Alexandre Kojdve

rgor-r968
Gentlemen! We find ourselves in an imponant ep-
och, in a fermentation, in which Spirit has made
a leap forward, has gone beyond its previous con-
crete form and acquired a new one. The whole
mass of ideas and concepts that have been current
until now, the very bonds of the world, are dis-
solved and collapsing into themselves like a vision
in a dream. A new emergence of Spirit is at hand;
philosophy must be the first to hail its appeerence
and recognize it, rvhile others, resisting impotently,
adhere to the past, and the maioriry unconsciously
constitute the mafter in which it makes ia appear-
ance. But philosophy, in recognizing it as what is
eternal, must pay homage to it.

Hegel,Lecnnes dt lena of 18o6,

find speech

The courage of truth, faith in the power of Spirfu,

are the first condition of philosophy. Man, because
he is Spirit, can and must consider himself worthy
of everything that is most sublime. He cen never
overestimate the greatness and power of his spirit.
And if he has this faith, nothing will be so recal-
citrant and hard as not to reveal itself to him.

Hegel, 1816
 EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

Queneau's collection of Kojdve's thoughts about Hegel constirutes

one of the few important philosophical books of the twentieth
cenrury-e book, knowledge of which is requisite to the full
awerenessof our situation and to the grasp of the most modern
perspective on the eternal questions of philosophy. A hostile critic
has given an accurete assessmeint of Koidve's influence:
Kojive is the unknown Superior whose dogma is revered, often
unawares,by that important subdivisionof the "animal kingdom of
the spirit" in the contemporary world-the progressivist intellec-
tuals. In the years preceding the second world war in France, the
transmissionwas effected by meansof oral initiation to a group of
personswho in turn took the responsibiliry of insuucting others,
and so on. It was only in 1947 that by the effors of Raymond
Queneau, the classeson the Phenomenology of Spirit taught by
Alexandre Kojive * the Ecole des Hautes Etudes from 1933-1939
were published under the title, Introduction to the Reading of
Hegel. This teaching was prior to the philosophico-politicalspecula-
tions of J. P. Sartre and M. Merleau-Ponry, ro the publication of
les Ternps modernes and the new orientation of. Esprit, reviews
which were the most important vehicles for the disseminationof
progressivistideology in France after the liberation. From that time
on we have breathed Kojdve's teaching with the air of the times.
It is known that intellectual progressivismitself admits of a subdivi-
sion, since one ought to consider its two species,_Christiag (Esprit)
and 4-ttreis!Qes Temps modernes); bur this distinction, for reasons
that the initial doctrine enablesone to clarify, does not take on the
importance of a schism. . . . M. Kojive is, so far as we know, the
first . . . to have attempted ro constirure the intellectual and moral
mdnaged trois oI Hegel, Marx and Heidegger which has since that
time been such a great success.[Aim6 Patri, "Dialecdque du Maitre
et de l'Bclave," Le Contrat Social,V, No. a (July-August 196r),
234.1

vll
 Eiiltatl Inlr'od.tccbrt

KojEve is the most thoughtful, the most learned,the most pro-

\found of those Marxists who, dissatisfiedwith the thinnes of
lMarx's eccount of the human and metaphysicalgrounds of his
iteaching,mrned to Hegel as the truly philosophic-sourceof thet
teaching.Although he madeno effort at publicizing his reflections,
the superior force of his interpretationsimposedthem willy-nilly
on those who heard him. For this reason,anyone who wishesto
understandthe senseof that mixture of Marxism and Existentialism
which characterizescontemporeryradicalismmust turn to Kofdve.
From him one can learn both the implications and the necessary
presuppositionsof historicist philosophy; he elaborateswhat the
world must be like if terms such as freedom, work, and creetivity
are to have a rational content and be parts of a coherent under-
sanding. It would, then, behooveany follower of the new version
of the left who wishes to think through the meaning of his own
action to mrdy that thinker who is at its origin.
However, Koidve is aboveall a philosopher-which, at the leest,
meansthat he is primarily interestedin the truth, the comprehen-
sive truth. His passionfor clariry is more powerful than his passion
for changingthe world. The charm of political solutionsdoesnot
causehim to forget the needto presentan adequateaccountof the
rational basisof thosesolutions,and this removeshim from the al-
ways distorted atmosphereof active commitment. He despisesthose
intellectualswho respond to the demandsof the contemPorary
audienceand give thC appearanceof philosophicseriousness with-
out raising the kinds of questionswhich would bore that audience
or be repugnant to it. A cenain senseof the inevitability of this
kind of ebuse---ofthe conversionof philosophy into ideology-is,
perhaps,at the root of his distastefor publication. His work has
beenprivate and has,in large meesure'beencommunicatedgnly !o
friends. And the core of that work is the careful and scholarly
snrdy of Hegel.
Bicausene is a seriousman, Kojive hasnever sought to be orig-
inal, and his originaliry hasconsisteilin his seaichfor the truth in
the thought of wise men of the past. His interpretadon has made
Hegel an important alternativeagaiq and showed how much we
hai to learn from him at a timt when he seemedno longer of
living significance.Kojdve accomplishedthis revival of interest in
Ueglt n-otby adaptinghim to make him relevant,but by showing

