SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 551 12/1/19, 10:38 AM

Factual findings of agencies exercising quasi-judicial

functions, like the National Labor Relations Commission,
are accorded not only respect but even finality aside from
the consideration that the Supreme Court is essentially not
a trier of facts. (Aquino vs. Court of Appeals, 502 SCRA 76
[2006])

··o0o··

G.R. No. 169370. April 14, 2008.*

EUSTACIO ATWEL, LUCIA PILPIL and MANUEL

MELGAZO, petitioners, vs. CONCEPCION
**
PROGRESSIVE ASSOCIATION, INC., respondent.

Courts; Jurisdictions; Corporation Law; Intra-Corporate

Disputes; Elements.·To determine whether a case involves an
intra-corporate controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC,
two elements must concur: (1) the status or relationship of the
parties, and (2) the nature of the question that is subject of their
controversy. The first element requires that the controversy must
arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations: (a) between
any or all of the parties and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates;
(b) between any or all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or associates
and (c) between such corporation, partnership or association and
the State insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. On the
other hand, the second element requires that the dispute among the
parties be intrinsically connected with the regulation of the
corporation. If the nature of the

_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

** Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo, presiding judge of Branch 8 of the Regional

Trial Court of Tacloban City, was impleaded as respondent. However, his name
was deleted from the title pursuant to Rule 45, Section 4 of the Rules which
states that public respondents, like judges of the lower courts, need not be
impleaded in the petition.

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

controversy involves matters that are purely civil in character,

necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-corporate controversy.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction by Estoppel; The operation of estoppel
on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the
lower court actually had jurisdiction or not·if it had no
jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that
it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from
assailing such jurisdiction, for the same „must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel,‰ but if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, the party who induced it to
adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.·In
Lozon v. NLRC, 240 SCRA 1 (1995), this Court came up with a clear
rule on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it does not:
The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually had
jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was
tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same „must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel.‰ However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as
that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position·that the lower court had jurisdiction . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968),
represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking the lack
of jurisdiction only did so after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage
where the case was already elevated to the Court of Appeals.·We
likewise held in Metromedia that Tijam provided an exceptional
circumstance. To void the trial courtÊs decision in Tijam for lack of
jurisdiction was not only unfair but patently revolting considering
that the question on jurisdiction was raised only after 15 years of
tedious litigation. We said: The notion that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel on the party invoking the
same most prominently emerged in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy . . . .
[H]owever, Tijam represented an exceptional case wherein the party
invoking

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

the lack of jurisdiction only did so after fifteen (15) years, and at a
stage where the case was already elevated to the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; The rule remains that estoppel does not
confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action or subject matter of the case.·The rule remains that estoppel
does not confer jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the
cause of action or subject matter of the case. Unfortunately for
CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to warrant
divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel is not available
here.
Same; Same; Same; Judgments; It is neither fair nor legal to
bind a party to the result of a suit or proceeding in a court with no
jurisdiction; The decision of a tribunal not vested with the
appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.·CPAI cannot be
permitted to wrest from petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers)
the administration of the disputed property until after the partiesÊ
rights are clearly adjudicated in the proper courts. It is neither fair
nor legal to bind a party to the result of a suit or proceeding in a
court with no jurisdiction. The decision of a tribunal not vested with
the appropriate jurisdiction is null and void.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Richard W. Sison & Associates for petitioners.
Josenilo Reoma for respondent.

CORONA, J.:

The present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

assails the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
March 17, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 85170, declaring
petition-

_______________

1 Penned by Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with the concurrence of

Justices Vicente L. Yap (retired) and Enrico A. Lanzanas, Twentieth
Division of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 29-35.

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

ers Eustacio Atwel,2 Lucia Pilpil and Manuel Melgazo

estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of Branch 8 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban City as a

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special commercial court under Republic Act (RA) No.

