Art. 54.

Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage under
Article 36 has become final and executory shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or born of the
subsequent marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be legitimate. 

PATERNITY AND FILIATION

Chapter 1. Legitimate Children

Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. (n)
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a
donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the
child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided
in this Code. (n)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: 
(a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
(b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse;
(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been that of the
husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
(3) That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification
of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence. (255a)

Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)
Art. 168. If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted another marriage within THREE
HUNDRED days after such termination of the former marriage, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof
to the contrary:
(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the solemnization of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the subsequent marriage is
considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three hundred
days after the termination of the former marriage. (259a)
Art. 169. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three hundred days following the termination
of the marriage shall be proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy. (261a)

Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do not reside at the place of birth as defined in the first
paragraph or where it was recorded, the period shall be two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and
three years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed from or was unknown to the husband or
his heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the child or of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier. (263a)
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

Chapter 2. Proof of Filiation

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during MINORITY or in a state of INSANITy. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:
(1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil
Code on Surnames;
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers and
sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional rights granted to them by the Civil
Code. (264a)

Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (289a)
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) 
 
Chapter 4. Legitimated Children

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, WERE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY each other may be
legitimated. (269a)
Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation. (270a) 
Art. 179. Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children. (272a)
Art. 180. The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the time of the child's birth. (273a)
Art. 181. The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their
descendants. (274)
Art. 182. Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five years
from the time their cause of action accrues.(275a) 
 

MARIANO ANDAL, assisted by mother Maria Dueñas as guardian ad litem, and MARIA DUEÑAS,
plaintiffs, vs. EDUVIGIS MACARAIG, defendant.

Facts: Mariano Andal, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the
CIF of Camarines Sur for the RECOVERY OF THE OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION OF A PARCEL
OF LAND situated in Camarines Sur. The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of
Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas and that Emiliano was the owner of the parcel of land in question having
acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS executed
by the latter in favor of the former. 

Emiliano Andal became sick of tuberculosis. Sometime thereafter, his brother, Felix, went to live in his house
to help him work his house to help him work his farm. His sickness became worse, he became so weak that he
could hardly move and get up from his bed. MARIA DUEÑAS, HIS WIFE, ELOPED WITH FELIX, and
both went to live in the house of Maria's father. Felix and Maria had sexual intercourse and treated each other as
husband and wife. Emiliano died without the presence of his wife, who did not even attend his funeral. Maria
Dueñas gave birth to a boy, who was given the name of Mariano Andal. 

The LOWER COURT RENDERED JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiffs:

(a) declaring Mariano Andal the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and such entitled to inherit the land in
question;
(b) declaring Mariano Andal owner of said land; and
(c) ordering the defendant to pay the costs of suit.

Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the child is considered as the legitimate son of Emiliano. 

RULING: MARIANO IS THE LEGITIMATE SON OF EMILIANO.

Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed
to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife. It is already seen that Emiliano and his wife were living
together, or at least had access one to the other, and Emiliano was not impotent, and the child was born within
300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. Under these facts no other presumption can be drawn than
that the issue is legitimate. It is also seen that this presumption can only be rebutted by clear proof that it was
physically or naturally impossible for them to indulge in carnal intercourse. And here there is no such proof.

Republic Act No. 9255

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 1 Series of 2004
 RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.
9255 (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for the
Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, Otherwise Known as the "Family Code of the
Philippines")

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner, vs. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A.
ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,
Manila, respondents.

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for
the latter to RECOGNIZE AND SUPPORT ROSENDO AS HIS BIOLOGICAL SON. Herrera denied
Armi’s allegations.

In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid )DNA testing to
establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba.

However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered
widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be admissible in court; and that the said test is
unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Herrera is correct.

HELD: No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in  Pe Lim vs CA  that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the prevailing
doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, IN 2002 there is already no question as to the acceptability of DNA
test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive ruling in the case
of People vs Vallejo (2002).

In the Vallejo Case, the Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other
hand, as to determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides, which
is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines:

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the
following data:

1. HOW THE SAMPLES WERE COLLECTED,

2. HOW THEY WERE HANDLED,
3. THE POSSIBILITY OF CONTAMINATION OF THE SAMPLES,
4. THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN ANALYZING THE SAMPLES,
 5. WHETHER THE PROPER STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES WERE
FOLLOWED IN CONDUCTING THE TESTS,
6. AND THE QUALIFICATION OF THE ANALYST WHO CONDUCTED THE
TESTS.

