Torts and Damages

Case Name CUSTODIO V. CA (1996)

Case No. x Date G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.
Civil Law; Action; Damages; To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the
plaintiff.

—However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does
not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the
recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to
the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since
damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.

Same; Same; Same; Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal

right, damage is the harm which results from the injury and
damages are the compensation awarded for the damage
suffered.

— There is a material distinction between damages and injury.

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are
the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage
suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
Doctrine x Syllabus
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called
damnum absque injuria.

Same; Same; Same; To maintain an action for injuries,

plaintiff must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff.

—In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries
of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal
responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for
the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was
injured in contemplation of law.
Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be
awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort
liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering.

Same; Same; Same; The law affords no remedy for damages

resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury
or wrong.

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Torts and Damages

—Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts

or omissions which cause damage or loss to another but which
violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently
create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone.

Same; Same; Same; In order that the law will give redress for
an act causing damage, that act must not only be hurtful, but
also wrongful.
—In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an
act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but
wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen
in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or
loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal
injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem
an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.

Civil Law; Article 21, Civil Code; Principle of Abuse of Right;

Requisites.
—In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no
legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents,
petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of
abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right
provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur:
(1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and
(3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

Same; Same; Same; There is no cause of action for lawful

acts done by one person on his property although such acts
incidentally caused damage or loss to another.

—A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his

own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to
which such property is usually applied. As a general rule,
therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person
upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although
such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to
another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria.
When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general
and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as
fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can
complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience
arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence
of community life.

Same; Same; Same; One may use any lawful means to

accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted
may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the
latter’s favor.

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Torts and Damages

—The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a

legal wrong for which an action will lie, although the act may
result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded.
One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose
and though the means adopted may cause damage to another,
no cause of action arises in the latter’s favor. Any injury or
damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The
courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting
from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by
lawful means.
Keywords Fence, passageway, tenants

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way
was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and
assigned to Branch 22 thereof.

Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died
during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse
[and children].

RELEVANT FACTS

• The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon
situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The
plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses
Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said
property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
defendants herein.
o Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left side, going to
plaintiff’s property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants
Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos
and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant
Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit “D”).

o As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff’s property, there are two

possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one meter wide
and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street.
Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The
second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff
Mabasa’s residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru
said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and
with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.

• When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the
premises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However,
sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the apartment and when
plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe
fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width.

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Torts and Damages

• Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed
her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed (Exhibit “1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. “D” for
plaintiff, Exhs. “1-C,” “1-D” and “1-E”) And it was then that the remaining tenants
of said apartment vacated the area.
o Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence
because there was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle
pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the first
passageway.
• She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house
a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors
and windows. Some of their footwear were even lost.

LOWER COURT RULINGS

RTC: On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this
dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access—ingress and egress, to the public street;
2. Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of
Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway.

CA: rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification,
the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs
appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants the
sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand
(P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary
Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.

ISSUE RATIO
Whether or not the With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred
grant of right of way to from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of
herein respondents is the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence
proper they are presumed to be satisfied with the adjudication therein. With
the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue
of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
Whether or not the
award of damages is in No, the CA erred in awarding damages in favor of private
order respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis.

A reading of the decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the
award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized
rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the
closure of the passageway.

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Torts and Damages

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give
rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong
inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong,
does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part
of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal
injury. Contrary to the claim of private respondents, petitioners could
not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right.

The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a

valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the
owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.
➔ It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose and
fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides
that “(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or
by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.”

➔ At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not
subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of way
existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by
contract.

➔ The fact that private respondents had no existing right over

the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the
trial court granting a compulsory right of way in their favor
after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right.

➔ Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute

right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully
perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To
repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained
by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said
land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed

decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED. SO
ORDERED.

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Torts and Damages

Case Name OCCENA V. ICAMINA (G.R. NO. 82146)

Case No. x Date G.R. No. 82146 x January 22, 1990
Criminal Law; Damages; Dual character of a crime; What gives rise
to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or
to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act
or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law.
—Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable
is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects,
a crime has dual character:
(1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the
social order; and as
(2) an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless
it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and
others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is
no private person injured by the crime.

Same; Same; Same; The offense of which private respondent was

found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability
results because either there is no offended party or no damage was
caused to a private person.
—In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight
Doctrine x Syllabus oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from
the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous.

As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable

offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and
the individual member of the society or private person who was
injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission.
➔ The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is
not one of those felonies where no civil liability results
because either there is no offended party or no damage was
caused to a private person. There is here an offended party,
whose main contention precisely is that he suffered
damages in view of the defamatory words and statements
uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the
further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary
damages.

Same; Same; Moral damages recoverable in case of libel, slander

or any other form of defamation.

—Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral
damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a

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Torts and Damages

case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages
for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is
likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.

Keywords Brgy. Captain, Defamation

RELEVANT FACTS

• On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the
Second MCTC of Sibalom-SanRemigio-Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal
Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly,publicly and
maliciously uttering the following insulting wordsand statements: “Gago
ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas,” which,
freely translated, mean: “You are a foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus,
traitor, tyrant, Judas” and other words and statements of similar import
which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and
honor.

• Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial

thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a
separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private
prosecutor.

LOWER COURT RULINGS

• After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral
Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
o No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court’s
opinion that “the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by
the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages.”

• Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the RTC, which in a decision dated
March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner’s appeal as follows:
o “IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower court’s
decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of merit, is
hereby DENIED.
o “After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this
case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its
decision on the criminal aspect. “SO ORDERED.”

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Torts and Damages

ISSUE RATIO
Whether or not petitioner Yes, he is entitled to damages.
is entitled to an award of
damages arising form the We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability
remarks uttered by private arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses
respondent and found by are governed by Article 100 of the RPC which provides that “(E)very
the trial court to be person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable,” in relation
to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for
defamatory
independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the
provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.

Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of
moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation.
➔ This provision of law establishes the right of an offended
party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty
party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The
offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or
exemplary damages.

➔ It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is

presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And
malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication
subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case
at bar.

Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus,

traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in
petitioner’s character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and
social humiliation.
- Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he
suffered as a result of the incident complained of. It is patently
error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence
and to conclude that the “facts and circumstances of the case
as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of
moral damages.” Having misapprehended the facts, the trial
court’s findings with respect thereto is not conclusive upon
us.

➔ From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his
feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner
is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a
further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount
ofP5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against private
respondent. SO ORDERED.

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Torts and Damages

Case Name Asilio, Jr. v. People and Sps. Bombasi (2011)

Case No. x Date G.R. Nos. 159017-18. March 9, 2011.

Nuisance; Causing undue injury to any party, including the

government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must
be established by evidence.
—Causing undue injury to any party, including the government,
could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence. In jurisprudence, “undue injury” is
consistently interpreted as “actual.” Undue has been defined as
Doctrine x Syllabus “more than necessary, not proper, [or] illegal”; and injury as “any
wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights,
reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any legally
protected interest of another.” Actual damage, in the context of
these definitions, is akin to that in civil law. It is evident from the
records, as correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo
and Mayor Comendador as accused below did not deny that there
was indeed damage caused the Spouses Bombasi on account of the
demolition.
Keywords Public market, Resolutions, demolition, without court order

RELEVANT FACTS

• On 15 March 1978, Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda. De

Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna (represented by
the then Municipal Mayor Crisostomo P. Manalang) entered into a lease contract whereby
the Municipality allowed the use and enjoymentof property comprising of a lot and a
store located at the corner ofCoronado and E. Fernandez Sts. at Poblacion, Nagcarlan,
Laguna, in favor of the respondent’s mother for a period of twenty (20) years beginning on
15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20years.

