1.

Doctrine of Actus Non Facit Reum, Nisi Mens Sit Rea

A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.

Reference:  De Guzman vs People, GR 166502 (2008)

Doctrine of Equipoise Evidence Rule

The "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when the evidence of the prosecution and the defense
are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the
accused. Thus, the evidence for the prosecution must be heavier to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused. The constitutional basis of the rule is Bill of Rights which finds expressions in Sec. 1, par.
(a), Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended (see People v. Argawamon, 215 SCRA
652; People v. Ramilla, G.R. No. 101435, 8 November 1993; People v. De la Iglesia, G.R. No. 110991-92,
24 Feb. 1995).

Reference:  Vicario vs CA, GR 124491 (1991)

See:  Dubio Pro Reo and Rule on Lenity 

The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent
until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.

Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that "a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment."

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." Since the goal of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused.

Reference:  Separate Opinion of CJ Corona in People vs Temporada, GR 173473

Principle of Dubio Pro Reo

The principle of in dubio pro reo (Latin for "[when] in doubt, for the accused") means that a defendant may
not be convicted by the court when doubts about his or her guilt remain. The rule of lenity is the doctrine that
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the more lenient punishment.

The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the
accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed
innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.

Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that "a
court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent
punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment."

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness."8 Since the goal of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt an application or
interpretation that is more favorable to the accused.

Reference:  People vs Temporada, GR 173473 - Separate Opinion of Justice Carpio

See:  Doctrine of Equipoise Evidence Rule The "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when the
evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such evidence calls
for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused. Thus, the evidence for the prosecution must be heavier to
overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. The constitutional basis of the rule is Bill of Rights
which finds expressions in Sec. 1, par. (a), Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended
(see People v. Argawamon, 215 SCRA 652; People v. Ramilla, G.R. No. 101435, 8 November 1993; People
v. De la Iglesia, G.R. No. 110991-92, 24 Feb. 1995).
Reference:  Vicario vs CA, GR 124491 (1991)

Principle Favorabilia Sunt Amplianda Adiosa Restrigenda

Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is favorable
or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are
the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws.

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable
to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched. It has been sanctioned since the old Penal
Code.

x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st of
December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an
exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the
accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the
Philippines through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are
prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit
(the law looks forward, not backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law provides for the
future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil
Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known
aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it,
the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.

According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded
on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are
based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on
principles of strict justice."

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to said Code51
and its amendments,52 as well as to special laws,53 such as Act No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No.
603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58 R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to
cite a few.

The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules.65
Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature.

Reference:  Inmates of the New Bilibid vs DOJ, GR 212719 (2019 - En Banc)

Ordinance: Formal Test and the Substantive Test

Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista enumerates the requirements for an ordinance to be valid, legally binding, and
enforceable, to wit:

For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and
must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the following
requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive; (3) not partial or
discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
not unreasonable.

Legaspi v. City of Cebu explains the two tests in determining the validity of an ordinance, i.e., the Formal
Test and the Substantive Test. 

The Formal Test requires the determination of whether the ordinance was enacted within the
corporate powers of the LGU, and whether the same was passed pursuant to the procedure laid down
by law. Meanwhile, the Substantive Test primarily assesses the reasonableness and fairness of the
ordinance and significantly its compliance with the Constitution and existing statutes.

Reference:  Meralco vs City of Muntinlupa, GR 198529 (2021 – En Banc)

Principle of Non-Delegation of Powers

On “President’s Stand-by Authority” to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% under RA 9337: Does it
constitute a virtual abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax.

They argue that VAT (a tax levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or exchange of services) cannot be included within the purview of tariffs under the exempted delegation
as the latter refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and
usually imposed on goods or merchandise imported or exported.
A logical corollary to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers is the Principle of Non-Delegation of Powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest which means "what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated."38 This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such as delegated
power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.

With respect to the Legislature, Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution provides that "the Legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives." The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been
described as the authority to make a complete law – complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as
to whom it shall be applicable – and to determine the expediency of its enactment. Thus, the rule is that in
order that a court may be justified in holding a statute unconstitutional as a delegation of legislative power, it
must appear that the power involved is purely legislative in nature – that is, one appertaining exclusively to
the legislative department. It is the nature of the power, and not the liability of its use or the manner of
its exercise, which determines the validity of its delegation.

Nonetheless, the general rule barring delegation of legislative powers is subject to the following recognized
limitations or exceptions:

1. Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
2. Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
3. Delegation to the people at large;
4. Delegation to local governments; and
5. Delegation to administrative bodies.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It
is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who
is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

In People vs. Vera, the Court, through eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel, expounded on the concept and extent
of delegation of power in this wise:

‘The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made.’

Clearly, the legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or
conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to
depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority.
While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and
administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the
existence of facts on which its operation depends.

The rationale for this is that the preliminary ascertainment of facts as basis for the enactment of legislation is
not of itself a legislative function, but is simply ancillary to legislation. Thus, the duty of correlating
information and making recommendations is the kind of subsidiary activity which the legislature may perform
through its members, or which it may delegate to others to perform. Intelligent legislation on the complicated
problems of modern society is impossible in the absence of accurate information on the part of the
legislators, and any reasonable method of securing such information is proper. The Constitution as a
continuously operative charter of government does not require that Congress find for itself every fact upon
which it desires to base legislative action or that it make for itself detailed determinations which it has
declared to be prerequisite to application of legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances
impossible for Congress itself properly to investigate.

The case before the Court is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The
legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified
fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside
of the control of the executive.

No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the
word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connotes a mandatory order. 
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the existence of
any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty which cannot be evaded by the President.
Inasmuch as the law specifically uses the word shall, the exercise of discretion by the President does not
come into play. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
The time of taking into effect of the 12% VAT rate is based on the happening of a certain specified
contingency, or upon the ascertainment of certain facts or conditions by a person or body other than the
legislature itself.

Pimentel, et al. that the word shall should be interpreted to mean may in view of the phrase "upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance." Neither does the Court find persuasive the submission of
petitioners Escudero, et al. that any recommendation by the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed
aside by the President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter.

In the present case, in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her
subordinate. In such instance, he is not subject to the power of control and direction of the President. He is
acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its
expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative
policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and
information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and
collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by
Congress is present. His personality in such instance is in reality but a projection of that of Congress. Thus,
being the agent of Congress and not of the President, the President cannot alter or modify or nullify, or set
aside the findings of the Secretary of Finance and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the
latter.

Reference:  ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita, GR 168056 (2005 – En Banc)

Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order) filed by the
above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the AFP
Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.

On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted men of the
AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare Group –
entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City.

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. A
total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the military
personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein) filed with
the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction over all the
charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055.

Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable cause
against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the
prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 

In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped the charge
of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.

... the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO,
recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the
RTCshould not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the court
martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded to hear petitioners’
applications for bail.

RULING

The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.’
Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies to crimes
punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine
applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives
civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus,
the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military personnel
because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from that of
civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and
other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization
dictate that military personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed
civilians or unarmed government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his reassignment
by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier cannot go to a
civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander reassigns him to another area of
military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

Reference:  Gonzales vs Abaya, GR 164007 (2006 - En Banc)

Doctrine of Jurisdiction Over Subject Matter

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the
complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to
dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. 

Also illuminating is the Court’s pronouncement in Go v. Distinction Properties Development and

Construction, Inc.:

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which
court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the
complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. 

Reference:  Medical Plaza Makati Condominium Corporation vs Cullen, GR

181416 (2013)
Doctrine of Alter Ego
 The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the
landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior. In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the
request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him guilty of
bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the President the
suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the
Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension,
asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there was no
specific law granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was
empowered to suspend local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his
suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the Secretary
of Interior. 

Justice Laurel, writing for the Court, opined:

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on
the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we
have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
 Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of
qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption of responsibility by
the President of the Philippines for acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or
improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid
argument against the system once adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential
background of the type of Government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-
known principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With
reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President’s bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and
in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise,
and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise authority." 

The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various
executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our
presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that
the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the
multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive
Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President
cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.

Reference: Demigillo vs TIDCORP, GR 168613 (2013 - En banc) 

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to RA 8494.

Petitioner was appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the
Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.

On the basis of OGCC Opinion, the Board of Directors approve a so-called Organizational
Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position
classification system, and a new set of qualification standards.

During the implementation of the plan, the LCSD was abolished. Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a
Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector
(RCMSS).

Among the issues, Demigillo filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA
decision that the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President who had the continuing
authority to reorganize TIDCORP.

Ruling of the SC:

Does the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency extends to Board of TIDCORP?  

But the doctrine could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite
some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet.

Under PD 1080, as amended by RA 8494, the Cabinet members sitting on the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the
Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.

Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board effected the assailed reorganization, they were
acting as the responsible members of the Board of TIDCORP, not as the alter egos of the President.

Nonetheless, we uphold the reorganization and declare it valid for being done in accordance with the
exclusive and final authority expressly granted under RA 8494, further amending PD 1080, the law creating
TIDCORP itself.
Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to RA 8494, we declare that there are
no legal and practical bases for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in the
LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place a set-up completely
different from the previous one, including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the
RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice President of TIDCORP. With that abolition, reinstating her as Senior Vice
President in the LCSD became legally and physically impossible.

That the RCMSS was a unit smaller than the LCSD did not necessarily result in or cause a demotion for
Demigillo. Her new position was but the consequence of the valid reorganization, the authority to implement
which was vested in the Board of Directors by RA 8494.

Indeed, we do not consider to be a violation of the civil servant’s right to security of tenure the exercise by
the agency where she works of the essential prerogative to change the work assignment or to transfer the
civil servant to an assignment where she would be most useful and effective. More succinctly put, that
prerogative inheres with the employer,31 whether public or private.

Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency

The doctrine of qualified political agency, also known as the alter ego doctrine, was introduced in the
landmark case of Villena v. The Secretary of Interior. In said case, the Department of Justice, upon the
request of the Secretary of Interior, investigated Makati Mayor Jose D. Villena and found him guilty of
bribery, extortion, and abuse of authority. The Secretary of Interior then recommended to the President the
suspension from office of Mayor Villena. Upon approval by the President of the recommendation, the
Secretary of Interior suspended Mayor Villena. Unyielding, Mayor Villena challenged his suspension,
asserting that the Secretary of Interior had no authority to suspend him from office because there was no
specific law granting such power to the Secretary of Interior; and that it was the President alone who was
empowered to suspend local government officials. The Court disagreed with Mayor Villena and upheld his
suspension, holding that the doctrine of qualified political agency warranted the suspension by the Secretary
of Interior. 

Justice Laurel, writing for the Court, opined:

After serious reflection, we have decided to sustain the contention of the government in this case on
the broad proposition, albeit not suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we
have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 12, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations
are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
required by the Constitution or the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are
performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.

Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court that the acceptance of the principle of
qualified political agency in this and similar cases would result in the assumption of responsibility by
the President of the Philippines for acts of any member of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or
improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said, are serious. Fear, however, is no valid
argument against the system once adopted, established and operated. Familiarity with the essential
background of the type of Government established under our Constitution, in the light of certain well-
known principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the necessary explanation. With
reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one purpose which is crystal-clear
and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight, and that is the establishment of a
single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the Constitution, dealing with the
Executive Department, begins with the enunciation of the principle that "The executive power shall be
vested in a President of the Philippines." This means that the President of the Philippines is the
Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The heads of the executive
departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory capacity, and, in the language of
Thomas Jefferson, "should be of the President’s bosom confidence" (7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and
in the language of Attorney-General Cushing (7 Op., Attorney-General, 453), "are subject to the
direction of the President." Without minimizing the importance of the heads of the various
departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the President. Stated otherwise,
and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court of the United States, "each
head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego in the matters of that department
where the President is required by law to exercise authority." 

The doctrine of qualified political agency essentially postulates that the heads of the various
executive departments are the alter egos of the President, and, thus, the actions taken by such
heads in the performance of their official duties are deemed the acts of the President unless the
President himself should disapprove such acts. This doctrine is in recognition of the fact that in our
presidential form of government, all executive organizations are adjuncts of a single Chief Executive; that
the heads of the Executive Departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and that the
multiple executive functions of the President as the Chief Executive are performed through the Executive
Departments. The doctrine has been adopted here out of practical necessity, considering that the President
cannot be expected to personally perform the multifarious functions of the executive office.

Reference: Demigillo vs TIDCORP, GR 168613 (2013 - En banc) 

Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee was renamed Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) pursuant to RA 8494.

Petitioner was appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status, and was assigned to the
Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.

On the basis of OGCC Opinion, the Board of Directors approve a so-called Organizational
Refinement/Restructuring Plan to implement a new organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position
classification system, and a new set of qualification standards.

During the implementation of the plan, the LCSD was abolished. Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as a
Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector
(RCMSS).

Among the issues, Demigillo filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA
decision that the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President who had the continuing
authority to reorganize TIDCORP.

Ruling of the SC:

Does the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency extends to Board of TIDCORP?  

But the doctrine could not be extended to the acts of the Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite
some of its members being themselves the appointees of the President to the Cabinet.

Under PD 1080, as amended by RA 8494, the Cabinet members sitting on the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP ex officio, or by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the
Board by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President, that sat them in the Board.

Under the circumstances, when the members of the Board effected the assailed reorganization, they were
acting as the responsible members of the Board of TIDCORP, not as the alter egos of the President.

Nonetheless, we uphold the reorganization and declare it valid for being done in accordance with the
exclusive and final authority expressly granted under RA 8494, further amending PD 1080, the law creating
TIDCORP itself.

Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to RA 8494, we declare that there are
no legal and practical bases for reinstating Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in the
LCSD. To be sure, the reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place a set-up completely
different from the previous one, including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be heading the
RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice President of TIDCORP. With that abolition, reinstating her as Senior Vice
President in the LCSD became legally and physically impossible.

That the RCMSS was a unit smaller than the LCSD did not necessarily result in or cause a demotion for
Demigillo. Her new position was but the consequence of the valid reorganization, the authority to implement
which was vested in the Board of Directors by RA 8494.

Indeed, we do not consider to be a violation of the civil servant’s right to security of tenure the exercise by
the agency where she works of the essential prerogative to change the work assignment or to transfer the
civil servant to an assignment where she would be most useful and effective. More succinctly put, that
prerogative inheres with the employer,31 whether public or private.

Principle of Unjust Enrichment

The principle of unjust enrichment is embodied by the letter of Article 22 of the Civil Code:

Article 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires
or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same to him.

There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. The principle of unjust enrichment requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without
a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at the expense of another.[46]

The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the
expense of another without just cause or consideration.

Applying law and jurisprudence, the principle of unjust enrichment requires PSE to return the money it had
received at the expense of the Litonjua Group since it benefited from the use of it without any valid
justification.

Reference: PSE vs Litonjua, GR 204014 (2016)

Principle of Rebus Sic Stantibus

Under this theory, the parties stipulate in the light of certain prevailing conditions, and once these conditions
cease to exist, the contract also ceases to exist. This theory is said to be the basis of Article 1267 of the Civil
Code, which provides:

Article 1267. When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation
of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part.

This article, which enunciates the doctrine of unforeseen events, is not, however, an absolute application of
the principle of rebus sic stantibus, which would endanger the security of contractual relations. The parties to
the contract must be presumed to have assumed the risks of unfavorable developments. It is therefore only
in absolutely exceptional changes of circumstances that equity demands assistance for the debtor.

Reference:  Comglasco Corporation vs Santos Car Check Center, GR 202989 (2015) 

Paragraph 15 of the parties’ lease contract permits pre-termination with cause in the first three years and
without cause after the third year. Citing business reverses which it ascribed to the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, Comglasco insists that under Article 1267 of the Civil Code it is exempted from its obligation under
the contract, because its business setback is the "cause" contemplated in their lease which authorized it to
pre-terminate the same.

Relying on Article 1267 of the Civil Code to justify its decision to pre-terminate its lease with Santos,
Comglasco invokes the 1997 Asian currency crisis as causing it much difficulty in meeting its obligations. 

Article 1267 speaks of a prestation involving service which has been rendered so difficult by unforeseen
subsequent events as to be manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.

To be sure, the Asian currency crisis befell the region from July 1997 and for sometime thereafter, but
Comglasco cannot be permitted to blame its difficulties on the said regional economic phenomenon
because it entered into the subject lease only on August 16, 2000, more than three years after it began, and
by then Comglasco had known what business risks it assumed when it opened a new shop in Iloilo City.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Doctrine of Exemplary Damages

Nevertheless, by focusing only on Article 2230 as the legal basis for the grant of exemplary damages—
taking into account simply the attendance of an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime,
courts have lost sight of the very reason why exemplary damages are awarded. Catubig is enlightening on
this point, thus—

Also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or corrective damages are intended to
serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and wanton
invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These
terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use of
exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted, the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of
the defendant—associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud—that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a
person to punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.
Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the
award. Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with
perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. Also, in People
v. Cristobal, the Court awarded exemplary damages on account of the moral corruption, perversity and
wickedness of the accused in sexually assaulting a pregnant married woman. Recently, in People of the
Philippines v. Cristino Cañada, People of the Philippines v. Pepito Neverio and The People of the
Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., the Court awarded exemplary damages to set a public example, to serve
as deterrent to elders who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to protect the latter from sexual abuse.

Rule of Lenity
The fundamental principle in applying and interpreting criminal laws, including the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, is to resolve all doubts in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. When in doubt, rule for the accused.
This is in consonance with the constitutional guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent
until and unless his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.

Intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. It is the doctrine that "a court, in
construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should resolve
the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment."

Lenity becomes all the more appropriate when this case is viewed through the lens of the basic purpose of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness." Since the goal of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is to look kindly on the accused, the Court should adopt an application or interpretation that is
more favorable to the accused.

Reference:  Separate Opinion of CJ Corona in People vs Temporada, GR 173473

See:  Doctrine of Equipoise Evidence Rule 

The "equipoise doctrine" is the rule which states that when the evidence of the prosecution and the defense
are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the
accused. Thus, the evidence for the prosecution must be heavier to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused. The constitutional basis of the rule is Bill of Rights which finds expressions in Sec. 1, par.
(a), Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended (see People v. Argawamon, 215 SCRA
652; People v. Ramilla, G.R. No. 101435, 8 November 1993; People v. De la Iglesia, G.R. No. 110991-92,
24 Feb. 1995).

Reference:  Vicario vs CA, GR 124491 (1991)

Doctrine of Double Jeopardy

1987 Constitution, Article 3 - Bill of Rights 

Section 27. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is
punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged with two
separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367)
for injuries sustained by respondent; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent’s husband and damage to the spouses’
vehicle. 

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366
through a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803) for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the
same offense of reckless imprudence. 

SC:  We hold that xxx (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner from prosecutions
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a
means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s
unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,
decided in 1954. 

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the
quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the
consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several
persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different
crimes and prosecutions.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the
number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the
penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of
charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.

The ensuing prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal)
consequences (excluding those amounting to light offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the
prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single quasi-
crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article 365?

Reference:  Aguilar vs Judge Modesto-San Juan (Ponce), GR 172716 (2010)

Doctrine of Processual Presumption

Whether a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the
laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so.

However, in view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern.

Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the
Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant
case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

SC:  Petition is granted.

Reference:  Del Socorro vs Wilsem, GR 193707 (2014)

Doctrine of Prejudicial Publicity

Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases
violation of his right to due process.

There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop
criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different.
US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an
accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial;
probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.

This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul
convictions in high profile criminal cases. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 54 (1955) later reiterated
in the case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al., 287 SCRA 581 (1998) we laid down the doctrine that:
 "We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances accused's
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the
criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that
the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they
happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges
are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances
of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per
se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v.
Alejandro, et al., GR L-30894 (1970 - En Banc), we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice
and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not
show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive
media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable
of change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual
bias and he has not discharged the burden.'

Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.131 He needs to show more weighty social science
evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note,
the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the
petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of
the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings
and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

Reference:  
Estrada vs Desierto, GR 146710-15 (2001 – En Banc)

Doctrine of Executive Immunity

Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.

Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be
most enlightening. 

The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910
case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a
Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands. J.E. Harding and C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret
Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport
him to China.

Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not
granted immunity from suit, viz "xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the
 time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect
engendered for the person of one of the highest officials of the state and for the office he
occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way, in distrust as to the
integrity of government itself."

One of the amendments of the 1973 Constitution involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:

"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for
official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.

The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of
this Constitution.

When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity
provision of the 1973 Constitution.

We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his
argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in
the impeachment proceedings.

The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and
by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate
passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio." Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to
demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted.
The plea if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. To be sure, the debates
in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him.

This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160 (1986) that
'incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of
their incumbency and tenure" but not beyond.

We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-
sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of
immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing
the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.

There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive
immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public
office is a public trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and
corruptio."119 it ordained that "public officers and employees must at all times be accountable
to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from their
nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.122 It created the office of the
Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to "investigate on its
own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office
or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or inefficient."123
The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy.124 These constitutional
policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys
immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.

Reference:  
Estrada vs Desierto, GR 146710-15 (2001 – En Banc)

Doctrine of Conclusiveness of Judgment

The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require

6. the finality of the prior judgment, 

7. a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the court that renders it, 
8. a judgment on the merits, and 
9. an identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action

Reference:  Minucher vs. CA (Scalzo), GR 142396 (2003)

Doctrine of Agency by Estoppel

 Doctrine of Apparent Authority or Agency by Estoppel

SJDH’s liability is not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of "Imputed Negligence" or
Vicarious Liability), but on the basis of the Doctrine of Apparent Authority or Agency by Estoppel. As a
general rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However, liability
arises if the independent physician acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. 

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine, a plaintiff must show that: 
10. the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; 

11. where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the
hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and 

12. the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary
care and prudence.

Referece Case:  Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, 31 January 2007
Also: Holding Out Theory, Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Agency by Estoppel

Constitution's Right to Security

Right to Security or Right to Security of Person
1987 Philippine Constitution, Article 3 (Bill of Rights), Section 2:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person, including the extensions of his/her person -
houses, papers, and effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the state's power over a
person's home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.

The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon
City, viz:

The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is
to prevent violations of private security in person and property and unlawful invasion of the
security of the home by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give
remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v.
Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and happiness
and to the peace and security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The
constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures
must be deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of his privacy and the
assurance of his personal security. Any interference allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.
 While the right to life under Article 3, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive - upon which the
enjoyment of all other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure
quality of this life.

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear."

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually
the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part
of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier
part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security.

Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the
degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical
injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.

 Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government.

In the context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty
under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom
from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right
to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full
respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.

Reference: 
Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo, GR 180906 (2008 – En Banc)
"The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo."

Constitution's Grave Abuse Clause

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article 8 - Judicial Department, Section 1 (second paragraph):

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government."

The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo
casacion, and Amparo administrativo.
Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution.

The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison.

Writ of Amparo-What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional
rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the
habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for
the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of peasants' rights derived from
the agrarian reform process.
Reference:  Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo, GR 180906 (2008 – En Banc)

State of The Most Significant Relationship" Rule

In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the "State of
the most significant relationship" rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the
factual context of this case.

In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant relationship, the following
contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury
occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines.
There is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the
"relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not
based on mere labor law violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant
contact with the matter in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant
(herein petitioner), in our view, has been properly established.

Reference:  Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA (Morada), GR 122191 (1998)

Doctrine of Qualification
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts
or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of qualification". It is the "process
of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule."  The purpose
of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper law.

Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative fact. An
essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact".
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a
connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of
performance, or the place of wrongdoing.

Reference:  Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA (Morada), GR 122191 (1998)

Doctrine of the Law of the Case

Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means
that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the
court.

Contrary to respondent’s position the law of the case doctrine applies only to the application for
waiver/exemption for Fund coverage for the year 1996 and not to the applications for the succeeding years
in view of the subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court in the China Bank case. The Supreme Court’s
decision, which attained finality, limited itself only to petitioner’s application for waiver/exemption from Fund
coverage for the year 1996. Apparently, petitioner applied for waiver/exemption from Fund coverage for the
years 1996-2000 by virtue of the decision in the China Bank case. Thus, except for year 1996, respondent
may still consider the remaining years, as they are not covered by the earlier application that was denied by
the respondent and eventually decided by the Supreme Court with finality. Succinctly stated, the decision of
the Supreme Court in the earlier case became the law of the case only for petitioner’s application for the
year 1996. x x x 

Expounding on the doctrine of the law of the case, this Court, in Villa v. Sandiganbayan,24 held:

The doctrine has been defined as "that principle under which determination of questions of law will
generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination
has already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is "merely a rule of procedure and
does not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an
unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case.

In Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, we held:

 "Law of the case" has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. …It is a rule of
general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law to the case on the
points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and appellate
courts and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a
second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the
same as those on which the first question rested and, according to some authorities, provided the
decision is on the merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The doctrine of the law of the case does not apply to the present case vis a vis the decision of this Court in
G.R. No. 132416. The present case is not a subsequent proceeding of the same case – G.R. No. 132416.
This is an entirely new one which was commenced by petitioner’s filing of an original petition for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus before the Court of Appeals against respondent.

At all events, the doctrine "is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the power of the court, and will
not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision."25 To sustain respondent’s refusal to
grant a waiver of Fund coverage to petitioner on the basis of amendments to implementing rules which had
priorly been declared null and void by this Court would certainly be unjust.

In fine, the doctrine of the law of the case cannot be made to apply to the case at bar, hence, petitioner’s
application for waiver from Fund coverage for the year 1996 must be processed by respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. Respondent is enjoined to process
petitioner’s application for waiver from Pag-IBIG Fund coverage for the year 1996

Reference:  Mercury Group vs HDMF, GR 171438 (2007)

Maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest."

"The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest."

The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:

(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution;

(3) Delegation to the people at large;

(4) Delegation to local governments; and

(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.

The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of the task of
government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the
myriad problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created
peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to attend to by itself.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates,
who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them.

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate - and (b) fix a standard - the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable - to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his
functions.

A careful reading of RA 8177 would show that there is no undue delegation of legislative power from the
Secretary of Justice to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice. Further, the Department of Justice is tasked, among others, to take charge of the "administration of
the correctional system." Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the Secretary of Justice
should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in
consultation with the Department of Health.

Reference:  Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, GR 132601 (1998 – En Banc)

Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass constitutional
muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,
(b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d)
being discriminatory.

Maxim: nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege

Applicable here is the familiar maxim in criminal law: Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. There is no crime
where there is no law punishing it.

Legal Maxim: “nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,” that is, that there can exist no punishable act except
those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.

No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.

References:

Evangelista vs People, GR 108135-36 (2000)

Corpuz vs People (Tangcoy), GR 180016 (2014 – En Banc)

Maxim: "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"

Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius."

Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.

Had the legislature intended to include the accused's absence from the Philippines as a ground for the
interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been expressly provided in Act
No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997 where the legislature made its
intention clear and was thus categorical that "

SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code - All violations of any provision of
this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.

Reference:  

Romualdez vs Marcelo, GR 165510-33 (2006)

Doctrines under Revised Penal Code

In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable
to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched.[47] It has been sanctioned since the old
Penal Code.[48]

x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st of
December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to
the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently
been carried over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22 x x x.
This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in
the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex defuturo, judex
de proeterito (the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a
prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is
contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one
distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by
science.[49]

According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded
on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are
based, and regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on
principles of strict justice."[50]

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to said
Code[51] and its amendments,[52] as well as to special laws,[53] such as Act No. 2126,[54] Presidential
Decree No. 603,[55] R.A. No. 7636,[56] R.A. No. 8293,[57] R.A. No. 8294,[58] R.A. No. 9344,[59] and R.A.
No. 10586,[60] to cite a few.

Reference:
Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison vs De Lima, GR 212719 (2019 – En Banc)

Presumption of Intent to Kill in Crimes Resulting in Death

It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.

In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to crimes of
personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds
the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.

Reference: Wacoy vs People, GR 213792 (2015)

CRIMINAL: The Doctrine in Nelmida

In Nelmida, we distinguished the two (2) kinds of complex crime: compound crime, when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, and complex crime proper, when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other. Moreover, we also made a distinction that "when various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes," not a complex crime.

Case Reference:  G.R. No. 184500, 11 September 2012, 680 SCRA 38

Codal Reference:  ACT 3815 - Revised Penal Code

Article 48. PENALTY FOR COMPLEX CRIMES. —When a single act constitutes two or more crimes, or
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Doctrine of Praeter Intentionem

Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from
that which is intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which
may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale of the rule is
found in the doctrine, 'el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado', or he who is the cause of the
cause is the cause of the evil caused.

References:

People vs Adriano, GR 205228 (2015)

People vs Herrera,  422 Phil. 830, 857 (2001)

The Concept and Genesis of Ill-Gotten Wealth in the Philippine Setting

A brief review of the Philippine law and jurisprudence pertinent to ill-gotten wealth should furnish an
illuminating backdrop for further discussion. xxx

The BASECO definition of ill-gotten wealth was reiterated in Presidential Commission on Good Government
v. Lucio C. Tan,91 where the Court said: 

On this point, we find it relevant to define "ill-gotten wealth." In Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co.,
Inc., this Court described "ill-gotten wealth" as follows: 

"Ill-gotten wealth is that acquired through or as a result of improper or illegal use of or the
conversion of funds belonging to the Government or any of its branches, instrumentalities,
enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence, resulting in unjust enrichment of the ostensible
 owner and grave damage and prejudice to the State. And this, too, is the sense in which the
term is commonly understood in other jurisdiction.

Read:  

Republic vs Sandiganbayan (Cojuangco), GR 166859 (2011 – En Banc)

Overbreadth Doctrine
The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.[22] Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights. On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.[23]
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine, This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has
been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated.

Clear and Present Danger RuleThis rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because
there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

The Balancing of Interests Test

used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation
source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195

Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts

Respondents claim that the petition before this Court violates the principle of hierarchy of courts.
They contend that petitioners should have filed their petition before the Court of Appeals since it
also exercises original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. According to
respondents, petitioners failed to justify a direct resort to this Court.

certiorari and prohibition. According to respondents, petitioners failed to justify a direct resort to this Court.

This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.

This Court thoroughly explained the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections:[69]

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that
every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do
not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise
competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially
organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries.
Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are
physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The
consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to
courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the
higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and
law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of
the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil
actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and,
ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual
questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of
new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a
court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these
doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.

In other words, the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect
constitutional rights when these become exigent should not be emasculated by the doctrine in respect
of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.

Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. This court has "full discretionary power
to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari ... filed directly with it for
exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in
the petition." As correctly pointed out by petitioners, we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies
of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches
of the government.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.
The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis
of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v.
Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower
courts:

In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition
proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a
matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court held
that: 

... it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this
Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a
collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

Fifth, ... Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ...

Seventh, [there is] no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law[.]

... The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to
this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of
public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were
found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the
past, questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts included citizens' right to bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters'
registration lists, and the status and existence of a public office.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a
direct resort to this court.

Reference:   

The Diocese of Bacold vs COMELEC, GR 205728 (2015 - En Banc)

Liza Maza et al. vs. Hon. Evelyn Turla, et al., G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences,
one class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature
of the equal protection guarantee in this manner:

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive
officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while
others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Reference: 
Quinto vs COMELEC, GR 189698 (December 01, 2009 - En Banc)

Doctrine of Self-Executing Constitutional Provisions

In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the Constitution embody judicially
enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of action in court.[177] Accordingly, it is necessary to
determine first whether the constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing; and if they
are, is there a conflict between these rights and the State's police power to regulate education? If a conflict
does exist, do the rights of petitioners yield to the police power of the State?

As defined, "a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for
action."[178]

In Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,[179] it was ruled that all provisions of the
Constitution are presumed self-executing,[180] because to treat them as requiring legislation would result in
giving the legislature "the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law."[181]
And this could result in a cataclysm.[182]

This pronouncement notwithstanding, however, the Court has, in several cases, had occasion to already
declare several Constitutional provisions as not self-executory.

In Tanada v. Angara,[183] it was settled that the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In fact, in the cases of Basco,[184] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,
[185] and Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals,[186] the Court categorically
ruled that Sections 11, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of Article II, Section 13 of Article XIII, and Section 2 of Article XIV,
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respectively, are non-self-executing. The very terms of these provisions
show that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation.[187]
And the failure of the legislature to pursue the policies embodied therein does not give rise to a cause of
action in the courts.[188]

In specific application to the present petitions, in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,[189] the Court also
ruled that Section 1, Article XIV on the right of all citizens to quality education is also not self-executory. The
provision "for the promotion of the right to 'quality education' x x x [was] put in the Constitution as moral
incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights."[190]

Further, Section 6, Article XIV on the use of the Filipino language as a medium of instruction is also not self-
executory.

Section 3, Article XIII, on the protection of labor and security of tenure, was also declared by the Court in
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,[192] (Agabon) as not self-executory. Reiterating Agabon,
the Court explained in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,[193] that Section 3, Article XIII, does not
automatically confer judicially demandable and enforceable rights and cannot, on its own, be a basis for a
declaration of unconstitutionality, to wit:

While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which this
Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one, particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature
of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, has described to be not self-
actuating: xxx

In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.,[235] the Court held that Section 15 on arts and culture of Article
XIV is not self-executory because Congress passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of
our cultural heritage.[236] The Court was of the view that all sections in Article XIV pertaining to arts and
culture are all non-self-executing, which includes Section 14 on Filipino national culture and Section 18 on
access to cultural opportunities. The Court in Basco[237] also ruled that Section 17, Article II on giving
priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture, and sports, and Section 2, Article XIV on
educational values, are non-self-executing.

Reference:
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) K-12 Law on Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects

Balancing of Interest Approach

Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing
process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional
obligations." 268 US at 535, 69 L Ed AT 1078.[174]

As quoted above, this balancing of interest approach has been applied in this jurisdiction in Lantion in
determining whether there was a violation of the private respondent's right to due process when he was not
furnished a copy of the request for his extradition. This right was balanced against the country's commitment
under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to extradite to the United States of America persons who were charged
with the violation of some of its laws. [175]

In this regard, and to digress, only self-executing provisions of the Constitution embody judicially
enforceable rights and therefore give rise to causes of action in court.[177] Accordingly, it is necessary to
determine first whether the constitutional provisions invoked by petitioners are self-executing; and if they
are, is there a conflict between these rights and the State's police power to regulate education? If a conflict
does exist, do the rights of petitioners yield to the police power of the State?

Reference:
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) K-12 Law on Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects
Posted 27th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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2.
JUN

27

Substantive Issues:  Whether the K to 12 Law constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

In determining whether or not a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the Court has
adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must
be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.[148] The policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein.[149] The sufficient standard test, on the other hand,
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits
of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.[150]

Clearly, under the two tests, the K to 12 Law, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all essential
terms and conditions and contains sufficient parameters on the power delegated to the DepEd, CHED and
TESDA.

Reference:
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) K-12 Law on Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects
Posted 27th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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3.
JUN

27

Enrolled Bill Doctrine

Petitioners question the validity of the enactment of the K to 12 Law claiming that: xxx (2) the enrolled bill
which the President signed into law varies significantly from the reconciled version of the bill as approved by
Congress and reported in the Senate Journal on January 30, 2013,[126] and that the Court, pursuant to its
ruling in Astorga v. Villegas,[127] (Astorga) should look into the entries in the Journal to determine whether
the K to 12 Law was duly enacted;[128] xxx

The Court holds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the K to 12 Law was validly enacted.

