Immovable Property

Article 415

1. Leung Yee v. Strong Machinery

GR NO. L-11658
Feb 15, 1918

The “Compañia Agricola Filipina” bought rice-cleaning machinery from Strong Machinery Company
and executed a chattel mortgage over the building and the machinery where it was installed to secure
payment of the purchase price, without reference to the land where the building stood. The mortgage
was foreclosed and the property was sold by the sheriff to Strongman machinery. Days after,
Compañia Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land where the building stood to the
machinery company, but the deed of sale which had no reference to the building, was not registered,
although the deed was made a public document.

On or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was executed, Compania executed a
real estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate from the
land. This real estate mortgage is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of
the building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed. Strong machinery company then
filed a complaint, demanding that it be declared the rightful owner of the building. The trial
court held that it was the machinery company which was the rightful owner as it had its title
before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of Leung Yee’s certificate.

ISSUE: 1. A.) Whether or not the building can be classified as a real property, so as to subject it to a
real estate mortgage.
B.) Who has better right over the building.

Held:
A. The building of strong materials in which the rice-cleaning machinery was installed by the
“Compañia Agricola Filipina” was real property, and the mere fact that the parties seem to have dealt
with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as real
property. It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the
machinery installed therein, not the annotation in that registry of the sale of the mortgaged property,
had any effect whatever so far as the building was concerned.

B. t appears that Yee had full knowledge of the machinery company’s claim of ownership
when he executed the indemnity bond and bought in the property at the sheriff’s sale. He took the
risk and must stand by the consequences; and it is in this sense that Yee was not a purchaser in good
faith. One who purchases real estate with knowledge of a defect or lack of title in his vendor cannot
claim that he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or of an
interest therein; and the same rule must be applied to one who has knowledge of facts which should
have put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to acquaint him with the
defects in the title of his vendor.

2. PRC, Inc. v. Jarque

 GR NO. 41506
Mar 25, 1935

Facts:
Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor
vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and
incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel
mortgage". Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith.

The third mortgage contained such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the
customs house until the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings
against Francisco Jarque; A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on
the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on
within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings.

Francisco was declared an insolvent with the result that an assignment of all the properties of
the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the
foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal
defectiveness of the mortgages.

Issue:
Whether or not the mortgages were defective.

Ruling:

Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Similarly under the common
law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal
property. They are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other
personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry
of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be
entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise, a mortgage on a
vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity.

In the case, the absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent
encumbrances. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith
required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
 3. Berkenkotter v. Cu Unjieng GR NO.41643 Jul 31, 1935

Facts:
April 26, 1926, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., owner of the sugar central situated in Mabalacat,
Pampanga, obtained from the defendants, Cu Unjieng e Hijos, a loan secured by a first mortgage
constituted on two parcels of land "with all its buildings, improvements, sugar-cane mill, steel railway,
telephone line, apparatus, utensils and whatever forms part or is a necessary complement of said
sugar-cane mill, steel railway, telephone line, now existing or that may in the future exist in. said lots."

Shortly after said mortgage had been constituted, the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., decided to
increase the capacity of its sugar central by buying additional machinery and equipment, so that
instead of milling 150 tons daily, it could produce 250. The estimated cost of said additional
machinery and equipment was approximately 100,000. On June 10, 1927, B. A. Green, president of
the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc., applied T;o Cu Unjieng e Hijos for an additional loan of P75,000 offering
as security the additional machinery and equipment acquired by said B. A.

Green and installed in the sugar central after the execution of the original mortgage deed, on
April 27, 1927, together with whatever additional equipment acquired with said loan. B. A. Green
failed to obtain said loan.

Issue:
whether the new machineries were also subject to a mortgage.

Ruling:
Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be “essential and
principal elements of an industry or works without which, such industry or works would be unable to
function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established.’’

“The Civil Code gives the character of real property to machinery, etc. intended by the owner of
any building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and all
are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade or industry. If the installation of the
machinery and equipment in question is permanent,’’ the additional new machineries must,
therefore, also be considered mortgaged.
 4. Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, GR NO. 40411 Aug 7, 1935

Facts:
The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., operates a sawmill. However, the land upon which the business was
conducted belonged to another person. On the land the sawmill company erected a building which
housed the machinery used by it. Some of the machines were placed and mounted on foundations of
cement. In the contract of lease between the sawmill company and the owner of the land there
appeared the following provision:
“That on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings
introduced and erected by the lessee shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without
any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; also, in the
event the lessee should leave or abandon the land leased before the time herein stipulated, the
improvements and buildings shall likewise pass to the ownership of the lessor as though the
time agreed upon had expired: Provided, however, That the machineries and accessories are not
included in the improvements which will pass to the lessor on the expiration or abandonment of
the land leased.”

In another action, wherein Davao Saw Mill was the defendant, a judgment was rendered in favor
of the plaintiff in that action against the defendant in that action; a writ of execution issued thereon,
and the properties now in question were levied upon as personalty by the sheriff.

Davao Saw Mill has on a number of occasions treated the machinery as personal property by
executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. One of such persons is the appellee by
assignment from the original mortgages.

Issue:
Whether or not the machinery in dispute is a personal property.

Ruling:
A mortgaged house built on a rented land was held to be personal property not only because the
deed of mortgage considered it as such, but also because it did not form part of the land for it is now
well settled that an object placed on land by one who has only a temporary right to the same such as
the lessee or usufructuary, does not become immobilized by attachment.

Machinery which is movable in its nature only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by
the owner of the property or plant. Such result would not be accomplished, therefore, by the placing
of machinery in a plant by a tenant or a usufructuary or any person having only a temporary right.

5. Machinery and Engineering v. CA GR NO.L-7057 Oct 29, 1954

 Facts:
For the recovery of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to said defendants at their
factory in barrio Bigti, Norzagaray, Bulacan. Upon application ex-parte of the petitioner company, and
upon approval of petitioner's bond in the sum of P15,769.00, on March 13,1953, respondent judge
issued an order, commanding the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan to seize and take immediate possession
of the properties specified in the order (Appendix I, Answer). On March 19, 1953, two deputy sheriffs
of Bulacan, the said Ramon S. Roco, and a crew of technical men and laborers proceeded to Bigti, for
the purpose of carrying the court's order into effect. Leonardo Contreras, Manager of the respondent
Company, and Pedro Torres, in charge thereof, met the deputy sheriffs, and Contreras handed to
them a letter addressed to Atty. Leopoldo C. Palad, ex-oficio Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, signed by
Atty. Adolfo Garcia of the defendants therein, protesting against the seizure of the properties in
question, on the ground that they are not personal properties. Contending that the Sheriff's duty is
merely ministerial, the deputy sheriffs, Roco, the latter's crew of technicians and laborers, Contreras
and Torres, went to the factory. Roco's attention was called to the fact that the equipment could not
possibly be dismantled without causing damages or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them.
As Roco insisted in dismantling the equipment on his own responsibility, alleging that the bond was
posted for such eventuality, the deputy sheriffs directed that some of the supports thereof be cut.

