entropy

Review
An Overview of Key Technologies in Physical
Layer Security
Abraham Sanenga 1, * , Galefang Allycan Mapunda 1 , Tshepiso Merapelo Ludo Jacob 1 ,
Leatile Marata 2 , Bokamoso Basutli 1 and Joseph Monamati Chuma 1
1 Electrical, Computer, and Telecommunications Engineering, Botswana International University of Science
and Technology, Palapye, Botswana; galefang.mapunda@studentmail.biust.ac.bw (G.A.M.);
tshepiso.jacob@studentmail.biust.ac.bw (T.M.L.J.); basutlib@biust.ac.bw (B.B.); chumaj@biust.ac.bw (J.M.C.)
2 Center for Wireless Communications, University of Oulu, 90570 Oulu, Finland; maratal@biust.ac.bw
* Correspondence: sa18100191@studentmail.biust.ac.bw




Received: 18 August 2020; Accepted: 21 September 2020; Published: 6 November 2020


Abstract: The open nature of radio propagation enables ubiquitous wireless communication.
This allows for seamless data transmission. However, unauthorized users may pose a threat to the
security of the data being transmitted to authorized users. This gives rise to network vulnerabilities
such as hacking, eavesdropping, and jamming of the transmitted information. Physical layer security
(PLS) has been identified as one of the promising security approaches to safeguard the transmission
from eavesdroppers in a wireless network. It is an alternative to the computationally demanding
and complex cryptographic algorithms and techniques. PLS has continually received exponential
research interest owing to the possibility of exploiting the characteristics of the wireless channel.
One of the main characteristics includes the random nature of the transmission channel. The aforesaid
nature makes it possible for confidential and authentic signal transmission between the sender and
the receiver in the physical layer. We start by introducing the basic theories of PLS, including the
wiretap channel, information-theoretic security, and a brief discussion of the cryptography security
technique. Furthermore, an overview of multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) communication is
provided. The main focus of our review is based on the existing key-less PLS optimization techniques,
their limitations, and challenges. The paper also looks into the promising key research areas in
addressing these shortfalls. Lastly, a comprehensive overview of some of the recent PLS research in
5G and 6G technologies of wireless communication networks is provided.

Keywords: artificial noise; beamforming; intelligent reflective surface; MIMO; optimization;

physical layer security; zero forcing

1. Introduction
Wireless communication technology is a necessity for modern-day life because human beings
depend on this technology for data transmission. In most cases, the said data contain confidential
information such as banking transactions, military applications, and multimedia. The International
telecommunication organization approximated that 53.6% of the world population, which amounts to
about 4.1 billion people, were using the internet at the end of 2019 [1]. It is expected that this number
will rise due to a rapid increase in active mobile subscribers as wireless networks continue to expand
and new applications are developed. However, it is reported in [2] that an increasing number of mobile
and wireless devices are affected by cyber-criminal activities. Cyber security ventures [2] predicted
that cyber crime costs will increase to more than 6 trillion US dollars annually by 2021, from 3 trillion
US dollars recorded in 2015. Therefore, it is highly important to improve wireless networks against
cyber-criminal activities.

Entropy 2020, 22, 1261; doi:10.3390/e22111261 www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy

Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 2 of 34

Conventionally, the upper layers of the open system interconnect model are utilized to handle any
discrepancies related to the attributes of authenticity, confidentiality, and privacy of data transmission.
These attributes are mostly dependent on cryptographic algorithms which include secret-key
distribution, public-key, and symmetric encryption. All these techniques function independently
from the physical layer [3]. Based on the assumption that the eavesdropper has limited computing
power ability, the above-mentioned techniques are considered to be secure. Moreover, they rely on
underlying computational complexity for their robustness. Recent advances in quantum computing
pose a serious threat to the currently used cryptographic schemes with their unlimited computational
capacity [4]. Therefore, it is evident that the conventional methods in secure wireless communication
are becoming less reliable.
The open and superposition nature of wireless networks raises issues of confidentiality and
security of the transmitted data when unintended users are present. Difficulties that prevent the
transmitted signal from reaching the unintended users are a result of the broadcast nature. On the
other hand, time variations and fluctuations in the wireless channel result in the arrival of multiple
copies of the transmitted signal at the receiver. With that being said, security attacks in wireless
networks may be categorized as active and passive attacks [5]. Passive attacks involve eavesdroppers
who listen to the ongoing transmission silently and try to steal the transmitted information without
interrupting legitimate transmission [6]. Under active attacks, the eavesdroppers use more aggressive
and intrusive techniques that attempt to deteriorate the quality of the signal at the intended receiver.
Common examples of these aggressive techniques are the denial of service, routing, and node
malfunction attacks [5]. With exposure to so many attacks, wireless networks are required to have
certain capabilities that will enable them to withstand and mitigate these attacks. The desired
characteristics of a secure network include integrity, confidentiality and authentication, availability,
and access control [5].

1.1. Related Works

In this section, we provide a brief overview of some of the related works on the review of key
technologies in PLS. It should be noted that this paper focuses only on key-less PLS technologies.
The survey paper in [7] provides a comprehensive overview of security in the physical layer from
both an information-theoretic point of view and optimization using multi-antenna techniques;
however, it does not describe applications of PLS techniques in modern wireless communication
networks. To the best of our knowledge, the reviews found in [8,9] are the only ones that cover the
application of conventional PLS techniques in 5G (and beyond) wireless communication systems.
They give insight into some of the emerging technologies, including internet of things (IoT),
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), energy harvesting, visible light communication (VLC),
and UAV communication. However, there are a lot of papers available that focus on individual
aspects of the technologies mentioned above.
VLC: Recently, the authors in [10] provided a comprehensive survey of VLC applications in PLS.
The paper also discusses VLC channel models, different network configurations, and also presents
some of the precoding strategies. In this paper, however, we demonstrate, with some simulation plots,
a VLC practical scenario model with realistic system design parameters and show how the optical
power decay in VLC is beneficial in PLS.
IRS: Another technology which has gained a lot of interest in PLS recently is intelligent reflecting
surfaces, and there has been a lot of work published in this area. Some recent papers are [11–13].
The authors in [11] provide an overview of IRS technology, particularly its applications across the
whole of wireless communication. They also outline the advantages IRS offers and some of the
challenges in implementing IRS-aided systems. The optimization problems in the IRS-based PLS
scheme are derived and solved in [12,14]. In this paper we specifically demonstrate the application
of IRS in PLS and evaluate the performance of an IRS-based scheme using the achievable secrecy
rate metric.
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 3 of 34

UAVs: There have been a couple of papers published in this area recently [15–17]. Current research
is aimed at the integration of UAV communication networks with 5G technology (and beyond 5G) to
safeguard the current and future wireless networks. We provide a brief overview and summary of
some of the interesting works on the applications of UAVs in PLS.
Satellite communication: This is another area that has become a trend in recent PLS research,
and a couple of interesting works have been published in [18–21]. Vasquez et al. [18] provided an
overview of precoding techniques in multibeam satellite communication systems. Another study [19]
proposed the inter-satellite communication of small satellite systems. A comprehensive overview of
PLS in space information networks is given in [21]. They proposed the integration of satellite and
IoT to form a satellite-based IoT and also discussed current technologies dedicated to PLS in land
mobile satellite communication networks. Our letter intends to summarize some of the promising
technologies that are discussed in the literature.

1.2. Overview of Cryptography and PLS

Cryptography is the method of transforming data into an unreadable format so that only
the authorized recipient can understand and be able to decode it [22]. The main process of
cryptography is shown in Figure 1. Encryption uses coding to transform plain text into an unreadable
format, whereas decryption uses a decoding process to convert the unreadable text to a piece of
readable information using some special keys. Cryptography can be divided into three main types:
hash functions, public key cryptography, and secret key cryptography. The latter uses only one digital
key to encrypt and decrypt data for both the sender and the receiver. Meanwhile, the first mentioned
type utilizes a pair of public digital keys. In this case, one key is a public key used by the sender to
encrypt the message, and the other key is a secret key used by the receiver to decrypt the information.
Lastly, hash functions are a type of cryptography method that uses a hash value of a fixed length
encrypted into the plain text. Hash functions use algorithms to generate a digital fingerprint to create
one-way encryption [22].