Second, the enrolled bill doctrine applies in this case. Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill
by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed is conclusive not only as to its provisions but also as to its due
enactment.[139] The rationale behind the enrolled bill doctrine rests on the consideration that "[t]he respect
due to coequal and independent departments requires the [Judiciary] to act upon that assurance, and to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to
determine, when the question properly arises, [as in the instant consolidated cases], whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."[140]

Jurisprudence will show that the Court has consistently adhered to the enrolled bill doctrine. Claims that the
required three-fourths vote for constitutional amendment has not been obtained,[141] that irregularities
attended the passage of the law,[142] that the tenor of the bill approved in Congress was different from that
signed by the President,[143] that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill,[144] and even
claims that the enrolled copy of the bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted by the conference committee,[145] had all failed to convince the Court to look
beyond the four corners of the enrolled copy of the bill.

Reference:
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) K-12 Law on Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects
Posted 27th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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4.
JUN

27

Power of Judicial Review

"... the Court's power is not unbridled authority to review just any claim of constitutional violation or grave
abuse of discretion. The following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.[111] Of
these four, the most important are the first two requisites ..."

Reference:
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) K-12 Law on Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects
Posted 27th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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5.
JUN

16

"Multiple Publication" Rule on Libel

We follow the "multiple publication" rule in the Philippines.

Thus, in the cases of Montinola v. Montalvo (34 Phil. 662, [1916]) and United States v. Sotto (36 Phil. 389
[1971]), this Court ruled that each and every publication of the same libel constitutes a distinct offense.

Stated more succinctly for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under Art. 360 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, every time the same written matter is communicated such communication is considered a
distinct and separate publication of the libel.

Reference: 
Soriano vs Intermediate Appelate Court [Tantuico] GR 72383 (November 9, 1988)
Posted 16th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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6.
JUN

Content-Based vs Content-Neutral Restraints on Freedom of Speech

The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.

------------------------
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.
------------------------

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

In the landmark case of Chavez v. Gonzales,[31] the Court laid down a more detailed approach in dealing
with free speech regulations. Its approach was premised on the rational consideration that  "the
determination x x x of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has
always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint."

The Court discussed:

Given that deeply ensconced our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and
any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid, and "any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows," it is important to stress that not all
prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but
determined only upon a careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it
should be measured against.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on the
freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is (1) a content neutral regulation,
i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of speech, or one that merely controls the time, place, or manner,
and under well[-]defined standards; or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is
based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. The cast of the restriction determines the test by
which the challenged act is assayed with.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental
interest is required for its validity. Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any
particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate
approach-somewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling
interest standard applied to content-based restrictions. The test is called intermediate because the Court will
not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the restrictions be narrowly-tailored to
promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression.
The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content
is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having
the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech
sought to be restrained would bring about - especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm
- otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified
by hypothetical fears, "but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality
already on ground." As formulated, "the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government
interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the
governmental interest will be invalidated. The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and narrowly drawn
to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken.

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate
review. A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured
against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a
compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)[32]

The paramount consideration in the analysis of the challenged provision, therefore, is the nature of
the restraint on protected speech, whether it is content-based or otherwise, content-neutral. As
explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule, while
courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30, 31] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195
Posted 7th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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7.
JUN

The Balancing of Interests Test

The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation,
may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms.[22] Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights.

On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.[23]

------------------------
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.
------------------------

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated.

Clear and Present Danger Rule

This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

The Balancing of Interests Test

used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation

source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195
Posted 7th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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8.
JUN

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state

regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.[22] Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights.

On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.[23]

------------------------
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.
------------------------

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated.

Clear and Present Danger Rule

This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

The Balancing of Interests Test

used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation

source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195
Posted 7th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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9.
JUN

Clear and Present Danger Rule

The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation,
may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms.[22] Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights.

On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.[23]
------------------------
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.
------------------------

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated.

Clear and Present Danger Rule

This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

The Balancing of Interests Test

used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation

source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195
Posted 7th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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10.
JUN

Measure of Judicial Scrutiny on Freedom of Speech

The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation,
may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of
protected freedoms.[22] Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights.

On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.[23]

------------------------
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.
------------------------

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated.

Clear and Present Danger Rule

This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

The Balancing of Interests Test

used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation

source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195

Posted 7th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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11.
JUN

Overbreadth Doctrine vs Vagueness Doctrine

The question now is what measure of judicial scrutiny should be used to gauge the challenged provision.

Over the years, guided by notable historical circumstances in our nation and related American constitutional
law doctrines on the First Amendment, certain tests of judicial scrutiny were developed to determine the
validity or invalidity of free speech restrictions in our jurisdiction.

Foremost, a facial review of a law or statute encroaching upon the freedom of speech on the ground of
overbreadth or vagueness is acceptable in our jurisdiction.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state

regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject broadly, thereby invading
the area of protected freedoms.[22] Put differently, an overbroad law or statute needlessly restricts even
constitutionally-protected rights.

On the other hand, a law or statute suffers from vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.[23]

------------------------
Restraints on freedom of expression are also evaluated by either or a combination of the following
theoretical tests, to wit: (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine,[28] which were used in early Philippine case
laws; (b) the clear and present danger rule,[29] which was generally adhered to in more recent cases; and
(c) the balancing of interests test,[30] which was also recognized in our jurisprudence.
------------------------

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

This test permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech
restrained and the danger contemplated.

Clear and Present Danger Rule

This rule rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the
speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent

As explained in Chavez, a content-based regulation is evaluated using the clear and present danger rule,
while courts will subject content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny.

The Balancing of Interests Test

used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and
requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation

source:
Nicolas-Lewis vs COMELEC, GR 223705 (August 14, 2019 – En Banc)
[22] Disini v. The Secretary of Justice, GR 203335 (February 11, 2014 – En Banc), 727 Phil. 28, 121
[23] Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, GR 178552 (October 5,
2010 – En Banc), 646 Phil. 452, 488
[28, 29, 30] Chavez v. Gonzales, GR 168338, February 15, 2008 – En Banc), 569 Phil. 155, 195

Posted 7th June 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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12.
MAY

Principle of Actual Case or Controversy

"... the Court's power is not unbridled authority to review just any claim of constitutional violation or grave
abuse of discretion. The following requisites must first be complied with before the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review, namely: (1) there is an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (2) the petitioner has standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance, i.e., he has a personal and substantial interest in the case that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the act or issuance; (3) the question of constitutionality is
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case.[111] Of
these four, the most important are the first two requisites ..."

Actual case or controversy

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference
or dispute since the courts will decline to pass upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions,
bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot questions. [112] Related to the requirement
of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," and a question is ripe when the act
being challenged has a direct effect on the individual challenging it. [113] For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that an act had been accomplished or performed by either branch of
government before a court may interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate
or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action.[114]
Similar to Imbong, these consolidated cases present an actual case or controversy that is ripe for adjudication. The assailed laws and executive issuances have
already taken effect and petitioners herein, who are faculty members, students and parents, are individuals directly and considerably affected by their
implementation.

Reference:
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October 09, 2018 - En Banc) K-12 Law on Constitution,
Filipino, Panitikan Subjects

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory
opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the
power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a
tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There
must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence, x x x.

Reference:
Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP),
et al
GR 183591 (October 14, 2008 - En Banc)

It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not
be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and
is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota
presented.8 To reiterate, the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a
law are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of
judicial determination, (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the
constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question
must be necessary to the decision of the case.9 A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.

Reference:
INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON vs De Lima
GR 212719 (June 25, 2019 - En Banc)

Posted 9th May 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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13.
MAY

Principle of Party-in-Interest
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an
action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced."

Reference:  
GR 212719 (June 25, 2019 - En banc)
Posted 8th May 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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14.
MAY

Principle of Conspiracy
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas
and Uriarte

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony,
and decide to commit it.[23] In this jurisdiction, conspiracy is either a crime in itself or a mere means to
commit a crime.

As a rule, conspiracy is not a crime unless the law considers it a crime, and prescribes a penalty for it.[24]
The exception is exemplified in Article 115 (conspiracy and proposal to commit treason), Article 136
(conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d'etat, rebellion or insurrection) and Article 141 (conspiracy to
commit sedition) of the Revised Penal Code. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is
indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime among all the conspirators, or their community of
criminal design must be alleged and competently shown.

We also stress that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one.[25] Conspiracy
transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute
one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose.[26] Hence, conspiracy must be established, not by
conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence.
In terms of proving its existence, conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires
proof of an actual agreement among all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. However, conspiracies are
not always shown to have been expressly agreed upon. Thus, we have the second form, the implied
conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists when two or more persons are shown to have aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment.[27] Implied conspiracy is proved through the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community of interest.[28]

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at
least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of
them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own
acts.

Reference:
Arroyo vs People [Sandiganbayan], GR 220598 (July 19, 2016 - En Banc) Plunder

Article 8 of RPC

Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. It
transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself
amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with
a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

Criminal liability cannot be based on a general allegation of conspiracy, and a judgment of conviction must
always be founded on the strength of the prosecution’s evidence. In criminal cases, moral certainty -- not
mere possibility -- determines the guilt or the innocence of the accused. Even when the evidence for the
defense is weak, the accused must be acquitted when the prosecution has not proven guilt with the requisite
quantum of proof required in all criminal cases.

Reference:
Ladonga vs People, GR 141066 (February 17, 2005)

Posted 4th May 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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15.
MAY

Mala in se vs Mala prohibita

Criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose. The
offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but becomes a criminal
offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and
convenience.13 It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is
completely irrelevant.

Reference:
Ysidoro vs People, GR 192330 (November 14, 2012)
Luciano vs Bautista, GR L-31622 (August 31, 1970 – En Banc), 145 Phil. 454, 464-465

The petitioner also posits that since he and Dennis were exchanging punches then, he could not have made
a deliberate design to injure Shiva. Without intent to harm Shiva, the petitioner insists that he deserves an
acquittal.

SC:  "When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other
elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed."

Reference:  Mabunot vs People, GR 204659 (September 19, 2016) 

Posted 4th May 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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16.
APR

28

Doctrine of Prima Facie Evidence

The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to
sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction.

Reference:
Salonga v. Cruz Paño, GR L-59524 (February 18, 1985 – En Banc)
Posted 28th April 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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17.
APR

27

Doctrine of Force Majeure

Doctrine of Force Majeure
Article 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation,
or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those
events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Philcomsat vs Globe, GR 147324 (May 25, 2004)

§ Issue:  whether the withdrawal of US military bases constitute force majeure which would exempt Globe
from paying rentals under its agreement with Philcomsat.
§ Article 1174, which exempts an obligor from liability on account of fortuitous events or force majeure,
refers not only to events that are unforeseeable, but also to those which are foreseeable, but inevitable.
§ A fortuitous event under Article 1174 may either be an "act of God," or natural occurrences such as floods
or typhoons, or an "act of man," such as riots, strikes or wars.
§ In order that Globe may be exempt from non-compliance with its obligation to pay rentals under Section 8,
the concurrence of the following elements must be established: (1) the event must be independent of the
human will; (2) the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
manner; and (3) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.31
§ … the Court finds and so holds that the afore-narrated circumstances constitute "force majeure or
fortuitous event(s) as defined under paragraph 8 of the Agreement.
§ … the Court finds that the defendant is exempted from paying the rentals for the facility for the remaining
term of the contract.
§ … the continued stay of all US Military forces and personnel would no longer be allowed, hence, plaintiff
would no longer be in any position to render the service it was obligated under the Agreement … there was
no longer any necessity for the plaintiff to continue maintaining the IBS facility.
§ … it would be unjust to require Globe to continue paying rentals even though Philcomsat cannot be
compelled to perform its corresponding obligation under the Agreement.
§ The aforementioned events made impossible the continuation of the Agreement until the end of its five-
year term without fault on the part of either party. CA was thus correct in ruling that the happening of such
fortuitous events rendered Globe exempt from payment of rentals for the remainder of the term of the
Agreement.
§ SC ruled for Globe.

Posted 27th April 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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18.
APR

22

Doctrine of Forum-Shopping
There is forum-shopping whenever as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum ... a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another.

The principle applies not only with respect to suits filed in the courts while an administrative proceeding is
pending as in this case, in order to defeat administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable
administrative ruling and a favorable court ruling. 

A violation of this rule shall constitute contempt of court and shall be a cause for summary dismissal of both
petitions, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel or the party concerned.

The mere filing of several cases based on the same incident does not necessarily constitute forum-
shopping. The test is whether the several actions filed involve the same transactions, essential facts,
and circumstances. 
Here, although several cases were filed by the same complainant against the same defendant and the subject
matter of the actions of two of the cases was the same incident (i.e., the application for free patent of petitioner
Ceferino Paredes, Jr.), the fact is that the several cases involve essentially different facts, circumstances and
causes of action.
Thus the present cases involve substantially different transactions, facts and circumstances from those involved
in the other, though related, cases. Although they arose from the same incident, i.e., petitioner’s public land
application, they involve different issues.
It is well settled that a single act may offend against two or more distinct and related provisions of law or that
the same act may give rise to criminal as well as administrative liability. As such, they may be prosecuted
simultaneously or one after another, so long as they do not place the accused in double jeopardy of being
punished for the same offense.

Reference:
Paredes vs Sandiganbayan (Gelacio), GR 108251 (1996, En Banc)
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19.
APR

20

Principle of First in Time, Stronger in Right

The governing principle is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right).

Knowledge by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except when the
second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale (Olivares vs. Gonzales, 159 SCRA 33).

Conversely, knowledge gained by the second buyer of the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to
register, since such knowledge taints his registration with bad faith (see also Astorga vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No 58530, 26 December 1984).

Registration, however, by the first buyer under Act 3344 can have the effect of constructive notice to
the second buyer that can defeat his right as such buyer in good faith (see Arts. 708-709, Civil Code;
see also Revilla vs. Galindez, 107 Phil. 480; Taguba vs. Peralta, 132 SCRA 700)

In Cruz vs. Cabana (G.R. No. 56232, 22 June 1984; 129 SCRA 656), it was held that it is essential, to merit
the protection of Art. 1544, second paragraph, that the second realty buyer must act in good faith in
registering his deed of sale (citing Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals, 69 SCRA 99, Crisostomo vs. CA, G.R.
95843, 02 September 1992).
source:
Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 336, August 14, 1995
Sps Abrigo vs De Vera, GR 154409 (2004)
Posted 20th April 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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20.
APR

20

Priority in Time Principle

What is this ?
Posted 20th April 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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21.
APR

20

Rule on Double Sale

CJ Panganiban:
Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens system, the law gives
ownership priority to (1) the first registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3)
finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the
property is not registered under the Torrens system.

RA 386, Article 1544

If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to
the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property. 
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first
in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided
there is good faith.

Otherwise stated, the law provides that a double sale of immovables transfers ownership to (1) the first
registrant in good faith; (2) then, the first possessor in good faith; and (3) finally, the buyer who in good faith
presents the oldest title. There is no ambiguity in the application of this law with respect to lands registered
under the Torrens system.

This principle is in full accord with Section 51 of PD 1529 which provides that no deed, mortgage, lease or
other voluntary instrument -- except a will -- purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as
a conveyance or bind the land until its registration. Thus, if the sale is not registered, it is binding only
between the seller and the buyer but it does not affect innocent third persons.

GOOD FAITH
We have consistently held that Article 1544 requires the second buyer to acquire the immovable in good
faith and to register it in good faith. Mere registration of title is not enough; good faith must concur with the
registration. 

In Uraca v. Court of Appeals, ... for the second buyer being able to displace the first buyer; that before the
second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in
ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer’s rights) ---- from the time of acquisition until the title is
transferred to him by registration, or failing registration, by delivery of possession.

Constructive notice to the second buyer through registration under Act 3344 does not apply if the property is
registered under the Torrens system, as in this case.
REGISTRATION UNDER ARTICLE 1544
The registration contemplated under Art. 1544 has been held to refer to registration under Act 496 or Land
Registration Act (now PD 1529) which considers the act of registration as the operative act that binds the
land (see Mediante vs. Rosabal, 1 O.G. [12] 900, Garcia vs. Rosabal, 73 Phil 694). 

On lands covered by the Torrens System, the purchaser acquires such rights and interest as they appear in
the certificate of title, unaffected by any prior lien or encumbrance not noted therein. The purchaser is not
required to explore farther than what the Torrens title, upon its face, indicates. The only exception is where
the purchaser has actual knowledge of a flaw or defect in the title of the seller or of such liens or
encumbrances which, as to him, is equivalent to registration (see Sec. 39, Act 496; Bernales vs. IAC, G.R.
75336, 18 October 1988; Hernandez vs. Sales, 69 Phil 744; Tajonera vs. Court of Appeals, L-26677, 27
March 1981).

Reference:
Sps Abrigo vs De Vera, GR 154409 (2004)

Posted 20th April 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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22.
APR

20

Principle of Buyer in Good Faith

1. The issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a
registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land. 
2. One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril. Nicolas’ claim of having bought the
land in good faith is thus irrelevant.

source:
Acabal vs Acabal, GR 148376 (2005)
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
JAN

15

Doctrine of Insurable Interest

An insurable interest is one of the most basic and essential requirements in an insurance contract. In
general, an insurable interest is that interest which a person is deemed to have in the subject
matter insured, where he has a relation or connection with or concern in it, such that the person will derive
pecuniary benefit or advantage from the preservation of the subject matter insured and will suffer pecuniary
loss or damage from its destruction, termination, or injury by the happening of the event insured against .

The existence of an insurable interest gives a person the legal right to insure the subject matter of the policy
of insurance.

Section 10 of the Insurance Code indeed provides that every person has an insurable interest in his own life.
Section 19 of the same code also states that an interest in the life or health of a person insured must exist
when the insurance takes effect, but need not exist thereafter or when the loss occurs.

Reference:
Lalican vs Insular Life, GR 183526 (2009)
Posted 15th January 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
  
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
JAN

15

Three-fold Liability Rule

As regards the administrative liability of Espenesin, the basic principle in the law of public officers is the
three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer, Espenesin in
these cases, may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others.

Reference: 
Ampil vs Ombudsman, GR 192685 (2013)
Posted 15th January 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
JAN

15

Principle on Determination of Probable Cause

We likewise stress that the determination of probable cause does not require certainty of guilt for a crime. As
the term itself implies, probable cause is concerned merely with probability and not absolute or even moral
certainty;34 it is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It is sufficient that based on the preliminary
investigation conducted, it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Well-settled in jurisprudence, as in Raro v. Sandiganbayan, that:

x x x Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor,
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.

Probable cause is a reasonable ground for presuming that a matter is or may be well-founded on such state
of facts in the prosecutor's mind as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe — or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion — that it is so.

A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has
been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it was committed by the accused. It need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.39

A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.40

A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based
on opinion and reasonable belief. x x x Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.

Reference:
Ampil vs Ombudsman, GR 192685 (2013)

Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a
state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to
believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. (Words and Phrases, Probable Cause
v. 34, p. 12) The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry
into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Reference:
Paredes vs Sandiganbayan (Gelacio), GR 108251 (1996, En Banc)

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable
mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the
crime for which he was prosecuted. The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in
damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. In other words, a suit
will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been carried on without probable cause. And the reason
for the rule, as stated by blackstone, is "that it would be a very great discouragement to public justice if
prosecutors, who had a tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be used at law whenever their
indictments miscarried."

Reference:
Buchanan vs Viuda De Esteban, GR L-10402 (November 30, 1915 - En Banc)

.. When a fiscal investigates a complaint in order to determine whether he should file charges with the
court against the person complained of, the scope of the investigation is far short of a trial of an accused
before the court. It is not required that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused must be
removed; it is only required that the evidence be sufficient to established probable cause that the
accused committed the crime charged.

Reference:
Trocio v. Manta (L-34834, November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 241, 246)

The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of
prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Reference:
De Lima vs Reyes, GR 209330 (2016)

Posted 15th January 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
JAN

14

Doctrine of Flagrant Disregard of Rules

Flagrant Disregard of Rules 
is a ground that jurisprudence has already touched upon. It has been demonstrated, among others, in the
instances when there had been open defiance of a customary rule; in the repeated voluntary disregard of
established rules in the procurement of supplies; in the practice of illegally collecting fees more than what is
prescribed for delayed registration of marriages; when several violations or disregard of regulations
governing the collection of government funds were committed; and when the employee arrogated unto
herself responsibilities that were clearly beyond her given duties. The common denominator in these
cases was the employee's propensity to ignore the rules as clearly manifested by his or her actions.

Reference:
Field Investigation Office of The Office of The Ombudsman vs Castillo, GR 221848 (2016):  2 types of
misconduct - grave + simple. 

1. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. 
2. Without any of these elements, the transgression of an established rule is properly characterized
merely as simple misconduct.
 3. Castillo, as Customs Security Guard, has no authority to remove or release the sealed tin can of
confiscated jewelry from the In-Bond Room Section to Customs Cashier Vigilia.

Posted 14th January 2020 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
DEC

24

What is Animus Possidendi

Animus Possidendi 
1. is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant events in
each case.  
2. may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances.
The case at bar involves the first imposition of the death penalty on a woman, Josefina A. Esparas. Her crime
is bringing to the country shabu whose street value at that time was estimated at P30 Million.
In the case at bar, there is evidence to believe that appellant knew the existence of the shabu in her
traveling bags. Upon arriving at the NAIA, her co-accused, Libed, managed to obtain an official
business (OB) pass to gain access at the restricted customs inspection area. He tried dissuade the
customs personnel from examining appellant's luggage but failed. Appellant's used clothes were
found inside the bags upon inspection. Upon further inspection, shabu was discovered in the false
bottom of said bags. Shortly after the discovery of the shabu, and as customs personnel were
arguing with accused Libed, appellant walked away from the customs inspection lane without
waiting for her other luggage to be cleared. In an unmistakable attempt to run away, appellant and
Juson clandestinely headed towards the exit gate. They were fortunately intercepted by Agent
Biteng. These circumstances lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant knew the illegal
contents of her traveling bags.

Reference:  People vs Esparas, GR 120034 (1988, En Banc)

Posted 24th December 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
NOV

27

What is an Overt Act?

II.
The Prosecution did not properly allege and prove the existence of conspiracy among GMA, Aguas and
Uriarte

But to be considered a part of the conspiracy, each of the accused must be shown to have performed at
least an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy, for without being shown to do so none of
them will be liable as a co-conspirator, and each may only be held responsible for the results of his own
acts. In this connection, the character of the overt act has been explained in People v. Lizada:[29]

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre
for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused consisting
merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so, irrespective of his
declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one which
may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment
of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act
should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first
or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations
are made." The act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however,
that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must
have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,[31] the Court recognized two nuances of appreciating conspiracy as a means
to commit a crime, the wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy.

The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two
or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with
another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.[32]

An illustration of wheel conspiracy wherein there is only one conspiracy involved was the conspiracy alleged
in the information for plunder filed against former President Estrada and his co-conspirators. Former
President Estrada was the hub while the spokes were all the other accused individuals. The rim that
enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.

On the other hand, the American case of Kotteakos v. United States[33] illustrates a wheel conspiracy
where multiple conspiracies were established instead of one single conspiracy. There, Simon Brown, the
hub, assisted 31 independent individuals to obtain separate fraudulent loans from the US Government.
Although all the defendants were engaged in the same type of illegal activity, there was no common purpose
or overall plan among them, and they were not liable for involvement in a single conspiracy. Each loan was
an end in itself, separate from all others, although all were alike in having similar illegal objects. Except for
Brown, the common figure, no conspirator was interested in whether any loan except his own went through.
Thus, the US Supreme Court concluded that there existed 32 separate conspiracies involving Brown rather
than one common conspiracy.[34]

Reference:
Arroyo vs People [Sandiganbayan], GR 220598 (July 19, 2016 - En Banc) Plunder

GR 229701 (2017)
Posted 27th November 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
OCT

23

Doctrine of Political Question

Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine
which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential
considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with
cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a
political question. Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051, 1068
(1957), where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great
degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question
doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has
focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts are given
a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not
just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this
intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called
political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII
which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
(of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x."

In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is
clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which
overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of
freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress
of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot
be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice
President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political
question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech
and of the freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance
which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not inappropriate.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following
Tañada v. Cuenco, we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this
is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative xxx branch of the government." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the
presidency. The question is political in nature and addressed solely to
Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue, which cannot be decided
by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch
of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

Reference:  
Estrada vs Desierto, GR 146710-15 (2001 – En Banc)

-------------------------------------------------------

The OSG submits that the cases filed by petitioners involve the
resolution of purely political questions which go into the
wisdom of the law: they raise questions that are clearly political
and non-justiciable and outside the power of judicial review.
[103]

The political question doctrine is "no longer the insurmountable

obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review"[105] under the expanded definition of
judicial power of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. Section 1,
Article VIII thereof authorizes courts of justice not only "to settle
actual case controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."

In determining whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to

excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government, the Court is
guided primarily, by the Constitution, and secondarily, by
existing domestic and international law, which set limits or
conditions to the powers and functions conferred upon these
political bodies.[106] Thus, when a case is brought before the
Court with serious allegations that a law or executive issuance
infringes upon the Constitution, as in these consolidated cases,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the Court to
settle the dispute.[107] In doing so, the Court is "not judging
the wisdom of an act of a coequal department, but is merely
ensuring that the Constitution is upheld."[108] And, if after said
review, the Court does not find any constitutional infringement,
then, it has no more authority to proscribe the actions under
review.[109]

Reference:  
CoTeSCUP vs Secretary of Education, GR 216930 (October
09, 2018 - En Banc) Constitution, Filipino, Panitikan Subjects

The term "political question" connotes what it means in

ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard
to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government." It
is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial
power, which now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."   Even so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other
37

departments simply because their views may not coincide with ours.

Association of Small Landowners vs Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform

GR 78742 (1989, En banc)

-------------------------------------------------------

Posted 23rd October 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
OCT

23

International Law: Doctrine of Incorporation vs Doctrine of Transformation

1987 Philippine Constitution
ARTICLE II - Declaration of Principles and State Policies
(Principles)
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

ARTICLE 6 - The Legislative Department

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Posted 23rd October 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
OCT

23

Doctrine of Verba Legis

The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing,
regardless of the penalty imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or P.D. No.
968. 

The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken
to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or speech is the index of
intention.30 Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute
there should be no departure.

Reference:  Padua vs People , GR 168546 (1999)

"The fundamental principle in constitutional construction however is that the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. In
other words, verba legis prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of the
provision being construed."

Very recently, in Francisco v. The House of Representatives, this Court indeed had the occasion to reiterate
33 

the well-settled principles of constitutional construction:

"First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
"Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole." 34
We do not see how applying a strictly literal or verba legis interpretation of paragraph 4 could inexorably
lead to the conclusions arrived at in the ponencia. First, the drafters' choice of words -- their use of the
phrase agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance -- does not indicate the intent
to exclude other modes of assistance. The drafters opted to use involving when they could have simply
said agreements for financial or technical assistance, if that was their intention to begin with. In this case,
the limitation would be very clear and no further debate would ensue.

In contrast, the use of the word "involving" signifies the possibility of the inclusion of other forms of
assistance or activities having to do with, otherwise related to or compatible with financial or technical
assistance. The word "involving" as used in this context has three connotations that can be differentiated
thus: one, the sense of "concerning," "having to do with," or "affecting"; two, "entailing," "requiring,"
"implying" or "necessitating"; and three, "including," "containing" or "comprising." 38

Plainly, none of the three connotations convey a sense of exclusivity. Moreover, the word "involving," when
understood in the sense of "including," as in including technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies
that there are activities other than those that are being included . In other words, if an
agreement includes technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance -- something else
already in, and covered or may be covered by, the said agreement.

In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly mentioned, could be made part of
the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these
agreements with foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The difference
in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for technical or financial assistance"
against "agreements including technical or financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba
legis approach.

Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations to financial or technical
assistance and nothing more, their language would have certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and
stringent as to leave no doubt in anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would have used
the sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the management or
operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import. A search for such stringent wording yields
negative results. Thus, we come to the inevitable conclusion that there was a conscious and
deliberate decision to avoid the use of restrictive wording that bespeaks an intent not to use the
expression "agreements x x x involving either technical or financial assistance" in an exclusionary
and limiting manner.

Deletion of "Service Contracts" to

Avoid Pitfalls of Previous Constitutions,
Not to Ban Service Contracts Per Se

Third, we do not see how a verba legis approach leads to the conclusion that "the management or operation
of mining activities by foreign contractors, which is the primary feature of service contracts, was precisely
the evil that the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to eradicate." Nowhere in the above-quoted Section
can be discerned the objective to keep out of foreign hands the management or operation of mining
activities or the plan to eradicate service contracts as these were understood in the 1973 Constitution. 

La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association vs Ramos, GR 127882 (2004, En Banc - on MR)

Posted 23rd October 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
OCT

23
 Moot and Academic Principle
Whether the Court Can Still Decide the Case,
Even Assuming It Is Moot

... a case becomes moot and academic when "there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no
useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits," 1

Acop v. Guingona, to the effect that the courts will decide a question -- otherwise moot and academic -- if it
23 

is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."

Salonga v. Cruz Paño, in which this Court declared that "(t)he Court also has the duty to formulate guiding
25 

and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating the bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. x x x."

But of equal if not greater significance is the cloud of uncertainty hanging over the mining industry, which is
even now scaring away foreign investments. Attesting to this climate of anxiety is the fact that the Chamber
of Mines of the Philippines saw the urgent need to intervene in the case and to present its position during
the Oral Argument; and that Secretary General Romulo Neri of the National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) requested this Court to allow him to speak, during that Oral Argument, on the economic
consequences of the Decision of January 27, 2004. 20

We are convinced. We now agree that the Court must recognize the exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest involved, as well as the necessity for a ruling to put an end to the
uncertainties plaguing the mining industry and the affected communities as a result of doubts cast upon the
constitutionality and validity of the Mining Act, the subject FTAA and future FTAAs, and the need to avert a
multiplicity of suits.

La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association vs Ramos

GR 127882             December 1, 2004 (En banc)
Posted 23rd October 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
SEP

24

Labor: Bystander Rule

RA 9481 (2007)

SEC. 12. A new provision, Article 258-A is hereby inserted into the Labor Code to read as follows:
"Article. 258-A. Employer as Bystander. - In all cases, whether the petition for certification
election is filed by an employer or a legitimate labor organization, the employer shall not be
considered a party thereto with a concomitant right to oppose a petition for certification election. The
employer's participation in such proceedings shall be limited to: (1) being notified or informed of
petitions of such nature; and (2) submitting the list of employees during the pre-election conference
should the Med-Arbiter act favorably on the petition."

Posted 24th September 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
SEP

23

Principle of Free Trade Unionism: Private vs Public Sectors

Principle of Free Trade Unionism (Private Sector)
Alliance of Government Workers vs Minister of Labor and Employment, GR L-60403 (1983, En
banc)
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that :
§  industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law.
§  Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis.
§  Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and conditions
of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the process of collective bargaining.

Principle of Free Trade Unionism (Public Sector)

Alliance of Government Workers vs Minister of Labor and Employment, GR L-60403 (1983, En
banc)
§  Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannot use the
same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers.
§  In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the
administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected
through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.

Posted 23rd September 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
AUG

21

School "Termination of Contract" Doctrine

In Alcuaz v. PSBA, the Court characterized the relationship between the school and the student as a
contract, in which "a student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester." 

Two years later, in Non v. Dames II (1990, En Banc), the Court modified the "termination of contract
theory" in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship between the school and the student is
not only semestral in duration,  but for the entire period the latter are expected to complete it ."

RULING:

This is not a simple case of a school refusing readmission or re-enrollment of returning students. Undisputed
is the fact that the refusal to readmit or re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school
authorities as a reaction to student mass actions directed against the school. Petitioners are students of
respondent school who, after leading and participating in student protests, were denied readmission or re-
enrollment for the next semester. This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as
exercised by students vis-a-vis the right of school officials to discipline them.

1. The Student Does Not Shed His Constitutionally Protected Rights at the Schoolgate.
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
[Art. III.]
In Malabanan v. Ramento, GR 62270 (1984)
"While therefore, the authority of educational institutions over the conduct of students must be
recognized, it cannot go so far as to be violative of constitutional safeguards." 
2. Permissible Limitations on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights Within the School.
While the highest regard must be afforded the exercise of the rights to free speech and assembly,
this should not be taken to mean that school authorities are virtually powerless to discipline students.
This was made clear by the Court in Malabanan, when it echoed Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District, 393 US 503, 514: "But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason — whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior — materially disrupts classwork or
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."
3. Circumventing Established Doctrine.
Malabanan was decided by the Court in 1984. Since then, student mass actions have escalated not
only because of political events that unfurled but also because of the constantly raging controversy
over increases in tuition fees. But the over-eager hands of some school authorities were not
effectively tied down by the ruling in Malabanan. Instead of suspending or expelling student leaders
 who fell into disfavor with school authorities, a new variation of the same stratagem was adopted by
the latter: refusing the students readmission or re-enrollment on grounds not related to, their alleged
misconduct of "illegal assembly" in leading or participating in student mass actions directed against
the school. Thus, the spate of expulsions or exclusions due to "academic deficiency."
4. The Nature of the Contract Between a School and its Student.
The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the "termination of contract" theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions [See Art. XIV, secs. 1-2, 4(1)].
This "presumption" has been translated into a right in BP 232, the "Education Act of 1982." Section 9
of this act provides: 
Sec. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations
prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights: 
x x x           x x x          x x x 
2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula  and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations.
5. Academic Freedom Not a Ground for Denying Students' Rights.
Moreover, respondent judge loses sight of the Court's unequivocal statement in Villar that the right of
an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against
students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there win be
a violation of their right to equal protection [At p. 711]
6. Capitol Medical Center and Licup.

7. The Instant Case.

To justify the school's action, respondents, in their Comment dated November 12, 1989, quoting
from their answer filed in the trial court, allege that of the thirteen (13) petitioners eight (8) have
incurred failing grades, 
Petitioners have not denied this, but have countered this allegation
Clearly, the five (5) students who did not incur failing marks, namely, Normandy Occiano, Lourdes
Banares, Bartolome Ibasco, Sonny Moreno and Giovani Palma, were refused re-enrollment without
just cause and, hence, should be allowed to re-enroll.
However, these should not be taken to mean that no disciplinary action could have been taken
against petitioners for breach of discipline if the facts had so warranted. In line with the Court's ruling
in Malabanan, petitioners could have been subjected to disciplinary proceedings in connection with
the February 1988 mass actions. But the penalty that could have been imposed must be
commensurate to the offense committed and, as set forth in Guzman, it must be imposed only after
the requirements of procedural due process have been complied with. This is explicit from the
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides in Paragraph 145 that "[n]o penalty shall
be imposed upon any student, except for cause as defined in this Manual and/or in the school's rules
and regulations duly promulgated and only after due investigation shall have been conducted."
But this matter of disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of administrative sanctions have
become moot and academic. Petitioners, who have been refused readmission or re-enrollment and
who have been effectively excluded from respondent school for four (4) semesters, have already
been more than sufficiently penalized for any breach of discipline they might have committed when
they led and participated in the mass actions that, according to respondents, resulted in the
disruption of classes. To still subject them to disciplinary proceedings would serve no useful purpose
and would only further aggravate the strained relations between petitioners and the officials of
respondent school which necessarily resulted from the heated legal battle here, in the Court of
Appeals and before the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of respondent judge dated August 8, 1988 and
February 24, 1989 are hereby ANNULLED. Respondent Mabini College is ORDERED to readmit and to
allow the re- enrollment of petitioners, if they are still so minded, without prejudice to its taking the
appropriate action as to petitioners Ariel Non, Joselito Villalon, George (Jorge) Dayaon and Daniel Torres, if
it is shown by their records (Form 137) that they have failed to satisfy the school's prescribed academic
standards.

