People v.

Borja
GR 199710. August 2, 2017

Facts:
In the Information dated May 28, 2004, PO3 Borja was charged of kidnapping punished
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Based on the collective testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution alleged that Ronalyn
Manatad and her friend, Vicky Lusterio, were walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City.
Suddenly, a man who was later identified as PO3 Borja, grabbed Ronalyn by her right forearm and
forcibly took her inside a gray van where three other men were waiting. Lusterio managed to
escape and reported immediately the incident to Ronalyn’s mother, Adelina.
Meanwhile, PO3 Borja and his companions drove the van around Quezon City. One of
Ronalyn’s abductors, a certain Major Clarito, asked for her relatives’ contact numbers. Ronalyn gave
the number of her brother, Edwin Silvio. The kidnappers the demanded P200,000.00 in exchange
for Ronalyn’s liberty. Edwin negotiated for a reduced ransom. The kidnappers acceded and lowered
their demand to P100,000.00.
Edwin sought assistance from the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force (NAKTAF) who
immediately mobilized a team for an entrapment operation.
Edwin received a call from Ronalyn’s abductors. They instructed him to place the money in
an SM plastic bag and to proceed to the Wildlife Park along Quezon Avenue. Edwin went to the
Wildlife Park as planned. Shortly after, PO3 Borja approached Edwin and took the SM plastic bag
containing the ransom money. Upon seeing the exchange, the police operatives arrested PO3 Borja.
Despite the successful entrapment operation, the authorities failed to rescue Ronalyn. While
she was inside the van. Afterwards, she was taken by her captors to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency where she was charged with illegal sale of shabu.
Accused-appellant anchors his arguments on the arrest and subsequent conviction of
Ronalyn for the sale of shabu. He argues that it is absurd to convict him of kidnapping considering
that the alleged victim was caught in flagrante delicto during a buy-bust operation on the day of the
alleged incident. Furthermore, Ronalyn was found guilty of violation of RA 9165 by both Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant PO3 Borja is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
kidnapping punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling:
Yes. PO3 Borja is guilty of kidnapping.
Ronalyn’s apprehension for violation of RA 9165 does not automatically negate the criminal
liability of accused-appellant. It also does not exclude the possibility of the commission of the crime
with which accused-appellant is charged. The buy-bust operation carried out against Ronalyn and
her kidnapping are events that can reasonably co-exist.
Furthermore, a violation of RA 9165 bears no direct or indirect relation to the crime of
kidnapping. Ronalyn’s arrest and conviction are immaterial to the determination of accused-
appellant’s criminal liability. In other words, Ronalyn’s innocence or guilt would neither affirm nor
negate the commission of the crime of kidnapping against her. Therefore, the resolution of this case
will depend solely on whether the prosecution has established all the elements of kidnapping under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
A conviction for the crime of kidnapping or serious illegal detention requires the
concurrence of the following elements:
1. The offender is a private individual;
2. That individual kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of
liberty;
3. The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal;
4. In the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:
a. The kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days.
b. It is committed by one who simulates public authority.
c. Any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or
any threat to kill that person is made.
d. The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.
Although the crime of kidnapping can only be committed by a private individual, the fact
that the accused is a public official does not automatically preclude the filing of an information for
kidnapping against him. A public officer who detains a person for the purpose of extorting ransom
cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity.
Accused-appellant’s membership in the PNP does not automatically preclude the filing of an
information for kidnapping or serious illegal detention against him. He may be prosecuted under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code if it is shown that he committed acts unrelated to the
functions of his office.
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is “the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. The deprivation of a person’s liberty can be
committed in different ways. It is not always necessary that the victim be imprisoned. The second
element of the crime of kidnapping is met as long as there is a showing that the victim’s liberty of
movement is restricted.
In this case, Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside a
vehicle by accused-appellant and his cohorts and was driven around Quezon City for at least 5
hours.
The first two and the last elements of the crime of kidnapping are present in this case,
Ronaly, a woman, was forcibly taken by the accused-appellant and loaded in a van where she was
detained for several hours. These acts are completely unrelated to accused-appellant’s functions as
a police officer, and as such, he may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The third element of the crime of kidnapping is also present. Accused-appellant and his
companions deprived the victim of her liberty to extort ransom from her family.
 People v. Dionaldo
GR 207949. July 23, 2014