DES DES
Plane Cipher Plain
encryption dencryption
text text text
algorithm algorithm

Alice Bob

Figure 1. The process of cryptography [23].

In most cases, cryptography is the main technology utilized to address security issues for
conventional and some modern-day electronic communication systems. From another perspective,
some novel technologies, mainly quantum computing, are a threat to systems that are based on
cryptography. Quantum computers have close to unbounded computing capabilities and can easily
break encryption and decryption keys. The ability to guess the secret keys or perform a quick reverse
calculation using a quantum computer enables breakage of such keys, and this gives unauthorized
or disguised network users the ability to intercept ongoing data transmissions or access the data [4].
With that being said, it is worth noting that quantum computing is limited to some extent as it
cannot break all kinds of cryptographic algorithms. This means that it is one of the technologies
which jeopardizes some of existing systems based on cryptography. Furthermore, the processes
involved in cryptography can impose delays which can be unwelcome in some applications, such as
fifth-generation (5G) ultra-reliable low-latency communication (URLLC) [24]. Moreover, cryptographic
methods are inefficient in terms of energy consumption as they require extra resources for performing
computations. Therefore, this calls for the need to implement new measures with an effort to augment
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 4 of 34

cryptography. One of the technologies directed towards augmenting cryptography is physical layer
security (PLS) [6,7,25].
PLS is different from cryptography technology because it is based on the concept of
information-theoretic security proposed by Wyner [26]. The concept of PLS describes communication
between two authorized users in the presence of an unintended user by modeling a discrete
memory-less wiretap channel [27]. Figure 2 shows the general case of the wiretap channel where two
authorized users communicate over the main channel and are observed by an eavesdropper through a
wiretap channel. Figure 3 illustrates the fundamental differences between cryptography and PLS [28].

Main channel

Alice
Bob

Wiretap channel
Eve

Figure 2. Wiretap channel.

Secure Message Secure Message

Upper Layer Encryption Upper Layer

keys

Bits Secure Bits

Physical Signals Physical Physical Signal Physical

Layer Layer Layer Layer
Physical Layer
Approach

Cryptography Physical Layer Security

Figure 3. The difference between cryptography and physical layer security approaches [28].

In contrast to cryptography, PLS schemes can seamlessly prevent unintended users from
intercepting data signals. PLS is able to facilitate security without any form of encryption in the
upper layers. The facilitation of key-free encryption is made possible by the exploitation of some
wireless channel characteristics through the application of suitable signaling and channel coding [29].
PLS techniques have proven capable of realizing verifiable security even when the network intruders
have almost limitless computational resources. Despite the unparalleled benefits of PLS, it is worth
noting that some shortfalls exist. It was shown in [30] that it is almost impossible to warrant maximal
security with a probability of one since PLS relies mainly on the average information. In addition,
most PLS schemes assume prior knowledge of the eavesdropper’s wiretap channel, which is not
feasible in practical applications. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that it will be difficult to only
use PLS in future wireless systems since it requires a high data rate to ensure security. PLS can be
combined with other higher-layer security techniques to achieve security and robustness of wireless
communication networks. Authors in [31], proposed cross-layer cooperation as a viable solution for
the achievement of reliability and energy efficiency in wireless communication. Chen et al. in [32] also
investigated a cross-layer optimization scheme using cooperative diversity for reliable data transfer
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 5 of 34

in wireless sensor networks to achieve significant energy savings and prolong the network lifetime
considerably. Having stated the aforementioned benefits of both technologies, investigations on the
concurrent use of PLS and cryptography are worth looking into to provide elevated robustness of the
communication network.

2. Background

2.1. Concept and Evolution of PLS

PLS dates back to the 1970s with a mathematical description of a wiretap channel [26]. Following
the advancements in massive MIMO and integration of technologies such as IEEE 802.11n and
long-term evolution (LTE), there has been major interest in PLS research over the last decade.
The current research is focused towards exploiting MIMO spatial degrees of freedom in order to
leverage security benefits [33]. A typical network in which PLS is employed comprises three nodes:
a transmitter, a legitimate receiver, and an eavesdropper. With this setup, the transmitter under normal
circumstances sends a confidential message to the receiver. The sent signal is protected from any form
of interception by the eavesdropper [29]. The adopted general convention is that the transmitter is
referred to as “Alice”, whilst the eavesdropper and the receiver are referred to as “Eve” and “Bob”,
respectively. This model is illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Physical layer security (PLS) system model.

2.2. Motivation of PLS

It was shown in Section 1 that the inception of technologies such as quantum computing poses
a major threat in existing security techniques in wireless networks, which means that wireless
communication is not completely secure. PLS offers an additional solution to exploit the secrecy
possibilities that the wireless channel offers. The main motivations behind PLS are (1) to find an
alternative means to supplement the existing security measures in wireless networks which are based
on cryptography algorithms, (2) employment of the physical layer of the network to improve security
through enhancements of security methods implemented at the upper layer of the protocol stack,
and (3) to find and develop new security technologies compatible with recent developments of the 5G
and 6G wireless networks as well as MIMO communication.

2.3. Information-Theoretic Security

This is the kind of security that purely defines the fundamental limits of PLS measures from an
information theory point of view. It was proposed by Claude Shannon in 1949 [34]. Shannon defined the
channel capacity as the maximum rate at which information can be transmitted over a communication
channel with an arbitrarily low probability of error. For an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
channel, the channel capacity is given by

C = Blog2 (1 + SNR) (1)

Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 6 of 34

where B represents the channel’s bandwidth (fixed quantity) in Hertz (Hz), and SNR is the
signal-to-noise ratio. The SNR is mathematically denoted by Equation (2). From Equation (1), it can be
seen that the channel capacity is directly proportional to the power of the signal.

P
SNR = , (2)
σ2

where P denotes the power of the signal and σ2 is the noise power.
The Shannon information content of an outcome, xi , is defined as
 
1
h( xi ) = log2 = − log2 p( xi ) (3)
p ( xi )

where the probability of the random variable X is denoted by p( xi ). Figure 5 shows a graph of
Shannon information content versus the different probabilities, and it illustrates that less probable or
rare outcomes contain more information than common or highly probable outcomes. The entropy
function H( X ) is the average of the Shannon information content and is given by

M   M
1
H (X) = ∑ p( xi ) log2
p ( xi )
= − ∑ p( xi ) log2 p( xi ) (4)
i =1 i =1

where M is the total number of possible outcomes. The mutual information, I ( X; Y ), defines the
amount of information X conveys about Y:

I ( X; Y ) = H ( X ) − H ( X | Y ) (5)

10

7
Shannon info. content (bits)

0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Probability p(x)

Figure 5. Shannon information content.

Therefore, this implies the amount of information sent to Bob by Alice is given by Equation (6),
whereas the same quantity between Alice and Eve is given by Equation (7).

I ( A; B) = H ( A) − H ( A | B), (6)

I ( A; E) = H ( A) − H ( A | E), (7)

where random variable A represents the bit sent by Alice. B denotes the bits received by Bob, and the
outcome observed by Eve is denoted by E. In order to ensure that the communication channel is secure,
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 7 of 34

it is significant to maximize the achievable mutual information by optimizing the input distribution
p( A) such that [35]
CS = max ( I ( A; B) − I ( A; E)) (8)
p( A)

Therefore the difference between the capacities of Bob and Eve’s channels gives the secrecy rate of the
PLS system model given in Figure 4 by

R s = C B − CE (9)

The notion of secrecy capacity plays a central role in PLS. It is a metric that defines the rate at
which the transmitted signal reaches the legitimate receiver without any form of invasion from the
eavesdropper. To define perfect secrecy, we consider Shannon’s wiretap channel model shown in
Figure 6. In this model, Alice intends to transmit confidential information, A, to an authentic receiver,
Bob, under a condition that an eavesdropper exists, Eve. A is encoded into X n , which represents the
information vector of length n. The received information vectors for Bob and Eve are given by Bn and
En , respectively. Consequently, the source information entropy together with the amount of uncertainty
of the message received by Eve are given by H ( A) and H ( A| En ), respectively. Shannon showed
that legitimate parties could achieve information-theoretically secure communication in a wireless
communication environment by using the same random secret key, which is unknown to the
eavesdropper. This is known as perfect secrecy, and it is given by Equation (10) in terms of the
entropy. Transforming Equation (10) into Equation (11) shows that the eavesdropper is not able to
receive any of the transmitted information content.

