Justice and Fairness: Promoting the Common Good

Pre-discussion: In light of President Duterte's free tuition bill, RA 10931, also known as
the "Universal Access to Quality Tertiary Education Act," all college students now have
the option of enrolling in any state schools and universities without paying tuition or
other expenses. Are you in favor of students receiving the same privileges regardless of
their financial status (upper class, middle class, or lower class)?

It's time to learn!

What to expect: How will you know if your decision was correct and reasonable? To
begin, you must comprehend how some philosophers regard justice and fairness. Later
on, you should be able to evaluate justice and fairness and apply what you've learned in
the classroom to real-life situations.

The Nature of the Theory

What is A Theory of Justice?

A Theory of Justice holds that every individual has an equal right to basic liberties, and
that they should have the right to opportunities and an equal chance as other individuals
of similar ability.

Fairness is a common definition of justice. It is the establishment or determination of

rights in a community based on its legal or equitable principles. It refers to impartiality
and the absence of any special treatment. Meaning everyone has the same chance.

• Although justice is a global concept, the way it is understood varies from culture to
culture.
• A good understanding of the frameworks that supports it is important for the role it
plays in maintaining social order.
• The famous Greek philosopher Plato proposed an early theory of justice is one of
his Dialogues, The Republic. Many other theories have arisen to explain the
concept of justice.
• From the divine Theory, Natural Law Theory, and philosophies within the social
contract tradition wherein it is believed that justice is derived from the mutual
agreement of concerned parties.
• Another American moral and political philosopher, John Rawls published a
Theory of Justice in 1971. Rawls argued that equal distribution of resources
should be the desirable state of nature, as opposed to following utilitarian
philosophies.

Justice according to Rawls, speaks about impartiality meaning no special treatment. It

speaks about every individual has equal opportunity and rights.

 The Two Principles of Justice

John Rawls presented two principles of justice that self-interested and rational
individuals would choose when separated by the veil of ignorance. The principles
include:

 1. Principle of Equal Liberty

The principle of equal liberty is the first principle of justice to be derived from the original
position. It states that all citizens have an equal right to basic liberties, which, according
to Rawls, entails freedom of conscience, expression, association, and democratic rights.

Rawls added the right of personal property as one of the basic liberties that individuals
should have, and that cannot be infringed or amended by the government. He, however,
excluded an absolute right to unlimited personal properties as part of the basic liberties
that people should have.

 2. Principle of Equality

The principle of equality holds that economic principles should be arranged in a way
that they meet two requirements. First, the least advantaged in society should receive a
greater number of benefits.

Second, the economic inequalities should be arranged in a way that no individual is

blocked from occupying any position or office, regardless of their ethnicity, sex, or social
background. Rawls argued that all individuals in the society should have fair equality of
opportunities and an equal chance as everybody else of similar natural ability.

Distributive Justice

For society to achieve some form of organization in its state of affair, a system is
employed for the members of the state to be assured that their action moves towards the
common good.

Meaning policy is implemented in each state to make sure that everyone is

protected and receive equal treatment but since the world is imperfect though we have
policies, there are cases that justice is unbiased.

Remember that even we have struggle, somehow we can achieve justice

because we have a JUST God. He will judge us fairly as He sees what we are doing.

Distributive Justice is concerned with how goods, duties and privilege are allotted or
distributed using as basis the merits of individuals while at the same time considering
the best interest of the society.

The system of distributing goods should emphasize fairness in the way goods are allotted
to people.
Problems usually arise when society has limited number of resources and wealth that fair
allocation becomes a source of conflict and debate.

Because we have varied visions, attitudes, or what they call individualism, not
everyone profited from the resources. Others are resourceful and quickly prosper.
But never forget that we succeed not for ourselves, but for our fellow man, which
means we must aid one another. The best example is what we are witnessing today
(pandemic), in which everyone is extending assistance to those in need, particularly
businesses, who have aided a large number of people by providing food, services,
personal protective equipment, and other items. It is, indeed, distributive justice. We
must show compassion and generosity to people who require assistance. What we
have isn't solely for our benefit. God bless us so that we can bless others as well.

