1 .L’Estrange v E.

Graucob Ltd [1934] 2 KB 394

Affirmed that the clauses of a written contract are binding on the signatories, even
where a party is unaware of the contract’s full contents.

Facts

The claimant, L’Estrange, contracted to purchase a slot machine for cigarettes from the
defendant, Graucob, and the agreement included an express clause stating ‘This agreement
contains all the terms and conditions under which I agree to purchase the machine specified
above and any express or implied condition, statement, or warranty, statutory or otherwise not
stated herein is hereby excluded’. The machine proved to be faulty and the claimant thus
brought an action against the defendant, alleging that the machine breached the Sale of Goods
Act by not being of merchantable quality. The defendant asserted that the statute was made
irrelevant by the express clause, and that he was not in breach of the agreement they had
made. The claimant responded she had been unaware of the clause as she had not properly
read the agreement and it ought not apply.

Issue - Whether the clause excluding all terms not stated in the contract should be deemed
effective and binding.

Held - The Court of Appeal found for the defendant, determining that the express provisions of
the contract were binding and effectively excluded the relevance of statutory sales provisions.
Furthermore, the fact that the claimant had not properly read the contract did not impact its
validity, as in signing the contract she consented to be bound by its contents. Significantly this
case emphasizes the Court’s respect for sanctity of contract.

2 Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co [1893] 1 QB 256

Emphasised the significance of offer and acceptance in contract law; distinguishes between
offers and invitations to treat.

Facts

The defendant, the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, placed an advertisement in a newspaper for
their products, stating that any person who purchased and used their product but still
contracted influenza despite properly following the instructions would be entitled to a £100
reward. The advert further stated that the company had demonstrated its sincerity by placing
£1000 in a bank account to act as the reward. The claimant, Mrs Carlill, thus purchased some
smoke balls and, despite proper use, contracted influenza and attempted to claim the £100
reward from the defendants. The defendants contended that they could not be bound by the
advert as it was an invitation to treat rather than an offer on the grounds that the advert was:
mere ‘puff’ and lacking true intent; that an offer could not be made ‘to the world’; the claimant
had not technically provided acceptance; the wording of the advert was insufficiently precise;
and, that there was no consideration, as necessary for the creation of a binding contract in law.

Issue - Whether the advert in question constituted an offer or an invitation to treat.

Held - The Court of Appeal found for the claimant, determining that the advert amounted to
the offer for a unilateral contract by the defendants. In completing the conditions stipulated by
the advert, Mrs Carlill provided acceptance. The Court further found that: the advert’s own
claim to sincerity negated the company’s assertion of lacking intent; an offer could indeed be
made to the world; wording need only be reasonably clear to imply terms rather than entirely
clear; and consideration was identifiable in the use of the balls.

3. Richardson Spence & Co v. Rowntree 1894

In the case of Richardson Spence & Co v. Rowntree the House of Lords applied the
approach outlined earlier in Parker. The plaintiff was a passenger on a steamer travelling
from Liverpool to Philadelphia. The plaintiff was given a folded ticket, no writing
being visible in this form. The ticket, when opened had a great many conditions, one of
which limited liability for personal injury or loss of baggage to $100. The plaintiff never
read the ticket. The plaintiff was injured whilst on the vessel. At first instance Bruce J left
three questions to the jury:

1. Did the plaintiff know that there was writing on the ticket? This question was
answered in the affirmative.

2. Did the plaintiff know the writing contained conditions relative to the contract of
carriage? This was answered in the negative.

3. Did the defendants do what was reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of
these conditions? This question was answered the negative.

The High Court, Court of Appeal and House of Lords held that in the light of these
findings the limitation clause was not available to the defendant.

ACCEPTANCE
1. Williams v Carwardine (1833)

The defendant offered a reward for information leading to the conviction of a murderer. The
plaintiff knew of this offer and gave information that it was her husband after he had beaten
her, believing she had not long to live and to ease her conscience. It was held that the plaintiff
was entitled to the reward as she knew about it and her motive in giving the information was
irrelevant.