H ( A| En ) = H ( A) (10)

I ( A, En ) = 0 (11)

The theorem also proves that perfect secrecy could be guaranteed if H (K ) ≥ H ( A), where K is
the random variable modeling the key. This means that the key should be equal to or longer than
the confidential message [36]. However, perfect secrecy was proven to be impractical because the
key management may be cumbersome for specific networks, such as ad hoc networks, which do not
operate under fixed infrastructures [37].

secret key K

A Xn
Alice Bob Bn

W Eve En

Figure 6. Shannon’s wiretap channel.

To expand Shannon’s information-theoretic secrecy theorem, Wyner proposed the concept of

weak secrecy. Weak secrecy is defined by the Wyner’s wiretap channel model shown in Figure 7.
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 8 of 34

In this model, the encoder operates on blocks of k source bits Ak = ( A1 , A2 , . . . , Ak ) and produces an
encoded sequence X n = ( X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) of length n.

^
Ak Xn Main Channel Yn Decoder Sk
Source Encoder
QM

Wiretap Channel
QW

En

Figure 7. Wyner’s wiretap channel.

The transmission rate, which is the proportion of information sent in each codeword, is given
by Equation (12). The equivocation rate, defined as a measure of confusion at the eavesdropper,
is employed to investigate the weak secrecy of transmitted information. The said rate is given by
Equation (13).
R = k/n (bits/channel ), (12)

1
∆= H ( A k | E n ), (13)
k
where k is the total number of source bits in the code, and n is the code length. A scheme is considered
to have weak secrecy in the event that

1
lim I ( A, En ) = 0 (14)
n→∞ n
Unlike the Shannon perfect secrecy metric, this metric proved that it is possible to obtain secrecy
in a practical scenario [38]. Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between the transmission rate and
equivocation. It shows the region of achievable pairs as ( R, ∆) [26]. The highest rate capable of
achieving complete equivocation Hs (i.e., confusion at the eavesdropper) is the secrecy capacity Cs of
the channel.

Figure 8. Wyner’s transmission rate vs equivocation rate.

With Wyner’s model, the assumption is that the signal arriving at the receiver of the eavesdropper
is degraded by some degree in comparison to that of the legitimate receiver [36]. However, it was
proved in [39] that secret communication is possible regardless of the statistical channel state of the
eavesdropper. It was further shown in [30] that weak secrecy was also insufficient in many cases to
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 9 of 34

prove secrecy in communication. Another metric, referred to as strong secrecy, was defined by [40].
The metric states that a scheme is said to achieve strong secrecy if

lim I ( A, Z n ) = 0 (15)
n→∞

Subsequently, in [41], strong secrecy was proved to be inefficient for some applications. This is
based on the assumption of random and uniformly distributed message symbols over the message
alphabet at the input of the secrecy encoders. In practice, the limitation is caused by the unavailability
of universal compression algorithms capable of providing messages that have the distribution
mentioned above.

2.4. Performance Metrics in PLS

The secrecy metrics from information-theoretic security are well-established and have laid the
foundation of secrecy coding in the physical layer. However, they are challenging to evaluate and
measure, especially when the coded sequence has a finite block length [42]. Therefore, different metrics
that are much easier to work with have been proposed. In this subsection, we discuss some of these
metrics according to how they are used to evaluate performance in PLS.

2.4.1. Secrecy Rate

The rate of transmission that can reliably be supported on the legitimate channel of transmission
but not decodable on the channel of the eavesdropper is termed secrecy rate. The secrecy rate of the
Gaussian channel is calculated as the maximum difference between the attainable secrecy rates of
Alice–Bob and Alice–Eve. Considering Figure 4, and using Equations (1) and (9), the secrecy rate of a
typical PLS communication system is given by
! !
P H P H
Rs = R B − R E = log2 1+ T2 B − log2 1+ T2 E , (16)
σB σE

where R B and R E are the secrecy rates of Bob and Eve, respectively. The secrecy rate, Rs , can be
maximized using signal design and optimization techniques, which will be discussed in Section 3.

2.4.2. Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP)

SOP defines the probability at which a specific value of Rs for a particular system is not obtainable.
This metric is used in instances where Alice has very little channel state information (CSI) of Bob and
Eve. In most of the applications, the SOP is put to use under the conditions where the eavesdropper’s
statistical CSI is known to the transmitter. Additionally, the metric characterizes the reliability and the
security of data transmission.

2.4.3. Quality of Service (QoS)-Related Metrics

Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR): This metric may be described as the quantitative
relationship between the power of the received signal and power of the interference plus noise.
The performance of a communication link is characterized by the QoS. SINR is directly related to the
QoS, and this can aid with the design of secrecy algorithms. A minimum value of SINR for transmission
from Alice to Bob and a maximum value of SINR for Eve means a good receiving performance in
terms of security and reliability. This paves the way for a robust transmission capable of achieving the
desired minimum and maximum error levels for Bob and Eve, respectively. Improvement of the SINR
can facilitate the use of PLS techniques such as beamforming. A detailed discussion of beamforming is
given in Section 3.
Bit error rate (BER): This metric is defined as the ratio of the number of information bits received in
error to the total number of bits transmitted. Different modulation and coding techniques have varying
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 10 of 34

BER performances at the same SINR level. For the establishment of a communication link, the BER of
a system must be above the minimum required level. Therefore, PLS techniques utilize optimization
methods to improve the security of a communication system by degrading the BER of illegitimate
users. Thus, the BER can be employed to measure the QoS and the security of a communication system.

2.5. Channel State Information (CSI)

CSI defines the properties of a channel in a wireless communication link. CSI is used to describe
the propagation of the transmitted signal in relation to the corresponding effects such as scattering,
fading, and power decay with distance. Wang et al. in [29] show that the availability of CSI is one of
the most important aspects to consider when choosing an appropriate secrecy performance metric
in order to design optimal transmission strategies in PLS. CSI can be categorized into two classes,
and they are referred to as perfect and imperfect CSI. The former involves the complete knowledge of
the channel properties of a communication link. The latter is concerned with characterization of the
statistical information only. Such information includes the average channel gain, the type of fading
distribution, the line-of-sight (LOS) component, and the spatial correlation.
In practice, CSI is initially not available at the transmitter and receiver terminals; it is gathered
through some channel estimation methods, such as those found in [43,44]. The two channel estimation
mechanisms commonly employed to acquire CSI are the pilot-based channel training and channel state
feedback. In pilot-based channel training, the transmitter distributes the total transmission time and
energy such that some of the energy and time are allocated for the transmission of pilot symbols while
the remaining portion is used for data transmission. In the channel state feedback method, the receiver
is required to share its estimated channel knowledge with the transmitter prior to transmission. It is
shown in [42] that the greatest level of security can be achieved if the transmitter has full knowledge
of both the wireless channels to the intended user and the unintended user. This can be achieved
by designing MIMO transmit precoders that minimize the information leaked to the eavesdropper’s
channels or to accurately direct jamming signals towards the eavesdroppers. A detailed discussion on
the use of CSI in PLS is given in Section 3.