Source:  Non et al vs Danes [Mabini College] GR 89317 (1990, En Banc)

ARIEL NON, REX MAGANA, ALVIN AGURA, NORMANDY OCCIANO, JORGE DAYAON, LOURDES
BANARES, BARTOLOME IBASCO, EMMANUEL BARBA, SONNY MORENO, GIOVANI PALMA,
JOSELITO VILLALON, LUIS SANTOS, and DANIEL TORRES, petitioners, 
 vs.
HON. SANCHO DANES II, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of 5th Regional Trial Court, Br. 38, Daet,
Camarines Norte; and MABINI COLLEGES, INC., represented by its president ROMULO ADEVA and by the
chairman of the Board of Trustees, JUSTO LUKBAN, respondents.
Posted 21st August 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
AUG

Writ of Amparo
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo (2007)
A.M. No. 07-09-12-SC

Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any

person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

------

NOTES:
1. CJ Puno stated that "If you have this right, it would be very, very difficult for State agents, State
authorities to be able to escape from their culpability."
2. The writ of amparo (Spanish for protection) strips the military of the defense of simple denial. 
3. The rule is enforced retroactively.
4. May be filed "on any day and at any time" with the Regional Trial Court, or with
the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court. 
5. No filing or legal fees 
6. The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
7. Within 72 hours after service, the respondent shall file a verified written return together with
supporting affidavits
8. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision.
9. Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order within 5 days to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45 (question of fact or law) 
10. The interim reliefs under amparo are: temporary protection order (TPO), inspection order (IO),
production order (PO), and witness protection order (WPO, RA 6981)
Reference:  http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/2697/

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial

power "to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."  

The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the Amparo contra
leyes, Amparo casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring
of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison.
Writ of Amparo
What began as a protection against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later
evolved for several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas
corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) Amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo
administrativo for the judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the protection of
peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform process.

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause through remedies of injunction
or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,  these
remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ of Amparo through
summary proceedings and the availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo
Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of the Latin American and
Philippine experience of human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary
proceeding that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner;
it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.

The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission
of these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive
and curative roles is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.

Reference:  
Secretary of National Defense vs Manalo, GR 180906 (2008 – En Banc)
"The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo."

Posted 8th August 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
JUN

11

Doctrine of Abuse of Superior Strength

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the crime. It is taken into account whenever the aggressor purposely used excessive
force that is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked.  
In this case, as personally witnessed by AAA, appellant struck Jennifer in the head with a lead pipe then
stabbed her repeatedly until she was dead.  Clearly, the manner by which appellant had brutally
slain Jennifer with a lethal weapon, by first hitting her in the head with a lead pipe to render
her defenseless and vulnerable before stabbing her repeatedly, unmistakably showed that
appellant intentionally used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to his
unarmed victim.  

As aptly observed by the appellate court: it has long been established that an attack made by a man
with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman constitutes the circumstance of
abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded him and from which
the woman was unable to defend herself.  

Abuse of superiority is determined by the excess of the aggressor’s natural strength over that of the
victim, considering the momentary position of both and the employment of means weakening the
defense, although not annulling it. People of the Philippines v. Conrado Laog y Ramin,  G.R. No. 178321,
October 5, 2011.

Posted 11th June 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
JUN

11

Principle of Demurrer to Evidence

Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 23. Demurrer to evidence. 'After the prosecution rests its case, the court may
dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative
after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court.

Corollarily, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. 'The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

A demurrer to evidence tests the sufficiency or insufficiency of the prosecution's

evidence. As such, a demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same must be
filed after the prosecution rests its case. But before an evidence may be admitted, the rules
require that the same be formally offered, otherwise, it cannot be considered by the court. A
prior formal offer of evidence concludes the case for the prosecution and determines the
timeliness of the filing of a demurrer to evidence.

As held in Aquino v. Sison,16 the motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence filed by the
accused after the conclusion of the cross-examination of the witness for the prosecution,
is premature because the latter is still in the process of presenting evidence. The chemistry
report relied upon by the court in granting the motion to dismiss was disregarded because it
was not properly identified or formally offered as evidence. Verily, until such time that the
prosecution closed its evidence, the defense cannot be considered to have seasonably filed a
demurrer to evidence or a motion for leave to file the same.

In the present case, petitioner's motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence is premature
because the prosecution had yet to formally rest its case. When the motion was filed on
January 19, 2004, the latter had not yet marked nor formally offered the Joint Stipulation of
Facts as evidence. It is inconsequential that petitioner received by mail on January 27, 2004, a
motion and formal offer of evidence dated January 20, 2004 from Prosecutor
Salindong,17 because, as aptly observed by the Office of the Ombudsman, the records of the
Sandiganbayan bear no such motion or formal offer of evidence filed by the prosecution. The
motion and formal offer found in the records are those attached as Annex "B" 18 to petitioner's
Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration 19 and not copies filed by the prosecution. Under
Section 12, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, the filing of a pleading or paper shall be proved by
its existence in the case records. The absence of the motion to rest the case in the records of
the Sandiganbayan and the failure to offer the Joint Stipulation of Facts prove that the
prosecution did not formally rest or conclude the presentation of its evidence, rendering
petitioner's motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, premature.

At any rate, had the prosecution actually filed said motion and formally offered the evidence
before the Sandiganbayan, the motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence still suffers
prematurity because it was filed on January 19, 2004, or one day before the date of the
motion and offer, i.e., January 20, 2004. In fact, even petitioner admitted in his motion for
leave to file demurrer to evidence that the prosecution failed to mark and offer any evidence
against him.20

Then too, while petitioner is free to acknowledge or reject the Joint Stipulation of Facts,
the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in ordering petitioner to
sign the same considering that said stipulation was not yet formally offered by the
prosecution. At that stage, said document cannot yet be considered "officially" an evidence
for the prosecution. The refusal therefore of petitioner to affix his signature in the said
stipulation or in the Pre-trial Order embodying the same is sufficient justification for the trial
court to recall the latter and in the exercise of its sound discretion, set the case for
presentation of the prosecution's evidence.

Finally, if petitioner disagrees with the denial of his motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence, his remedy is not to file a petition for certiorari but to proceed with the
presentation of his evidence and to appeal any adverse decision that may be rendered by the
trial court. The last sentence of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, provides that "the
order denying a motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer
itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or certiorari  before judgment."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The June 14, 2004 Order of respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 25160 which denied petitioner's motion for leave
to file demurrer to evidence and set the case for presentation of evidence for the
prosecution; as well its July 28, 2004 Resolution denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration are AFFIRMED. 
The instant case is REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings. 
SO ORDERED.

source:  Valencia vs Sandiganbayan, GR 165996 (2005, First Division)

demurrer = a pleading in a lawsuit that objects to or challenges a pleading filed by an

opposing party; the word demur means "to object"; a demurrer is the document that makes
the objection. Lawyers informally define a demurrer as a defendant saying "So what?" to the
pleading.

Posted 11th June 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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MAY

27

Doctrine of DBM's Approval Authority on Upgrading, Reclassification,

Creation, and Collapsing of Plantilla Positions
ISSUE:
The central question we must answer in order to resolve this case is: Can the Commission on Human Rights
validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the
Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?

We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the approval by the DBM is a condition precedent to the
enactment of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR.

RULING:
After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties and an assiduous scrutiny of the records in
the case at bar, it is the Court's opinion that the present petition is imbued with merit.

Germane to our discussion is RA. 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, dated
01 July 1989, which provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the DBM that shall establish and
administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus :

SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy of the State to provide equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in duties and
responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. In determining rates of pay, due
regard shall be given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work.
For this purpose, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to
establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification System,
hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended,
that shall be applied for all government entities, as mandated by the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied.) 
SEC. 4. Coverage. – The Compensation and Position Classification System herein provided shall
apply to all positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now existing or hereafter
created in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations and government
financial institutions.

The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative and the Judicial Branches and the
Constitutional Commissions and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments, bureaus, offices,
boards, commissions, courts, tribunals, councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state
colleges and universities, local government units, and the armed forces. The term "government-owned or
controlled corporations and financial institutions" shall include all corporations and financial institutions
owned or controlled by the National Government, whether such corporations and financial institutions
perform governmental or proprietary functions.

This power to "administer" is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the Court of Appeals.
The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct or superintend the
execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the
government of the state. 15

The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well.

Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation
of additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding that such scheme lacks legal justification.

All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included in the
genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.

This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to implement and administer a unified compensation
system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to
implement a statute is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED ...

G.R. No. 155336             November 25, 2004 (Second Division)

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES' ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its

President, MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.

Posted 27th May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

  
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MAY

27

Doctrine of Ombudsman Appointment Authority Not Within the CES Rules

This Court is once again called upon to settle a controversy between two independent
constitutional bodies and delineate the limits of their respective powers.

This controversy traces its roots to Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo's letter 1 dated July 28,
2003 to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) requesting the approval of the amendment of
qualification standards for Director II positions in the Central Administrative Service and
Finance and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman.

Acting thereon, the CSC issued Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 3 dated January 23, 2004 disapproving
the request.

CSC:  The Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, is mandated by
the Constitution to administer all levels in the civil service, including that of the third level.

The Office of the Ombudsman, claiming that its constitutional and statutory powers were
unduly curtailed, now seeks to set aside and nullify CSC Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 via this
petition for certiorari .6

Ruling
We agree with the Office of the Ombudsman.

Thus, the CES covers presidential appointees only.

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is the appointing authority for all officials and
employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, except the Deputy Ombudsmen. 9 Thus, a person
occupying the position of Director II in the Central Administrative Service or Finance and
Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman is appointed by the Ombudsman, not by
the President. As such, he is neither embraced in the CES nor does he need to possess CES
eligibility.10

To classify the positions of Director II in the Central Administrative Service and the Finance
and Management Service of the Office of the Ombudsman as covered by the CES and require
appointees thereto to acquire CES or CSE11eligibility before acquiring security of tenure will
lead to unconstitutional and unlawful consequences. It will result either in (1) vesting the
appointing power for said position in the President, in violation of the Constitution or (2)
including in the CES a position not held by a presidential appointee, contrary to the
Administrative Code.12

Section 6, Article XI of the Constitution provides:

The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies, shall be
appointed by the Ombudsman according to the Civil Service Law.

Under the Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent body. 14 As a guaranty
of this independence, the Ombudsman has the power to appoint all officials and employees of
the Office of the Ombudsman, except his deputies. 15 This power necessarily includes the power
of setting, prescribing and administering the standards for the officials and personnel of the
Office.

Qualification standards are used as guides in appointment and other personnel actions, in
determining training needs and as aid in the inspection and audit of the personnel work
programs.16 They are intimately connected to the power to appoint as well as to the power of
administrative supervision. Thus, as a corollary to the Ombudsman's appointing and
supervisory powers, he possesses the authority to establish reasonable qualification standards
for the personnel of the Office of the Ombudsman. ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl  lαω lιbrαrÿ
Accordingly, the petition is hereby GRANTED and Opinion No. 44, s. 2004 dated January 23,
2004 of the Civil Service Commission is SET ASIDE.

G.R. NO. 162215 : July 30, 2007 (En banc)

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent.
Posted 27th May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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MAY

25

Doctrine of SC's Not a Trier of Facts

At the outset, it must be stressed that the issue of whether respondent acted in good faith is a question of
fact, the determination of which is beyond the ambit of this Court’s power of review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 

Only questions of law may be raised under this Rule as this Court is not a trier of facts.

However, there are instances when questions of fact may be reviewed by this Court, as when: 

1. (a) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 

2. (b) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 
3. (c) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 
4. (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 
5. (g) the findings of fact of the trial court are contrary to those of the Court of Appeals
6. (e) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the evidence on record; and,
7. (f) the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
such findings are contrary to the admission of both the appellant and appellee

Reference:  GR 165253
Posted 25th May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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MAY

25

Doctrine of Question of Law

At the outset, it must be stressed that the issue of whether respondent acted in good faith is a question of
fact, the determination of which is beyond the ambit of this Court’s power of review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. 

Only questions of law may be raised under this Rule as this Court is not a trier of facts.

However, there are instances when questions of fact may be reviewed by this Court, as when: 

1. (a) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 

2. (b) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 
3. (c) there is a grave abuse of discretion; 
4. (d) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 
5. (g) the findings of fact of the trial court are contrary to those of the Court of Appeals
6. (e) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to the evidence on record; and,
7. (f) the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
such findings are contrary to the admission of both the appellant and appellee

Reference:  GR 165253
Posted 25th May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
  
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3.
MAY

24

Doctrine on Burden of Proof

The burden of proof in administrative cases lies on the complainant. 
G.R. No. 154521 September 30, 2005
Civil Service vs Ledesma
En banc
Posted 24th May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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MAY

22

Supreme Court Decisions: December, 2018

1.
A.M. No. P-18-3882 (Formerly OCA IPI No.13-4207-P)
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND CORRUPTION PREVENTION OFFICE, BY ATTY. JOCELYN Y. DACUMOS, COMPLAINANT, V. SOCIAL WELFARE
OFFICER II CAROLINA A. PAUMIG, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TAGBILARAN CITY, RESPONDENT.
December 04, 2018 
1. serious dishonesty
2. case arose from a Letter-Complaint [2] of a concerned citizen addressed to the Deputy
OMB for Visayas regarding the missing funds from the Self-Employment Assistance
sa Kaunlaran (SEA-K) Loan Program of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD)
3. Having clear finding that respondent is guilty of misappropriating public funds,
PACPO recommended that respondent be charged criminally and administratively
for malversation of public funds and dishonesty.
4. The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.
5. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds respondent Carolina A.
Paumig, Social Welfare Officer II, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court,
Tagbilaran City, GUILTY of serious dishonesty.
A.M. No. 15-05-136-RTC
IN RE: SPECIAL REPORT ON THE ARREST OF ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, FOR VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, A.M. NO. P-16-3450 (FORMERLY A.M. No.
15-12-379-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, COMPLAINANT, VS ROGELIO M. SALAZAR, JR., SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT-OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BOAC, MARINDUQUE, RESPONDENT.
December 04, 2018 
6. Issue:  The pivotal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable despite dismissal of the related criminal cases against him.
7. Ruling:  
8. Respondent was charged with illegal sale, possession, and use of illegal drugs. Respondent,
however, pounds on the fact that the criminal cases against him from which these administrative
cases rooted, had already been dismissed by virtue of the quashal of the search warrant and the
suppression of the evidence taken by virtue of the said warrant. It is the respondent's position that
since the evidence obtained through such search warrant were declared illegal and inadmissible by
the RTC, the same cannot likewise be used in the instant administrative cases. Hence, respondent
argued that the administrative cases against him has no leg to stand on and must be dismissed. We
do not agree.
9. This is an administrative case against a Sheriff of the court charged with the administrative offenses
of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as an offshoot of a
prior arrest and criminal charges for violations of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002 against said officer.
 10. , the paramount interest sought to be protected in an administrative case is the preservation of the
Constitutional mandate that a public office is a public trust.fifth, the quantum of proof required for a
finding of administrative guilt remains to be substantial evidence; and fourth, the Supreme Court, in
taking cognizance of this administrative case, acts not as a prosecutor, but as the administrative
superior specifically tasked to discipline its Members and personnel; third, the Sheriff stands
scrutiny and treated not as an accused in a criminal case, but as a respondent court officer; second,
the finding of administrative guilt is independent of the results of the criminal charges against the
Sheriff; first Owing to the administrative nature of the instant case, several important considerations
must be taken into serious account: 
11. Thus, the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 62-15 and 63-15 does not automatically entail the
dismissal of the instant administr ative actions.[25] Evidence to support a conviction in a criminal case is
not necessary, and the dismissal of the criminal case against the respondent is not a ground for the
dismissal of the administrative case. It bears stressing that a criminal case is different from an
administrative case and each must be disposed of according to the facts and the law applicable to
each case.[24]Well settled is the rule that an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an
administrative prosecution or vice-versa.
12. even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. [26]It is necessary to
emphasize that to sustain a finding of administrative culpability, only substantial evidence is
required, that is, more than a mere scintilla of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion xxx The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is responsible for
the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming
or even preponderant.
13. The question now is, taking into consideration the inadmissibility in the criminal cases of the
drugs obtained by virtue of the search warrant and the positive result of the confirmatory test
conducted on the respondent upon arrest, is there substantial evidence to hold the respondent
administratively liable in this case? We answer in the affirmative.
14. There is no doubt that the use of prohibited drugs constitute grave misconduct. It is
a flagrant violation of the law, in fact a crime in itself, thus considered as grave
misconduct.
15.

Posted 22nd May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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MAY

21

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

In Allied Banking Corporation v. Bank of the Philippine Islands,   the Court explained:
[15]

The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by
exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff
notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. The doctrine necessarily assumes negligence on the part
of the defendant and contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except
upon that assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude
him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the
last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in
situations where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant's failure to exercise such ordinary
care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which was the proximate cause of the
occurrence of such loss or injury.
[16]

Reference:
G.R. No. 199562, January 16, 2019
Bank of the Philippine Islands and Ana C. Gonzales, petitioners, VS. Spouses Fernando V. Quiaoit and
Nora L. Quiaoit, respondents.

Posted 21st May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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MAY

21

Doctrine of Prosecution Evidence in Criminal Case

G.R. No. 224210, January 23, 2019
People vs Gumban and Cheng

1. Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
2. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the mandatory procedural safeguards in buy-bust
operations
3. Indeed, non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily
invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs as long as there were justifiable grounds
for the non-compliance and the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved.[9] Records of the
instant case reveal that the absence of a DOJ representative during the marking, inventory and
photographing of the seized items was due to the fact that it was already late at night.[10] This
explanation, however, was found unjustifiable and unacceptable in People v. Miranda[11] and
recently in People v. Lim.[12] Moreover, assuming to be true, coordination with the mayor in
securing the attendance of a DOJ representative was not tantamount to a genuine and serious
attempt to secure the presence of the DOJ representative. 
4. Indeed, appellant's failure to present any evidence for her defense as she waived her right to do so
was inconsequential. The well-entrenched dictum in criminal law is that "the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense." If the prosecution cannot, to begin with, establish the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the defense is not even required to adduce evidence.
5. All told, the totality of the prosecution's evidence presented in this case did not support appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 as the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the object of the sale which is an element of the offense. 
6. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. 

Posted 21st May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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MAY

21

Plain View Doctrine

Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out
through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause, absent
which, such search and seizure become "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.
To protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible
in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. 

1. In other words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches
and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree.

One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be effected is when the "plain
view" doctrine is applicable. In People v. Lagman, this Court laid down the following parameters for its
application":

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view are
subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. 
 2. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: 
3. (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; 
4. (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; 
5. (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. 
6. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent. (Emphases supplied)

Ruling
In this case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta. Instead, he argues that the
second requisite is absent since the discovery of the police officers of the marijuana plants was not
inadvertent as it was prompted by Salucana. After a careful review of the records, this Court is inclined to
agree.

It is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even prior to the mauling
incident. In fact, it may be reasonably inferred that the mauling incident had something to do with Acosta's
planting of marijuana. It is also clear that Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal planting and
cultivation of the marijuana plants when he reported the mauling incident. Thus, when the police officers
proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that there could possibly be marijuana
plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the plants was inadvertent. In People v.
Valdez,[28] the Court held that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching"
for evidence against the accused

All told, since the marijuana plants seized from Acosta constitute inadmissible evidence in violation of
Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, and given that the confiscated plants are the very corpus
delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds Acosta's conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated February 22, 2018 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01612-MIN is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant
Billy Acosta is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Reference:  G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019

People of The Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. Billy Acosta, Accused-Appellant.
Posted 21st May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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MAY

20

Supreme Court Decisions: January 2019

G.R. No. 193534, January 30, 2019 
Tio vs BPI
1. Compromise Agreement; Foreclosure

G.R. No. 211829, January 30, 2019

Bagaporo vs People
2. Petitioner was indicted for Bigamy
3. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of
the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage,
precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith
based on mere testimony is found incredible.
4. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019
People vs NANCY LASACA RAMIREZ A.K.A. "ZOY" OR "SOY" 

5. RA 9208 - Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003

A.M. No. P-18-3791 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-4447-P), January 29, 2019
Malubay vs Hon. Guevara (Judge)

6. A court employee who fails to exercise diligence in performing his duties and repeatedly
disregards the directives and instructions of his superiors for him to do so is a disgrace to the
Judiciary, and should be dismissed from the service. His name should be stricken out from the
roll.
7. We hereby consider and resolve the administrative complaint charging herein respondent Clerk
III of Branch 270 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Valenzuela City with gross neglect of duty
and gross disobedience to the directives and instructions of his superiors.
8. Issue:  Did the acts and omissions of the respondent constitute gross neglect of duty and gross
insubordination that warrant his dismissal from the service?
9. Ruling:  WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES respondent HONORIO RAUL C.
GUEVARA GUILTY of GROSS NEGLECT OF DUTY, GROSS INSUBORDINATION and GROSS
INEFFICIENCY AND INCOMPETENCE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTIES; and,
accordingly, DISMISSES him from the service EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY with FORFEITURE of all
his benefits, except accrued leave credits.

A.M. No. 18-03-03-SB, January 29, 2019

RE: E-mail Complaint of Ma. Rosario Gonzales Against Hon. Maria Theresa Mendoza-Arcega,
Associate Justice, Sandiganbayan and Hon. Flerida Z. Banzuela, Presiding Judge, RTC - Branch 51,
Sorsogon City, Sorsogon.

10. In addition, even assuming that Judge Zaballa-Banzuela's orders regarding the submission of
the memoranda and the extension given to Gonzales were in order, she still failed to render a
decision within the prescribed 90-day period. The 90-day period to render a decision is
constitutionally mandated and failure to decide cases within the same constitutes a ground for
administrative sanction except when there are valid reasons for the delay.[11] The prompt
disposal of cases is necessary as undue delay erodes the public's faith and confidence to the
justice system and brings it into disrepute.[12]
11. Judge Flerida P. Zaballa-Banzuela is GUILTY for undue delay in rendering a Decision. She is
REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.
G.R. No. 234951, January 28, 2019
People vs Benjamin A. Elimancil

12. Simple Rape under Article 266-A, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

G.R. No. 228953, January 28, 2019

People vs Sahibil

13. illegal sale of dangerous drugs (shabu), as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165

G.R. No. 226578, January 28, 2019

Augustin International Center, Inc vs Bartolome and Yamat
14. illegally dismissed from employment
G.R. No. 239521, January 28, 2019
Mina, et al vs CA (Tandoc)

15. Perjury - Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

16. 2000 National Prosecution Service (NPS) Rule on Appeal as amended by DOJ Department Circular
No. 70-A (2010), which was strengthened further by DOJ Department Circular No. 018-14 (2014)
17. In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the OPP accusing
Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the OPP (Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor) and such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP (Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor). Since (a) the criminal complaint was filed outside of the NCR; (b) perjury cases are
cognizable by the first-level courts since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than
six (6) years;[18] and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision
over the entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling was
 with finality. As such, petitioners have already exhausted its administrative remedies and may now
go to the CA via a petition for certiorari.
18. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 238865

People vs Acosta

19. Section 16, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,[4] otherwise known as the "Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
20. the "Plain View" Doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching" for evidence against the
accused. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of
SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could
spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a
"further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or
"open to eye and hand." The "Plain View" Doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
21. Considering that the "Plain View" Doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the seized marijuana
plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits of the poisonous tree.
22. given that the confiscated plants are the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court finds
Acosta's conviction to be improper and therefore, acquits him.
23. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, accused-appellant Billy Acosta is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged. 
24. Note: in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing
tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court's decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal
confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to
examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law. 
G.R. No. 212107, January 28, 2019
Keihin-Everett Forwarding Co vs. Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co and Sunfreight Forwarders &
Customs Brokerage

25. Right of Reimbursement

26. It is undisputed that the cargoes were lost when they were in the custody of Sunfreight Forwarders.
Hence, under Article 1735 of the Civil Code, the presumption of fault on the part of Sunfreight
Forwarders (as common carrier) arose. Since Sunfreight Forwarders failed to prove that it observed
extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligation to Keihin-Everett, it is liable to the latter
for breach of contract. Consequently, Keihin-Everett is entitled to be reimbursed by Sunfreight
Forwarders due to the latter's own breach occasioned by the loss and damage to the cargoes under
its care and custody.
27. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 8, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No.
98672 is AFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 201302, January 23, 2019

Hygienic Packaging Corporation vs. Nutri-asia

28. The venue for the collection of sum of money case is governed by Rule 4, Section 2 of the Rules of
Court. Unless the parties enter into a written agreement on their preferred venue before an action is
instituted, the plaintiff may commence his or her action before the trial court of the province or city
either where he or she resides, or where the defendant resides. If the party is a corporation, its
residence is the province or city where its principal place of business is situated as recorded in its
Articles of Incorporation.
29. This Court reminds litigants that while the rules on venue are for the convenience of plaintiffs, these
rules do not give them unbounded freedom to file their cases wherever they may please
30. [T]he rules on venue, like the other procedural rules, are designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice or the impartial and even-handed determination of every
action and proceeding. Obviously, this objective will not be attained if the plaintiff is given
unrestricted freedom to choose the court where he may file his complaint or petition. The
choice of venue should not be left to the plaintiff's whim or caprice. He [or she] may be
impelled by some ulterior motivation in choosing to file a case in a particular court even if not
allowed by the rules on venue.

G.R. No. 224210, January 23, 2019

People vs Gumban and Cheng

31. Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
32. Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the mandatory procedural safeguards in buy-bust
operations
33. Indeed, non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily
invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs as long as there were justifiable grounds
for the non-compliance and the integrity of the corpus delicti was preserved.[9] Records of the
instant case reveal that the absence of a DOJ representative during the marking, inventory and
photographing of the seized items was due to the fact that it was already late at night.[10] This
explanation, however, was found unjustifiable and unacceptable in People v. Miranda[11] and
recently in People v. Lim.[12] Moreover, assuming to be true, coordination with the mayor in
securing the attendance of a DOJ representative was not tantamount to a genuine and serious
attempt to secure the presence of the DOJ representative. 
34. Indeed, appellant's failure to present any evidence for her defense as she waived her right to do so
was inconsequential. The well-entrenched dictum in criminal law is that "the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the defense." If the prosecution cannot, to begin with, establish the guilt of
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the defense is not even required to adduce evidence.
35. All told, the totality of the prosecution's evidence presented in this case did not support appellant's
conviction for violation of Section 5, Article II, RA 9165 as the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the identity of the object of the sale which is an element of the offense. 
36. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. 
G.R. No. 221418, January 23, 2019
Villarosa, et al vs Ombudsman (Basilio)

37. Crime of Technical Malversation (Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code) and violation of Section 3
(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019
38. petitioners' use of the municipality's "Trust Fund" derived from tobacco excise taxes (Tobacco Fund)
under R.A. No. 8240[3] to finance the regular operations of the municipality
39. "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be
affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take
on their own property."[34]
40. In this case, the finding of the Ombudsman falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to
establish the fact that petitioners acted with manifest partiality or there was a failure to show that
there was a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection on the part of the petitioners to favor
one side rather than the other. Contrary to the view of the Ombudsman, the mere act of using
government money to fund a project which is different from what the law states you have to spend it
for does not fall under the definition of manifest partiality nor gross inexcusable negligence. It must
always be remembered that manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not elements in
the crime of Technical Malversation and simply alleging one or both modes would not suffice to
establish probable cause for violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, for it is well-settled
that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can we deduce any or all of the modes from mere
speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of petitioners as with any other person is
presumed. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith which connotes not only bad
judgment, but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.
41. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court  is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Joint Resolution of the Ombudsman are AFFIRMED only insofar as its finding of
probable cause against petitioners for the crime of Technical Malversation.

G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019

Cabral vs Bracamonte

42. Crime of estafa

43. purchase of shares of stock. Simultaneous with the signing of the MOA, Bracamonte issued a
postdated check which eventually dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. 
44. Consequently, for failure to settle the obligation, Cabral instituted a complaint for estafa against
Bracamonte in Parañaque City. Finding probable cause, the prosecutor filed with the RTC of
Parañaque City an Information
 45. Indeed, it is rather unfair to require a defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a
trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper
venue. It has been consistently held that "in a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that
the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court." There being no showing that the
offense was committed within Parañaque City, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over
the case.
46. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 210773, January 23, 2019

Gsis Family Bank Employees Union vs Villanueva, et al

47. Officers and employees of GOCCs without original charters are covered by the Labor Code, not the
Civil Service Law. However, non-chartered GOCCs are limited by law in negotiating economic terms
with their employees. This is because the law has provided the Compensation and Position
Classification System, which applies to all GOCCs, chartered or non-chartered.
48. praying that GSIS Family Bank be declared outside the coverage of RA 10149 and, therefore, be
directed to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement with its employees.
49. Facts:  application of Royal Savings Bank for conservatorship was denied and instead BSP  placed it
under receivership. Royal Savings Bank filed several complaints against the Central Bank for grave
abuse of discretion. To amicably settle the cases, then Central Bank Governor Jose B. Fernandez,
Jr. offered to reopen and rehabilitate Royal Savings Bank if it would drop all its complaints against
the Central Bank and transfer all its shares of stock to Commercial Bank of Manila, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the GSIS.
50. When it comes to collective bargaining agreements and collective negotiation agreements in
government-owned or controlled corporations, Executive Order No. 203 unequivocally stated that
while it recognized the right of workers to organize, bargain, and negotiate with their employers, "the
Governing Boards of all covered [government-owned or controlled corporations], whether Chartered
or Non-chartered, may not negotiate with their officers and employees the economic terms of their
[collective bargaining agreements]."
51. Thus, considering the existing law at the time, GSIS Family Bank could not be faulted for refusing to
enter into a new collective bargaining agreement with petitioner as it lacked the authority to negotiate
economic terms with its employees. Unless directly challenged in the appropriate case and with a
proper actual controversy, the constitutionality and validity of RA 10149, as it applies to fully
government-owned and controlled non-chartered corporations, prevail.
52. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019
Miranda vs People

53. crime of Frustrated Homicide

54. Significantly, in cases of frustrated homicide, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt
that: "(i) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his
assault; (ii) the victim sustained [a] fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical
assistance; and (iii) none of the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are present."
55. It bears stressing that the main element in frustrated homicide is the accused's intent to take his
victim's life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible
doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations, such as the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the
assault and immediately thereafter. [23] Likewise, such homicidal intent may be inferred from, among other
things, the means the offender used, and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. 
56. In his defense, Miranda admitted that he hacked Pilo with the bolo twice, but claimed that his acts
were done in self-defense. [9] He narrated that on August 14, 2011, at around 7:00p.m., while he was at home
with his wife and daughter, he suddenly heard a thud at their door, followed by several other thuds and stones hurled
at their house. Miranda peeped through the window and saw Pilo, throwing stones. He claimed that before he peeped
through the door, he heard Pilo challenge him to come out so that they could kill each other. [10] Miranda asked Pilo if
something was wrong, but the latter ignored him and continued hurling stones.[11] According to Miranda, Pilo
approached him and hit his upper left cheek with a stone. When Pilo stretched his two arms downwards to pick up
something from the ground, Miranda suddenly hacked Pilo's arm with his bolo, in order to defend himself from Pilo's
oncoming attack.
57. Although Pilo's act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression, admittedly,
however, such deed was vexatious, improper and enough to incite Miranda into anger. The fact that
Miranda was stirred to rage was understandable considering that his wife and daughter were at his
home, and were peacefully having supper when Pilo threw the stones.
58. In Gotis v. People, the Court held that while an act cannot be considered an unlawful
aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act may be regarded as sufficient
provocation for the purpose of mitigating the crime.[48] "As a mitigating circumstance,
sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim adequate enough
 to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity." The
victim must have committed a prior act that incited or irritated the accused. Likewise, in order
to be mitigating, the provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act.
59. It, likewise, bears stressing that the most important element of self-defense is unlawful aggression.
This is a condition sine qua non for upholding self-defense. It is all too apparent that Miranda's life
was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed against Miranda. More than this, Miranda
even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not
faced with any actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger for him to have the need to defend
himself. Moreover, the Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when
the latter was completely defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force beyond
what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant's attack—and is certainly unjustified.
60. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019

Marilyn Nullada vs Civil Registrar of Manila (Akira, Shin)

61. RTC in Special Proceedings denied the recognition of a foreign divorce that was obtained by
petitioner Marlyn Monton Nullada (Marlyn) with Japanese national Akira Ito (Akira).

62. she and Akira got married in Japan resulting in the birth of a child, Shin Ito.  In 2009, Akira and
Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan.

63. pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26 of the Family Code
64.
 Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),
(4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38.


 Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad  by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Underscoring ours)
65. Applying the same legal considerations and considering the similar factual milieu that attended in
Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC's decision that refused to recognize the
divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner spouse in Japan solely on
the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses.
66. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it
only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does
not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein
the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the
petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. 
67. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

A.M. No. P-16-3505 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4134-P], January 22, 2019 
Duque vs Calpo (court stenographer)

68. for malfeasance, grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct unbecoming of a public official in the
judiciary
69. Complainant, a member of the Philippine Coast Guard, alleged that sometime in September 2010,
he met respondent through a common friend. After opening up about his marital problems to
respondent, the latter voluntarily offered his services to help complainant secure an annulment order
from the court.
70. A year later, sometime in November 2011, respondent gave a copy of the Decision[7] issued by the
RTC of Dasmariñas City, Cavite, Branch 90, docketed as Civil Case No. DAS-815-11, penned by
Executive Judge Perla V. Cabrera-Faller (Judge Cabrera-Faller), granting complainant an annulment
of his marriage. Suspicious of the veracity of the decision, complainant followed the advice of a
lawyer and sought to verify its authenticity. To his dismay, complainant learned that there was no
such case and that Judge Cabrera-Faller had not issued any such decision. He also learned that her
signature therein was a forgery. Complainant confronted respondent of his discovery, who begged
 complainant not to file any case against him and promised to return the money. Despite several
demands and time to comply, respondent failed to fulfill his promise.
71. After the hearings, the investigating judge determined that it was respondent who offered his
services to complainant for the annulment of the latter's marriage for a fee of P150,000.00,
which respondent did not deny. The investigating judge also resolved that respondent
manufactured and falsified the decision purportedly rendered by the RTC of Dasmariñas
City, Cavite, Branch 90 and forged the signature of Judge Cabrera-Faller appearing thereon.
Considering that the acts of respondent clearly constitute grave misconduct, the investigating
judge recommended the dismissal of respondent from service and all of his benefits forfeited
therefor.