2. Hyde v Wrench (1840)

6 June W offered to sell his estate to H for £1000; H offered £950 27 June W rejected H’s offer .
29 June H offered £1000. W refused to sell and H sued for breach of contract.

Lord Langdale MR held that if the defendant’s offer to sell for £1,000 had been unconditionally
accepted, there would have been a binding contract; instead the plaintiff made an offer of his
own of £950, and thereby rejected the offer previously made by the defendant. It was not
afterwards competent for the plaintiff to revive the proposal of the defendant, by tendering an
acceptance of it; and that, therefore, there existed no obligation of any sort between the
parties.

3. Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt Allahabad High Court (1913)

The facts of the case are these: In January last the nephew of the defendant absconded from home and no
trace of him was found. The defendant sent his servants to different places in search of the boy and among
them was the plaintiff who was the munim of his firm. He was sent to Hardwar and money was given to him
for his railway fare and other expenses. After this the defendant issued handbills offering a reward of Rs. 150
to any one who might find out the boy. The plaintiff traced the boy to Rishikesh and found him there. He
wired to the defendant who went to Hardwar and brought the boy back to Cawnpore. He gave to the plaintiff
a reward of two sovereigns and afterwards on his return to Cawnpore gave Rs. 20 more. The plaintiff did not
ask for any further payment and continued in the defendant’s service for about six months when he was
dismissed. He then brought this suit, out of which this application arises, claiming Rs. 499 out of the amount
of the reward offered by the defendant under the handbills issued by him. The record shows that the
handbills were issued subsequently to the plaintiff’s departure for Hardwar. It appears, however, that some
of the handbills were sent to him there.

The court below having dismissed the claim, this application for revision has been made by the plaintiff and it
is claimed on his behalf that as he traced out the boy he is entitled to the reward offered by the defendant.

The defendant contends that the plaintiff claim can only be maintained on the basis of a contract, that there
must have been an acceptance of the offer and an assent to it, that there was no contract between the
parties in this case and that in any case the plaintiff was already under an obligation to do what he did and
was, therefore, not entitled to recover. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff, that a
privity of contract was unnecessary and neither motive nor knowledge was essential. In any opinion a suit like
the present one can only be founded on a contract. In order to constitute a contract there must be an
acceptance of the offer and there can be no acceptance unless there is knowledge of the offer. Motive is not
essential but knowledge and intention are. In the case of a public advertisement offering a reward, the
performance of the act raises an inference of acceptance. This is manifest from S. 8 of the Contract Act,
which provides that “Performance of the conditions of a proposal is an acceptance of the proposal.”

In the present case the claim cannot be regarded as one on the basis of a contract. The plaintiff was in the
service of the defendant. As such servant he was sent to search for the missing boy. It is true that it was not
within the ordinary scope of his duties as a minim to search for a missing relative of his master but he agreed
to go to Hardwar in search of the boy and he undertook that particular duty. Being under that obligation,
which he had incurred before the reward in question was offered, he cannot, in my opinion, claim the
reward. There was already a subsisting obligation and therefore, the performance of the act cannot be
regarded as a consideration for the defendant’s promise. For the above reasons hold that the decision of the
Court below is right and I dismiss the application with cost.

ESSENTIAL IN ACCEPTANCE

1. Eliason v Henshaw
Issue - Can an offeror dictate terms of acceptance?

Facts
On February 10, 1813 a letter written from Eliason to Henshaw proposing to buy flour at Georgetown and
asking “Please write by return of wagon whether you accept our offer” to Harper’s Ferry. The letter was
delivered to Henshaw on the 14th, but the wagoner informed them that he would not be returning to
Harper's Ferry. Henshaw wrote in acceptance on the 15th and the letter was sent by the regular mail carriage
to Georgetown on the 19th, the next available wagon. Eliason sent a reply on the 25th acknowledging the
receipt of the letter, but said that the response was too late as it was not returned by the wagon. Henshaw
sued for non-performance.