2.6. Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) Communication

MIMO is a very powerful technology in wireless communication systems. A MIMO network
structure consists of many antennas at the transmitter as well as at the receiver. MIMO technology has
been well-studied and developed for the past decade, mainly because of its capability to significantly
enhance performance and widen the coverage range of wireless communication systems [45]. Some of
its other important benefits that have been shown include, but are not limited to, its capability to
provide higher data rates, improved reliability, and less noise and interference [46]. Even though
MIMO technology was proposed many years back, it only came to reality in the practical world in
2018 [47]. In this review paper, we focus on the relevance and application of MIMO technology in PLS
rather than its traditional capacity benefits in wireless communication networks. It was shown in [48]
that MIMO systems are very robust against passive eavesdropping attacks since the secrecy capacity is
directly proportional to the difference in capacities of the main and wiretap channels. Beamforming in
massive MIMO was used in [49] to implement security in the physical layer. In [50], artificial noise
generation was used to demonstrate the application of PLS in MIMO orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) systems. A typical MIMO system is shown in Figure 9 wherein the transmitter,
the intended receiver, and the eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas NA , NB , and NE .
This is referred to as MIMO multiple-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) [29], and in this case the
secrecy capacity can be expressed as

log2 |I + Hb K x HbH |
Cs = max (17)
K x 0,tr (K x  P) log2 | I + He K x HeH |
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 11 of 34

where I is the identity matrix, K x is the covariance matrix of the transmit signal x, P is the maximum
transmit power constraint, and Hb ∈ C NB × NA and He ∈ C NE × NA are the MIMO complex Gaussian
channel matrices of the legitimate and wiretap channel, respectively. The signals received by the
legitimate receiver and passive eavesdropper are given by Equation (18):

yb = Hb x a + nb ,
(18)
ye = He x a + ne ,

where x a ∈ C NA ×1 is the transmit signal, and nb ∈ C NB ×1 and ne ∈ C NE ×1 are zero-mean complex

white Gaussian additive noise vectors. Equation (18) is used as a fundamental tool in optimization
techniques in PLS and also to demonstrate the application of MIMO in Section 3.

Figure 9. MIMO wiretap channel model [29].

3. Secure Multi-Antenna Techniques

Multi-antenna techniques have been widely considered in wireless communication because they
offer higher spatial degrees of freedom, which can be utilized effectively in PLS to ensure secure data
transmission. Such techniques either attempt to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel relative to the
main transmission channel or enhance the quality of the received signal at the legitimate receiver.
From the perspective of optimization, the four techniques which are representative of this area are (1)
beamforming, (2) zero-forcing (ZF), (3) convex optimization, and (4) artificial noise (AN). In Figure 10,
from [33], each technique is described in terms of the transmission’s orthogonality to Bob and Eve.

Bob

Bob

Alice Alice

Eve
Eve

(a) Beamforming (b) ZF

Figure 10. Cont.

Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 12 of 34

Eve Bob Bob

Alice
Alice

Eve

(c) AN (d) convex optimization

Figure 10. Secure multi-antenna techniques.

3.1. Convex Optimization

Convex optimization can be used in PLS with other secure-multi antenna techniques to find the
most favorable transmit solutions that can effectively make the best out of the performance metrics
of the wireless communication system. The objective function f ( x ) to be maximized or minimized
may be considered to be the performance metric, for example, secrecy rate, SINR, and secrecy outage
probability [7]. Several methods which are commonly used to solve optimization problems in PLS are
widely available in the literature [51].
One convex optimization method involves the objective function having quadratic terms, and it is
called quadratic programming. Quadratic programming is used in the design problems of nonlinear
programming. Some of the common quadratic problems in PLS are power minimization, secure power
allocation, and beamforming. Another method used in PLS is semi-definite programming (SDP). It is
used to optimize a linear function of variables under linear equality constraints and a non-negativity
constraint. Most problems in PLS are usually non-convex, and they must be converted into convex
problems using SDP. In turn, an efficient algorithm that is easy to implement is developed in order to
obtain optimal performance metrics. One other convex optimization method is the difference of convex
functions (DC) programming. In DC programming, the objective function is a subtraction of two
convex functions, for instance, secrecy rate maximization. Furthermore, mixed-integer programming
is one of the methods utilized. This method is applicable to problems which have discrete and
continuous variables. Not least of all, fractional programming is one more method which is directed
towards optimization of a ratio of two nonlinear functions. A typical example of its application in
PLS is the energy efficiency maximization. Even though convex optimization offers improved secrecy
performance in the physical layer than the conventional precoding techniques such as beamforming or
zero-forcing, it is more computationally expensive to implement.

3.2. Beamforming
Beamforming is a signal processing technique that is used to transmit signals effectively in
intended directions to give a maximum signal difference between the receiver in the intended direction
and the one in the unintended direction. Beamforming forms a beam in the direction of the desired
recipient to maximize the signal-to-noise power ratio while suppressing the reception or transmission
in the direction of the unintended user, Figure 11. This significantly improves the energy efficiency
of the system because the energy is transmitted or focused in a particular direction rather than being
spread out in a diffused fashion.
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 13 of 34

Figure 11. Beamforming.

Beamforming can be used at both the transmitting and receiving ends to achieve spatial
selectivity, i.e., transmit beamforming and receive beamforming. Transmit beamforming steers the
transmitted signal towards the intended receiver by finding the best possible channel among all the
transmit antennas.
Beamforming is one of the key techniques in PLS and has been widely studied in the
literature [49,52–57]. A beamforming problem in PLS involves steering the transmitted signal towards
the desired user while taking into account an interfering user trying to decode the transmitted
information, Figure 11. To demonstrate the beamforming optimization problem in PLS we consider a
MISO system shown in Figure 12 in which the transmitter uses transmit beamforming to communicate
with K users.

Alice

Bob
Eve ... Eve
Bob

user-eaves pair user-eaves pair

Figure 12. System model of multi-user and eavesdropper pairs with beamforming.

We assume that the transmitter is equipped with Nt transmit antennas, and the legitimate user
and the eavesdropper each have a single receiving antenna. Therefore, the received signal at legitimate
user i and their equivalent SINR are given by

K
yi = hiH xi + ∑ hiH xk + ni ,
k =1
k 6 =i

|hiH wi |2 (19)
SINR =
K
| ∑ hiH wk |2 + σ2
k =1
k 6 =i
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 14 of 34

Similarly, the signal received signal by the ith eavesdropper and their equivalent SINR can be
given by

K
zi = giH xi + ∑ giH xk + mi ,
k =1
k 6 =i

|giH wi |2 (20)
SINR =
K
| ∑ giH wk |2 + σ2
k =1
k 6 =i

where xi ∈ C NT ×1 is the transmitted signal symbol of the desired user i with corresponding
beamforming vector wi ∈ C NT ×1 , h ∈ C NT ×1 and g ∈ C NT ×1 are the channel vectors of the desired
user and eavesdropper respectively, and ni and mi are the corresponding AWG noise vectors for the ith
user and eavesdropper with zero mean and noise power σ2 . The covariance matrix of the transmitted
signal is given by Rn = E{xi xiH }. The objective problem of a typical beamforming design scheme is to
minimize the interference signal at the desired user so that they receive the transmitted signal with
the desired QoS, which is usually described by the constraint of the SINR greater or equal to the given
threshold amount of the ith user, i.e., SINR ≥ ρi . Therefore, the beamforming optimization problem
can be written as follows:
K
min | ∑ hiH wk |2 + σ2
wi
k =1
k 6 =i (21)
s.t. SINR ≥ ρi
||wi ||2 ≤ PT