Issue:
whether machinery mounted on foundations of cement and installed by the
lessee on leased land should be regarded as real property for
purposes of execution of a judgment against the lessee.

Ruling:

That ruling is an interpretation of paragraph (5) of Article 415 of the Civil Code regarding
machinery that becomes real property by destination. In the Davao Sawmill case, the question was
whether machinery mounted on foundations of cement and installed by the lessee on leased land
should be regarded as real property for purposes of execution of a judgment against the lessee. The
sheriff treated the machinery as personal property. The Court sustained the sheriff’s action. The
provincial sheriff hesitated to remove the property in question, petitioner's agent and president, Mr.
Ramon Roco, insisted "on the dismantling at his own responsibility," stating that., precisely, "that is
the reason why plaintiff posted a bond ." In this manner, petitioner clearly assumed the
corresponding risks.

In other words, petitioner knew that the restitution of said property to respondent company
might be ordered under said provision of the Rules of Court, and that, consequently, it may become
necessary for petitioner to meet the liabilities incident to such return. Inasmuch as the machinery and
equipment involved in this case were duly installed and affixed in the premises of respondent
company when petitioner's representative caused said property to be dismantled and then removed,
it follows that petitioner must also do everything necessary to the reinstallation of said property in
conformity with its original condition.
 6. Navarro v. Pineda
GR NO. L-18456 Nov 30, 1963
Facts:
Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of Navarro, to secure
a loan they got from the latter.The REM covered a parcel of land owned by the mother while the
chattel mortgage covered a residential house. Due to the failure to pay the loan, they asked for
extensions to pay for the loan. On the second extension, Pineda executed a PROMISE wherein in case
of default in payment, he wouldn’t ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for
any formal demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of
the mortgages. The court decided in his favor.

Issue:
Whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended to the complaint is
valid notwithstanding the fact that the house was made subject of chattel mortgage for the reason
that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.

Ruling:
The doctrine gathered from the above cases is that although in some instances a house of mixed
materials has been considered as a chattel between the parties and the validity of the contract
between them has been recognized, it has been a constant criterion nevertheless that with respect to
third persons who are not parties to the contract and especially in execution proceedings (particularly
regarding notice of public auction sale by publication), the house is considered as immovable
property.

Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as a
chattel between the parties and that the validity of the contract between them, has been recognized,
it has been a constant criterion that with respect to third persons, who are not parties to the
contract, and specially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as immovable property.

7. Caltex v. CBAA GR NO. L-50466 May 31, 1982

 Facts:
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex (Philippines)
Inc. in its gas stations located on leased land. The machines and equipment consists of underground
tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing pumps, water
pumps, car washer, car hoists, truck hoists, air compressors and tireflators. Said machines and
equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or
receipt. It is stipulated in the lease contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex
the machines and equipment in good condition as when received, ordinary wear and tear excepted.
The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines
and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.

Issue:
Are the pieces of machinery and equipment subject to realty tax despite them having been placed by
a lessee?

Ruling:

The Central Board of Assessment Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in upholding the
city assessor’s imposition of the realty tax on Caltex’s gas station and equipment.’’ Yes, they are
subject to realty tax. Here, the question is whether the gas station equipment and machinery
permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas station and pavement (which are indubitably taxable realty)
should be subject to the realty tax. This question is different from the issue raised in the Davao Saw
Mill case. Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they
might be considered personalty.

8. Benguet Corp. v. CBAA GR NO. 10604 Jan 29, 1993

 Facts:
A realty tax assessment has been imposed on the petitioner's tailings dam and the land thereunder by
the Provincial Assessor of Zambales claiming that the said properties are taxable improvements.

Petitioner, on the other hand, argued that the tailings dam cannot be said and classified as an
improvement upon the land within the meaning of the Real Property Tax Code and thus is not subject
to realty tax. It claimed that the tailings dam has no value separate from and independent of the mine
and is actually an integral part of the latter. It is submerged underwater wastes from the mine and
serves only as a pollution control device which is a requirement imposed by law for mine business. It
also claimed that the dam will eventually benefit the local community as an irrigation facility after its
mining operation.
Issue:
Whether the tailings dam is an improvement upon the land, which is real property and is therefore
subject to realty tax.
Ruling:

Yes. The Real Property Tax Code does not carry a definition of "real property" and simply says
that the realty tax is imposed on "real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery and other
improvements affixed or attached to real property." In the absence of such a definition, we apply
Article 415 of the Civil Code. The pertinent portions applicable in this case are found in Article 415
paragraphs (1) and (3).The tailings dam in this case is an improvement upon the mine. The Real
Property Tax Code defines improvement as a valuable addition made to property or amelioration in
its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital
and intended to enhance its value, beauty, or utility or to adapt it for new or future purposes.

The term has also been interpreted as "artificial alterations of the physical condition of the
ground that is reasonably permanent in character. A structure constitutes an improvement so as to
partake of the status of realty would depend upon the degree of permanence intended in its
construction and use. The expression "permanent" as applied to improvement does not imply that
the improvement must be used perpetually but only until the purpose to which the principal realty is
devoted has been accomplished. It is sufficient that the improvement is intended to remain as long as
the land to which it is annexed is still used for the said purpose.

9. Serg's Products v. PCI GR NO. 137705 Aug 22, 2000

 Facts:
Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for a sum of money
with an application for a writ of replevin. Respondent Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its
sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI after 5 days and upon the payment
of the necessary expenses. In the implementation of the said writ, the sheriff proceeded to
petitioner’s factory, seized one machinery with word that he would return for the other.

Petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power of the court to control
the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff
to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground
that the properties were still personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin. The
sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He
was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers from taking the rest.

Issue:
Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by Serg’s became real property by virtue
of immobilization.

Ruling:

No.The machines that were subjects of the Writ of seizure were placed by petitioners in the
factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements of their
chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or personal property on its
own, all of them have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal
elements in the industry. In that sense petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are
real property pursuant to Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.

But the Court disagrees with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines are not
proper subject of the Writ of Seizure. The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate
that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are
consequently stopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppels, a party to a contract
is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.

Clearly then, petitioners are stopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines
as personal property. Under circumstances, they are proper subjects of the Writ of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that the Court’s holding-that the machines should be deemed
personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement-is good only insofar as the contracting parties are
concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the Agreement, third persons acting in good faith
are not affected by its stipulation characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any event,
there is no showing that any specific third party would be adversely affected.