72.
73. Respondent's actuations clearly demonstrate an intent to violate the law or a persistent disregard of
well-known rules. Respondent deceived complainant into believing he had the power to obtain an
annulment order in complainant's favor. Receiving money from complainant, on the consideration
that he can obtain a favorable decision from the court, falsifying a court decision, and forging the
signature of the trial court judge, undeniably constitute grave misconduct and serious dishonesty.
74. Sec. 46, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, promulgated on
November 8, 2011, classifies grave misconduct and serious dishonesty as grave offenses.[16]
Accordingly, the imposable penalty for grave misconduct and serious dishonesty is the extreme
penalty of dismissal from service. Sec. 52(a) of the same Rules states that the penalty of dismissal
shall carry with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from holding public office and bar from taking civil service examinations.
75. WHEREFORE, respondent CESAR C. CALPO, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Cavite,
Branch 16, is found GUILTY of grave misconduct and serious dishonesty. He is hereby DISMISSED from service,
with FORFEITURE of all benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-
employment in any government instrumentality, including government-owned and controlled corporations, without
prejudice to the filing of appropriate criminal and civil cases.
A.M. No. 18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019
RE: Complaint-affidavit of Elvira N. Enalbes, Rebecca H. Angeles and Estelita B. Ocampo Against Former
Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro [Ret.], Relative to G.R. Nos. 203063 and 204743.
76. Courts are not unmindful of the right to speedy disposition of cases enshrined in the
Constitution. Magistrates are obliged to render justice in the swiftest way possible to ensure
that rights of litigants are protected. Nevertheless, they should not hesitate to step back,
reflect, and reevaluate their position even if doing so means deferring the final disposition of
the case. Indeed, justice does not equate with hastily giving one's due if it is found to be
prejudicial. At the end of the day, the duty of the courts is to dispense justice in accordance
with law.
77. This administrative matter originated from a Complaint-Affidavit [1] filed by complainants Elvira N.
Enalbes, Rebecca H. Angeles, and Estelita B. Ocampo against former Chief Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro
(Chief Justice De Castro), charging her with gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross
dishonesty, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
78. Gross ignorance of the law is the failure of a magistrate to apply "basic rules and settled jurisprudence." [13] It connotes
a blatant disregard of clear and unambiguous provisions of law [14] "because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty[,] or
corruption."[15] It is a serious charge[16] that is punishable by the following: Rule 40
79. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Administrative Complaint against respondent, former Chief Justice Teresita
J. Leonardo-De Castro, for gross ignorance of the law, gross inefficiency, gross misconduct, gross dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is DISMISSED as there is no showing of a prima facie case
against her.

G.R. No. 229780, January 22, 2019

Balayan Water District (BWD), Conrado S. Lopez and Romeo D. Pantoja, petitioners, vs. Commission on
Audit, respondent.

80.
81. Factual background:  On February 10, 2006, BWD's Board of Directors (BOD) passed Resolution
No. 16-06 granting the payment of COLA to BWD employees in an installment basis starting 2006.
The amount to be paid was the accrued COLA from 1992 to 1999. On November 14, 2012, several
NDs were issued disallowing the payment of accrued COLA during calendar years 2010 and 2011.
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the COA Regional Director, Regional Office No. IV-A (COA-
R0).
82.
83. In this case, the majority of the petitioners are the LGU of Tayabas, Quezon's rank-and-file
employees and bona fide members of UNGK.AT (named-below) who received the 2008 and 2009
CNA Incentives on the honest belief that UNGKAT was fully clothed with the authority to
represent them in the CNA negotiations. As the records bear out, there was no indication that
these rank-and-file employees, except the UNGKAT officers or members of its Board of Directors
named below, had participated in any of the negotiations or were, in any manner, privy to the internal
workings related to the approval of said incentives; hence, under such limitation, the reasonable
 conclusion is that they were mere passive recipients who cannot be charged with knowledge
of any irregularity attending the disallowed disbursement. Verily, good faith is anchored on an
honest belief that one is legally entitled to the benefit, as said employees did so believe in this case.
Therefore, said petitioners should not be held liable to refund what they had unwittingly
received. (Emphasis supplied)
84. In the same vein, BWD employees who had no hand in the approval or release of the COLA
back payments are exempt from refunding the disallowed amount. They had acted in good
faith as they were unaware of any irregularity in its disbursement, especially since it was made
pursuant to the resolution passed by BWD's BOD. Passive recipients should not be faulted in
unwittingly receiving allowances or benefits they assumed they were entitled to.
85. WHEREFORE, the December 27, 2016 Decision ofthe Commission on Audit in Decision No. 2016-425
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the employees of the Balayan Water District who were mere passive
recipients of the disallowed disbursement are absolved from refunding the amount they have received
G.R. No. 230566, January 22, 2019
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority, et al., petitioners, VS. Commission On Audit, respondent.
86. Antecedents:  In 2009, SBMA procured special and field uniforms for its employees through regular
public bidding, and the winning bidder with the lowest price was Topnotch Apparel Corporation
(Topnotch Apparel). However, SBMA claimed that the quality and craftsmanship of the uniforms of
the employees were compromised due to the current procurement laws. After a series of meetings
conducted by the Uniform Committee, it was agreed that departments/officer[s] with special or field
uniforms will be allowed to procure their uniforms on their own following a set of guidelines or
procedures, in the flowchart form, hereto attached as Annex A. For uniformity purposes, each
department with special or field uniform will also be provided with a template contract. 
87. On March 26, 2012, the Special Audit Team of the SBMA issued Special Audit ND No. 2012-
001-(2011) against several SBMA officers, department heads and suppliers regarding the
procurement of special and field uniforms of the SBMA employees.
88. Ruling:  The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.
89. Public bidding as a method of government procurement is governed by the principles of
transparency, competitiveness, simplicity and accountability. Alternative methods of procurement,
however, are allowed under R.A. No. 9184, which would enable dispensing with the requirement of
open, public and competitive bidding, but only in highly exceptional cases and under the conditions
set forth in Article XVI thereof. 
90.
91.
92. As public bidding is the general rule and alternative methods of procurement are mere
exceptions, it was incumbent upon petitioners to prove the definite and particular alternative
method of procurement they availed of under Section 48 of RA 9184. At best, petitioners
assert that they resorted to the alternative mode of negotiated procurement to purchase the
said uniforms.
93.
94. In negotiated procurement, the procuring entity directly negotiates a contract with a
technically, legally, and financially capable supplier, contractor or consultant.
95.
96. Notably, petitioners resorted to their chosen procurement method for the benefit of its employees - to
ensure that they will receive the uniform with superior quality based on the budget provided by the
government - and not for some selfish or ulterior motive. Evidently, while there may be irregular
expenditure because petitioners did not strictly comply with the IRR of R.A. No. 9184, they may not
be held personally liable under the ND based on their exercise of good faith.
97.
98. In conclusion, it is unfair to penalize public officials based on overly stretched and strained
interpretations of rules which were not that readily capable of being understood at the time
such functionaries acted in good faith. If there is any ambiguity, which is actually clarified
years later, then it should only be applied prospectively. A contrary rule would be
counterproductive. It could result in paralysis, or lack of innovative ideas getting tried. In
addition, it could dissuade others from joining the government. When government service
becomes unattractive, it could only have adverse consequences for society.
99.
100. WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. 

G.R. No. 213323, January 22, 2019 (En banc)

Teresita S. Lazaro, Dennis S. Lazaro, Marieta V. Jara, Antonio P. Relova, Gilberto R. Mondez, Pablo V. Del
Mundo, Jr., and Alsaneo F. Lagos, petitioners, VS. Commission On Audit, Regional Director of COA
Regional Office No. IV-A, and COA Audit Team Leader, Province of Laguna, respondents.

101. disallowed the Provincial Government of Laguna's P118 million purchase of medicines,
medical and dental supplies, and equipment (medical items)
102. WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 213323 is DENIED and the Petition in G.R. No.
213324 is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The August 17, 2011 Decision and May 6, 2014 Resolution of
the Commission on Audit are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Evelyn T. Villanueva is
 NOT LIABLE for the disallowed transactions that were completed prior to her designation as Officer-
in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Accountant. The cases are REMANDED to the Commission
on Audit, which is directed to determine which of the disallowed transactions occurred prior to July 5,
2005, for which petitioner Villanueva is not liable.

G.R. No. 228262, January 21, 2019

People vs Molde

103. crime of qualified theft

104. The elements of qualified theft are: "(a) taking of personal property; (b) that the said property
belongs to 'another; (c) that the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) that it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; [and] (f) that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
105. The prosecution failed to prove the crucial elements of taking of personal property and intent
to gain on the part of appellant. For one thing, the subject checks were issued payable to Sun Pride;
hence, appellant could not have possibly presented said checks to the drawee bank for encashment
for his own personal gain. This fact was confirmed by Sun Pride's own internal auditor
106. At this juncture, it bears to stress that the burden to overcome the presumption of innocence
of the accused lies on the prosecution. It is in this context that we have consistently ruled that "the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the defense."
107. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019

Aguilar vs Benlot and Cuico

108. violation of Republic Act No. 6713 or The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees and Dereliction of Duty
109. Aguinaldo Doctrine
110. Edgardo M. Aguilar (petitioner) was elected and had served as Punong
Barangay of Barangay Bunga, Toledo City, Cebu, for three consecutive terms prior
to the October 25, 2010 barangay elections where he was elected Barangay
Kagawad and ranked third. During the same elections, petitioner's sister, Emma
Aguilar-Arias (Arias), was elected Punong Barangay, while Leonardo Oralde
(Oralde) and Emiliana Mancao (Mancao) were elected Barangay Kagawads and
ranked first and second, respectively.
111. Ruling :  
112. For a thorough disposition, however, it may be noted that the facts support
the Ombudsman's conclusion that there was conspiracy among the three individuals
who resigned and petitioner. The resignations are peculiar, undertaken as they were
on the day immediately following Arias, Oralde, and Mancao's oaths of office. They
wasted no time in filing their resignations and did not even serve a day in the
positions they were elected for. Personal reasons were cited, which beg the
question why these were not considered before they filed for candidacy and actively
campaigned. Then, just barely a month after petitioner succeeded as Punong
Barangay, Oralde and Mancao accepted appointments as Barangay Kagawads in a
surprising change of heart and despite personal reasons they invoked in their
resignation letters. Even Arias took a contractual position with the city government
despite the familial and personal limitations she cited in her resignation letter. We
are, thus, not inclined to disregard as mere conjecture the Ombudsman's
conclusion, that the resignations were concerted acts to give way to petitioner's
appointment and enable him to circumvent the three-term limit. Conspiracy is
sufficiently established when the concerted acts show the same purpose or common
design and are united in its execution.
113. Without a doubt, Arias, Oralde, and Mancao acted in concert to circumvent the law and give
unwarranted benefit to the petitioner, to enable the latter to retain power which the law requires of
him not to perpetuate. The concerted acts of petitioner, Arias, Oralde, and Mancao amount to Grave
Misconduct.
114. The foregoing issue is nonetheless mooted by the petitioner's re-election
as Punong Barangay, an event which precludes the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal, following the doctrine of condonation.
115. This Court had already clarified that the doctrine can be applied to a public
officer who was elected to a different position provided that it is shown that the body
politic electing the person to another office is the same.  It is not necessary for the
[36]
 official to have been re-elected to exactly the same position; what is material is that
he was re-elected by the same electorate.
116. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The act committed by petitioner
Edgardo M. Aguilar is deemed CONDONED.
G.R. No. 240541, January 21, 2019

People vs Barrion

117. crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,  otherwise known as the
[4]

"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

118. WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, accused-appellant Rey
Barrion y Silva is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

A.M. No. 18-08-69-MTC, January 21, 2019

[*]
RE: Dropping from The Rolls of Mr. Steveril  J. Jabonete, Jr., Junior Process Server, Municipal Trial
Court Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.

119. Jabonete has been absent without official leave

G.R. No. 231459, January 21, 2019

Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar, as Represented by Aureo* Fabillar, petitioners, VS. Miguel
M. Paller, Florentina P. Abayan, and Demetria P. Sagales, respondents.

120. The instant case stemmed from an Amended Complaint  for Recovery of [5]

Ownership, Possession, and Damages filed by respondents

121. The Court's Ruling
122. Although the principal action in this case was for the recovery of ownership
and possession of the subject land, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of
Ambrosio to Marcelino for the purpose of determining what legal rights he may have
in the subject land which he can pass to his heirs, petitioners herein.
123. In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article
172 [50] of the Family Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be proved by any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Such other
proof of one's filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation
respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses,
and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
(Rules).  Article 175  of the same Code also allows illegitimate children to
[51] [52]

establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has
evidentiary value to prove filiation only if considered alongside other
evidence of filiation.  Because the putative parent has no hand in the
[53]

preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary value if

taken in isolation;  while it may be considered a public document, "it can only
[54]

serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date

 specified, but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child's
paternity."  As such, a baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a
[55]

disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse other pieces of evidence instead
of relying only on a canonical record. [

124. The Court finds that respondents failed to establish the identity of the land
they were seeking to recover, in the first place.
125. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

G.R. No. 231122, January 16, 2019

People vs Casemiro and Catalan

126. charged with murder

127. Our Ruling:  There is no merit in the appeal.
128. To successfully prosecute the crime of murder under Article 248  of the [45]

Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements must be established: "(1) that a
person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was
attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide."
129. In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that the victim was stabbed to
death and accused-appellants were the perpetrators.
130. The crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized under Article 248 of
the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with reclusion perpetua to death.
Accused-appellants were meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua by the trial court
which the CA affirmed. This Court finds the imposition and subsequent affirmance
thereof in order.
131. WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 199562, January 16, 2019

Bank of the Philippine Islands and Ana C. Gonzales, petitioners, VS. Spouses Fernando V. Quiaoit and
Nora L. Quiaoit, respondents.

132. Issue:  Whether the counterfeit US dollar bills came from BPI + Whether BPI
exercised due diligence in handling the withdrawal of the US dollar bills
133. Ruling:  We deny the petition.
134. The Court ruled that the bank's compliance with this degree of diligence has
to be determined in accordance with the particular circumstances of each case. the [10]

General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity
and performance. The Court ruled that banks are under obligation to treat the
accounts of their depositors with meticulous care. BPI failed to exercise due
diligence in the transaction. BPI could have listed down the serial numbers of the
dollar bills and erased any doubt as to whether the counterfeit bills came from it.
While BPI Greenhills marked the dollar bills with "chapa" to identify that they came
from that branch, Lambayong was not informed of the markings and hence, she
could not have checked if all the bills were marked. BPI insists that there is no law
requiring it to list down the serial numbers of the dollar bills. However, it is well-
settled that the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a
family.
135. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the action of BPI is the proximate
cause of the loss suffered by the spouses Quiaoit. Proximate cause is defined as the
cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.
136. The Doctrine of Last Clear Chance
137. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
G.R. No. 225725, January 16, 2019
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company vs. Mamaril, et al

138. The Issue:  Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in
holding that (1) Mamaril was dismissed by Lepanto without a just and valid cause
and thus entitled to separation pay and full backwages, and (2) Mamaril and the
other respondents are entitled to be compensated for work rendered on overtime,
holiday, and rest days.
139. The Ruling:  The petition lacks merit. 
140. In dismissal cases, the burden of proof is on the employer to show that the
employee was dismissed for a valid and just cause. Here, Lepanto dismissed
Mamaril based on loss of trust and confidence. To be a valid ground for dismissal,
the loss of trust and confidence must be based on a willful breach and founded
on clearly established facts.
141. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
G.R. No. 217044, January 16, 2019
Spouses Yulo vs BPI

142. When issuing a pre-screened or pre-approved credit card, the credit card provider must
prove that its client read and consented to the terms and conditions governing the credit card's use.
Failure to prove consent means that the client cannot be bound by the provisions of the terms and
conditions, despite admitted use of the credit card.
143. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari
is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioners are DIRECTED TO PAY BPI

G.R. No. 214906, January 16, 2019

Bosta Shipmanagement Corp., Cido Shipping Company Ltd., and Alex S. Estabillo, petitioners, VS. Dante

C. Segui, respondent.

144. This labor case is about a seaman's claim for a maximum benefit of permanent and total
disability benefits, and attorney's fees. 
145. Ruling:  The petition is denied.
146. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals
Decision are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION

G.R. No. 211449, January 16, 2019

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner, VS. Transfield Philippines, Inc., respondent.

147. Ruling:  A tax amnesty operates as a general pardon or intentional overlooking

by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of
evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law. It is an absolute forgiveness or waiver
by the government of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who
wish to relent a chance to start with a clean slate. A tax amnesty, much like a tax
exemption, is never favored nor presumed in law. The grant of a tax amnesty is akin
to a tax exemption; thus, it must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
148. On May 24, 2007, R.A. No. 9480 took effect and authorized the grant of
a tax amnesty to qualified taxpayers for all national internal revenue taxes for
the taxable year 2005 and prior years, with or without assessments duly
issued therefor, that have remained unpaid as of December 31, 2005.

In this case, it remains undisputed that respondent complied with all the
requirements pertaining to its application for tax amnesty by submitting to the
 BIR a Notice of Availment of Tax Amnesty, Tax Amnesty Return, SALN as of
December 31, 2005 and Tax Amnesty Payment Form. Further, it paid the
corresponding amnesty taxes. Hence, respondent has successfully availed
itself of the tax amnesty benefits granted under R.A. No. 9480 which include
immunity from "the appurtenant civil, criminal, or administrative penalties
under the NIRC of 1997, as amended, arising from the failure to pay any and
all internal revenue taxes for taxable year 2005 and prior years."
149. It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In implementing tax amnesty laws, the
CIR cannot now insert an exception where there is none under the law.  
150. the rule-making power of administrative agencies cannot be extended
to amend or expand statutory requirements or to embrace matters not
originally encompassed by the law. Administrative regulations should always
be in accord with the provisions of the statute they seek to implement, and
any resulting inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of the basic law.
151.  WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019 (En banc)

Halili vs COMELEC

152. During Morales 2nd Term as Mayor, RA 10164 was passed converting the municipality as a
component city. On the succeeding 2013 election, Morales won again. During the 2016 Election, he filed
candidacy as a substitute mayoralty candidate. He was proclaimed a winner.
153. Issues:  The primordial issue to be resolved is whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction: (1) in finding that Morales committed a false
material representation in his COC when he declared that he was eligible to run as mayor of Mabalacat
City for the 2016 elections despite his violation of the three-term limit rule; and (2) in proclaiming Garbo
as the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat City for being the qualified candidate with the highest number
of votes.
154. Ruling:  We do not find merit in both petitions.
155. In Latasa vs COMELEC, we held that the conversion of a municipality into a city
does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official's continuity of service.
156. Applying our ruling in Latasa, the provisions of RA 10164 mean that the
delineation of the metes and bounds of Mabalacat City did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Mabalacat.
Consequently, the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected Morales to
be their mayor for three consecutive terms, and over whom he held power and
authority as their mayor. Accordingly, Morales never ceased from acting and
discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Mabalacat, despite
the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City. 
157. WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit

A.M. No. 2014-16-SC, January 15, 2019

RE: Complaint Against Mr. Ramdel Rey M. De Leon, Executive Assistant III, Office of Associate Justice
Jose P. Perez, On the Alleged Dishonesty and Deceit In Soliciting Money for Investments
158. In this case, respondent is a court personnel, thus, he shall be governed by
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which incorporates, among others, the
civil service laws and rules. Consequently, the provisions of CSC Resolution No.
1101502, or the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS) are applicable herein. 
159. WHEREFORE, respondent Ramdel Rey M. De Leon is GUILTY of less
serious dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, violations
of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5-88, and Section 5 of Canon III
(Conflict of Interest) and Section 1 of Canon IV (Performance of Duties) of the Code
of Conduct for Court Personnel.
A.M. No. P-19-3911 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 13-4159-
P), January 15, 2019 (En banc)
Rural Bank of Talisay (Cebu), Inc., represented by Its President, Adele V. Villo, complainant, VS. Manuel
H. Gimeno, Sheriff IV, Branch 19, Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Respondent.
160. In the case at bench, respondent's actions were clearly tainted with corruption
as he received money from complainant in his capacity as sheriff for the RTC. He,
however, appropriated the funds for himself instead of using it to pay for the
publication cost for Notice of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale. Even if it were true that
respondent only used it to pay for the hospital funds of his mother, it cannot be
gainsaid that he used his position as sheriff to obtain funds from private persons for
his own benefit and to the detriment of the latter.
161. Grave misconduct is a serious offense which could lead to dismissal from the
service of the errant employee. Respondent, however, pleads that his length of
service be considered in the imposition of the penalty considering that this is his first
offense. It is true that in several instances, [16] the Court had reduced the penalty of
dismissal on account of length of service and other present mitigating
circumstances. Nevertheless, length of service does not ipso facto warrant the
imposition of a lesser penalty as it is an alternative circumstance which may serve
as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance depending on the factual milieu of
each case.
162. In the present case, respondent's length of service does not justify the
imposition of a penalty lesser than dismissal from service. The length of service had
been taken against the erring public official, even if it is for the first offense, in cases
involving serious offense such as grave misconduct.
163. WHEREFORE, Manuel H. Gimeno, Sheriff IV, Branch 19, Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City, is GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and would have
been DISMISSED from the service, had he not been earlier dropped from the rolls.
Accordingly, his retirement and other benefits, except accrued leave credits, are
hereby FORFEITED and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from re-
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporation.

G.R. No. 241091

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. LITO PAMING Y JAVIER, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 238176

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAMON BAY-OD, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 232060

VIRGILIA T. AQUINO, NAZARIA T. AQUINO, AVELINA A. RONQUILLO, PATROCINIO T. AQUINO, AND RAMONCITO T. NEPOMUCENO,
PETITIONERS, VS. ESTATE OF TOMAS B. AGUIRRE, RESPONDENT.
January 14, 2019 

A.C. No. 9917

NORBERTO S. COLLANTES, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ANSELMO B. MABUTI, RESPONDENT.
January 14, 2019 
164. violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
165. The Court has emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. Notarization by a notary public converts a private
document into a public document making it admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity.  A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and
[16]

credit,  and as such, notaries public are obligated to observe with utmost care the
[17]

basic requirements in the performance of their duties.

166. In this case, the IBP found that respondent notarized the subject document,
"Memorandum of Agreement," without being commissioned as a notary public at the
time of notarization. 
167. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Anselmo B. Mabuti
(respondent) GUILTY
G.R. No. 209116
DANNY BOY C. MONTERONA, JOSELITO S. ALVAREZ, IGNACIO S. SAMSON, JOEY P. OCAMPO, ROLE R. DEMETRIO, [*] AND ELPIDIO
P. METRE, JR.,[**] PETITIONERS, V. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. AND GIOVANNI ACORDA, [***] RESPONDENTS.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 233336

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. DON EMILIO CARIÑO Y AGUSTIN A.K.A. "DON EMILIO CARIÑO
AGUSTIN,"[*] ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 211289

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, V. LA FLOR DELA ISABELA, INC., RESPONDENT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 239471

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. JOSEPH CINCO ARCIAGA A.K.A. "JOSEPHUS CINCO ARCIAGA," ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 205282

STEAG STATE POWER, INC. (FORMERLY STATE POWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION), PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 237809

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. ROSALINA AURE Y ALMAZAN AND GINA MARAVILLA Y AGNES,[*] ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 232940

DENNIS LOAYON Y LUIS, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
January 14, 2019 

G.R. No. 187262

ENGINEERING GEOSCIENCE, INC., PETITIONER, V. PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, RESPONDENT.
January 10, 2019 

G.R. No. 215904

EDGAR L. TORILLOS, PETITIONER, VS. EASTGATE MARITIME CORPORATION, F.J. LINES, INC., PANAMA, AND EMMANUEL L. REGIO,
RESPONDENTS. [G.R. No. 216165] EASTGATE MARITIME CORPORATION, F.J. LINES, INC., PANAMA, AND EMMANUEL L. REGIO,
PETITIONERS, VS. EDGAR L. TORILLOS, RESPONDENT.
January 10, 2019 

G.R. No. 210683

DR. CONSOLACION S. CALLANG, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
January 08, 2019  

A.C. No. 12063 (En banc)

EVERDINA C. ANGELES, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. WILFREDO B. LINA-AC, RESPONDENT.
January 08, 2019 

168. The practice of law is a privilege, and lawyers who fail to meet the strict
standards of legal proficiency, morality, and integrity will have their names stricken
out of the Roll of Attomeys.
G.R. No. 235071
EVANGELINE PATULOT Y GALIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 234156

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. EMMANUEL OLIVA Y JORJIL, BERNARDO BARANGOT Y PILAIS AND MARK
ANGELO MANALASTAS Y GAPASIN, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 234323

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JORDAN BATALLA Y AQUINO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 215545

QUIRINO T. DELA CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 241017

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. BRENDA CAMIÑAS Y AMING, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 228718

EDWIN FUENTES Y GARCIA @ "KANYOD," PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
January 07, 2019 

A.M. No. 18-07-153-RTC

RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF LAYDABELL G. PIJANA, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY CITY, CAVITE,
BRANCH 18
January 07, 2019 

169. The records of the Employees' Leave Division, Office of Administrative

Services, Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) show that Pijana has neither
submitted her Daily Time Record (DTR) since March 1, 2018 up to the present nor
filed any application for leave. Thus, she has been on absence without official leave
(AWOL) since March 1, 2018.

G.R. No. 223713

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. RODELINA MALAZO Y DORIA, APPELLANT.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 233883

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MARK VINCENT CORRAL Y BATALLA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
January 07, 2019 

G.R. No. 209047

ANGELA USARES Y SIBAY, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
January 07, 2019 

A.C. No. 11334

JOCELYN SORENSEN, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FLORITO T. POZON, RESPONDENT. A.C. NO. 11335 JOCELYN SORENSEN,
COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. FLORITO T. POZON, RESPONDENT.
January 07, 2019 
170. These consolidated administrative cases stemmed from the continuous
negligence of respondent Atty. Fiorito T. Pozon to handle the legal matters entrusted
to him by his client and herein complainant, Jocelyn Sorensen,
A.M. No. P-19-3925 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 16-4635-P)
ASUNCION Y. ARIÑOLA, COMPLAINANT, V. ANGELES D. ALMODIEL, JR., INTERPRETER II, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
MASBATE CITY, MASBATE, RESPONDENT.
January 07, 2019 
171. gross neglect of duty, inefficiency, incompetence in the performance of official
duties and refusal to perform an official duty
172. On August 3, 2012, Respondent Sheriff submitted his Report on the
Implementation of the Writ  to the MTCC informing the court that he had served
[12]

the Writ of Execution and a Notice of Demand for Immediate Payment with Notice of

Levy on Execution as well as the Notice of Levy upon Realty on the Spouses Viceo.
The Spouses Viceo failed to pay, leading Respondent Sheriff to cause the issuance
and publication of a Notice of Sale on Execution of Real Property  on August 1, [13]

2012. 
173. However, before the scheduled date of the execution sale on August 1, 2012,
Respondent Sheriff learned that the subject property had already been sold by John
Mark Viceo to his uncle and former Masbate Mayor Konrad Ramos (Ramos).
Subsequently, Respondent Sheriff sent a letter  to Ramos on September 4, 2012 [14]

advising him to file a third-party claim over the property. 

174. Heeding Respondent Sheriffs advice, Ramos filed an Affidavit of Third-Party
Claim  before the MTCC Masbate on October 4, 2012. Attached to the Affidavit of
[15]

Third-Party Claim was a Deed of Absolute Sale  dated May 27, 2008 executed [16]

between John Mark Viceo and Ramos. In his Affidavit, Ramos claims that he
purchased the property from John Mark Viceo for P2.5 million and that he had been
in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the property since 2008. Finally,
Ramos claimed that he was the occupant of the property and was never served a
copy of the Notice of Levy upon Realty, in violation of the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.   [17]

175. x x x [t]here can be no valid sale without a valid levy. Under Section 9,
Rule 39, in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is
required to do only two specific things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) file with the
register of deeds a copy of the order of execution, together with the description of
the levied property and notice of execution; and (b) leave with the occupant of the
property [a] copy of the same order, description and notice (Hulst v. PR Builders,
Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74). These are prerequisites
to a valid levy, non-compliance with any of which is fatal. 
176. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion of the plaintiff is GRANTED.
Consequently, the execution proceedings conducted by the Court Sheriff are hereby declared
NULL and VOID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT. The levy on execution is hereby LIFTED and/or
 CANCELLED and the Sheriff is restrained from proceeding with the auction sale of the levied real
property. 
177. Four months having lapsed since the MTCC issued the above order directing
Respondent Sheriff to proceed with the enforcement of the execution, no action had
yet been taken by Respondent Sheriff, leading Complainant to send a letter  to [21]

Judge-Designate Diana Tambago-Sanchez of the MTCC

178. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds Respondent Angeles
D. Almodiel, Jr., GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty and is hereby FINED the amount
of P5,000.00 with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or any similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.

Posted 20th May 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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MAR

18

Labor: Disparate Impact Theory

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a
co-employee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but
it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only
way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned policy cannot prejudice
the employees right to be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon
stereotypes of married persons working together in one company.[40]

In challenging the anti-nepotism employment policies in the United States, complainants

utilize two theories of employment discrimination: the disparate treatment and the
disparate impact. Under the disparate treatment analysis, the plaintiff must prove that
an employment policy is discriminatory on its face. No-spouse employment policies
requiring an employee of a particular sex to either quit, transfer, or be fired are facially
discriminatory. For example, an employment policy prohibiting the employer from hiring
wives of male employees, but not husbands of female employees, is discriminatory on its
face.[22]
 
On the other hand, to establish disparate impact, the complainants must prove that a
facially neutral policy has a disproportionate effect on a particular class. For example,
although most employment policies do not expressly indicate which spouse will be
required to transfer or leave the company, the policy often disproportionately affects one
sex.[23]

source:  G.R. No. 164774

Posted 18th March 2019 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
DEC

28

Variance Doctrine
Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the "variance
doctrine":

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance

between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted
of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily

includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as
alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of
those constituting the latter.
--------------------------------------------------

Essentially, the issue for the Court’s resolution is whether petitioner can be convicted of the felony of
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence notwithstanding that the charge against him in
the Information was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Article 171(4) of the
RPC.

The Variance Rule (Sections 4 – 5, Rule 120):  Accordingly, in case of variance between the allegation and
proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved.

Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of public document is necessarily included in the intentional felony of falsification of public
document under Article 171(4) of the RPC.  

To stress, reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily
included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater offense. As such, he
can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents notwithstanding that
the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of public documents.

Reference:  Sevilla vs People, GR 194390 (2014) - Reckless Imprudence

--------------------------------------------------

Can the petitioners be convicted thereof, considering that it was not charged in the
information?  

The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in

relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

1. Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is

a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
2. Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitutes the
latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those
constituting the offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense
charged, as alleged in the information, constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense
proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to
this case, thereby warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved.

source:  Teves vs Sandiganbayan, GR 154182 (2004, En banc)

--------------------------------------------------

In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified rape but was
convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III, Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 91 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert [the
accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92

In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.

XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The slightest penetration into one’s
sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua 94
discussed this distinction:

It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the
male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already
consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip
of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape  through
sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical
interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her
private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however,
is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was
defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through
sexual assault. 95 (Emphasis supplied) 

People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape
involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a
man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of
rape through sexual assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important.
Rape is an "assault on human dignity."96

Reference: 
 Ricalde vs People, GR 211002 (January 21, 2015 – Second
Division)

Posted 28th December 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
NOV

22

Doctrine of Damnum Absque Injuria

Under the principle of damnum absque injuria, 
the legitimate exercise of a person's right, 
even if it causes loss to another, 
does not automatically result in an actionable injury 
and the law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. 
However, this principle admits of exception 
as when there is an abuse of a person's right.

The exercise of one's right 

should be clone in a manner that will not cause injustice to
another. 
------------
Article 19 of NCC deals with the Principle of Abuse of Rights:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
 
The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: 
(1) there is a legal right or duty; 
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; 
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Reference: 
Metroheights Subdivision HOA vs CMS Construction
GR 209359 (October 17, 2018 - 3rd Division)
Posted 22nd November 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
 NOV

22

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Doctrine of Operative Fact recognizes the existence of the law or

executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality
that produces consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored
or disregarded. In short it nullifies the law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that
a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
source:  En banc Decision on LGU Share on National Taxes - Mandanas vs Ochoa, GR 199802 (2018)

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair
play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.

The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
who have relied on the invalid law.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267               June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod
City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN,
JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION
LEONEN, J.:

Posted 22nd November 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV

20

Doctrine of Original vs Appellate Jurisdictions

The power to create or characterize jurisdiction of courts belongs to the legislature. While the
traditional notion of appellate jurisdiction connotes judicial review over lower court decisions, it has to yield to
statutory redefinitions that clearly expand its breadth to encompass even review of decisions of officers in
the executive branches of government. 

Original jurisdiction is the power of the Court to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial
action for the first time under conditions provided by law. 

Appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a Court higher in rank to re-examine the final order or judgment of
a lower Court which tried the case now elevated for judicial review.
 The quoted definitions were taken from the commentaries of the esteemed Justice Florenz
Regalado. With the definitions as beacon, the review taken by the RTC over the denial of the protest by the
local treasurer would fall within that courts original jurisdiction. In short, the review is the initial judicial
cognizance of the matter. Moreover, labeling the said review as an exercise of appellate jurisdiction is
inappropriate, since the denial of the protest is not the judgment or order of a lower court, but of a local
government official.

Rules of Court, BP129 and RA 7160

The stringent concept of original jurisdiction may seemingly be neutered by Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of which lists a slew of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
tribunals or their officers whose decisions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. 
However, the basic law of jurisdiction, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), [27] ineluctably
confers appellate jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals over final rulings of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards or commission, by explicitly using the phrase appellate jurisdiction. [28] 
Section 22 of B.P. 129 expressly delineates the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts,
confining as it does said appellate jurisdiction to cases decided by Metropolitan, Municipal, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts. Unlike in the case of the Court of Appeals, B.P. 129 does not confer appellate
jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts over rulings made by non-judicial entities.  
From these premises, it is evident that the stance of the City Treasurer is correct as a matter of law,
and that the proper remedy of the Corporation from the RTC judgment is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41
to the Court of Appeals. However, we make this pronouncement subject to two important qualifications.
First, in this particular case there are nonetheless significant reasons for the Court to overlook the
procedural error and ultimately uphold the adjudication of the jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Appeals
in this case. Second, the doctrinal weight of the pronouncement is confined to cases and controversies that
emerged prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9282, the law which expanded the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Republic Act No. 9282 definitively proves in its Section 7(a)(3) that the CTA exercises exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local
tax cases original decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their originally or appellate jurisdiction.
Moreover, the provision also states that the review is triggered by filing a petition for review under a
procedure analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [29]

Luz R. Yamane vs BA Lepanto Condominium Corporation

(October 25 2007) G.R. No. 154993 – Second Division
 

Posted 20th November 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
SEP

21

Principle of Litis Pendentia

In Daswani v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank, et al., the Court elucidated that:
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most
important factor to consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur,
namely: a) there is identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the
same interests in both actions; b) there is identity of rights asserted and reliefs
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, c) that the identity with
respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Meanwhile, in Club Filipino Inc., et al. v. Bautista, et al., the Court enumerated, to
wit:
The elements of res judicata are: 1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must
be final; 2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; 3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment
on the merits; and 4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity
of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

In the case at bar, the first petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was based on the validity
of its issuance in favor of Alejandro, while the second petition was based on the alleged violation of the
prohibition on the sale of the subject land. As such, there is no, as between the first petition and the second
petition, identity of causes of action. Therefore, the final decision in G.R. No. 135317 does not constitute as
res judicata on the second petition.