The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US jurisprudence
(Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be employed by courts before
admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the Daubert Test inquires:

1. Whether the theory or technique can be tested,

2. Whether the proffered work has been subjected to peer review,
3. Whether the rate of error is acceptable,
4. Whether the method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance

In this case, the Supreme Court declared that IN FILIATION CASES, before paternity inclusion can be had,
the DNA test result must state that the there is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological
father.   HOWEVER, a 99.9% probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) DOES NOT
IMMEDIATELY RESULT IN THE DNA TEST RESULT BEING ADMITTED AS AN
OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE. It does not automatically become a conclusive proof that the alleged father,
in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child (Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable
evidence which can be brought down if the Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with.

What if the result provides that there is less than 99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological
father?

Then the evidence is merely corroborative.

Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an
exclusion of evidence TAKEN FROM HIS BODY when it may be material. There is no “testimonial
compulsion” in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot properly invoke self-incrimination.

There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and child.

In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:

SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. – For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxxx
 (c) “DNA evidence” constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic information
directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) “DNA profile” means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample obtained
from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that person;
(e) “DNA testing” means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of DNA
from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the information obtained
from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty,
whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same
person (direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons (kinship
analysis); and
(f) “Probability of Parentage” means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a putative
parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in a given
population.

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Minor Joanne Diaz

G.R. No. 171713, Dec. 17, 2007
Facts:
Nov 1993 – Rogelio and Jinky got acquainted, and the friendship blossomed into
love.-   J i n k y   h o w e v e r ,   w a s   a l r e a d y   m a r r i e d   t o   H a s e g a w a   K a t s u o ,   a   J a p a n e s e natio
nal, in spite of this, the lovers lived together out of which JOANNE DIAZ was born on Feb 25,
1998-  

Rogelio initially recognized  Joanne as his, ONLY TO ABANDON THE FAMILY

o n Sept 1998, Jinky thereafter files a complaint

J u d g m e n t   r e n d e r e d   i n f a v o r o f   J i n k y ,   R o g e l i o   f i l e s   a   n e w m o t i o n   a n d i s granted.

RTC again rules for Jinky given the Rogelio‘s admission that he was the one
w h o   s h o u l d e r e d   h o s p i t a l   b i l l s   d u r i n g   J o a n n e ‘ s   b i r t h   a n d   t h a t   o n   s o m e instance
s he continued visiting Jinky after the birth  of Joanne.

  R o g e l i o   g o e s   t o   t h e C o u r t o f   A p p e a l s ,   d u r i n g t h e   p e n d e n c y o f   t h e t r i a l , HOWEVER HE
DIES, and is substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong.- CA remands the case to the RTC for DNA
analysis to finally determine the paternity of Joanne, hence the petition

Issue:
W/n the court erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that said analysis is no
longer feasible given that Rogelio Ong is dead
Held:
No, decision of the appellate court is affirmed.- Case discusses DNA testing again, see Herrera vs Alba.- The
new rules on DNA testing allows for the application of DNA testing for as long as biological samples
of Rogelio Ong is
presento   B i o l o g i c a l   s a m p l e s   a n y   o r g a n i c   m a t e r i a l   o r i g i n a t i n g   f r o m   t h e   p e r s o n ‘ s body, even if
found on inanimate objects- Thus, even if Rogelio is dead, biological samples may be available and used for
DNA testing-   A s   h e l d   i n   T e c s o n v s   C o m e l e c : ― A n y p h y s i c a l r e s i d u e o f   t h e l o n g   d e a d
parent could be resorted to.

Presently, DNA testing has evolved into a dependable and authoritative

formo f   e v i d e n c e   g a t h e r i n g ,   t h e   C o u r t   t h e r e f o r e   r e i t e r a t e s   i t s   s t a n d   t h a t   D N A testing is a valid
means of determining paternity
Art. 163. The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. (n)
Tison vs. CA

FACTS: The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are NIECE AND NEPHEW OF THE
DECEASED TEDORA DEZOLLER GUERRERO, who appears to be the sister of their father
Hermogenes Dezoller . The present action for RECONVEYANCE INVOLVES A PARCEL OF LAND
WITH A HOUSE AND APARTMENT which was originally owned by the spouses Martin Guerrero and
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.

Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March 5, 1983 WITHOUT ANY ASCENDANT OR DESCENDANT,

and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners' father,
Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of
representation. 

The records reveal that upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse executed an
AFFIDAVIT OF EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT ADJUDICATING UNTO HIMSELF,
ALLEGEDLY AS SOLE HEIR, THE LAND IN DISPUTE.

Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter. 

MARTIN GUERRERO DIED. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action for reconveyance claiming that
THEY ARE ENTITLED TO INHERIT ONE-HALF OF THE PROPERTY in question by right of
representation. Tedoro Domingo however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes. 

On December 3, 1992, the trial court issued an order granting the demurrer to evidence and dismissing the
complaint for reconveyance .[7]
In upholding the dismissal, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the documentary evidence presented
by herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture, and joint affidavits are all inadmissible
and insufficient to prove and establish filiation. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a third person, not the father nor an heir, may attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes 

HELD: NO. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule
that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally. 

ONLY THE HUSBAND CAN CONTEST THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD BORN TO HIS WIFE . He

is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he
should decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of
these cases, none — even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult to his memory.

The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same may be
admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time
they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an
alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since
the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive.

The PRIMARY PROOF that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is
the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or
sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered
a DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE, as an EXCEPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions:

(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify;

(2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry;
(3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and
(4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the
suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.

EVIDENCES PRESENTED: (a family picture; baptismal certificates of Teodora and Hermogenes Dezoller;
certificates of destroyed records of birth of Teodora Dezoller and Hermogenes Dezoller; death certificates of
Hermogenes Dezoller and Teodora Dezoller Guerrero; certification of destroyed records of live birth of
Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar attesting to the parents, date
and place of birth of Corazon and Rene Dezoller; joint affidavit of Juliana Cariaga and Manuela Cariaga
attesting to the fact of marriage between Martin Guerrero and Teodora Dezoller; and the marriage certificate of
Martin and Teodora Guerrero.[4] Petitioners thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of these
exhibits to which a Comment[5] was filed by herein private respondent.)

All told, on the basis of the foregoing considerations, the demurrer to plaintiffs’ evidence should have been, as
it is hereby, denied.
WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, and herein petitioners and private respondent are declared co-owners of the subject property with an
undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4) share therein, respectively.

Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli “Corazon” Angeles MAGLAYA

 
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila, leaving behind 4 parcels
of land and a building, among other valuable properties. 

Respondent Corazon claims that as the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF THE DECEASED AND
GENOVEVA MERCADO (former wife) has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required
of an administrator.

Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made
administratix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for,
although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, THE CORRESPONDING BIRTH
CERTIFICATE WAS NOT SIGNED BY HIM. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of
being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the marriage contract
between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. She also said that
she and Francisco adopted a child.

Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the January to December 1938
records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of  Bacolor, Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-
Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing
to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC at Caloocan.

Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of  a legitimate
child. FOUR OTHER WITNESSES testified on her behalf, and she also offered in evidence her BIRTH
CERTIFICATE which contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo,
Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten word “YES” APPEARS
ON THE SPACE  BELOW THE QUESTION “LEGITIMATE? (Legitimo?)”. Pictures taken during
respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T.Maglaya; a copy of her marriage contract, and her
scholastic and government service records, were also offered as evidence.

Eventually, in an Order dated July 12, 1999,[11] the trial court, on its finding that respondent failed to prove
her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco, dismissed the petition.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision dated May 29, 2002,[13]
reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint respondent as administratrix
of the estate of Francisco

ISSUE: WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado?

HELD: NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, t
herefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 164). However, the presumption of legitimacy
under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s
parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that
marriage. RESPONDENT FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF FRANCISCO’S MARRIAGE TO
GENOVEVA, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented WAS NOT
SIGNED BY FRANCISCO against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only
signed by the attending physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.

The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it CANNOT BE MADE DEPENDENT
ON THE DECLARATION OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIAN OR MIDWIFE, OR THAT OF THE
MOTHER OF THENEWBORN CHILD. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove
filiation or recognition.

Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their
child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on
conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter
of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco
and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of
competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between
herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the
surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the deceased.
 