10. Soriano v. Galit GR NO. 156295 Sep 23, 2003

 Facts:
Respondent Ricardo Galit contracted a loan from petitioner Marcelo Soriano, in the total sum of
P480,000.00, evidenced by four promissory notes. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage
over a parcel of land. After he failed to pay his obligation, Soriano filed a complaint for sum of money
against him with the Regional Trial Court.Respondents, the Spouses Ricardo and Rosalina Galit, failed
to file their answer. Hence, upon motion of Marcelo Soriano, the trial court declared the spouses in
default and proceeded to receive evidence for petitioner Soriano ex parte.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioner Soriano, against the defendant ordering the
latter to pay. It became final and executory. Accordingly, the trial court issued a writ of execution in
due course, by virtue of which, Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles levied on the following real properties
of the Galit spouses:
1. A parcel of land
2. STORE/HOUSE CONSTRUCTED made of strong materials
3. BODEGA made of strong materials

At the sale of the above-enumerated properties at public auction, petitioner was the highest and only
bidder. Accordingly, Deputy Sheriff Robles issued a Certificate of Sale of Execution of Real Property.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, assailing the inclusion of the
parcel of land covered among the list of real properties in the writ of possession. Respondents argued
that said property was not among those sold on execution by Deputy Sheriff Renato E. Robles as
reflected in the Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Property.

Issue:
Whether or not the Certificate of Sale on execution of real property is null and void and subsequently
the writ of possession.

Ruling:
Yes. Petitioner dwells on the general proposition that since the certificate of sale is a public
document, it enjoys the presumption of regularity and all entries therein are presumed to be done in
the performance of regular functions.There are actually two copies of the Certificate of Sale on
Execution of Real Properties issued namely: (a) copy which is on file with the deputy sheriff; and (b)
copy registered with the Registry of Deeds. The object of scrutiny, however, is not the copy of the
Certificate of Sale on Execution of Real Properties issued by the deputy sheriff but the copy thereof
subsequently registered by petitioner with the Registry of Deeds which included an entry on the
dorsal portion of the first page thereof describing a parcel of land not found in the Certificate of Sale
of Real Properties on file with the sheriff.

Thus, it has been held that while a public document like a notarized deed of sale is vested with
the presumption of regularity, this is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. It must be pointed
out in this regard that the issuance of a Certificate of Sale is an end result of judicial foreclosure where
statutory requirements are strictly adhered to; where even the slightest deviations therefrom will
invalidate the proceeding and the sale. Among these requirements is an explicit enumeration and
correct description of what properties are to be sold stated in the notice. The foregoing provision of
the Civil Code enumerates land and buildings separately. This can only mean that a building is, by
itself, considered immovable. Thus, it has been held that while it is true that a mortgage of land
necessarily includes, in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a
building by itself may be mortgaged apart from the land on which it has been built. Such mortgage
would be still a real estate mortgage for the building would still be considered immovable property
even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.
In this case, considering that what was sold by virtue of the writ of execution issued by the trial
court was merely the storehouse and bodega constructed on the parcel of land, which by themselves
are real properties of respondents spouses, the same should be regarded as separate and distinct
from the conveyance of the lot on which they stand.

11. Capitol wireless VS. Provincial Treasurer GR NO. 180110 May 30, 2016
 Facts:
Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the business of providing
international telecommunications services. As such provider, Capwire has signed agreements with
other local and foreign telecommunications companies covering an international network of
submarine cable systems such as the Asia Pacific Cable Network System (APCN) (which connects
Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Indonesia and the
Philippines) ); the Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable Network System (BMP-CNS), the Philippines-Italy
(SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS) systems. The agreements provide for co-
ownership and other rights among the parties over the network.

Petitioner Capwire claims that it is a co-owner only of the so-called “Wet Segment” of the APCN.
As a co-owner, Capwire claims that it does not own any particular physical part of the cable system
but, consistent with its financial contributions, it owns the right to use a certain capacity of the said
system. Meanwhile, the landing stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN located in Nasugbu,
Batangas are allegedly owned by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Corporation (PLDT).
Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international, and not Philippine waters.

Issue:
Whether or not submarine communications cables be classified as taxable real property by the local
governments.

Ruling:

Yes, Submarine or undersea communications cables are akin to electric transmission lines which
this Court has recently declared in Manila Electric Company v. City Assessor and City Treasurer of
Lucena City, as “no longer exempted from real property tax” and may qualify as “machinery” subject
to real property tax under the Local Government Code.

Moreover, both electric lines and communications cables, in the strictest sense, are not directly
adhered to the soil but pass through posts, relays or landing stations, but both may be classified
under the term “machinery” as real property under Article 415(5)of the Civil Code for the simple
reason that such pieces of equipment serve the owner’s business or tend to meet the needs of his
industry or works that are on real estate. Even objects in or on a body of water may be classified as
such, as “waters” is classified as an immovable under Article 415(8)of the Code. A classic example is a
boathouse which, by its nature, is a vessel and, therefore, a personal property but, if it is tied to the
shore and used as a residence, and since it floats on waters which is immovable, is considered real
property. It is settled in the Local Government Code, “municipal waters” includes “not only streams,
lakes, and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and not
comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or fishery reserves,
but also marine waters included between two lines drawn perpendicularly to the general coastline
from points where the boundary lines of the municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third
line parallel with the general coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers from it. Although the term
“municipal waters” appears in the Code in the context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries
privileges for a fee by local governments, its inclusion in the Code’s Book II which covers local taxation
means that it may also apply as guide in determining the territorial extent of the local authorities’
power to levy real property taxation.

Movable Property
Article 416
 12. Sibal vs. Valdez GR NO.26278 Aug 4, 1927

Facts:
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, ,
attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his
tenants on parcels of land. Within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff
offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to
cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may
have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez refused
to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff.

Plaintiff also prayed that a judgment be rendered in his favor and against the defendants
ordering them to consent to the redemption of the sugar cane in question, and that the defendant
Valdez be condemned to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,056 the value of palay harvested by him in
the two parcels of land, with interest and costs.The trial court rendered a judgment against the
plaintiff and in favor of the defendants. It appeared that the eight parcels of land belonging to Sibal
were attached and Macondray Co., Inc. bought the eight parcels of land. Within 1 year from the sale,
Sibal paid Macondray Co., Inc. for the account of the redemption price.

Issue:
Whether or not pending crops which have potential existence may be the valid subject matter of a
sale.

Held:
Yes, it can be a valid subject matter of a sale. From an examination of the reports and codes of
the State of California and other states we find that the settle doctrine followed in said states in
connection with the attachment of property and execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised
by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property.