8799.3
The facts follow:
In 1948, then Assemblyman Emiliano Melgazo4 founded
and organized Concepcion Progressive Association (CPA) in
Hilongos, Leyte. The organization aimed to provide
livelihood to and generate income for his supporters.
In 1968, after his election as CPA president, Emiliano
Melgazo bought a parcel of land in behalf of the association.
The property was later on converted into a wet market
where agricultural, livestock and other farm products were
sold. It also housed a cockpit and an area for various forms
of amusement. The income generated from the property,
mostly rentals from the wet market, was paid to CPA.
When Emiliano Melgazo died, his son, petitioner Manuel
Melgazo, succeeded him as CPA president and
administrator of the property. On the other hand,
petitioners Atwel and Pilpil were elected as CPA vice-
president and treasurer, respectively.
In 1997, while CPA was in the process of registering as a
stock corporation, its other elected officers and members
formed their own group and registered themselves in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as officers and
members of respondent Concepcion Progressive
Association,

_______________

2 Also referred to as „Eustacio Atuel‰ in the Records.

3 The Securities Regulation Code, which took effect on August 8, 2000.
Under RA 8799, jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies and other
cases in PD 902-A (Reorganization of the Securities and Exchange
Commission) was transferred from the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The creation of
special commercial courts was by virtue of A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
promulgated on 21 November 2000.
4 Petitioner Manuel MelgazoÊs father.

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276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

Inc. (CPAI). Petitioners were not listed either as officers or

members of CPAI. Later, CPAI objected to petitionersÊ
collection of rentals from the wet market vendors.
In 2000, CPAI filed a case in the SEC for mandatory
injunction.5 With the passage of RA 8799, the case was
transferred to Branch 24 of the Southern Leyte RTC and
subsequently, to Branch 8 of the Tacloban City RTC. Both
were special commercial courts.

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In the complaint, CPAI alleged that it was the owner of

the property and petitioners, without authority, were
collecting rentals from the wet market vendors.
In their answer, petitioners refuted CPAIÊs claim saying
that it was preposterous and impossible for the latter to
have acquired ownership over the property in 1968 when it
was only in 1997 that it was incorporated and registered
with the SEC. Petitioners added that since the property
was purchased using the money of petitioner Manuel
MelgazoÊs father (the late Emiliano Melgazo), it belonged to
the latter.
On June 9, 2004, the special commercial court ruled that
the deed of sale covering the property was in the name of
CPA, not Emiliano Melgazo:

„The terms and language of said Deed is unmistakable that the

vendee is [CPA], through Emiliano Melgazo, and Emiliano Melgazo
signed said Deed „for and [in] behalf of the CPA‰. . . there is
therefore no doubt as to who the vendee is. It is [CPA] and not
Emiliano Melgazo. As such, it is [CPA] who is the owner of said
property and not [petitioner] Manuel Melgazo . . . [Petitioners]
contend that the money used in the purchase of [the property] was
Emiliano Melgazo[Ês]. This Court is not persuaded and to rule
otherwise. . . will be a contravention [to] the Parole Evidence
Rule.‰6

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5 With a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. SEC

Case No. 2001-07-110.
6 Rollo, p. 80. Under Rule 130, Section 9, when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered to contain all the terms agreed
upon. As between the parties and their succes-

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

In the dispositive portion of the decision, the court,

however, considered CPA to be one and the same as CPAI:

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds for [CPAI]

and against [petitioners] and the latter are hereby directed to cease
and desist from collecting the vendorÊs fee for and [on] behalf of
[CPAI] and to account what they have collected from October 1996
up to the present and [turn over] the same to the proper officer.
SO ORDERED.‰7

Aggrieved, petitioners went to the CA and contested the

jurisdiction of the special commercial court over the case.

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According to them, they were not CPAI members, hence the

case did not involve an intra-corporate dispute „between
and among members‰ so as to warrant the special
commercial courtÊs jurisdiction over it. CPAI, on the other
hand, argued that petitioners were already in estoppel as
they had participated actively in the court proceedings.
In its assailed decision of March 17, 2005, although the
CA found that the special commercial court should not have
tried the case since there was no intra-corporate dispute
among CPAI members or officers, it nonetheless held that
petitioners were already barred from questioning the
courtÊs jurisdiction based on the doctrine of estoppel.
Quoting this CourtÊs ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,8 the
CA held:

_______________

sors in interest, there can be no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.

