TC 53 - P
TC 53 - P
DANIEL &Ors……………………………………………………………….PETITIONER
v.
1. STATE OF UPPAM PRADESH
2. UNION OF AMPHISSA……………………………………………….RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRAYER............................................................................................................................. 16
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
BOOK
Justice Khastgir, Criminal Major Acta. Ed 2020, Kamal Law House, Kolkata…………11,12
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Republic of Amphissa is located in the South Asian Region of Asia.It achieved
independence in 1947. Now, the Republic of Amphissa is a democratic country with a
written Constitution which came into force in 1950. It has 28 States and 8 Union
Territories. The Constitution has adopted Parliamentary system wherein President is
the executive Head of the government.
2. Republic of Amphissa is the most ethnically and religiously diverse country in the
world and its history is dotted with numerous religious conflicts and riots.
3. In March 2019 certain newspapers published a report about Love Jihad which is an
activity of certain Organizations under which young Muslim men and boys in the
state target young girls belonging to non- Muslim communities for conversion to
Islam by feigning love. The news report stated that there has been 3,000- 4,000
conversions in the past four years having the nature of Love Jihad in the Republic of
Amphissa.
4. The Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion Ordinance, 2020,
is a law enacted by the Government of Uppam Pradesh, Amphissa. The ordinance
makes conversion non-bailable with up to 10 years of jail time if undertaken through
misinformation, unlawfully, forcefully, allurement or other allegedly fraudulent
means and requires that religious conversions for marriage in Uppam Pradesh to be
approved by a district magistrate. The law also encompasses strict action for mass
conversion, including cancellation of registration of social organization involve in
mass religious conversion.
5. On 10th January, Prabha, a jain by religion and Daniel who belonged to a family
practicing Islamic faith married each other under Special Marriage Act, 1956.Prabha
decided to convert to Islam, out of her love and respect for Daniel’s family and faith
and hoping that his family would be more willing to accept their marriage if she
undertakes such a gesture. And Prabha’s conversion was kept a secret from her
parents.
6. After marriage the couple lived in a separate apartment for two months and on 11 th
March went to visit Daniel’s home in Lunnow. On 15th March a two weeks lockdown
was announced in the state due to rise in cases of Covid.In the midst of this, Prabha’s
younger brother fell down from stairs and was put to bed-rest. Prabha strongly wished
to visit him several times but Daniel’s family did not allow her to go during due to
limited transportation options and on an apprehension, that Prabha may contract
Covid-19 while travelling.
7. Being frustrated, after 2 months, Prabha called up her parents and asked them to pick
her up. Upon knowing about the details of their marriage and the conversion, they
suspected that Daniel and his family had forced Prabha to convert into a different
religion and were now forcefully restraining her against her will.
8. An FIR was filed in Rainbow Police Station against Daniel’s family under Section
498A APC, section 340 of APC as well as under the Uppam Pradesh Anti-Conversion
Ordinance and soon, his family members were arrested on 20 th May, 2021.
9. The Magistrate denied bail to Daniel’s family and issued a non-bailablewarrant
against Daniel under section 498A. Daniel and his familypreferred a Special Leave
Petition before the Supreme Court and alsofiled a writ petition challenging the
validity of Uppam PradeshProhibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion
Ordinance, 2020.
ISSUES INVOLVED
-I-
-II-
-III-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
II. WHETHER SECTION 498A AND 340 OF AMPHISSA PENAL CODE HAVE
BEEN VIOLATED BY DANIEL AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS.
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that the ingredients of Section 498A
and 340 of Amphissa Penal Code have not met and therefore, there is no violation of section
498Aand 340. There is no violation in this case because: [A] ingredients of Section 498A are
notfulfilled and [B] ingredients of Section 340 are not fulfilled.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
The Petitioner has Locus Standi to Approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble SC that the appellant has locus standi to
approach the court in the present case. Article 136 empowers the SC to grant in discretion
Special Leave to Appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of Amphissa.2Art. 136
is couched in the widest phraseology. This Court’s jurisdiction is limited only by its
discretion. 3 Scope of Art. 136 is very broad and confers discretion on the Court to grant
special leave “in any cause or matter”.4
The court in criminal cases can grant appeal in the cases of perversity or impropriety,
violation of principles of natural justice, error of law or errors of record or misreading of
evidence.5 The Supreme Court invokes the power under Article 136 in “exceptional
circumstances as and when a question of law of general public importance arises.” 6
1
Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh & Ors, AIR 1954 SC 520; Associated Cement Companies
Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, (1965) 2 SCR 366; Jose Da Costa & Anr. v. Bascora Sadasiva Sinai Narcornim & Ors.