Justice and Fairness

Many public policy arguments focus on fairness. Is affirmative action fair? Are
congressional districts drawn to be fair? Is our tax policy fair? Is our method for funding
schools fair?

Arguments about justice or fairness have a long tradition in Western civilization. In fact,
no idea in Western civilization has been more consistently linked to ethics and morality
than the idea of justice. From the Republic, written by the ancient Greek philosopher
Plato, to A Theory of Justice, written by the late Harvard philosopher John Rawls, every
major work on ethics has held that justice is part of the central core of morality.

Justice means giving each person what he or she deserves or, in more traditional terms,
giving each person his or her due. Justice and fairness are closely related terms that
are often today used interchangeably. There have, however, also been more distinct
understandings of the two terms. While justice usually has been used with reference to
a standard of rightness, fairness often has been used with regard to an ability to judge
without reference to one's feelings or interests; fairness has also been used to refer to
the ability to make judgments that are not overly general but that are concrete and
specific to a particular case. In any case, a notion of being treated as one deserves is
crucial to both justice and fairness.

When people differ over what they believe should be given, or when decisions have to
be made about how benefits and burdens should be distributed among a group of
people, questions of justice or fairness inevitably arise. In fact, most ethicists today hold
the view that there would be no point of talking about justice or fairness if it were not for
the conflicts of interest that are created when goods and services are scarce and people
differ over who should get what. When such conflicts arise in our society, we need
principles of justice that we can all accept as reasonable and fair standards for
determining what people deserve.
But saying that justice is giving each person what he or she deserves does not take us
very far. How do we determine what people deserve? What criteria and what principles
should we use to determine what is due to this or that person?

Principles of Justice

The most fundamental principle of justice—one that has been widely accepted since it
was first defined by Aristotle more than two thousand years ago—is the principle that
"equals should be treated equally and unequal’s unequally." In its contemporary form,
this principle is sometimes expressed as follows: "Individuals should be treated the
same, unless they differ in ways that are relevant to the situation in which they are
involved." For example, if Jack and Jill both do the same work, and there are no
relevant differences between them or the work they are doing, then in justice they
should be paid the same wages. And if Jack is paid more than Jill simply because he is
a man, or because he is white, then we have an injustice—a form of discrimination—
because race and sex are not relevant to normal work situations.

There are, however, many differences that we deem as justifiable criteria for treating
people differently. For example, we think it is fair and just when a parent gives his own
children more attention and care in his private affairs than he gives the children of
others; we think it is fair when the person who is first in a line at a theater is given first
choice of theater tickets; we think it is just when the government gives benefits to the
needy that it does not provide to more affluent citizens; we think it is just when some
who have done wrong are given punishments that are not meted out to others who have
done nothing wrong; and we think it is fair when those who exert more efforts or who
make a greater contribution to a project receive more benefits from the project than
others. These criteria—need, desert, contribution, and effort—we acknowledge as
justifying differential treatment, then, are numerous.

On the other hand, there are also criteria that we believe are not justifiable grounds for
giving people different treatment. In the world of work, for example, we generally hold
that it is unjust to give individuals special treatment on the basis of age, sex, race, or
their religious preferences. If the judge's nephew receives a suspended sentence for
armed robbery when another offender unrelated to the judge goes to jail for the same
crime, or the brother of the Director of Public Works gets the million-dollar contract to
install sprinklers on the municipal golf course despite lower bids from other contractors,
we say that it's unfair. We also believe it isn't fair when a person is punished for
something over which he or she had no control, or isn't compensated for a harm he or
she suffered. 

Different Kinds of Justice

There are different kinds of justice. Distributive justice refers to the extent to which
society's institutions ensure that benefits and burdens are distributed among society's
members in ways that are fair and just. When the institutions of a society distribute
benefits or burdens in unjust ways, there is a strong presumption that those institutions
should be changed. For example, the American institution of slavery in the pre-civil war
South was condemned as unjust because it was a glaring case of treating people
differently on the basis of race.

