Order Code RL32615

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments

Updated October 5, 2004

K. Alan Kronstadt
Analyst in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

 Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments

Summary
Pakistan is a strategically important country and home to one of the world’s
largest Muslim populations. In October 1999, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen.
Pervez Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. In the
wake of the military overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced
considerable international opprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related
U.S. sanctions. The September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and
Musharraf’s ensuing withdrawal of support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however,
had the effect of greatly reducing Pakistan’s international isolation. Congress
removed restrictions, and large-scale U.S. aid to the country resumed, in the final
months of 2001. The United States views Pakistan as a vital ally in the international
anti-terrorism coalition. The Bush Administration has refrained from expressing any
significant public criticisms of the Pakistan’s internal political practices, while still
asserting that the strengthening of civilian political institutions in Islamabad is “a
requirement for the development of a stable, moderate Islamic state.”

October 2002 elections in Pakistan nominally fulfilled President Musharraf’s

promise to restore the National Assembly that was dissolved in the wake of his extra-
constitutional seizure of power. A pro-military alliance won a plurality of seats,
while a coalition of Islamist parties made a surprisingly strong showing. Musharraf
supporter M.Z. Jamali became Pakistan’s new prime minister. The civilian
government was hamstrung for more than one year by fractious debate over the
legitimacy of Musharraf’s August 2002 changes to the country’s constitution and his
continued status as Army Chief and President. A surprise December 2003 agreement
between Musharraf and the Islamist opposition ended the deadlock by bringing the
constitutional changes before Parliament and by eliciting a promise from Musharraf
to resign his military commission before 2005. Non-Islamist opposition parties
strongly criticized the arrangement as undemocratic. In 2004, Parliament established
a National Security Council that may institutionalize a permanent governance role
for the army; Musharraf “shuffled” prime ministers to seat his close ally, Finance
Minister Shaukat Aziz; secular opposition parties saw themselves further
marginalized; and Musharraf has signaled that he may continue his role as Army
Chief beyond the stated deadline. There are concerns that Pakistan’s civilian
democratic institutions have been weakened by these developments.

In P.L. 108-106, Congress extended the President’s authority to waive coup-

related sanctions through FY2004. In September 2004, Congress passed H.R. 4818,
which would further extend that authority through FY2005. The 9/11 Commission
Report called Musharraf’s government the “best hope” for stability in Pakistan and
Afghanistan and recommends the provision of long-term and comprehensive support
to Pakistan so long as its government remains committed to combating terrorism and
to a policy of “enlightened moderation.” Pending legislation in the 108th Congress,
including H.R. 5024, H.R. 10, and S. 2774, seeks to implement this and other
Commission recommendations. See also CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations and CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia. This report will be
updated periodically.
Contents

U.S. Interests and Policy Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

U.S. Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Policy Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Political Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Major Political Parties and Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Pakistan Muslim League . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Pakistan People’s Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Front) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Earlier Developments Under Musharraf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Military Rule and Assumption of the Presidency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Constitutional Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
The 2002 National Election . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Coalition-Building and Deadlock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Musharraf-MMA Accommodation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Developments in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Creation of a National Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
The Non-Islamist Opposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
“Shuffling” of Prime Ministers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Musharraf’s Status as Chief of Army Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Islamization and Anti-American Sentiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Legislation and Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

U.S. Aid and Aid Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Succession Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

List of Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan FY2001-FY2005
(in millions of dollars, excluding food aid) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Figure 2. Map of Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
 Pakistan’s Domestic Political Developments

U.S. Interests and Policy Discussion

U.S. Interests
Pakistan, a strategically important country that is home to one of the world’s
largest Muslim populations, has been a key cooperating nation in U.S.-led
counterterrorism efforts in South Asia. While top-tier U.S. emphases in the region
after September 2001 have remained combating religious extremism and ending
illicit nuclear weapons proliferation, the United States expresses a strong interest in
the improvement of Pakistan’s human rights situation, especially as regards the
restoration and strengthening of the country’s civilian democratic institutions. Some
observers urge patience on this issue, contending that a “true” democratic system will
require time and that “military-guided” governance is required in an unstable setting
and to deter extremist political influences. Others argue that Pakistan’s Islamist
forces are themselves manipulated by and at times in collusion with the military as
it manages skewed civil-military relations wherein moderate political parties play a
decreasing role. A number of top U.S. diplomats, along with several Members of
Congress, have called for more and accelerated development of Pakistani democracy.

On October 12, 1999, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Gen. Pervez
Musharraf replaced Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in a bloodless coup. In the wake
of the military overthrow of the elected government, Islamabad faced considerable
international opprobrium and was subjected to automatic coup-related U.S. sanctions
under section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act. The September
2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and Musharraf’s ensuing withdrawal of
support for the Afghan Taliban regime, however, had the effect of greatly reducing
Pakistan’s international isolation. Congress removed restrictions, and large-scale
U.S. aid to the country resumed, in the final months of 2001 (in March 2003 and
again in March 2004, President Bush exercised one-year waiver authority on coup-
related sanctions granted to him by Congress). The United States now considers
Pakistan to be a vital ally in the international anti-terrorism coalition.1 The Bush
Administration has refrained from expressing any strong public criticisms of
Pakistan’s internal political practices, while still asserting that the strengthening of
civilian political institutions in Islamabad is “a requirement for the development of

1
See also CRS Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, and CRS Report RL32259,
Terrorism in South Asia, both by K. Alan Kronstadt.
 CRS-2

a stable, moderate Islamic state.”2 According to U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Nancy

Powell in August 2004:

America wants to see strong Pakistani democratic institutions and practices,

including a National Assembly, Senate, and Provincial Assemblies that play a
vigorous and positive role in governance and an independent judiciary that
promotes the rule of law. We also would like to see Pakistan’s civil society play
an active role in governance.3

The 9/11 Commission Report (released in July 2004) claims that — even after
acknowledging problems in U.S.-Pakistan relations and President Musharraf’s role
in them — “Musharraf’s government is the best hope for stability in Pakistan and
Afghanistan.” In addition to identifying Pakistan as a principal transit country for the
9/11 hijackers and naming the western regions of the country as one of six “actual or
potential terrorist sanctuaries” worldwide, the Commission offers a key
recommendation for U.S. policy toward Pakistan:

If Musharraf stands for enlightened moderation in a fight for his life and for the
life of his country, the United States should be willing to make hard choices too,
and make the difficult long-term commitment to the future of Pakistan.
Sustaining the current scale of aid to Pakistan, the United States should support
Pakistan’s government in its struggle against extremists with a comprehensive
effort that extends from military aid to support for better education, so long as
Pakistan’s leaders remain willing to make difficult choices of their own.4

Pending legislation in the 108th Congress, including H.R. 5024, H.R. 10, and S. 2774,
seeks to implement this and other Commission recommendations. Each of the bills
calls for comprehensive and long-term U.S. support to Pakistan, but only H.R. 10
notes a “sense of Congress” that U.S. assistance should encourage and enable a
“more effective and participatory democracy” there; the others make no mention of
Pakistan’s political system. The concept of “enlightened moderation,” as expounded
by Musharraf himself, is a direct response to a growing world perception that Islam
is linked to fundamentalism, and thus to extremism, and thus to terrorism. It is a
strategy meant to both shun the militancy that is rooted in “political injustice, denial,
and deprivation,”and to bring “socioeconomic uplift”in the Muslim world.
Musharraf has called upon Muslims to “adopt a path of moderation and a conciliatory
approach to fight the common belief that Islam is a religion of militancy in conflict
with modernization, democracy and secularism.” Pakistan’s prime minister, Shaukat
Aziz, a close ally of Musharraf and his finance minister since 1999, took office in