(1976) 2 SCC 917; Arunachalam v. P.S.R Sadhanantham & Anr. (1979) 2 SCC 297; P.S.R Sadhanantham &
Anr. v. Arunachalam; (1980) 3 SCC 141; Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. v. Union of Amphissa & Ors.
(1991) 4 SCC 584.
2
Art. 136, Constitution of Amphissa, 1950.
3
Nihal Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 26.
4
Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
5
Ganga Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2005) 6 SCC 211.
6
Ibid.
The jurisdiction conferred under Art. 136 on the SC is corrective and not restrictive. 7
A duty is enjoined upon the SC to exercise its power by setting right the illegality in the
orders. It is well-settled that illegality must not be allowed to be perpetrated and failure by the
SC to interfere with the same would amount to allowing the illegality to be perpetuated. In
the present case, the issue involves a matter of General Public Importance [1] and
substantial question of law [2].
The matter involves question of law of general public importance and
therefore, entitled to be maintainable.
It has been held by this Hon’ble Court that when a question of law of general public
importance arises, or a decision shocks the conscience of the court, its jurisdiction can always
be invoked. Art. 136 is the residuary power of SC to do justice where the court is satisfied
that there is injustice.8 The principle is that this court would never do injustice nor allow
injustice being perpetrated for the sake of upholding technicalities. 9
In the case at hand, grave injustice is done to Daniel and his family by denying the
bail in a case which has no substance. The entire issue arises solely based on the petitioner’s
religion. Hence, the matter concerned is a matter of public interest and national importance.
Hence, it is humbly submitted before this court that the matter involves question of law of
general public importance and therefore, petition is maintainable under Art. 136.
The matter involves substantial question of law and therefore, entitled to be
maintainable.
The expression “substantial question of law” is not defined in any legislation.
Nevertheless, it has acquired a definite connotation through judicial pronouncements. The
constitutional bench, while explaining the import of the said expression, observed that: “the
proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would,
in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and
substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in
the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal
Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views.” 10 The
question raised by the Appellants involve substantial questions of law, as would be shown in
the subsequent submissions, and the same requires to be adjudicated by this Hon’ble Court.
7
Haryana State Industrial Corporation v. Cork Mfg. Co. (2007) 8 SCC 359.
8
C.C.E v. Standard Motor Products, AIR 1989 SC 1298; N Suriyakala v. A. Mohan Doss & Ors., (2007) 9 SCC
196; Narpat Singh v. Jaipur Development Authority, AIR 2002 SC 2036.
9
Janshed Hormusji Wdia v. Board of Trustess, Port of Mumbai (2004) 3 SCC 214.
10
Sir Chunilal Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spinning & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1314.
Hence, the case involves the matter of general public importance and it directly and
substantially affects the rights of the parties as the order is erroneous and prejudicial to the
interest of the petitioners. It is humbly submitted that substantial and grave injustice has been
done to the rights of the petitioner and that the case in question presents features of sufficient
gravity to warrant a review of the decision appealed against.
11
Justice Khastgir, Criminal Major Acta. Ed 2020, Kamal Law House, Kolkata.
12
Moot Proposition, Para 12.
13
Moot Proposition, Para 12.
14
Moot Proposition, Para 11.
Section 498A could succeed only if it can be proved that there was an “unlawful demand” by
the husband of some money. 15
And ultimately, since there is no basis to impose Section 498A, Daniel and his family
are wrongfully accused of the crime and the denial of bail was a miscarriage of justice. The
Supreme Court has held that the circumstances from the which the conclusion of cruelty is
drawn should be fully proved i.e. it should be conclusive in nature. 16 In the present case, the
circumstances are not conclusive in nature.