Issue - Was the offer accepted in the right time, place and manner by christow (A batch)
Decision - Appeal accepted
Reasons Washington held there had been no acceptance and hence no contract was formed. Three
things were amiss:

1. the contract was not accepted within the proper time - not sent back by the wagon;
2. the contract was not accepted in the right place - the acceptance should have been sent back to
Harper's ferry, not to Georgetown; and
3. the contract was not accepted by the correct manner - should have been sent by wagon, but was
sent by mail.

Finding it is perfectly reasonable for Eliason to have dictated the terms of acceptance, he finds no contract
was created and hence no breach.

Suraj Besan And Rice Mills v/s Food Corporation of India 1987

(1) PLAINTIFF has filed the present suit thereby claiming a decree of declaration to the effect that there is no
legal, valid and binding contract for the sale and purchase of 6200 M. Ts. of damaged paddy as per
acceptance telegram dated July 22, 1983 and that this does not bring about a valid, legal and binding
contract.
(2). Briefly, the facts are that plaintiff firm is registered with defendant vide Registration No. 25/82 dated
January 27, 1982. It is alleged that under this registration, the annual requirement of the plaintiff has been
assessed at 15,000 quintals (1500 M. Ts.). As such plaintiff can quote only for this registered quantity.
Regional Office of defendant at Chandigarh invited tenders for the purchase and removal of damaged
foodgrains declared fit for cattle/poultry feed etc. Plaintiff submitted their tenders through Sh. Niranjan Lal in
the prescribed form. the tender submitted by plaintiff, was not signed by all the partners of plaintiff firm.
Tenders were submitted and opened onjane 29, 1983. It is alleged that tender of plaintiff was neither valid
nor the same could be deemed as valid for acceptance beyond the annual assessed capacity of 1500 M. Ts of
stocks. Plaintiff vide letter dated July 8, 1983 informed defendant that the offer was for 1500 M. Ts of stocks
and not over and above specific quantity. This, according to plaintiff, amounted to amended offer which was
received by defendant Corporation on July 11, 1983. However, the tender of plaintiff was accepted and an
acceptance telegram was issu e.
Ramsgate Victoria Hotel v Montefiore (1866
Contract – Shares – Offer – Acceptance – Specific performance – Time Lapse – Reasonable Time

Facts The defendant, Mr Montefiore, wanted to purchase shares in the complainant’s hotel. He
put in his offer to the complainant and paid a deposit to his bank account to buy them in June.
This was for a certain price. He did not hear anything until six months later, when the offer was
accepted and he received a letter of acceptance from the complainant. By this time, the value
of shares had dropped and the defendant was no longer interested. Mr Montefiore had not
withdrawn his offer, but he did not go through with the sale.

Issues The complainant brought an action for specific performance of the contract against the
defendant. The issue was whether there was a contract between the parties after the
acceptance of the original offer six months after it was made.

Held The court held that the Ramsgate Victoria Hotel’s action for specific performance was
unsuccessful. The offer that the defendant had made back in June was no longer valid to form a
contract. A reasonable period of time had passed and the offer had lapsed. The court stated
that what would be classed as reasonable time for an offer to lapse would depend on the
subject matter. In this case, it was decided that six months was the reasonable time before
automatic expiration of the offer for shares. Yet, for other property, this would be decided by
the court in the individual cases.

4. CONSIDERATION
1. Durgaprasad v Baldeo (1880)

D promised to pay a commission on the articles sold through their agency in a bazar in
which they occupied shops, in consideration of B having extended money for the
construction of such bazaar. Such money had been expended by B at the desire of the
Collector of the District. It was held that such expenditure was not consideration since it
was not made at the desire of D.

Consideration may move from the promisee or any other person — Stranger to a
contract: A consideration may move from promisee or any other person. Consideration
from a third party is a valid consideration. Under English law, however, consideration
must move from the promises only.

2. Venkata Chinnaya Rau vs. Venkata Ramaya Garu (1881)

Facts :

A, an old lady, granted / gfted an estate to her daughter the defendant, with the direction /
condition that the daughter should pay an annuity ( annual payment ) of Rs 653 to A’s brother, the
plaintiff.