The solution to the beamforming problem provides the optimal vector wi , which maximizes the
SNR of the desired user. This results in focusing the beam in one direction, and the process is referred
to as electronic steering. One beamforming vector is assigned to each legitimate user and is matched to
their channel. The beamforming design problem in PLS has been well-investigated in many studies in
the literature, which can be found in [51,58–64], with the aim of developing algorithms that minimize
the interference and also maximize secrecy of transmission. We summarize some of the results from
these studies here. One approach which was considered in [58] involves using semi-definite relaxation
to obtain the optimal beamforming solution, which minimizes the transmission power subject to SINR
constraints. In the paper, they showed that the quadratic optimization problems with non-convex
and discontinuous constraints could be recast as SDP with additional constraints, which imposes that
the solution matrices must be of rank one. Another study employing semi-definite relaxation was
proposed in [59], wherein they used Taylor expansion to solve the optimization problem. The author’s
study proved that their proposed algorithm outperformed both the signal-to-leakage-and-noise ratio
(SLNR)-based algorithm and zero-forcing beamforming. The SLNR algorithm and zero-forcing were
employed to minimize the power leaking to the channels of other users. Another novel approach of
path-following algorithm was proposed in [60,61], which used a simple quadratic program to perform
iterations for finding the optimal transmit beamformers. The QoS, which is given in terms of both
the user’s secrecy throughput and the network secure energy efficiency, is optimized through the use
of the obtained beamformers. The algorithm proposed in [60,61] offers a better performance when
compared with the existing methods based on zero-forcing beamformers. Authors in [51,51] further
studied the algorithm proposed by [60,61] using a different approach. The authors defined secrecy
throughput in terms of outage probability. It was found that this approach offered a more practical
beamforming design solution. Interference alignment (IA) was proposed by [65,66] as an excellent
solution for interference management in multi-user wireless networks to significantly improve the
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 15 of 34

sum-rate. The concept of the IA technique is that the transmitted signals are directed to concentrate the
interference in the particular sub-spaces at the unintended receivers, thus opening up interference-free
sub-spaces to transmit the desired signal to the intended user. Following the proposal, several research
works in [64,67–69] have been conducted to develop IA algorithms for directing the interference in a
manner that is detrimental to the illegitimate receiver while ensuring that the legitimate receiver is not
severely affected. To enhance the desired signal gain and suppress the undesired interference and the
noise signal, authors in [63] employed spatial degrees of freedom.

3.3. Artificial Noise (AN) Precoding

The notion of using artificial noise to enhance security in the physical layer was first proposed
in [70]. They identified AN-based transmission as an effective technique that can be deployed in PLS
to ensure secure communication in wireless networks. The technique involves deliberately degrading
the quality of the channel of the eavesdropper by generating an interference signal, which is used
to interrupt their eavesdropping capabilities. In the AN precoding scheme, the transmitter Alice
divides the transmission power between transmitting the information to the intended recipient, Bob,
and transmitting the noise signal towards the eavesdropper, Eve, is shown in Figure 13.

AN

Bob

Eve Alice

Figure 13. Secrecy beamforming with artificial noise (AN).

Generating AN depends on the transmitter’s knowledge of the eavesdroppers’ channel state

information. In a case where the eavesdropper’s CSI is unknown, the isotropic AN is generated.
The generated AN is designed such that it lies in the nullspace of the intended receiver and directed
in the range space of the unintended receivers. This is done to cancel out its effect at the intended
receiver such that only the eavesdropper’s channel is degraded [70]. Another form of AN generation
is called spatially selective AN, which is applicable in the event that the transmitter knows the the
eavesdropper’s CSI [71]. The AN generation technique’s major strength is that the provided secrecy
scales well with the SNR since an increase in SNR at Eve will increase the received AN power along
with the message power. The conventional AN scheme can be represented in general as follows:

x = ws a + vs j , (22)

where x is the signal transmitted by Alice. The source information is denoted by s a and s j denotes
the AN jamming signal, which is chosen to be independent of the source information, i.e., s a 6= s j .
Beamforming vectors for the information and jamming signals are represented by w and v, respectively.
Therefore, the signals received by Bob and Eve are given by Equations (23) and (24), respectively.

y B = h BH ws a + g BH vs j + n B (23)

y E = h EH ws a + g EH vs j + n E (24)
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 16 of 34

where h BH and g EH denote the channel responses of Alice–Bob and Alice–Eve, respectively.
The independent, identically distributed complex Gaussian noise for Bob and Eve with zero mean and
variance σ2 are denoted by n B and n E , respectively. The corresponding secrecy rate is given by
! !
| h H w |2 | h H v |2
R = log2 1 + H B2 − log2 1 + H E2 (25)
| g B v | + σ2 | g E v | + σ2

A novel approach of the AN scheme that offers better secrecy rate performance, where the
jamming signal is generated to be dependent on the information signal, was presented in [72].
The scheme significantly improved the signal strength at Bob and, at the same time, canceled the
received signal at the eavesdropper. In the scheme the signal received by Bob and Eve can be shown by

y B = h BH ws a + g BH vs a + n B (26)

y E = h EH ws a + g EH vs a + n E (27)

Therefore, the secrecy rate is now given by

! !
|h H w + g BH v|2 |h H v + g EH v|2
R = log2 1+ B − log2 1+ E (28)
σ2 σ2

The optimization problem in the AN precoding scheme is to find an optimal power allocation
method for the artificial noise, which ensures maximum secrecy of the legitimate transmission.
A comprehensive summary of several methods proposed in the literature for solving the AN precoding
optimization is presented below.
The classical AN injection schemes are investigated broadly in the literature, and their application
in MIMO systems has been shown as promising to exploit in future wireless networks. In [73],
the authors demonstrated an approach capable of guaranteeing secrecy without knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s CSI. In [73], two schemes were proposed for AN generation in PLS. In the first scheme,
they proposed a scheme which was based on MIMO technology, while the second scheme used a single
transmitter antenna. For the latter scheme, amplifying relays were used to mimic the effects of multiple
antennas. Moreover, in the second scheme the transmitter and the intended receiver both transmit
independent AN signals to the helper nodes. The eavesdropper receives differently weighted versions
of the AN signals from the transmitter and the receiver. The two transmission schemes proposed in
the paper transmit both AN and information-bearing signals together. However, the paper does not
necessarily find an optimal power allocation for the transmission of message signals and minimal
power allocated to the AN.
To tackle the shortfall indicated in [73], researchers [74] proposed an AN-assisted secure
MIMO-OFDM system to improve the security of the legitimate transmission and find an optimal
power allocation scheme. AN precoding scheme is proposed where Alice divides her power between
transmitting a message to Bob and transmitting AN into Bob’s nullspace. Assuming Bob and Eve’s
channels are independently faded, Eve will see some of the AN in her range space. The authors
determined the minimum power consumption that satisfies the legitimate transmission quality with
the largest residual power in generating AN. They use convex optimization solvers to find the optimal
solution to this problem. This technique’s major strength is that the provided secrecy scales well with
SNR, since an increase in SNR at Eve will increase the received AN power along with the message
power [23].
AN precoding was also used in [50] to implement security in the physical layer. AN was used as
a transmit strategy over Bob’s null space with the intention of improving the secrecy of the Alice–Bob
channel without affecting its quality. The authors examine three approaches of generating AN. Firstly,
the minimum power was used for the information-bearing signal, and the rest of the transmit power
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 17 of 34

was distributed to the AN. Secondly, the power was evenly distributed between the transmit signal and
the AN signal in order to maximize ergodic secrecy capacity. Lastly, the AN power was progressively
varied in order to understand its effects on the secrecy confidence level. Eve was modeled to use
the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) as an optimal receiver structure to maximize the SNR.
Eve’s capability to compromise the secrecy of the main link was defined as the SNR difference between
the intended receiver and the eavesdropper. It was shown in [50] that when an eavesdropper uses
zero-forcing to mitigate the interference introduced by the artificial noise transmission with a large
number of receiving antennas and knows some of the main channel’s CSI, the secrecy of the system
can be compromised.

3.4. Zero-Forcing (ZF) Precoding

Zero-forcing precoding, or null-steering, is a method of spatial signal processing in which multiple
antennas at the transmitter can completely cancel out or null the multiple user interference signals in a
wireless communication network. The ZF method is based on canceling out the interference at the
intended receiver in multiple user communications. This can be done by using the eavesdropper’s CSI
to transmit a message orthogonal to the eavesdropper, which is equivalent to steering a null in the
direction of the eavesdropper, illustrated in Figure 10b.
The design problem of ZF precoding has been presented in [75]. The iterative algorithm presented
in [75] was developed to obtain the optimal transmit and receive filters to cancel out the interference.
The designed filters minimizes the mean-square error (MSE) between the legitimate parties whilst
guaranteeing and maintaining a certain eavesdropper MSE level, subject to the power constraint.
Nonetheless, the ZF precoding methods presented have been demonstrated to perform well or achieve
the highest secrecy system capacity when full knowledge of CSI is available at the transmitter, which is
a highly unlikely case. Therefore, with limited CSI at the transmitter, the performance of ZF precoding
is very poor, which makes it less applicable.