• The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her
rented property which must be at least as high as the store; and in case of modification of
the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.

• Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984.9 From then on up
to January 1993, Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s permits.10Sometime in 1986, a fire
razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection on 15 May
1986, District Engineer Marcelino B.Gorospe (Engineer Gorospe) of the then Ministry of
Public Works and Highways,11 Regional Office No. IV-A, found that the store of
Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was
contested by the Municipality of Nagcarlan.

• The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until15 October 1993.

• On 1 September 1993, Visitacion received a letter12 from Mayor Comendador directing

her to demolish her store within five (5) days from notice.
➔ On 15 September 1993, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Florencio Buyser sent a letter to
Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the public market she was occupying within
15days from her receipt of the letter; else, a court action will be filed against her.

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Torts and Damages

➔ On 11 October 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nagcarlan, Laguna issued Resolution No.
183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the store being occupied by Visitacion
using legal means.

• On 14 October 1993, Municipal Administrator Paulino S.Asilo, Jr. (Asilo) also sent a
letter16 to Visitacion informing her of the impending demolition of her store the next day.
o Within the same day, Visitacion wrote a reply letter17 to Asilo, alleging that there
is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court order and that the
Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only the filing of an
appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further replied that if the
demolition will take place, appropriate administrative, criminal and civil actions
will be filed against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and all persons who will take part
in the demolition.

➔ On 15 October 1993, Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan

Resolution Nos. 183 and 156 authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles
supervising the work.

• On 19 August 1994, Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses
Bombasi) filed with the Regional TrialCourt of San Pablo City, Laguna a Civil Case19 for
damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna,
Mayor Demetrio T. Comendador, Paulino S. Asilo, Jr.,and Alberto S. Angeles.

ISSUE RATIO

Whether or not petitioners Yes.

are liable for actual
damages
Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the
casecould have extinguished the civil liability if the same
arosedirectly from the crime committed. However, in this
case, thecivil liability is based on another source of
obligation, the law onhuman relations.49 The pertinent
articles follow:

Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:

“When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from

the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action
may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.”
And, Art. 32(6) states:

“Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who

directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner
impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process
of law;

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Torts and Damages

Indeed, the basic facts of this case point squarely to the

applicability of the law on human relations. First, the
complaint for civil liability was filed way AHEAD of the
information on the Anti-Graft Law. And, the complaint for
damages specifically invoked defendant Mayor
Comendador’s violation of plaintiff’s right to due process.
Thus:

xxxx
In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question,
the individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse
of authority but usurped a power which belongs to our courts of
justice ;such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and
constitute an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without
due process of law.
xxxx
The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a
violation of the right to private property of the Spouses
Bombasi. The accused public officials should have
accorded the spouses the due process of law guaranteed by
the Constitution and New Civil Code. The Sangguniang
Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as
already shown, justify demolition of the store without court
order. This Court in a number of decisions51 held that even
if there is already a writ of execution, there must still be a
need for a special order for the purpose of demolition issued
by the court before the officer in charge can destroy,
demolish or remove improvements over the contested
property.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the

Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T.
Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.3019. We declare the
finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as
the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending trial,
his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria
BuetaVda. De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi
for temperate damages in the amount ofP200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00. Costs against the petitioners-appellants. SO ORDERED.

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Torts and Damages

Case Name Manchester Dev’t Corp vs. CA

Case No. x Date No. L-75919. May 7, 1987.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Complaint; Filing Fees;
Environmental facts of Magaspi vs. Ramolete case, different from
case at bar
.—ln the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for
recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee
for the damages should be the basis of assessment. Although the
payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be
insufficient, nevertheless, it was held that since the payment was
the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had
were proper and regular." Hence, as the amended complaint
superseded the original complaint, the allegations of damages in
the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of
the filing fee.

In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was

possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and
the prayer show clearly that it is an action for damages and specific
performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by
considering the amount of damages as alleged in the original
complaint.
Doctrine x Syllabus
Same; Same; Same; Same; Case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of actual date of filing in
court.
—As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a
case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of filing in court." Thus, in the
present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket fee. Neither
can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon
the Court. For all legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all
subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are
null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Basis of assessment of the docket fee

should be the amount of damages in the original complaint and
not in the amended complaint. — The Court of Appeals therefore,
aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the original
complaint and not in the amended complaint.
Keywords Docket fee, Original/Amended Complaint

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Torts and Damages

RELEVANT FACTS

Manchester contended that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended
complaint, citing the case of Magaspi v. Ramolete. The environmental facts of Magaspi as
compared to the current Manchester case were as follows:

Magaspi v. Ramolete Manchester v. CA

Action for torts and damages and specific

Action for recovery of ownership and performance, with prayer for temporary
possession of parcel of land with damages. restraining order

Prayer is for the issuance of writ of

preliminary prohibitory injunction during
the pendency of action against defendant’s
announced forfeiture of P3M paid by
Manchester for the property in question;
To attach such property of defendant that
may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that
may be rendered;

And after hearing, order defendants to

execute contract of purchase and sale of
property and annul defendant’s illegal
forfeiture of Manchester’s money;

Ordering them to pay A/C/E damages and

attorney’s fees;

And declaring the tender of payment of

purchase price of Manchester valid and
Seeks not only the annulment of title of producing the effect of payment and to make
defendant to property, the declaration of injunction permanent.;
ownership and delivery of possession to
Magaspi; The amount of damages sought is not
But also for the payment of A/M/E damages specified in the prayer, although the body of
and attorney’s fees arising therefrom with the complaint alleges the total amount of
the amounts specified therein P78M as damages.

No such honest difference of opinion. As per

complaint, it is both an action for damages
and specific performance;
There was an honest difference of opinion as Docket fee paid upon filing of complaint
to nature of action. The complaint was P410 because the action is merely one for
considered an action for recovery of specific performance where the amount
ownership and possession of parcel of land. involved is not capable of pecuniary
Damages were treated as merely to the main estimation is wrong, because the body of
cause of action. Thus, docket fee of P60 and complaint totaling P78M should be the basis
P10 for sherrif’s fee were paid. of assessment of filing fee.

RTC ordered Magaspi to pay P3k as filing fee When the under-reassessment of the filing
covering the damages alleged in the original fee in Manchester was brought to the
complaint, as it did not consider the damages attention of SC together with other similar

[13]
Torts and Damages

to be merely an or incidental to the action for cases, an investigation was immediately

recovery of ownership and possession of real ordered by the Court.
property; Manchester, thru another counsel and with
The amended complaint was filed by leave of court, filed an amended complaint
Magaspi with leave of court to include the for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable
State as defendant and reducing the amount Corporation as co-plaintiff, and by emanating
of damages and attorney’s fees to P100k. any mention of the amount of damages in the
Such amendment was admitted. body of complaint.

RTC directed Manchester to rectify the

amended complaint by stating the amounts
which they are asking for. It was only then
that Manchester specified the amount of
damages in the body of complaint in the
reduced amount of P10M.