Mr. Floyd R. Mechem (He is the author of A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property)
says that a valid sale may be made of a thing, which though not yet actually in existence, is reasonably
certain to come into existence as the natural increment or usual incident of something already in
existence, and then belonging to the vendor, and then title will vest in the buyer the moment the
thing comes into existence. Things of this nature are said to have a potential existence. A man may
sell property of which he is potentially and not actually possessed. He may make a valid sale of the
wine that a vineyard is expected to produce; or the gain a field may grow in a given time; or the milk a
cow may yield during the coming year; or the wool that shall thereafter grow upon sheep; or what
may be taken at the next cast of a fisherman’s net; or fruits to grow; or young animals not yet in
existence; or the good will of a trade and the like. The thing sold, however, must be specific and
identified. They must be also owned at the time by the vendor. The Supreme Court held that pending
crops which have potential existence may be the valid subject matter of sale and may be dealt with
separately from the land on which they grow. Judgment appealed from AFFIRMED.

13. Laurel v. Judge Abrogar GR NO.155076 Jan 13, 2009

 Facts:
Laurel was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR) or the unauthorized routing and
completingof international long distance calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency
and connecting these callsdirectly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where
destined.PLDT alleges that the “international phone calls” which are “electric currents or sets of
electric impulses transmitted througha medium, and carry a pattern representing the human voice to
a receiver,” are ersonal properties which may be thesubject of theft. Art. 416(3) deems “forces of
nature” (which includes electricity” which are brought under the control byscience, are personal
property.Laurel claims that a telephone call is a conversation on the phone or a communication
carried out using the telephone. It isnot synonymous to electric currents or impulses. Hence, it may
not be considered as personal property susceptible ofappropriation. Laurel claims that the analogy
between generated electricity and telephone calls is misplaced. PLDT does notproduce or generate
telephone calls. It only rovides the facilities or services for the transmission and switching of the
calls.He also insists that “business” is not personal property. It is not the “business” that is protected
but the “right to carry abusiness.” This right is what is considered as property. Since the services of
PLDT cannot be considered as “property,” thesame may not be the subject of theft.

Issue:
Whether or not Laurel guilty of theft of personal property?

Held:
YES. The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various equipment or
apparatus to PLDT’stelephone system, through which Laurel is able to resell or re-route international
long distance calls using PLDT’s facilitiesconstitutes acts of subtraction. The business of roviding
telecommunication is likewise ersonal property which cann be the object of theft. Interest in business
was not specifically enumerated as personal property in the Civil Code in force at the time the
abovedecision was rendered. Yet, interest in business was declared to be personal property since it is
capable of appropriationand not included in the enumeration of real roperties. Art. 414 provides that
all things which are or may be the object ofappropriation are considered either real property or
personal property. Business is likewise not enumerated as personalproperty under the Civil Code. Just
like interest in business, however, it may be appropriated. Business should also beclassified as ersonal
property. Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real properties under Art. 415. It
istherefore personal roperty.In making the international phone calls, the human voice is converted
into electrical impulses or electric current which aretransmitted to the arty called. A telephone call,
therefore, is electrical energy. Intagnible property such as electrical energyis capable of appropriation
because it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under art. 416(3)which
enumerates “forces of natur which are brought under control by science.”It is the use of these
communications facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is
theunlawful taking of the telephone services and business.Therfore, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone service is personal property.

Property in Relation to the Person to whom it belongs

Article 420
 14. City of Manila v. Garcia GR NO. L-26053 Feb 21, 1967

FACTS:

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area in Malate, Manila,
and covered by Torrens Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon
these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class
materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building
permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present. Few years thereafter,
defendants were given written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in
the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged
nominal rentals.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came
the need for this school's expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to
clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of defendants to vacate and remove his
construction or improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on
each defendant for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate. The
judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE
Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

RULING
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set
aside for the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
The defendants were wrong in insisting that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They
entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent
of the city. Their homes were erected without city pemits, thus, illegal. In a language familiar to all,
defendants are squatters. These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued when the
effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted
themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they
wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they
preferred to remain on city property. Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions
are as illegal, without permits.

The houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly hinder and impair
the use of that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that
housing school children in the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city.
The selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of
constructing the school building annex is paramount.

15. Republic v. Lat Vda. Del Castillo GR NO. L-69002 Jun 30, 1988
 Facts:
In 1951, the late Modesto Castillo applied for the registration of two parcels of land, Lots 1 and
2, located in Banadero, Tanauan, Batangas, as the true and absolute owner of the land with
theimprovements thereon, which was issued to him by the Register of Deeds of Batangas. He
was married to Amanda Lat. By virtue of an instrument dated in March 1960, the two parcels of
land with Original Certificate of Title (OCT) were consolidated and divided into Lots 1 to 9 which was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT). After the death of Modesto Castillo on August 31,
1960, Amanda Lat Vda. de Castillo, et al., executed a deed of partition and assumption of
mortgage in favor ofFlorencio L. Castillo, et al., as a result of which Original Certificate of Title
was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, new transfer certificates of title (TCT) were issued to the following
appellants-defendants.The Republic of the Philippines filed CivilCase No. 2044 with the lower
court for the annulment of the certificates of title issued to defendants Amanda Lat Vda. de
Castillo, et al., as heirs/successors of Modesto Castillo, and for the reversion of the lands covered
thereby (Lots 1 and 2, Psu-119166) to the State. It was alleged that said lands had always formed
part of the Taal Lake and being of public ownership, it could not be the subject of registration as
private property. They alleged in their answer that the Government's action was alreadybarred
by the decision of the registration court; that the action has prescribed; and that the government was
estopped from questioning the ownership and possession of appellants.The then Court of First
Instance of Batangas, Branch VI, decided that the Register of Deeds of Batangas to order the
cancellation of the OCT in the name of Modesto Castillo and the subsequent TCT issued over
the property in the names of the defendants. Lots Nos. 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-19166 are hereby
declared public lands belongingto the state. Without pronouncement as to costs. Defendants
appealed their case. The Court of Appeals, in a decision promulgated on April 26,1984, reversed and
set aside the appealed decision, and dismissed the complaint.

Issue:
The sole issue raised in this case is whether or not the decision of the Land Registration Court
involving shore lands constitutes res adjudicata.

Held:
There is no question that one of the requisites of res judicata is that the court rendering the final
judgment must have jurisdiction over the subject matter (Ramos v. Pablo, 146 SCRA 24 [1986];
that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use (Article 420, Civil
Code) and, therefore, not registrable. Thus, it has long been settled that portions of the foreshore or
of the territorial waters and beaches cannot be registered. Their inclusion in a certificate of title
does not convert the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant
(Republic v. Ayala y Cia, 14 SCRA, 259 [1965], citing the cases of Dizon, et al. v. Bayona, et al., 98 Phil.
943; and Dizon, et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., 13 SCRA 704).But an important bone of contention is the
nature of the lands involved in this case. Petitioner contends "that "Lots 1 and 2, PSU-119166 had
always formed part of the Taal Lake, washed and inundated by the waters thereof. Consequently, the
same were not subject to registration, being outside the commerce of men; and that since the lots in
litigation are of public domain (Art. 502), par. 4 Civil Code) the registration court (of 1951) did not
have jurisdiction to adjudicate said lands as private property, hence, res judicata does not apply.
(Rollo, pp. 37-38).The Government presented both oral and documentary evidence. Lakeshore land or
lands adjacent to the lake, like the lands in question must be differentiated from foreshore land or
that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately covered and left dry by the ordinary flow
of the tides (Castillo, Law on Natural Resources, Fifth Edition, 1954, p. 67). Such distinction draws
importance from the fact that accretions on the bank of a lake, like Laguna de Bay, belong to the
owners of the estate to which they have been added (Gov't. v. Colegio de San Jose, 53 Phil. 423)
while accretion on a sea bank still belongs to the public domain, and is not available for
private.