viii
 Eilitalc lnbo&rcrbn

that contemporaryconcernsare bestunderstoodin the permanent

Iight of Hegel's teaching.Kojdve's book is a model of textual in-
tCrpretation;the book is suffusedwith the awerenessthat it is of
pressingconcern to 6nd out preciselywhat such a thinker meent'
for he may well know much more than we do about the things
that we needto know. Here scholarshipis in rhe serviceof philos-
ophy, and Kojdve givesus a glimpseof the power of great minds
,andrespectfor the humble and unfashionablebusinessof spending
t' yeeg studying an old book. His own teachingis but the distillation
of more than six years devoted to nothing but reading a single
book, line by line. INrnooucrtoN To rHE Rpeowc or Hocei- con-
'stitutes
the most authoritative interpretation of Hegel.
Such a careful and comprehensivestudy which makessenseof
Hegel'svery difficult textswill be of greatvalue in America where,
though his influence has been great and is ever greater,very few
peopleread, let alone understand,him. He has regularly been ig-
nored by academicpositivistswho are put off by his languageand
are unawereof the problemsinvolved in their own understanding
of scienceand the relation of scienceto the world of human con-
;ccrn. Hegel is now becomingpopular in literary and artistic circles,
but in a superficial form adaptedto pleasedilettantesand other
seekersafter the senscof depth who wish to use him rather than
understandhim. Koidve presentsHegel's teaching with a force
and rigor which should counterpoiseboth tendencies.
What distinguishesKoidve's treatment of Hegel is the recogni-
tion that for Hegel the primary concern is not the knowledge of
anything outside himself-be it of nature or history-but knowl-
edgeof himself,that is, knowledge of what the philosopheris and
how he can know what he knows. The philosophermust be able
tt_glplg1 lir own doingp;an explanationof the heavens,of ani-
mals, or of nonphilosophicmen which does not leave room for,
or doesnot talk about, the philosopheris radically incompletebe-
causeit cennot eccount for the posibility of its own existenceas
knowledge. The world known by philosophy must be such that
it supportsphilosophy and makesthe philosopherthe highest or {
most complete khd of human being.
Koilve learnedfrom Hegel that the philosopherseeksto know
himself or to possessfull self-consciousness, and that, therefore,
thc tnrc philosophicendeavoris a coherentexplanationof all things

lx
 Eilltor\ Iafioilractut

that culminetes in the explenation of philosophy. The man who

seeksany other form of knowledge, who cannot explain his own
doings, cennot be called a philosopher. Discussionof the retionel
$ate is only a corollary of the proof that the world can be known
or is rational. Koilve insiststhat Hegel is the only man who suc-
ceededin making this proof, and his interpretation of the Phenom-
enology expandsand clarifies Hegel's assertionthat realiry is ra-
tional and henceiustifiesrationel discourseabout it. According to
Kojive, Hegel is the fulfillment of what Plato and Aristotle could
i only pray for; he is the modern Aristotle who respondedto-or,
I better, incorporated-the objectionsmade to Aristotelian philoso-
In phy by modern natural rnd human science.Koilve intransigently
uies to makeplausibleHegel's claim that he hed achievedabsolute
/ wisdom.He arguesthat without the possibilityof absolutewisdom,
1
all knowledge,science,or philosophy is impossible.
"'\.
It may indeedbe doubted whether Koidve is fully persuasiveto
the modern consciousnes,particularly since he fnds himself com-
pelled to abandon Hegel's philosophy of nature as indefensible
and sugEesathat Heidegger'smeditationon being may provide a
substimrc for it. The ablndoned philosophy of nature may well
be e necesaiji CosmicsuPPoftfor Hegel's human,historicalteach-
ing. One might ask whether Koidve is not really-somewherebe-
ttJ"en Hegel and Heidegger,but it should be addedthat Kofdve
himself leadsthe readerto this question'which is a proper theme
of philosophical reflection. Koilve describesthe charecter of wis-
dom evenlf he doesnot Proveit hasbeenactualized.
Now, the most striking feature of Koi€ve's thought is his in-
sistence-fully lustifed-that for Hegel, and for all followers of
ffegel, history is complet-ed,that -nothing really new can again
Iffi i. the world. To most of us, such a position seemsutterly
p"t"do*i""I and wildly implausible.But Koidve easily shows the
ineluctablenecessityof this consequencefor anyone who under-
standshuman life to be historically determined,for anyone who
believesthat thought is relative to time-that is, for most modern
'\-'
men. For if thought is historical, it is only at the end of history
, \that this fact can-beknown; there can only be knowledge if his-
tory et some point stops.Koidve elaboratesthe meaningof this
logical necessitythroughout the courseof the book and attemPts
to indicate how a sensiblemrn could eccePt it and interpret the