Still, no amount of damages were specified in

the prayer. Such amendment was admitted.

Action was not only one for recovery of

ownership but also for damages, so that the
filing fee for damages should be the basis of
assessment.
Although docket fee of P60 was insufficient,
SC held that the payment was the result of an
honest difference of opinion as to the correct
amount to be paid as docket fee. As such, the
court had acquired jurisdiction over the case, No such honest difference of opinion is
and the proceedings thereafter were proper possible as the allegations of the complaint,
and regular. the designation, and the prayer showed
clearly that it is an action for damages and
Hence, as amended complaint superseded specific performance.
the original complaint, the allegations of The docket fee should be assessed by
damages in the amended complaint should considering the amount of damages as
be the basis of the computation of filing fee. alleged in the original complaint.

ISSUE RATIO
In relation to docket fees 1.a) It must be based in the original complaint (as compared from
as applied in Manchester Magaspi case where the docket fee was based from amended
case: complaint due to honest difference of opinion.
a) Must it be based in 1.b) The amount of damages being prayed for must be stated in both
original complaint or in the body of the pleading and the prayer. Such amount will be the
the amended complaint? basis of the filing fees.
1.c) Yes
b) In which part of the In Magaspi case, SC declared that a case is deemed filed only upon
pleading must the amount payment of docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in court.
As such, in Manchester, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
of damages being prayed
over the case by payment of only P410 as docket fee. Neither the
for stated? amendment of complaint vested jurisdiction upon the court because
in essence, there was no such original complained that was duly filed
which could be amended. The orders admitting the amended

[14]
Torts and Damages

c) Is the court devoid of complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the
jurisdiction for failure to RTC are null and void.
pay the correct docket
fees? CA was correct in ruling that the basis of assessment of
docket fee should be the amount of damages sought in the
original complaint and not in the amended complaint.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied forlack of merit. SO ORDERED.

RUKS KONSULT AND CONSTRUCTION, Petitioner, vs.

Case Name ADWORLD SIGN AND ADVERTISING CORPORATION* and
TRANSWORLD MEDIA ADS, INC., Respondents.
Case No. x Date G.R. No. 204866, FIRST DIVISION, January 21, 2015
Civil Law; Quasi-Delicts; Negligence; Words and Phrases;
Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do something
which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the
doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
not do.—Jurisprudence defines negligence as the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and
reasonable man would not do. It is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury.

Same; Same; Joint Tortfeasors; Solidary Obligations; Under

Article2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are solidarily
liable for the resulting damage; Joint tortfeasors are each liable
Doctrine x Syllabus as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they
had performed the wrongful act themselves.—Both Transworld
and Ruks were fully aware that the foundation for the former’s
billboard was weak; yet, neither of them took any positive step to
reinforce the same. They merely relied on each other’s word that
repairs would be done to such foundation, but none was done at
all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that both
Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction
ofthe former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its
collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard
structure. As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liable
to Adworld.
Verily,“[j]oint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate,
promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet
the commissionof a tort, or approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit. They are also referred to as those who act together
in committing wrong orwhose acts, if independent of each other,
unite in causing a single injury.

[15]
Torts and Damages

Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are

solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint
tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in
the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act
themselves.”
Keywords Collapse, Billboard, weak foundation,

RELEVANT FACTS

• The instant case arose from a complaint for damages filed by Adworld against Transworld
and Comark InternationalCorporation (Comark) before the RTC.

o In the complaint, Adworld alleged that it is the owner of a 75 ft. x 60 ft. billboard
structure located at EDSA Tulay, Guadalupe, Barangka, Mandaluyong, which was
misaligned and its foundation impaired when, on August 11, 2003, the adjacent
billboard structure owned by Transworld and used by Comark collapsed and
crashed against it.

o Resultantly, on August 19, 2003, Adworld sent Transworld and Comark a letter
demanding payment for the repairs of its billboard as well as loss of rental income.

• On August 29, 2003, Transworld sent its reply, admitting the damage caused by its
billboard structure on Adworld’s billboard, but nevertheless, refused and failed to pay the
amounts demanded by Adworld. As Adworld’s final demand-letter also went unheeded, it
was constrained to file the instant complaint, praying for damages in the aggregate amount
of P474,204.00, comprised of P281,204.00 for materials, P72,000.00 for labor, and
P121,000.00 for indemnity for loss of income.

• In its Answer with Counterclaim, Transworld averred –

o that the collapse of its billboard structure was due to extraordinarily strong winds
that occurred instantly and unexpectedly, and maintained that the damage caused
to Adworld’s billboard structure was hardly noticeable.
o Transworld likewise filed a Third-Party Complaint against Ruks, the company
which built the collapsed billboard structure in the former’s favor.
▪ It was alleged therein that the structure constructed by Ruks had a weak
and poor foundation not suited for billboards, thus, prone to collapse,
and as such, Ruks should ultimately be held liable for the damages caused
to Adworld’s billboard structure.

• For its part, Comark denied liability for the damages caused to Adworld’s billboard
structure, maintaining that it does not have any interest on Transworld’s collapsed billboard
structure as it only contracted the use of the same. In this relation, Comark prayed for
exemplary damages from Transworld for unreasonably including it as a party-defendant in
the complaint.

• Lastly, Ruks admitted that it entered into a contract with Transworld for the construction
of the latter’s billboard structure, but denied liability for the damages caused by its collapse.
o It contended that when Transworld hired its services, there was already an existing
foundation for the billboard and that it merely finished the structure according to
the terms and conditions of its contract with the latter.

[16]
Torts and Damages

LOWER COURT RULINGS

The RTC’s Ruling (August 25, 2009)

- ruled in Adworld’s favor, and accordingly, declared, inter alia, Transworld and Ruks
jointly and severally liable to Adworld in the amount of P474,204.00 as actual damages,
with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until full payment thereof,
plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
- The RTC found both Transworld and Ruks negligent in the construction of the
collapsed billboard as they knew that the foundation supporting the same was weak and
would pose danger to the safety of the motorists and the other adjacent properties, such as
Adworld’s billboard, and yet, they did notdo anything to remedy the situation.

➔ In particular, the RTC explained that Transworld was made aware by Ruks that the initial
construction of the lower structure of its billboard did not have the proper foundation and
would require additional columns and pedestals to support the structure. Notwithstanding,
however, Ruks proceeded with the construction of the billboard’s upper structure and
merely assumed that Transworld would reinforce its lower structure.

- The RTC then concluded that these negligent acts were the direct and proximate cause of
the damages suffered by Adworld’s billboard.

Aggrieved, both Transworld and Ruks appealed to the CA.

The CA’s Ruling (November 16, 2011)

- the CA denied Ruks’s appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

- It adhered to the RTC’s finding of negligence on the part of Transworld and Ruks which
brought about the damage to Adworld’s billboard.

- It found that Transworld failed to ensure that Ruks will comply with the approved plans
and specifications of the structure, and that Ruks continued to install and finish the
billboard structure despite the knowledge that there were no adequate columns to support
the same.

ISSUE RATIO

Whether or not the CA Yes, the CA is correct in affirming the ruling of the lower court.
correctly affirmed the
The petition is without merit.
ruling of the RTC
declaring Ruks jointly In this case, the CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s finding that
and severally liable with Transworld’s initial construction of its billboard’s lower structure
Transworld for damages without the proper foundation, and that of Ruks’s finishing its upper
sustained by Adworld. structure and just merely assuming that Transworld would reinforce
the weak foundation are the two (2) successive acts which were the
direct and proximate cause of the damages sustained by
Adworld.