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.

Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a
donor or both are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of them
authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by them before the
birth of the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate of the
child. (55a, 258a)
Art. 166. Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:

(1) That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife within
the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child because of: 
 (b) the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible; or

Art. 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. (256a)

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
respondents.

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named JOSE GERARDO in December 1990. 

The husband filed on December 1991, a PETITION TO HAVE HIS MARRIAGE ANNULLED ON THE
GROUND OF BIGAMY since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom
according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. 

Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. 

Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of
an illegitimate child”.  She further wanted to have the SURNAME OF THE SON CHANGED FROM
“CONCEPCION TO ALMONTE”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mother’s
surname. 

After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo
but of Mario.  Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario. 

Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of the above decision but the same was denied.[18]

Hence, this appeal.

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.[19] Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child
who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate.[20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against
its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE,
respondents.
HELD: The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the
period of conception.[28] To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code,
it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that THERE WAS NO ACCESS THAT COULD HAVE
ENABLED THE HUSBAND TO FATHER THE CHILD.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.[30
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same city but also that no evidence at all was
presented to disprove personal access between them. Considering these circumstances, the separation
between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act.

First, the import of Ma. Theresa’s statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her
illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration ― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the
very declaration that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code.

The language of the law is unmistakable. AN ASSERTION BY THE MOTHER AGAINST THE
LEGITIMACY OF HER CHILD CANNOT AFFECT THE LEGITIMACY OF A CHILD BORN OR
CONCEIVED WITHIN A VALID MARRIAGE.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there was never an instance where Ma.
Theresa could have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them.
All she said was that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened between them.
Thus, the impossibility of physical access was never established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively
lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his heirs.[37] A MOTHER HAS NO RIGHT TO DISAVOW A
CHILD BECAUSE MATERNITY IS NEVER UNCERTAIN.[38] Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by
law to question Jose Gerardo’s legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say that she had no
intercourse with her husband and that HER OFFSPRING IS ILLEGITIMATE.[39] The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean
toward the legitimacy of children.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and
Youth Welfare Code, is clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Child’s Welfare Paramount. – In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Under Article 167 of the Family Code, “the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress”.  Having the best interest of the
child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court.  As a legitimate child, the son shall
have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code
on surnames.  GERARDO CANNOT THEN IMPOSE HIS SURNAME TO BE USED BY THE CHILD,
SINCE IN THE EYES OF THE LAW, THE CHILD IS NOT RELATED TO HIM IN ANY WAY.        

Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the filiation of the child within the period prescribed in the
preceding article only in the following cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint without having desisted therefrom; or
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband. (262a)

TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B. CATOTAL, respondent.

FACTS:
-Presentacion (petitioner THEN) filed a petition for the cancellation of the entry of Birth of Teofista
(respondent) in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Presentacion asserted that she was the only surviving child of
the late Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa.
-Months after the spouses' death, a baby girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the spouses' house and the baby's
mother, Flora Guinto, and the housemaid simulated that the baby girl was the spouses' child.
-Petitioner personally witnessed Flora give birth to Teofista as contested that the birth certificate of Teofista
Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false
entries, and it was medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a child because:
1.) Hermogena was already 54 years old;
2.) Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941, the year petitioner was born.
-Teofista contends that respondent has no standing to sue, because Article 171 of the Family Code states that
the CHILD'S FILIATION CAN BE IMPUGNED ONLY BY THE FATHER OR, IN SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES, HIS HEIRS. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is not subject to a collateral attack.
She averred that she was always known as Teofista Babiera, and she and petitioner are full-blood sisters.
CERTIFICATE OF BIRTH, CERTIFICATE OF BAPTISM AND STUDENT'S REPORT CARD ARE
SHOWN with Hermogena's signature are Teofista's proof. She also pointed out that the instant petition is
barred by prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.
-CA DEEMED INAPPLICABLE ARTICLES 170 AND 171 OF THE FAMILY CODE, which stated that
only the father could impugn the child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral attack. It
held that said provisions contemplated a situation wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the
wife was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the child's Birth Certificate for being
void ab initio on the ground that the child did not belong to either the father or the mother.

ISSUES:
1. Does Presentacion have the legal capacity to file the special proceeding of appeal?
2. Is the special proceeding on appeal improper and is barred by the statute of limitation (prescription)?
3. Has CA failed to hold that the ancient public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the self-serving oral
testimony of respondent?