Therefore, it is humbly submitted before the court that there is no violation of Section
498A, IPC.
15
Ramesh Chand v. State of U.P., (1992) Cri. L.J. 1444 (All).
16
State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, (1992) 3 SCC 300.
17
Justice Khastgir, Criminal Major Acta. Ed 2020, Kamal Law House, Kolkata, pg 402.
18
Ibid.
19
Moot Proposition, Para 13.
20
1994 AIR 1918.
21
AIR 1973 SC 1461.
22
Crl.A 366/2018.
In Salamat Ansari &Ors. V. State of U.P. &Ors.,23 the Allahabad High Court referred
to Shafin Jahan to affirm an individual’s right to marry a person of one’s own choice. The
Court noted that it saw the couple beyond their religious identities. And emphasised the need
for constitutional courts to guarantee an individual’s right to live with a person of his/her
choice irrespective of religion.
In Shakti Vahini v. Union of Amphissa,24 the Court has held that preventing two
consenting adults from marrying is absolutely 'illegal' and an erosion of personal choice. The
laws reflect this erosion.the Court recognised the fundamental right of an individual who has
attained majority to marry a person of their choice. Personal relationships between people
cannot be limited or encroached upon due to caste or religion.25
The petition claims that such encroaching and scrutinising powers of the State in an
individual’s intimate choice to convert on his/her own volition is a grave assault on an
individual’s liberty. Moreover, declarations and intentions to marry being recorded with the
local administration, along with personal information, can put such couples at risk. It is not
unreasonable to presume that vigilante groups will invoke this law to target men from
minority religions and interfere in inter-faith marriages. Such laws have the potential to easily
become a weapon in the hands of bad elements to falsely implicate innocent persons.
The Supreme Court emphasised the ill effects of State intervention in such matters. It
remarked that “interference by the State in such matters has a seriously chilling effect on the
exercise of freedoms.”28 The petition argue that State interference with personal matters has a
chilling effect on constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and liberties.
23
Crl. Mis. Writ Petition No. 11367 of 2020.
24
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 231 of 2010.
25
Palash Sarkar v. State of West Bengal & Ors., WPA 9732 of 2020.
26
WP (C) 494/2012
27
AIR 2018 SC 4321.
28
Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M, Crl.A 366/2018.
The notice under section 8 29 requires those intending to convert to provide such
intrusive details as names of parents, address, occupation, monthly income, marital status,
caste and even the names of their dependents. The intended date of conversion, place of
conversion and name and address of the priest conducting the conversion must also be
provided.
D. There is an Excessive Criminalization under the Ordinance.
Lastly, the Law and the Ordinance, it can be argued, criminalise inter-faith marriages,
religious conversion and freedom of choice – all basic rights under the Constitution.
Normally, in criminal cases, the burden of proof lies with the prosecution. Under these laws,
the burden of proof lies with the converted individual and/or person causing a conversion.
This makes it easy for family members and mala fide third parties to file false complaints
without evidence to harass inter-faith couples.
Except in exceptional offences, the Amphissan Penal Code prescribes less severe
punishment for an attempt as compared to the offence itself (for instance, in the case of
sedition). The impugned laws, on the other hand, prescribe equal quantum of punishment for
committing the crime and for attempts. The petitions argue that through such excessive
criminalisation, the impugned laws equate conversion due to marriage to “acts of terror”.
In Bommai v. Union of Amphissa,30 this Hon’ble Court held that while the citizens of
thiscountry are free to profess, practice and propagate such religion, faith or belief as they
choose, so far asthe state is concerned i.e., from the point of view of the State, the religion,
faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To it, all are equal and all entitled to be treated
equally. Any step inconsistent with constitutional policy is, in plain word, unconstitutional.
29
U.P. Ordinance Sec 8.
30
(1994) 3 SCC 1.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly requested that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare:
1. That the SLP is maintainable under Article 136 of the Constitution of Amphissa,
1950.
2. That the Section 340 and Section 498A of Amphissa Penal Code have not been
violated.
3. That the Uppam Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2020 is
not constitutionally valid.
And pass any such order, writ or direction as the Honourable Court deems fit and proper, for
this the Petitioners shall duty bound pray.