2
Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca, “Transcript: Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations Committee,”
March 20, 2003. In July 2003, 16 Member of Congress signed a letter to President Bush
informing him that they “will be looking for a quicker pace for democratic reform” in
Pakistan.
3
“Ambassador Powell Outlines U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” U.S. Department of State
Washington File, August 20, 2004.
4
See Section 12.2, p. 367-369, of The 9/11 Commission Report, available at [http://www.
gpoaccess.gov/911].
 CRS-3

August 2004 vowing to pursue a policy of “enlightened moderation.”5 Musharraf

contends that Pakistan’s democratic institutions are fully functioning in accordance
with the country’s Constitution. However, in September 2004, Secretary of State
Powell said he thinks that “Pakistan is moving in the right direction,” even if the
political system is “not yet to where we would like to see it.” The Bush
Administration rejects criticism that it is overly focused on the person of Musharraf
and calls the Pakistani President “the right man in the right place at the right time for
the right job.”6

Policy Discussion
U.S. interest in Pakistani democratization exists in tandem with the perceived
need to have a stable and effectively-administered front-line ally in the international
anti-terrorism coalition. However, while many observers believe that U.S. interests
in combating terrorism and weapons proliferation in South Asia entail a “trade-off”
with regard to other concerns, some contend that the human rights situation in
Pakistan may itself be a crucial aspect of the incidence of terrorism and religious
extremism.7 Congressional oversight of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a March 2003
hearing included Member expressions of concern about problems with Pakistani
democratization and the danger of the United States “giving full recognition to a
military takeover” through continuous waivers of coup-related aid restrictions.8 The
military continues to dominate Pakistan’s centralized decision making process and,
while in office, Prime Minister Jamali referred to President Musharraf as being his
“boss.”9 While it is possible to argue that Pakistan is more democratic since October
2002 elections, many analysts note that the country’s democratic institutions and
processes are inflexible and unaccommodating of dissent, and they see Pakistan’s
political parties seriously weakened in recent years, with the military’s influence
correspondingly more profound.10 Moreover, numerous commentators reject the 9/11

5
Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,” Washington Post, June 1, 2004;
“Text of Newly-Elected Pakistani Prime Minister’s Address to Parliament,” BBC
Monitoring South Asia, August 27, 2004.
6
“Democracy Restored: Musharraf,” Dawn (Karachi), August 10, 2004; Secretary of State
Colin Powell, “Remarks at the Herbert Quandt Distinguished Lecture,” September 10, 2004;
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, “U.S. Hails Pakistan’s Efforts to Fight Terror,
Build Democracy,” U.S. Department of State Washington File, October 1, 2004.
7
A House panel received expert testimony indicating that Pakistan’s worsening religious
freedom situation is “part of the larger problem of the suppression of democratic freedoms”
there (“House International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism,
Nonproliferation and Human Rights Holds Hearing on State Department Report on
International Religious Freedom,” FDCH Transcripts, February 10, 2004).
8
“Transcript: Hearing of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House
International Relations Committee,” Federal News Service, March 20, 2003.
9
“Jamali: Musharraf Elected President for Five Years,” Pakistan Press International, April
18, 2003.
10
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “Sustainable Democracy,” Daily Times (Lahore), May 24, 2004;
David Rhode and Salman Masood, “Many See Musharraf Keeping Army Post to Cement
(continued...)
 CRS-4

Commission’s “best hope” label for Musharraf himself as myopic and repetitive of
past U.S. reliance on Pakistani military regimes, especially in light of signs that
Pakistan’s allegedly decreasing political stability is rooted in Musharraf’s policies
and in his patronage by the United States.11

President Musharraf remains a popular figure in Pakistan: a March 2004 survey

found that 86% of Pakistanis view Musharraf favorably (with 60% viewing him very
favorably).12 It may be that the events of September 11, 2001, and after have
accelerated the process by which Musharraf is seeking to bolster his own power. One
former Pakistani political advisor and diplomat notes that, “Each of Pakistan’s
patriarchs have based their claim to power on grounds of U.S. support and their own
ability to provide good governance.”13 The perceived U.S. need for a stable and
reliable regional ally in its ongoing counterterrorism efforts in South Asia have some
analysts concluding that Musharraf remains in a position to take further domestic
political advantage of current geopolitical dynamics. Yet at a July 2004 hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee there appeared to be consensus among the
three-witness panel of veteran Pakistan watchers about the potential problems
inherent in a perceived U.S. over-reliance on the individual of Musharraf at the
potential cost of more positive development of Pakistan’s democratic institutions and
civil society. Many analysts believe such development is key to the long-term
success of stated U.S. policy in the region. One witness offered that Musharraf is best
seen as a “marginal satisfier” who will do only the minimum expected of him. He
recommended that, “The United States must alter the impression our support for
Pakistan is essentially support for Musharraf.”14 This conception is echoed by a
leading Pakistani analyst, who contends that all of Musharraf’s major policy shifts
after September 2001 have come through compulsion by external pressure or events
and that, while the direction of Pakistan’s policy change has been appropriate, “the
momentum of change is too slow and awkward and unsure to constitute a critical and
irreversible mass.”15 Many leading Pakistani commentators insist that only by

10
(...continued)
Power,” New York Times, September 18, 2004.
11
Sumit Ganguly, “The ‘Best Hope’ in South Asia,” Hindu (Madras), August 13, 2004;
Paula Newberg, “As U.S. Talks of Liberty, Musharraf Scorns It,” Los Angeles Times, July
4, 2004.
12
Pew Research Center, “A Year After the Iraq War,” March 16, 2004.
13
Husain Haqqani, “Replaying the Old Marching Tune,” Indian Express (Bombay), July 10,
2002.
14
Statement of Professor Marvin Weinbaum, “Senate Foreign Relations Committee Holds
Hearing on Pakistan and Counterterrorism,” FDCH Transcripts, July 14, 2004. At the same
hearing, Ambassador Teresita Schaffer concurred, saying that the United States is
attempting to deal with Pakistan through “policy triage and by focusing on the personal
leadership of President Musharraf,” both of which are “flawed concepts.”
15
Najam Sethi, “Happy Birthday Pakistan,” Friday Times (Lahore), August 13, 2004.
 CRS-5

allowing the country’s secular political parties fully into the system can the country
realize stable and enduring democracy.16

Many American policy makers believe that U.S. interests are for the time being
best served by the presence of a strong and secure Islamabad leadership. Thus, while
early optimism about Musharraf’s potential as a reformer has waned considerably,
there are those who still conclude that the existence of an unstable and possibly
Islamicized or failed state between Afghanistan and India — a state in possession of
nuclear weapons — is a far less desirable circumstance than the present one in which
a powerful and secular military institution maintains a reasonable degree of order in
Pakistan. For some, this argument has become less persuasive as the country’s law-
and-order situation has deteriorated in 2004 and uncertainty about political
succession in Islamabad causes trepidation in numerous world capitals (see
“Succession Issues” section below). Pakistan’s fragile democratic institutions are
under continuous threat emanating from the authoritarian influences of the country’s
powerful military and quasi-feudal economic structures. Given a stated U.S. position
that, “Democratic institutions are required if Pakistan is to thrive economically and
to develop further into an enlightened and moderate Muslim state,”17 Pakistan’s
domestic political developments likely will be closely monitored by the United
States.