On the same day the defendant, daughter (promisor) , made a promise vis a vis an agreement with
her uncle that sshe would pay the annuity as directed by her mother, the old lady.

Later the defendant refused to pay on the ground that her uncle (promisee, plaintiff) has not given
any consideration. She contended that her uncle was stranger to this consideration and hence he
cannot claim the money as a matter of right.

Held:

The Madras HC held that in this agreement between the defendant and plaintiff the consideration
has been furnished on behalf of the plaintiff (uncle ) by his own sister (defendant’s mother).
Although the plaintiff was stranger to the consideration but since he was a party to the contract he
could enforce the promise of the promisor, since under Indian law, consideration may be given by
the promisee or anyone on his behalf – vide Section 2 (d) of ICA.

Thus, consideration furnished by the old lady constitutes sufficient consideration for the plaintiff to
sue the defendant on her promise. Held, the brother / uncle was entitled to a decree for payment
of the annual sum of money.

3. Abdul Aziz v. Masum Ali [1914]

Facts

1. The appellants are the members of the lslam Local Agency Committee, Agra.
2. It appears that in the year 1907, a movement was set on foot to collect money
for repairing and reconstructing a mosque known as Masjid Hamman Alawardi
Khan.

3. The local agency committee themselves sanctioned a subscription of Rs. 3,000;

besides this amount, Rs. 100 were paid in cash at that time by Hakim Shafi Ullah,
500 were promised by Munshi Abdul Karim and another sum of Rs. 500 was
promised by Munshi Jan Mohammad.

4. Munshi Abdul Karim was appointed treasurer.

5. The local agency committee handed over their contribution of Rs, 3,000 to
Munshi Abdul Karim and he also received the donation of Rs. 100 from Hakim
Shafi Ullah.

6. Munshi Jan Mohammad gave a cheque for Rs500 dated 12th September 1907.

7. On 29th September 1907, the cheque was presented for payment, but it was
returned by the Bank with a note that the endorsement was not regular.

8. It was again presented on 12th January 1909 when the bank returned the
cheque with a note that it was out of date.

9. Munshi Abdul Karim died on 20th April 1909; the present suit was instituted
against his heirs on 14th April 1910.

10. Munshi Jan Mohammad died in May 1910.

11. This suit was brought against the heirs of Hafiz Abdul Karim for the recovery of
Rs. 1000, that is, Rs 500 promised by him, and Rs 500, the amount for which Jan
Mohammad had paid a cheque which was not cashed.

12. The court below made the heirs liable for Rs. 1000.
13. This is Second Appeal from a decree of H.M. Amith, District judge of Agra,
dated the 7th September, 1912, modifying a decree of SubordinateJudge, dated
the 26th September, 1910.

Issues

1. Whether a promise is enforceable without any consideration?

2. Whether the heirs of Munshi Abdul Karim are liable for negligence?

Judgment

It appears to the court that the suit cannot be maintained in respect of either of
the issues:

1. With regard to the subscription of Munshi Abdul Karim, it was a mere

gratuitous promise on his part.

2. Under the circumstances of the present case it is admitted that if the promise
had been made by an outsider it could not have been enforced.

3. We cannot see that it makes any difference that Munshi Abdul Karim was
himself the treasurer.

4. There is no evidence that he ever set aside a sum of Rs. 500 to meet his
promised subscription.

5. As to the other item that is the amount of Munshi Jan Mohammad’s cheque,
there is a great difficulty in holding that a suit could have been brought against
Munshi Abdul Karim in respect of this cheque during his lifetime.

6. His undertaking of the office of treasurer was purely gratuitous.

7. In the opinion of the court Munshi Abdul Karim cannot be said to have been an
agent of the committee; even if he was, it is very doubtful that he could have
been held guilty of gross negligence.

8. He had presented the cheque for payment; the mistake in the endorsement
was a very natural one and the delay in representing the cheque or getting a
duplicate from the drawer may well be explained by the delay which took place in
carrying out the proposed work.