Worse, both Transworld and Ruks were fully aware that the
foundation for the former’s billboard was weak; yet, neither of them
took any positive step to reinforce the same. They merely relied on
each other’s word that repairs would be done to such foundation, but
none was done at all. Clearly, the foregoing circumstances show that
both Transworld and Ruks are guilty of negligence in the construction

[17]
Torts and Damages

of the former’s billboard, and perforce, should be held liable for its
collapse and the resulting damage to Adworld’s billboard structure.

As joint tortfeasors, therefore, they are solidarily liableto

Adworld.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 16, 2011 and the
Resolution dated December 10, 2012of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 94693 are
hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

Case Name Integrated Packaging Corp. vs. CA

Case No. x Date G.R. No. 115117. June 8, 2000
Obligations and Contracts; Reciprocal obligations are to be
performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one is
conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. —
The transaction between the parties is a contract of sale whereby
private respondent (seller)obligates itself to deliver printing paper
to petitioner (buyer) which, in turn, binds itself to pay therefor a
sum of money or its equivalent (price). Both parties concede that
the order agreement gives rise to reciprocal obligations such that
the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other.

Thus, private respondent undertakes to deliver printing paper of

various quantities subject to petitioner’s corresponding obligation
to pay, on a maximum 90-day credit, for these materials. Note that
in the contract, petitioner is not even required to make any deposit,
down payment or advance payment, hence, the undertaking of
private respondent to deliver the materials is conditional upon
Doctrine x Syllabus payment by petitioner within the prescribed period. Clearly,
petitioner did not fulfill its side of the contract as its last payment
in August 1981 could cover only materials covered by delivery
invoices dated September and October 1980.

Same; Where a party has not paid for the materials covered by
delivery invoices on time, the other party has the right to cease
making further deliveries. — In this case, as found a quo
petitioner’s evidence failed to establish that it had paid for the
printing paper covered by the delivery invoices on time.
Consequently, private respondent has the right to cease making
further delivery, hence the private respondent did not violate the
order agreement. On the contrary, it was petitioner which
breached the agreement as it failed to pay on time the
materials delivered by private respondent. Respondent
appellate court correctly ruled that private respondent did not
violate the order agreement.

[18]
Torts and Damages

Damages; While indemnification for damages comprehends not

only the loss suffered, that is to say actual damages (damnum
emergens),but also profits which the obligee failed to obtain,
referred to as compensatory damages (lucrum cessans), to justify
a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is necessary to
prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the
injured party, the actual amount of loss.—The rule on
compensatory damages is well established.
In the case at bar, the trial court erroneously concluded
that petitioner could have sold books to Philacorat the quoted
selling price of P1,850,750.55 and by deducting the production
cost of P1,060,426.20, petitioner could have earned profit
ofP790,324.30. Admittedly, the evidence relied upon by the trial
court in arriving at the amount are mere estimates prepared by
petitioner. Said evidence is highly speculative and manifestly
hypothetical. It could not provide sufficient legal and factual basis
for the award of P790,324.30 as compensatory damages
representing petitioner’s self-serving claim of unrealized profit.

Same; Moral damages may be awarded when in a breach of

contract the defendant acted in bad faith, or was guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation. — The deletion of the award of moral
damages is proper, since private respondent could not be held
liable for breach of contract. Moral damages may be awarded
when in a breach of contract the defendant acted in bad faith, or
was guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligation. Finally, since the
award of moral damages is eliminated, so must the award for
attorney’s fees be also deleted.
Keywords Printing paper, Deliveries, Books

RELEVANT FACTS

▪ May 5, 1978: Integrated Packaging Corp agreed to deliver to Fil-anchor paper co.,
inc. 3,450 reams of printing paper. Materials were to be paid within 30-90 days

▪ June 7, 1978: Integrated entered into a contract with Philippine Appliance

Corporation (Philacor) to print three volumes of "Philacor Cultural Books"

▪ July 30, 1979: only 1,097 out of the 3,450 had been delivered so it wrote to Fil-anchor
that delay will prejudice them

▪ July 23, 1981: Fil-anchor delivered amounting to P766,101.70 of printing paper

o Petitioner encountered difficulties paying Fil-anchor the said amount.

o Accordingly, private respondent made a formal demand upon petitioner to settle

the outstanding account. On July 23 and 31, 1981 and August 27, 1981, petitioner
made partial payments totalling P97,200.00 which was applied to its back accounts
covered by delivery invoices dated September29-30, 1980 and October 1-2, 1980.

[19]
Torts and Damages

▪ Integrated entered into an additional printing contract with Philacor but it failed to
comply so Philacor demanded compensation for the delay and damage it suffered on
account of Integrated's failure

➔ Fil-anchor filed a collection suit of P766,101.70 against Integrated representing unpaid

purchase price of printing paper bought on credit

▪ By way of counterclaim, Integrated Packaging Corporation alleged that the delivery

was short of 2,875 reams so it suffered actual damages and failed to realize expected
profits and that complaint was prematurely filed

LOWER COURT RULINGS

RTC Decision
On July 5, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring:
- that petitioner should pay private respondent the sum of P763,101.70
representing the value of printing paper delivered by private respondent
from June 5, 1980 to July 23, 1981.

- However, the lower court also found petitioner’s counterclaim meritorious.

o It ruled that were it not for the failure or delay of private respondent to
deliver printing paper, petitioner could have sold books to Philacor and
realized profit of P790,324.30 from the sale.
o It further ruled that petitioner suffered a dislocation of business on
account of loss of contracts and goodwill as a result of private
respondent’s violation of its obligation, for which the award of moral
damages was justified.

CA Decision
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment
of the trial court.
- The appellate court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the sum of
P763,101.70 representing the amount of unpaid printing paper delivered by
private respondent to petitioner, with legal interest thereon from the date of
the filing of the complaint until fully paid.4

- However, the appellate court deleted the award of P790,324.30 as

compensatory damages as well as the award of moral damages and attorney’s
fees, for lack of factual and legal basis.

ISSUE RATIO

1) W/N Fil-Anchor 1) No, it did not violate the order agreement.

violated the order
agreement when it There is no dispute that the agreement provides for the delivery of
failed to deliver the printing paper on different dates and a separate price has been agreed
balance of the printing upon for each delivery. It is also admitted that it is the standard
paper on the dates
practice of the parties that the materials be paid within a minimum
agreed upon
period of thirty (30) days and a maximum of ninety (90) days from
each delivery.9

[20]
Torts and Damages

2) W/N Integrated Accordingly, the private respondent’s suspension of its deliveries to

should be awarded petitioner whenever the latter failed to pay on time, as in this case, is
compensatory and legally justified under the second paragraph of Article 1583 of the
moral damages. Civil Code which provides that:

“When there is a contract of sale of goods to be delivered by stated

installments, which are to be separately paid for, and the seller makes
defective deliveries in respect of one or more installments, or the
buyer neglects or refuses without just cause to take delivery of or pay
for one or more installments, it depends in each case on the terms of
the contract and the circumstances of the case, whether the breach of
contract is so material as to justify the injured party in refusing to
proceed further and suing for damages for breach of the entire
contract, or whether the breach is severable, giving rise to a claim for
compensation but not to aright to treat the whole contract as broken.”