Political Setting
Background
The history of democracy in Pakistan is a troubled one marked by ongoing
tripartite power struggles among presidents, prime ministers, and army chiefs.
Military regimes have ruled Pakistan for more than half of the country’s 57 years in
existence, and most observers agree that Pakistan has no sustained history of
effective constitutionalism or parliamentary democracy. The country has had five
constitutions, the most recent being ratified in 1973 (and significantly modified
several times since). From the earliest days of independence, the country’s armed
forces have thought of themselves as “saviors of the nation,” a perception that has
received significant, though limited, public support. The military, usually acting in
tandem with the president, has engaged in three outright seizures of power from
civilian-led governments: Gen. Ayub Khan in 1958, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq in 1977, and
Gen. Musharraf in 1999.18 Since 1970, five successive governments have been voted

16
Husain Haqqani, “Agenda for Pakistan’s New Prime Minister,” Nation (Lahore),
September 1, 2004; Najam Sethi, “What the Country Needs,” Friday Times (Lahore),
September 12, 2003. See also Ayesha Siddiqa, “Musharraf’s Successor,” Friday Times
(Lahore), March 19, 2004.
17
“Ambassador Powell Outlines U.S. Policy Toward Pakistan,” U.S. Department of State
Washington File, August 20, 2004.
18
In 1958, President Iskander Mizra, with the support of the army, abrogated the
Constitution as “unworkable and full of dangerous compromises.” Three weeks later Mizra
(continued...)
 CRS-6

into power, but not a single time has a government been voted out of power — all
five were removed by the army through explicit or implicit presidential orders. Of
Pakistan’s three most prominent prime ministers, one (Z.A. Bhutto) was executed,
another (Benazir Bhutto) exiled and her husband jailed on corruption charges, and
the last (Nawaz Sharif) remains in exile under threat of life in prison for similar
abuses should he return. Such long-standing turmoil in the governance system may
partially explain why, in a 2004 public opinion survey, nearly two-thirds of
Pakistanis were unable to provide a meaning for the term “democracy.”19

Notable Pakistan Leaders

Governor-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah 1947-1948
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan 1947-1951
President Iskandar Ali Mirza 1955-1958
President-General Mohammed Ayub Khan 1958-1969
President-General Mohammed Yahya Khan 1969-1971
President-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 1971-1977
President-General Zia ul-Haq 1978-1988
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 1988-1990
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 1990-1993
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto 1993-1996
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 1997-1999
President-General Pervez Musharraf 1999-

Major Political Parties and Coalitions

Pakistan Muslim League. The Pakistan Muslim League (PML) is the
country’s oldest political party and was the only major party existing at the time of
independence. Long associated with the Quaid-e-Azam (Father of the Nation)
Muhammed Ali Jinnah and his lieutenant, Liaquat Ali Khan, the PML was weakened

18
(...continued)
was exiled and Army Chief Gen. Ayub Khan installed himself as President while declaring
martial law and banning all political parties (thus formalizing the militarization of Pakistan’s
political system). His appointment of a senior civil servant as Deputy Martial Law
Administrator gave some legitimating cast to the event and, four years later, Ayub Khan
introduced a new Constitution that sought to legitimate his rule in the absence of martial
law. In 1977, and in the midst of political turmoil involving Z.A. Bhutto and the Pakistan
National Alliance opposed to him, Army Chief Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, in apparent collusion with
conservative Islamic groups, declared martial law, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the
National Assembly, and took power in a bloodless coup. He vowed to hold national
elections within 90 days, but soon rescinded that promise, and spent the next 11 years
making changes to the Pakistani constitution and system of governance that would ensure
his continued hold on power. Only two of the three coups d’etat (Zia in 1977 and Musharraf
in 1999) were entirely extra-constitutional in nature. See Robert Stern, Democracy and
Dictatorship in South Asia (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001).
19
International Foundation for Election Systems, “National Public Opinion Survey Pakistan
2004,” available at [http://www.plsc.org.pk/survey/index.htm].
 CRS-7

upon their premature deaths in 1948 and 1951. Not until the 1988 elections — when
Nawaz Sharif, who had been Gen. Zia’s finance minister, led a PML-Islamist
coalition to a strong second-place showing and became Punjab chief minister — was
the party again be a player on the national scene. Sharif was elected prime minister
in 1990 and, three years later, established the offshoot PML-Nawaz (PML-N), which
went on to dominate the 1997 elections. In the lead up to the 2002 elections, most
former (but still influential) Sharif loyalists joined the new PML-Quaid-e-Azam
(PML-Q), a group widely seen to enjoy overt support from the military. In May
2004, five PML factions united and named Punjabi politician and industrialist
Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as their leader. Nawaz Sharif and most of his immediate
family live in exile in Saudi Arabia. His family’s legal status is unclear, but reports
indicate that, shortly after the 1999 coup, the Sharif family and the Musharraf
government concluded an “arrangement” that would bar any family member from
returning to Pakistan for a period of ten years. The PML’s electoral strength typically
is found in the densely populated Punjab province.

Pakistan People’s Party.20 The left-leaning Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)

was established in 1967 in reaction to the military dictatorship of Gen. Ayub Khan.
The party slogan was and remains “Islam is our Faith, Democracy is our Polity,
Socialism is our Economy.” Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who had
resigned his position as Khan’s foreign minister, the PPP won a majority of West
Pakistan’s assembly seats in 1970 elections and held power from 1971 until 1977,
when Bhutto’s government was overthrown by his Army Chief, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq.
Bhutto, who oversaw the establishment of a parliamentary system with the 1973
Constitution and who launched Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, was executed
by the military government in 1979. When Zia’s ban on political parties was lifted
in 1986, Bhutto’s daughter Benazir emerged as its leader and won the prime
ministership in 1988 and again in 1993. Today, she lives in exile in London and
Dubai under threat of imprisonment should she return to Pakistan (she has thrice
been convicted of corruption in absentia). In an effort to skirt legal barriers to its
electoral participation in 2002, the PPP formed a separate entity, the PPP
Parliamentarians (PPPP), that pledged to uphold Bhutto’s political philosophy. This
group is headed by Makhdoom Amin Fahim. The PPP historically has done
especially well in the southern Sind province.

Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (United Action Front). The Muttahida Majlis-e-

Amal (MMA or United Action Forum) is a loose coalition of six Islamist parties
formed for the 2002 elections.21 Its largest constituent is the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI),
founded by Maulana Maududi in 1941 and considered to be Pakistan’s best-
organized religious party. JI chief Qazi Hussein Ahmed serves as MMA president.
Another long-standing Islamist party is the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam faction led by
Maulana Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F). The JUI is associated with religious schools that
gave rise to the Afghan Taliban movement. In addition to promoting a central role
for religion in Pakistani affairs, Islamists have been opposed to Westernization in

20
See [http://www.ppp.org.pk].
21
Islamist parties are conservative advocates of a central role for Islam and sharia (Islamic
law) in national governance. They also oppose Westernization in its socioeconomic and
cultural forms.
 CRS-8

both its capitalist and socialist forms. Although Pakistan’s religious parties enjoy
considerable “street” power and were strengthened by Zia’s policies of the 1980s,
their electoral showing has in the past been quite limited (they won only two
parliamentary seats in the 1993 and 1997 elections).