A second important kind of justice is retributive or corrective justice. Retributive justice

refers to the extent to which punishments are fair and just. In general, punishments are
held to be just to the extent that they take into account relevant criteria such as the
seriousness of the crime and the intent of the criminal, and discount irrelevant criteria
such as race. It would be barbarously unjust, for example, to chop off a person's hand
for stealing a dime, or to impose the death penalty on a person who by accident and
without negligence injured another party. Studies have frequently shown that when
blacks murder whites, they are much more likely to receive death sentences than when
whites murder whites or blacks murder blacks. These studies suggest that injustice still
exists in the criminal justice system in the United States.

Yet a third important kind of justice is compensatory justice. Compensatory justice

refers to the extent to which people are fairly compensated for their injuries by those
who have injured them; just compensation is proportional to the loss inflicted on a
person. This is precisely the kind of justice that is at stake in debates over damage to
workers' health in coal mines. Some argue that mine owners should compensate the
workers whose health has been ruined. Others argue that workers voluntarily took on
this risk when they chose employment in the mines.

The foundations of justice can be traced to the notions of social stability,

interdependence, and equal dignity. As the ethicist John Rawls has pointed out, the
stability of a society—or any group, for that matter—depends upon the extent to which
the members of that society feel that they are being treated justly. When some of
society's members come to feel that they are subject to unequal treatment, the
foundations have been laid for social unrest, disturbances, and strife. The members of a
community, Rawls holds, depend on each other, and they will retain their social unity
only to the extent that their institutions are just. Moreover, as the philosopher Immanuel
Kant and others have pointed out, human beings are all equal in this respect: they all
have the same dignity, and in virtue of this dignity they deserve to be treated as equals.
Whenever individuals are treated unequally on the basis of characteristics that are
arbitrary and irrelevant, their fundamental human dignity is violated.

Justice, then, is a central part of ethics and should be given due consideration in our
moral lives. In evaluating any moral decision, we must ask whether our actions treat all
persons equally. If not, we must determine whether the difference in treatment is
justified: are the criteria we are using relevant to the situation at hand? But justice is not
the only principle to consider in making ethical decisions. Sometimes principles of
justice may need to be overridden in favor of other kinds of moral claims such as rights
or society's welfare. Nevertheless, justice is an expression of our mutual recognition of
each other's basic dignity, and an acknowledgement that if we are to live together in an
interdependent community, we must treat each other as equals.