9. Under the circumstances of the present case, Munshi Abdul Karim could not
have been sued in his lifetime

10. It is quite clear that if no suit lay against Munshi Abdul Karim be brought after
his death against his heirs.

11. Appeal is allowed to the extent that that the court varies with the decree of
the Court below, dismissing the claim in respect of the two items of Rs. 500 each.

12. The appellants will get their costs of this appeal including in this court fees on
the higher scale.

13. In the Court below, the parties will pay and receive the costs in proportion to
failure and success.

14. Appeal-allowed and Decree varied. 

Conclusion

1. Mere promise to contribute for a charitable purpose is not enforceable, as it is

without consideration.

2. If, however, on the faith of the promise, some liability is incurred by the
promise, then the promise is enforceable.
3. Thus, if A promises to donate Rs. 500 for the repair etc. of a mosque, but
nothing is done to carry out the necessary repairs; A cannot be made liable to
pay. (Abdul Aziz v. Masum Ali[v])

4. But, if A promises to pay Rs.100 towards the expenses for the construction of
Town Hall in Calcutta, and on the faith of such promise, the construction work is
started. A would be liable to pay the sum promised by him. (Kedar Nath
Bhattacharji v. Gorie Mahomed 

4. Kedarnath Bhattacharji v. Gorie Mohammad [1887]

“Any act done at the will of the promisor’s wish is taken as the fulfilment of consideration of a
contract”- this was emphasised by the Calcutta high court under the contract law in the Kedarnath
Bhattacharji v. Gorie Mohammad case.

Facts of the case

In Kedarnath Bhattacharji v. Gorie Mohammad, the offended party was a Municipal Commissioner
of Howrah and one of the trustees of the Howrah City Council Fund. Sometime before, it was
thought to make a City Hall in Howrah, they gave the essential resources that could be raised and,
provided that things existed, people were intrigued to work to perceive what memberships they
could obtain.

After gaining enough membership to support the funds required to build the town hall, the
commissioners including the offended party made an agreement with the defendant to build the
town hall. The plans for the proposed structure were submitted and passed. But as the membership
list increased the plans also expanded. Hence the expected cost of construction is increased from
Rs. 26,000 to Rs. 40,000; the now increased amount of Rs. 40,000 stayed approved and obligated by
the commissioners including the offended party. 

The offended party though as a member and one of the commissioners obligated
under the agreement to the respondent can sue the respondent for the benefit of
himself and each one of those members. 
Judgment
In the case, it was held that although the promise was for a charitable purpose and that D had no
benefit, however, he is responsible for the promise made by him. So he was held liable. It was
noted that in this case people were asked to knowingly subscribe to the purpose for which the
money was to be applied or used. 

They also knew that in the faith of their subscription they had to incur the obligation to pay the
contractor for the work. The Law of the applicant, that is, the conclusion of a contract with the
contractor was made at the will of the promoter, which is a good consideration in the sense
of section 2(d).

5. White v Bluett (1853)

Contract law – Consideration Facts

Bluett Sr. lent his son, the respondent in this case, a sum of money and died before his son had
repaid this to him. Bluett Sr. and Jr. had agreed on this and completed a promissory note to this
effect.  Bluett’s will was executed by White. In the course of executing the will, White sued
Bluett’s son for the outstanding payment. The son argued, as a defence, that Bluett Sr. had
stated that repayment was not necessary to render the promissory note ineffective if the son
stopped complaining about the manner in which Bluett Sr. spread his estate among the other
members of the family.

Held

The court held that there was no consideration given by the son which would absolve him of
having to repay the debt to his father’s estate. The court also believed that the son had no right
to complain as the father was free to distribute his property as he wished. As a result, ceasing
from complaining was not consideration and was ultimately an intangible promise. Pollock, CB
was clear in his summing up of the decision: ‘…the argument…is pressed to an absurdity, as a
bubble is blown until it bursts’. 

