Ramon Gonzales v. Go Tiong Case Digest
Ramon Gonzales v. Go Tiong Case Digest
L-11776
SUMMARY
Gonzales deposited with Go Tiong, a bonded warehouseman, 860 sacks of palay. In return,
Tiong issued ordinary receipts. Eventually, the warehouse were the palays were stored was
burned down. Gonzales demanded for payment of P8,600 (the value of the palay) plus
damages, which Tiong did not pay, hence, the present action. Tiong was contending that he
shouldn’t be held liable under the Bonded Warehouse Law but under the Civil Code because
what he issued were ordinary receipts. The Court ruled that that the kind or nature of the
receipts issued by Tiong for the deposits is not very material. Under Section 1 of the Warehouse
Receipts Act, the issuance of a warehouse receipt in the form provided by it is merely
permissive and directory and not obligatory
Go Tiong owned a rice mill and warehouse in Pangasinan. He had a license as a bonded
warehouseman. Luzon Surety Co. was Tiong’s guarantor, securing Tiong’s performance of his
obligations as a boned warehouseman: receiving palay for storage, and delivering such upon
demand, or paying the market value thereof in case he was unable to return the same.
Go Tiong received a total of 860 sacks of palay, valued at P8,600 (P10/ sack), from Ramon
Gonzales, for which Tiong issued receipts. The receipts he issued were ordinary receipts, not
the “warehouse receipts” defined by the Warehouse Receipts Act (Act No. 2137). He also
accepted deliveries of palay from other depositors.
Gonzales demanded from Tiong the value of his deposits amounting to P8,600, but Tiong was
not able to return it. Eventually, the warehouse where the palays were stored was burned down.
At the time of fire, there were about 5,847 sacks of palay in the warehouse.
Eventually, Gonzales filed the present action against Go Tiong and Luzon Surety for the sum of
P8,600, the value of his palay, with legal interest, and damages. The RTC ruled in favor of
Gonzales, but found that the claim was covered by the Bonded Warehouse Law, Act 3893, and
not by the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Is the plaintiff’s claim covered by the Civil Law, and not Bonded Warehouse Act for the reason
that, Go Tiong issued to plaintiff were ordinary receipts, not the warehouse receipts
contemplated by the Warehouse Receipts Law, and because the deposits of palay of plaintiff
were gratuitous?
RULING:
Consequently, any deposit made with him as a bonded warehouseman must necessarily be
governed by the provisions of Act No. 3893. Though it is desirable that receipts issued by a
bonded warehouseman should conform to the provisions of the Warehouse Receipts Law, said
provisions are not mandatory and indispensable in the sense that if they fell short of the
requirements of the Warehouse Receipts Act, then the commodities delivered for storage
become ordinary deposits and will not be governed by the provisions of the Bonded Warehouse
Act.
As the trial court well observed, as far as Go Tiong was concerned, the fact that the receipts
issued by him were not "quedans" is no valid ground for defense because he was the principal
obligor. Furthermore, as found by the trial court, Go Tiong had repeatedly promised plaintiff to
issue to him "quedans" and had assured him that he should not worry; and that Go Tiong was in
the habit of issuing ordinary receipts (not "quedans") to his depositors. Considering the fact, as
already stated, that prior to the burning of the warehouse, plaintiff demanded the payment of the
value of his palay from Go Tiong on two occasions but was put off without any valid reason, it is
illogical and unreasonable to hold that the presumption of negligence in case of this kind is
rebutted by the bailee by simply proving that the property bailed was destroyed by an ordinary
fire which broke out on the bailee's own premises, without regard to the care exercised by the
latter to prevent the fire, or to save the property after the commencement of the fire. Besides, as
observed by the trial court, the defendant violated the terms of his license by accepting for
deposit palay in excess of the limit authorized by his license, which fact must have increased
the risk. Appealed decision affirmed.