I
 Edlar's Introd.uctbn

world in accordencewith it. It is preciselyMam's failure to thinki

through the meaning of his own historical thought that_provesI
his philosophicalinadequacyand cornpelsus to turn to the Pro- I
founder Hegel. i
If concreie historical reality is all that the human mind can
know, if there is no-tg1lgl![lgnt intelligible world, then, for there
to be philosophy or-science,realiry must have become rational.
The Hegeliarsolution, acceptedby Koiive, is that this hasindeed
happenedand that the enunciationof the universal,rational princi-l
plesof the rights of man in the French Revolution marked the be-l
g"nni"g of thi end of history. Thereafter,thesearethe only accept-l
able, viable principles of the state.The dtgnity of man has been
recognized,and all men are understoodto participatein it; all that
remainsto do is, et most, to realize the state grounded on these
principlesall over the world; no antithesiscan underminethis syn- o(
thesis,which containswithin itself all the valid possibilities.In this
perspectiveKoj€ve interprets our situation; he paints a powerful
picture of our problemses thoseof post-historicalman with none
of the classictasks of history to perform, living in a universal,
homogeneousstate where there is vimral egreementon all the
\
fundamenta!principles of science,politics, and religion. He char-
acterizesthe life of the man who is free. who hasno work, who has
''
no worlds to conquer,statesto found, gods to revere,or truths to \# h ,
discover.In so doing, Koidve gives an exampleof what it means
to follow out the necesiry of one's position manfully and philo-
sophically.If Koldve is wrong, if his world doesnot correspondto
the real one, vr'elearn at leastthat either one must abandonreason
-and this includesall science-or one must abandonhistoricism.
More common-sensicalbut less intrensigent writers would not
teach us nearly so much. Koidve presentsthe essentialoutlines of
historicalthought; and,to repeet,historicalthought, in one foim or
another,is at the root of almostall modern human science.
It is concerningthe characterizationof man at the end of history
that one of the most inuigui"g C$ggl$s in Kojdve's teaching
arises.As is only to be expected,his honesty and clarity lead him
to posethe difficulty himself. If Hegel is right that history fulfills
the demandsof reason,the citizen of the finel state should enloy
the satisfactionof all reasonablehuman aspirations;he should be
r free, rational being, content with his situation and exercising all

xi
 Eilltor't llndrudgctton

of his powerq emencipatedfrom thc bonds of prciudicc md op-

prcssion. But looking around us, Koidvc, like every other pcne-
trating observer, seesthar thc completion of the human task may
very wcll coincidewith the decayof humaniry,the rebarbarizrtion
or even reanimalizationof man. He addressesthis problcm pefticu-
,l*ly in the note on Japanaddedto the secondedition (pp. rrg-
I 16z). After reading it, one wonders whether the citizcn of the
\univenal homogeneousstate is not identicel to Nietzsche's Last
lMan, and whether Hegel's -*orc historicismdoes not by an inevitable
''dialectic
force us to a somber and more radical historicism
which reiects rcason.We are led to a confrontation berweenHegel
end Nieusche and perhaps,even funher, toward a reconsideration
of the classicdphilosophy of Plato and Arl*otle, who rciectcd his-
toricism before the fact and whom Hegel believed he had zur-
pased. It is the speciel merit of Koilve to bc one of the very few
srre guides to the contempladon of the fundamental alternatives.

ALLIIN BLOOM

Itbaca, Ne,utYotk

[Shonly after the completion of this $atement I learncd that

Alcxandrc Koilve had died in Bmsels in May, 1968.1