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Extract From Gen. Niazi's Book

The document contains extensive extracts from Lt. General A.A.K. Niazi's book "The Betrayal of East Pakistan" which provides his perspective on the 1971 war between Pakistan and India that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Niazi claims that East Pakistan was lost not due to military defeat but due to deliberate sabotage by the Pakistani government and military leadership. He accuses President Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of hatching a plan to deny power to the winning party in East Pakistan and intentionally weakening East Pakistan's defenses, leaving it vulnerable to the Indian attack. Niazi provides numerous examples of actions taken and requests denied that he argues prove the fall of East Pakistan

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159 views6 pages

Extract From Gen. Niazi's Book

The document contains extensive extracts from Lt. General A.A.K. Niazi's book "The Betrayal of East Pakistan" which provides his perspective on the 1971 war between Pakistan and India that led to the creation of Bangladesh. Niazi claims that East Pakistan was lost not due to military defeat but due to deliberate sabotage by the Pakistani government and military leadership. He accuses President Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of hatching a plan to deny power to the winning party in East Pakistan and intentionally weakening East Pakistan's defenses, leaving it vulnerable to the Indian attack. Niazi provides numerous examples of actions taken and requests denied that he argues prove the fall of East Pakistan

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Hassun Cheema
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© © All Rights Reserved
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EXTRACT FROM GEN.

NIAZI’S BOOK
Book extract: Lt-General A.A.K. Niazi's 'The Betrayal of East
Pakistan'

The 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh were events that
would irrevocably change the destiny of not just three nations
but nearly a fifth of humanity. There have been many versions
and interpretations of the Bangladesh War but now comes
perhaps the most controversial, Lt-General A.A.K. Niazi's The
Betrayal of East Pakistan.

https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/society-the-
arts/books/story/19980302-book-extract-from-lt-general-a-a-k-
niazi-the-betrayal-of-east-pakistan-825853-1998-03-02

he 1971 war and the creation of Bangladesh were events that would
irrevocably change the destiny of not just three nations but nearly a
fifth of humanity. There have been many versions and interpretations
of the Bangladesh War but now comes perhaps the most
controversial, Lt-General A.A.K. Niazi's The Betrayal of East Pakistan
(Rs 450, Pages 320, Oxford University Press, PO Box 13033, Karachi,
Pakistan).

Niazi, who commanded the Pakistani Army's Eastern Command


signed the surrender document "with trembling hands" and spent 28
months in India as a prisoner of war, still seethes with anger and
resentment at the way the war was handled by the Pakistani top
brass.

According to him, East Pakistan was lost not in warfare but due to
petty intrigues and deliberate sabotage by the Pakistan army
headquarters in league with the country's President. Niazi calls it the
"interplay of power between General Yahya, Mr Bhutto, Mujibur
Rehman and their henchmen".
Fiercely protective of the army he commanded, he claims to have
exploited the Indian Army which had "poor leadership, weak
planning and over-cautious approach and was always doing the
obvious ... (Jagjit Singh) Aurora did not have the gambler's touch nor
did he urge his formations to push forward at speed".

If much of Niazi's account reads like the glorious memoirs of a


victorious general instead of the bitter tales of a humiliated
commander, it is because he cleverly covers his flanks. Exclusive
excerpts from Chapter 13, Engineered Debacle, containing a day-by-
day account of the war:

I have no intention of trying to disentangle the web of intrigues and


conspiracies concerning the separation of East Pakistan that have
been such a feature of the chequered history of Pakistan.

I will say, however, that it was a consistent policy of all the rulers to
deprive East Pakistanis of their legitimate right of participation in
the governance and decision-making process of the country. The
results of the 1970 elections could have kept Pakistan together if
the democratic process of rule by the majority party had been
adhered to.

President Yahya Khan and Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto


viewed Mujib's victory in those elections with distaste, because it
meant that Yahya had to vacate the Presidency and Bhutto had to
sit on the opposition benches, which was contrary to his
aspirations. So these two got together and hatched a plan at
Larkana, Bhutto's home town, which came to be known as the
Larkana Conspiracy.

The plan was to postpone the National Assembly session indefinitely


and to block the transfer of power to the Awami League by
diplomacy, threats, intrigues, and the use of military force.
Connected to this conspiracy was the 'M.M. Ahmad plan', which
aimed at leaving East Pakistan without a successor government.
As a matter of fact, after the announcement of the date of the
assembly session to be held at Dhaka, General Omar began putting
pressure on the politicians to boycott it. The reason he gave was
that East Pakistan had become a hub of international intrigue,
therefore it should be discarded. In the end this clique achieved its
aim when Bhutto tore up the Polish Resolution...