In the case at bar, the first petition for cancellation of EP Nos. 445829 and 445830 was based on the validity
of its issuance in favor of Alejandro, while the second petition was based on the alleged violation of the
prohibition on the sale of the subject land. As such, there is no, as between the first petition and the second
petition, identity of causes of action. Therefore, the final decision in G.R. No. 135317 does not constitute as
res judicata on the second petition.

Reference: Berboso vs. Cabral, GR 204617 (2017)

[l]itis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means a pending suit and is

variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation
where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious.

We further emphasized in Guevara v. BPI Securities Corporation[33] that [t]here

is litis pendentia or another action pendente lite if the following requisites are
present: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same
interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless
of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court defines a cause of action as the act or
omission by which a party violates a right of another. Section 3 of Rule 2
provides that [a] party may not institute more than one suit for a single cause of
action. Anent the act of splitting a single cause of action, Section 4 of Rule 2
explicitly states that [i]f two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

source:  
 Posted 21st September 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
SEP

18

Business-enterprise Transfer Doctrine

Reference: Y-I LEISURE PHILIPPINES, INC., YATS
INTERNATIONAL LTD. AND Y-I CLUBS AND RESORTS,
INC., Petitioners, v. JAMES YU, Respondent, GR 207161
(2015 , En banc)
 
In the 1965 case of Nell v. Pacific Farms, Inc.,33 the Court first
pronounced the rule regarding the transfer of all the assets of
one corporation to another (hereafter referred to as the Nell
Doctrine) as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Generally, where one corporation sells or otherwise
transfers all of its assets to another corporation, the latter
is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor,
except:
1. Where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume such debts;
2. Where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or
merger of the corporations;
3. Where the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation; and
4. Where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in
order to escape liability for such debts.

The Nell Doctrine states the general rule that the transfer

of all the assets of a corporation to another shall not
render the latter liable to the liabilities of the transferor. If
any of the above-cited exceptions are present, then the
transferee corporation shall assume the liabilities of the
transferor.

Legal bases of the Nell Doctrine

xxx

The legal basis of the last in the four (4) exceptions to the Nell
Doctrine, where the purchasing corporation is merely a
continuation of the selling corporation, is challenging to
determine. In his book, Philippine Corporate Law,36 Dean
Cesar Villanueva explained that this exception contemplates
the "business-enterprise transfer." In such transfer, the
transferee corporation's interest goes beyond the assets
of the transferor's assets and its desires to acquire the
latter's business enterprise, including its goodwill.

In Villa Rev Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer,37 the Court held that when

one were to buy the business of another as a going concern,
he would usually wish to keep it going; he would wish to get
the location, the building, the stock in trade, and the
customers. He would wish to step into the seller's shoes and to
enjoy the same business relations with other men. He would
be willing to pay much more if he could get the "good will" of
the business, meaning by this, the good will of the customers,
that they may continue to tread the old footpath to his door and
maintain with him the business relations enjoyed by the seller.

In other words, in this last exception, the transferee

purchases not only the assets of the transferor, but also
its business. As a result of the sale, the transferor is merely
left with its juridical existence, devoid of its industry and
earning capacity. Fittingly, the proper provision of law that is
contemplated by this exception would be Section 40 of the
Corporation Code,38 which
provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 40. Sale or other disposition of assets. - Subject to
the provisions of existing laws on illegal combinations and
monopolies, a corporation may, by a majority vote of its
board of directors or trustees, sell, lease, exchange,
mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of all or
substantially all of its property and assets, including
its goodwill, upon such terms and conditions and for such
consideration, which may be money, stocks, bonds or
other instruments for the payment of money or other
property or consideration, as its board of directors or
trustees may deem expedient, when authorized by the
vote of the stockholders representing at least two-thirds
(2/3) of the outstanding capital stock, or in case of non-
stock corporation, by the vote of at least two-thirds (2/3) of
the members, in a stockholder's or member's meeting duly
called for the purpose. Written notice of the proposed
action and of the time and place of the meeting shall be
addressed to each stockholder or member at his place of
residence as shown on the books of the corporation and
deposited to the addressee in the post office with postage
prepaid, or served personally: Provided, That any
dissenting stockholder may exercise his appraisal right
under the conditions provided in this Code.

A sale or other disposition shall be deemed to cover

substantially all the corporate property and assets if
thereby the corporation would be rendered incapable of
continuing the business or accomplishing the
purpose for which it was incorporated.

After such authorization or approval by the stockholders or

members, the board of directors or trustees may,
nevertheless, in its discretion, abandon such sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of
property and assets, subject to the rights of third parties
under any contract relating thereto, without further action
or approval by the stockholders or members.

Nothing in this section is intended to restrict the power of

any corporation, without the authorization by the
stockholders or members, to sell, lease, exchange,
mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of any of its
property and assets if the same is necessary in the usual
and regular course of business of said corporation or if the
proceeds of the sale or other disposition of such property
and assets be appropriated for the conduct of its
remaining business.

In non-stock corporations where there are no members

with voting rights, the vote of at least a majority of the
trustees in office will be sufficient authorization for the
 corporation to enter into any transaction authorized by this
section.
[Emphases Supplied]

To reiterate, Section 40 refers to the sale, lease, exchange or

disposition of all or substantially all of the corporation's assets,
including its goodwill.39 The sale under this provision does
not contemplate an ordinary sale of all corporate assets;
the transfer must be of such degree that the transferor
corporation is rendered incapable of continuing its
business or its corporate purpose.40cralawrednad

Section 40 suitably reflects the business-enterprise

transfer under the exception of the Nell Doctrine because
the purchasing or transferee corporation necessarily
continued the business of the selling or transferor
corporation. Given that the transferee corporation acquired
not only the assets but also the business of the transferor
corporation, then the liabilities of the latter are inevitably
assigned to the former.

It must be clarified, however, that not every transfer of the

entire corporate assets would qualify under Section 40. It does
not apply (1) if the sale of the entire property and assets is
necessary in the usual and regular course of business of
corporation, or (2) if the proceeds of the sale or other
disposition of such property and assets will be appropriated for
the conduct of its remaining business. 41 Thus, the litmus test
to determine the applicability of Section 40 would be the
capacity of the corporation to continue its business after the
sale of all or substantially all its assets.

Jurisprudential recognition of the

business-enterprise transfer

Jurisprudence has held that in a business-enterprise

transfer, the transferee is liable for the debts and liabilities
of his transferor arising from the business enterprise
conveyed. Many of the application of the business-enterprise
transfer have been related by the Court to the application of
the piercing doctrine.42cralawrednad

In A.D. Santos, Inc. v. Vasquez,43 a taxi driver filed a suit for

workmen's compensation against the petitioner corporation
therein. The latter's defense was that the taxi driver's employer
was Amador Santos, and not the corporation. Initially, the taxi
driver was employed by City Cab, a sole proprietary by
Amador Santos. The taxi business was, however, transferred
to the petitioner. Applying the piercing doctrine, the Court held
that the petitioner must still be held liable due to the transfer of
the business and should not be allowed to confuse the
legitimate issues.

In Buan v. Alcantara,44 the Spouses Buan were the owners of

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. They died in a vehicular accident
and the administrators of their estates were appointed. The
administrators then incorporated the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines. The issue raised was whether the liabilities of the
estates of the spouses were conveyed to the new corporation
due to the transfer of the business. Utilizing the alter-ego
doctrine, the Court ruled in the affirmative and stated
that:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As between the estate and the corporation, the intention of
incorporation was to make the corporation liable for past
and pending obligations of the estate as the transportation
business itself was being transferred to and placed in the
name of the corporation. That liability on the part of the
corporation, vis-a-vis the estate, should continue to remain
with it even after the percentage of the estate's shares of
stock in the corporation should be diluted.45

The Court, however, applied the business-enterprise transfer

doctrine independent of the piercing doctrine in other cases.
In San Teodoro Development Enterprises v. SSS,46 the
petitioner corporation therein attempted to avoid the
compulsory coverage of the Social Security Law by alleging
that it was a distinct and separate entity from its limited
partnership predecessor, Chua Lam & Company, Ltd. The
Court, however, upheld the findings of the SSS that the entire
business of the previous partnership was transferred to the
corporation ostensibly for a valuable consideration. Hence,
"[t]he juridical person owning and operating the business
remain the same even if its legal personality was
changed."47cralawrednad

Similarly, in Laguna Trans. Co., Inc. v. SSS,48 the Court held

that the transferee corporation continued the same
transportation business of the unregistered partnership therein,
using the same lines and equipment. There was, in effect, only
a change in the form of the organization of the entity engaged
in the business of transportation of passengers.

Perhaps the most telling jurisprudence which recognized the

business-enterprise transfer would be the assailed case
of Caltex. In that case, under an agreement of assumption of
obligations, LUSTEVECO transferred, conveyed and assigned
to respondent PSTC all of its business, properties and assets
pertaining to its tanker and bulk business together with all the
obligations, properties and assets.49 Meanwhile,
petitioner Caltex, Inc. obtained a judgment debt against
LUSTEVECO, and it sought to enforce the same against
PSTC. The Court ruled that PSTC was bound by its
agreement with LUSTEVECO and the former assumed all
of the latter's obligations pertaining to such business.

More importantly, the Court held that, even without the

agreement, PSTC was still liable to Caltex, Inc. based on
Section 40, as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or
substantially all the properties and assets of a corporation,
the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the
assignor. The only way the transfer can proceed without
prejudice to the creditors is to hold the assignee liable for
the obligations of the assignor. The acquisition by the
assignee of all or substantially all of the assets of the
assignor necessarily includes the assumption of the
assignor's liabilities, unless the creditors who did not
consent to the transfer choose to rescind the transfer on
the ground of fraud. To allow an assignor to transfer all its
business, properties and assets without the consent of its
creditors and without requiring the assignee to assume the
 assignor's obligations will defraud the creditors. The
assignment will place the assignor's assets beyond the
reach of its creditors.

Here, Caltex could not enforce the judgment debt against

LUSTEVECO. The writ of execution could not be satisfied
because LUSTEVECO's remaining properties had been
foreclosed by lienholders. In addition, all of LUSTEVECO's
business, properties and assets pertaining to its tanker
and bulk business had been assigned to PSTC without the
knowledge of its creditors. Caltex now has no other means
of enforcing the judgment debt except against
PSTC.50cralawrednad
[Emphasis Supplied]

The Caltex case, thus, affirmed that the transfer of all or

substantially all the proper from one corporation to
another under Section 40 necessarily entails the
assumption of the assignor's liabilities, notwithstanding
the absence of any agreement on the assumption of
obligations. The transfer of all its business, properties and
assets without the consent of its creditors must certainly
include the liabilities; or else, the assignment will place the
assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors. In order to
protect the creditors against unscrupulous conveyance of the
entire corporate assets, Caltex justifiably concluded that the
transfer of assets of a corporation under Section 40 must
likewise carry with it the transfer of its liabilities.

Fraud is not an essential

consideration in a business-
enterprise transfer

Notably, an evaluation of the relevant jurisprudence reveals

that fraud is not an essential element for the application of
the business-enterprise transfer.51 The petitioners in this
case, however, assert otherwise. They insist that under
the Caltex case, there was an assumption of liabilities because
fraud existed on the part of PSTC, as the transferee
corporation.
The Court disagrees.

The exception of the Nell doctrine,52 which finds its legal basis

under Section 40, provides that the transferee corporation
assumes the debts and liabilities of the transferor corporation
because it is merely a continuation of the latter's
business. A cursory reading of the exception shows that it
does not require the existence of fraud against the creditors
before it takes full force and effect. Indeed, under the Nell
Doctrine, the transferee corporation may inherit the liabilities of
the transferor despite the lack of fraud due to the continuity of
the latter's business.

The purpose of the business-enterprise transfer is to

protect the creditors of the business by allowing them a
remedy against the new owner of the assets and business
enterprise. Otherwise, creditors would be left "holding the
bag," because they may not be able to recover from the
transferor who has "disappeared with the loot," or against
the transferee who can claim that he is a purchaser in
good faith and for value.53 Based on the foregoing, as the
exception of the Nell doctrine relates to the protection of the
creditors of the transferor corporation, and does not depend on
any deceit committed by the transferee -corporation, then fraud
is certainly not an element of the business enterprise doctrine.

The Court also agrees with the CA, in its assailed April 29,
2013 resolution, that there was no finding of fraud in
the Caltex case; otherwise it should have been clearly and
categorically stated.54 The discussion in Caltex relative to fraud
seems more hypothetical than factual,
thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
If PSTC refuses to honor its written commitment to
assume the obligations of LUSTEVECO, there will be a
fraud on the creditors of LUSTEVECO. x x x To allow
PSTC now to welsh on its commitment is to sanction a
fraud on LUSTEVECO's creditors.55

Besides, the supposed fraud in Caltex referred to PSTC's

refusal to pay LUSTEVECO's creditors despite the agreement
on assumption of the latter's obligations. Again, the Court
emphasizes in the said case, even without the
agreement, PSTC was still liable to Caltex, Inc. under Section
40, due to the transfer of all or substantially all of the corporate
assets. At best, transfers of all or substantially all of the assets
to a transferee corporation without the consent of the transferor
corporation's creditor gives rise to a presumption of fraud
against the said creditors.
Applicability of the
business-enterprise transfer
in the present case

During the trial before the RTC, Sangil testified that MADCI was a development company which acquired
properties in Magalang, Pampanga to be developed into a golf course. xxx

The CA found that MADCI had an entire asset consisting of 120 hectares of land, and that its sale to the
petitioners rendered it incapable of continuing its intended golf and country club business.

Respondent Yu testified that he verified the landholdings of MADCI with the Register of Deeds in Pamapanga
and discovered that all its lands were transferred to YICRI.64 Because the properties of MADCI were already
conveyed, Yu had no other way of collecting his refund.

Section 40 must apply.

Consequently, the transfer of the assets of MADCI to the petitioners should have complied with the
requirements under Section 40. Nonetheless, the present petition is not concerned with the validity of the
transfer; but the respondent's claim of refund of his P650,000.00 payment for golf and country club shares.
Both the CA and the RTC ruled that MADCI and Sangil were liable.

On the question of whether the petitioners must also be held solidarily liable to Yu, the Court answers in the
affirmative.

The MOA cannot

prejudice respondent

The MOA, which contains a provision that Sangil undertook to redeem MADCI proprietary shares sold to third
persons or settle in full all their claims for refund of payments, should not prejudice respondent Yu. The CA
correctly ruled that such provision constituted novation under Article 129370 of the Civil Code. When there
is a substitution of debtors, the creditor must consent to the same; otherwise, it shall not in any way
affect the creditor. In this case, it was established that Yu's consent was not secured in the execution of the
MOA. Thus, insofar as the respondent was concerned, the debtor remained to be MADCI. And given that the
assets and business of MADCI have been transferred to the petitioners, then the latter shall be liable.
 Posted 18th September 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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2.
SEP

18

Nell Doctrine
Reference: Y-I LEISURE PHILIPPINES, INC., YATS INTERNATIONAL LTD. AND Y-I CLUBS AND
RESORTS, INC., Petitioners, v. JAMES YU, Respondent, GR 207161 (2015 , En banc)

In the 1965 case of Nell v. Pacific Farms, Inc.,33 the Court first pronounced the rule regarding the transfer of
all the assets of one corporation to another (hereafter referred to as the Nell Doctrine) as follows: ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Generally, where one corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to another corporation,
the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the transferor, except:

1. Where the purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts;

2. Where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the corporations;
3. Where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling corporation; and
4. Where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability for such debts.

The Nell Doctrine states the general rule that the transfer of all the assets of a corporation to another
shall not render the latter liable to the liabilities of the transferor. If any of the above-cited exceptions
are present, then the transferee corporation shall assume the liabilities of the transferor.

Legal bases of the Nell Doctrine

An evaluation of our contract and corporation laws validates that the Nell Doctrine is fully supported by
Philippine statutes. The general rule expressed by the doctrine reflects the principle of relativity
under Article 131134 of the Civil Code. Contracts, including the rights and obligations arising therefrom, are
valid and binding only between the contracting parties and their successors-in-interest. Thus, despite the
sale of all corporate assets, the transferee corporation cannot be prejudiced as it is not in privity with the
contracts between the transferor corporation and its creditors.

The first exception under the Nell Doctrine, where the transferee corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to
assume the transferor's debts, is provided under Article 204735 of the Civil Code. When a person binds
himself solidarity with the principal debtor, then a contract of suretyship is produced. Necessarily, the
corporation which expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the transferor's debts shall be liable to the same.

The second exception under the doctrine, as to the merger and consolidation of corporations, is well-
established under Sections 76 to 80, Title X of the Corporation Code. If the transfer of assets of one
corporation to another amounts to a merger or consolidation, then the transferee corporation must take over
the liabilities of the transferor.

Another exception of the doctrine, where the sale of all corporate assets is entered into fraudulently to
escape liability for transferor's debts, can be found under Article 1388 of the Civil Code. It provides that
whoever acquires in bad faith the things alienated in fraud of creditors, shall indemnify the latter for damages
suffered. Thus, if there is fraud in the transfer of all the assets of the transferor corporation, its creditors can
hold the transferee liable.

The legal basis of the last in the four (4) exceptions to the Nell Doctrine, where the purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation of the selling corporation, is challenging to determine. In his book, Philippine
Corporate Law,36 Dean Cesar Villanueva explained that this exception contemplates the "business-
enterprise transfer." In such transfer, the transferee corporation's interest goes beyond the assets of the
transferor's assets and its desires to acquire the latter's business enterprise, including its goodwill.

In Villa Rev Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 37 the Court held that when one were to buy the business of another as a
going concern, he would usually wish to keep it going; he would wish to get the location, the building, the
stock in trade, and the customers. He would wish to step into the seller's shoes and to enjoy the same
business relations with other men. He would be willing to pay much more if he could get the "good will" of
the business, meaning by this, the good will of the customers, that they may continue to tread the old
footpath to his door and maintain with him the business relations enjoyed by the seller.

In other words, in this last exception, the transferee purchases not only the assets of the transferor, but also
its business. As a result of the sale, the transferor is merely left with its juridical existence, devoid of its
industry and earning capacity. Fittingly, the proper provision of law that is contemplated by this exception
would be Section 40 of the Corporation Code,38 which provides: ChanRoblesvirtualL awlibrary

Sec. 40. Sale or other disposition of assets. - Subject to the provisions of existing laws on illegal
combinations and monopolies, a corporation may, by a majority vote of its board of directors or
trustees, sell, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of all or substantially
all of its property and assets, including its goodwill, upon such terms and conditions and for
such consideration, which may be money, stocks, bonds or other instruments for the payment of
money or other property or consideration, as its board of directors or trustees may deem expedient,
when authorized by the vote of the stockholders representing at least two-thirds (2/3) of the
outstanding capital stock, or in case of non-stock corporation, by the vote of at least two-thirds (2/3)
of the members, in a stockholder's or member's meeting duly called for the purpose. Written notice
of the proposed action and of the time and place of the meeting shall be addressed to each
stockholder or member at his place of residence as shown on the books of the corporation and
deposited to the addressee in the post office with postage prepaid, or served personally: Provided,
That any dissenting stockholder may exercise his appraisal right under the conditions provided in
this Code.

A sale or other disposition shall be deemed to cover substantially all the corporate property and
assets if thereby the corporation would be rendered incapable of continuing the business or
accomplishing the purpose for which it was incorporated.

After such authorization or approval by the stockholders or members, the board of directors or
trustees may, nevertheless, in its discretion, abandon such sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge
or other disposition of property and assets, subject to the rights of third parties under any contract
relating thereto, without further action or approval by the stockholders or members.

Nothing in this section is intended to restrict the power of any corporation, without the authorization
by the stockholders or members, to sell, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or otherwise dispose of
any of its property and assets if the same is necessary in the usual and regular course of business of
said corporation or if the proceeds of the sale or other disposition of such property and assets be
appropriated for the conduct of its remaining business.

In non-stock corporations where there are no members with voting rights, the vote of at least a
majority of the trustees in office will be sufficient authorization for the corporation to enter into any
transaction authorized by this section.

[Emphases Supplied]

To reiterate, Section 40 refers to the sale, lease, exchange or disposition of all or substantially all of the
corporation's assets, including its goodwill.39 The sale under this provision does not contemplate an
ordinary sale of all corporate assets; the transfer must be of such degree that the transferor corporation is
rendered incapable of continuing its business or its corporate purpose. 40 cralawrednad

Section 40 suitably reflects the business-enterprise transfer under the exception of the Nell Doctrine
because the purchasing or transferee corporation necessarily continued the business of the selling or
transferor corporation. Given that the transferee corporation acquired not only the assets but also the
business of the transferor corporation, then the liabilities of the latter are inevitably assigned to the former.

It must be clarified, however, that not every transfer of the entire corporate assets would qualify under
Section 40. It does not apply (1) if the sale of the entire property and assets is necessary in the usual and
regular course of business of corporation, or (2) if the proceeds of the sale or other disposition of such
property and assets will be appropriated for the conduct of its remaining business. 41 Thus, the litmus test to
determine the applicability of Section 40 would be the capacity of the corporation to continue its business
after the sale of all or substantially all its assets.

Jurisprudential recognition of the

business-enterprise transfer

Jurisprudence has held that in a business-enterprise transfer, the transferee is liable for the debts and
liabilities of his transferor arising from the business enterprise conveyed. Many of the application of the
business-enterprise transfer have been related by the Court to the application of the piercing doctrine. 42 cralawrednad

In A.D. Santos, Inc. v. Vasquez,43 a taxi driver filed a suit for workmen's compensation against the petitioner
corporation therein. The latter's defense was that the taxi driver's employer was Amador Santos, and not the
corporation. Initially, the taxi driver was employed by City Cab, a sole proprietary by Amador Santos. The
taxi business was, however, transferred to the petitioner. Applying the piercing doctrine, the Court held that
the petitioner must still be held liable due to the transfer of the business and should not be allowed to
confuse the legitimate issues.

In Buan v. Alcantara,44 the Spouses Buan were the owners of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. They died in a
vehicular accident and the administrators of their estates were appointed. The administrators then
incorporated the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. The issue raised was whether the liabilities of the estates of
the spouses were conveyed to the new corporation due to the transfer of the business. Utilizing the alter-ego
doctrine, the Court ruled in the affirmative and stated that: ChanRoblesvirtualL awlibrary

As between the estate and the corporation, the intention of incorporation was to make the
corporation liable for past and pending obligations of the estate as the transportation business itself
was being transferred to and placed in the name of the corporation. That liability on the part of the
corporation, vis-a-vis the estate, should continue to remain with it even after the percentage of the
estate's shares of stock in the corporation should be diluted. 45

The Court, however, applied the business-enterprise transfer doctrine independent of the piercing doctrine in
other cases. In San Teodoro Development Enterprises v. SSS,46 the petitioner corporation therein attempted
to avoid the compulsory coverage of the Social Security Law by alleging that it was a distinct and separate
entity from its limited partnership predecessor, Chua Lam & Company, Ltd. The Court, however, upheld the
findings of the SSS that the entire business of the previous partnership was transferred to the corporation
ostensibly for a valuable consideration. Hence, "[t]he juridical person owning and operating the business
remain the same even if its legal personality was changed." 47 cralawrednad

Similarly, in Laguna Trans. Co., Inc. v. SSS,48 the Court held that the transferee corporation continued the
same transportation business of the unregistered partnership therein, using the same lines and equipment.
There was, in effect, only a change in the form of the organization of the entity engaged in the business of
transportation of passengers.

Perhaps the most telling jurisprudence which recognized the business-enterprise transfer would be the
assailed case of Caltex. In that case, under an agreement of assumption of obligations, LUSTEVECO
transferred, conveyed and assigned to respondent PSTC all of its business, properties and assets pertaining
to its tanker and bulk business together with all the obligations, properties and assets. 49 Meanwhile,
petitioner Caltex, Inc. obtained a judgment debt against LUSTEVECO, and it sought to enforce the same
against PSTC. The Court ruled that PSTC was bound by its agreement with LUSTEVECO and the former
assumed all of the latter's obligations pertaining to such business.

More importantly, the Court held that, even without the agreement, PSTC was still liable to Caltex, Inc.
based on Section 40, as follows: ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all the properties and assets of
a corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the assignor. The only way the
transfer can proceed without prejudice to the creditors is to hold the assignee liable for the
obligations of the assignor. The acquisition by the assignee of all or substantially all of the
assets of the assignor necessarily includes the assumption of the assignor's liabilities, unless
the creditors who did not consent to the transfer choose to rescind the transfer on the ground of
fraud. To allow an assignor to transfer all its business, properties and assets without the consent of
its creditors and without requiring the assignee to assume the assignor's obligations will defraud the
creditors. The assignment will place the assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors.

Here, Caltex could not enforce the judgment debt against LUSTEVECO. The writ of execution could
not be satisfied because LUSTEVECO's remaining properties had been foreclosed by lienholders. In
addition, all of LUSTEVECO's business, properties and assets pertaining to its tanker and bulk
business had been assigned to PSTC without the knowledge of its creditors. Caltex now has no
other means of enforcing the judgment debt except against PSTC.50 cralawrednad

[Emphasis Supplied]

The Caltex case, thus, affirmed that the transfer of all or substantially all the proper from one corporation to
another under Section 40 necessarily entails the assumption of the assignor's liabilities, notwithstanding the
absence of any agreement on the assumption of obligations. The transfer of all its business, properties and
assets without the consent of its creditors must certainly include the liabilities; or else, the assignment will
place the assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors. In order to protect the creditors against
unscrupulous conveyance of the entire corporate assets, Caltex justifiably concluded that the transfer of
assets of a corporation under Section 40 must likewise carry with it the transfer of its liabilities.

Fraud is not an essential

consideration in a business-
enterprise transfer

Notably, an evaluation of the relevant jurisprudence reveals that fraud is not an essential element for the
application of the business-enterprise transfer. 51 The petitioners in this case, however, assert otherwise.
They insist that under the Caltex case, there was an assumption of liabilities because fraud existed on the
part of PSTC, as the transferee corporation.
The Court disagrees.

The exception of the Nell doctrine, 52 which finds its legal basis under Section 40, provides that the transferee
corporation assumes the debts and liabilities of the transferor corporation because it is merely a continuation
of the latter's business. A cursory reading of the exception shows that it does not require the existence of
fraud against the creditors before it takes full force and effect. Indeed, under the Nell Doctrine, the transferee
corporation may inherit the liabilities of the transferor despite the lack of fraud due to the continuity of the
latter's business.

The purpose of the business-enterprise transfer is to protect the creditors of the business by allowing them a
remedy against the new owner of the assets and business enterprise. Otherwise, creditors would be left
"holding the bag," because they may not be able to recover from the transferor who has "disappeared with
the loot," or against the transferee who can claim that he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. 53 Based
on the foregoing, as the exception of the Nell doctrine relates to the protection of the creditors of the
transferor corporation, and does not depend on any deceit committed by the transferee -corporation, then
fraud is certainly not an element of the business enterprise doctrine.

The Court also agrees with the CA, in its assailed April 29, 2013 resolution, that there was no finding of
fraud in the Caltex case; otherwise it should have been clearly and categorically stated. 54 The discussion
in Caltex relative to fraud seems more hypothetical than factual, thus: ChanRoblesvirtualL awlibrary

If PSTC refuses to honor its written commitment to assume the obligations of LUSTEVECO, there
will be a fraud on the creditors of LUSTEVECO. x x x To allow PSTC now to welsh on its
commitment is to sanction a fraud on LUSTEVECO's creditors. 55

Besides, the supposed fraud in Caltex referred to PSTC's refusal to pay LUSTEVECO's creditors despite the
agreement on assumption of the latter's obligations. Again, the Court emphasizes in the said case, even
without the agreement, PSTC was still liable to Caltex, Inc. under Section 40, due to the transfer of all or
substantially all of the corporate assets. At best, transfers of all or substantially all of the assets to a
transferee corporation without the consent of the transferor corporation's creditor gives rise to a presumption
of fraud against the said creditors. 56cralawrednadralawrednad

Posted 18th September 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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3.
SEP

12

Doctrine of Separability or Severabilty

Is the arbitration clause valid even if the contract where it is written is repudiated by either party?

Under the Doctrine of Separability, the Supreme Court ruled in GR 167994 that the arbitration clause is a
contract in itself which validity is not affected even if one party repudiates the contract containing such
clause. The recent ruling modified the Court's view in GR 161957.

"The Doctrine enunciates that an arbitration agreement is independent of the main contract. The arbitration
agreement is to be treated as a separate agreement and the arbitration agreement does not automatically
terminate when the contract of which it is a part comes to an end.

The separability of the arbitration agreement is especially significant to the determination of whether the
invalidity of the main contract also nullifies the arbitration clause. Indeed, the doctrine denotes that the
invalidity of the main contract, also referred to as the  "container" contract, does not affect the validity of the
arbitration agreement. Irrespective of the fact that the main contract is invalid, the arbitration clause /
agreement  still remains valid and enforceable." - Strickland vs EYLLP, GR 193782 and 210695 (2018, First
Division)
Posted 12th September 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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4.
AUG
 27

Congressional Inherent Power of Contempt?

How long may a recalcitrant witness be imprisoned under the

Congressional Power of Contempt?
“The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent
power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation
should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under
which the said power is invoked.
xxx that detention under the legislative's inherent power of contempt
is not entirely punitive in character because it may be used by
Congress only to secure information from a recalcitrant witness or to
remove an obstruction, it is still a restriction to the liberty.
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislations are intended to affect or change. Mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed through the power of
contempt during legislative inquiry.” – Balag vs Senate, GR
234608 (2018, En banc)
Posted 27th August 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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5.
AUG

25

Writ of Habeas Corpus

The writ of Habeas Corpus or the "great writ of liberty" was
devised as a "speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient
defense of personal freedom." The primary purpose of the writ
"is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal." Under the Constitution,
the  privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be
suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the
public safety requires it. 
 
As to what kind of restraint against which the writ is effective,
case law deems any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action as sufficient. 
 
Accordingly, a Writ of Habeas Corpus may no longer be
issued if the person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained
under a lawful process or order of the court because since
then, the restraint has become legal.
 
source:  Agcaoili, et al vs Farinas, GR 232395 (2018, En
banc)
 
Posted 25th August 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: Writ of Habeas Corpus
 
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6.
AUG

25

Principle of Equity Jurisdiction

Equity jurisdiction versus appellate jurisdiction of the RTC
The appellate jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law. The appellate court acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties when an appeal is perfected.42

On the other hand, equity jurisdiction aims to provide complete justice in cases where a court of law is
unable to adapt its judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of a resulting legal inflexibility
when the law is applied to a given situation. The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction, among others,
is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure restitution.43

The RTC orders which allowed the withdrawal of the deposited funds for the use and occupation of the
subject units were issued pursuant to the RTC’s equity jurisdiction xxx.

The RTC’s equity jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its appellate jurisdiction on the ejectment case.
The RTC could not have issued its orders in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction since there was nothing
more to execute on the dismissed ejectment case. As the RTC orders explained, the dismissal of the
ejectment case effectively and completely blotted out and cancelled the complaint. Hence, the RTC orders
were clearly issued in the exercise of the RTC’s equity jurisdiction, not on the basis of its appellate
jurisdiction.

The levy of real property was ordered by the RTC in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction.
The levy of the respondent’s property was made pursuant to the RTC orders issued in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, independent of the ejectment case originally filed with the MTC.

An examination of the RTC order dated June 30, 2008, directing the levy of the respondent’s real property
shows that it was based on the RTC order dated July 25, 2003.
The subsequent order of the RTC to levy on the respondent’s property was merely a reiteration and an
enforcement of the original writ of execution issued.

Since the order of levy is clearly rooted on the RTC Orders, the only question that needs to be resolved is
which court has jurisdiction to order the execution of the RTC orders.

source:  Regulus Development vs Dela Cruz, GR 198172 (2016, Second Division)  

 Posted 25th August 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: Equity Jurisdiction
 
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7.
AUG

25

Principle of Moot and Academic Case

MOOT AND ACADEMIC?
"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy because of supervening events, rendering the adjudication of the case or the
resolution of the issue without any practical use or value. Courts generally decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness except when, among others, the case
is capable of repetition yet evades judicial review.

It is well-settled in jurisprudence that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or

waived by the parties. "Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue
of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the case."

source:  Regulus Development vs Dela Cruz, GR 198172 (2016, Second Division)

MAY THE COURT TAKE ANSWER OF A MOOT AND ACADEMIC CASE/QUESTION?

In Prof David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court summed up the four exceptions to the rule when
Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot, thus: 
1. first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; 
2. second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; 
3. third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar, and the public; and 
4. fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
 source: Prof. David vs President Arroyo, GR 171396 (2016, En banc)
Posted 25th August 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: lease moot and academic
 

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
AUG

23

Doctrine of Estoppel

"The principles of equitable estoppel, sometimes called estoppel in

pais, are made part of our law by Art. 1432 of the Civil Code.
Coming under this class is estoppel by silence, which obtains here
and as to which it has been held that:
. . . an estoppel may arise from silence as well as from words.
"Estoppel by silence" arises where a person, who by force of
circumstances is under a duty to another to speak, refrains from doing
so and thereby leads the other to believe in the existence of a state of
facts in reliance on which he acts to his prejudice. Silence may
support an estoppel whether the failure to speak
is intentional or negligent.
Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a
misrepresentation and concealment of facts, so as to raise
an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and
under such circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other
party to permit the party who has kept silent to deny what his silence
has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an
estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains
silence, when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him
from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who
remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be heard to speak when
he should be silent.” – PBCOM vs CA (Gaw Le Ja Chua), GR
106858 (1997, First Division)

------------------------ 
 
Despite his passionate arguments, we are constrained to rule against petitioner on grounds of
fairness and equity particularly on the principle of estoppel.  In PNB v. CA,  we held:
[17]

"The doctrine of estoppel is based upon the grounds of public policy,

fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to forbid one to
speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the
injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied
thereon.  The doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles
and the equities in the case.  It is designed to aid the law in the
administration of justice where without its aid injustice might
result.   It has been applied by this Court  wherever and whenever
special circumstances of a case so demand."
source:  Ysmael vs CA (HLURB - Jamlang), GR 96999 (June 10, 1997)
Posted 23rd August 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: estoppel
 
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
AUG

20

May the Accused Question Illegal Arrest After Arraignment?

The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning
the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation applies only if he voluntarily  enters his plea and participates
during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto .[19] There must
be clear and convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish
his right to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of
intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent
with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible.

Wikipedia: 
Arraignment is a formal reading of a criminal charging document in the presence
of the defendant to inform the defendant of the charges against them. In
response to arraignment, the accused is expected to enter a "plea of guilty or no
guilty".

source: Leviste vs Alameda (Delas Alas), GR 182677 (2010, 3rd

Division)
 
Posted 20th August 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
JAN

29

Doctrine of Res Judicata

In Daswani v. Banco de Oro Universal Bank, et al., the Court elucidated that:
In determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to
consider is whether the elements of litis pendentia concur, namely: a) there is identity of parties, or at least
such parties who represent the same interests in both actions; b) there is identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and, c) that the identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

Meanwhile, in Club Filipino Inc., et al. v. Bautista, et al., the Court enumerated, to wit:
The elements of res judicata are: 1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; 2) the decision
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; 3) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there must be as between the first and
second action, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.

