MARCELO G.

SALUDAY VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR No. 215305; APRIL 3, 2018

SUMMARY: Marcelo G. Saluday (petitioner) found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

illegal possession of high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866
FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA
Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to
disembark from the vehicle while allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He
then boarded the bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband,
illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.
Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-
black pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag
and found it too heavy for its small size. Buco then looked at the male passengers lined
outside and noticed that a man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping
through the window towards the direction of the bag.
Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus conductor answered that
petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back. Buco then requested
petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the bag revealed the
following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number 64702; (2)
one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a
ten-inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority
to carry firearms and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested
and informed of his rights by SCAA Buco.
Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao
City. The latter found probable cause to charge him with illegal possession of high-
powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866.
On direct examination, Saluday claims that it was only cellphone and he did not own the
bag and that his brother who died in 2009 owns the bag.
RTC RULING: The trial court declared the petitioner in actual or constructive possession
of firearm and explosive without authority or license and was adjudged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosives under PD
1866.
CA RULING: The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction and affirmed the ruling of the
trial court.
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, the CA denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for being pro forma. Hence, petitioner filed Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the RTC and CA misappreciated the evidence against the petitioner
 Whether or not the search was illegal
RULING:
No. In the present case, the prosecution proved the negative fact that appellant has no
license or permit to own or possess the firearm, ammunition and explosive. The court
ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a certification from, the PNP
Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm
would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of possession of
illegal firearms. The prosecution more than complied when it presented both.
Section 2, Article Ill of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
***when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply.
The search conducted by the Task Force at a military checkpoint constitutes a
reasonable search.
The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes
a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public
transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA
Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was
even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport
terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and luggages.
Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution
finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant. As regards the
warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that petitioner consented to
the search) thereby making the seized items admissible in evidence.
In this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When
SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered ''yes, just open
if' based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search
of the contents of his bag.
Reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are
mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the
underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different.
A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application. Examples include searches
done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public ·places. In contrast, a
warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of
practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search incidental
to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive
search of a private moving vehicle.
The inspection of passengers and their effects prior to entry at the bus terminal and the
search of the bus while in transit must also satisfy the following conditions to qualify as a
valid reasonable search. First, as to the manner of the search, it must be the least
intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person or persons being searched,
minimizing, if not altogether eradicating, any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation
or ridicule. Second, neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive such as
insidious profiling, stereotyping and other similar motives. In all instances, the
fundamental rights of vulnerable identities, persons with disabilities, children and other
similar groups should be protected. Third, as to the purpose of the search, it must be
confined to ensuring public safety. Fourth, as to the evidence seized from the reasonable
search, courts must be convinced that precautionary measures were in place to ensure
that no evidence was planted against the accused.
The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put
at risk. Given the present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public
transport buses and their terminals, just like passenger ships and seaports, are in that
category.
Aside from public transport buses, any moving vehicle that similarly accepts passengers
at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these guidelines. Hence,
whenever compliant with these guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of
the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable search. However, the
guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to moving
vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by
only one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down
by any other person until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.
NOTES:
1. Two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth Amendment.
 First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.
 Second, the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).
2. Where a person does not have an expectation of privacy or one's expectation of
privacy is not reasonable to society, the alleged State intrusion is not a "search"
within the protection of the Constitution against unreasonable searches and
seizures.
3. Airport searches are outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due
to the lack of an expectation of privacy that society will regard as reasonable. There
is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel.
4. Seaport searches are reasonable searches on the ground that the safety of the
traveling public overrides a person's right to privacy
5. The Supreme Court did not agree to the Petitioner’s position that his failure to
object to the search cannot be construed as an implied waiver. Constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which
may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Relevant to this determination of voluntariness are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent
is given: (a) the age of the consenting party; (b) whether he or she was in a public
or secluded location; (c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively
looked on; (d) his or her education and intelligence; (e) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (f) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found; (g)
the nature of the police questioning; (h) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (i) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person
consenting.