6. Re McArdle [1951]
Past consideration is no consideration - Facts:

William McArdle left a house to his five children in equal shares, subject to a life interest for his
widow. The wife of one of these sons, Mrs Marjorie McArdle, carried out improvements to the
house amounting to £488. She also bore the cost of these repairs. After the repairs had been
carried out, she got all the five children of McArdle to sign a document in which they promised
to repay Mrs McArdle the £488 out of the estate when it was eventually distributed. After the
testator’s widow died, Mrs McArdle asked for payment. However, the other four sons refused
to pay her. She tried to enforce her interest in the property in court.

Held:

The Court of Appeal held that the transaction had not been completed and was imperfect.
Therefore, it was only a promise to pay and not a gift. Mrs McArdle had already performed the
work before she asked for payment. Her consideration was in the past. Past consideration is not
good consideration. Therefore, the agreement was unenforceable.  

7. Rajlukhy Dabee v. Bhootnath Mookerjee [1900]

The defendant promised to pay his wife a certain amount every month as maintenance. The
promise was made in writing and the quarrels the husband and wife had were also mentioned.
A case was filed to recover the amount promised to be paid as maintenance. However, the
judge decided in favour of the defendant as although the two were in a near relation, the court
held that there was no natural love and affection between them.

ESSENTIAL TO PRIVITY TO CONTRACT

(a) Agency
The rule here is that if one of the contracting parties contracts as an agent, then
either the agent or the principal, but not both, can sue to enforce the contract. In
our example, if B is C’s agent then either B or C can enforce the contract against
A. In these cases it is immaterial as to whether A knew that B was C’s agent.

(b) Trusts
Using the above example, if B had contracted with A in the capacity of trustee for
C, C as beneficiary under the trust has enforceable rights. These rights arise
because the law of trusts gives a beneficiary certain rights against a trustee.

In the context of privity, if C is a beneficiary under a trust, C can bring an action

against B, the trustee, that has the effect of compelling B to sue A for breach of
contract. In formal procedural terms C sues in an action in which B and A are
joined as defendants.

(c) Estoppels
Following the decision in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher[5], a third party
may be able to seek relief against a promisor on the basis of promissory estoppels
principles. To succeed the third party would need to establish the elements of
promissory estoppels.

In Trident, Mason CJ, Wilson J, at 123-124, were of the view that it was likely that
estoppels could be established on the facts of the case, but it was not necessary
for them to determine the issue on the basis that they had decided the case on
other grounds.

[D] Provision for maintenance or marriage under family

arrangement:- These type of provisions is treated as an exception to the
doctrine of privity of contract for protecting the rights of family members who not
likely to get a specific share and also to give maximum effect to the will of the
testator. For eg., If A gives his Property in equal portions to his 3 sons with a
condition that after his death all 3 of them will give Rs 10,000 each to C, the
daughter of A. Now C can prosecute if any one of them fails to obey this.

Privity

Rose Fernandez v/s Joseph Gonsalves [1924]