16. Republic vs. Gonzales GR NO. 45338 Jul 31, 1991

Facts:
 Then President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street
Widening and Parking Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated in the
Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon."1 Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn
from sale or settlement and reserved for the purposes mentioned in the Proclamation.

The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed Resolutions2 authorizing the filing of ejectment
cases against appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could be implemented. On 23 June 1955, the
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Rizal filed separate complaints against appellants for the recovery
of the portions of Lot 2 they were occupying.

Appellants disputed the light of the Government to recover the land occupied by them. In his
answer, Policarpio Gonzales claimed (1) that Lot 2 was covered by a lease application, and later a
miscellaneous sales application, filed before the Bureau of Lands; (2) that he had a municipal permit
to construct a building as well as a business license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon;
and (3) that the lot occupied by him was not needed by the Municipality of Malabon in the widening
of F. Sevilla Boulevard. The defenses interposed by Augusto Josue were substantially similar to those
raised by Policarpio Gonzales.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Proclamation No. 144. long-term benefits which the proposed street
widening and parking areas make available to the public in the form of enhanced, safe and orderly
transportation on land.

Held:
Yes, In the first place, Section 83 above speaks not only of use by a local government but also of
"quasi-public uses or purposes." To constitute public use, the public in general should have equal or
common rights to use the land or facility involved on the same terms, however limited in number the
people who can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. There is nothing in Proclamation No.
144 which excludes non-car-owners from using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact
happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use thereof remains open for the public in
general.

17. Republic v. CA, Morato GR NO. 100709 Nov. 14, 1997

FACTS:
 In December 1972, respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land which
was granted but with the condition that the land shall not be alienated or encumbered within five
years from the date of issuance of the patent. Respondent mortgaged a portion of property in 1974
and another portion was based to another party whereby a house and warehouse were respectively
constructed. RTC and CA found that there was alienation because the land was merely based adding
that the improvement and not the land itself.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the base and/or mortgage of a portion of realty acquired through free patent
constitute sufficient ground for the nullification of such land grant.

HELD:
Public Land Act, Sec 118 states: “Except in favor of Government or any of its branches… lands,
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be subject to encumbrance or
alienation from the date of the approval of the application for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt
contracted prior to the expiration of said period.” Encumbrance has been defined as “anything that
impairs the use or transfer of property; anything which constitutes a burden on the title; a burden or
charge upon property; a claim or lien upon property.”

Respondent Morato, although the land mortgaged/leased does not significantly affect his
possession and ownership, cannot fully use or enjoy the land during the duration of lease contract.
The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the
approval of every application. Prior to the fulfillment of the requirements of law, Morato had only an
inchoate right to the property; such property remained a public domain and therefore not susceptible
to alienation or encumbrance.

18. Chavez v. PEA GR NO.133250 Jul 9, 2002

FACTS:
 In 1973, the government signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract
also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated
itself to carry out all the works in consideration of 50% of the reclaimed land. In 1977, then President
Marcos created the Public Estates Authority (PEA), tasking it to “reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas” and “to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands” and
issued another Presidential Decree transferring to PEA the “lands reclaimed in the foreshore and
offshore of the Manila Bay” under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
In 1981, then President Marcos issued a memo directing PEA to amend its contract with CDCP,
so that “All future works in MCCRRP shall be funded and owned by PEA. In 1988, then President
Aquino issued a Special Patent transferring to PEA the reclaimed parcels of land. Then, the Register of
Deeds of Parañaque issued titles in the name of PEA, covering the “Freedom Islands”. In 1995, the
PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the
Freedom Islands without public bidding. In 1998, Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed the instant
petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. Petitioner contends that the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale
by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public
domain as a violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable
lands of the public domain to private corporations.
ISSUE:

Whether the stipulations in the amended Joint Venture Agreement for the transfer to Amari of
certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed, violate the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint
which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all “lands, territories and possessions” in the Philippines
passed to the Spanish Crown. The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitution adopted the Regalian Doctrine
substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain. It is a time-honored principle of land ownership that “all lands that were not acquired from
the Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain.” AMARI as a private
corporation cannot acquire the reclaimed Freedom Islands, though alienable lands of the public
domain, except by lease, as provided under Sec. 3, Article XII of the Constitution. The Decision does
not bar private corporations from participating in reclamation projects and being paid for their
services in reclaiming lands. The Decision however prohibits, private corporations to acquire
reclaimed lands of the public domain. Despite the nullity of the Amended JUA, AMARI is not
precluded from recovering from the PEA in the proper proceedings, on a quantum meruit basis,
whatever AMERI may have incurred in implementing the Amended JUA prior to its declaration of
nullity.

19. Morandarte & Ferbrera v. CA GR NO.123586 Aug 12, 2004

 FACTS:
Morandarte filed an application for free patent, dated December 5, 1972, before the Bureau of Lands,
Dipolog City District Land Office (BOL for brevity),... covering a parcel of land located at Sta. Filomena,
Dipolog City with an area of 4.5499 hectares and described as a portion... of Lot 1038 of Dipolog
Cadastre No. 85. On July 27, 1976, the District Land Officer of the BOL approved the free patent
application of Morandarte and directed the issuance of a free patent in his favor. Accordingly, Free
Patent No. (IX-8) 785 for Lot No. 7, Csd-09-05-00078-D was issued in the... name of Morandarte.
Original Certificate of Title No. (P-21972) 5954. Morandarte caused a subdivision survey of the lot,
dividing the same into Lot No. 6781-A, with an area of 13,939 square meters, and Lot No. 6781-B,
with an area of 32,819 square meters.

On May 22, 1981, Morandarte and his wife, Marina Febrera, executed a real estate mortgage over Lot
6781-B, subject of TCT No. 1836, in favor of the Development Bank of the Philippines, Dipolog City
branch (DBP for brevity), in consideration of a loan in the amount of P52,160.00. More than ten years
after the issuance of the OCT in Morandarte's name, or on March 19, 1987, respondent Republic of
the Philippines (Republic for brevity), represented by the Director of Lands, filed before the RTC a
Complaint for Annulment of Title and Reversion against the Morandarte spouse, the Register of
Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte, the Register of Deeds of Dipolog City, and DBP,... The Republic alleged
that the BOL found that the subject land includes a portion of the Miputak River which cannot be
validly awarded as it is outside the commerce of man and beyond the authority of the BOL to dispose
of. Morandarte spouses deliberately and... intentionally concealed such fact in the application to
ensure approval thereof the Morandarte spouses denied the allegations of the complaint and claimed
that they were able to secure the title in accordance and in compliance with the requirements of the
law.