Distributive Justice
Distributive justice is concerned with the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits of
social cooperation among diverse persons with competing needs and claims. A theory
of distributive justice must set out an account of political justification specifying the
weight to be assigned to various kinds of relevant considerations and providing an
acceptable description of the standpoint from which judgments are formed. The theory
must employ these resources to justify an account of a just distribution of social goods,
determining, in the process, the priority to be assigned to considerations such as claims
of right, entitlement, efficiency, equality, fairness, and community.
The economic, political, and social frameworks that each society has—its laws,
institutions, policies, etc.—result in different distributions of benefits and burdens across
members of the society. These frameworks are the result of human political processes
and they constantly change both across societies and within societies over time. The
structure of these frameworks is important because the distributions of benefits and
burdens resulting from them fundamentally affect people’s lives. Arguments about which
frameworks and/or resulting distributions are morally preferable constitute the topic of
distributive justice. Principles of distributive justice are therefore best thought of as
providing moral guidance for the political processes and structures that affect the
distribution of benefits and burdens in societies, and any principles which do offer this
kind of moral guidance on distribution, regardless of the terminology they employ,
should be considered principles of distributive justice.
This entry is structured in the following way. After outlining the scope of the entry and
the role of distributive principles, the first relatively simple principle of distributive justice
examined is Strict Egalitarianism, which calls for the allocation of equal material goods
to all members of society. John Rawls’ alternative distributive principle, which he calls
the Difference Principle, is examined next. The Difference Principle permits diverging
from strict equality so long as the inequalities in question would make the least
advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict equality.
Some have thought that neither strict equality nor Rawls’ Difference Principle capture
the important moral roles of luck and responsibility. The “Luck Egalitarianism” literature
comprises varying attempts to design distributive principles that are appropriately
sensitive to considerations of responsibility and luck. Desert-based principles similarly
emphasize the moral roles of responsibility and luck but are distinct because they
approach these factors through claims about what people deserve because of their
work.
Advocates of welfare-based principles (of which utilitarianism is the most famous) do
not believe the primary distributive concern should be material goods and services.
They argue that material goods and services have no intrinsic value but are valuable
only in so far as they increase welfare. Hence, they argue, distributive principles should
be designed and assessed according to how they affect welfare, either its maximization
or distribution. Advocates of libertarian principles, by contrast to each of the principles
so far mentioned, generally criticize any distributive ideal that requires the pursuit of
specific ‘patterns’, such as maximization or equality of welfare or of material goods.
They argue that the pursuit of such patterns conflicts with the more important moral
demands of liberty or self-ownership. Finally, feminist critiques of existing distributive
principles note that they tend to ignore the particular circumstances of women, so
feminists tend to argue for principles which are more sensitive to facts such as that
women often have primary responsibility for child-rearing and on average, spend less of
their lifetimes than men in the market economy.
1. Scope and Role of Distributive Principles
Distributive principles vary in numerous dimensions. They vary in what is considered
relevant to distributive justice (income, wealth, opportunities, jobs, welfare, utility, etc.);
in the nature of the recipients of the distribution (individual persons, groups of persons,
reference classes, etc.); and on what basis the distribution should be made (equality,
maximization, according to individual characteristics, according to free transactions,
etc.). In this entry, the focus is primarily on principles designed to cover the distribution
of benefits and burdens of economic activity among individuals in a society. Although
principles of this kind have been the dominant source of Anglo-American debate about
distributive justice over the last six decades, there are other important distributive justice
questions, some of which are covered by other entries in the encyclopedia.
Although the numerous distributive principles vary along different dimensions, for
simplicity, they are presented here in broad categories. Even though these are common
classifications in the literature, it is important to keep in mind they necessarily involve
over-simplification, particularly with respect to the criticisms of each of the groups of
principles. Some criticisms may not apply equally to every principle in the group. The
issue of how we are to understand and respond to criticisms of distributive principles is
discussed briefly in the final section on methodology.
Throughout most of history, people were born into, and largely stayed in, a fairly rigid
economic position. The distribution of economic benefits and burdens was normally
seen as fixed, either by nature or by a deity. Only when there was a widespread
realization that the distribution of economic benefits and burdens could be affected by
government did distributive justice become a live topic. Now the topic is unavoidable.
Governments continuously make and change laws and policies affecting the distribution
of economic benefits and burdens in their societies. Almost all changes, whether they
regard tax, industry, education, health, etc. have distributive effects. As a result, every
society has a different distribution at any point in time and we are becoming increasingly
more adept at measuring that distribution. More importantly, at every point in time now,
each society is faced with a choice about whether to stay with current laws, policies, etc.
or to modify them. The practical contribution of distributive justice theory is to provide
moral guidance for these constant choices.