Facts:
In the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro dropped his brother Edwin Navarro off
the Health is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from
another brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped. Records show that three men, later
identified as Armando, Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway
of the gym and pushed him inside a Toyota car. Roderick immediately reported the incident to the
police. On the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin’s kidnappers who threatened to kill
Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.
The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded
payment of ransom money in the amount of P15,000,000.00. After negotiations over the telephone,
the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of P110,000.00.
On the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the
ransom money, he received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan instead and proceed to C-5
until he arrives at the Centennial Village.
Meanwhile, a team of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) had
been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin. The PACER team found the dead body of
Edwin at Sitio Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.
The RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention. While the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the
victim Edwin was abducted, deprived of liberty, and eventually killed, a fact which is supported by
the subject certificate of death, did not consider said death in its judgment.
The CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-appellants, finding that the
prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention. It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention.
Ruling:
No. The crime committed is not Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention but Special
Complex Crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
It was clearly established that accused-appellants, who were all private individuals, took the
victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal, and for the purpose of
extorting ransom.
The Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime
the accused-appellants have committed does not merely constitutes Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, but that of special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in
view of the victim’s death. This matter should be considered in accordance with the settled rule that
in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and
the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed
judgment.
Article 267 of the RPC now provides:
“Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
xxx
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is
subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.”
The rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as
separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of
Article 267, as amended by RA 7659
Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom, accused-appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide.
 Caluag v. People
GR 171511. March 4, 2009

Facts:
In the afternoon of March 19, 2000, around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, Nestor Denido
learned that two of his guests from an earlier drinking spree were mauled. At that time, Caluag and
Sentillas were drinking at a store. When Nestor inquired from several people including his own son
what happened, Caluag butted in and replied, “Bakit kasama ka ba roon?,” and immediately boxed
him without warning. Caluag and Sentillas overpowered Nestor. Julia, Nestor’s wife, saw Caluag ans
Sentillas boxed her husband. Nestor ran to his house. Julia followed him. At around 6:00 pm, Nestor
told his wife to report the boxing incident to the barangay authorities.
When Julia and her son were in their way to their barangay hall, she encountered Caluag,
who blocked her way. Caluag confronted Julia with agun, poked it at her forehead, and said “Saan
ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Despite this fearful encounter, she was still able to proceed to the
barangay hall where she reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay authorities.
The MeTC found Caluag and Sentillas guilty of slight physical injuries, and Caluag guilty of
grave threats. The RTC affirmed in toto the joint decision of the MeTC. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
Petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Petitioner maintains that just because Julia
immediately reported the gun-poking incident to the barangay, this did not necessarily mean that it
actually happened. Petitioner also argues that assuming that he did poke a gun at Julia, the crime
committed was other light threats as defined under Article 285, paragraph 1 of the RPC.
Issue:
Whether or not Caluag is guilty of the crime of Grave Threats under Article 282 paragraph 2
of the RPC?
Ruling:
Yes. Caluag is guilty as charged.
The MeTC, RTC and the Court of Appeals uniformly found petitioner guilty of grave threats
under Article 282 par. 2 of the RPC. The Court finds no reason to reverse the findings and
conclusions of the lower courts.
Under the Revised Penal Code, there are three kinds of threats: grave threats (Article 282),
light threats (Article 283) and other light threats (Article 285). These provisions state:
“Art. 282. Grave threats. – Any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon
the person, honor or property of the latter or of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, shall
suffer:
xxx
2. The penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 500 pesos, if the threat shall not
have been made subject to a condition.”
 “Art. 283. Light threats. – Any threat to commit a wrong not constituting a crime made in
the manner expressed in subdivision 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by arresto
mayor.”
“Art. 285. Other light threats. – The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who, without being included in the provisions of the next preceding article,
shall threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel, unless it be in
lawful self-defense.
xxx xxx”
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be
accompanied by a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but
is always accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not
amount to a crime and there is no condition.
The records show that petitioner confronted Julia and pointed a gun to her forehead, while
at the same time saying “Saan ka pupunta, gusto mo ito?” Petitioner’s act of pointing a gun at Julia’s
forehead clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injuries on her person.
Actions speak louder than words. The uttered words do not go against the threat to kill or to inflict
serious injury evinced by petitioner’s accompanying act.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 282 par. 2
(grave threats) since: (1) killing or shooting someone amounts to a crime; and (2) the threat to kill
was not subject to conditions.
Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, “shall
threaten another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel,” since it presupposes that the
threat to commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will
constitute or not constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand,
and light and other light threats on the other.
 Paera v. People
GR 181626. May 30, 2011