Issues:

Whether or not the subject property of petitioners was affected thereby so that the title of
petitioners to the remaining portion is valid and cannot be nullified as it remained.

Ruling:

The State, as the party alleging that fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for
free patent, bears the burden of proof. The circumstances evidencing fraud and misrepresentation
are as varied as the people who perpetrate it in each case. In this case, the State failed to prove that
fraud and misrepresentation attended the application for free patent. Besides, it is undisputed that
the original survey plan submitted by Morandarte to the BOL reflected the true state of the Miputak
River in Lot 1038 but the BOL did not approve the plan because a 1916 survey did not so indicate the
existence of a river traversing Lot 1038 such... that Morandarte was directed to submit an amended
plan deleting the existence of the Miputak River.

Accordingly, the 12,162-square meter portion traversed by the Miputak River and the 13,339-
square meter portion covered by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya spouses which were
erroneously included in Free Patent No. (IX-8) 785 and Original Certificate of Title No. P-21972 should
be reconveyed back to the State. The Morandarte spouses cannot seek refuge in their claim that
Antonio A. Morandarte, their predecessor-in-interest, was already the owner of that portion of Lot
1038 when the fishpond application of Aguido S. Realiza was approved in 1948 because Lot 1038 was
still part of the... public domain then. Respondent Republic of the Philippines within thirty (30) days
from the finality of this Decision the 12,162-square meter portion... traversed by the Miputak River
and the 13,339-square meter portion covered by the fishpond lease agreement of the Lacaya spouses.

20. Villarico v. Sarmiento GR NO.136438 Nov 11, 2004

FACTS:
Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel of land to which they allege that
they absolutely own the land. This was opposed to by a person who posed himself also to be the
rightful owner of the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the subject land is part
of forest land and may not be appropriated. Trial and appellate court dismissed application of
petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way over the land of the government
which is between his property and the ninoy aquino avenue.

RULING:
There has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in question as
disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have not introduced
any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise.

Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long doesn’t
ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant or title or
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

21. Domalsin v. Valenciano GR NO. 158687 Jan 25, 2006

FACTS:
The property subject of this action for forcible entry is a parcel of land located at sitio Riverside,
Benguet. Respondent Frisco B. Domalsin claims to be the lawful owner and possessor of said parcel of
land since 1979 up to the present. He declared it for taxation purposes in 1983 as (per) Tax
Declaration No. 9540 issued on September 12, 1983 by the Municipal Assessor of Tuba Benguet. He
allegedly introduced improvements consisting of levelling, excavation, riprapping of the earth and a
private road to the river, fruitbearing trees and other agricultural plants of economic value. He was in
continuous, adverse possession and in the concept of an owner for the past nineteen (19) years.

August 1, 1998, petitioners Spouses Juanito Valenciano and Amalia Valenciano (Sps. Valenciano,
for brevity) allegedly entered the premises to construct a building made of cement and strong
materials, without the authority and consent of respondent, by means of force and strategy, and
without a building permit from the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH, for brevity).
Respondent protested and demanded that petitioners Sps. Valenciano halt construction of said
building, but the latter refused to do so. Hence, he filed the instant case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not frisco domalsin abandoned the property subject of the litigation.

HELD:

No, The fact that the parties do not and cannot own the property under litigation does not mean
that the issue to be resolved is no longer priority of possession. The determining factor for one to be
entitled to possession will be prior physical possession and not actual physical possession. Since title is
never in issue in a forcible entry case, the Court of Appeals should have based its decision on who had
prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior
possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, so that it
behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.

Abandonment of a thing is the voluntary renunciation of all rights which a person may have in a
thing, with the intent to lose such thing. A thing is considered abandoned and possession thereof lost
if the spes recuperandi (the hope of recovery) is gone and the animus revertendi (the intention of
returning) is finally given up.

In the case before us, we find that petitioner never abandoned the subject land. His opposition
to the construction of respondents' house upon learning of the same and the subsequent filing of the
instant case are clear indicia of non-abandonment; otherwise, he could have just allowed the latter to
continue with the construction. Moreover, the fact that the house petitioner built was destroyed by
the earthquake in 1990, was never rebuilt nor repaired and that same was leveled to the ground by
Gloria Banuca do not signify abandonment. Although his house was damaged by the earthquake,
Gloria Banuca, the person who supposedly demolished said house, had no right to do the same. Her
act of removing the house and depriving petitioner of possession of the land was an act of forcible
entry. The entry of respondents in 1998 was likewise an act of forcible entry.

22. MIAA v. CA GR NO. 155650 Jul 20, 2006

FACTS:
MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was estimated at P624 million. The
City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the
Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction
the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with
prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the
City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the
Airport Lands and Buildings. Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code
expressly withdrew the tax exemption privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations”
upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of
statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An
international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government
Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws?

Held:
Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings
taken pursuant to such assessments, are void. 1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled
Corporation. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of
the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA
is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation must have
members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently
its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference is
that MIAA is vested with corporate powers.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also
corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent domain, police
authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises “all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Executive Order.”

23. RP v. City of Parañaque GR NO. 191109 Jul 18, 2012

FACTS:
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1084 (Creating the Public Estates Authority, Defining its Powers and Functions,
Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes) which took effect on February 4, 1977 to provide a
coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of
lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the government with the object of maximizing their
utilization and hastening their development consistent with public interest.

By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay, including those located in Parañaque City, and was issued Original Certificates of Title
(OCT Nos. 180, 202, 206, 207, 289, 557, and 559) and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT Nos. 104628,
7312, 7309, 7311, 9685, and 9686) over the reclaimed lands. On February 19, 2003, then Parañaque
City Treasurer Liberato M. Carabeo (Carabeo) issued Warrants of Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties
(Central Business Park and Barangay San Dionisio) located in Parañaque City based on the assessment
for delinquent real property taxes made by then Parañaque City Assessor Soledad Medina Cue for tax
years 2001 and 2002.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not PRA IS EXEMPT FROM REAL PROPERTY TAX.

HELD:
YES. The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters
on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must
meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of common
good but failed the second one — economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation
of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete in the
market place considering that there were no other competing reclamation companies being operated
by the private sector. As mentioned earlier, PRA was created essentially to perform a public service
considering that it was primarily responsible for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation,
administration and operation of lands belonging to the government with the object of maximizing
their utilization and hastening their development consistent with the public interest. This Court is
convinced that PRA is not a GOCC either under Section 2 (3) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code or under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. The facts, the evidence
on record and jurisprudence on the issue support the position that PRA was not organized either as a
stock or a non-stock corporation. Neither was it created by Congress to operate commercially and
compete in the private market. Instead, PRA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate
powers and performing an essential public service pursuant to Section 2 (10) of the Introductory
Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an incorporated government instrumentality, it is
exempt from payment of real property tax.