Many writers on distributive justice have tended to advocate and defend their particular
principles by describing or considering ideal societies operating under them. They have
been motivated to do this as an aid to understanding what their principles mean.
Unfortunately, though, as a result of this practice, some readers and the general public
have been misled into believing that discussions of distributive justice are merely
exercises in ideal theory—to be dismissed as a past-time of the academic elite rather
than as something that is crucially relevant to current political discussion. This
misunderstanding is unfortunate because, in the end, the main purpose of distributive
justice theory is not to inform decisions about ideal societies but about our societies. To
help correct this misunderstanding it is important to acknowledge that there has never
been, and never will be, a purely libertarian society or Rawlsian society, or any society
whose distribution conforms to one of the proposed principles. Rather than guiding
choices between ideal societies, distributive principles are most usefully thought of as
providing moral guidance for the choices that each society faces right now. So, for
instance, advocates of Rawls’ Difference Principle are most constructively understood
as arguing for changes to our basic institutional structures which would improve the
lifetime prospects of the least advantaged in society. Other theorists are arguing for
changes to bring economic benefits and burdens more in accordance with what people
really deserve. Libertarians are arguing that reductions in government intervention in the
economy will better respect liberty and/or self-ownership of its citizens. Sometimes a
number of the theories may recommend the same changes to our current practices;
other times they will diverge. It is best to understand the different theorists, despite the
theoretical devices they sometimes employ, to be speaking to what should be done in
our society—not about what should be done in some hypothetical society. Of course,
ensuring that philosophical principles be effective for the purpose of guiding policy and
change in real societies involves important and complex methodological questions. For
a review of work specifically addressing this issue, in ideal and nonideal theory, see
Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift (2012), and Valentini (2012).
Distributive justice theorists (perhaps like all theorists) tend to emphasize the
differences between their theories. This emphasis also provides an avenue for those
who have an interest in ignoring distributive justice to dismiss the relevance of the
distributive justice literature—‘we cannot get any guidance from these theorists—they
completely disagree with each other’. Such dismissals misunderstand that it is
impossible not to take a stand on distributive justice at every moment of a society’s
existence. This misunderstanding is, perhaps, best illustrated by the most common type
of dismissal. Often governments try to justify inaction, in the face of calls to change
some government policy in light of some distributive justice concern, on the grounds
that there are ‘disagreements/lack of consensus’ about the issue. Of course, there
always are disagreements, on any topic, whether moral or empirical, which will have a
differential effect on people’s material interests. But to think that this points to the
desired conclusion—that in light of this we should retain the status quo for the time
being—reveals a confusion about the nature of the choices always facing each society.
So, in this instance, to claim that we should not pursue any changes to our economic
structures in light of a distributive justice argument calling for change is, by its very
nature, to take a stand on the distributive justice of (or, if one prefers, the morality of)
the current distribution and structures in the society compared to any of the possible
alternative distributions and structures practically available. At any particular moment
the existing economic and institutional framework is influencing the current distribution
of economic and life prospects for all members of the society. To assert that we should
not change the current system is therefore, despite implications to the contrary, to take
a substantive position on distributive justice debates. It is to argue that keeping the
existing distribution is morally preferable to changing to any practical alternative
proposed—to take a substantive position in just the area that it was claimed was too
controversial to consider. Societies cannot avoid taking positions about distributive
justice all the time and any suggestion that they can should be resisted as incoherent.
A related point can be made when people assert that economic structures and policy
should be left to economists, or when people assert that economic policy can be
pursued without reference to distributive justice. These assertions reveal
misconceptions about what distributive justice and economics are, and how they are
related. Positive economics, at its best, can tell us about economic causes and effects.
Positive economics is very important for distributive justice because it can give us
guidance about which changes to pursue in order to better instantiate our moral
principles. What it cannot do, in the absence of the principles, is tell us what we should
do. This point is easily lost in everyday political discussion. When an economist says
‘The Central Bank should raise interest rates’, the general population often, mistakenly,
believes the recommendation is purely coming from the science of economics.
Moreover the ‘should’ is almost always a moral ‘should’. When economists make such a
recommendation they, sometimes unconsciously, have taken off their social scientific
hat. They are employing alongside their positive economic theory, a moral principle.
Suppressing, either consciously or unconsciously, that there are always moral
arguments being employed in arguments about what economic policies a government
should pursue has had the effect of creating misconceptions about the respective roles
of positive economics and distributive justice in government decision-making.
For instance, the raising of interest rates is typically thought by economists to have the
dual effects of suppressing inflation and suppressing employment. To get to a
recommendation that the Central Bank should reduce interest rates involves not only
empirical views about the relative sizes of the inflation and unemployment effects and