2) The rule on compensatory damages is well established.

To justify a grant of actual or compensatory damages, it is
necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty,
premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence
obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss.
➔ In the case at bar, the trial courter roneously
concluded that petitioner could have sold books to
Philacor at the quoted selling price of P1,850,750.55
and by deducting the production cost of
P1,060,426.20, petitioner could have earned profit
of P790,324.30. Admittedly, the evidencerelied upon
by the trial court in arriving at the amount are mere
estimates prepared by petitioner.14 Said evidence is
highlys peculative and manifestly hypothetical. It
could not provide sufficient legal and factual basis
for the award of P790,324.30 as compensatory
damages representing petitioner’s self- of unrealized
profit.
Further, the deletion of the award of moral damages is
proper,since private respondent could not be held liable for
breach ofcontract.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[21]
Torts and Damages

Case Name Fuentes vs. CA

Case No. x Date G.R. No. 111692. February 9, 1996

Criminal Law; Murder; Actual Damages; Actual damages if not
supported by the evidence on record cannot be granted.
— The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages
is not supported by the evidence on record. We have only the
testimony of the victim’s elder sister stating that she incurred
expenses of P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina.
Doctrine x Syllabus
However, no proof of the actual damages was ever presented
in court. Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court
can only give credence to those supported by receipts and which
appear to have been genuinely expended in connection with the
death of the victim. Since the actual amount was not substantiated,
the same cannot be granted.
Keywords Mistaken identity, Cousin Zoilo, Stabbed using Knife

RELEVANT FACTS

• Petitioner Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., seeks reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming his conviction for murder. (He insists that he is a
victim of mistaken identity)

• At four o’clock in the morning of 24 June 1989 Julieto Malaspina together

with Godofredo Llames, Honorio Osok and Alberto Toling, was at a benefit
dance at Dump Site, Tudela,Trento, Agusan del Sur.
o Petitioner called Malaspina and placed his right arm on the shoulder of
the latter saying, “Before, I saw you with a long hair but now you have
a short hair.”2 Suddenly petitioner stabbed Malaspina in the
abdomen with a hunting knife. Malaspina fell to the ground and his
companions rushed to his side. Petitioner fled.
o Before the victim succumbed to the gaping wound on his abdomen he
muttered that Alejandro Fuentes, Jr., stabbed him.

• Dr. Porfirio L. Salubre, the Rural Health Physician who autopsied the cadaver
of Julieto Malaspina on 24 July 1989, reported that death was due to “stab
wound at left lumbar region1-1/2 in. in length with extra cavitation of the
small and large intestines.”

• Petitioner’s Contentions:

o That it was his cousing Zoilo Fuentes, jr. alias “Jonie” who knifed Malaspina
o That when the victim was killed he was conversing with him;
o That he was compelled to run away when he heard that somebody with a bolo
and spear would “kill all those from San Isidro” because “Jonie,” the killer, was
from that place;

[22]
Torts and Damages

o that since he was also from San Isidro he sought refuge in his brother’s house
where he met “Jonie”;
▪ that “Jonie” admitted spontaneously that he stabbed Malaspina because
after a boxing match before the latter untied his gloves and punched him;
that as there were many person smilling around the house “Jonie” jumped
out and escaped through the window; that he was arrested at eight o’clock
in the morning of 24 June 1989 while he was in a store in the barangay.
LOWER COURT RULINGS

RTC Decision
- found petitioner Fuentes guilty of murder qualified by treachery

- imposed on him an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) yearsand one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17)years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the victim Julieto Malaspina the amount
ofP50,000.00 and to pay P8,300.00 as actual damages plus costs
CA Decision
- affirmed the judgment of the trial court

ISSUE RATIO

W/N the appellate The Court of Appeals as well as the trial court correctly determined
court erred when it the crime to be murder qualified by treachery. The suddenness of
held that petitioner the attack, without any provocation from the unsuspecting victim,
was positively and made the stabbing of Malaspina treacherous.
categorically
identified as the killer No, he is not liable for damages.
of Malaspina Petitioner maintains that assuming that he committed the crime it
W/N the petitioner is is error to hold him answerable for P8,300.00 as actual damages on
liable for damages to the basis of the mere testimony of the victim’s sister, Angelina
Serrano, without any tangible document to support such claim. This
the heirs of the victim.
is a valid point.
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant is liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or
omission complained of. To seek recovery for actual damages it is
essential that the injured party proves the actual amount of loss with
reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and
on the best evidence available.19 Courts cannot simply rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and
amount of damages.

The award by the court a quo of P8,300.00 as actual damages is not

supported by the evidence on record. We have only the testimony
of the victim’s elder sister stating that she incurred expenses of

[23]
Torts and Damages

P8,300.00 in connection with the death of Malaspina. However, no

proof of the actual damages was ever presented in court. Of the
expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can only give
credence to those supported by receipts and which appear to have
been genuinely expended in connection with the death of the
victim.
Since the actual amount was not substantiated, the same cannot be
granted.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from finding petitionerALEJANDRO

FUENTES, JR. guilty of MURDER and directinghim to indemnify the heirs of
Julieto Malaspina in the amount ofP50,000.00 plus costs is AFFIRMED with the
modification thatthe penalty imposed should be as it is corrected to
reclusionperpetua, and the award of actual damages is deleted. SO ORDERED.

Case Name Eastern Shipping vs CA

Case No. x Date GR No. 97412 x 12 July 1994

Common Carriers; Obligations; Presumption of Fault; When the

goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a
presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that
requisite diligence, and there need not be an express finding of
negligence to hold it liable.—The common carrier’s duty to
observe the requisite diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from
the time the articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed
in the possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for their
acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them (Arts. 1736-
1738, Civil Code; Ganzon vs. Court ofAppeals, 161 SCRA 646;
Kui Bai vs. Dollar Steamship Lines, 52 Phil.863).

There are, of course, exceptional cases when such presumption of

Doctrine x Syllabus fault is not observed but these cases, enumerated in Article 1734
of the Civil Code, are exclusive, not one of which can be applied
to this case.

Same; Same; Arrastre Operator; Carrier and arrastre operator

liable in solidum for the proper delivery of the goods to the
consignee. — The question of charging both the carrier and the
arrastre operator with the obligation of properly delivering the
goods to the consignee has, too, been passed upon by the Court.
In Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. vs. Metro Port Service, Inc. (182
SCRA 455), we have explained, in holding the carrier and the
arrastre operator liable in solidum, thus: “The legal relationship
between the consignee and the arrastre operator is akin to that of a
depositor and warehouseman (Lua Kian v. Manila Railroad Co.,
et al., 19 SCRA 5 [1967]. The relationship between the consignee

[24]
Torts and Damages

and the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee and the
arrastre operator (Northern Motors, Inc. v. Prince Line, et al., 107
Phil. 253[1960]). Since it is the duty of the ARRASTRE to take
good care of the goods that are in its custody and to deliver them
in good condition to the consignee, such responsibility also
devolves upon the CARRIER. Both the ARRASTRE and the
CARRIER are therefore charged with the obligation to deliver the
goods in good condition to the consignee.”