24. LBP v. Cacayuran GR NO. 191667 Apr 17, 2013

Facts:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari of the CA affirming the RTC in declaring the nullity of the
loan agreements entered into by Land Bank and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union. Agoo SB passed a
certain resolution to implement a redevelopment plan to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza. To finance
the plan, SB passed a resolution authorizing then Maor Eriguel to obtain a loan from Land Bank,
incidental to it, mortgaged a portion of the plaza as collateral. It has also authorized the assignment of
a portion if the IRA and monthly income in favor of Land Bank to secure the payment. 10 Kiosks were
made at the plaza, then were rented out. Later, a commercial center on the Plaza lot was built too,
with a loan from Land Bank, posting the same securities as the first loan.

Issues:
(1) whether Cacayuran has locus standi (2) whether the subject resolutions were validly passed and
(3) whether the subject loans are ultra vires.
Held:
(1) Taxpayer is allowed to sue if: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a
political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is
committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In the case, the proceeds
from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public funds by the Municipality’s receipt
thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the characteristics of public
funds when they are under official custody. Public plaza belongs to public dominion, Cacayuran need
not to be a privy to the loans, as long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question the
contracts entered into by the government. (2) While ordinances are laws and possess a general and
permanent character, resolutions are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a law making
body on a specific matter and are temporary in nature. As opposed to ordinances, "no rights can be
conferred by and be inferred from a resolution." In this accord, it cannot be denied that the SB
violated Section 444(b)(1)(vi) of the LGC altogether. Noticeably, the passage of the Subject
Resolutions was also tainted with other irregularities, such as (1) the SB’s failure to submit the Subject
Resolutions to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of La Union for its review contrary to Section 56 of the
LGC; and (2) the lack of publication and posting in contravention of Section 59 of the LGC.

(3) Generally, an ultra vires act is one committed outside the object for which a corporation is
created as defined by the law of its organization and therefore beyond the powers conferred upon it
by law.43 There are two (2) types of ultra vires acts. There is a distinction between an act utterly
beyond the jurisdiction of a municipal corporation and the irregular exercise of a basic power under
the legislative grant in matters not in themselves jurisdictional. The former are ultra vires in the
primary sense and void; the latter, ultra vires only in a secondary sense which does not preclude
ratification or the application of the doctrine of estoppel in the interest of equity and essential justice.

25. Dream Village v. BCDA GR NO. 192986 Jul 24, 2013

Facts:
 Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent
more than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan,
Taguig City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously."

On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a blueprint copy
of the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR.
Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:
3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is
outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an
actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the area occupied by Dream Village, on the basis of the DENR’s verification survey
report, that sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the area of BCDA, declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable.

HELD:
NO. The petition is DENIED. The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302
was abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani
does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then
become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant
that under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families
affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-
0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, making them
commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has
abandoned them to Dream Village.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth.
Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.

26. Dumo v. Republic G.R. No. 218269 [June 6, 2018])

Facts:
 Severa Espinas, Erlinda Espinas, Aurora Espinas, and Virginia Espinas filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the heirs of Bernarda M. Trinidad (Trinidad), namely, Leticia T. Valmonte, Lydia T. Nebab,
Purita T. Tanag, Gloria T. Antolin, Nilo Trinidad, Elpidio Trinidad, Fresnida T. Saldana, Nefresha T.
Tolentino, and Dumo.

The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the ground that the
properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the
RTC consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land that Dumo seeks to register is alienable and disposable.

HELD:
No. Considering that the only issue in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages that
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. In an application for
land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has the burden of proving, by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, that her alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.11 Thus, it was upon Dumo to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the land sought to be registered in the nature and duration required by law.

27. Republic vs Alejandre GR No. 217336 October 17, 2018

 FACTS:
They alleged that they are the owners of the subject property by virtue of a deed of sale or
conveyance; that the subject property was sold to them by its former owner Angustia Lizardo Taleon
by way of a Deed of Absolute Sale... the said land is presently occupied by the applicants-spouses. the
Land Registration Authority... submitted a Report noting that there were discrepancies in the plan
submitted by the applicant spouses, which discrepancies... the trial court... allowed the applicants-
spouses to present their evidence.

the LRA submitted its Supplementary Report stating that the "polygon does not close" even after the
corrections effected on the bearings and distances of the technical description were made. Hence, the
LRA requested for reverification and correction. the LRA submitted its Final Report stating... the area
was increased by six (6) meters.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA seriously misappreciated the facts as well as made findings which are
inconsistent with, or not supported by, the evidence on record; and gravely misapplied the applicable
laws and jurisprudence

Held:
No. Under Section 14 of PD No. 1529, there are four (4) types of applicants who may apply for
registration of title to land[,] viz[.]:Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private
lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.(4) Those
who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. (Italics and Emphasis
Ours)

It is undisputed that they acquired the land in question by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
executed... on June 20, 1990 from Angustia Alejandre Taleon who acquired the land from her mother
by inheritance. In other words, the applicant spouses acquired ownership over Lot 6487 through a
contract of sale, which is well within the purview of Paragraph 4 of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529.
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been classified, reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable lands of
public domain.[33] Therefore, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption
that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the
applicant.

Article 421
 28. Cebu Oxygen v. Bercilles GR NO. L-40474 Aug 29, 1975

FACTS:
This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court... dismissing petitioner's application for
registration of title over a parcel of land The parcel of land sought to be registered was originally a
portion of M. Borces Street City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, approved... declared
the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, as an abandoned road. Subsequently, the City Council of
Cebu passed Resolution No. 2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public...
bidding... he lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder... the City of Cebu,...
executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner

By virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the Cour... to
have its title to the land registered... the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss
the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended
for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of... man.
Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. Trial court issued an order
dismissing the petitioner's application for registration of title.[6] Hence, the instant petition for
review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Charter of Cebu City valid right to declare a road as abandoned City provides:
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides.

HELD:
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides: the City Council shall have the following legislative
powers: to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real
property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."... it is undoubtedly clear that the
City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. "Such power to vacate a street or alley is
discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts,
absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. So the fact... that some private interests may be
served incidentally will not invalidate the vacation ordinance."

Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
"Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale
to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

29. Dumo v. Republic G.R. No. 218269 [June 6, 2018])

Facts:
 Severa Espinas, Erlinda Espinas, Aurora Espinas, and Virginia Espinas filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the heirs of Bernarda M. Trinidad (Trinidad), namely, Leticia T. Valmonte, Lydia T. Nebab,
Purita T. Tanag, Gloria T. Antolin, Nilo Trinidad, Elpidio Trinidad, Fresnida T. Saldana, Nefresha T.
Tolentino, and Dumo.