7 Id., p. 81. Decided by Judge Salvador Y. Apurillo.

8 131 Phil. 556; 23 SCRA 29 (1968). In this case, Tijam filed a case for
recovery of sum of money in 1948 in the then Court of First Instance
(CFI), now RTC. Respondent SibonghanoyÊs surety filed a counter-bond.
When Sibonghanoy lost to Tijam, a writ of execution was later issued
against the bond. The surety opposed the execution and assailed the
CFIÊs jurisdiction contending that it was the inferior courts that had
jurisdiction over the case. The Supreme Court held in this case that,
although the inferior court had jurisdiction, the surety was already
estopped from questioning the CFIÊs jurisdic-

278

278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

„An examination of the record of the case will show that [CPAI]
admitted in its Pre-Trial Brief and Amended Pre-Trial Brief that
petitioners are not its members. The fact that petitioners are
admittedly not members of [CPAI], then, [the special commercial
court] should not have taken cognizance of the case as [it] exercises
special and limited jurisdiction under R.A. No. 8799. However, as
correctly argued and pointed out by [CPAI], the acts of the
petitioners, through their counsel, in participating in the trial of the
case . . . show that they themselves consider the trial court to have
jurisdiction over the case.9
x x x   x x x   x x x
. . . [I]n the case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, the Supreme Court
categorically that:

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„The rule is that the jurisdiction over the subject matter is

conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and as the lack
of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance
of the case, the objection may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. However, considering the facts and the
circumstances of the present case, a party may be barred by
laches from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for
the purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the
active participation of said party invoking the plea.‰
Hence, we agree with [CPAI] that petitioners, after actively
participating in the trial of the case, can no longer be allowed to
impugn the jurisdiction of the court . . .10
x x x   x x x   x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the petition filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the DECISION dated June 9, 2004 of the [special
commercial court] of Tacloban City, Branch 8 in SEC Case No. 2001-
07-110.
SO ORDERED.‰11

_______________

tion considering that it participated (as a quasi-party) in the proceedings and it

was only after 15 years that the question on jurisdiction was raised.

9 Supra at note 1.
10 Id., p. 33.
11 Id., p. 34.

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was

denied by the CA.12 Hence, this petition.
Petitioners essentially argue that estoppel cannot apply
because a courtÊs jurisdiction is conferred exclusively by the
Constitution or by law, not by the partiesÊ agreement or by
estoppel.
We agree.
Originally, Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) 902-A13
conferred on the SEC original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the following:

„(1) Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board

of directors, business associates, officers or partners, amounting to
fraud or misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the
interest of the public and/or of the stockholders, partners, or

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members of any corporation, partnership, or association;

 Controversies arising out of intra-corporate,
(2) 
partnership, or association relations, between and among
stockholders, members, or associates; or association of
which they are stockholders, members, or associates,
respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors,
trustees, officers or managers of corporations, partnerships, or
associations;
(4) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to
be declared in the state of suspension of payment in cases where the
corporation, partnership or association possesses sufficient property
to cover all its debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them
when they fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities but is
under the management of a rehabilitation receiver or management
committee . . .‰ (emphasis supplied)

Upon the enactment of RA 8799 in 2000, the jurisdiction

of the SEC over intra-corporate controversies and other
cases

_______________

12 Resolution dated August 12, 2005. Rollo, pp. 36-37.

13 Reorganization of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

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280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the

courts of general jurisdiction. Under this authority, Branch
8 of the Tacloban City RTC, acting as a special commercial
court, deemed the mandatory injunction case filed by CPAI
an intra-corporate dispute falling under subparagraph (2)
of the aforecited provision as it involved the officers and
members thereof.
To determine whether a case involves an intra-corporate
controversy to be heard and decided by the RTC, two
elements must concur:
(1) the status or relationship of the parties, and
(2) the nature of the question that is subject of
their controversy.14
The first element requires that the controversy must
arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations: (a)
between any or all of the parties and the corporation,

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partnership or association of which they are stockholders,

members or associates; (b) between any or all of them and
the corporation, partnership or association of which they
are stockholders, members or associates and (c) between
such corporation, partnership or association and the State
insofar as it concerns their individual franchises. On the
other hand, the second element requires that the dispute
among the parties be intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation.15 If the nature of the
controversy involves matters that are purely civil in
character, necessarily, the case does not involve an intra-
corporate controversy.16
In the case at bar, these elements are not present. The
records reveal that petitioners were never officers nor
members of CPAI. CPAI itself admitted this in its
pleadings. In fact,

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14 Speed Distributing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 739;

