Hence, it did have
the effect of suspending the reglementary period of appeal until the denial of the motion was notified
to the petitioner.

The rest of the petition deals with the substantive issue of whether the respondent Municipality of
Norzagaray has the power to impose business taxes on the petitioner as a manufacturer and
distributor of cement. This issue involves not only legal but also factual considerations that have not
been fully examined because the petitioner was not given its day in court. A fair resolution of this
issue requires a healing where both parties will be given an opportunity to present their respective
sides in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court. No less than full compliance
with procedural due process will suffice. Hence, It is imperative that this case be remanded to the
court a quo for a full trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 7, 1989, the default order of the trial
court dated August 2, 1985, and the judgment by default dated February 4, 1986, are SET ASIDE.
Civil Case No. 7971-M is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, for further
proceedings in accordance with the rules laid down in this decision. Costs against respondent
Municipality of Norzagaray.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.