Facts:
As punong barangay, petitioner Santiago Paera allocated his constituents’ use of communal
water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong.
The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned by
complainant Vicente Darong, father of complainant Indalecio Darong. Despite petitioner’s scheme,
Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. Petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water
distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access.
The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water
supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected. Petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when
Indalecio arrived.
According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and
charged towards Indalecio, shouting “Patyon tikaw!” (I will kill you). Indalecio ran for safety,
passing along the way his wife, Dioseta Darong who had followed him to water tank. Upon seeing
petitioner, Dioseta inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted “Wala koy
gipili, babaye ka, patyon tikaw!” (I don’t spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!).
Dioseta similarly scramped and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue
Dioseta, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed
Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting “Bisag gulang
ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!” (Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull).
The MCTC found petitioner guilty as charged. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to
prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282. The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the
latter’s finding on petitioner’s motive.
Petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the “continued complex
crime” of Grave Threats. Alternatively, petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges for having
acted in defense of the property of strangers and in lawful performance of duty, justifying
circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner is guilty as charged.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats “any person who shall threaten
another with the infliction upon the person… of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a
crime.” This felony is consummated “as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person
threatened.”
 Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner’s threat to kill Indalecio and Dioseta
and crack open Vicente’s skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide
and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These threats were consummated as soon
as Indalecio, Dioseta, and Vicente heard petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken
the threats at different points in time to these three individuals, albeit rapid succession, petitioner
incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
Having disposed of petitioner’s theory on the nature of his offense, the Court sees no reason
to extensively pass upon his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty
scheme.
There is likewise no merit in the petitioner’s claim of having acted to “defend and protect
the water rights of his constituents” in the lawful exercise of his offense as punong barangay. The
defense of stranger rule under paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC requires proof of (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment. None of these requisites
obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights when
petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. With the element of unlawful aggression
absent, inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is
rendered irrelevant.
Petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with
a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. Petitioner ought to
know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of
violence or threats of violence.
 Escolano v. People
GR 226991. Dec. 10, 2018