their long-term impact on growth, etc. but also normative views about the relative moral
importance of inflation, employment and growth. For economists, these normative views
on economic policies come under the rubric of ‘normative’ economics, while
philosophers would typically categorize them under ‘distributive justice’. But the rubrics
are not important as basically the same area is covered under different names—the
normative evaluation of economic policies, structures, or institutions. (To avoid
confusion it should be noted that the distributive justice tradition includes principles
which do not use ‘justice’ per se, such as utilitarianism, but which are moral principles
relating to distribution just the same.) The evaluations often look different because
economists most commonly use utility as their fundamental moral concept while
philosophers use a wider variety of moral concepts, but the task in which they are both
engaged is very similar. What is most important to understand here is that positive
economics alone cannot, without the guidance of normative principles, recommend
which policies, structures, or institutions to pursue. Distributive justice theories, such as
those discussed in this entry, aim to supply this kind of normative guidance.
2. Strict Egalitarianism
One of the simplest principles of distributive justice is that of strict, or radical, equality.
The principle says that every person should have the same level of material goods
(including burdens) and services. The principle is most commonly justified on the
grounds that people are morally equal and that equality in material goods and services
is the best way to give effect to this moral ideal.
Even with this ostensibly simple principle, some of the difficult specification problems of
distributive principles can be seen. The two main problems are the construction of
appropriate indices for measurement (the index problem), and the specification of time
frames. Because there are numerous proposed solutions to these problems, the
‘principle of strict equality’ is not a single principle but a name for a group of closely
related principles. This range of possible specifications occurs with all the common
principles of distributive justice.
The index problem arises primarily because the goods and services to be distributed
need to be measured if they are going to be distributed according to some pattern (such
as equality). The strict equality principle stated above says that there should be ‘the
same level of material goods and services. The problem is how to specify and measure
levels. The simplest way of solving the index problem in the strict equality case is to
specify that everyone should have the same bundle of material goods and services
rather than the same level (so everyone would have 4 oranges, 6 apples, 1 bike, etc.).
The problem with adopting this simple solution is that there will be many other
allocations of material goods and services which will make some people better off
without making anybody else worse off. Such allocations are what are called ‘Pareto
superior’ allocations (see equality for a more detailed discussion of Pareto efficiency).
For instance, someone who prefers apples to oranges will be better off if she swaps
some of her oranges for some of the apples belonging to a person who prefers oranges.
That way, they are both better off and no one is worse off. Indeed, since most everyone
will wish to trade something, requiring identical equal bundles will make virtually
everybody worse off than they would be under an alternative allocation. So, specifying
that everybody must have the same bundle of goods does not seem to be a satisfactory
way of solving the index problem. Some index for measuring the value of goods and
services is required.
Money is an index for the value of material goods and services. It is an imperfect index
whose pitfalls are documented in most economics textbooks. Moreover, once the goods
to be allocated are extended beyond material ones to include goods such as
opportunities, money must be combined with other indices. (For instance, John Rawls’
index of primary goods—see Rawls 1971.) Nevertheless, using money, either in the
form of income or wealth or both, as an index for the value of material goods and
services is the most common response to the index problem. In terms of public, rather
than academic discourse, GDP (gross domestic product) or per capita GDP is most
commonly touted as the way to measure the effect of governments’ policies on the
population’s well-being. The deficiencies in such indices have now been well-
documented and has led to the proposing of better alternative indices such as the
Human Development Index (HDI) and Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
(IHDI). Unfortunately, the general population is generally unaware of these more
accurate indices and so are disadvantaged in their ability to judge the distributive justice
effects of their governments’ policies.
The second main specification problem involves time frames. Many distributive
principles identify and require that a particular pattern of distribution be achieved or at
least be pursued as the objective of distributive justice. But they also need to
specify when the pattern is required. One version of the principle of strict equality
requires that all people should have the same wealth at some initial point, after which
people are free to use their wealth in whatever way they choose, with the consequence
that future outcomes are bound to be unequal. Principles specifying initial distributions
after which the pattern need not be preserved are commonly called ‘starting-gate’
principles. (See Ackerman 1980, 53–59,168–170,180–186; Alstott and Ackerman
1999.)
Because ‘starting-gate’ principles may eventually lead to large inequalities, strict
egalitarians do not usually favor them. The most common form of strict equality principle
specifies that income (measured in terms of money) should be equal in each time-
frame, though even this may lead to significant disparities in wealth if variations in
savings are permitted. Hence, strict equality principles are commonly conjoined with
some society-wide specification of just saving behavior. In practice, however, this
principle and the starting-gate version might require more similar distributions than it
first appears. This is because the structure of the family means the requirement to give
people equal starts will often necessitate redistribution to parents, who due to bad luck,
bad management, or simply their own choices, have been unsuccessful in accruing or
holding on to material goods.

Social Dimensions of Justice

Social justice means to give proper opportunities to every citizen, in every sphere of life,
to develop his personality and to end all types of social inequalities.
Following conditions are necessary to ensure social justice:
 Equality before law
 Absence of special rights
 Prohibitions of discrimination
 To end caste system
 Just distribution of wealth
 Democratic government
 Just balance between freedom and social control
 Social security
 Provision of equal political rights
 Protection of interest of minorities
 Abolition of social values.
The concept of Social Justice is based on the belief that all human being is equal and
that no discrimination should be made on the ground of race, religion, caste, sex, or
place of birth.

It has three implications

1. Equal social opportunities

2. Special attention to weaker sections
3. Removal of social evils

Economic Dimensions of Justice

Economic justice means to provide equal opportunities to everybody to earn his
livelihood. It also means to help such people who are not able to work and earn their
livelihood. The basic needs of everybody such as food, cloth and shelter, should be
fulfilled and the unequal distribution of wealth needed to be stopped. Economic justice
implies non-discrimination between man and man on the basis of economic viability. It
stands for by assuring adequate means of livelihood to all, by making provisions for
adequate working conditions, for equal pay for equal work, fair distribution of resources,
equal economic opportunities to all people etc. The concept of economic justice was
emphasized by the socialistic thinkers.

Following conditions are necessary to ensure economic justice.

 Right to work for everybody. Fulfillment of basic needs.
 reduce wide economic disparities.
 Protection of the interest of workers according to his ability and needs
 Just distribution of wealth
 End of economic exploitation
 Special protection of the interest of weaker section
 Limited right to property
 Question of state interference in economic needs
 Fixed economy is better
 Equal wages for same job

Principles of Taxation
Taxation is the inherent power of the sovereign, exercised through the legislature, to
impose burdens upon subjects and objects within its jurisdiction for the purpose of
raising revenues to carry out the legitimate objects of government. It is the action,
process, or system of taxing people or things

Taxes are the enforced proportional contributions from persons and property levied by
the law-making body of the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the
government and all public needs.

Essential elements of a tax

 1. It is enforced contributions which signifies that it is compulsory on the part of the
government and an obligation of the citizen.
2. is generally payable in money.
3. It is proportionate in character which means it is largely based on the ability to
pay principle.
4. It is levied on persons, property, or the exercise of a right or privilege.
5. It is levied by the state which has jurisdiction over the subjects or objects of
taxation.
6. It is levied by the law-making body of the state which is deemed to be the direct
representatives of the taxpayers themselves, the people.
7. It is levied for public purpose or purposes which takes the form of benefit for the
greater majority.

Purposes of taxation
1. Revenue or fiscal: the primary purpose of the taxation on the part of the
government is to provide funds or property with which to promote the general
welfare and the protection of its citizens and to enable it to finance its multifarious
activities without which the government cannot function.
2. Non-revenue or regulatory: taxation may also be employed for purposes of
regulation or control. This takes the form of the following measures, to wit;
a.) imposition or tariffs on imported goods to protect local industries
b.) the adoption of progressively higher tax rates to reduce inequalities in
wealth and income
c.) the increase or decrease of taxes prevent inflation or ward off
depression.

Public Purpose in Taxation

This is one of the inherent limitations of the power to tax and is synonymous to
“governmental purpose”, a tax must always be imposed for a public purpose otherwise,
it will be declared as invalid. The term “public purpose” has no fixed connotation.

It has been said that the best test of rightful taxation is the proceeds tax must be used:
a) For the support of the government; or
b) Some of the recognized objects of government; or
c) To promote the welfare of the community

Effects of incidental benefit to private interest

The purpose to be accomplished by taxation need not to be exclusively public although
private individuals are directly benefited, the tax would still be valid provided such
benefit is only incidental. The test is not as to who receives the money, but the
character of the purpose for which it is expended; not the immediate result of the
expenditure, but rather the ultimate results.

Inherent limitations
1. Purpose must be public in nature
 2. Prohibition against delegation of the taxing power
3. Exemption of government entities, agencies and instrumentalities
4. International comity
5. Limitation of territorial jurisdiction

Nature of the power of taxation

1. It is inherent in sovereignty; hence, it may be exercised although it is not
expressly granted by the constitution.
2. It is legislative in character; hence, only the legislature can impose taxes.
3. It is subject to constitutional and inherent limitations; hence, it is not an absolute
power that can be exercised by the legislature anyway it pleases.