In my opinion the following happenings prove that the fall of East


Pakistan was deliberately engineered:

May 1971: Not allowing me to enter India in pursuit of the beaten,


retreating guerillas although politically, militarily and economically
we had every justification to enter India - the Indians had entered
our area and were still firing into our territory. My going into India
would have nipped things in the bud and Pakistan would have
remained united.

September 1971: Follow-up of Larkana/M.M. Ahmad plans. Briefing


by my COS (chief of staff) about new enemy deployment. Advised to
cover all approaches and seal the borders. No written orders issued
revising the original tasks. My recommendation for grant of general
amnesty and the starting of a political process not implemented.

October 1971: Visit of COS Army. My strategic planning is


approved. He re-emphasises the importance of not losing any
territory where a Bangladesh government could be established. I am
told to continue my operations in the interior and on the borders.

Mr Sajjad Haider, our ambassador in India, persists in his warning


about India's impending attack. He is transferred. GHQ orders me
to commit my reserves against anti-rebel operations at all levels.
This leaves me in the lurch.

Promised additional troops are not sent. Governor Malik's proposal


to induct the remaining Awami League Members of the National
Assembly (MNAs) into the government is not approved; no elections
are held to fill the seats of absconding MNAs.
November 15: Major-General Jamshed and my COS brief army top
brass and COS Navy; their request that the divisions in East
Pakistan be upgraded from light formations for law and order to
proper divisions with full organic complement of artillery, armour
and others is not heeded.

No deficiencies are made up as per COS Army's decision, thus


leaving East Pakistan troops too weak to face the Indian onslaught.

"As I signed the document with trembling hands, sorrow rose from
my heart to my eyes."

November 19: Information received that the Indian Army is


planning a full-fledged attack on Eid day. Eight battalions and 111
Infantry Brigade from Rawalpindi and the Engineer Regiment are
promised for the defence of Dhaka.

111 Brigade's allocation is cancelled - it is to be used in the coup


d'etat against Yahya. Only two battalions reach Dhaka in the next
four days. Allocation of the remaining battalions cancelled. The
troops earmarked for the defence of Dhaka never arrived.

November 21: The Indians attack East Pakistan. Only the vice-chief
of general staff is available to receive the news. Chief of General
Staff Lt-General Gul Hassan is enjoying Eid at Lahore, knowing full
well that war is imminent on Eid Day.

November 22: The President and COS Army leave for hunting in
Sialkot area and decline to attend the briefing at GHQ. Notorious
remark of the President: "What can I do for East Pakistan? I can
only pray." Pakistan is under attack but the President does not
move the Security Council to stop the Indian aggression.

November 22 to December 2: Neither diplomatic and political action


nor other moves to strengthen the defence of East Pakistan by
making up the deficiencies. Bhutto makes a statement at Lahore
airport: "Pakistan should not take the case of Indian aggression to
the Security Council."

December 3: Aerial attacks instead of ground attacks - which give


away the element of surprise and alert the Indians - initiated by
Pakistan against India without prior intimation to Eastern
Command.

December 4: Polish Resolution in the Security Council asking for a


ceasefire and a political solution rejected by Pakistan.

December 5: GHQ asks us to tie down enemy forces in East


Pakistan so that they cannot be transferred to West Pakistan. I,
therefore, have to leave sufficient troops at places like Dinajpur,
Rangpur, Khulna, etc, to contain the enemy till the ceasefire, which
affects my plans for the offensive in Rajshahi sector. I am informed
by GHQ that Chinese help will soon be forthcoming. This is a farce,
just a picture painted to mislead us, when in truth nothing is
happening.

December 8: A farcical signal to me from GHQ saying Chinese


activities have begun. It is difficult to imagine a more sinister and
cold-blooded approach to the business of war.

December 12: Lt-General Gul Hassan paints another bogus picture,


telling me in Pushto: "Yellows from the north and whites from the
south." I am told to hold out for 36 hours because the Chinese are
coming from the north and Americans from the south, a blatant lie.

December 13: I signal GHQ Dhaka fortress defences well organised


and determined to fight it out, and issue my press statement about
"tanks over my dead body".

December 13/14 night: An unclassified open signal from the


President to surrender. I tell them, "My decision to fight it out still
stands." I am reluctant to surrender; at the same time the Governor
wants to avoid signing the surrender document.
15 December: Poland, supported by Russia, introduces a resolution
in the UN proposing transfer of power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
and initial ceasefire for 72 hours.

I send a signal to the President to release Sheikh Mujibur Rahman


and save Pakistan and the honour of the armed forces. He writes
NFA (no further action) on the signal ... Instead of acceptance of the
Polish Resolution, ignominious surrender is imposed on the Eastern
Command.

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