Earlier Developments Under Musharraf

Military Rule and Assumption of the Presidency
On October 12, 1999, Army Chief Gen. Pervez Musharraf overthrew the elected
government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, dismissed the National Assembly, and
appointed himself “Chief Executive.” The proximate cause of Musharraf’s action
appears to have been Sharif’s attempt to remove him from his Army leadership
position and prevent his return from abroad, but widespread dissatisfaction with
Sharif’s authoritarian and allegedly corrupt regime — both within the Pakistani
military and among the general public — are believed to have been important broader
factors. Under a “Provisional Constitution Order” (PCO), Musharraf declared a state
of emergency, suspended the Constitution, and, by special decree, ensured that his
actions could not be challenged by any court. He promised to end corruption and
revive “genuine democracy.” In January 2000, members of Pakistan’s Supreme
Court were required to take an oath promising to uphold the PCO; six jurists,
including the Chief Justice, refused and stood retired. Five months later, the new
Supreme Court issued a sweeping validation of Musharraf’s actions, including the
PCO and the dissolution of the national and provincial assemblies, but it also ordered
that elections to reseat these bodies be held no later than three years from the date of
the coup (i.e., by October 12, 2002). These developments left Pakistan with a
“seemingly benign, but nonetheless very real, military dictatorship.”22

Gen. Musharraf’s October 1999 seizure of power initially was met with
widespread approval among the Pakistani people, many of whom considered the
Sharif government to be incorrigibly corrupt. Even many of the country’s more
liberal-minded opinion-makers acquiesced with the hope that Musharraf might
succeed in improving Pakistan’s lot where civilian-led governments had failed,
and/or because they believed that a military-led government was the only remaining
alternative to a radical Islamic regime in Islamabad.23 Yet Musharraf’s subsequent
actions became widely interpreted as indicating his intention to impose a more or less
permanent authoritarian rule over the country, and they thus alienated many of the
early optimists. While maintaining his promise to hold national elections in October
2002, Musharraf spent ensuing years taking actions that bolstered his ruling position
and that of the military. Proponents of Musharraf’s political choices since 1999 insist

22
Craig Baxter, et al., Government and Politics in South Asia, 5th Ed. (Boulder, Co.:
Westview Press, 2002), p. 193.
23
Pamela Constable, “Will Two and Two Equal Five?” in On the Abyss: Pakistan After the
Coup (New Delhi: Harper Collins India, 2000), p. 135.
 CRS-9

that the country is becoming more stable, and less corrupt and personality-centered
through “military-guided” administration.24

In June 2001, President Mohammad Rafiq Tarar was forced to resign under the
PCO and was replaced by Gen. Musharraf. Musharraf later sought to legitimize his
status as president with an April 2002 referendum. Islamabad reported resounding
public approval for Musharraf’s continued rule in the results of this exercise, with
98% of votes cast in favor. Yet opposition parties had boycotted the vote, and
charges of widespread coercion and fraud marred the outcome. Musharraf later
apologized for “irregularities” in the process.25

Constitutional Changes
In August 2002, President Musharraf took unilateral action in announcing a
“Legal Framework Order” (LFO) of constitutional changes. The most important of
these provide greatly enhanced powers to the Pakistani President. Musharraf
maintained that the amendments were necessary to bring “true” and stable
democracy to the country. Critics contended that Musharraf (who retained his
position as Army Chief) was seeking to legitimize the military’s extra-constitutional
role in governance, as well as ensure his own continued power in contravention of
democratic principles. The key constitutional change was a provision allowing the
President to dismiss the National Assembly.26 Other controversial clauses called for
presidential appointments of military chiefs and creation of a military-dominated
National Security Council (NSC) authorized to oversee the country’s security
policies, as well as monitor the process of democracy and governance in the
country.27 Many saw the NSC providing Pakistan’s armed forces with a permanent
and unprecedented institutional role in the country’s governance. Pakistan’s major
opposition parties decried Musharraf’s action as illegal, claiming that only Parliament
has the power to amend the constitution. For numerous critics, the proposed changes
harked back to Zia-ul-Haq’s continuous and years-long efforts to avoid any form of
electoral or judicial challenge to his rule. In response to Musharraf’s LFO
announcement, the United States indicated that full U.S. support for the Pakistani

24
Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, “Transition in Pakistan”
(letter), New York Times, January 19, 2004; Ahmed Qurashi, “Late Nation-Building,” News
(Karachi), August 31, 2004.
25
“Political Leaders, Lawyers Denounce Musharraf Presidency Move,” Agence France
Presse, June 20, 2001; Simon Denyer, “Pakistan’s Musharraf Won’t Start War, But Ready,”
Reuters News, May 27, 2002.
26
Pakistan’s 1973 constitution envisaged a sovereign parliament where powers rested with
the prime minister, but subsequent changes under the military-dominated regime of Gen.
Zia-ul-Haq shifted power to the presidency. The very Parliament that provided Zia with
these powers was itself dismissed by him in 1988. In 1997, PM Nawaz Sharif oversaw
passage of the 13th Amendment to the constitution, repealing Zia’s 8th Amendment (1985)
right to dismiss the government and appoint military chiefs (and thus restoring powers to the
prime minister’s office).
27
Zaffar Abbas, “Analysis: Musharraf Sidelines Parliament,” BBC News, August 21, 2002.
A well-received and more clearly progressive change was the reservation of 60 assembly
seats for women and non-Muslims.
 CRS-10

President would continue, even if some of the changes “could make it more difficult
to build strong, democratic institutions in Pakistan.”28

The 2002 National Election

Following the October 1999 coup, the Pakistani Supreme Court ordered that
national elections be held within a period of no more than three years, and President
Musharraf set and held to a poll date of October 10, 2002. Given the country’s poor
historical record with democratic processes, many observers lauded Musharraf for
the mere act of holding elections as promised. However, and despite the
government’s insistence that the exercise was free and fair, opposition parties and
numerous independent observers called the election deeply flawed. Widely asserted
was that the military regime’s machinations substantively weakened the main secular
opposition parties.29 Voter turnout was estimated by the Pakistan Election
Commission to have been above 40%, but still lower than any previous Pakistani
national election. Major parties offer even lower estimates, with most falling
between 20% and 30%.