3.5. Cooperative Jamming

Cooperative jamming is one of the techniques proposed to implement security in the physical
layer to curb eavesdropping in wireless networks. A cooperative jamming network comprises the
source that transmits its message to the intended receiver and a relay node that transmits a jamming
signal to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel and improve the secrecy rate. Cooperative jamming
was derived from the conventional technique for user cooperation known as cooperative relaying.
However, cooperative relaying is distinctive from cooperative jamming because it improves the security
by enhancing channel quality between the transmitter and legitimate receiver. Some of the examples of
cooperative relaying are decode-and-forward (DF) and amplify-and-forward (AF) schemes. A system
model of a typical cooperative jamming scheme is shown in Figure 14, which consists of the transmitter
Alice, a single trusted relay, an intended receiver Bob, and and eavesdropper Eve. Bob transmits
a message signal s using a transmit power PA, and the relay transmits a jamming signal z with a
weighting vector w, simultaneously.
The signal received by Bob and Eve is given by Equations (29) and (30), respectively

PA h AB s + w H h RB z + n B
p
yB = (29)

√
yE = PAh AE s + w H h RE z + n E (30)

where h AB is the Alice–Bob channel, h RB is the relay–Bob channel, h AB is the Alice–Bob channel, h AB
is the Alice–Bob channel, h RE is the relay–Eve channel, h AE is the Alice–Eve channel, and n B and n E
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 18 of 34

are the AWG noise with variance σ2 at both Bob and Eve, respectively. The corresponding secrecy rate
is given by
PA |h AB |2 PA |h AE |2
   
R = log2 1 + − log2 1 + (31)
|w H h RB |2 + σ2 |w H h RE |2 + σ2
The problem of secrecy maximization has been extensively studied in the literature [76–83].
Authors in [76,77] investigated the problem of secrecy rate maximization of a secure wireless
communication system in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Hu et al. in [79] studied cooperative
jamming for PLS enhancement in IoT, specifically considering a downlink transmission problem
to tackle multiple passive and non-colluding eavesdroppers. The current research in cooperative
jamming is focused towards integrating cooperative jamming with the current technologies in 5G
and 6G, which can be found in [80–84]. In [80], they used joint cooperative jamming and secure
channel training solutions to safeguard a two-user power domain non-orthogonal multiple access
(NOMA) system against eavesdropping attacks coming simultaneously from inside and outside of
the network. Another interesting study in [81] uses cooperative jamming to implement security for
industrial wireless networks with mobile users and eavesdroppers. In the paper they employed an
edge computing device to intelligently select an optimal cooperative node.

Bob

Alice Cooperative
jammer

Eve

Figure 14. Secrecy with cooperative jamming.

3.6. Space-Time Coding (STC)

In 1998, Alamouti proposed a space-time block code (STBC) to achieve transmitter diversity [85].
Space-time coding is based on the Alamouti scheme. In the conventional transmit schemes, diversity
techniques were applied at the receiver using algorithms such as the MRC. These techniques require
knowledge of the channel between the transmitter and the receiver to derive the optimal beamforming
weights. However, Alamouti showed that it is possible to transmit data using multiple antennas and
perform separation at the receiver using a single receiving antenna, which gives the same diversity
gains. To provide diversity using the Alamouti scheme, the time and space blocks are used to encode
the information signal. The Alamouti space-time encoder takes a block of two modulated symbols to
create an encoding matrix denoted by
" #
s1 −s2∗
C= , (32)
s2 −s1∗

where s1 and s2 are the modulated symbols mapped to two transmit antennas in two transmit time
slots [86]. The columns of C represent timeslots, and the rows represent different transmit antennas.
Studies by [87,88] showed that STBC may be employed to provide secure communication for space-time
systems while lowering the eavesdropper’s order of diversity. A technique depicted in Figure 15
to achieve a secure STBC without the need to estimate CSI at the transmitter was proposed in [87].
The proposed technique uses mutual received signal strength indicator measurements to generate
a pseudo-random sequence used to secure communication. In this model, at each transmit antenna,
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 19 of 34

random phase rotations θ1 and θ2 are applied to the symbols. Each phase shift is applied for one code
duration. For a single codeword, the transmitter encodes source information s1 and s2 as
" #
s1 e jθ1 s2∗ e jθ2
X= (33)
−s2 e jθ1 s1∗ e jθ2

Therefore, Bob receives the signal given by

z = Xh + n
z = H+ (θ1 , θ2 )s + ñ
" # " #" # " # (34)
z1 h1 e jθ1 h2∗ e jθ2 s1 n1
= +
−z2∗ −h2 e jθ1 h1∗ e jθ2 s2 −n2∗

ALICE
BOB

ALAMOUTI
STBC
EVE

Figure 15. System block diagram.

Using the MRC algorithm, the source information can be estimated by

s̃ = H+ (θ1 , θ2 )z (35)

Eve’s received signal is given by y, which can be also be decomposed to ỹ as

y = Xg + e
(36)
ỹ = G+ (θ1 , θ2 )s + ẽ

where H+ and G+ are the pseudo-inverse of H and G, respectively. The transmitter manipulates the
transmitted symbols by generating and applying the maximum number of phase rotations so that the
eavesdropper is completely denied access to the source information. The strength of this technique is
that improved security is achieved without the knowledge of the CSI, unlike in the preceding security
schemes which assumes that the CSI is available. However, it was shown in [88] that the security of
the transmitted signal is compromised if the eavesdropper can obtain one of the space angles and is
in close proximity to Bob. To avoid this, the authors proposed a technique that was able to achieve
zero diversity for the eavesdropper even under enhanced receive diversity. This was achieved through
signal and space rotations.
In Figure 16a we demonstrate the BER performance of the beamforming and AN schemes.
The figure illustrates that the eavesdropper’s channel has the worst bit error rate because it is corrupted
by the AN signal; it is followed by a single-input single-output (SISO) system, which does not
receive diversity from beamforming. Lastly, the 1 × 2 single-input multiple-output (SIMO) and
2 × 1 multiple-input single-output (MISO) systems receive the signal with better BER because of
beamforming. The achievable secrecy rates of different precoding schemes are shown in Figure 16b.
In particular, in a MIMO scheme, six transmit antennas, the intended receiver, and eavesdropper are
each equipped with two receive antennas. In the figure we have the same MIMO configurations for no
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 20 of 34

beamforming and use of beamforming. Lastly, we introduce an AN signal. The figure confirms that the
use of AN indeed improved the secrecy rate of the communication network compared to beamforming
only or no beamforming used.

25
10 0
MIMO with Beamforming
MIMO with AN
MIMO without Beamforming
20
10 -1

Achievable secrecy rate

15
10 -2
Bit Error Rate

10
10 -3

SIMO (nTx=1, nRx=2, MRC) 5

10 -4
SISO (nTx=1, nRx=1)
Bob (nTx=2, nRx=1, TX BF)
Eve (nTx=2, nRx=1, TX BF with AN)
0
10 -5 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25
-20 -10 0 10 20 30
Eb/No, dB SNR dB)
(a) BER vs SNR (b) Comparison of the achievable secrecy
rate for beamforming precoding with and
without AN

Figure 16. Bit error rate (BER) and secrecy rate performance metrics simulations for different
precoding schemes.