Reference: Berboso vs. Cabral, GR 204617 (2017)

  

In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and
parallel administrative action against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption
against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing the Office of the President from proceeding against
petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of res judicata applies only
to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.42 In Montemayor v.
Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a Regional Director of the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon
investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court
categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar charges against said official
did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.

source:   
Gonzales vs OP, G.R. No. 196231 (September 4, 2012) En banc
Posted 29th January 2018 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
NOV

Doctrine of Rejection of the Second Placer

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of

the Doctrine on the Rejection of the Second Placer. The
doctrine will apply in (Vice Mayor) Bayacsan's favor, regardless
of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur:
(1) the decision on Cayat's disqualification remained pending
on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two
mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections;
and (2) the decision on Cayat's disqualification became final
only after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates the doctrine on the

rejection of the second placer, does not apply to the present
case because in Labo there was no final judgment of
disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host
of other cases because the judgment declaring the candidates
disqualification in Labo and the other cases had not become
final before the elections. To repeat, Labo and the other cases
applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second placer
have one common essential condition the disqualification of
the candidate had not become final before the elections. This
essential condition does not exist in the present case.
Thus, in Labo, Labo's disqualification became final only on 14 May
1992, three days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day
itself, Labo was still legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat
was disqualified by final judgment 23 days before the 10 May 2004
elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer legally a candidate
for mayor. In short, Cayat's candidacy for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet
was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections.

Case Reference:  Fr. Cayat vs COMELEC, GR 163776 (2007, En banc) citing Labo vs COMELEC

Re:  disqualification due to non-payment of P300-filing Fee; Doctrine on the Rejection of the Second Placer

Jurisprudence
Maquiling vs COMELEC [Kauswagan Mayor Arnado], GR 195649 (April 2013, En banc)
Fr. Cayat vs COMELEC, GR 163776 (2007, En banc)
Kare vs COMELEC, GR 157526 (2004, En banc)
PB Bautista vs COMELEC [Alcoreza], GR 154796-97 (2003, En banc) 
Baguio Mayor Labo vs COMELEC [Lardizabal], GR 86564 (1989, En banc)

FOR DISCUSSION: 
Prior to Maquiling, the Doctrine Applies if the election protest has
resulted to disqualification of the winning candidate IF the decision
has become final and executory after the election. But
when Maquiling (2013) was decided, the Supreme Court ruled that
the elected but subsequently disqualified Mayor should be replaced
by the 2nd placer candidate and not the elected Vice Mayor under the
Rule of Succession.
 
Posted 6th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
NOV

Doctrine of Respondent Superior

Latin:   “let the master answer”

 
It follows that under the Doctrine of Respondent Superior,
petitioner-municipality is to be held liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was attributable to the
negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents.

The LGU cannot evade liability by pointing to Macaraeg who

constructed the stage, who acted merely as an agent. Under
the above doctrine, LGU is responsible or liable for the
negligence of its agent acting within his assigned tasks.

RA 386, Art. 2176:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. . .

RA 386, Art. 2180:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only
for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible . . . The State is responsible in
like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
article 2176 shall be applicable.

Case Reference:  Torio vs Fontanilla, GR L-29993 (1978, 1st Division)

Re:  a stage collapsed during the Malasiqui, Pangasinan Fiesta town fiesta killing a zarzuela performer

Case Reference:  City of Manila vs IAC (Irene Sto Domingo), 

GR 71159 (1989, 2nd Division) citing Torio vs Fontanilla
Re:  family sued the City for exhumation of father-husband bones and leasing the North Cemetery plot
to another
 

Posted 6th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV

Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability

We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a

municipality may become obligated upon an implied
contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted
or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to
contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has
been said to apply to all cases where money or other
property of a party is received under such
circumstances that the general law, independent of express
contract, implies an obligation upon the municipality to do
justice with respect to the same.
The petitioner cannot set up the plea that the contract was ultra
vires and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the
contract as valid for purposes of reaping some benefits, the
petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the purposes of
denying answerability.
  
Case Reference:  Province of Cebu vs IAC, GR 72841 (1987, 2nd Division)
Re:  illegal property donation by Cebu Provincial Board to Cebu City

Posted 6th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV

Doctrine of Non-suability of State, Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity

1987 Philippine Constitution
Article 16 - General Provisions
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

--------------------------------------------------

During the infamous Mendiola Massacre in January 1987, 13 rallyists were killed. The Citizens
Mendiola Commission recommended criminal sanctions among its police officers as well as
government compensation. At the instance, Caylo Group (rallyist) commenced  a civil suit against
the Republic. 

Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit is expressly provided in Article
XVI, Section 3. 

The principle is based on the very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. 

It also rests on reasons of public policy — that public service would be hindered, and the public
endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the instance of every citizen and
consequently controlled in the uses and dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of
the government.

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are: 

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;
(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;
(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is such that ultimate liability will
belong not to the officer but to the government. 

The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief demanded by the
suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the State nor the affirmative discharge of any
obligation which belongs to the State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and as its agents and servants. 22
This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high position in the government does not confer a license to
persecute or recklessly injure another." 
As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a
public agent acting under the color of his office when his acts are wholly without authority. Until recently in
1991, this doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot institutionalize
irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the
Republic.

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for the deaths that followed the
incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the named defendants in the lower court.

SC dismissed the petition.

Case Reference:  
Republic vs Sandoval, GR 84607 (1993 – En banc)

--------------------------------------------------

Re:  a collision of a passenger jeepney with a gov’t dump truck loading for gov’t project
… LGU not liable for its driver’s negligence

Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when
they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit.

Case Reference:  
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs Firme (Heirs of Baniña, Sr.), 
G.R. No. L-52179 (1991, 1st Division)

--------------------------------------------------
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being
sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers
and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This
situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in
him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the scope of
his authority and jurisdiction."
  
Case Reference:  Minucher vs. CA (Scalzo), GR 142396 (2003)
 
Posted 6th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
NOV

Quasi-Judicial Function
While a "quasi-judicial function" is
A term which applies to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Emphasis supplied)

In the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates the COMELEC to hear
and decide cases first by division and upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. In
Baytan v. COMELEC, the Court expounded on the administrative and quasi-judicial powers of the
COMELEC. The Court explained:
 Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative
and quasi-judicial powers. The COMELEC's administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3),
(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9) of Article IX-C. The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the
COMELEC should exercise its administrative powers, whether en banc or in division. The
Constitution merely vests the COMELEC's administrative powers in the "Commission on Elections,"
while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the COMELEC en
banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the
practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

On the other hand, the COMELEC's quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and
barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."

The COMELEC's exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly
requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC
in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held
by the Court in Canicosa, that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon
motion for reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers. (Emphasis
supplied)

Case Reference:   
Bautista vs COMELEC [Alcoreza], GR 154796-97 (2003, En banc)  
citing  Labo vs Comelec

Re:  who seats as PB after a winning Barangay Chairman found to be a non-registered voter; Doctrine of
Rejection of the Second Placer
 

Posted 5th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV

Doctrine of Rejection of the Second Placer

Second, there are specific requirements for the application of the doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer. The doctrine will apply in Bayacsans favor,
regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the
decision on Cayats disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May
2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates
for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision
on Cayats disqualification became final only after the elections.

Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, which enunciates the doctrine on the rejection of the

second placer, does not apply to the present case because in Labo there was no
final judgment of disqualification before the elections. The doctrine on the
rejection of the second placer was applied in Labo and a host of other
cases because the judgment declaring the candidates disqualification
in Labo and the other cases had not become final before the elections. To
repeat, Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer have one common essential condition the disqualification of the
candidate had not become final before  the elections. This essential condition
does not exist in the present case.

Thus, in Labo, Labo's disqualification became final only on 14 May 1992, three

days after the 11 May 1992 elections. On election day itself, Labo was still
legally a candidate. In the present case, Cayat was disqualified by final judgment
23 days before the 10 May 2004 elections. On election day, Cayat was no longer
legally a candidate for mayor. In short, Cayats candidacy for Mayor
of Buguias, Benguet was legally non-existent in the 10 May 2004 elections. 

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final

judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law. Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong. (Emphasis added)
 
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first
is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the
situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the
disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered
in the second sentence of Section 6.

The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral

Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate
disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and
votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Resolution
disqualifying Cayat became final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004
elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayats favor
are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in the 10 May 2004
elections. Palilengs proclamation is proper because he was the sole and only
candidate, second to none.

Labo involved the second situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6

of the Electoral Reforms Law.

Case Reference:   
Fr. Cayat vs COMELEC [Palileng], GR 163776 (2007, En banc) 
     citing Labo, Jr vs COMELEC

Re:  disqualification due to non-payment of P300-filing Fee; 

        Doctrine on the Rejection of the Second Placer
 

Posted 5th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV

3-Term Limit Rule: Will a practically, fully served term --- but eventually
declared void --- be considered an exception ?
Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He
assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor
for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC (April 02 2011) in
the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as
mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.

It is undisputed that respondent Morales was elected to the position of

mayor of Mabalacat for the following consecutive terms:
a)                 July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998
b)                July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001
c)                 July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 
d)                July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007

Case Reference:  Atty Rivera III vs COMELEC [Mabalacat Mayor Morales], GR 167591 (2007, En

banc)
Posted 4th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
NOV

General Law vs Special Law; New Law vs Old Law

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed
as an exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government
Code is a later law which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local
elective officials, the Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to
probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a later statute, general
in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will
ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.

Case Reference:  Moreno vs COMELEC, GR 168550 (2006, En banc)

 

Posted 4th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV
 4

Grave Abuse of Discretion

As settled in jurisprudence, grave abuse of discretion is the arbitrary exercise
of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to
be condemned as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, such an
abuse must be patent and gross.

Case Reference:   
Atty. Risos-Vidal vs COMELEC (Estrada), GR 206666 (January 21, 2015 – En
Banc) 

Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but it generally

refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or
to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

Case Reference:   
People [Ombudsman] vs Sandiganbayan (4th Div.) [Villapando], 
GR 164185 (2008, 4th Division)
Posted 4th November 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
MAY

25

Habeas Corpus vs Warrantless Arrest

1. However, the grant of relief in a habeas corpus proceeding is not predicated on the disappearance
of a person, but on his illegal detention. Habeas corpus generally applies to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

2. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. It is
devised as a speedy relief from unlawful restraint. It is a remedy intended to determine whether the
person under detention is held under lawful authority.

3. The purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived of his liberty. If
the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders the release of the person.  If,
however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use
of habeas corpus is thus very limited.

4. When forcible taking and disappearance -- not arrest and detention -- have been alleged, the proper
remedy is not habeas corpus proceedings, but criminal investigation and proceedings.
Reference:  Martinez vs Mendoza, G.R. No. 153795 (August 17, 2006)
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution states that:
“The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any
part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members
in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be
set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or
rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of
the civil courts or the legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military
courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially
charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.”

Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the three instances
when warrantless arrests may be lawfully effected are: 
1. an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto (in the very act of); 
2. an arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable
cause that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and 
3. an arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined
during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

Posted 25th May 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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2.
APR

21

Question on Jurisdiction of Court Only During the Appeal

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus - BANTIGUE POINT
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
G. R. No. 162322 (March 14, 2012)

Facts 
"Acting on an appeal filed by the Republic, the CA ruled that since the (Republic) former
had actively participated in the proceedings before the lower court, but failed to raise the
jurisdictional challenge therein, petitioner is thereby estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court on appeal."

SC Ruling
The Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction in this case.
At the outset, we rule that petitioner Republic is not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the lower court, even if the former raised the jurisdictional question only
on appeal. The rule is settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. [18] Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred
only by the Constitution or the law. [19] It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged
by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.
[20]
 Consequently, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first
time on appeal.[21]
The ruling of the Court of Appeals that a party may be estopped from raising such
[jurisdictional] question if he has actively taken part in the very proceeding which he
questions, belatedly objecting to the courts jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him[22] is based on the doctrine of estoppel by
laches. We are aware of that doctrine first enunciated by this Court in Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy.[23] In Tijam, the party-litigant actively participated in the proceedings
before the lower court and filed pleadings therein. Only 15 years thereafter, and after
receiving an adverse Decision on the merits from the appellate court, did the party-
litigant question the lower courts jurisdiction. Considering the unique facts in that case,
we held that estoppel by laches had already precluded the party-litigant from raising the
question of lack of jurisdiction on appeal. In Figueroa v. People,[24] we cautioned
that Tijam must be construed as an exception to the general rule and applied only in the
most exceptional cases whose factual milieu is similar to that in the latter case.
The facts are starkly different in this case, making the exceptional rule
in Tijam inapplicable. Here, petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration when the records were still with the RTC. [25] At that point, petitioner could
not have questioned the delegated jurisdiction of the MTC, simply because the case was
not yet with that court. When the records were transferred to the MTC, petitioner neither
filed pleadings nor requested affirmative relief from that court. On appeal, petitioner
immediately raised the jurisdictional question in its Brief. [26] Clearly, the exceptional
doctrine of estoppel by laches is inapplicable to the instant appeal.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned
or declined to assert it.[27] In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that it has abandoned or
declined to assert its right to question the lower court's jurisdiction.
Posted 21st April 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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3.
JAN
 9

Acquisitions by Lucrative Title

Acquisitions by lucrative title 
... refers to properties acquired gratuitously 
... and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage 
... by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. 

Reference:
Francisco vs CA (Evangelista, et al), G.R. No. 102330 November 25, 1998
Posted 9th January 2017 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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4.
DEC

28

What is an "Ancient Document"

"The affidavit cannot be considered an ancient document either.

An ancient document is one that is (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody,
and (3) unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion.  It must on its face
[11]

appear to be genuine.

Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication. Thus, an affidavit
does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat.
Furthermore, the affidavit in question does not state how the ownership of the subject land was
transferred from Sinforoso Mendoza to Margarito Mendoza. By itself, an affidavit is not a mode
of acquiring ownership."

source:
Cequena and Lirio vs Bolante, GR 137944 (April 6, 2000)
Posted 28th December 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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5.
DEC

28

Dead Man's Statute or Survivorship Rule

"Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court

SEC. 23.  Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party.  – Parties or

assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against a person of
unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person, or
against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before
the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.

The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded
from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not
entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of
the transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
 1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a
case in prosecuted.

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a

deceased person or a person of unsound mind;

3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;

4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such
deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind." 10
source:  
Sunga-Chan and Sunga vs Chua, G.R. No. 143340 (August 15, 2001)
Posted 28th December 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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6.
NOV

22

Principle of Ambulatory Nature of a Will

79 Am Jur 2d, Wills, 851: It seems clear that in the absence of
statute expressly conferring such jurisdiction, a court does not
have the power to entertain a suit for the establishment or
annulment of the will of a living testator. The ambulatory
nature of a will, and the absence of parties in interest, which
results from the rule that a living person has neither heirs
nor legatees, render impossible the assumption that a court
has inherent power to determine the validity of a will prior to
the death of the maker. It has been held that a statute
providing for the probate of a will before the death of the
testator, leaving him at liberty to alter or revoke it, or to escape
the effect of any action under it by removal from the
jurisdiction, is alleged and void on the ground that such a
proceeding is not within the judicial power.

source:  

[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA DE LOS REYES
PHILLIPS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 133359. January 31, 2000]
OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
FERNANDO V. GOROSPE, JR., in his Official Capacity as Presiding Judge of
RTC-Makati, Branch 61, and PACITA PHILLIPS as the alleged executrix of the
alleged will of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, respondents. 
AMBULATORY - capable of being altered
Ambulatory will refer to a will that can be altered during the testator's lifetime. Generally all wills are
considered ambulatory because as long as the person who made it lives, it can always be changed or revoked.
Posted 22nd November 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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7.
NOV

18

Conflict of Laws: Lex Loci Celebrationis vs Lex Loci Contractus

Lex loci celebrationis relates to the law of the place of the ceremony or the law of
the place where a contract is made. 

The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the law of the place
where a contract is executed or to be performed. It controls the nature,
construction, and validity of the contract and it may pertain to the law voluntarily
agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them either expressly or
implicitly.

Reference:  GR 149177

Posted 18th November 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: Lex Loci Celebrationis Lex Loci Contractus
 

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8.
NOV

18

Conflict of Laws: Most Significant Relationship Rule

"Under the state of the most significant relationship rule, to ascertain what state
law to apply to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most
substantial connection to the occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a
contract, the court should consider where the contract was made, was
negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or place of
incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue to be resolved."

Reference:  GR 149177

Read Also:  

1. Lex Loci Celebrationis

2. Lex Loci Contractus
Posted 18th November 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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 
JAN

20

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

"The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact."

source:  Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2,

2007, 517 SCRA 255
Posted 20th January 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
JAN

20

Doctrine of Primacy of Administrative Remedies

"The general rule is that before a party may seek the
intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be
summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without
first giving such administrative agency the opportunity to
dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is, courts
cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question
which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal
prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact."

source:  Republic v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2,

2007, 517 SCRA 255

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our

judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective competence.[42] It has been held, however, that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In the case of Republic of the Philippines v.
Lacap,[43] the Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules, namely:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where
the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will
irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively
so small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question
involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of
justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where the application of the
doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts
violate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies has been rendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy; (k) where strong public interest is involved; and (l) in quo
warranto proceedings.[44] [Underscoring supplied]
Posted 20th January 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
JAN

20

SC's Doctrine of Law

"[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted,
the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied
on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof."

source:  People vs Jabinal, 154 Phil. 565 (1974)

 Posted 20th January 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
JAN

20

Condonation Doctrine: By reelection can no longer be used as a defense

"The condonation doctrine --- which connotes this same sense
of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein
elaborated upon --- is not based on statutory law. It is a
jurisprudential creation from the 1959 case of Pascual vs
Honorable Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, (Pascual), which
was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution."

Condonation Doctrine by reelection can no longer be used as a

defense. SC's abandonment, however, is prospective.

source:  Morales vs Court of Appeals, GR 217126-27 (Nov. 10,

2015)

Posted 20th January 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
JAN

11

Constitutional Law: Doctrine of Vested Rights

A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest.’ (16 C.J.S. 1173). It is “the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to
enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of property conferred by existing law” (12 C.J. 955, Note 46, No. 6) or
“some right or interest in property which has become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy” (Downs vs. Blount, 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. ‘A state may not impair vested rights by
legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a
change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power’ (16 C.J.S. 1177-
78).

It has been observed that, generally, the term “vested right” expresses the concept of present fixed interest,
which in right reason and natural justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
just an imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual
rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174, Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs.
Rosenthal, 192 Atl. 2nd 587).

reference: Yinlu vs Trans-Asia, GR 207942 (January 12 2015)

Posted 11th January 2016 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
NOV

11

SC, 1959: The Aguinaldo Doctrine or Doctrine of Condonation

SC reverses ombudsman suspension of Junjun

Dismissed Makati Mayor Jejomar Erwin “Junjun” Binay Jr. has won his case in the Supreme Court (SC)
against the Office of the Ombudsman in relation to his earlier preventive suspension over alleged anomaly in
the Makati City Hall Building 2 project.
In its decision against the suspension order on Binay, the Supreme Court (SC) allowed the application of the
condonation doctrine or Aguinaldo doctrine.
The doctrine has been a common defense invoked by elected officials in evading liabilities for acts committed
in their previous terms in office.
It effectively extinguishes a reelected official’s administrative liability from alleged wrongdoing during a
previous term.
The SC conceived of the doctrine in an October 1959 decision.
A court insider bared that the justices decided in session to abandon the doctrine, but only for future cases.
Binay could use the latest SC ruling in questioning the Ombudsman’s subsequent dismissal order against
him, the source stressed.
The SC insider further revealed that the high court also upheld the power of the Court of Appeals (CA) to
review and stop administrative orders of the Office of the Ombudsman on cases against officials.
The abandonment of the doctrine would be prospective in application, as agreed upon by the majority of
justices during the voting, the source said.
This means the doctrine will apply in Binay’s case but he will be the last to benefit from it.
The SC rejected the position of Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales that the condonation doctrine cannot
apply in Binay’s case.
Binay invoked the doctrine in questioning the preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman.
Last month, the Ombudsman ordered the dismissal from service of Mayor Binay over the controversy.
Binay had argued that the alleged anomalies were committed during the first and second phases of the
project when he was not yet mayor of the city.
The third and fourth phases, on the other hand, were then undertaken during his previous term from 2010
to 2013.
The SC, the source said, has also rejected the position of Morales that only the high court can review and
stop her orders on administrative cases based on Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act).
Such provision in the Ombudsman law was declared ineffective as Congress did not consult the SC in
approving it, according to the ruling penned by Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe.
No other details were available as the high court has not yet released a copy of the ruling as of press time.
The SC issued the ruling in response to a petition filed by the ombudsman questioning the orders of the CA
stopping the ombudsman’s first preventive suspension order against Mayor Binay.
In her petition last March, Morales assailed the temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) issued by the CA stopping her suspension order against Binay.
The SC heard the case in oral arguments during summer session in Baguio City last April before four justices
– Presbitero Velasco Jr., Diosdado Peralta, Arturo Brion and Francis Jardeleza – decided to inhibit from the
case. 
Meanwhile, the Makati City police said the large presence of policemen around the Makati City Hall is part of
APEC preparations and not a reaction to the SC decision on Binay case.
“They (police officers) are being billeted at the school. It has nothing to do with the Supreme Court decision,”
Sr. Supt. Ernesto Barlam, chief of the Makati City Police, said, referring to the General Pio Del Pilar National
High School. The school is located near the city hall building on F. Zobel street. The Makati City Hall
building is not very far from the hotels where some of the APEC delegates would be staying during the
summit.
Binay spokesman Joey Salgado said they were not convinced of the city police chief’s explanation.
“That is their version of things.  But the timing is suspicious. APEC is still quite far away,” Salgado toldThe
STAR.
He said the mayor will issue a statement only after getting his copy of the SC decision.  – With Mike
Frialde
source:  Philippine Star
Posted 11th November 2015 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
JUN

The 20-lender rule

BIR’s power to interpret tax laws is not
absolute
Another instance of overturned administrative issuances would be BIR Ruling Nos. 370-2011 and 378-2011.  

In January 2015, the SC invalidated these tax rulings which covered the imposition of a 20% final withholding
tax (FWT) on the interest income from the issuance of Poverty Eradication and Alleviation Certificates (PEACe)
Bonds by the Bureau of Treasury for being deposit substitutes (G.R. No. 198756, 13 January 2015). 

The Tax Code defines deposit substitutes as “an alternative form of obtaining funds from the public (the term
‘public’ means borrowing from twenty [20] or more individual or corporate lenders at any one time), other
than deposits, through the issuance, endorsement, or acceptance of debt instruments for the borrower’s own
account.”

In striking down these issuances, the SC applied the 20-lender rule (i.e., 20 or more lenders at any one time)
to determine whether a debt instrument is considered a deposit substitute, subject to 20% FWT. The SC found
that these rulings disregarded the 20-lender rule by considering all treasury bonds, regardless of the number
of purchasers/lenders at the time of origination/issuances, to be deposit substitutes. As a result, the SC ruled
that the BIR’s interpretation created a distinction between government debt instruments and private bonds
where there was none in the tax law.

The SC further explained that the phrase ‘at any one time’, for purposes of determining the 20-lender rule,
would refer to every transaction executed in the primary or secondary market relative to the purchase or sale
of the securities. The SC also ruled that there is a deemed public borrowing and the bonds are considered
deposit substitutes when funds are simultaneously obtained from 20 or more lenders through any of the
transactions connected in the issuance/trading of the government bonds (e.g., issuance by the Bureau of
Treasury; sale/distribution of government dealers; and trading in the secondary market).

Sylvia B. Salvador is a director at the tax services department of Isla Lipana & Co., the Philippine member firm
of PwC network.

source:  Businessworld
Posted 4th June 2015 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
JAN

28
 Principle of Relativity of Contracts
Contract law; principle of relativity. The basic principle of relativity of contracts is that contracts can
only bind the parties who entered into it, and cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if he is
aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof “Where there is no privity of contract,
there is likewise no obligation or liability to speak about.”  Philippine National Bank v. Teresita Tan Dee, et
al.,  G.R. No. 182128, February 19, 2014.
Posted 28th January 2015 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
DEC

25

Doctrine of Judicial Stability (or non-interference)

doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference dictates that the assumption by the Makati RTC
over the issue operates as an “insurmountable barrier” to the subsequent assumption by the
Parañaque RTC.[42]  By insisting on ruling on the same issue, the Parañaque RTC effectively
interfered with the Makati RTC’s resolution of the issue and created the possibility of
conflicting decisions. Cojuangco v. Villegas[43] states:  “The various branches of the [regional
trial courts] of a province or city, having as they have the same or equal authority and exercising
as they do concurrent and coordinate jurisdiction, should not, cannot and are not permitted to
interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or judgments.  A contrary rule
would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the administration of justice.”  The
matter is further explained thus:

It has been held that "even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, it is, also, axiomatic that the court first acquiring jurisdiction
excludes the other courts."

                In addition, it is a familiar principle that when a court of competent jurisdiction acquires jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case, its authority continues, subject only to the appellate authority, until the matter is finally and
completely disposed of, and that no court of co-ordinate authority is at liberty to interfere with its action. This doctrine is
applicable to civil cases, to criminal prosecutions, and to courts-martial. The principle is essential to the proper and orderly
administration of the laws; and while its observance might be required on the grounds of judicial comity and courtesy, it
does not rest upon such considerations exclusively, but is enforced to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous
conflicts of jurisdiction and of the process.[44]

source:  G.R. No. 175303 (April 11, 2012)

Posted 25th December 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
DEC

18

Doctrine of Immutability of Judgments

A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Finality becomes a fact when the
reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such period. As a consequence, no
court (not even this Court) can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a decision that has
become final. When a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer
be modified in any respect either by the court, which rendered it or even by this Court. The doctrine is
founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments must become final at some definite point in time.
This principle has a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why courts exist. Verily, it fosters the
judicious perception that the rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an
indefinite period of time. As such, it is not regarded as a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but
rather, a matter of public policy which must be faithfully complied." 

The only recognized exceptions to the doctrine of immutability and unalterability are the correction of clerical
errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and void judgments. The
instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions.

However, this doctrine "is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to
relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice considering: (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor, or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the
case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of
the rules; (e) the lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) that the
other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

References:
Lalican vs Insular Life, GR 183526 (2009)
Aguinaldo vs People, GR 226615 (2021)

espouses that a judgment that has acquired finality

becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be
modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of
the land
The significance of this rule was emphasized in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, to wit:
The reason for the rule is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment
to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the
judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to
the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements.
The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial
business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of
every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrine is not a mere
technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as a time-honored
principle of procedural law.29 (Citations omitted)

source:  G.R. No. 189316

Posted 18th December 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
DEC

11

Sub Judice Rule

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice, the CA reminded
the parties. 

Anyone violating the sub judice rule can be cited for indirect contempt of court under Section 3(d), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. 
source:  5-page CA resolution after its July 30 2013 ruling for Makati reversing the Pasig RTC on Taguig
Ownership of BGC,  
Posted 11th December 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
NOV

Doctrine of Condonation
Suffice it to state that the “Doctrine of Condonation” as enunciated in several Supreme
Court decisions is explicit that “reelection to office operates as condonation of the officer’s
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor”. Thus,
“reelection” of a public official renders the administrative case filed against the public official
concerned moot and academic.
But what if he is elected to a different post, let us say, from being a vice mayor to mayor
or vice versa? Is the doctrine applicable?  I often get an affirmative answer from local elective
officials. Their answer is basically premised on the following: (1) the same people vote for the
local official whether he runs for the mayoralty or vice mayoralty post; (2) the electorate
belongs to the same local government unit; and (3) the “forgiveness” factor is applicable as
manifested by the election, although not “reelection”, of the public official despite his previous
misconduct, if any.
The Office of the Ombudsman had other view in mind. In its opinion dated March 09,
2012, the Office of the Ombudsman opined that the doctrine applies only to “reelection” citing
myriads of Supreme Court rulings. It emphasized the textual language of the Supreme Court
which is “reelection” and therefore, there is no basis to deviate from the settled jurisprudential
holdings and the clear meaning of the same.
The position of the Office of the Ombudsman has been quoted in the recent DILG
Opinion dated March 09, 2013. In the words of Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales:
                  “xxx for condonation to apply, reelection should be to the same position for
misconduct committed during a ‘prior’ term. Hence, there is no cogent reason for this
Office to depart from the prevailing jurisprudence and this Office is constrained to
implement the penalty imposed xxx”.
         The term “reelection” has been construed to mean exactly what it says. Plain.
source:  https://revieweronlocalgovernance.wordpress.com/tag/local-government-code/
Posted 1st November 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
OCT

19

Willful Blindness Doctrine

MERE RELIANCE on another person in preparing, filing and paying income taxes is not a
justification for failure to file the right information on income taxes.

In People v. Gloria Kintanar (CTA EB Crim. No. 006, Dec. 3, 2010), Ms. Kintanar was charged
with failure to make or file her income tax returns (ITR), violating Section 255 of the 1997
National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended. She claimed that she did not actively
participate in the filing of her joint ITR with her husband since she entrusted such duty to the
latter who, in turn, hired an accountant to perform their tax responsibilities. She testified that
she did not know how much her tax obligation was; nor did she bother to inquire or determine
the facts surrounding the filing of her ITRs. Despite several notices and subpoena received by
the accused, only an unsupported protest letter made by her husband was filed with the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc found her neglect
or omission tantamount to “deliberate ignorance” or “conscious avoidance”. As an experienced
businesswoman, her reliance on her husband to file the required ITR without ensuring its full
compliance showed clear indication of deliberate lack of concern on her part to perform her tax
obligations. This ruling was sustained by the Supreme Court (SC) in 2012.

Based on the foregoing, the willful blindness doctrine was applied by the CTA, as sustained by
SC on cases where there is a natural presumption that the taxpayer knows his/her tax
obligations under the law considering the factual circumstances of the case, such as being a
businesswoman or official of a company. This case set a precedent that mere reliance on a
representative or agent (i.e., accountant or husband) is not a valid ground to justify any
noncompliance in tax obligations. The taxpayer must inquire, check and validate whether or
not his/her representative or agent has complied with the taxpayer’s tax responsibilities.

However, in the recent case of People v. Judy Ann Santos (CTA Crim. Case no. 012, Jan. 16,
2013), the CTA Division seemed to have a change of heart and acquitted Ms. Santos despite
having almost the same circumstances as that of the case of Ms. Kintanar. In this case, Ms.
Santos was accused of failure to supply correct and accurate information in her ITR. She
claimed that by virtue of trust, respect and confidence, she has entrusted her professional,
financial and tax responsibilities to her manager since she was 12 years old. She participated
and maintained her intention to settle the case, and thus provided all the documents needed
as well as payment of her taxes. The element of willfulness was not established and the CTA
found her to be merely negligent. The CTA also noted the intention of Ms. Santos to settle the
case, which negates any motive to commit fraud. This was affirmed by the SC in its resolution
issued April 2013.

THE DIFFERENCES

“Willful blindness” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “deliberate avoidance of knowledge

of a crime, especially by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing,
despite being aware that it is highly probable.” A “willful act” is described as one done
intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse.

“Willful” in tax crimes means voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty, and bad faith
or bad purpose need not be shown. It is a state of mind that may be inferred from the
circumstances of the case; thus, proof of willfulness may be, and usually is, shown by
circumstantial evidence alone. Therefore, to convict the accused for willful failure to file ITR or
submit accurate information, it must be shown that the accused was (1) aware of his/her
obligation to file annual ITR or submit accurate information, but that (2) he/she, or his/her
supposed agent, nevertheless voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally failed to file the required
ret urns or submit accurate information. Bad faith or intent to defraud need not be shown.

As can be observed in the first case, the accused knew that she had to timely file and supply
correct and accurate information of the joint ITR with the BIR in relation to the profession or the
position she holds. The knowledge was presumed based on the fact that Ms. Kintanar is an
“experienced” businesswoman, having been an independent distributor of a product for several
years. However, despite this knowledge, the CTA found that she voluntarily, knowingly and
intentionally failed to fulfill her tax responsibilities by not participating in the filing of the ITR and
ensuring that everything was filed correctly and accurately. As compared with the Santos case,
which the SC affirmed, the element of “voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally” was taken
differently by the CTA in consideration of the facts of the case. Ms. Santos fully entrusted her
tax obligations and finances to her manager since she was a child. It can be said that she is
not an “experienced” manager of her finances and taxes since she never handled such task,
as compared with the situation of Ms. Kintanar, who is considered an experienced
businesswoman who manages her business as well as her financial and tax responsibilities --
which is expected of somebody in her position (i.e., president and/or businessperson).

The concept of willful blindness doctrine is new in Philippine jurisprudence. The application of
this doctrine by the CTA in the said cases was guided by the appreciation of the facts and the
pieces of evidence produced by the prosecution and accused to prove the non-existence of
willfulness. However, defined and clear standards in its application must be done as guidance
for future application. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary application and to encourage proper
use of the doctrine by both parties in the case.

source:  Punongbayan & Araullo

Posted 19th October 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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OCT

Statutes of Limitations
Statutes of limitations set the deadline or maximum period of time within which a lawsuit or legal claim may be
filed. They vary depending on the circumstances of the case, the type of case or claim involved, and whether the
lawsuit or claim is filed in state or federal court.
source:  http://research.lawyers.com/statutes-of-limitations.html
Posted 7th October 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
SEP

28

Notarized Document
"It is settled that absent any clear and convincing proof to the contrary, a notarized document enjoys the
presumption of regularity and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of its contents."

source:
Palada v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 172227, June 29, 2011, 653 SCRA 10, 21
ECE Realty vs Mandap, GR 196182 (September 01 2014).pdf

Posted 28th September 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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17

Doctrine of In Pari Delicto

Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the

law; the courts leave them as they are, because they are deemed in
pari delicto or "in equal fault."30  
In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be
maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property
agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto,
no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the
other.

The principle is grounded on two premises: 

1. first, that courts should not lend their good offices to mediating
disputes among wrongdoers; and 
2. second, that denying judicial relief to an admitted wrongdoer is
an effective means of deterring illegality. This doctrine of
ancient vintage is not a principle of justice but one of policy as
articulated in 1775 by Lord Mansfield in Holman v. Johnson
Thus, to serve as both a sanction and as a deterrent, the law will not aid either party to an
illegal agreement and will leave them where it finds them.

This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32 that permit the

return of that which may have been given under a void contract
to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil Code);33 
(b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art. 1413, Civil
Code);34 
(c) the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal
purpose is accomplished or before damage is caused to a third
person and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery
(Art. 1414, Civil Code);35 
(d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands
(Art. 1415, Civil Code);36 
(e) the party for whose protection the prohibition by law is
intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely
prohibited and if public policy would be enhanced by permitting
recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code);37 and 
(f) the party for whose benefit the law has been intended such
as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code)38 and labor laws
(Arts. 1418-1419, Civil Code).39
 
sources:  

Hulst vs PR Builders, GR 156364 (September 3, 2007)

Acabal vs Acabal, GR 148376 (2005)

Posted 17th September 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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12

Doctrine of Corporate Opportunity

The doctrine of "corporate opportunity" 29 is precisely a
recognition by the courts that the fiduciary standards could not
be upheld where the fiduciary was acting for two entities with
competing interests. This doctrine rests fundamentally on the
unfairness, in particular circumstances, of an officer or director
taking advantage of an opportunity for his own personal profit
when the interest of the corporation justly calls for protection. 

source:

G.R. No. L-45911 April 11, 1979

JOHN GOKONGWEI, JR., petitioner, 

vs.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANDRES M. SORIANO, JOSE M. SORIANO, ENRIQUE

ZOBEL, ANTONIO ROXAS, EMETERIO BUNAO, WALTHRODE B. CONDE, MIGUEL ORTIGAS,
ANTONIO PRIETO, SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, EMIGDIO TANJUATCO, SR., and EDUARDO R.
VISAYA, respondents.