The PML-Q — also called the “king’s party” due to its perceived pro-military
bent — won 118 of the total 342 parliamentary seats, almost all of them from Punjab,
and the affiliated National Alliance won 16 more.30 This number gave the pro-
Musharraf parties a plurality in the National Assembly, but fell well short of the
majority representation needed to control the body outright. The PPP won the largest
number of votes overall, but Pakistan’s electoral rules awarded it runner-up status
only, with a total of 81 national seats. Perhaps the most surprising outcome of the
elections was the strong third-place showing of the MMA Islamist coalition that now
controls the provincial assembly of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
leads a coalition in that of Baluchistan, as well as seating 68 legislators in the
National Assembly (up from two previously) — about 20% of the total.31

28
State Department Spokesman Philip Reeker, “Musharraf’s Constitutional Changes
Concern U.S.,” U.S. Department of State Washington File, August 22, 2002.
29
Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Entire Election Process ‘Deeply Flawed,’” October 9,
2002; Sumit Ganguly, “The Slide Continues,” Foreign Affairs, April 2003. Both of his
predecessors as national leaders — Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif — were, by
Musharraf’s own decree, excluded from candidacy regardless of the status of criminal
charges against them. While the core membership of the PPP and the PML-N remained
loyal to its leadership, it became clear that after 1999 neither could mobilize the levels of
support enjoyed during the 1990s. This combined with evidence of a pervasive apathy
among the Pakistani people with regard to national politics. Recognizing their weakened
positions, the parties — one-time bitter rivals — agreed to cooperate in the 2002 elections,
and coordinated regional candidacies in an attempt to maximize their final combined
victories.
30
Election figures come from the Associated Press of Pakistan, a government news service.
31
The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) is a Sindhi regional party mainly comprised of
the descendants of pre-partition immigrants (Muhajirs) from what is now India. Although
it did well in Sind’s provincial elections, the MQM collected only a small percentage of the
national vote (winning 17 national seats). The nationalist and formerly powerful Awami
(continued...)
 CRS-11

Coalition-Building and Deadlock

The new National Assembly sat in November 2002. The three leading national
parties — the PML-Q, PPP, and MMA — had engaged in convoluted and ultimately
failed coalition-building negotiations. Both the secular opposition PPP and the
Islamist parties maintained a strident rejection of the Legal Framework Order
changes to the Constitution. A PPP-Islamist alliance would have set the pro-military
parties in opposition, a possibility that reportedly sent the Musharraf regime into
“panic.”32 Signals that a PML-Q-Islamist alliance was in the offing ended when
President Musharraf refused to accept MMA demands that he resign his position as
Army Chief. Some political analysts opined that an outcome in which no party
secured a majority served President Musharraf’s interests by allowing him to retain
preeminent power, and such an outcome may well have been his intent.33

In an unexpected circumstance, the pro-Musharraf parties succeeded in forming

a thin working coalition without the participation of either the PPP or the MMA, a
development made possible by the defection of several PPP members, some of whom
were rewarded with high-profile ministerships of their own.34 In November 2002,
PML-Q favorite and former Baluchistan Chief Minister Mir Zafarullah Jamali was
elected to serve as prime minster.35 Speculation abounded over whether or not the
Pakistani President intended for the Islamist coalition to make as strong a showing
as it did; Benazir Bhutto, for one, suggested that Musharraf “handed over the areas
bordering Afghanistan to religious parties” in an effort to ensure continued U.S.
support while simultaneously placating domestic opponents.36 Although a full
National Assembly was seated, the body remained stalled on procedural issues for
more than one year; only a single piece of legislation (a budget) was passed in that
time. In July 2003, more than 20 groups representing nearly all of Pakistan’s non-
Islamist opposition parties issued a joint rejection of the LFO and called for
Musharraf’s resignation. Shortly after, the MMA, which had continued negotiating

31
(...continued)
National Party was shutout at the national level and did quite poorly in the NWFP, its
traditional provincial stronghold. Small parties and independents accounted for the
remaining 31 seats.
32
Rana Jawad, “Musharraf Regime Panicked by Surprise Secular-Islamist Deal: Analysts,”
Agence France-Presse, November 6, 2002.
33
See, for example, Paula Newburg, “Musharraf’s Win, Pakistan’s Loss,” Los Angeles
Times, October 20, 2002.
34
This group of PPP “Patriots” has continued to be strongly pro-Musharraf.
35
With 172 votes, Jamali beat out top MMA official Maulana Fazlur Rehman (86 votes) and
PPP contender Shah Mehmood Qureshi (70 votes) for the prime ministership. A
constitutionally-mandated December 2002 vote of confidence was narrowly won by Jamali.
February 2003 Senate elections bolstered the position of the ruling coalition-leading PML-
Q, which oversees a simple majority in the 100-seat body.
36
“Benazir Seeks World Support for PPP,” Dawn (Karachi), October 24, 2002.
 CRS-12

with Musharraf’s forces, announced its “final” refusal to accept the LFO and
Musharraf’s status as Army Chief.37

Musharraf-MMA Accommodation
The fractious 14-month-long dispute between President Musharraf’s allies and
opposition parties in the National Assembly came to an end with a surprise December
2003 deal between Musharraf and the Islamist MMA. Under the arrangement,
Musharraf pledged to resign his military commission by the end of 2004. He also
agreed to put a slightly altered version of the LFO before Parliament. It was passed
and, on the final day of 2003, became the 17th Amendment to the Constitution.38
Finally, Musharraf submitted to a vote of confidence by Pakistan’s Electoral College
(comprised of the membership of all national and provincial legislatures). On
January 1, 2004, Musharraf’s presidency through 2007 was legitimized when he won
about 60% of the total vote.39 Officials in Islamabad contended that the
developments augured well for Pakistani democracy and stability, but non-Islamist
opposition parties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy
(ARD) accused the MMA of betrayal and insisted that the new arrangement merely
institutionalized military rule in Pakistan.40

Developments in 2004
Despite the potentially brightened prospects for future civilian governance in
Pakistan, military rule substantively continues in 2004, and most analysts foresee
little or no power being transferred to the country’s civilian political leaders in the
near- and middle-term. A “devolution plan” launched by the Musharraf government
in 2000 ostensibly sought to transfer more power to local authorities, but may instead
have further marginalized established political parties and enhanced centralized
military rule.41 Military agencies are blamed for abusing human rights and some
critics have suggested that Musharraf’s “Faustian bargain” with Islamists serves to

37
“Musharraf Says He’ll Only Quit When Pakistan Stops Needing Him,” Agence France-
Presse, June 9, 2003; Zaffar Abbas, “Musharraf Reforms Rejected,” BBC News, July 26,
2003; Mohammed Imran, “No More Talks, Says MMA,” Daily Times (Lahore), September
20, 2003.
38
Passage was possible only with the support of MMA members; secular opposition parties
boycotted the vote. The most important change to the LFO was a requirement that the
Supreme Court must approve of any presidential dissolution of Parliament within 15 days
of such a move. The amendment also retroactively validated all legal actions taken by
Musharraf after October 12, 1999.
39
Only a single vote against was recorded. Musharraf received only minority support in the
NWFP (24%) and Baluchistan (43%) (Bronwyn Curran, “Pakistan President Musharraf
Sails Through Confidence Vote,” Agence France Presse, January 1, 2004).
40
“Deal Over Pakistan Power Struggle,” BBC News, December 29, 2003.
41
“Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?,” International Crisis Group Asia Report
77, March 22, 2004.
 CRS-13

strengthen the very extremism that he publically opposes.42 One senior Western
observer contends that, “The generals cannot govern Pakistan, but they will not let
anyone else govern it.” A leading Pakistani commentator sees the problem as “a
military that wants to control things without being overtly seen to be doing so.”43