[1] This suit has been filed by the plaintiff, who has now attained majority, for
recovering damages for breach of contract of marriage made by the defendant with her
and her father. There is no dispute as to the facts in the case, and although the
defendant s counsel in his cross-examination tried to elicit facts with a view to show
that the contract of marriage was by mutual consent cancelled and abandoned, the
defendant has not ventured to go into the witness-box or lead any evidence to
substantiate the said allegation. I must, therefore, take it that the contract of marriage,
which is admitted by the defendant, was subsisting at the date the defendant
admittedly married another lady in the year 1921 and that he has committed a breach
of the contract. The defendant s counsel, however, has taken up a point which, if
decided in defendant s favour, goes to the very root of the case. The point is that the
pontract in suit was either made by the defendant with the plaintiff or by the defendant
with the plaintiffs father, that if it was made by the defendant with the plaintiff , the
contract is void as having been made with a minor, on the authority of Mohori Bibee v.
Dharmodas Ghose,(1903) I.L.R. 30 Cal. 539 and on the other hand, if the contract was
made by the defendant with the plaintiff s father, the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit,
she not being a party to the contract. If either of the points is decided in favour of the
defendant, the suit will necessarily fail.
[2] Now, as to how the contract was entered into, there is no doubt in my mind that the
contract was entered into by the defendant with the plaintiff s father as the guardian of
the plaintiff. No doubt the plaintiff was a consenting party; but she could not herself
have entered into the contract she being then only about thirteen years of age. The
facts proved as to the making of the contract are as follows:-The plaintiff s father and
the defendant were employed in the docks and thus the defendant came to know the
plaintiff. He asked the plaintiff s father to give the plaintiff in marriage to him and he
also asked the plaintiff to marry him. Both plaintiff and plaintiff s father agreed. This was
about a month or so before the writing of May 26, 1919, passed by the defendant. It
appears that on that day the defendant desired that the plaintiff should go out with him
as his fiancee. The plaintiff?s father objected. Thereupon the defendant passed the
writing, which has been put in as Exh. A, whereby he agreed to marry the plaintiff within
two years and to pay Rs. 2,000 by way of damages if he failed to do so. He gave the said
writing to the plaintiff s father as the natural guardian of the plaintiff", and the plaintiff s
father thereupon allowed the plaintiff to go out with the defendant as desired by him.
Upon these facts I hold that a contract of marriage was entered into between the
defendant on the one hand, and the plaintiff?s father on the other acting as guardian of
the plaintiff and on her behalf.

Abdul Gaffar Vs. Piare Lal (1935)

A minor entered into contract of sale and delivered goods to purchaser. It was held that
minor can sue for the recovery of price.

Raghavachariar vs. Srinivasa –

A minor is allowed to enforce a contract which is of some benefit to him and under which he is required
to bear no obligation.  In the said case full bench of Madras High Court unanimously decided, that a
mortgage executed in favour of a minor, who has advanced the whole of mortgage money, is
enforceable by him or any other person on his behalf. Again it is important to note that where the
contract is still executory or the consideration is still to be supplied, the principle of Mohoribibi’s case
would thwart (prevent) any action on the contract.

Section 115 in The Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Estoppel. —When one person has, by his declaration, act or omission, intentionally caused
or permitted another person to believe a thing to be true and to act upon such belief,
neither he nor his representative shall be allowed, in any suit or proceeding between
himself and such person or his representative, to deny the truth of that thing.
Illustration A intentionally and falsely leads B to believe that certain land belongs to A, and
thereby induces B to buy and pay for it. The land afterwards becomes the property of A,
and A seeks to set aside the sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had no title.
He must not be allowed to prove his want of title.

Nawab Sadiq Ali Khan v/s Jai Kishori [1928]

Judgment
[1] This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Oudh, dated May 27, 1925,
reversing a decree dated April 30, 1924, of the Subordinate Judge of Lucknow.

[2] The first respondent, who alone appeared in the appeal, is the mortgagee under a mortgage, dated April
18, 1908, and the appellants are the representatives by succession or purchase of two persons named Baqar
Ali Khan and AH Ahmad Khan.

[3] The mortgage was executed by the two persons last mentioned in security of a sum of Rs. 7,000 loaned by
the mortgagee for a term of five years in the first instance and bearing interest at the rate of fourteen annas
per cent, per mensem. It is in the ordinary form, and provision is made for interest being accumulated at
compound rates in the event of non-payment, and for the period of payment of the principal sum and
interest being extended beyond the stipulated period in the option of the mortgagee.

[4] The mortgagors were two of the family of a certain Quasim Ali Khan, originally the zemindar of the village
of Jamwasi and the owner of certain other heritable properties, Quasim Ali Khan had as far back as the year
1892 executed a deed of gift in favour of his wife, Mussamat Rais-un-nisa, of the entire village of Jamwasi,
and on August 10, 1899, he executed another M2JJ deed of gift in her favour of his house property in
Lucknow.

[5] On June 21, 1902, she in her turn gifted the village Jamwasi Khan and the house property to her three
sons and one daughter, excluding, however,