[G.R.

 No. 112260. June 30, 1997.]

JOVITA YAP ANCOG and GREGORIO YAP, JR., petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARIO DIEZ and CARIDAD
YAP, respondents.

Artemio P. Cabatos for petitioners.

Vicente Dela Serna, Jr. for respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE COURT

OF APPEALS GENERALLY CONCLUSIVE UPON PARTIES. — It is settled that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon the parties and
are not reviewable by this Court when they are an affirmation of the findings of
the trial court. 
CDScaT

2. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT, NOT

SIMULATED IN CASE AT BAR. — In this case, the trial court and the Court of
Appeals found no evidence to show that the extrajudicial settlement was required
to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a loan from the Bank of
Calape. Petitioners merely claimed that the extrajudicial settlement was
demanded by the bank. To the contrary, that the heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and
Caridad Yap) meant the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective is shown by
the fact that Rosario Diez performed acts of dominion over the entire land,
beginning with its registration, without any objection from them. Instead,
petitioner Jovita Ancog agreed to lease the land from her mother, private
respondent Rosario Diez, and accepted from her a special power of attorney to
use the land in question as collateral for a loan she was applying from the DBP.
Indeed, it was private respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order
to secure the release of the property from mortgage. Petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog
contends that she could not have waived her share in the land because she is
landless. For that matter, private respondent Caridad Yap is also landless, but
she signed the agreement. She testified that she did so out of filial devotion to
her mother. Thus, what the record of this case reveals is the intention of Jovita
Ancog and Caridad Yap to cede their interest in the land to their mother Rosario
Diez. It is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire
a loan. Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code, every act which is intended to put an
end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it
should purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT BINDING ON MINOR WHO HAS NOT
PARTICIPATED THEREIN; CASE AT BAR. — We hold, however, that the Court
of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred
by laches. In accordance with Rule 74, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, as he did not
take part in the partition, he is not bound by the settlement. It is uncontroverted
that, at the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was
a minor. For this reason, he was not included or even informed of the
partition. AECacS

4. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; IMPLIED

TRUST; ESTABLISHED BY INTENTION OF PARTIES TO THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT; CASE AT BAR. — The registration of the land
in Rosario Diez's name created an implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art.
1451 of the Civil Code, . . . In the case of O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, Art. 1451 was
held as creating a resulting trust, which is founded on the presumed intention of
the parties. As a general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably presumed
to be the intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances
existing at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established.
In this case, the records disclose that the intention of the parties to the
extrajudicial settlement was to establish a trust in favor of petitioner Yap, Jr. to
the extent of his share. Rosario Diez testified that she did not claim the entire
property, while Atty. de la Serna added that the partition only involved the shares
of the three participants.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN PRESCRIPTION RUNS IN FAVOR OF
TRUSTEE; CASE AT BAR. — A cestui que trust may make a claim under a
resulting trust within 10 years from the time the trust is repudiated. Although the
registration of the land in private respondent Diez's name operated as a
constructive notice of her claim of ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of
repudiation adverse to petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in the
property was precisely not included by the parties in the partition. Indeed, it has
not been shown whether he had been informed of her exclusive claim over the
entire property before 1985 when he was notified by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog
of their mother's plan to sell the property. This Court has ruled that for
prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the trust must be repudiated by
unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que trust and proved by clear and
conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the rule that the prescriptive period should be
counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens certificate of title applies only to
the remedy of reconveyance under the Property Registration Decree. Since the
action brought by petitioner Yap to claim his share was brought shortly after he
was informed by Jovita Ancog of their mother's effort to sell the property,
Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim cannot be considered barred either by prescription or by
laches. ECSHID
 DECISION