Creation of a National Security Council

When the 17th Amendment to the Constitution was passed in December 2003,
one of the key changes to President Musharraf’s original August 2002 LFO proposal
was the removal of the National Security Council. In something of a concession,
Musharraf and the military allowed the NSC to be created through a legislative rather
than constitutional process, meaning Parliament will have at least nominal power to
alter or dissolve the body. Draft legislation was completed in January 2004. Secular
and Islamist opposition parties vowed to oppose the bill, saying an NSC would
curtail Parliament’s powers, but their vehement protest failed to sway the ruling party
and they boycotted voting when the bill passed in April. The first formal meeting of
the NSC took place in June and focused on Pakistan’s deteriorating law-and-order
situation.44 Notably absent was Maulana Fazlur Rehman, whose status as Leader of
the Opposition provides an NSC seat. Musharraf reportedly was unhappy with the
Islamist’s boycotting of the inaugural session.45 Musharraf and his supporters in
Parliament insist that the NSC will reduce the likelihood of future military coups by
providing a “safety valve” — a forum in which the army can play a role short of
dissolving the National Assembly. Opponents still contend that a military-dominated
body headed by the President will only undercut the already tenuous power of
Parliament.46

The Non-Islamist Opposition

Pakistan’s non-Islamist parties unified under the Alliance for the Restoration of
Democracy consider themselves to be the country’s “true” opposition, given MMA
accommodation with the ruling party. People’s Party leaders and loyalists of Nawaz

42
“Pakistan: Four Years After Coup, Rights Abuses Abound,” Human Rights Watch,
October 10, 2003; Paul Watson, “A Delicate Balance of Rule for Pakistan’s Musharraf,” Los
Angeles Times, March 5, 2004; “Pakistan,” Amnesty International Report 2004, May 2004.
43
Stephen P. Cohen, “The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan,” Washington Quarterly, Summer
2003; Ejaz Haider, “CMAG’s Decision Is Right,” Friday Times (Lahore), October 3, 2003.
44
The 13-member body is chaired by the President, and includes the Prime Minister, the
Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker and Opposition Leader of the National Assembly, four
provincial Chief Ministers, the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the top officer from
each of the three military branches.
45
Musharraf even suggested that, by failing to sit at the NSC meeting, the MMA was
reneging on an agreement (“President Musharraf Chairs Inaugural Session of National
Security Council,” Pakistan Press International, June 24, 2004).
46
Asim Yasin, “NSC to Help Flourish Democracy: Jamali,” News (Karachi), April 2, 2004;
“The NSC Albatross,” Daily Times (Lahore), April 4, 2004; Roedad Khan, “NSC:
Abdicating Sovereignty,” Dawn (Karachi), April 12, 2004; “Pakistan Law Enshrines Army
Role,” BBC News, April 14, 2004.
 CRS-14

Sharif’s PML-N warn U.S. officials that military dictators are not reliable over time
and that Pakistan’s civilian political forces may soon become so marginalized as to
become ineffective.47 The October 2003 arrest of opposition political figure
Makhdoom Javed Hashmi spurred some to identify renewed governmental
repression. Hashmi, leader of the ARD, was jailed after he publicized a letter
allegedly written by an army officer criticizing President Musharraf’s policies. In
April 2004, Hashmi was sentenced 23 years in prison for sedition, mutiny, and
forgery. The United States expressed regret at the “closed nature of the proceedings”
against Hashmi and called on Pakistan to administer justice fairly and in a transparent
manner in his case. Islamabad responded by accusing the United States of
“unwarranted and misplaced” interference in its internal affairs.48

In May 2004, Shabaz Sharif, a former Punjab Chief Minister and the brother of
deposed PM Nawaz Sharif, attempted to return to Pakistan from exile, but was
“dragged away by commandos” and deported to Saudi Arabia after less than two
hours in Lahore in what some termed a “massive over-reaction” by authorities.
Police arrested as many as 2,200 supporters from Sharif’s PML-N party who had
gathered to welcome him. The events were widely viewed as indicating that the
military intends to maintain its hold on civil society.49 Furthermore, the May
elevation of Jamiat-Ulema-Islami chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman to the position of
Leader of the Opposition in Parliament spurred commentary that the “mullah-military
alliance” had become a “Musharraf-Maulana alliance,” further marginalizing
Pakistan’s more secular opposition parties.50 There also are reports of other more
subtle forms of harassment and suppression of opposition political figures.51

“Shuffling” of Prime Ministers

At the time of this writing, Pakistan has its third prime minster since the October
2002 elections. There were in 2004 increasing indications that Musharraf was
unhappy with Prime Minister Jamali’s perceived ineffectiveness and lack of
enthusiasm on key issues such as the NSC and Musharraf’s possible continuation as
Army Chief.52 On June 26, Jamali announced his resignation at the request of

47
Author interviews with PPP and PML-N officials, Islamabad, January 19, 2004.
48
M.B. Naqvi, “A Season of Repression?,” News (Karachi), November 5, 2003; “U.S. Calls
for Judicial Fairness for Pakistan Opposition Figure,” U.S. Department of State Washington
File, May 13, 2004; “Pakistan Tells US Jailing of Opposition Leader ‘an Internal Affair,’”
Agence France Presse, April 16, 2004.
49
“Pakistan Deports Ex-PM’s Brother,” BBC News, May 11, 2004; Sajjad Shafiq Butt,
“Lahore Under ‘Police Siege’ Before Shabaz Arrival ,” News (Karachi), May 11, 2004;
“Pakistan’s Military Shows No Intention of Letting Slip Its Grip on Power,” Agence France
Presse, May 12, 2004.
50
Najam Sethi, “His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition?,” Friday Times (Lahore), May 28, 2004.
51
Matthew Pennington, “Pakistan Gives Opposition Tough Time,” Associated Press, May
10, 2004.
52
David Rhode, “Pakistan Choreographs Vote for Chosen Premier,” New York Times, July
25, 2004; Rana Qaisar, “Jamali Wanted to Dilute NSC Role,” Daily Times (Lahore), January
(continued...)
 CRS-15

President Musharraf. Opposition parties and independent analysts called Jamali’s

“smooth sacking” further evidence of the military’s supreme power.53 Jamali
nominated PML president and Parliament Speaker Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as his
successor. However, Shujaat’s tenure was meant to be transitional only, as the
person called “Musharraf’s favorite candidate,” Senator and Finance Minister
Shaukat Aziz, was constitutionally obligated to win a seat in the National Assembly
to be eligible for the prime ministership. After he did so, opposition parties
nominated jailed political figure Javed Hashmi as their candidate for the prime
ministership. However, the Assembly Speaker ruled that Hashmi could not attend
the vote, and Aziz won 192 of 342 ballots, with the opposition boycotting the process
as “sham democracy.”54

The choice of Aziz appears to fit with the military’s preference for a “task-
oriented technocrat” who approaches economic development and governance as a
“mechanical process.”55 Aziz’s elevation was seen as being less about the will of the
electorate than about the will of President Musharraf, who is seen as seeking to
secure his grip on the civilian components of his regime by installing a prime
minister who will have little real power over most domestic and international
political matters.56

Musharraf’s Status as Chief of Army Staff

As was noted above, a key complaint of Pakistan’s opposition parties has been
Musharraf’s concurrent standing as both President and Chief of Army Staff, a
circumstance they believe violates the Constitution and perpetuates overt military
rule. Despite apparent legal proscriptions set forth in the 17th Amendment57 and his
own nationally-televised promise to resign his commission before January 2005,
there have been increasing signs that Musharraf will choose to retain dual offices in