Facts:
Private complainant AAA testified that he was 11 years old at the time of the incident: that
on May 29, 2009, at around eleven o’clock in the morning, he and his two brothers: BBB, 9 years
old, and CCC, 8 years old, were flying paper planes from the third floor of their house when the
planes landed in front of the house of Perlin Escolano, the daughter of petitioner.
The following day, the siblings saw Perlin in front of their house. Private complainants got
three ketchup sachets from their refrigerator and threw these at her. However, Perlin went inside
their house so it was petitioner who was twice hit instead by the sachets. Petitioner exclaimed,
“Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong
bumaba ditto, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko.” Private complainants
reported the incident to their mother DDD when she arrived from the market.
When DDD confronted petitioner, the latter uttered “nagpuputa ka, puta-puta ka.” Petitioner
went inside her house, came out with a bolo, and threatened DDD, “walang demanda demanda sa
kin, basta bumaba kayo dito lahat, papatayin ko kayong lahat. Tatagain ko kayo, papatayin ko kayo.”
The incident left private complainants terrified. They only went downstairs when they had a
companion; and they no longer played as they usually did.
On the other hand, DDD testified that private complainants told her about the incident, thus,
she confronted petitioner. The latter pointed her finger at her and uttered, “Hoy, putang ina mo,”
got a bolo, and yelled “Kaya ninyo ito? Pagtatatagain ko kayo.” Thereafter, DDD noticed a change in
behavior of private complainants as they no longer played downstairs and they even transferred
residence because of the incident. DDD averred that her children were traumatized, and they were
in constant fear because of petitioner’s threat.
The RTC found petitioner guilty of violating Sec. 10 (a) of RA 7610. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the RTC. It held that the acts of petitioner caused untoward repercussions in
the life and dignity of private complainants. The incident made hostile the environment for private
cmplainants where they could no longer freely live and enjoy their childhood and were forced to
move out. Private complainants even deprived of their chance to play games and enjoy leisure time
within their own home.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner is not guilty of violation of Section 10(a) of RA 7610. However, petitioner
committed the crime of other light threats under Article 285 par. 2 of the RPC.
Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, in relation thereto, Sec. 3 (b) of the same law, highlights that
in child abuse, the act by deeds or words must debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being. When the element of intent to debase, degrade or demean is
present, the accused shall be convicted of violating Sec. 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, which carries a
heavier penalty compared to that of slight physical injuries or other light threats under the RPC.
In this case, the Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private
complainants does not constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of RA 7610. Petitioner
had no intention to debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was rather an act
carelessly done out of anger. The circumstances surrounding the incident proved that petitioner’s
act of uttering invectives against the minors AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in the heat of anger.
Evidently, petitioner’s statements “bobo, walang utak, putang ina” and the threat to “ipahabol” and
“ipakagat sa aso” were all said out of frustration or annoyance. Petitioner merely intended that the
children stop their unruly behavior. Thus, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable under Sec. 10
(a) of RA 7610.
Nevertheless, though the prosecution failed to prove the intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth of private complainants, petitioner still uttered insults and invectives at
them. Specifically, petitioner’s statement “Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan,
wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko and aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa
aso ko,” were directed against private complainants. In this regard, AAA testified that this particular
utterance from petitioner was scary. DDD also corroborated said claim that private complainants
were too traumatized even to go downstairs because of their fear that petitioner might release her
dog to chase and bite them.
However, it must be also emphasized that petitioner’s utterances were made in the heat of
her anger because private complainants had thrown ketchup sachets at her. Petitioner merely
intended that private complainants stop their rude behavior. Thus, petitioner committed the crim
of Other Light Threats under Article 285 (2) of the RPC, to wit:
“Art. 285. Other light threats – The penalty of arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
xxx
2. Any person who, in the heat of anger, shall orally threaten another with some harm not
constituting a crime, and who by subsequent acts show that he did not persist in the
idea involved in his threat, provided that the circumstances of the offense shall not
bring it within the provisions of Article 282 of this Code.”
In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime and there is no
condition. Here the threat made by petitioner of releasing her dogs to chase private complainants
were expressed in the heat of anger. Petitioner was merely trying to make private complainants
stop throwing ketchup sachets at her. However, instead of doing so, private complainants still
continued to throw ketchup sachets against the petitioner, which infuriated the latter causing her to
utter invectives against private complainants.
Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 285, par. 2
(other light threats) since: (1) threat does not amount to a crime, and (2) the prosecution did not
establish that petitioner persisted in the idea involved in her threat.
Thus, for threatening private complainants, petitioner is criminally liable for Other Light
Threats under Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Consulta v. People
GR 179462. Feb. 12, 2009

Facts:

At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre
boarded a tricycle on their way to Pembo, Makati City.upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and
his brother blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant at
once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying “Putang ina mong matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala,
sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita.”

Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which was
worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left saying “Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses
lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo.kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi
niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kalian!”

Nelia immediately went to barangay hall. They repaired to the Police Station and reported
the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to return in a few days
when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest. After nine days, Nelia gave her
statement before a police investigator.

Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family.

The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part “is presumed from the
unlawful taking” of the necklace, and brushing aside appellant’s denial and claim of harassment,
convicted appellant of Robbery. The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Robbery under Article 293 of the
RPC.

Ruling

No. Appellant is not guilty of Robbery. However, he is criminally liable for Grave Coercion
under Article 286 of the RPC.

Article 293 of the RPC under which appellant was charged provides:

“Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. – Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person,
or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery.”
 The elements of robbery are thus: (1) there is taking of personal property; (2) the personal
property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi, and (4) the taking is with
violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.

Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the
overt acts of the offender. It may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful property pertaining
to another, unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
The Court finds that under the above-mentioned circumstances surrounding the incidental
encounter of the parties, the taking of Nelia’s necklace does not indicate presence of intent to gain
on appellant’s part. That intent to gain on appellant’s part is difficult to appreciate gains light given
his undenied claim that his relationship with Nelia is rife with ill-feelings, manifested by, among
other things, the filing of complaints against him by Nelia and her family were subsequently
dismissed or ended in his acquittal.

Absent intent to gain on the part of the appellant, robbery does not lie against him. He is
however, just the same, criminally liable.

Grave coercion, like robbery, has violence for one of its elements. Thus Article 286 of the
RPC provides:

“Art. 286. Grave coercions. – The penalty of prision correccional and a fine not exceeding six
thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, without any authority of law, shall, by
means of violence, threats or intimidation, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

xxx”

The difference in robbery and grave coercion lies in the intent in the commission of the
act.the motives of the accused are the prime criterion. There was no common robber in the present
case, but a man who had fought bitterly for title of his ancestral estate, taking the law into his own
hands and attempting to collect what he thought was due him. Animus furandi was lacking.

The Court finds that by appellant’s employment of threats, intimidation and violence
consisting of, inter alia, uttering of invectives, driving away of the tricycle driver, and kicking of the
tricycle, Nelia was prevented from proceeding to her destination.

Appellant is guilty of grave coercion.

Facts:

On October 22, 1997, an Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging with
grave coercion the Municipal Mayor Melchor G. Maderazo, his nephew, Victor, who was a member
of the Sangguniang Bayan, Seniforio Perido, Caibiran Police Station Chief, together with six others.

Verutiao testified that she spent P24,267.00 for the construction of a market stall. She was
not, however, reimbursed by the Municipality of her expenses. After the construction, she then
opened the stall for business. She paid the rent for the whole year of 1992 but did not pay the
rentals in 1993. The Municipality partially paid her P10,000.00 of her total expenses in the
construction of the market stall. However, considering that she had not been fully reimbursed of
her expenses for the construction of the stall, she did not pay her rent.

On December 22, 1996 Verutiao closed her stall and proceeded to Mindanao where she
spent the Christmas holidays. She returned to Caibiran on January 15, 1997. On January 17, 1997,
she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Madarezo, directing her to vacate the stall
within twenty-four (24) hours because of her failure to pay the rentals for the stall. Verutiao
admitted that they had not paid any rent since 1993 but maintained that, under Section 38 of
Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, she did not have t pay rental until her expenses were reimbursed,
as the rentals due would be debited from 50% of the amount she advanced for the construction of
the market stall, and that she will vacate the stall only after the municipality shall have reimbursed
her expenses in the construction.

On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. The locks were
opened on the authority of the Mayor on January 27, 1997. The contents of the market stall were
inventoried by Victor Maderazo and taken to the police station for safekeeping. While these were
being undertaken, Verutiao was in her farm about 4 to 5 kilometers away from the market stall. She
considered the act of Mayor as a political harassment.

The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment convicting the accused of the crime of unjust
vexation. The court ruled that Melchor Maderazo had no authority to padlock, open and inventory
the contents of the subject stall and take the same to the police station.