Posted 12th September 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
SEP

Why no supremacy clause in our Constitution?

When Chief Justice Lourdes Sereno last week told President Benigno Aquino 3rd, that “The Constitution is
supreme,” everyone, this writer included, wholeheartedly agreed.
But did you know that nowhere in the 21,000-word charter will you find a clause that proclaims the
Constitution as the supreme law of the land? Or even just “the law of the land.” Look for the clause in the
text and you will look in vain.
In contrast, the American Constitution contains an explicit supremacy clause, article VI, clause 2, which
reads,
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of
the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any
state to the contrary notwithstanding.”
This command speaks volumes about the US charter. When it makes the claim of supremacy, you know it is
supreme in the United States of America.
Since our charter neglected to provide a similar supremacy clause for itself, it’s not surprising that it failed to
provide a clause proclaiming the Supreme Court as the final arbiter of law and the Constitution in our
political system.
It appears that the 48 commissioners whom President Cory Aquino tasked to write the Constitution forgot
this provision that in the constitutions of other states is considered fundamental.
Power of judicial review in PH charter
But then, to the lasting credit of our charter framers, they did something more than the drafters of the US
Constitution.
They wrote into our fundamental law the power of judicial review by the Judiciary.
As several readers, some writing from across the seas, have ably pointed out to me, certain provisions in
Article VIII of our charter spell out the power of judicial review and imply judicial supremacy. These are:
“Article VIII, Sec.1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government….”
“Article VIII, sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers….
“(2) review, revise, reverse, or affirm on appeal or certiorari. As the law or the rules of court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts, in:
“(a) all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.”
In contrast, the US constitution stopped short of recognizing judicial review.

Learning from my readers

I must admit here that the many letters I received in response to my column (“The disputed doctrine of
judicial supremacy,” Times, August 28), have helped clarify the key points where my analysis was wanting,
and my error in assigning too much importance to the continuing US debate on the doctrine of judicial
supremacy.
All the comments received were helpful and instructive; alas I can only cite and quote a few here, and will
have to content myself with just thanking everyone for writing.
The high degree of public feeling and understanding of the issues of judicial independence and judicial
supremacy is remarkable.
To quote some of the letters:
1. Reader Jun Adan sent me the following comment, which is incisive and persuasive.
“ ‘Judicial Supremacy’ only means that the judicial branch of the government, of which the Supreme Court is
the highest, has the ultimate power to interpret the laws and Constitution of the land, as emanating from the
‘Judicial Review’ power granted to it by the Constitution, which the two other branches must obey. It means
the Judiciary has the exclusive jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the two other branches, to decide on what the
law or the Constitution means which form part of the law of the land and must prevail over the two other
branches.
“In relation to the power of the Legislative to enact and make laws, including appropriation acts, such power
must conform to the Constitution.
On the other hand, in relation to the power of the Executive to enforce and implement the laws and the
Constitution, such executive acts must conform to laws and the Constitution.
“The three branches are ‘co-equal’ in terms of each’s power to exercise it within its exclusive jurisdiction and
no one reigns supreme over the other. All three branches must respect and obey the Constitution, as the
supreme law of the land, the soul and spirit of which fully resides in the people.
“Applying the current Supreme Court (SC) rulings on the PDAF and DAP, the SC is not asserting its
supremacy but has merely exerted its Constitutional-given power of judicial review by way of interpreting the
law and the Constitution as it relates to the power of the purse of Congress and the Executive (Order) on
implementation of the budget GAA.
“In the proper exercise of its power, the SC found PDAF and DAP unconstitutional for reasons therein
explained. As such, the Legislative and Executive must obey and respect such SC decisions and must stop
actions therein forbidden. It is not an exertion of Judicial Supremacy but a proper exercise of the Judicial
Review power mandated by the Constitution.”
2. Reader Raymart Anthony Hernaez helped to clarify why I got caught between Philippine and US
jurisprudence. He wrote:
“We have based our Constitution and early jurisprudence on American roots but I believe that we have
already departed from the US, at least jurisprudentially.
“The basis of judicial review in the US Judiciary, especially that of their Supreme Court, is solely established
by a legal precedent while ours was established by none other than the supreme law of our land. The power
of judicial review is explicitly mentioned and even expanded in our Constitution. While the US Judiciary
cannot touch purely political questions, our courts can and should as it is their constitutional duty….”
Supremacists vs. departmentalists
Michael Dorff of Cornell University, in an interesting essay on the US debate over judicial supremacy, says
that debaters/combatants tend to be either supremacists or departmentalists.
Supremacists believe that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution prevails over contrary
interpretations by Congress, the President, and just about everyone else, unless and until the Court
overrules its precedent or the People amend the Constitution.
Through much of US history, many have differed with this position. And they include such giants as Thomas
Jefferson and Abraham Lincoln.
According to Professor Dorff, Jefferson adhered to a view that Stanford Law School Dean Larry Kramer has
called “departmentalism,” under which each branch (or department) of government has the power and duty
to construe the Constitution for itself.
The danger of this, says Dorff, is that departmentalism can undermine judicial independence.
He cites a famous case where Congress disagreed with a Supreme Court ruling invalidating a law, as
Congress did in the 1989 ruling in Texas v. Johnson that the First Amendment’s protection for freedom of
speech includes the right to burn an American flag. Congress responded by passing a new law banning flag
burning, acting on its different interpretation of the First Amendment.
The Court accepted the invitation to reconsider but then reaffirmed the Johnson ruling. Congress then took
no for an answer and stopped enacting statutes that it knew would be struck down. Eventually, the issue
died because Congress was not willing to insist on an all-out confrontation with the Supreme Court.
We could be headed in this direction, if Congress presses on with Aquino’s demand for a redefinition of
savings and the legalization of DAP.
In all likelihood, the SC will reaffirm its earlier ruling on the DAP.
Our childish president could insist on revising the Constitution so he can win the argument. Drilon and
Belmonte, for their own selfish reasons, may indulge him.
And public funds will be commandeered and impounded to raise the wherewithal to secure congressional
support. Legislators will join the battle as mercenaries fighting on Aquino’s side.
I think I already know on which side the public will stand in this fight. Most Filipinos are supremacists when it
comes to judicial supremacy. They believe in their Supreme Court.
Aquino is fighting a losing battle here because he is on the clock. He will be out of office by June 30, 2016.
In contrast, SC Justices will be around for much, much longer, until they are ready to retire.
Executive supremacy is a fight Aquino will have to fight alone. He cannot win this one.
yenmakabenta@yahoo.com

source:  Manila Times Column of Yen Makabenta

Rem Ramirez says:
September 2, 2014 at 9:44 pm
Judiciary interprets the Law; Legislative writes the Law; and, the Executive implements the Law.
What gives the Supreme Court ultimate power is that they can interpret a Law not only on “how the
Congress intended it to be written” but if such has been written in accordance with the Constitution.
While the President and the Congress can “work together and passed whatever new laws or repeal existing
laws”, Supreme Court holds the exclusive and final interpretation of any law by virtue of its “constitutionality”.
Pen is, indeed, mightier than the sword.
Posted 2nd September 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: Judicial Supremacy
 
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AUG

28

The disputed doctrine of judicial supremacy

THIS may disappoint some of my readers, or lead others to wonder whether I have abandoned constitutional
principles.
But in the interest of fairness and objectivity, I feel duty-bound to state that I do not believe the Supreme
Court’s decision on the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is the absolutely final word on the
subject, even though I have hailed it as a landmark ruling and a possible “tipping point” in national politics
and governance.
After the decision was handed down, I embarked on a search for authoritative materials that will shed light
on the issue. I did so out of both curiosity and skepticism, and the distant possibility that the court may revise
or reverse its ruling. Philconsa on judicial supremacy
When the president and chairman of the Philippine Constitution Association (Philconsa) — Rep. Martin
Romualdez and former presidential legal counsel Justice Manuel Lazaro — declared the other week that
there is such a thing as “judicial supremacy,” which should leave in no doubt the finality of the SC ruling, I
thought their opinion might render my research moot and academic.
My readings say otherwise, however. Indeed, the claim of supremacy only makes the matter more
debatable.
Constitution silent on SC as final arbiter
I began my research with Philippine sources, particularly the 1987 constitution and certain rulings of the SC.
The following points were quickly established:
First, The Constitution is silent on SC as final arbiter on judicial supremacy. The powers of the SC are
expressly enumerated in Section 5, Article VIII of the charter, and nowhere affirms either.
Second, The Constitution introduced some new provisions (as distinct from the 1935 and 1973
constitutions), notably The provision that judicial power now includes the duty of the Supreme Court not to
refuse to decide a case on the ground that the question or issue raised involves a political question.
Third, In his separate and dissenting opinion in the DAP case, Associate Justice Arturo Brion underscores
the importance of keeping all three branches of the government in balance. He wrote:
“While we have the duty to pass upon the validity of the DAP, we must, at the same time, do so fully aware
of the consequences of our decision. As I have said, the highest stakes are involved for the country…
“If the DAP is unconstitutional, then we should unequivocally so declare as we did in the PDAF case, but we
should do this with an eye on consciously protecting our institutions, whether they be executive, legislative
or judicial; we cannot aim to destroy or weaken, or impose the superiority that the Constitution did not grant
us. Our aim should be to maintain the balance intended by our Constitution, the guiding instrument that must
at all times reign supreme.”
“The superiority that the Constitution did not grant us” shows plainly that Justice Brion does not entertain any
claim of judicial supremacy for the High Court.
The US and judicial review
The Philconsa position is more widely discussed in American politics and US jurisprudence.
US chief justice John Marshall affirmed the judiciary’s leading role in interpreting laws and determining their
constitutionality with his court’s unanimous assertion of judicial review in Marbury v. Madison (1803).
First, the decision declared that “it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is.”
Second, it declared that the Supreme Court has the duty of weighing laws against the Constitution, and
invalidating those that are inconsistent with it.
In their authoritative book on the US Congress and its members (CQ Press, 2008), professors Roger
Davidson, Walter Oleszek and Frances Lee provide an informative discussion of judicial review and the
following findings:
1. Although since the US civil war, the Supreme Court has invalidated 159 congressional statutes, in whole
or in part, the court does not necessarily have the last word in saying what the law is. Its interpretation of
laws may be questioned and even reversed.
One study found that 121 of the court’s interpretive decisions had been overriden in the 1967-1990 period,
an average of ten per Congress.
2. The US high court is not the sole judge of what is or is not constitutional. Courts routinely accept customs
and practices developed by the other two branches. When courts do strike down an enactment, Congress
may turn around and pass laws that meet the court’s objections or achieve the same goal by different
means.
 
Judicial supremacy: A doctrine challenged
Turning now to the doctrine of judicial supremacy, there’s no question that it is widely popular in this country.
Most Filipinos look at the idea as reassuring.
The doctrine is of vital importance today, because many burning issues in our public life are hanging upon
the question of whether the Supreme Court can be challenged in its recent rulings on the constitutionality of
the DAP and PDAF. And whether the tag-team of President Aquino and Congress can legally clip the
powers of the SC.
In this light, judicial supremacy sounds like a neat solution. But significantly, there is much disagreement
over the doctrine.
Author William J. Watkins, Jr. writes: “JUDICIAL SUPREMACY IS THE gospel of modern American
constitutional law. It is the doctrine that the Supreme Court has the last word on most of the country’s
important issues from electing a president to campaign finance reform to treatment of the Guantanamo
detainees.”
Watkins reports that in recent years there have been few critics of judicial supremacy. When someone of
influence has questioned the doctrine, they have been excoriated in the media and academic press. For
example, when then-Attorney General Edwin Meese questioned the doctrine in 1986, academe all but called
for his political exile. Faced with criticism from left and right, Meese backpedaled.
Some American legal scholars have criticized judicial supremacy as a case of “judicial over-extension.”
Even more critical is Professor Larry D. Kramer, dean of the Stanford Law School, whose 2005 book, “The
People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review” (Oxford University Press, 2005) is a
comprehensive attack on the doctrine of judicial supremacy.
Kramer contends that the standard interpretation of Marbury that John Marshall declared the Court to be the
final arbiter of the Constitution is erroneous. At most, the Court may make reference to the Constitution
when deciding a case.
Had Marshall truly declared the Supreme Court to be the final arbiter, President Jefferson would likely have
had him sent to federal jail.
Jefferson denied that the judiciary was the final arbiter of the Constitution. To give any one “co-equal”
branch such a power would make it “despotic.” Of course, a final arbiter is needed if the branches cannot
reach an accommodation on certain issues. And for Jefferson this ultimate power resided in the people—the
ultimate sovereign in the American system.
A tripartite system: No one supreme
What emerged from my research is the fact that the contentions between the Supreme Court and Congress
and the Executive are even more intense in the US than here in the Philippines.
The tension between policymaking by lawmakers versus judge-made decisions is perennial.
The most sensible conclusion I reached is this:
The Judiciary, like congress and the president, is an important forum for resolving the political, social and
economic conflicts in Philippine society.
All three branches of government constantly interact to shape and influence the laws our people will live
under.
Through this process of interaction, says legal scholar Louis Fisher, “all three institutions are able to expose
weaknesses, hold excesses in check, and gradually forge a consensus on constitutional values.”
All this just brings us back to the premise where our political system begins. Ours is a system of three
separate powers and branches of government: the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
No branch is supreme over the others. And all must protect and obey the Constitution.
yenmakabenta@yahoo.com
 
source:  Manila Times Column of Yen Makabenta
Posted 28th August 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
AUG

25

Scrutinizing Sereno, one year after

If she learns from these 'rookie mistakes,' Sereno would be able to do more in the years to
come

18 years. President Aquino and Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno after her oath-taking on Aug 25, 2012. File photo by EPA
MANILA, Philippines - Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno is, in the words of retired Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban, “both an insider and outsider.” Sereno, who took her oath as
chief justice on August 25, 2012, had enough time “to know the internal dynamics, habits and
processes of the Supreme Court,” Panganiban said in a speech last year. Sereno, after all,
served for two years as an associate justice before taking on the highest post in the judiciary.

But she is also an outsider, given her short time in the SC, which would work to her advantage,
Panganiban added. She could “see afresh the judiciary, think outside the box and transform
the courts without being tied to past practices and traditions.”

As it turns out, this was a double-edged sword.

One year into her term as chief justice, Sereno, the first junior justice to be appointed to lead
the Court, is continuing earlier reforms in the institution, but it is far from easy. The pace has
been slow as she wades through difficult terrain in the hierarchy-steeped Court, meeting up
with strong resistance from some of her colleagues.

READ: Sereno is first female justice

Decentralization was a priority in Sereno’s reform agenda. She wanted to restore the regional
court administrator’s office (RCAO), which was launched in 2008, to make operations of the
court more efficient. Past chief justices, Reynato Puno and Renato Corona, were not keen on
this project as its initial implementation showed problems in the coordination between the
central court administrator’s office and RCAO; it also drew opposition from some court
employees in Cebu.

But Sereno erred when she unilaterally issued a resolution in November 2012 which ordered
the re-opening of RCAO under a new name, the Judiciary Decentralized Office. Justice
Teresita de Castro, who has been at odds with Sereno even before the latter became chief
justice, issued a memorandum saying that Sereno’s resolution did not reflect the views of the
en banc on the issue. De Castro said the en banc opposed RCAO’s restoration.

To avoid an impasse, the en banc decided to establish a committee that will study the re-
opening of RCAO. The project is on hold.

Other reforms appear to proceeding smoothly.

Under Sereno’s watch, the SC launched the electronic Court (eCourt) system in June, which
records information about cases, from the date they were filed to their status. The assignment
of cases is also done electronically. The eCourt is being pilot-tested at the Quezon City
regional trial court.

It was also under her term when the judicial affidavit rule – which aims to cut trial time by 50%
– was implemented, though it was developed during the time of her predecessor, impeached
Chief Justice Corona. The judicial affidavit rule will do away with direct testimonies and instead
use affidavits in criminal cases. It was modified, however, after the Prosecutors League of the
Philippines and the Department of Justice complained that the judicial affidavit rule would only
worsen the delay in the resolution of cases because prosecutors would still have to prepare
the affidavits.

Minority CJ?

When it comes to her voting record in high-profile cases, Sereno is often with the minority.

The status quo ante order that the High Court issued in the case of the Senior Citizens’ party-
list group in was enmeshed in a backdrop of internal fissure, one that has hounded Sereno
since her appointment as chief justice.
Sereno first issued a temporary restraining order stopping Comelec from proclaiming winning
party-list groups in May.

READ: SC reverses Comelec on Senior Citizens party-list

Reports said that Justice De Castro, however, only wanted the TRO to cover the Senior
Citizens party-list group and not other groups that also sought remedy from the Court after
they were disqualified by the poll body.

In a letter to Sereno, De Castro said that issuing a blanket TRO would “be deemed as an
overbroad restriction on the constitutional authority of the Comelec to proclaim winners in the
party-list elections.”

In Maliksi v. Saquilayan, Sereno was in the minority. The SC, voting 8-7 in April 2013, initially
upheld the Comelec decision declaring Homer Saquilayan as the rightful winner in the 2010
mayoralty elections in Imus, Cavite.

The poll body said Saquilayan beat Maliksi by 8,429 votes. Maliksi got 40,092 votes while
Saquilayan got 48,521 votes.

The SC changed its vote, however and granted the motion for reconsideration filed by
Saquilayan’s rival, Emmanuel Maliksi, Aquino’s party-mate in the Liberal party. In the final
decision, Sereno voted with the minority.

READ: SC flip-flops; Maliksi still mayor

In Atong Paglaum v. Comelec, Sereno also voted with the minority where the SC said not only
marginalized sectors could participate in the party-list system. The ruling paves the way for
national and regional political parties and organizations to register under the party-list system
and seek seats in Congress as long as they do not field candidates in legislative district
elections.

READ: SC shakes up party list in new verdict

The decision widened the playing field for groups that aimed to participate in the party-list
elections, but organizations representing marginalized sectors said it put them at a
disadvantage.

Voting with the minority, Sereno said the decision “may have further marginalized the already
marginalized and underrepresented of this country. In the guise of political plurality, it allows
national and regional parties or organizations to invade what is and should be constitutionally
and statutorily protected space."

Sereno was in the minority as well when the SC ruled against San Roque Power Corp in its
claim for a P560-million tax refund. The SC said the corporation should have waited for the
Bureau of Internal Revenue to first decide on the firm’s demand for a tax refund before going
to the Court of Tax Appeals in 2003. The High Court voted 9-4, with Sereno dissenting with
Justices Presbitero Velasco Jr., Jose Mendoza and Estela Perlas-Bernabe.

Being part of the minority is not new for Sereno – she is a known dissenter, her opinions laced
with frank and strong language.

READ: Justice Sereno: Defying tradition

But that was when she was a junior magistrate. Now that she is chief justice, even if she only
has one vote, as primus inter pares (first among equals), she’s expected to hold sway over the
court and establish near-consensus.

No predictability yet

A paramount measure of the Court’s unity is the quality of its decisions.

Sereno took on the High Court’s headship when it was reeling from criticisms that its decisions
lacked predictability and were heavily influenced by politics.

Under the time of Chief Justice Reynato Puno from 2007-2010, up until Corona’s short-lived
leadership, the SC flip-flopped on various cases – it changed its decision in the case of League
of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec thrice, where it initially ruled that the laws converting 16
towns into cities were unconstitutional.

READ: League of Cities finally recognizes 16 'unqualified' cities

The SC also reversed its decision on the constitutionality of declaring Dinagat islands as a
province. In another case, it made a turnaround when it exempted the judiciary from the
appointment ban in 2010, something it chastised the executive for in 1998 in De Castro v. JBC.

The Sereno court has its own share of flip-flops: in Maliksi v. Saquilayan, the SC, voting 8-7,
initially declared Homer Saquilayan as the rightful winner in the 2010 mayoralty elections in
Imus, Cavite. This was in March.

A month later, it changed its vote and granted the motion for reconsideration filed by
Saquilayan’s rival, Emmanuel Maliksi, who belongs to the Liberal party.

The SC also allowed the live coverage of the Ampatuan trial but reversed itself and granted the
motion for reconsideration filed by Andal Ampatuan Jr., one of the main suspects in the killing
of about 58 people in Maguindanao in 2009.

READ: SC flip-flops: No more live broadcast of Ampatuan trial

One case that does not involve flip-flopping but which cast a shadow on the integrity of the
Sereno court involved Justice Velasco’s son, Allan, who lost to Regina Reyes in the 2013
elections. Reyes defeated the younger Velasco for the post of representative of the lone
district of Marinduque.

Velasco questioned her citizenship before Comelec, which ruled in his favor. Comelec said
Reyes should be disqualified because she is an American citizen and has failed to meet the
one-year residency requirement for candidates. Reyes elevated the case to the High Court –
which acted immediately, voting 7-4-3 in favor of Comelec; Sereno was with the majority.

READ: Marinduque rep threatens to impeach Velasco

Critics said the SC lacked jurisdiction over the case, as it should have been resolved by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not by the High Court.

Sereno’s vote favoring Allan was seen as her way of strengthening her ties with his father and
have him as an ally amid the infighting in the SC.

READ: Dark clouds in the Supreme Court

Majority vote
The SC was not as split, however, in its decision invalidating the 2009 conferment of the
National Artist Award to comic strip artist and filmmaker Carlo J. Caparas, fashion designer
Jose “Pitoy” Moreno, theater artist Cecile Guidote-Alvarez and architect Francisco Mañosa.
The SC voted 12-1.

The SC also voted 13-2 when it upheld the constitutionality of the joint panel of the Department
of Justice and the Comelec which filed a case of electoral sabotage against former President
Arroyo.

The High Court has yet to decide on a slew of major cases.

It will be interesting to see if Sereno will be in the minority when the SC votes on the
constitutionality of the following: a. authority of the Department of Justice to issue hold
departure orders b. Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime law c. Republic Act 10354 or the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 d. Republic Act 9742 or the
Mining Act of 1995

These would also show how Sereno, Aquino’s first appointee in the High Tribunal, will vote on
cases that would impact the Aquino administration.

But one case has become urgent in the light of the multi-billion pork barrel scandal that has
shocked and angered the public—and Sereno is the justice assigned to the case. She
inherited it in 2010 when she was appointed to the Court.

READ: Pork for the President

The Malampaya fund case, which has been pending in the SC for 7 years, involves billions of
revenues from the Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, P900 million of which allegedly
went to a fake NGOs linked to Janet Lim-Napoles. The law provides a 60-40 revenue sharing
between the national government and Palawan in Malampaya, but Palawan’s share is now the
subject of the case. Petitioners headed by Puerto Princesa Bishop Pedro Dulay Arigo pressed
the SC to act on the case following the emergence of reports on the pork barrel scam.

Dulay and other petitioners have sought the abolition of Executive Order 386, which was
issued by President Arroyo in 2008. The order allowed the use of revenues from Malampaya
for development projects in Palawan.

Seniority and squabbling

Sereno had to fight fires early in her term as her bypassed more senior justices like De Castro,
Carpio, Roberto Abad, Arturo Brion and Presbitero Velasco. The four have been appointed to
the SC prior to Sereno, with Carpio being the most senior as he has been in the Court since
2001. Tradition dictates that seniority should be a prime consideration in choosing the head of
the judiciary.

Panganiban wrote in the Inquirer that he understands why the senior justices of the Supreme
Court are “disappointed, even dismayed, by the choice of a junior justice as the new chief. For
years, they have patiently lined up in faithful observance of the century-old tradition that only
the most senior and second most senior are chosen to lead the judiciary. Tradition, seniority
and rank are sacred in the judiciary, as they are in the military and in the Church.”

The reports on the tension within the Court ranged from justices not showing up during flag
ceremonies to skipping weekly lunches after their en banc meetings. For one, the SC en banc
wanted to have the results of the psychological exams of applicants for the post of chief justice
released to the respective aspirants following reports that Sereno recorded a low grade of “4.”
The psychological exam is a requirement of the Judicial and Bar Council, the body that
screens and vets nominees to judicial posts.

When she became the body’s head, Sereno reportedly proposed the removal of psychological
tests as a requirement to expedite the selection process of judges and justices.

Lawyer Rene Saguisag though said that this would have to change. “The initial cat fights and
intramural have been reduced but as the new kid on the block, the elders should discreetly
advise her, instead of showing her up in a shame campaign,” he told Rappler.

The polls show, however, an increase in public approval of Sereno.

According to the June 2013 Pulse Asia performance survey, Sereno’s approval rating
increased to 37% from 32% in March. Her predecessor, Corona, enjoyed a slightly higher
approval rating at 38% in his first year as chief justice but saw it dip to 14% in March 2012.
Sereno’s trust rating also rose to 38% in June from 29% in March.

‘Dignified silence’

As chief justice, Sereno’s first order of the day then was to bring back the SC to days of
“dignified silence,” when the justices were heard through their decisions and not through the
media.

READ: SC must return to dignified days of silence

While it was lauded by court observers, it caused problems when lack of media access led to
confusion in decisions. The Public Information Office, for one, erred in saying that a TRO
issued by the SC in a plunder case covers Arroyo.

In 2012, Sereno made UP law professor Theodore Te head of the SC PIO.

READ: Incoming SC spokesman on the Court's 'dignified silence'

The SC has now become more accessible. Its website has been revamped to include not only
the Court’s financial reports, which were first uploaded when Carpio was acting chief justice,
but also audio files of oral arguments. The SC en banc issued new guidelines for the release of
their SALNs. Once the requirements for the release of the public document have been met, the
justices would approve the release of their respective SALNs.

‘Rookie mistakes’

For Rose Beatrix Cruz-Angeles, former spokeswoman of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
one of the most important actions of the Sereno court, is the revision of the code of civil
procedure. “It’s conceived to shorten the proceedings,” she said.

Angeles added that the Court’s willingness, under Sereno’s leadership, to change its rules is
one of its strengths. Hence if one looks at the big picture, Angeles said Sereno’s mishaps do
not necessarily show weak leadership: “They are what we call 'rookie mistakes.'”

If she learns from them, Sereno would be able to do more in the years to come. Sereno is the
longest to serve under the 1987 Constitution at 18 years and also the youngest at 52. As
Angeles said, “Time is on her side.” - Rappler.com
 Posted 25th August 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
AUG

23

Natural Law in Consideration in Jurisprudence

Our natural Constitution

TO MY MIND, what ironically went below many people’s radar are the most damaging portions of
the April 8 Reproductive Health (RH) Law decision penned by Justice Jose Mendoza: “With respect
to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution.”

It then goes on to say: “While every law enacted by man emanated from what is
perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive
issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an
acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions
on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists
of the philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than
in the actual law of the past or present.”

“Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as
a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case cited by
the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.”

The foregoing, with all due respect, evokes a substantial misappreciation of

natural law. To say that “natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most
peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is
applicable” is itself contradicted by the ruling. Setting aside precisely the fact that
the Constitution is silent on the subject of contraception, Justice Mendoza himself
declares: “Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on
natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a
particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the
laws of men.“

The ruling also seems to be saying that our Constitution has no philosophy,
without history, and has vacuum as context.

Had the ruling been within the parameters of the US Constitution, the above
statements would be correct. US constitutional law places strict boundaries on the
US Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the US SC employed natural law in
a number of cases.

Our Supreme Court, on the other hand, has the power to strike down laws
considered done with grave abuse of discretion. This serves as basis for our
Supreme Court to examine the wisdom of a law (a power not normally given to
judicial bodies of other countries), whether the law is in conformity with reason,
and complies with the overall objectives of the Constitution.

Our Supreme Court itself knowingly employed the natural law (or reasoning
involving or related to it) in many past decisions. Our domestic laws, such as the
Civil Code, in fact contain provisions in which the natural law is expressly
mentioned. The international law system, which the Philippines is part of,
considers natural law as basis for determining whether other international law
norms (such as treaties) are valid, a fact constantly recognized by previous
Supreme Courts.

Instead, the present Supreme Court seemed to have mixed natural law with a
religious freedom argument, a point which Hugo Grotius (the father of
international law) sought to dispel: “Natural law would maintain its objective
validity even if we should assume the impossible, that there is no God or that he
does not care for human affairs.”

The saving grace in all this is found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Mariano Del
Castillo: the statements in the ruling quoted earlier “are not necessary in the
disposition of this case and appear to be an inaccurate description of natural law.
The Court need not foreclose the usefulness of natural law in resolving future
cases.”

Hopefully, Justice Del Castillo’s more considered statements could serve as an

opening for natural law to be considered in future cases, particularly on legislation
involving same-sex marriage, divorce, stem cells, and euthanasia -- all of which
the Constitution is silent on and for which only the natural law and the invocation
of the “common good” (found in the Preamble) stand as reasonable standards.

And, since natural law has been a part of our constitutional system, resort to it by
the Supreme Court can in no way be considered as “judicial activism.”

Finally, this also tells us that our political system is dominated almost exclusively
by “positivists” that ignore the culture, history, and philosophy upon which
Philippine society is based. There is therefore a need to work harder in correcting
this imbalance that has resulted in so much inconsistency in our legal system.

Jemy Gatdula specializes in international economic law (WTO and ASEAN), and
teaches international law and legal philosophy at the UA&P School of Law and
Governance.

jemygatdula@yahoo.com

www.jemygatdula.blogspot.com

source:  Businessworld 
Posted 23rd August 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
AUG

20

Civil Law: Trust Pursuit Rule

Third, there is a fundamental principle in agency that where certain property
entrusted to an agent and impressed by law with a trust in favor of the principal
is wrongfully diverted, such trust follows the property in the hands of a third person and
the principal is ordinarily entitled to pursue and recover it so long as the property can be
traced and identified, and no superior equities have intervened.  This principle is actually
one of trusts, since the wrongful conversion gives rise to a constructive trust which
pursues the property, its product or proceeds, and permits the beneficiary to recover the
property or obtain damages for the wrongful conversion of the property.  Aptly called the
“trust pursuit rule,” it applies when a constructive or resulting trust has once affixed
itself to property in a certain state or form.[74] 

Hence, a trust will follow the property – through all changes in its state and form as
long as such property, its products or its proceeds, are capable of identification, even into
the hands of a transferee other than a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution will be
enforced at the election of the beneficiary through recourse against the trustee or the
transferee personally.  This is grounded on the principle in property law that ownership
continues and can be asserted by the true owner against any withholding of the object to
which the ownership pertains, whether such object of the ownership is found in the hands
of an original owner or a transferee, or in a different form, as long as it can be identified.
[75]
  Accordingly, the person to whom is made a transfer of trust property constituting a
wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of the trust, when not protected as
a bona fide purchaser for value, is himself liable and accountable as a constructive
trustee.  The liability attaches at the moment of the transfer of trust property and
continues until there is full restoration to the beneficiary. Thus, the transferee is charged
with, and can be held to the performance of the trust, equally with the original trustee,
and he can be compelled to execute a reconveyance.[76] 

This scenario is characteristic of a constructive trust imposed by Article 1456 [77] of

the Civil Code, which impresses upon a person obtaining property through mistake or
fraud the status of an implied trustee for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.  Petitioner, in laying claim against respondents who are concededly
transferees who professed having validly derived their ownership from Roberto, is in
effect enforcing against respondents a constructive trust relation that arose by virtue of
the wrongful and fraudulent transfer to them of the subject properties by Roberto.

source:  CABACUNGAN vs LAIGO, et al, G.R. No. 175073 (August 15, 2011)

Posted 20th August 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
AUG

Doctrine of Representation

In an agent-principal relationship, the personality of the

principal is extended through the facility of the agent. In so
doing, the agent, by legal fiction, becomes the principal,
authorized to perform all acts which the latter would have him
do. Such a relationship can only be effected with the consent
of the principal, which must not, in any way, be compelled by
law or by any court.

source: 
G.R. No. 76931 May 29, 1991

ORIENT AIR SERVICES & HOTEL REPRESENTATIVES, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN AIR-LINES INCORPORATED, respondents.

Posted 5th August 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
AUG

Principle in Interpreting a Contract

It is a well settled legal principle that in the interpretation of a contract, the
entirety thereof must be taken into consideration to ascertain the meaning of its
provisions. 12 The various stipulations in the contract must be read together to
give effect to all.

... any ambiguity in this "contract of adhesion" is to be taken "contra

proferentem", i.e., construed against the party who caused the ambiguity and
could have avoided it by the exercise of a little more care. Thus, Article 1377 of
the Civil Code provides that the interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity. 14  

To put it differently, when several interpretations of a provision are otherwise

equally proper, that interpretation or construction is to be adopted which is most
favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made and who did not
cause the ambiguity.

source: 

G.R. No. 76931 May 29, 1991

ORIENT AIR SERVICES & HOTEL REPRESENTATIVES, petitioner, 
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AMERICAN AIR-LINES INCORPORATED, respondents.

Posted 5th August 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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MAY

28

Doctrine of Lack of Capacity to Sue

The doctrine of lack of capacity to sue based on the failure to acquire a local license is based on
considerations of sound public policy.The license requirement was imposed to subject the foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines to the jurisdiction of its courts. This was never intended to favor
domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms and then repudiate their
obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to do business in this country. - Marshall-Wells Co. v.
Elser and Co., G.R. No. 22015, 1 September 1924, 46 Phil. 71

... If, on the other hand, the foreign corporation is not doing business in the Philippines, it does not need a
license to sue before Philippine courts, This is so because what the law prevents is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without a license from gaining access to Philippine courts.5 It is not
therefore the absence of the prescribed license, but "doing business" in the Philippines without the proper
license which bars the foreign corporation from gaining access to Philippine courts. In other words, although
a foreign corporation has no license to do business in the Philippines, it does not necessarily follow that it
has no capacity to bring an action because a license is not necessary if the foreign corporation is not doing
business in the Philippines.

* A Branch Office of a foreign corporation "carries out the business activities of the head office and
derives income from the host country." (Section l(c) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Foreign Investments Act (R.A. 7042).

* A Representative or Liaison Office of a foreign corporation "deals directly, with the clients of the of
the parent company but does not derive income from the host country and is fully subsidized by its
heal office. It undertakes activities such as but not limited to information dissemination and
promotion of the company's products as well as quality control of products."

source:  http://www.sec.gov.ph/investorinfo/opinions/ogc/cy%202013/13-02.pdf
Posted 28th May 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
MAR

20

Tax Refund: 2 years Prescriptive Period

SUMMARY:

1. Section 112(A) of the Tax Code - claim for refund of excessively paid input VAT
2. claim for excess input VAT should be filed within two years from the close of the taxable quarter
when the sales were made
3. when to reckon the two-year prescriptive period, in a 2013 Decision, SC already drew a distinction
between claims for refund under Section 112(A) and Section 229 of the Tax Code
4. Section 112(A) applies in the case of a taxpayer who is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-
rated sales. 
5. By contrast, Section 229 may still apply to a refund of input VAT, but only in cases where the amount
is excessively or wrongfully collected.
6. The prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for refund for erroneously paid tax (including
erroneously paid input VAT, if applicable) under Section 229 is two years from the date of the
erroneous payment. 
7. Sec 112 (A):  Administrative Claim = 2-year period reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the zero-rated sales were made. Consequently, an appeal or judicial claim before CTA may
still be filed outside of the two-year period.  
8. Sec 112 (A):  Judicial Claims = taxpayer may file an appeal to the CTA under 2 scenarios, i.e., in
case of a denial of the claim for refund or due to inaction by the BIR Commissioner. The Supreme
Court also explained the remedies of a taxpayer as consisting of: 1) filing a judicial claim with the
CTA within 30 days from receipt of the denial by the BIR Commissioner, or (2) filing the judicial claim
within 30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period in case of inaction by the BIR
Commissioner.
9. The 30-day period mentioned under the 2 scenarios is mandatory and jurisdictional 
10. An appeal before the expiration of the 120-day period in the 2nd scenario is likewise prejudicial to
the claim
 
Section 112(A) of the Tax Code

"any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years
after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit
certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales."
Supplemented by Section 112(C)
"the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax
refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application, the taxpayer
affected may, within thirty (30) days, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax
Appeals."
 