52
(...continued)
30, 2004; “Musharraf Will Keep Promise,” Daily Times (Lahore), April 12, 2004.
53
Qamar Jabbar, “Opposition Parties Say Jamali’s Removal a Setback to Democracy,” Daily
Times (Lahore), June 27, 2004; “Jamali’s Resignation Shocks Qazi,” Dawn (Karachi), June
27, 2004; Husain Haqqani, “Changing Managers of Pakistan Inc,” Nation (Lahore), June 30,
2004; Ejaz Haider, “Musharraf’s Unstable Stability,” Friday Times (Lahore), July 9, 2004.
54
“Musharraf Ally Sworn in as New PM,” BBC News, August 28, 2004. Critics argued
that, because Hashmi was a sitting member of Parliament whose criminal case was under
appeal, his exclusion was a violation of basic rights (“Press Gallery: Another Black Day in
Pakistan History,” Daily Times (Lahore), August 28, 2004).
55
Hasan-Askari Rizvi, “The Making of a Prime Minister,” Daily Times (Lahore), July 12,
2004. See also “The Technocrats Take Over,” Economist (London), August 28, 2004.
56
David Rhode, “Pakistan Choreographs Vote for Chosen Premier,” New York Times, July
25, 2004; “Musharraf: New Cabinet, Old Agenda,” Stratfor.com, September 1, 2004; Owais
Tohid, “Musharraf’s Hand Stronger After Prime Minister Quits,” Christian Science
Monitor, June 28, 2004; “Puppet Prime Minister?,” Economist Intelligence Unit, August 31,
2004.
57
“Musharraf’s Staying as Army Chief Violates Constitution: Jurists,” Agence France
Presse, September 17, 2004.
 CRS-16

what often is described as the “national interest.” The British Commonwealth, which
in May 2004 lifted a four-year suspension of Pakistan, has insisted that Musharraf
stand by his pledge to resign from the military or risk further opprobrium.58
Musharraf’s lieutenants and party supporters have for months urged him to stay on
so as to maintain “political stability” in Pakistan, and their outspokenness peaked in
September 2004. Among independent observers, such a decision is widely expected
and would be viewed as an expression of Musharraf’s insecurity.59 The United States
responded by stating that it expects to see continuing progress toward the goal of
“fully functioning democracy” in Pakistan and that it continues to view Musharraf’s
planned military retirement as “progress in this general direction.”60 As of early
October 2004, Musharraf remains noncommittal on the subject, but reportedly
believes that remaining in both offices for years to come may be necessary to prevent
“political destabilization” and to maintain “continuity.” His reshuffling of top army
leadership in preparation for scheduled retirements of key lieutenants did not include
the naming of a successor for the top spot, an omission that many took as further
evidence that Musharraf intends to remain as Army Chief into 2005.61

Islamization and Anti-American Sentiment

Adding to U.S. concerns about Pakistan’s domestic political developments are
increasing signs of “Islamization” and anti-American sentiment there. Pakistanis are
a pious people, many or most of whom are unlikely to want separation between Islam
and governance: A 2004 survey found that nearly two-thirds of citizens say that
“religion should play a paramount role in politics” and only 6% see no role for
religion in politics.62 In June 2003, the Islamist coalition in the NWFP passed a
Shariat bill in the provincial assembly, and the government of Baluchistan later
established an Islamist legal council. These efforts may seek to replicate in Pakistan
the harsh enforcement of Islamic law seen in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Such
developments alarm Pakistan’s moderates and, in August 2003, President Musharraf

58
“Commonwealth Lifts Pakistan Suspension,” New York Times, May 22, 2004. Opposition
parties criticized the Commonwealth’s decision as unjustified given an absence of true
democracy.
59
“Musharraf Urged Not to Quit Army,” BBC News, April 9, 2004; Ashraf Mumtaz,
“Shujaat Wants Musharraf to Stay in Uniform,” Dawn (Karachi), September 6, 2004; “Key
Pakistani Province Urges Musharraf Not to Quit as Army Chief,” Agence France Presse,
September 13, 2004; “Army Post for President Key to Stability: Aziz,” Dawn (Karachi),
September 17, 2004. On Musharraf’s insecurity, see Simon Cameron-Moore, “Pakistan’s
Musharraf Keeps Khaki and Grip on Power,” Reuters News, September 9, 2004.
60
Richard Boucher, State Department Noon Briefing, September 16, 2004.
61
Masood Haider and Anwar Iqbal, “Leaving the Army Can Lead to Chaos, Says
Musharraf,” Dawn (Karachi), September 27, 2004; Zahid Hussain, “Musharraf Keeps Army
Post in Military Shake-Up,” Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2004.
62
International Foundation for Election Systems, “National Public Opinion Survey Pakistan
2004,” available at [http://www.plsc.org.pk/survey/index.htm].
 CRS-17

vowed to “finish off religious extremism.”63 Pakistan’s Islamists routinely denounce

Pakistani military operations in western tribal areas, resist government attempts to
reform religious schools that teach militancy, and harshly criticize Islamabad’s
cooperation with the U.S. government.

Anti-American sentiment among Pakistani citizens is not limited to Islamic

groups: A 2003 Pew Center opinion poll found that 45% of Pakistanis had at least
“some confidence” in Osama bin Laden’s ability to “do the right thing regarding
world affairs.” Nearly one year later, Pew found that only 6% of Pakistanis believed
the United States was sincere in its efforts to combat terrorism; about half viewed the
United States as seeking to “dominate the world.” The Pakistani army, which was
significantly radicalized by Gen. Zia’s policies in the 1980s, continues to be home
to Muslim hardliners at the middle and lower ranks. In 2004 testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, one senior expert opined that “Pakistan is
probably the most anti-American country in the world right now, ranging from the
radical Islamists on one side to the liberals and Westernized elites on the other side.”
Most analysts contend that two December 2003 attempts to assassinate President
Musharraf were carried out by Islamic militants angered by Pakistan’s post-
September 2001 policy shift.64

The leadership of the MMA’s two main constituents — the Jamaat-i-Islami’s

(JI) Qazi Hussein Ahmed and the Jamiat-Ulema-Islami (JUI)-Fazlur’s Maulana
Fazlur Rehman — are notable for their sometimes virulent anti-American rhetoric;
they have at times called for “jihad” against what they view as the existential threat
to Pakistani sovereignty that alliance with Washington entails.65 In addition to
decrying and seeking to end President Musharraf’s cooperation with the United
States, many clerics also are viewed as opposing the U.S.-supported Kabul
government. Despite their sometimes grating rhetoric, Pakistan’s Islamists have
benefitted greatly from Musharraf’s undermining of the country’s mainstream parties,
and today the MMA is a fairly cohesive political force that presents a serious
challenge to Musharraf’s policies of moderation.66 Musharraf repeatedly has called

