Clientlogic (SITEL) vs.

Castro DIGEST
GR 186070 April 11, 2011

Facts:
Respondent was employed by petitioner ClientLogic Philippines, Inc. (now known
and shall hereafter be referred to as SITEL) on February 14, 2005 as a call center
agent for its Bell South Account. After six (6) months, he was promoted to the
“Mentor” position, and thereafter to the “Coach” position. A “Coach” is a team
supervisor who is in charge of dealing with customer complaints which cannot be
resolved by call center agents. In June 2006, he was transferred to the Dot Green
Account.

 During respondent’s stint at the Dot Green Account, respondent noticed that some
of the call center agents under him would often make excuses to leave their work
stations. Their most common excuse was that they would visit the company’s
medical clinic. To verify that they were not using the clinic as an alibi to cut their
work hours, respondent sent an e-mail to the clinic’s personnel requesting for the
details of the agents’ alleged medical consultation. His request was denied on the
ground that medical records of employees are highly confidential and can only be
disclosed in cases involving health issues, and not to be used to build any disciplinary
case against them.

 On October 11, 2006, respondent received a notice requiring him to explain why he
should not be penalized for: (1) violating Green Dot Company’s Policy and Procedure
for Direct Deposit Bank Info Request when he accessed a customer’s online account
and then gave the latter’s routing and reference numbers for direct deposit; and (2)
gravely abusing his discretion when he requested for the medical records of his team
members. Respondent did not deny the infractions imputed against him. He,
however, justified his actuations by explaining that the customer begged him to
access the account because she did not have a computer or an internet access and
that he merely requested for a patient tracker, not medical records

          On January 22, 2007, SITEL posted a notice of vacancy for respondent’s
position, and on February 12, 2007, he received a Notice of Termination. These
events prompted him to file a complaint for illegal dismissal; non-payment of
overtime pay, rest day pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay; full backwages;
damages; and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter against herein petitioners
SITEL and its officers, Joseph Velasquez, Irene Roa, and Rodney Spires.
Issue: WON respondent is a member of the managerial staff of petitioner.

Held: Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on
working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees.
Generally, managerial employees are not entitled to overtime pay for services
rendered in excess of eight hours a day.
 Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code defines a managerial employee as “one who is
vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management policies
and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees, or to effectively recommend such managerial actions.

              Employees are considered occupying managerial positions if they meet all of

the following conditions, namely:
             1) Their primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which
they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof;
             2) They customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more employees
therein;
             3) They have the authority to hire or fire other employees of lower rank; or
their suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring and firing and as to the
promotion or any other change of status of other employees are given particular
weight.

             They are considered as officers or members of a managerial staff if they

perform the following duties and responsibilities:
   1) The primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to
management of policies of their employer;
             2) Customarily and regularly exercise discretion and independent judgment;
             3) (a) Regularly and directly assist a proprietor or a managerial employee
whose primary duty consists of management of the establishment in which he is
employed or subdivision thereof; or (b) execute under general supervision work
along specialized or technical lines requiring special training, experience, or
knowledge; or (c) execute, under general supervision, special assignment and tasks
xxx.

The test of “supervisory” or “managerial status” depends on whether a person

possesses authority to act in the interest of his employer and whether such authority
is not merely routinary or clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent
judgment. 
The position held by respondent and its concomitant duties failed to hurdle this
test. As a coach or team supervisor, respondent’s main duty was to deal with
customer complaints which could not be handled or solved by call center agents. If
the members of his team could not meet the needs of a customer, they passed the
customer’s call to respondent.

This job description does not indicate that respondent can exercise the powers and
prerogatives equivalent to managerial actions which require the customary use of
independent judgment. There is no showing that he was actually conferred or was
actually exercising the following duties attributable to a “member of the managerial
staff,”
From the foregoing, respondent is entitled to holiday pay, service incentive leave
pay, overtime pay, and rest day.

Petition denied
 MERCIDAR FISHING CORP vs. NLRC AND AGAO DIGEST
DECEMBER 20, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

FACTS: 
This case originated from a complaint filed by Agao against petitioner for illegal dismissal,
violation of P.D. No. 851, and non-payment of five days SIL. Private respondent had been
employed as a “bodegero” or ship’s quartermaster. He complained that he had been
constructively dismissed by petitioner when the latter refused him assignments aboard its
boats. Private respondent alleged that he had been sick and thus allowed to go on leave
without pay for one month but that when he reported to work at the end of such period with a
health clearance, he was told to come back another time as he could not be reinstated
immediately. Thereafter, petitioner refused to give him work. 

Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that it was private respondent who actually abandoned
his work. It claimed that the latter failed to report for work after his leave had expired and was,
in fact, absent without leave for three months . 

Labor Arbiter  Amansec rendered a decision ordering respondents to reinstate complainant

with backwages, pay him his 13th month pay and incentive leave pay.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC which dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. The NLRC
dismissed petitioner’s claim that it cannot be held liable for SIL pay by fishermen in its employ
as the latter supposedly are “field personnel” and thus not entitled to such pay under the Labor
Code. 

ISSUE: is Agao a field employee, hence not entitled to SIL pay?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED

NO; Agao is NOT a field employee, he is entitled to SIL pay

Art. 82 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 82. Coverage. — The provisions of this Title [Working Conditions and Rest Periods] shall
apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings whether for profit or not, but not to
government employees, field personnel, members of the family of the employer who are
dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal service of another,
and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
regulations.

Xxx
“Field personnel” shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties
away from the principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual
hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty.
Petitioner argues essentially that since the work of private respondent is performed away from
its principal place of business, it has no way of verifying his actual hours of work on the vessel.
It contends that private respondent and other fishermen in its employ should be classified as
“field personnel” who have no statutory right to SIL pay.
In the case of Union of Pilipro Employees (UFE) v. Vicar,  this Court explained the meaning of
the phrase “whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with reasonable
certainty” in Art. 82 of the Labor Code, as follows:

Moreover, the requirement that “actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty” must be read in conjunction with Rule IV, Book III of the Implementing
Rules which provides:

Rule IV Holidays with Pay

Sec. 1. Coverage — This rule shall apply to all employees except:
(e) Field personnel and other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner in said case is contending that such rule added another element not found in the law.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the Court finds that the aforementioned rule did
not add another element to the Labor Code definition of field personnel. The clause “whose
time and performance is unsupervised by the employer” did not amplify but merely interpreted
and expounded the clause “whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty.” The former clause is still within the scope and purview of Article 82
which defines field personnel. Hence, in deciding whether or not an employee’s actual working
hours in the field can be determined with reasonable certainty, query must be made as to
whether or not such employee’s time and performance is constantly supervised by the
employer

In the case at bar, during the entire course of their fishing voyage, fishermen employed by
petitioner have no choice but to remain on board its vessel. Although they perform non-
agricultural work away from petitioner’s business offices, the fact remains that throughout the
duration of their work they are under the effective control and supervision of petitioner
through the vessel’s patron or master as the NLRC correctly held.