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court is not implying, however,

that the arrastre operator and the customs broker are themselves
always and necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-
versa, nor that attendant facts in a given case may not vary the
rule.—We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement
that the arrastre operator and the customs broker are themselves
always and necessarily liable solidarily with the carrier, or vice-
versa, nor that attendant facts in a given case may not vary the
rule.
The instant petition has been brought solely by Eastern Shipping
Lines which, being the carrier and not having been able to rebut
the presumption of fault, is, in any event, to be held liable in this
particular case. A factual finding of both the court a quo and the
appellate court, we take note, is that “there is sufficient evidence
that the shipment sustained damage while in the successive
possession appellants” (the herein petitioner among them).

Accordingly, the liability imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines,

Inc., the sole petitioner in this case, is inevitable regardless of
whether there are others solidarily liable with it.

Damages; Interest Rates; Rules of thumb for future guidance in

the award of damages and interest rates .— The ostensible discord
is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have
called for different applications, guided by the rule that the courts
are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of each case,
on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise, by
way of clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following
rules of thumb for future guidance.

Same; Same; Same; When an obligation is breached, the

contravenor can be held liable for damages. — When an
obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is breached, the contravenor can
be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on
“Damages” of the Civil Code govern in determining the measure
of recoverable damages.

Same; Same; Same; Interests in the Concept of Actual and

Compensatory Damages; In a loan or forbearance of money, the
interest due should be that stipulated in writing, and in the
absence thereof, the rate shall be 12% per annum.—With regard
particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual

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Torts and Damages

thereof, is imposed, as follows: 1. When the obligation is

breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that
which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the
interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded.
In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per
annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or
extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.
Keywords Shipment, spill

RELEVANT FACTS

• On December 4, 1981, two fiber drums of riboflavin were shipped from Yokohama, Japan
for delivery vessel ‘SS EASTERN COMET’ owned by defendant Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
under Bill of Lading No. YMA-8. The shipment was insured under plaintiff’s Marine
Insurance Policy No. 81/01177 for P36,382,466.38.

• Upon arrival of the shipment in Manila on December 12, 1981, it was discharged unto the
custody of defendant Metro Port Service, Inc. the latter excepted to one drum, said to be
in bad order, which damage was unknown to plaintiff.

• On Jan 7, 1982 defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation received the shipment from
defendant Metro Port Service, Inc., one drum opened and without seal (per ‘Request for
Bad Order Survey’.)

• On Jan 8 and 14, 1982, defendant Allied Brokerage Corporation made deliveries of the
shipment to the consignee’s warehouse. The latter excepted to one drum which
contained spillages, while the rest of the contents was adulterated/fake.

• Plaintiff contended that due to the losses/damage sustained by said drum, the consignee
suffered losses totalling to P19,032.95, due to the fault and negligence of defendants.
Claims were presented against defendants who failed and refused to pay the same.

• As a consequence of the losses sustained, plaintiff was compelled to pay the consignee
P19,032.95 under the aforestated marine insurance policy, so that it became subrogated
to all the rights of action of said consignee against defendants.

• As for Eastern Shipping it alleged --

o that the shipment was discharged in good order from the vessel unto the custody
of Metro Port Service so that any damage/losses incurred after the shipment was
turned over to the latter, is no longer its liability;

• Metroport averred that although subject shipment was discharged unto its custody,
portion of the same was already in bad order;

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Torts and Damages

• Allied Brokerage alleged that plaintiff has no cause of action against it, not having
negligent or at fault for the shipment was already in damage and bad order condition
when received by it, but nonetheless, it still exercised extra ordinary care and diligence
in the handling/delivery of the cargo to consignee in the same condition shipment was
received by it.

LOWER COURT RULINGS

RTC Decision as affirmed by the CA –

‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
A. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally:

1. The amount of P19,032.95, with the present legal interest of12% per annum from
October 1, 1982, the date of filing of thiscomplaints, until fully paid (the liability of
defendant EasternShipping, Inc. shall not exceed US$500 per case or the CIFvalue
of the loss, whichever is lesser, while the liability ofdefendant Metro Port Service,
Inc. shall be to the extent of theactual invoice value of each package, crate box or
container inno case to exceed P5,000.00 each, pursuant to Section 6.01 ofthe
Management Contract);
2. P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
3. Costs.

B. Dismissing the counterclaims and crossclaim of defendant/cross-claimant Allied

Brokerage Corporation.

ISSUE RATIO

The petition is, in part, granted.

(a) whether or not a
claim for damage The common carrier’s duty to observe the requisite
sustained on a diligence in the shipment of goods lasts from the time the
shipment of goods can articles are surrendered to or unconditionally placed in the
be a solidary, or joint possession of, and received by, the carrier for transportation
and several, liability until delivered to, or until the lapse of a reasonable time for
of the common their acceptance by, the person entitled to receive them.
carrier, the arrastre When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged
operator and the condition, a presumption arises against the carrier of its
customs broker; failure to observe that diligence, and there need not be an
express finding of negligence to hold it liable.

The legal relationship between the consignee and the

(b) whether the
arrastre operator is akin to that of a depositor and
payment of legal
warehouseman. The relationship between the consignee
interest on an award and the common carrier is similar to that of the consignee
for loss or damage is
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Torts and Damages

to becomputed from and the arrastre operator. Since it is the duty of the arrastre
the time the complaint to take good care of the goods that are in its custody and to
is filed or from the deliver them in good condition to the consignee, such
date thedecision responsibility also devolves upon the carrier. Both the
appealed from is arrastre and the carrier are therefore charged with the
rendered obligation to deliver the goods in good condition to the
consignee.

We do not, of course, imply by the above pronouncement

that the arrastre operator and the customs broker are
themselves always and necessarily liable solidarily with the
carrier, or vise-versa, nor that attendant facts in a given case
may not vary the rule. The instant petition has been brought
solely by Eastern Shipping Lines which, being the carrier
and not having been able to rebut the presumption of fault,
is, in any event, to be held liable in this particular case. A
factual finding of both the court a quo and the appellate
court, we take note, is that “there is sufficient evidence that
the shipment sustained damage while in the successive
possession of appellants”. Accordingly, the liability
imposed on Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., the sole
petitioner in this case, is inevitable regardless of
whether there are others solidarily liable with it.

Damages; Interest Rates; Rules of thumb for future guidance in the award of damages and interest
rates .— The ostensible discord is not difficult to explain. The factual circumstances may have
called for different applications, guided by the rule that the courts are vested with discretion,
depending on the equities of each case, on the award of interest. Nonetheless, it may not be unwise,
by way of clarification and reconciliation, to suggest the following rules of thumb for future
guidance.
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, a
loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially
demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed
from default, from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Art 1169
of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an
interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the
rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged or unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where
the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time
the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably
established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably.

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Torts and Damages

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory,
the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls under par 1 and 2, above, shall be 12% per annum
from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. Theappealed decision is AFFIRMED

with the MODIFICATION thatthe legal interest to be paid is SIX PERCENT (6%) on theamount
due computed from the decision, dated 03 February 1988,of the courta quo. A TWELVE
PERCENT (12%) interest, in lieuof SIX PERCENT (6%), shall be imposed on such amount
uponfinality of this decision until the payment thereof. SO ORDERED.

Case Name Daywalt vs. Recoletos et al.

Case No. x Date No. 13505. February 4, 1919

CONTRACTS; DAMAGES FOR BREACH; LIABILITY OF

THIRD PARTY. — Whatever may be the character of the
liability, if any, which a stranger to a contract may incur by
advising or assisting one of the parties to evade performance, he
cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the
nonperformance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he
intermeddles.