Petitioner maintain that they are not criminally liable for unjust vexation because Verutiao
was not prevented from doing something not prohibited by law. She could not have been possibly
intimidated or forced by petitioners, and could not have been prevented from doing business. in
fact, she was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods inventoried; hence, she could not
have been vexed.

Issue:
 Whether or not petitioners were guilty of the crime of unjust vexation.

Ruling:

Yes. Petitioners were guilty of the crime of unjust vexation.

The Court agrees with the contention of the respondents that indeed, the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt to prove the guilt of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo
and Sangguniang Bayan Member Victor Maderazo for unjust vexation.

Article 287 of the RPC reads:

“Art. 287. Light coercions. – Any person, who by means of violence, shall seize anything
belonging to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing,
but in no case less than 75 pesos.

Any other coercions or unjust vexations shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.”

The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which,
although not productive of some physical or mental harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an
innocent person. Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, for the crime of
unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, unjust vexation, being a felony
by dolo, malice is an inherent element of the crime. Good faith is a good defense to a charge for
unjust vexation because good faith negates malice.

The Court agrees with the respondent’s contention that based on th evidence on record, the
overt acts of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr., on January 27, 1997,
annoyed, irritated and caused embarrassment to her. It was petitioner Melchor Maderazo who
ordered petitioner Victor Maderazo, Jr. to have the stall reopened, to conduct an inventory of the
contents thereof, and to effect the transportation of goods to the ploice station. Petitioner Victor
Maderazo, who was a Sangguniang Bayan member obeyed the order of the Mayor.

Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the contents thereof taken
from the stall and brought to the police station, the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless
committed. For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the
crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was
embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners.
Indeed, by their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from
selling therein, hence, losing income from the business. Verutiao was deprived of her possession of
the stall from January 21, 1997.

Petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Sangguniang Bayan member Victor Maderazo, Jr.,
had no right, without judicial intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall, and had her merchandise
transported to the police station, thereby preventing her from doing business therein and selling
her merchandise. Petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no right to take the law into his own hands and
deprive Verutiao of her possession of the stall and her means of livelihood.
 Baleros v. People
GR 138033. Feb. 22, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner Renato Baleros, Jr. assails and seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision affirmed an earlier
decision of the RTC of Manila, finding petitioner guilty of attempted rape.

Malou was a medical student of the University of Santo Tomas in 1991. In the evening of
December 12, inside Unit 307 of the Celestial Marie Building, Malou retired at around 10:30. Early
in the morning of the following day, Malou was awakened by the smell of chemical on a piece of
cloth pressed on her face. Somebody was pinning her down on the bed, holding her tightly. She
wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were
very tight. Still, Malou continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand
got free. With this the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ
which she then squeezed. The man let her go and Malou went straight to the bedroom door. To
Room 310 of the building where her classmates were staying, Malou then proceeded to seek help.

For its part, the defense presented, as its main witness, the petitioner himself. He denied
committing the crime imputed to him or making at any time amorous advances on Malou.

The trial court rendered its decision convicting petitioner of attempted rape and
accordingly sentencing him. The CA in its assailed Decision, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of
conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of attempted rape.

Ruling:

No. Petitioner is not guilty of the crime of attempted rape. However, he is guilty of the crime
of unjust vexation.

Under Article 335 of the RPC, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or
intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or
intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When
the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in relation to the
aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
 There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge
in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the petitioner,
in pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.

Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried
out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external
obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense.

Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to
construe petitioner’s act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would
induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were,
petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to
rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no
attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner
wanted complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.

Lest it be misunderstood, the Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under the
premises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The information filed against petitioner contained an
allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And
during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of chemical-soaked cloth and
having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of
acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, they constitute unjust
vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the RPC.

As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for
the reason that his term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not
productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.
The paramount question is whether the offender’s act causes annoyance, irritation, torment,
distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou, after the
incident in the question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual
attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was
disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner.