PROJECT SUBMISSION ON PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES AND ETHICS

TOPIC

In Re Keshav Singh Vs. Speaker Legislative Assembly, 1965 SC 745

Bench - Hon'ble Judges P.B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., A.K. Sarkar, J.C. Shah, K.H. Subba Rao,
K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.

BY
SUSHMA
Roll No – 10287
2nd semester, LLM Constitutional & Administrative Law

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 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project entitled “In Re Keshav Singh Vs. Speaker Legislative
Assembly” submitted by me for evaluation is the result of my original and independent
research work.

Date:

SUSHMA
Roll No – 10287
LLM, Constitutional and
Administrative Law NUALS, Kochi

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 IN RE KESHAV SINGH VS. SPEAKER LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY,
1965 SC 745

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

In 1964, the Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly put forward a claim to determine the scope
of its constitutional power to punish citizens for its contempt. This claim was advanced upon
the basis that such power to interpret the Constitution on such a matter was itself a privilege
conferred upon the Assembly by the Constitution under Article 194(3). The Assembly tried to
enforce this claim by ordering the production, by way of punishment, of two Judges of the
Allahabad High Court in custody because they had entertained the Habeas Corpus petition of
a citizen, Keshav Singh, and had passed an interim order of release of the petitioner on bail
after the petitioner had been arrested on a warrant issued by the Speaker of the Assembly and
sent to prison for its contempt. The petitioner's complaint to the High Court was that the
Legislative Assembly had stepped beyond the limits of its constitutional power to punish its
contempt. The filing of the Habeas Corpus petition by Keshav Singh demanded a reference of
several questions of grave constitutional importance by the President to the Supreme Court of
India. These questions had to be answered by the Supreme Court before Keshav Singh's case
could be finally decided by the Allahabad High Court.

FACTS IN ISSUE

The facts of the Keshav Singh’s case are not controversial but a little long and complicated.
The Uttar Pradesh Assembly had passed a resolution on March 14, 1964, that a reprimand be
administered to Keshav Singh, who is a resident of Gorakhpur, for having committed
contempt of the House and also for having committed a breach of the privileges of Narsingh
Narain Pandey, a member of the House. The contempt of the House and the breach of
privileges arose because of pamphlets which were printed and distributed, and which bore the
signature of Keshav Singh, libelling Mr. Pandey, accusing him of bribery and corruption. In
spite of being repeatedly required to appear before the Assembly, Keshav Singh refused to do
so, quoting inability to pay the fare for the travel journey to Lucknow. He was later brought
to the Assembly in execution of a warrant issued by the Speaker of the House on March 14,

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1964. He refused to take part in the proceedings of the House, showing great disrespect to the
House. Shortly after the reprimand was administered to him, the Speaker brought to the
notice of the Assembly a letter dated March 11, 1964, which Keshav Singh wrote to him, in
which he stated that he “protested against the sentence of reprimand and had absolutely no
hesitation in calling a corrupt man corrupt”, adding that “the contents of his pamphlet were
correct and that a brutal attack had been made on democracy by issuing the warrant on him”.
The Assembly therefore passed a resolution and sentenced Keshav Singh to imprisonment for
seven days for having written a letter worded in language which constitutes contempt of the
House and his misbehaviour in the House. A general or unspeaking warrant, which did not
cite the facts which constituted contempt, was issued to the Marshal of the House and the
Superintendent, District Jail, Lucknow. Keshav Singh was taken to jail on the same day and
kept imprisoned there. On March 19, 1964, six days after his arrest, Keshav Singh’s advocate
presented a petition to a bench of Allahabad High Court for a writ of Habeas Corpus for the
release of Keshav Singh stating that he had been deprived of his personal liberty without any
authority of law and that this detention was mala fide and with ill-will. The petition was made
under Article 226 of the Constitution and section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The
Court, on the merits of the petition, pronounced a judgement that Keshav Singh be released
on bail on a few conditions. This judgement intervened with the sentence of imprisonment
passed by the House by permitting Keshav Singh to be released before he had served the full
term of his sentence. Therefore, on March 21, 1964, the Assembly passed a resolution stating
that both the Judges of the Lucknow Bench and his advocate be brought in custody before the
House, and also that Keshav Singh be taken into custody and brought before the House after
he had served the remainder of his sentence. On the same day, both the Judges filed petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Allahabad High Court itself to quash the
resolution of the Assembly of March 21, 1964. Warrants were issued on March 23, 1964 to
the Marshal of the House and the Commissioner of Lucknow for carrying out the terms of the
resolution. This petition was heard by all the Judges of the High Court excepting those two
Judges and they passed a judgement on the same day directing the resolution be stayed. The
Assembly later stated that Judges will not be arrested but issued notices to them to appear in
the House to justify their actions of delivering judgement against the House. The warrants
issued on March 23, 1964, which had never been executed, were withdrawn in view of these
notices.

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Considering the entire case facts and the conflict between the legislature and the judiciary,
the President of India had formulated five questions for the opinion of the Supreme Court
under Article 143(1), which authorizes the President “to refer to Supreme Court questions of
law or facts, which appear to him, to have arisen or are likely to arise, and which are of such
a nature and of such public importance that it is expedient to obtain the opinion of the
Supreme Court”. In his Order of Reference made on March 26, 1964, the President expressed
his conclusions that the questions of law set out in the Reference 1 are of such a nature and of
such public importance that it is expedient that the opinion of the Supreme Court of India
should be obtained in Keshav Singh’s case.
The facts clearly indicated that there was a serious conflict between the jurisdiction of the
High Court and its Judges in relation to the State Legislature (House) and its officers and
regarding the powers, privileges and immunities of the State Legislature and its members in
relation to the High Court and its Judges in the discharge of their duties. The questions
referred to the Supreme Court under the Reference were:
(a) Whether it was competent for the Lucknow Bench of the High Court of Uttar
Pradesh to deal with the petition of Mr. Keshav Singh against the sentence of
imprisonment imposed upon him by the House
(b) Whether Mr. Keshav Singh, his Advocate, and the two Judges committed contempt
of the House
(c) Whether it was competent for the House to direct the production of the two Judges
and the Advocate before it in custody and to seek explanation
(d) Whether it was competent for the Full Bench of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh to
deal with the petitions of the two Judges and the Advocate and to pass orders
(e) Whether a Judge of a High Court, who deals with a petition challenging any order of
a House for its contempt or for infringement of its privileges and immunities, or who
passes any order on such petition, commits contempt of the House, and whether the
House is competent to take proceedings against such a Judge in the exercise and
enforcement of its powers, privileges and immunities.
The Supreme Court referred to so many cases and precedents across the world in detail and
finally came to certain conclusions regarding the answers. (a) The Lucknow Bench was
competent to deal with Habeas Corpus petitions generally. (b) There was no material to prove

1
In the Matter Of: Under Article 143 ... vs Unknown on 30 September 1964 Equivalent citations: AIR 1965 SC
745

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that the presentation of the petition was an illegal act and therefore no contempt was,
committed by both the Judges and Keshav Singh about the filing of the petition. (c) It was not
competent for the House to charge the Judges to be guilty of contempt without giving them a
hearing and they were also incompetent to order their custody. (d) The Full Bench had the
power to pass the interim orders that it did. (e) Neither does a Judge who entertains the
petition of a person against a House’s order commit contempt of the House, nor is the House
competent to take actions against the Judge.
The petition for bail was filed in Allahabad High Court after the Supreme Court sent its
suggestion to the President through the Reference.

PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE JUDGES – BY MR. M.C SETALVAD

a. The House does not possess any penal jurisdiction and has no power to punish any person
for its contempt.

b. Even if the House had such power, the detention of the petitioner is illegal since it is in
violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution.

c. The conviction of the petitioner by the House was in violation of the provisions of
Articles 21 and 22(1) and of the principles of Natural Justice.

d. The Superintendent, District Jail, Lucknow, had no power to receive and detain the
petitioner based on the warrant issued by the House.

e. The actions of the House to punish the petitioner were mala fide and out of political ill-
will.

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENTS – BY MR. H.M SEERVAI

a. The House possesses penal jurisdiction under Article 194(3) and since it is also a court of
record, it can punish persons for its contempt.
b. Provisions of Part III of the Constitution are not relevant to a case falling under Article
194(3) of the Constitution; the former always yield to the later.

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c. Deprivation of the personal liberty of the petitioner is according to the procedure laid
down and established by law.
d. There is no express prohibition against the Superintendent of a Jail receiving persons sent
by a competent authority other than a Court of law and therefore Superintendent of that
jail was bound by law to receive the petitioner and to detain him in accordance with the
warrant issued by the Speaker.
e. The mere fact that the person committed for contempt belongs to some other political
party other than the majority party in the House is no indication of the fact that the House
acted mala fide.

SUPREME COURT

Parliament in England is supreme but not in India. The essential characteristic of federalism
is "the distribution of limited executive, legislative and judicial authority among bodies
which are co-ordinate with an independent of each other’s" The supremacy of the
constitution is fundamental to the existence of a federal State in order to prevent either
the legislature of the federal unit or those of the member States from destroying or
impairing that delicate balance of power which satisfies the requirements of States
which are desirous of union, but not prepared to merge their individuality in a unity.
This supremacy of the constitution is protected by the authority of an independent
judicial body to act as the interpreter of a scheme of distribution of powers. Nor is any
change possible in the constitution by the ordinary process of federal or State
legislation. Thus, the dominant characteristic of the British Constitution cannot be
claimed by a federal constitution like ours.

Our Legislatures have undoubtedly plenary powers, but these powers are controlled by
the basic concepts of the written Constitution itself and can be exercised within the
legislative fields allotted to their jurisdiction by the three Lists under the Seventh Schedule;
but beyond the Lists, the Legislatures cannot travel. They can no doubt exercise their plenary
legislative authority and discharge their legislative functions by virtue of the power conferred
on them by the relevant provisions of the Constitution; but the basis of the power is the
constitution itself. Besides, the legislative supremacy of our Legislatures including the
Parliament is normally controlled by the provisions contained in Part III of the Constitution.

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If the Legislatures step beyond the legislative fields assigned to them, or acting within their
respective fields, they trespass on the fundamental rights of the citizens in a manner not
justified by the relevant article dealing with the said fundamental rights, their legislative
actions are liable to be struck down by courts in India. Therefore, it is necessary to remember
that though our Legislatures have plenary powers, they function within the limits prescribed
by the material and relevant provisions of the Constitution.

In a democratic country governed by a written Constitution, is the Constitution which is

supreme and supreme and sovereign. It is no doubt true that the Constitution itself can be
amended by the Parliament, but that is possible because Art. 368 of the Constitution itself
makes a provision in that behalf, and the amendment of the Constitution can be validity made
only by following the procedure prescribed by the said article. That shows that even when the
Parliament purports to amend the Constitution, it has to comply with the relevant mandate of
the Constitution itself. Legislators, Ministers, and Judges all take oath of allegiance to the
Constitution, for it is by the relevant provisions of the Constitution that they derive their
authority and jurisdiction, and it is to the provisions of the Constitution that they owe
allegiance. Therefore, there can be no doubt that the sovereignty which can be claimed by the
Parliament in England, cannot be claimed by any Legislature in India in the literal absolute
sense.

There is another aspect of this matter which must also be mentioned; whether there is distinct
and rigid separation of powers under the Indian Constitution, there is no doubt that the
Constitution has entrusted to the Judicature in this country the task of construing the
provisions of the Constitution and of safeguarding the fundamental rights of the citizens.
When a statute is challenged on the ground that it has been passed by Legislature without
authority, or has otherwise unconstitutionally trespassed on fundamental rights, it is for the
courts to determine the dispute and decide whether the law passed by the legislature is valid
or not. Just as the legislatures are conferred legislative functions, and the functions and
authority of the executive lie within the domain of executive authority, so the jurisdiction and
authority of the Judicature in this country lie within the domain of adjudication. If the validity
of any law is challenged before the courts, it is never suggested that the material question as
to whether legislative authority has been exceeded or fundamental rights have been
contravened, can be decided by the legislatures themselves.

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Adjudication of such a dispute is entrusted solely and exclusively to the Judicature of this
country; and so, we feel no difficulty in holding that the decision about the construction of
Art. 194(3) must ultimately rest exclusively with the Judicature of this country. That is why
we must over-rule Mr. Seervai's argument that the question of determining the nature, scope
and effect of the powers of the House cannot be said to lie exclusively within the jurisdiction
of this Court. This conclusion, however, would not impair the validity of Mr. Seervai's
contention that the advisory opinion rendered by us in the present Reference
proceedings is not adjudication properly so-called and would bind no parties as such.

 All the three organs must act in coordination and not with hostility.
 Article 121 and 211: Conduct of judges cannot be discussed then how can have held
them responsible for contempt. The existence of fearless and independent judiciary is
foundation of constitutional structure. No legislature has power to act under Article
194 and 105.
 Right to approach court under Article 32 and 226 cannot be controlled by Article
105 and 194.

The court rejected the argument of Mr Seervai that house has absolute power and a general
and non-speaking warrant issued by it would be conclusive and free from judicial scrutiny.

The House of Commons enjoyed the privilege to commit a person for contempt by a non-
justiciable general warrant, as a superior court of record in the land and not as Legislature.
Even if the House of Commons has this privilege as a legislative organ, parliament and state
Legislature in cannot claim it because of the existence of the Fundamental Rights and the
doctrine of judicial review. Thus, court has power to examine a nonspeaking warrant of
house. It can be scrutinized on the ground that it violates Article 21 and malafide,
capricious and perverse.

AFTERMATH OF REFERENCE ORDER BY SUPREME COURT

After the Supreme Court’s opinion to the President, the Allahabad High Court, going through
the facts and circumstances of the petition, still dismissed it and refused to interfere with the
judgment of the House. The HC turned down Keshav Singh’s contention that the facts found
by the Assembly against the petitioner did not amount to contempt of the Assembly. The HC

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also dictated that there was neither a violation of Article 21 nor of natural justice by the
respondent, since the legislature had formulated the rules to investigate complaints of breach
of privileges. The HC also stated that the Superintendent of the District jail was well within
his jurisdictional limits to execute the warrant received from the Speaker. The HC said that
provisions of Part III of the Constitution are not relevant to a case falling under Article 194(3)
of the Constitution and reiterated that the fundamental rights in Part III yield to Article
194(3). The HC also ruled that the deprivation of the personal liberty of the petitioner is
according to the procedure laid down and established by law under the latter part of Article
194(3). The petitioner had also argued that his committal by the Assembly was mala fide as
the Assembly was dominated by political ill-will and hatred. The charge of mala fides
against the House could not be substantiated merely from the fact that the person charged
belonged to a political party different from the majority party in the House. The HC disposed
Keshav Singh’s case and refused to infer mala fides in the Assembly. The High Court held,
dismissing Keshav Singh’s petition, that whether there had been contempt of the House, or
not, in a particular situation, is a matter exclusively for the House to decide and the court
would not go into the question of legality.

REFERENCES

 Subhash C. Kashyap, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGES IN INDIA, 1554 (2000)

 In the Matter Of: Under Article 143 ... vs Unknown on 30 September 1964 Equivalent
citations: AIR 1965 SC 745
 https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/parliamentary-privileges/
 http://constitutionalrenaissance.in/keshav-singhs-case-ii-on-presidents-reference-under-
article-143/

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