ID.; ID.; MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF

CONTRACT. — The damages recoverable upon breach of
contract are, primarily, the ordinary, natural and in a sense the
necessary damage resulting from the breach. Other damages,
known as special damages, are recoverable where it appears
Doctrine x Syllabus that the particular conditions which made such damages a
probable consequence of the breach were known to the
delinquent party at the time the contract was made. This
proposition must be understood with the qualification that, if the
damages are in the legal sense remote or speculative, knowledge
of the special conditions which render such damages possible will
not make them recoverable. Special damages of this character
cannot be recovered unless made the subject of special stipulation.

ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT

FOR SALE OF LAND.—The damages ordinarily recoverable
against a vendor for failure to deliver land which he has contracted
to deliver is the value of the use and occupation of the land for the
time during which it is wrongfully withheld.

Keywords Agreements, Parcel of land, Interference, Larger than stated

RELEVANT FACTS

• In the year 1902, Teodorica Endencia, an unmarried woman, resident in the Province of
Mindoro, executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo. W.

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Torts and Damages

Daywalt,. a tract of land situated in the barrio of Mangarin, municipality of Bulalacao,

now San Jose, in said province.
o It was agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as the title to the land should
be perfected by proceedings in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens
certificate should be procured therefor in the name of Teodorica Endencia.
o A decree recognizing the right, of Teodorica as owner was entered in said court in
August 1906, but the Torrens certificate was not issued until later.
o The parties, however, met immediately upon the entering of this decree and made
a new contract with a view to carrying their original agreement into effect.
▪ This new contract was executed in the form of a deed of conveyance and
bears date of August 16, 1906.The stipulated price was fixed at P4,000, and
the area of the land enclosed in the boundaries defined in the contract was
stated to be 452 hectares and a fraction.

• The second contract was not immediately carried into effect for the reason that the Torrens
certificate was not yet obtainable and in fact said certificate was not issued until the
period of performance contemplated in the contract had expired.

• Accordingly, upon October 3, 1908, the parties entered into still another agreement,
superseding the old, by which Teodorica Endencia agreed, upon receiving the Torrens title
to the land in question, to deliver the same to the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in Manila,
to be forwarded to the Crocker National Bank in San Francisco, where it was to be
delivered to the plaintiff upon payment of a balance of P3,100.

• The Torrens certificate was in time issued to Teodorica Endencia, but in the course of the
proceedings relative to the registration of the land, it was found by official survey that
the area of the tract inclosed in the boundaries stated in the contract was about 1,248
hectares instead of 452 hectares as stated in the contract.
o In view of this development Teodorica Endencia became reluctant to transfer the
whole tract to the purchaser, asserting that she never intended to sell so large an
amount of land and that she had been misinformed as to its area.

• This attitude of hers led to litigation in which Daywalt finally succeeded, upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, in obtaining a decree for specific performance;
and Teodorica Endencia was ordered to convey the entire tract of land to
Daywalt pursuant to the contract of October 3, 1908, which contract was
declared to be in full force and effect. This decree appears to have become
finally effective in the early part of the year 1914.

• The defendant, La Corporación de los Padres Recoletos, is a religious

corporation, with its domicile in the city of Manila. Said corporation was
formerly the owner of a large tract of land, known as the San Jose Estate,
on the island of Mindoro, which was sold to the Government of the
Philippine Islands in the year 1909.
o The same corporation was at this time also the owner of another
estate on the same island immediately adjacent to the land which
Teoderica Endencia had sold to Geo. W. Daywalt; and for many years
the Recoletos Fathers had maintained large herds of cattle on the
farms referred to.
o Their representative, charged with the management of these farms,
was father Isidoro Sanz, himself a member of the order. Father Sanzhad
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Torts and Damages

long been well acquainted with Teodorica Endencia andexerted over

her an influence and ascendency due to his religious character as well
as to the personal friendship which existed between them.

➔ Father Sanz was fully aware of the existence of the contract of1902 by which
Teodorica Endencia agreed to sell her land to the plaintiff as well as of the
later important developments connected with the history of that contract and
the contract – substituted successively for it; and in particular Father Sanz, as
well as other members of the defendant corporation, knew of the existence of
the contract of October 3, 1908, which, as we have already seen, finally fixed
the rights of the parties to the property in question.
o When the Torrens certificate was finally issued in 1909 in favor of
Teodorica Endencia, she delivered it for safekeeping to the defendant
corporation, and it was then taken to Manila where it remained in the
custody and under the control of P. Juan Labarga the procurador and
chief official of the defendant corporation, until the delivery thereof to
the plaintiff was made compulsory by reason of the decree of the
Supreme Court in 1914.

• When the defendant corporation sold the San Jose Estate, it was necessary to bring the
cattle off of that property; and, in the first half of 1909, some 2,368 head were removed to
the estate of the corporation immediately adjacent to the property which the plaintiff had
purchased from Teodorica Endencia.
o As Teodorica still retained possession of said property Father Sanz entered into
an arrangement with her whereby large numbers of cattle belonging to the
defendant corporation were pastured upon said land during a period extending
from June 1, 1909, to May 1,1914.

• Under the first cause stated in the complaint in the present action the plaintiff seeks to
recover from the defendant corporation the sum of P24,000, as damages for the use
and occupation of the land in question by reason of the pasturing of cattle there on
during the period stated.

LOWER COURT RULINGS

- The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant corporation was liable for
damages by reason of the use and occupation of the premises in the manner stated; and
fixed the amount to be recovered at P2,497.
- The plaintiff appealed and has assigned error to this part of the judgment of the court below,
insisting that damages should have been awarded in a much larger sum and at least to the
full extent of P24,000, the amount claimed in the complaint.

- the plaintiff (Daywalt) seeks to recover from the defendant corporation (Recoletos) the sum
of P500,000, as damages, on the ground that said corporation, for its own selfish purposes,
unlawfully induced Teodorica Endencia to refrain from the performance of
hercontract f or the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery to the plaintiff
of the Torrens title, and further, maliciously and without reasonable cause, maintained her
in her defense to the action of specific performance which was finally decided in favor of
the plaintiff in this court.

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Torts and Damages

- The cause of action here stated is based on a liability derived from the wrongful
interference of the defendant in the performance of the contract between the plaintiff
and Teodorica Endencia;

ISSUE RATIO
No. Damages assessed are sufficient to compensate the
plaintiff for the use and occupation of the land during the
whole time it was used.

Article 1902 of the Civil Code declares that any person who by
an act or omission, characterized by fault or negligence, causes
damage to another shall be liable for the damage so done.
Ignoring so much of this article as relates to liability f or
negligence, we take the rule to be that a person is liable for
damage done to another by any culpable act; and by "culpable
act" we mean any act which is blameworthy when judged by
accepted legal standards. The idea thus expressed is
undoubtedly broad enough to include any rational conception
of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any
society.

It should in the first place be noted that the liability of

Whether or not the
Teodorica Endencia for damages resulting from the breach of
damages allowed her contract with Daywalt was a proper subject for
should be increased adjudication in the action for specific performance which
due to the alleged Daywalt instituted against her in 1909 and which was litigated
unjustified interference by him to a successful conclusion in this court, but without
obtaining any special adjudication with referrence to damages.
Indemnification for damages resulting from the breach of a
contract is a right inseparably annexed to every action for the
fulfilment of the obligation (art. 1124, Civil Code); and it is
clear that if damages are not sought or recovered in the action
to enforce performance they cannot be recovered in an
independent action. As to Teodorica Endencia, therefore, it
should be considered that the right of action to recover
damages for the breach of the contract in question was
exhausted in the prior suit.