63
“Pakistani Legislators Approve Islamic Law for Province,” New York Times, June 3, 2003;
“Baluchistan Islamization Council Set Up,” Daily Times (Lahore) July 14, 2003; Najam
Sethi, “Finish Off Religious Extremism: Musharraf,” Daily Times (Lahore), August 5,
2003.
64
Pew Research Center, “Views of a Changing World 2003,” June 3, 2003; Pew Research
Center, “A Year After Iraq War,” March 16, 2004; John Lancaster, “Pakistan Struggles to
Put Army on Moderate Course,” Washington Post, April 4, 2004; Statement of Stephen P.
Cohen Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 28, 2004; Zaffar Abbas,
“Musharraf and the Mullahs,”BBC News, December 30, 2003.
65
See “US Trying to Destabilize Pakistan, Iran: MMA,” Dawn (Karachi), November 4,
2003; “MMA Says Check on Seminaries to be Resisted,” Dawn (Karachi), November 11,
2003. JUI leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman reportedly said he considers Americans to be
“criminals” and the Taliban “innocent” (“MMA Opposes Pak-US Military Drive,” News
(Karachi), June 24, 2003).
66
See Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism, and Democracy in Pakistan,” Middle East
Journal 58, 2, Spring 2004.
 CRS-18

on Pakistan’s Muslim clerics to assist in fighting extremism and improving

Pakistan’s image as a moderate and progressive state.67

Legislation and Issues for Congress

U.S. Aid and Aid Restrictions
Pakistan is among the world’s top recipients of U.S. assistance, with nearly $2
billion in U.S. aid in FY2002-FY2004, including more than $750 million for
security-related programs. In June 2003, President Bush hosted President Musharraf
at Camp David, Maryland, where he pledged to work with Congress on establishing
a five-year, $3 billion aid package for Pakistan to begin in FY2005. Gen.
Musharraf’s extra-constitutional seizure of power in October 1999 triggered penalties
under Section 508 of the annual foreign assistance appropriations act, which bans
non-humanitarian U.S. assistance “to any country whose duly elected head of
government is deposed by military coup or decree.”68 In October 2001 (P.L. 107-57),
Congress waived coup-related aid restrictions for FY2002 and granted the President
waiver authority for FY2003. President Bush exercised this in March 2003. A
November 2003 emergency supplemental appropriations bill (P.L. 108-106) included
a provision extending the President’s waiver authority through FY2004; this was
exercised in March 2004. In September 2004, Congress extended the President’s
waiver authority through FY2005 with the passage of H.R. 4818. In the 108th
Congress, pending legislation includes H.R. 1403, which seeks to remove the
President’s waiver authority.69

67
Rana Qaisar, “Clerics Asked to Help Fight Terror,” Daily Times (Lahore), February 18,
2004.
68
Assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies
to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a
democratically elected government has taken office.
69
In 2002, some Members of the 107th Congress suggested a reimposition of restrictions on
aid to Pakistan in light of what were perceived to be continuing anti-democratic practices
by the Musharraf government. A bill on such sanctions (H.R. 5150) saw no floor action.
See also CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions, by
Diane Rennack.
 CRS-19

Figure 1. U.S. Assistance to Pakistan

FY2001-FY2005
(in millions of dollars, excluding food aid)

In August 2003, Pakistan and the U.S. Agency for International Development
established a three-year grant program to support more participatory, representative,
and accountable democracy in Pakistan. Six “good governance” projects have been
funded with $19 million to date; the total over three years is expected to be double
that amount. The “Strengthening National and Provincial Legislative Governance
in Pakistan” project accounts for the great majority of budgeted funds and is overseen
by World Vision, an independent private Christian organization. According to
USAID, the project aims to improve the transparency, accountability and competency
of the legislative branch and establish strong relations between legislative bodies,
civil society and citizens. Smaller projects seek to strengthen civil society
organizations and the media.70

Succession Issues
An acute concern of many U.S. policy makers is the issue of political succession
in Pakistan, especially as it relates to potential domestic upheaval and control of that
country’s nuclear arsenal.71 The constitutionally-designated successor to the

70
See USAID Pakistan at [http://www.usaid.gov/pk].
71
David Sanger and Thom Shanker, “A Nuclear Headache,” New York Times, December 30,
2003. The physical security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons materials and technologies has
become a vital issue in the wake of September 2001 and appeared vulnerable after the public
exposure of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s transcontinental proliferation network. Al Qaeda
members reportedly have met with Pakistani nuclear scientists (Kamran Khan and Molly
Moore, “2 Nuclear Experts Briefed Bin Laden, Pakistanis Say,” Washington Post, December
12, 2001). See also CRS Report RL31589, Nuclear Threat Reduction Measures for India
(continued...)
 CRS-20

President is the Chairman of the Senate, currently PML-Q member and Musharraf
loyalist Muhammadmian Soomro, an international banker from a well-known Sindhi
family. It is the President’s prerogative to appoint Army Chiefs. The consensus view
among analysts has the Pakistani military maintaining its substantive administration
of the country in the event of President Musharraf’s premature removal. The nature
of such a potential removal likely would influence the scope and intensity of military
governance. For example, if Musharraf were removed through violent means, it is
quite possible that the army would declare martial law and rule directly for a period.
In any case, it is widely assumed that the hierarchical solidarity and historic
professionalism of Pakistan’s military would result in its continued effectiveness as
a stabilizing force, at least in the short- and perhaps middle-term.

After his September 2001 policy shift, Musharraf moved to purge pro-Taliban
Islamists from the higher ranks of the military. Vice-Chief of Army Staff (COAS)
Gen. Mohammed Yusuf, a moderate, was seen as the most likely successor to the
position of COAS, although some observers identified the Chairman of the Joints
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Gen. Mohammad Aziz, as a contender. While considered
fully loyal to the army, of Pakistan’s 30 highest ranking officers, Gen. Aziz may have
been the only remaining with meaningful links to Islamist groups.72 Both Gen. Yusuf
and Gen. Aziz retire in October 2004. President Musharraf has named two close
allies to replace them: Lt. Gen. Ahsan Salim Hayat, the Karachi Corps Commander,
will be the new Vice-COAS and the senior-most army officer after Musharraf; ISI
chief Lt. Gen. Ehsan ul-Haq, a moderate who oversaw the removal of pro-Taliban
officers from Pakistan’s intelligence service after September 2001, has been
appointed Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Committee. Gen. Hayat narrowly
escaped assassination in a bloody June 2004 attack on his motorcade, an event which
appeared to confirm his status as an enemy of Islamic extremists. The newly-
promoted four-star general is believed to be one of Musharraf’s closest allies in the
military and his most likely successor as Army Chief.73

Given Pakistan’s strategic setting, large Muslim population, experience with

religious extremism, weapons proliferation activities, and historical involvement in
regional conflict, the level of stability and quality of governance there are likely to
remain of keen interest to most U.S. policy makers.

71
(...continued)
and Pakistan, by Sharon Squassoni, and Rajesh Basrur and Hasan Askari-Rizvi, “Nuclear
Terrorism and South Asia,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper 25, Sandia
National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, February 2003.
72
See B. Raman, “After Musharraf, What?,” Outlook India (Delhi), December 25, 2003.
73
“Pakistan’s Musharraf Names Aides to Top Army Slots,” Reuters News, October 2, 2004.;
Zahid Hussain, “Musharraf Keeps Army Post in Military Shake-Up,” Wall Street Journal,
October 4, 2004.
 CRS-21

Figure 2. Map of Pakistan