The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the ground that the
properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the
RTC consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land that Dumo seeks to register is alienable and disposable.

HELD:
No. Considering that the only issue in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages that
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. In an application for
land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has the burden of proving, by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, that her alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.11 Thus, it was upon Dumo to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the land sought to be registered in the nature and duration required by law.

30. Republic v. Abarca G.R. No. 217707 October 9, 2019])

 FACTS:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with
evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL
KOH on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot
wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot
wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby
inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and
Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crimes
of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold
Amparado which prevented their death.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the City Charter of Cebu City valid right to declare a road as abandoned City provides:
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides.

HELD:
Revised Charter of Cebu City provides: the City Council shall have the following legislative powers: to
close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to
the City may be lawfully used or conveyed."... it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is
empowered to close a city road or street. "Such power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary. And
the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of
abuse or fraud or collusion. So the fact... that some private interests may be served incidentally will
not invalidate the vacation ordinance."

Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that
"Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the
petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
 31. PNOC NGCP G.R. No. 224936 [September 4, 2019]

FACTS:

The instant case stems from a Complaint3 for Expropriation (Complaint) filed by respondent
National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (respondent NGCP) on February 9, 2011 against
petitioner PAFC, Orica Philippines, Inc. (Orica), Edgardo P. Manieda, Winy P. Manieda, Mercedes P.
Manieda, Nemy Manieda Amado, Danilo P. Manieda, the Heirs of Leonardo Serios,4and Cresencia
Toribio Soriano, represented by Imelda S. Villareal.

During the pendency of the expropriation case, in 2013, R.A. No. 10516 was passed by Congress.
The said law expanded the use of the Petrochemical Industrial Park to include businesses engaged in
energy and energy-allied activities or energy-related infrastructure projects, or of such other business
activities that will promote its best economic use.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner PAFC was correct in filing its Rule 45 Petition directly before the Court.

HELD:
In the assailed Order of Expropriation, the RTC denied the objections and defenses raised by
petitioner PAFC and Orica for lack of merit. The RTC held that respondent NGCP "has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated for the public use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon payment of just compensation."27 The RTC also ordered the parties to submit the names of
three Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC, and set the case for reception of evidence with
respect to payment of just compensation.

Section 4 of Rule 67 further states that a final order sustaining the right to expropriate the
property, such as the assailed Order of Expropriation, may be appealed by any party aggrieved
thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just compensation
to be paid. It is clear from the foregoing that the proper remedy of a defendant in an expropriation
case who wishes to contest an order of expropriation is not to file a certiorari petition and allege that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of expropriation. The remedy is to
file an appeal of the order of expropriation.

Article 422
 32. Laurel v. Garcia GR NO. 92013 Jul 25, 1990

FACTS:
The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the Roppongi property. The
said property was acquired from the Japanese government through Reparations Contract No. 300. It
consists of the land and building for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became
the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi
building needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan. The President
issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.

Issues:
Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell
the Roppongi property.

Ruling:
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own
sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable
not so much because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of
its symbolic value to all Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and
related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and
Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion and
disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.

33. International Hardwood v. UP 200 SCRA 554 Aug 30, 1991

 FACTS:
Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing and exportation of plywood and was, for
said purpose, granted by the Government an exclusive license for a period of 25 years expiring on
February 1, 1985, to cut, collect and remove timber from that portion of timber land located in the
Municipalities of Infanta, Mauban and Sampaloc Province of Quezon and in the Municipalities of
Siniloan, Pangil, Paete, Cavite and Calauan, Province of Laguna under License Agreement No. 27-A
(Amendment) issued and promulgated by the Government through the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on January 11.

Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, I, Carlos P. Garcia, President of the Philippines, do hereby
withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for the College of Agriculture, University of the
Philippines, as experiment station for the proposed Dairy Research and production studies of this
College, a certain parcel of land of the Public domain situated partly in the municipalities of Paete and
Pakil province of Laguna, and partly in the municipality of Infants, Province of Quezon, Island of
Luzon, subject to private rights.
ISSUE:
Whether plaintiff, as of the date of present case was filed, should pay forest charges due and
payable under its Timber License Agreement No. 27-A (Amendment) as set forth in paragraph 2
hereof, to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, or to the University of the Philippines.

HELD:
The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites
for declaratory relief. (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a
legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ape for judicial determination.

There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of
one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the
declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy
when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested.

34. Chavez v. PEA GR NO. 133250 Jul 9, 2002

 FACTS:
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority to disclose all facts on PEA’s then on-going
renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving
such reclamation. PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to
enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown
that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or implementation of the Amended JVA.
Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties?

HELD:
Petition granted. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. The right of citizens to information on matters of
public concern and the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens are two constitutional
rights involved. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the
sale of government lands worth billions of pesos. The second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution,
compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
 35. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic GR NO.179987 Apr 29, 2009

FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased
from Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. The application was granted by the RTC.
However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC
Judgment. Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the
said decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was denied.

ISSUE:
What are the classifications of public lands?
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.

RULING:

Classifications of land according to ownership. Land, which is an immovable property, may be

classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion
if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and
is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription
never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth.

36. SANGGUNIANG vs. Garcia, JR. GR NO. 174964 October 05, 2016
 FACTS:
Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from
Eduardo Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years,
thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. The application was granted by the RTC.
However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to the CA, which reversed the RTC
Judgment. Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the
said decision to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was denied.

ISSUE:
What are the classifications of public lands?
Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land
of the public domain.

RULING:

Classifications of land according to ownership. Land, which is an immovable property, may be

classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land is considered of public dominion
if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and
is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no
longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the
State. Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and
municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual. Pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by Spain
through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription
never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for
land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or
for the development of the national wealth.
 37. Dumo v. Republic G.R. No. 218269 [June 6, 2018])
Facts:
Severa Espinas, Erlinda Espinas, Aurora Espinas, and Virginia Espinas filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction
against the heirs of Bernarda M. Trinidad (Trinidad), namely, Leticia T. Valmonte, Lydia T. Nebab,
Purita T. Tanag, Gloria T. Antolin, Nilo Trinidad, Elpidio Trinidad, Fresnida T. Saldana, Nefresha T.
Tolentino, and Dumo.

The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the ground that the
properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the
RTC consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land that Dumo seeks to register is alienable and disposable.

HELD:
No. Considering that the only issue in ejectment is that of rightful possession, damages that
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those
caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which he may
have suffered but which have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. In an application for
land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has the burden of proving, by clear, positive and
convincing evidence, that her alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration
required by law.11 Thus, it was upon Dumo to prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the land sought to be registered in the nature and duration required by law.