Right Timing

THERE is great truth in the biblical passage about there being a time for everything, and a season for every
activity under the heavens. This also applies to tax refund claims in the Philippines.

Tax refunds are based on the general premise that taxes have either been erroneously or excessively paid.
Though the Tax Code recognizes the right of taxpayers to request the return of such excess/erroneous
payments from the government, they must do so within a prescribed period.

Not a few have expressed the sentiment that obtaining tax refunds from the Philippine government is a
difficult and drawn-out process. Often, it leads to failure due to confusion in terms of the prescriptive period
for filing such claims.

Take, for instance, the claim for refund of excessively paid input value-added taxes (input VAT). Cursorily,
the relevant provision under Section 112(A) of the Tax Code seems simple enough. It states that "any VAT-
registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or
refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales."

The above is supplemented by Section 112(C) of the same Code, which provides that "the Commissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of
submission of complete documents. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or
the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty
(30) days, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals."

Easily, taxpayers can discern from reading Section 112 that the claim for excess input VAT should be filed
within two years from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made; otherwise, the right to
claim for refund becomes invalid. In the past, however, the two-year period was interpreted by the courts to
cover both administrative and judicial claims. The evolution of case law, particularly Supreme Court
decisions, in interpreting the prescriptive period has, in large part, added to the confusion on when and
where to file the claim for refund.

To clarify the fundamental question of when to reckon the two-year prescriptive period, in a decision
promulgated early last year, the Supreme Court already drew a distinction between claims for refund under
Section 112(A) and Section 229 of the Tax Code. Generally, claims for excess input VAT would fall under
Section 112(A). The input VAT covered under that section is the correct and proper amount. However, it
contemplates a situation where the input VAT available as credit exceeds the output VAT payable.
Thus, Section 112(A) applies in the case of a taxpayer who is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
sales. By contrast, Section 229 may still apply to a refund of input VAT, but only in cases where the amount
is excessively or wrongfully collected. This means that the taxpayer paid more than what is legally due.

Proceeding from the foregoing discussion, the prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for refund for
erroneously paid tax (including erroneously paid input VAT, if applicable) under Section 229 is two years
from the date of the erroneous payment. In contrast, the two-year period under Section 112(A) covers only
the administrative claim filed with the BIR; it excludes the judicial claim. This two-year period is reckoned
from the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated sales were made. Consequently, an appeal or
judicial claim before the Court of Tax Appeals ("CTA") may still be filed outside of the two-year period.

For judicial claims filed under Section 112(A), the taxpayer may file an appeal to the CTA under two
scenarios, i.e., in case of a denial of the claim for refund or due to inaction by the BIR Commissioner. The
Supreme Court also explained the remedies of a taxpayer as consisting of: 1) filing a judicial claim with the
CTA within 30 days from receipt of the denial by the BIR Commissioner, or (2) filing the judicial claim within
30 days from the expiration of the 120-day period in case of inaction by the BIR Commissioner.

The 30-day period mentioned under the two scenarios is mandatory and jurisdictional; this means that the
filing of the appeal with the CTA beyond this prescribed period is fatal to the claim. In the same manner,
filing of an appeal before the expiration of the 120-day period in the second scenario is likewise prejudicial to
the claim.

The above doctrine was reiterated by the Supreme Court in another decision promulgated early this year.

Hopefully, the consistency of these last two decisions can be taken as a sign of stability in the application of
the prescriptive periods in claiming input VAT refunds. Consistency in interpreting Tax Code provisions is an
important attribute inherent in the right to claim tax refunds. Otherwise, it would just negate the fundamental
principle of fairness in taxation.

The author is a senior manager at the tax services department of Isla Lipana & Co., the Philippine member
firm of the PwC network. Readers may call (02) 845-2728 or e-mail the author
at susan.m.aquino@ph.pwc.com for questions or feedback. The views or opinions presented in this article
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of Isla Lipana & Co. The firm will not
accept any liability arising from the article.

source:  Businessworld
Posted 20th March 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
Labels: Section 112 Section 229 Tax Refund
 

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
FEB

24

International Doctrine of Pacta Sunt Servanda

Deutsche Bank wins tax case ‘with finality’ vs BIR
The Supreme Court (SC) has upheld with finality the tax-treaty relief of Deutsche Bank AG Manila branch. It
was, thus, cleared to collect refund from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
In the Entry of Judgment dated January 24, 2014, the SC First Division denied “with finality” a motion for
reconsideration filed by the BIR on the High Court’s decision, dated August 19, 2013, granting tax-treaty
relief to Deutsche Bank.

The SC ordered the “respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund or issue a tax credit certificate
in favor of petitioner Deutsche the amount of P22.562 million, representing the erroneously paid BPRT
[branch profits remittance tax ] for 2002 and prior taxable years.”

SC’s decision should prompt the Philippines to start honoring international agreements and stop the BIR’s
practice of consistently denying tax-treaty relief applications on the grounds of noncompliance of the 15-day-
period requirement.

The case stemmed from global financial-services provider Deutsche Bank’s initial noncompliance with the
BIR procedure under Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) 01-2000, requiring that an application to claim
tax treaty benefits should be filed at least 15 days prior to a transaction.

The SC nullified the rule in RMO 072-2010, which contends that failure to file a tax treaty relief application
within the prescribed period will result in its disqualification.

The High Tribunal explained that the BIR must not impose additional requirements that would negate access
to relief as provided under international agreements.

The SC held that the period of application of tax treaty compliance as outlined in RMO 01-2000 should not
operate to divest entitlement to the relief.

It added that to deny access would constitute a violation of the time-honored international doctrine of
pactasuntservanda (Latin for “agreements must be kept”) whereby agreeing states or nations comply in
good faith with their treaty obligations.

The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over administrative rules and procedural
requirements.

source:   Business Mirror

Posted 24th February 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
FEB

24
 Doctrine of Absolute Privileged Communication and Qualifiedly Privileged
Communications
NCC, Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even
if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or
other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions.

There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory imputation, where there is no
showing of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation.

11. The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly privileged communications. The
enumeration under said article is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications
since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. They are known as qualifiedly
privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of actual
malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In other words, defamatory imputations
written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged communications enumerated above
– (1) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions; and (3) fair commentaries on matters of public interest – may still be considered actionable if
actual malice is proven. This is in contrast with absolutely privileged communications, wherein the
imputations are not actionable, even if attended by actual malice:

12. A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even if its author has
acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their
functions as such, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and
allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the
hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded
to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon
the other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing
defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith.

source:  http://attylaserna.blogspot.com/2010/01/malice-and-damages.html
Posted 24th February 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
FEB

24

Doctrine of Libelous Speech

Libel - Guingguing vs CA, G.R. No. 128959 (September 30, 2005)

Criminal libel laws present a special problem. At face value, they might strike as laws passed that
abridge the freedom of speech, expression, or the press. Whatever seeming conflict between these two
precepts has long been judicially resolved with the doctrine that libelous speech does not fall within the
ambit of constitutional protection. Nonetheless, in ascertaining what class of materials may be considered as
libelous, the freedom of expression clause, its purposes as well as the evils it guards against, warrant
primordial consideration and application.
Posted 24th February 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
FEB

23

NCC - Art 19 : Principle of Abuse of Rights

Libel - Yuchengco vs The Manila Chronicle, G.R. No. 184315 (November 28, 2011)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE

OF RIGHTS, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights,
but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to
give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed.  A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.  When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.   But
while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. [1][19]

 xxx
 
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under
Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
 
xxx
 
Such damages may be awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s anguish. Further, converse to
Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument, although petitioner is claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil
Code, still such violations directly resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in the newspaper, which, by
analogy, is one of the ground for the recovery of moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.
 

Posted 23rd February 2014 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
DEC

28

Willful Blindness Doctrine - People v. Gloria Kintanar (CTA EB Crim. No.

006, Dec. 3, 2010)
The Supreme Court recently introduced the "Doctrine of Willful Blindness" in a landmark tax evasion case
decided in year 2012. Under this doctrine, the taxpayer’s deliberate refusal or avoidance to verify the
contents of his or her ITR and other documents constitutes "willful blindness" on his or her part. It is by
reason of this doctrine that taxpayers cannot simply invoke reliance on mere representations of their
accountants or authorized representatives in order to avoid liability for failure to pay the correct taxes.

As they say, "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith." In order to be liable, it is
enough that the taxpayer knows his or her obligation to file the required return and he has failed to comply
thereto in the manner required by law.

Evidently, it is imperative for individual taxpayers like professionals to be knowledgeable with their tax
obligations, to be compliant with tax rules and regulations, and to be responsible for all information reported
in his or her ITR.

And as previously mentioned, the "Doctrine of Willful Blindness" is already part of our jurisprudence, and it
can be used as a precedent for future tax evasion cases.

----------------

Willful blindness doctrine by: Maridelle M. Ramos (Punongbayan & Araullo)

MERE RELIANCE on another person in preparing, filing and paying income taxes is not a justification for
failure to file the right information on income taxes.

In People v. Gloria Kintanar (CTA EB Crim. No. 006, Dec. 3, 2010), Ms. Kintanar was charged with failure to
make or file her income tax returns (ITR), violating Section 255 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC), as amended. She claimed that she did not actively participate in the filing of her joint ITR with her
husband since she entrusted such duty to the latter who, in turn, hired an accountant to perform their tax
responsibilities. She testified that she did not know how much her tax obligation was; nor did she bother to
inquire or determine the facts surrounding the filing of her ITRs. Despite several notices and subpoena
received by the accused, only an unsupported protest letter made by her husband was filed with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR). The Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc found her neglect or omission
tantamount to “deliberate ignorance” or “conscious avoidance”. As an experienced businesswoman, her
reliance on her husband to file the required ITR without ensuring its full compliance showed clear indication
of deliberate lack of concern on her part to perform her tax obligations. This ruling was sustained by the
Supreme Court (SC) in 2012.

Based on the foregoing, the willful blindness doctrine was applied by the CTA, as sustained by SC on cases
where there is a natural presumption that the taxpayer knows his/her tax obligations under the law
considering the factual circumstances of the case, such as being a businesswoman or official of a company.
This case set a precedent that mere reliance on a representative or agent (i.e., accountant or husband) is
not a valid ground to justify any noncompliance in tax obligations. The taxpayer must inquire, check and
validate whether or not his/her representative or agent has complied with the taxpayer’s tax responsibilities.

However, in the recent case of People v. Judy Ann Santos (CTA Crim. Case no. 012, Jan. 16, 2013), the
CTA Division seemed to have a change of heart and acquitted Ms. Santos despite having almost the same
circumstances as that of the case of Ms. Kintanar. In this case, Ms. Santos was accused of failure to supply
correct and accurate information in her ITR. She claimed that by virtue of trust, respect and confidence, she
has entrusted her professional, financial and tax responsibilities to her manager since she was 12 years old.
She participated and maintained her intention to settle the case, and thus provided all the documents
needed as well as payment of her taxes. The element of willfulness was not established and the CTA found
her to be merely negligent. The CTA also noted the intention of Ms. Santos to settle the case, which negates
any motive to commit fraud. This was affirmed by the SC in its resolution issued April 2013.

THE DIFFERENCES

“Willful blindness” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “deliberate avoidance of knowledge of a crime,
especially by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing, despite being aware that it
is highly probable.” A “willful act” is described as one done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse.

“Willful” in tax crimes means voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty, and bad faith or bad
purpose need not be shown. It is a state of mind that may be inferred from the circumstances of the case;
thus, proof of willfulness may be, and usually is, shown by circumstantial evidence alone. Therefore, to
convict the accused for willful failure to file ITR or submit accurate information, it must be shown that the
accused was (1) aware of his/her obligation to file annual ITR or submit accurate information, but that (2)
he/she, or his/her supposed agent, nevertheless voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally failed to file the
required ret urns or submit accurate information. Bad faith or intent to defraud need not be shown.

As can be observed in the first case, the accused knew that she had to timely file and supply correct and
accurate information of the joint ITR with the BIR in relation to the profession or the position she holds. The
knowledge was presumed based on the fact that Ms. Kintanar is an “experienced” businesswoman, having
been an independent distributor of a product for several years. However, despite this knowledge, the CTA
found that she voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally failed to fulfill her tax responsibilities by not
participating in the filing of the ITR and ensuring that everything was filed correctly and accurately. As
compared with the Santos case, which the SC affirmed, the element of “voluntarily, knowingly and
intentionally” was taken differently by the CTA in consideration of the facts of the case. Ms. Santos fully
entrusted her tax obligations and finances to her manager since she was a child. It can be said that she is
not an “experienced” manager of her finances and taxes since she never handled such task, as compared
with the situation of Ms. Kintanar, who is considered an experienced businesswoman who manages her
business as well as her financial and tax responsibilities -- which is expected of somebody in her position
(i.e., president and/or businessperson).
The concept of willful blindness doctrine is new in Philippine jurisprudence. The application of this doctrine
by the CTA in the said cases was guided by the appreciation of the facts and the pieces of evidence
produced by the prosecution and accused to prove the non-existence of willfulness. However, defined and
clear standards in its application must be done as guidance for future application. This is necessary to avoid
arbitrary application and to encourage proper use of the doctrine by both parties in the case.

Posted 28th December 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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
NOV

11

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Doctrine of Operative Fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality
that produces consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored
or disregarded. In short it nullifies the law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that
a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
source:  En banc Decision on LGU Share on National Taxes - Mandanas vs Ochoa, GR 199802 (2018)

THE ADAGE that "nothing is constant except change" holds most true for tax rules and regulations. We, as
taxpayers, have to be constantly vigilant not just of changing rules and regulations but of changing
interpretations of old rules and regulations. Most of us are now reeling from the realization that some
practices that we hold sacrosanct are actually erroneous interpretations of the Tax Code.

One case in point is the practice relevant to the filing of the judicial claim for refund of input value-added tax
(VAT). Prior to Oct. 6, 2010, taxpayers would rush to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to file the judicial claim
for refund prior to the lapse of the two-year period believing that the prescriptive period is mandatory and
jurisdictional.

However, said practice was struck down by the Supreme Court (SC) in the Aichi case where it declared that
the judicial claim for input VAT refund does not follow the two-year prescriptive period but the 120+30-days
rule. In the Aichi case, the SC held that the taxpayers must file the judicial claim within 30 days from the
issuance of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) decision or after the lapse of 120 days in case of inaction
by the BIR. Thus, the prior practice of filing the judicial claim within the two-year period was held in most
cases as either premature or delayed. As a result, a number of pending CTA cases have been denied for
failure to observe the 120+30-days rule. This meant loss of millions of pesos for some taxpayers.

The Aichi case was further reiterated in the consolidated cases of San Roque, Taganito and Philex, which
were decided by the SC on Feb. 12 this year. As expected, the parties filed a motion for reconsideration.

In its motion, San Roque Power Corp. prayed that the new 120+30-day rule be given only a prospective
effect, arguing that the manner by which the BIR and the CTA actually treated the 120+30-days periods prior
to the controversial Aichi decision constitutes an operative fact, the effects and consequences of which
cannot be erased or undone.

Deciding on the case, the SC denied the motion for reconsideration on Oct. 8, 2013. It held that the doctrine
of operative fact does not apply in this case.

Under the general rule, a void law or an administrative act cannot be the source of legal rights or duties.
However, the doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule. Under the doctrine, a judicial
declaration of invalidity may not necessarily eliminate all the effects and consequences of a void act prior to
such declaration.

Prior to the declaration of nullity, such challenged legislative or executive act must have been in force and
had to be complied with as they were presumed to be valid. Only the courts can declare a law invalid, and
without such declaration, taxpayers would have had no other choice but to follow the existing rules or in this
case the practice of filing the judicial claim within the two-year period.
In rejecting the application of the doctrine of operative fact, the SC emphasized that there must be a law or
executive issuance that is invalidated by the court for the doctrine to apply. In the present case, however,
there is no such law or executive issuance that has been invalidated. What were held erroneous were the
BIR and the CTA’s actual practice of not observing and requiring taxpayers to comply with the 120- and 30-
day periods.

The SC reiterated that the 120- and 30-day rules are in accordance with Section 112(C) of the Tax Code
and must be applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. The taxpayer cannot simply
file a petition with the CTA as there will be no decision or deemed denial decision by the BIR Commissioner
for the CTA to review.

The SC’s decision emphasized that tax refunds are construed strictly against the taxpayers. Therefore,
taxpayers should now be able to interpret tax laws and regulations and not just rely on the existing practices
upheld by the BIR and the CTA. We should now meticulously examine every law and regulation as if we are
the SC and anticipate if the current practice runs counter to the strict interpretation of the law. And if we have
somehow decided that the current interpretation is incorrect, we must now bravely go where others have not
dared tread and pray most heartily that our interpretation will be upheld by the SC. Such daunting burden we
all must face every day as we diligently pay our taxes and painstakingly seek our refunds.

The author is a head of the tax advisory & compliance division of Punongbayan & Araullo. P&A is a member
firm within Grant Thornton International Ltd.

source:  Businessworld
Posted 11th November 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
OCT

20

Filipino justice—from concept to practice

Interesting, challenging and at times intriguing were the readers’ replies to the query I posed last Sunday on
whether our present justice system reflects the Filipino concept of justice articulated by Dean Jose Manuel I.
Diokno. These replies were posted on this paper’s website (www.inquirer.net). More numerous and many
from abroad were those e-mailed directly to me. They could fill up several columns. For all these, I am
grateful.

Ferdinand and Cory. Meanwhile, as promised, let me take up Dean Diokno’s answer to the query. He began
with a brief history of our judiciary, from the 1936 Constitution which required jurists to be appointed by the
president with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.

He rued that when martial law was imposed in 1972, the judiciary’s independence suffered three
“assaults”—(1) at the beginning of the iron rule, all judges were required to resign; (2) then, under the 1973
Constitution, they were authorized to “continue in office until they reach[ed] the age of 70 unless sooner
replaced” by law or presidential decree; and (3) the Judiciary Act of 1980 allowed President Ferdinand
Marcos to remove judges perceived to be against his regime.

After the fall of Marcos, President Cory Aquino purged the judiciary of “many judges identified with Marcos.”
The 1987 Constitution tried to restore judicial independence by vetting judicial nominations via the newly-
conceived Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

However, Diokno grieved that the JBC “has not lived up to its intended purpose. Judges who had been
purged by President Aquino managed to find their way back into the judiciary… Judges who applied for
promotion often spoke of the need for political backers.”

SALNs and PDS. He lamented that during the last 20 years, the “Supreme Court has made it very difficult to
obtain the SALNs (Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth) of justices and judges by imposing
additional conditions for access not found in the SALN laws (RA 3019 and 6713).”

May I, however, interject that on June 11, 2013, the Court granted the request of the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) and authorized the release to PCIJ of the SALNs and Personal Data Sheets
(PDS) of all sitting justices from their appointment to 2011.

Veering to another topic, Diokno said the Court “disturbed a basic, time-honored principle—immutability of
final judgments… in the ‘Sixteen Cities’ case… and soon spread to other cases… The demolition of the
immutability of final judgments doctrine… was institutionalized by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court
promulgated on May 4, 2010, (specifically) Section 3 of Rule 15” allowing second motions for
reconsideration under certain conditions.

Diokno also decried “congestion and delay in our courts,” noting “that 26 percent of our courts—more than
one out of every four courts—have no judges… The problem is compounded by the cumbersome court
procedures which we took from the United States and which were designed for a jury system when we have
no juries here… Isn’t it about time that we develop[ed] court rules that are consistent with the Filipino
concept of justice?” 

He also criticized “chambers practice” in which cases are sometimes decided via the “old boys” network,
political connections, school chums, relatives and friends. To avoid this, he proposed that justices and
judges be “required to disclose their clients and other potential conflicts of interest.”

Still hopeful. Though he believed the judiciary had not lived up to the Filipino concept of justice, Diokno was
still hopeful of the reforms proposed by the Supreme Court. He recalled that in 1981, “Ka Pepe submitted an
amicus curiae memorandum to the Supreme Court in De La Llana vs Alba (March 12, 1982), involving the
constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (BP 129). What he said 21 years ago about the
judiciary—on who is to blame for its sorry state—still holds true today:

“‘One last word… [C]ounsel had laid the blame for the sorry state of the Judiciary mainly on the policies of
the present regime and partly on some acts of members of the Court.  But they are not alone to blame… We
… all must bear some share of responsibility … for the present situation. Because by act or omission, at one
time or another, we have all contributed to it;  most of us by unnecessary delays, some in more
reprehensible ways, and all by not speaking out as often and as forcefully as we could…’

“That is why I have chosen to focus my attention on this subject. The problems and prospects of the
Philippine Judiciary are actually a challenge not only to my generation but to succeeding generations of
Filipino lawyers.

“But can we really expect genuine changes to take place in our lifetime?”

Concluding his thesis, Diokno remained hopeful: “I will leave you as I started, with the words of Ka Pepe: ‘If
you mean meet completely and immediately, they are. But only yesterday in world time, it was thought
impossible to land on the moon. And not too long ago, Aristotle—one of the wisest of men—justified slavery
as natural and listed torture as a source of evidence. Standards thought too high today may well turn out to
be too low tomorrow. But whether they do so or not is not really important. What Nikos Kazantzakis said of
freedom can be said of justice: the superior virtue is not to receive justice, it is to fight relentlessly for it—to
struggle for justice in time, yet under the aspect of eternity.’”
* * *
Comments to chiefjusticepanganiban@hotmail.com

Source:  Philippine Daily Inquirer Column of Former CJ Artemio V. Panganiban

Posted 20th October 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
AUG

21

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Doctrine of Operative Fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality
that produces consequences that cannot always be erased, ignored
or disregarded. In short it nullifies the law or executive act but
sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that
a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
source:  En banc Decision on LGU Share on National Taxes - Mandanas vs Ochoa, GR 199802 (2018)

Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair
play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional.
[1]
 The Supreme Court stated in Planters Products, Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation,[2] that:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and
affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not
been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded
in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is
supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.
The "operative fact" doctrine realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness and
resulting unfairness must be avoided. [3] In a labor case involving the computation of holiday pay, the court
held that it is "now almost the end of 1991 . . and [t]o require various companies to reach back to 1975 now
and nullify acts done in good faith is unduly harsh. [4]
source:  http://wiki.lawcenter.ph/index.php?title=Operative_fact_doctrine 

Posted 21st August 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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
AUG

21

RA 386, Article 429: Doctrine of Self-Help

RA 386, Article 429
The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and
disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or
prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property. (n)

Reference Case:  People vs Depante, C.A., 58 O.G. 926

Tolentino's Comment (Vl II, p54, citing 3-1 Ennecerrus, Kipp & Wolff 92-93):
If the propety is immovable, there should be no delay in the use of force to recover it; a delay, even if
excusable, such as when is due to the ignorance of the dispossession, will bar the right to the use of force.

Once the usurper's possession has become firm by the lapse of time,  the lawful possessor must resort to
the competent authority to recover his property."

Principle of Self-Help:  GermanManagement Services, Inc.  vs CA, G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
Posted 21st August 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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
JUL

Writ of Habeas Data

Death threat and resort to the Writ of Habeas Data
 
I was one of those who filed yesterday a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against
Commission on Elections Chairman Sixto Brilliantes and Deputy Presidential Mouth Abigal Valte.  I decided
to join the petition because last Monday, my law office received a registered mail which contained a letter
threatening my life. The letter asked me not to “allow myself to be used ” and to” refrain from wasting my
intelligence”. It was signed by the “Rodante Untal Command” which purportedly is part of the New People’s
Army.

I do not know who sent the letter. I can think of no less than four sensitive cases that I am involved with that
could have occasioned the treat. There’s the Ampatuan massacre case, the Gerry Ortega murder case, the
Evangelista torture case, and the murder case of Manolo Daza, brother of former Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza. And yet, despite the fact that the threat may have come from anyone connected with any of these
cases, I opted to join the Habeas Data petition against the Comelec, if only to eliminate the poll body as
being the source of this latest threat to my life and security.

The writ of habeas data was enacted by the Supreme Court under then Chief Justice Reynato Puno
as a means of utilizing the Court’s rule-making powers to protect and promote the right to life. It was
promulgated by the Supreme Court after it declared “all branches of government to be in breach of the duty
to protect and promote the right to life”. This right is undoubtedly the most important of all rights since
without it, no exercise of any other human right could be possible. It was intended  “for people whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee,  x x x engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”. The relief that may be ordered  when the
writ is issued includes: “updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of”.

I suspect both Brilliantes and Valte as among those behind the threat because both have made   statements
to the media acknowledging the use of no less than P30 million in intelligence funds   to “surveil election
saboteurs” such as the AES Watch. I am a founding convenor of this group. Said Brillantes to the media :
“Bakit sila matatakot kung wala silang ginawang masama? Talaga namang ginagamit ang intel fund sa mga
nagsasabotahe ng election” or only to those out to sabotage the polls. “Kapag natatakot sila, ibig sabihin
meron sila sigurong ginagawang masama”. Later Brilliantes added: “They made our life difficult. Now, they
should watch out how I get payback“.

Valte for her part, confirmed that it was the President that gave Comelec the P30 million in intelligence fund:
“The justification is supposed to be utilized for intelligence, counter-intelligence activities and gathering of
information relative to the activities of certain groups, individuals and technology experts suspected of
conducting overt and covert operations to sabotage the results of the elections.”

I repeat, I do not have evidence on who was responsible for the latest threat on my life. But because I
consider this as serious, lest I end up as part of the growing statistics of victims of extra-legal killings, I   filed
the petition to narrow down the possibilities.

Under the writ, I hope to obtain the information gathered by the COMELEC, which prompted Brilliantes to
label  us in AES watch as a group of “saboteurs”. Note that Brilliantes has also said that he will expose the
groups behind us. He has never made that disclosure. Meanwhile, I am entitled to know exactly what
information the Comelec  has to rule out the possibility that the COMELEC or Valte is responsible for the
latest threat against me.

In any case, I would like to assure everyone that since the time we filed our petition impugning the
constitutionality of the use of the precinct count optical scan machines in 2009, we have been guided solely
by the concern that the chosen automated election system, the PCOS,  violates the constitutional right to
secret voting and public counting. Our concern currently is unless the safeguards provided by law are
complied with, to wit: examination of the source code, use of digital signatures, and enabling vote
verification,  are implemented by the Comelec; the right of the people to a clean elections would be the
subject of continuing violation. For what it is worth, the contractor, Smartmatic, had already earned its  
profit.  Presumably, all those who made money from the use of the PCOS have also already cashed in. Isn’t
it time now that the voters are accorded their right to public counting of their ballots?
I do not know how the Supreme Court will resolve the petition. All that I can do as one whose life and
security is  under threat is to avail of all legal remedies to protect my rights.

I leave the rest to God.

source:  Manila Standard's Column of Atty Harry Roque, Jr.

Posted 6th July 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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 
JUN

19

SC justice chides MT senior reporter

[Supreme Court Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen addresses the letter below to Jomar Canlas, one
of our senior reporters.]

I refer to your article, “SC Justice slammed for misbehavior,” which appeared in the online edition of The
Manila Times on June 16, 2013, and on the front page of the broadsheet edition on June 17, 2013. It is
unfortunate that the article is inaccurate and a misrepresentation of the events that transpired during my trip
to The Netherlands last month, as well as the response of my colleagues to what had taken place.
It is true that I had been incorrectly registered as a Justice of the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme
Court, during the International Judicial Colloquium on Insolvency organized by the International Association
of Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankrupcy Professionals (and not, as your article claims, by the American
Bar Association). Although a number of my colleagues have served as Justices of the Court of Appeals
before serving the Supreme Court, I did not have that honor. It was improper for me to misrepresent myself
as having served as a Justice of that Court. It is in this context that I had sought to correct the mistake.
Through telephone conversations and email, we quietly consulted with the conference organizer, and the
American Bar Association, which had assisted in registering conference participants from the Philippines. In
this way, we were able to reach a solution. The error was corrected even before the conference started.
I did not “boycott the conference” to “dramatize” my “discontent.” As a matter of fact, upon being apprised of
the error, the conference secretariat offered to revise the directory to correct the error in my designation. I,
however, suggested it would be unnecessary. Up to this day, the directory lists my position as “Court of
Appeals Justice.”

More worrisome to me, however, is your account of how my colleagues at the Supreme Court reacted to
these events. Contrary to your assertions, I was not “slammed for misbehavior” by my colleagues, some of
whom had approached me to clarify what had actually transpired, and then affirmed that I had done the right
thing in requesting the conference organizers to correct the mistake.

One of the things I have learned in my first few months with the Court is that its Members are candid toward
each other, and quick to point out any concern they might have with each other. Your report, which claims to
carry the opinion of some of my colleagues, suggest otherwise. But based on my own experience with the
Court, I do not believe that Justices of the Supreme Court would stoop so low as to use the media to air
personal grievances, when they regularly communicate their views candidly toward each other.

I respect the right and power of the media to report stories that they believe are important. That you have
characterized me as a “complainer” is your prerogative. I, however, think that there is a difference between
one who simply complains and another who believes that there are more efficient and effective ways of
doing things—and then does something about it. I hope you do not mean to suggest that Justices of the
Supreme Court should timidly accept the status quo, especially if they have the opportunity to change
things. “Complainers” have a huge role to play to make our world a better place to live in.

Humility is a difficult human trait to master. Public officials who are entrusted with correcting wrongs and
doing justice can be vulnerable to losing that valuable human trait. That is why I give time to reading
criticisms whether right or wrong, honest or dishonest. I try to see beyond the inaccuracy in some criticisms
to discern kernels of truth that I can learn from. I am willing to accept this burden of public office.

It is my hope that you and your editors accept the burden of good journalism too—that is, the duty to be
objective when presenting a story. My understanding is that it is good journalistic practice to hear every side
of a story, to give every side an opportunity to respond. Unfortunately, only one side of the story was
presented in your report, and an incorrect one at that. One wishes that you might have tried to verify your
story with our office, or with the Supreme Court Public Information Office. You failed to do so.
Through acceptance of criticisms, I think we can help achieve the level of humility that public service
requires.

With you in service,

Marvic M. V. F. Leonen
Associate Justice

source:  Manila Times

Posted 19th June 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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
 JAN

26

General Principle of Good Faith, Bad Faith

Good Faith is ALWAYS presumed and upon him who alleges vd faith, on the part of the possessor rests the
burden of proof.

RA 386 - New Civil Code

Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof.  

Posted 26th January 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 

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JAN

26

Latins
Juris Tantum - Both in common law and in civil law, a rebuttable
presumption (in Latin, praesumptio iuris tantum) is an assumption made by a court, one that is taken to be
true unless someone comes forward to contest it and prove otherwise. For example, a defendant in a
criminal case is presumed innocent until proved guilty. A rebuttable presumption is often associated
with prima facie evidence. / legal but rebuttable /
Posted 26th January 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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JAN

26

Expropriation and Just Compensation Landmark Cases

1. Valhueza ... non-payment of JC for 57 years = construed as
deliberate refusal >>> Law on Property by Dean Pineda, p81 -
82
2. Republic vs PNB, 1 SCRA 957 ... When is JC determined?  >>>
Law on Property by Dean Pineda, p81 - 82
3. MIAA vs Rodriguez, 483, SCR 619 ... taking precedes the filing
>>> Law on Property by Dean Pineda, p88
4. Phil. Exe. Commission vs Estacio, 98 Phil 18 ... payment of
legal interest (6%) >>> Law on Property by Dean Pineda, p88
5. Between Power of Eminent Domain and Constitutional
Prohibition Against Impairment of Contracts, the former
prevails except when one of the parties is the Government
6. Noble vs City of Manila, 38 OG 2770 ... Expropriation cannot
be resorted to as a way of repudiating the contract agreed upon
which is validly and legally contracted
 7. MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [252 SCRA 412;
G.R. NO. 106440, 29 JAN. 1996] - Concept of Extraordinary
Expropriation ... for private use (i.e. expropriation of estate for
sundivision nto lots and sales to

Posted 26th January 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231

 
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JAN

26

Doctrine of Governmental Immunity from Suit

Posted 26th January 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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JAN

26

Doctrine of Laches
LACHES is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

San Roque Realty vs Republic

Doctrine of Laches or Doctrine of Stale Demand

G.R. No. 112519 November 14, 1996

CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BALANGA, respresented by CRISPULO TORRICO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDO DE LEON, respond

Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled
to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.  25 It has also been defined as such neglect
or omission to assert a right taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity.  26
The principle of laches is a creation of equity which, as such, is applied not really to penalize neglect
or sleeping upon one's right, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so would result in a
clearly inequitable
situation. 27 As an equitable defense, laches does not concern itself with the character of the
defendant's title, but only with whether or not by reason of the plaintiff's long in action or inexcusable
neglect, he should be barred from asserting this claim at all, because to allow him to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to the defendant.  28
The doctrine of laches or of stale demands is based upon grounds of public policy which requires,
for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and . . . is principally a question of
the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.  29
The time-honored rule anchored on public policy is that relief will be denied to a litigant whose claim
or demand has become "stale", or who has acquiesced for an unreasonable length of time, or who
has not been vigilant or who has slept on his rights either by negligence, folly or inattention.  30 In
 other words, public policy requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of claims grown
stale for non-assertion; thus laches is an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right which
has become, under the circumstances, inequitable or unfair to permit.  31
The following are the essential elements of laches:
(1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of;
(2) Delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and
after he has an opportunity to sue;
(3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the
right on which he bases his suit; and
(4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.  32
Under the present circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.
 

 
Posted 26th January 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 
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JAN

22

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial
system.  The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry
out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. 

Republic v. Lacap,
Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, which are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible
rules.  There are many accepted exceptions, such as: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party
invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice
the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical
and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by
the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its application may cause great
and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due process; (i) when the issue of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j) when there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto proceedings. 

a litigant cannot go around the authority of the concerned administrative agency and
directly seek redress from the courts.  Thus, when the law provides for a remedy against a
certain action of an administrative board, body, or officer, relief to the courts can be made
only after exhausting all remedies provided therein.  It is settled that the non-observance
of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action,
which is one of the grounds in the Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the
complaint.
(GR No. 175039 - April 2012)
Posted 22nd January 2013 by Rem Ramirez, REBL No. 20231
 

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JAN

21

Doctrine of Apparent Authority

Doctrine of Apparent Authority or Agency by Estoppel
SJDH’s liability is not on the basis of Article 2180 of the Civil Code (Doctrine of "Imputed Negligence" or
Vicarious Liability), but on the basis of the Doctrine of Apparent Authority or Agency by Estoppel. As a
general rule, hospitals are not liable for the negligence of its independent contractors. However, liability
arises if the independent physician acts as an ostensible agent of the hospital. 

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine, a plaintiff must show that: 
1. the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that
the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; 

2. where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the
hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and 

3. the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary
care and prudence.

Referece Case:  Professional Services, Inc. vs. Agana, G.R. No. 126297, 31 January 2007
Also: Holding Out Theory, Doctrine of Ostensible Agency or Agency by Estoppel