4. Challenges and Promising PLS Solutions

4.1. Challenges and Limitations in PLS

The individual PLS techniques discussed above have their own different pros and cons. The major
challenge is the ability to implement an optimal secure transmit precoding algorithm that can maximize
the achievable secrecy rates without any counter cost. We outline some of the notable challenges in
detail, and show how they are addressed, in the subsequent section.
One problem prevalent in PLS techniques, specifically beamforming, is the leakage of transmitted
signals into the eavesdropper’s subspace. In beamforming, the transmitted signal is steered in the
desired direction to the legitimate receiver. The transmit power is highly concentrated in the main
lobe beam, but some of the power is lost in the minor side lobes. This leakage makes it possible for
eavesdroppers who are in the vicinity to decode the transmitted signal since the finite number of
transmit antennas could only provide a limited amount of spatial directivity [52]. It has also been
shown that transmit beamforming focuses only on enhancing the quality of the main channel [89].
Beamforming does not take into consideration the possibility that the eavesdropper can have a
favorable channel when compared to the main channel. Therefore, it can be concluded that even
though the design of an optimal beamforming vector for the intended receiver is fairly easy, it is
cumbersome and computationally expensive to come up with a perfect balance between getting rid of
signal leakage and obtaining the optimal signal power.
It has been shown in Section 3.3 that AN precoding offers provable security in the physical layer.
However, this comes at an additional cost of extra energy requirement. The approach relies on the
generation of AN signals. A fraction of the power used for transmission of information signal power
is used to generate the AN signal. This consumes the transmission power which could have been
used to improve the channel capacity and receiver’s SNR. Therefore, there is a trade-off between
capacity and secrecy rate capacity by means of the transmit power available. On the other hand,
there is also a higher power consumption in both convex optimization and zero-forcing, owing to the
computational requirements.
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 21 of 34

PLS precoding schemes make an assumption of the knowledge or availability of the unintended
user’s CSI. This is the fundamental limitation of such PLS techniques. In practice it is very difficult
for the transmitter to obtain the CSI of the eavesdropper. This is due to the fact that the eavesdropper
does not naturally cooperate with the transmitter to send CSI feedback. Therefore, this assumption
is entirely valid for theoretical systems. Most PLS secure precoding techniques assume that an
eavesdropper has limited resources. To be more specific, the eavesdropper is commonly assumed to
have a smaller number of antennas when compared to those of the intended receiver. Even though
it has been proposed that secrecy against an eavesdropper with more antennas than the transmitter
is possible in [90], such a solution requires additional power assumptions. Hence, secrecy against
resourceful eavesdroppers remains a major challenge in PLS precoding.

4.2. Promising PLS Solutions

4.2.1. Simultaneous Wireless Information and Power Transfer (SWIPT)

The phenomenon of simultaneous wireless information and power transfer was derived from the
idea that RF signals can carry energy that is used for transmitting the information [91]. SWIPT has been
identified as a sustainable proposition for harvesting of energy from the radio frequency (RF) signals,
which in turn is supplied to finite-powered wireless communication devices including wireless sensors
and electronic gadgets [92,93]. As it can be seen in Figure 17, the transmitter transmits the information
signal to the information receivers and also transfers the power to the energy receivers responsible
for harvesting the energy [94]. However, it has been shown that in some cases the energy-harvesting
receivers might have a better channel for receiving the information aimed at the information receivers,
and they might jeopardize the security of the transmitted information. Additionally, efficient methods
are also required for improving the efficiency of energy-harvesting receivers to enhance the amount
of energy that can be harvested. In order to address these challenges, PLS has been employed on
SWIPT in many different studies [92–99]. The authors of [94] investigated SWIPT for MISO secrecy
channel and considered transmit beamforming for two cases, with AN and without AN, with the aim
of maximizing the secrecy rate as well as the harvested energy. Boshkovska et al. in [93] proposed a
robust resource allocation scheme jointly responsible for time allocation and power control, taking into
consideration uncertainty regarding the CSI. In [100], the authors consider a secure beamforming
design for SWIPT in heterogeneous cellular networks which are formed by a single macrocell consisting
of multiple macrocell users and a single femtocell comprising a single information receiver and multiple
eavesdroppers. They use semi-definite programming and proposed an iterative algorithm to maximize
the secrecy rate at information receivers while guaranteeing the SINR requirement recorded at each
macrocell user.

..

... Energy Receiver

Transmitter
..
Information Receiver

Figure 17. A multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system for Simultaneous Wireless Information
and Power Transfer (SWIPT).
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 22 of 34

4.2.2. Machine Learning (ML)-Based Channel Estimation

The development of channel estimation techniques has been investigated in [101–104]. From these
investigations it is evident that tackling imperfect CSI in PLS is one of the problems still open for
research. The conventional channel estimation methods based on channel modeling have been proved
to be insufficient for providing accurate and timely CSI. There has been a recent surge in research
directed towards the feasibility of tackling some of the various communication problems using
ML [101]. Most of the research is devoted towards developing efficient and reliable algorithms for
channel estimation in communication networks. The performance of the existing channel estimation
algorithms can be augmented through the use of ML to achieve close-to-optimal algorithms with
reduced complexity on the implementation [47]. ML has emerged as an effective tool for channel
estimation in wireless communication systems, especially under some imperfect environments.

4.2.3. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)

Drones or UAV-based communication technology has been thoroughly studied and adopted by
the 3GPP standard [105]. A study on UAV systems that highlighted and gave an overview of the latest
advances and current state of research in the field of PLS was conducted [105]. UAV systems have been
envisaged to form an integral part of future wireless communication applications due their dynamic,
flexible, and flying nature. It was shown in [106] that, due to their ability to reach higher altitudes,
they usually have dominant LOS channels with the ground nodes. This capability can be used to
provide confidentiality to the legitimate receivers against the eavesdroppers. This can be done by
deploying UAVs to launch more effective jamming signal attacks to terrestrial eavesdroppers, as shown
in Figure 18. The conventional cooperative jamming schemes make an assumption that the locations
of terrestrial jammers are fixed, which might compromise the secrecy of the system if the jammers are
located far away from the eavesdroppers, and is also not practical as it makes an assumption of perfect
CSI of the jammer to eavesdropper channel [107]. Authors in [107] deployed a UAV-based system as a
jammer to improve the secrecy rate of a ground wiretap channel. Wu et al. [15] considered a scenario
in which a UAV is equipped with an air-to-ground jammer and a ground communication network
comprising a legitimate transmitter–receiver pair and an eavesdropper. They proposed an iterative
algorithm to maximize the achievable average secrecy rate of a wireless communication system.

Cooperative
Legitimate link
jammer
Wiretap link

Jamming signal

Alice

Bob
Eve

Figure 18. Cooperative jamming using unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).

4.2.4. Intelligent Reflecting Surface (IRS)

Future wireless networks are expected to employ intelligent and software re-configurable
functionalities to enable safe and secure communication [108]. Intelligent reflective surfaces have been
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 23 of 34

identified as a solution to create a controllable wireless environment. According to [109], an IRS is a

software-controlled artificial surface that can be programmed to alter its electromagnetic response.
An IRS can change the attenuation and scattering of the incident electromagnetic wave so that it can
propagate in the desired way towards the intended receiver by adjusting the reflecting coefficients.
Authors in [110] discussed two methods of deploying IRS, namely (a) energy focusing and (b) energy
nulling. Energy focusing employs a beamforming technique by using the IRS reflecting elements to
adjust the phases of the signal coming from the transmitter, so that it is focused towards one intended
user. Meanwhile, energy nulling uses the IRS to perform destructive reflection by adjusting the phases
of the scattered signals to null out the signal at the unintended recipients [110]. One application
of IRS is in holographic beamforming, as shown in [111]. Holographic beamforming is a dynamic
beamforming technique that uses a software-defined antenna (SDA).
To demonstrate the application of IRS in PLS, we consider a communication setup of a MISO
shown in Figure 19 from [14]. The system comprises a single transmitter, Alice, with N antennas;
an intended receiver, Bob; and one eavesdropper, Eve. Both Bob and Eve have single receive antennas.
The system is also made of an IRS which has L reflecting elements. The received signals at Bob and
Even are given by
yB = h H H
IB ΘH AI x + h AB x + n B (37)

yE = h H H
IE ΘH AI x + h AE x + n E (38)

where h IB is the IRS–Bob channel, Θ = diag{[e( jφ1 ) , . . . , e( jφi ) , . . . , e( jφL ) ]} is the diagonal with φi
denoting the phase shift of the i-th reflecting element of the IRS, H AI is the Alice–IRS channel, x is
the transmitted signal with maximum transmit power, P, h H AB is the Alice–Bob channel, and n B is the
2
AWGN noise at Bob with variance σn,B . Similarly, subscript {·} E denotes parameters with relevance
to Eve.