MENDOZA, J  : p

This is a petition for review of the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. No. CV-19650, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court 2 of Bohol
of an action for partition of a parcel of land which petitioners had filed.
The land, with improvements thereon, was formerly the conjugal property
of the spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez. In 1946, Gregorio Yap died,
leaving his wife, private respondent Rosario Diez, and children, petitioners Jovita
Yap Ancog and Gregorio Yap, Jr., and private respondent Caridad Yap as his
heirs.
In 1954 and again 1958, Rosario Diez obtained loans from the Bank of
Calape, secured by a mortgage on the disputed land, which was annotated on its
Original Certificate of Title No. 622. When Rosario Diez applied again for a loan
to the bank, offering the land in question as security, the bank's lawyer, Atty.
Narciso de la Serna, suggested that she submit an extrajudicial settlement
covering the disputed land as a means of facilitating the approval of her
application. The suggestion was accepted and on April 4, 1961, Atty. de la Serna
prepared an extrajudicial settlement, which the heirs, with the exception of
petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr., then only 15 years old, signed. The document was
notarized by Atty. de la Serna on April 12, 1961. As a result, OCT No. 622 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3447 (T-2411) was issued on April
13, 1961. On April 14, 1961, upon the execution of a real estate mortgage on the
land, the loan was approved by the bank.
Rosario Diez exercised rights of ownership over the land. In 1985, she
brought an ejectment suit against petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's husband and son
to evict them from the ground floor of the house built on the land for failure to pay
rent. Shortly thereafter, petitioner Jovita Ancog learned that private respondent
Rosario Diez had offered the land for sale.
Petitioner Ancog immediately informed her younger brother, petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr., who was living in Davao, of their mother's plan to sell the land.
On June 6, 1985, they filed this action for partition in the Regional Trial Court of
Bohol where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 3094. As private respondent
Caridad Yap was unwilling to join in the action against their mother, Caridad was
impleaded as a defendant.
Petitioners alleged that the extrajudicial instrument was simulated and
therefore void. They claimed that in signing the instrument they did not really
intend to convey their interests in the property to their mother, but only to enable
her to obtain a loan on the security of the land to cover expenses for Caridad's
school fees and for household repairs.
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated:
1. That the parcel of land in question originally belonged to the
conjugal partnership of spouses Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
2. That Gregorio Yap, Jr. is the legitimate child of spouses
Gregorio Yap and Rosario Diez Yap;
3. That Gregorio Yap is not a party in the execution of the Extra
Judicial Settlement of the Estate dated April 4, 1961;
4. That all the encumbrances found in TCT No. (3447) T-2411
which is now marked as Exh. C for the plaintiffs and Exh. 2 for the
defendants as Entry No. 6719, 6720, 11561 and 11562 are admitted by
the plaintiffs subject to the condition that the Extra Judicial Settlement of
Estate dated April 4, 1961, was made by the parties that the same was
only for the purpose of securing a loan with the Philippine National
Bank. 3
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' action. It
dismissed petitioners' claim that the extrajudicial settlement was simulated and
held it was voluntarily signed by the parties. Observing that even without the
need of having title in her name Rosario Diez was able to obtain a loan using the
land in question as collateral, the court held that the extrajudicial settlement could
not have been simulated for the purpose of enabling her to obtain another loan.
Petitioners failed to overcome the presumptive validity of the extrajudicial
settlement as a public instrument.
The court instead found that petitioner Ancog had waived her right to the
land, as shown by the fact that on February 28, 1975, 4 petitioner's husband,
Ildefonso Ancog, leased the property from private respondent Diez. Furthermore,
when the spouses Ancog applied for a loan to the Development Bank of the
Philippines using the land in question as collateral, they accepted an
appointment from Rosario Diez as the latter's attorney-in-fact. 5
The court also found that the action for partition had already prescribed.
The registration of the land under private respondent Rosario Diez's name
amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership. Therefore, petitioners had ten
(10) years from April 13, 1961 within which to bring an action to recover their
share in the property. While it is true that petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor
at the time the extrajudicial settlement was executed, his claim, according to the
court, was barred by laches.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the extrajudicial
settlement and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the case. The appellate
court emphasized that the extrajudicial settlement could not have been simulated
in order to obtain a loan, as the new loan was merely "in addition to" a previous
one which private respondent Diez had been able to obtain even without an
extrajudicial settlement. Neither did petitioners adduce evidence to prove that an
extrajudicial settlement was indeed required in order to obtain the additional loan.
The appellate court held that considering petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog's
educational attainment (Master of Arts and Bachelor of Laws), it was improbable
that she would sign the settlement if she did not mean it to be such. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
I. IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT RULING THAT THE
CONTESTED EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT (EXHIBIT "B") IS
NOT A SIMULATED ONE;
II. IN BLOATING THE EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF
PETITIONER JOVITA YAP ANCOG AND USING THE SAME AS
ARGUMENT AGAINST HER CLAIM THAT SAID EXHIBIT "B"
WAS INDEED A SIMULATED DOCUMENT;
III. IN SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT
PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR PARTITION HAS PRESCRIBED;
IV. IN RULING THAT PETITIONER GREGORIO YAP, JR., ONE OF
THE CO-OWNERS OF THE LITIGATED PROPERTY, HAD
LOST HIS RIGHTS TO THE PROPERTY THROUGH
PRESCRIPTION OR LACHES.
We hold that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly acted in
upholding the extrajudicial settlement but erred in ruling that petitioner Gregorio
Yap, Jr. was barred by laches from recovering his share in the property in
question.
To begin with, it is settled that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive upon the parties and are not reviewable by this Court when they
are an affirmation of the findings of the trial court. 6 In this case, the trial court
and the Court of Appeals found no evidence to show that the extrajudicial
settlement was required to enable private respondent Rosario Diez to obtain a
loan from the Bank of Calape. Petitioners merely claimed that the extrajudicial
settlement was demanded by the bank.
To the contrary, that the heirs (Jovita Yap Ancog and Caridad Yap) meant
the extrajudicial settlement to be fully effective is shown by the fact that Rosario
Diez performed acts of dominion over the entire land, beginning with its
registration, without any objection from them. Instead, petitioner Jovita Ancog
agreed to lease the land from her mother, private respondent Rosario Diez, and
accepted from her a special power of attorney to use the land in question as
collateral for a loan she was applying from the DBP. Indeed, it was private
respondent Diez who paid the loan of the Ancogs in order to secure the release
of the property from mortgage.  cdasia

Petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog contends that she could not have waived her
share in the land because she is landless. For that matter, private respondent
Caridad Yap is also landless, but she signed the agreement. 7 She testified that
she did so out of filial devotion to her mother.
Thus, what the record of this case reveals is the intention of Jovita Ancog
and Caridad Yap to cede their interest in the land to their mother Rosario Diez. It
is immaterial that they had been initially motivated by a desire to acquire a loan.
Under Art. 1082 of the Civil Code, 8 every act which is intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition even though it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, or any other transaction.
We hold, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the claim
of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr. was barred by laches. In accordance with Rule 74,
§1 9 of the Rules of Court, as he did not take part in the partition, he is not bound
by the settlement. 10 It is uncontroverted that, at the time the extrajudicial
settlement was executed, Gregorio Yap, Jr. was a minor. For this reason, he was
not included or even informed of the partition.
Instead, the registration of the land in Rosario Diez's name created an
implied trust in his favor by analogy to Art. 1451 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
When land passes by succession to any person and he causes
the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by
implication of law for the benefit of the true owner
In the case of O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit, 11 Art. 1451 was held as creating a
resulting trust, which is founded on the presumed intention of the parties. As a
general rule, it arises where such may be reasonably presumed to be the
intention of the parties, as determined from the facts and circumstances existing
at the time of the transaction out of which it is sought to be established. 12 In this
case, the records disclose that the intention of the parties to the extrajudicial
settlement was to establish a trust in favor of petitioner Yap, Jr. to the extent of
his share. Rosario Diez testified that she did not claim the entire
property, 13 while Atty. de la Serna added that the partition only involved the
shares of the three participants. 14
A cestui que trust may make a claim under a resulting trust within 10 years
from the time the trust is repudiated. 15 Although the registration of the land in
private respondent Diez's name operated as a constructive notice of her claim of
ownership, it cannot be taken as an act of repudiation adverse to petitioner
Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim, whose share in the property was precisely not included
by the parties in the partition. Indeed, it has not been shown whether he had
been informed of her exclusive claim over the entire property before 1985 when
he was notified by petitioner Jovita Yap Ancog of their mother's plan to sell the
property. 16
This Court has ruled that for prescription to run in favor of the trustee, the
trust must be repudiated by unequivocal acts made known to the cestui que
trust and proved by clear and conclusive evidence. Furthermore, the rule that the
prescriptive period should be counted from the date of issuance of the Torrens
certificate of title applies only to the remedy of reconveyance under the Property
Registration Decree. 17 Since the action brought by petitioner Yap to claim his
share was brought shortly after he was informed by Jovita Ancog of their
mother's effort to sell the property, Gregorio Yap, Jr.'s claim cannot be
considered barred either by prescription or by laches.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the
determination of the claim of petitioner Gregorio Yap, Jr.
SO ORDERED.
 (Ancog v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112260, [June 30, 1997], 340 PHIL 766-
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775)