425 SCRA 691 (2004).
15 Id.
16 Id.

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

petitioners were the only remaining members of CPA

which, obviously, was not the CPAI that was registered in
the SEC.
Moreover, the issue in this case does not concern the
regulation of CPAI (or even CPA). The determination as to
who is the true owner of the disputed property entitled to
the income generated therefrom is civil in nature and
should be threshed out in a regular court. Cases of this
nature are cognizable by the RTC under BP 129.17
Therefore, the conflict among the parties here was outside
the jurisdiction of the special commercial court.
But did the doctrine of estoppel bar petitioners from
questioning the jurisdiction of the special commercial
court? No.
In Lozon v. NLRC,18 this Court came up with a clear
rule on when jurisdiction by estoppel applies and when it
does not:

„The operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction

seemingly depends on whether the lower court actually had

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jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was

tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction,
the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same „must exist as a matter of law, and
may not be conferred by the consent of the parties or by
estoppel.‰ However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case
was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as
that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt
such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position·that the lower court had jurisdiction . . . .‰
(emphasis supplied)

The ruling was reiterated in Metromedia Times

Corporation [(Metromedia)] v. Pastorin,19 where we
reversed the CA ruling that Metromedia was already
estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter (LA) after it participated in the proceedings before
him. There, an illegal dis-

_______________

17 The Judiciary Reorganization Act.

18 310 Phil. 1; 240 SCRA 1 (1995).
19 G.R. No. 154295, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 320.

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282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

missal case was filed by an employee against Metromedia

alleging that his transfer to another department20 was
tantamount to constructive dismissal. Realizing the issue
was properly cognizable by a voluntary arbitrator,
Metromedia assailed the LAÊs jurisdiction in the NLRC and
the CA. The CA, also citing Tijam,21 ruled erroneously that
Metromedia was already barred from questioning the LAÊs
jurisdiction.
We likewise held in Metromedia that Tijam provided an
exceptional circumstance. To void the trial courtÊs decision
in Tijam for lack of jurisdiction was not only unfair but
patently revolting considering that the question on
jurisdiction was raised only after 15 years of tedious
litigation.22 We said:

„The notion that the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived

by estoppel on the party invoking the same most prominently
emerged in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy . . . . [H]owever, Tijam
represented an exceptional case wherein the party invoking the lack
of jurisdiction only did so after fifteen (15) years, and at a stage

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where the case was already elevated to the Court of Appeals.‰

In Calimlim v. Ramirez,23 which we extensively quoted

in Metromedia, we spoke of Tijam in this sense:

„A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and

upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that jurisdiction is a
matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of
the parties. . . . [T]his doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of [Tijam v.] Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however,
that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional
circumstances involved in [Tijam v.] Sibonghanoy which justified
the departure from the ac-

_______________

20 Due to his failure to pay his personal obligations to Metro​mediaÊs client.

21 Supra at note 8.
22 Id. It was SibonghanoyÊs surety that questioned the courtÊs jurisdiction in
this case.
23 No. L-34362, 19 November 1982, 118 SCRA 399.

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Atwel vs. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc.

cepted doctrine of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has

been ignored and instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling [therein] not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time-honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction
is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.‰

The rule remains that estoppel does not confer

jurisdiction on a tribunal that has none over the cause of
action or subject matter of the case.24 Unfortunately for
CPAI, no exceptional circumstance appears in this case to
warrant divergence from the rule. Jurisdiction by estoppel
is not available here.
Consequently, CPAI cannot be permitted to wrest from
petitioners (as the remaining CPA officers) the
administration of the disputed property until after the
partiesÊ rights are clearly adjudicated in the proper courts.
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party to the result of a
suit or proceeding in a court with no jurisdiction.25 The
decision of a tribunal not vested with the appropriate
jurisdiction is null and void.26
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

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assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

85170 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, SEC
Case No. 2001-07-110 is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

Puno (Chairperson), Carpio and Leonardo-De Castro,

JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., On Official Leave.

_______________

24 See also Southeast Asian Fisheries and Development Center-

Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 86773, 14 February 1992, 206 SCRA 283; Union
Motors Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 373 Phil.
310; 314 SCRA 531 (1999).
25 Calimlim v. Ramirez, supra.
26 Id.

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