Alice Bob

Eve

Figure 19. Intelligent Reflecting Surface (IRS) system model [14].

Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 24 of 34

The achievable secrecy rate is given by

Rs = Rb − Re
!
h H ΘH AI h H
AB PH AI Θ h IB + h AB
H H
= log2 1 + IB 2
σn,B (39)
!
IE ΘH AI h AE PH AI Θ h IE
hH H H H + h AE
− log2 1 + 2
σn,E

The performance of the secrecy rate in Equation (39) is illustrated by the simulation shown in
Figure 20. The secrecy rate is shown by varying the distance between Alice and Bob. Figure 20 clearly
shows that the performance of a PLS scheme without an IRS yields a lower secrecy rate with an increasing
distance between Bob and Alice. On the other hand, an improved secrecy rate can be achieved when IRS
is introduced, as shown in the above-mentioned figure. However, it should be noted that optimization
techniques may significantly and efficiently enhance the secrecy rate, as shown in [14].

15 w IRS
w/o IRS

10
Secrecy in [bps/Hz]

10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Distance [m]
Figure 20. Secrecy rate vs distance.

4.2.5. Visible Light Communication (VLC)

VLC is one of the technologies which has emerged with the potential of providing omnipresent
access to wireless broadband for indoor settings [10,112]. This is enabled by some of its unique
characteristics, which include line-of-sight propagation, inability of light waves to penetrate opaque
surface, technological advancements, and economical costs of lighting equipment such as solid-state
light-emitting diodes (LEDs). The aforementioned characteristics are highly useful in PLS since VLC
signals are confined inside the building’s walls, hence an inherently secure communication which
prevents eavesdropping for outdoor eavesdroppers. VLC schemes are realized through the use of a
number of LED arrays and photodetectors (PDs). The LED arrays serve a dual purpose of offering
illumination and data transmission simultaneously while the PDs are used as receivers. The most
common method of modulation in VLC is the intensity modulation and direct detection (IM/DD).
Unlike in RF systems, the modulating signals in VLC systems must have real, non-negative values [113].
To show the concept of VLC, Figure 21 depicts the illumination and power distribution using various
arrays made up of red-green-blue (RGB) LEDs.
Horizontal illuminance of a light fixture made up of an LED array of 50 × 50 RGB LED chips with a
semi-angle of 60◦ is depicted in Figure 21a. Each LED chip has a Lambertian radiation pattern and total
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 25 of 34

luminous intensity of 33.74 cd. As seen in Figure 21b, increasing the number of LED arrays leads to an
increased intensity and luminescence at all points of the room. Consequently, this results in elevated
optical power, as seen in Figure 21d. Optical power is crucial for data transmission because direct
detection depends on the amount of power which impinges the PD. Due to incoherently distributed
light intensity, the amount of optical power produced by the LED arrays decreases logarithmically
with increasing distance.

440 640
2 2
400 560
360
480
1 1

Horizontal illuminance [lux]

Horizontal illuminance [lux]

320
400
Room width [m]

Room width [m]

280
0 0 320
240
240
200
1 1
160
160

2 120 2 80

80 0
2 1 0 1 2 2 1 0 1 2
Room length [m] Room length [m]

(a) Illumination with one LED Array (b) Illumination with two LED Arrays

800
30 One LED
2 Two LEDs
720 Four LEDs

640 32
1
Horizontal illuminance [lux]

560
Optical power [dB]
Room width [m]

34
0 480
36
400
1
320 38

2 240
40
160
2 1 0 1 2 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
Room length [m] Distance [m]

(c) Illumination with four LED Arrays (d) Optical power distribution

Figure 21. Power and illumination distribution vs distance.

4.2.6. PLS in Satellite Communication

Satellite communication is being more incorporated into current terrestrial wireless
communication networks mainly because of its features, which include wide-area coverage and
high bandwidth. Some noteworthy applications of satellite communication include, but are not limited
to, military operations, TV broadcast, and internet access. However, their broadcast nature and
ability to provide wide coverage area make them more vulnerable to eavesdropping. Traditionally,
security in satellite communication is implemented in the upper layers of the protocol stack by means
of encryption. PLS has been identified as an alternative to augment the current cryptography security
measures [21]. We demonstrate a PLS concept in satellite using a system model shown in Figure 22
and derive the optimization problem.
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 26 of 34

Suppose that the satellite transmits the signal si intended for the ith legitimate user with average
power E[|si |2 ] = 1. The transmitted signal has a weighted beamforming vector given by wi ∈ C N ×1 .
Therefore, the overall transmitted signal is given by

M
x= ∑ wi si (40)
i =1

Satellite

User

Eve

... ...

Figure 22. Multi-beam satellite communication network [114].

The signals received by the ith legitimate and ith eavesdropper are given by Equations (41)
and (42), respectively.
M
yuser−i = hiH wi si + ∑ hiH wm sm + ni (41)
m 6 =i

M
ye−i = giH wi si + ∑ giH wm sm + ne−i (42)
m 6 =i

where hi ∈ C N ×1 denotes the channel gain vector between the ith intended user and the satellite,
gi ∈ C N ×1 denotes the channel gain vector between the ith eavesdropper and the satellite, and ni
and ne−i are assumed to be zero-mean AWG noise of the ith intended user and the ith eavesdropper,
respectively. The achievable secrecy rate of the ith intended user is given by
! !
|hiH wi |2 |giH wi |2
Rs = log2 1+ M − log2 1+ M (43)
∑m6=i |hiH wm |2 + σi2 ∑m6=i |giH wm |2 + σe2−i
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 27 of 34

The typical optimization problem of interest is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate and can be
written mathematically as follows:

min Rs
wi
M (44)
s.t. ∑ ||wi ||2 ≤ PT
m =1

where PT is the maximum transmit power of the satellite. The authors in [115] studied the problem
of minimizing the transmit power on a multi-beam satellite while fulfilling the minimum per user
secrecy rate. They further proposed an iterative algorithm to jointly optimize the transmission power
and the beamforming vector by completely eliminating the co-channel interference and perfectly
nulling out the received signal at the eavesdropper. Kalantari et al. in [116] also used PLS to
address the issue of confidentiality in bidirectional satellite communication based on network coding.
They designed the optimal beamforming weight vector which maximizes the sum secrecy rate by
using semi-definite programming.

5. Conclusions
We have provided a comprehensive review of PLS in wireless networks based on optimization
techniques. We have also shown that PLS is an auspicious technology for strengthening the
confidentiality and secrecy of information transmission in both existing and emerging wireless
networks, which can be used to augment conventional cryptographic methods. To emphasize the
benefits of PLS, we first compared conventional encryption using cryptography and PLS. This work
mainly focused on the provision of a comprehensive review of both the design and the optimization
of PLS schemes. We also discussed some of the main challenges facing PLS and outlined some of
the promising solutions to these problems and how they can benefit future wireless communication
networks. In short, we have shown that PLS is a very promising technology in ensuring safe and
secure wireless communication.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, A.S. and B.B.; methodology, A.S.; software, A.S. and G.A.M.; validation,
A.S. and G.A.M.; writing—original draft preparation, A.S.; writing—review and editing, A.S., G.A.M., T.M.L.J. and
L.M.; supervision, B.B. and J.M.C. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by Botswana International University of Science and Technology grant
number R00067 and S00081. The APC was funded by R00067 and S00081.
Acknowledgments: We would like to acknowledge the Botswana International University of Science and
Technology (BIUST) for research funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 28 of 34

AN Artificial noise
AWGN Additive white Gaussian noise
BER Bit error rate
CSI Channel state information
IRS Intelligent reflecting surface
ITU International telecommunication Union
MIMO Multiple-input multiple-output
OFDM Orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
PLS Physical layer security
QoS Quality of service
SINR Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
STBC Space-time block code
UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle
URLLC Ultra-reliable low latency communication
WIPT Wireless information and power transfer
ZF Zero-forcing
Entropy 2020, 22, 1261 29 of 34

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