The most that can be said with reference to the conduct of

Teodorica Endencia is that she refused to carry out a contract
for the sale of certain land and resisted to the last an action for
specific performance in court. The result was that the plaintiff
was prevented during a period of several years from exerting
that control over the property which he was entitled to exert
and was meanwhile unable to dispose of the property
advantageously.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Our conclusion is that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, and it is so ordered,
with costs against the appellant.

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Torts and Damages

Case Name Algarra V. Sandejas (1914)

Case No. x Date No. 8385 x March 24, 1914

DAMAGES; NEGLIGENT ACT OR OMISSION; EXTENTOF

LIABILITY.—Under both the Spanish Civil Code and American
law of damages, actual damages for a negligent act or omission
are confined to those which "were foreseen or might have been
foreseen," or those which were "the natural and probable
consequences" or "the direct and immediate consequences" of the
act or omission.

ID.; ID.; ID.—In this jurisdiction the author of a negligent act or

omission which causes damage to another is obliged to repair the
damage done. This is practically equivalent to compensatory or
actual damages as those terms are used in American law.

ID.; ELEMENTS. — Pain and suffering, whether physical or

mental, are not elements of actual or compensatory damages in
this jurisdiction. Aside from this exception, the measure of
Doctrine x Syllabus damages in this country and in the United States is arrived at by
the same evidence.

ID.; Loss OF PROFITS. — Loss of profits of an established

business which was yielding fairly steady returns at the time of its
interruption by defendant's wrongful act is not so speculative or
contingent that a court of justice may refuse to allow the plaintiff
any damages at all.
When the evidence shows the previous average income of the
plaintiff's business and the reduced receipts therefrom during or
immediately after the interruption, there can be no doubt that a loss
of profits has resulted.
The fact that such a loss cannot be determined with exactitude is
no reason for refusing to allow them at all. In such a case damages
should be allowed for the diminution in profits from the time of
the interruption until the business has resumed its normal
proportions, based upon the time it has taken or will take the owner
to rebuild it by the exercise of proper diligence.

Keywords Collision, Commission Agent, Incapacitated to work

RELEVANT FACTS

• Plaintiff Lucio Algarra received personal injuries as a result of defendant's

(Sixto Sandejas) negligent act and was incapacitated for labor for two months.
o Collision with the defendant’s automobile due to the negligence of the
defendant who was driving the car

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Torts and Damages

• As a result of the injuries received, plaintiff was obliged to spend ten days in
the hospital, during the first four or five of which he could not leave his bed.
After being discharged from the hospital, he received medical attention from
a private practitioner for several days. The latter testified that after the last
treatment the plaintiff described himself as being well.

• On the trial the plaintiff testified that he had done no work since the accident,
which occurred on July 9, 1912, and that he was not yet entirely recovered.

o Plaintiff testified that his earning capicity was P50 per month. It is not
clear at what time plaintiff became entirely well again, but as the doctor
to whom he described himself as being well stated that this was about
the last of July, and the trial took place September 19, two months' pay
would seem sufficient for the actual time lost from his work. Plaintiff
further testified that he paid the doctor P8 and expended P2 for
medicines. This expense, amounting in all to P110, should also be
allowed.

• Plaintiff was a commission agent, had about twenty regular customers, who
purchased his wares in small quantities, necessitating regular and frequent
deliveries. Being unable to attend to their wants during the two months he was
incapacitated, his regular customers turned their trade to other competing
agents. On recovering, he had lost all but four regular customers, whose
purchases netted him about seven pesos per month. It took him four years to
build up his patronage to its proportions at the time of the accident. At that
time this trade netted him about fifty pesos per month. Upon these facts he
should be allowed fifty pesos per month for the actual time he was
incapacitated, his medical expenses, and for diminution in profits of his
business for one year, during which he should be able to rebuild his business
to its former proportions.

LOWER COURT RULINGS

- Recognized the claim but refused to allow him anything for injury to his business due to
his enforced absence therefrom;
o The alleged damages which the court refused to entertain in that case (Marcelo
vs Velasco) and under the discussion of which appears the above quotation from
Viada, were for pain and suffering the plaintiff may have experienced.

ISSUE RATIO
Yes.
Whether or not there is
actual or compensatory Actions for damages such as the case at bar are based upon
article 1902 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:
damage despite
"A person who, by act or omission, causes damage to another
absence of malicious
when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage
intent so done."

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Torts and Damages

Of this article, the supreme court of Spain, in its decision of

February 7, 1900, in considering the indemnity imposed by
it,said: "It is undisputed that said reparation, to be efficacious
and substantial, must rationally include the generic idea of
complete indemnity, such as is defined and explained in article
1106 of the said (Civil) Code."

Articles 1106 and 1107 of the Civil Code read as follows:

"1106. Indemnity for losses and damages includes not only
the amount of the loss which may have been suffered, but also that of
the profit which the creditor may have failed to realize, reserving the
provisions contained in the following articles.

"1107. The losses and damages for which a debtor in

goodfaith is liable, are those foreseen or which may have been foreseen,
at the time of constituting the obligation, and which may be a
necessary consequence of its nonfulfillment.
"In case of fraud, the debtor shall be liable for all those
whichclearly may originate from the nonfulfillment of the
obligation."
Fraud is not an element of the present case, and we
are not therefore concerned with it. The liability of the present
defendant includes only those damages which were "foreseen
or may have been foreseen" at the time of the accident, and
which are the necessary and immediate consequences of his
fault.

Notes
"The purpose of the law in awarding actual damages is torepair the wrong that has been done, to
compensate for the injuryinflicted, and not to impose a penalty. Actual damages are notdependent
on nor graded by the intent with which the wrongfulact is done." (Field vs. Munster, 11 Tex. Civ.
Appl., 341, 32 S.W., 417.) "The words 'actual damages' shall be construed to include all damages
that the plaintiff may show he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession,
or occupation, and no other damages whatever." (Gen. Stat. Minn., 1894, sec.5418.) "Actual
damages are compensatory only." (Lord, Owen &Co. vs. Wood, 120 lowa, 303, 94 N. W., 842.)

" 'Compensatory damages' as indicated by the word employed to characterize them, simply make
good or replace the loss caused by the wrong. They proceed from a sense of natural justice, and
are designed to repair that of which one has been deprived by the wrong ofanother." (Reid vs.
Terwilliger, 116 N. Y., 530; 22 N. E., 1091.) "'Compensatory damages' are such as are awarded to
compensate the injured party for injury caused by the wrong, and must be only such as make just
and fair compensation, and are due when the wrong is established, whether it was committed
maliciously—that is, with evil intention—or not." (Wimer vs. Allbaugh, 78Iowa, 79; 42 N. W.,
587; 16 Am. St. Rep., 422.)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The judgment of the lower court is set aside, and the plaintiff is awarded the following
damages: ten pesos for medical expenses; one hundred pesos for the two months of his enforced
absence from his business; and two hundred and fifty pesos for the damage done to his business
in the way of loss of profits, or a total of three hundred and sixty pesos. No costs will be allowed
in this instance.

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