RULING:
1. This argument is incorrect. Presentacion has the requisite standing to initiate the present action. Section
2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." The interest of Presentacion
in the civil status of Teofista stems from an action for partition which the latter filed against the former. THE
CASE CONCERNED THE PROPERTIES INHERITED BY RESPONDENT FROM HER PARENTS.

2. The PRESENT ACTION INVOLVES THE CANCELLATION OF PETITIONER'S BIRTH

CERTIFICATE; it does not impugn her legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the
Family Code DOES NOT APPLY. Verily, the action to NULLIFY THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE DOES
NOT PRESCRIBE, because it was allegedly void ab initio.
3. While it is true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of
regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during
trial, sufficiently negate such presumption. 

First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was NOT SIGNED
BY THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR. More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the
MOTHER'S SIGNATURE THEREIN WAS DIFFERENT from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.

Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the former's
real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy, such as medical records and
doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to
the pregnancy of Hermogena during that time.

Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for
her to have given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when
her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available only in a hospital.

The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition of HERMOGENA BABIERA WHICH
STATES THAT SHE DID NOT GIVE BIRTH TO PETITIONER, and that the latter was not hers nor her
husband Eugenio's.

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO

AND FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian HAD VARIOUS PROPERTIES. Isabel died in 1982 while
his husband died in 1989 (BOTH INTESTATE).  The special proceedings for administration of the properties
were filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister VICTORIA B. LIRIO FILED FOR ISSUANCE OF
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION IN FAVOR OF THE NEPHEW.

Marissa opposed the petition, saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of
administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and testified that the spouses
TREATED HER AS THEIR OWN DAUGHTER.

The relatives of Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that THE SPOUSES FAILED TO
BEGET A CHILD during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa was not the biological
child of the spouses who were unable to physically procreate.

Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of Marissa.

On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and declared Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological
child of the late spouses.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.

RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above
provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged not to be the biological child of a certain
couple.

In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:

(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child;
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his child;

(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file
an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that Marissa is not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not
born to Vicente and Isabel.

Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of Live Birth was repudiated by
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that HE AND HIS
BROTHER-IN-LAW ARE THE SOLE HEIRS OF THE ESTATE.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)

Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during MINORITY or in a state of INSANITy. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on
the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent. (289a)

BERNABE VS ALEJO

Doctrine:
Procedural laws do not create vested rights. Test for determining whether rule is substantive/procedural: If
the rule merely regulates procedure, that is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties, and for justly
administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them, it is merely PROCEDURAL.

But if the rule creates a right, such as the right to appeal, it is SUBSTANTIVE. However, if it operates merely as a
means to implementing an existing right, then the rule merely deals with PROCEDURE.

Facts:
•Fiscal Bernabe (married to Rosalina) fathered a SON WITH HIS SECRETARY ALEJO.
•In 1993, Fiscal Bernabe and his legitimate wife Rosalinda died, leaving their only daughter Ernestina as heir.
•In 1994, Secretary Alejo filed  a complaint praying that Adrian be declared and acknowledged as Fiscal
Bernabe’s son and thus be given a share in his estate.

•Relevant CC and FC provisions:

CC 285: The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the  presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1)If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may
file the action before the EXPIRATION OF FOUR YEARS FROM  THE ATTAINMENT OF
HIS MAJORITY;
(2)If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which
nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case,
the action must be COMMENCED WITHIN FOUR YEARS FROM THE FINDING OF
THE DOCUMENT.

FC 172: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1)The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2)An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private hand written instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1)The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”

FC 173: The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority orin a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by
the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both ofthe parties.

FC 174: Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Procedure:
•RTC: Dismissed the complaint.

Death of putative father barred the action because under the FC, if the putative father had not acknowledged the
child in writing, the action should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father. In this case, father
is already dead.

•CA: Allowed the complaint to proceed.

Since Adrian was born in 1981, his rights are governed by CC, not FC, which allows an action for recognition to
be filed within 4 years after the child has attained age of  majority. The enactment of the FC did not take
away that right.

Issue/s:
1. (TOPICAL) When is the period to file an action for recognition? CC must be applied, hence,
4 years after child attains age of Majority.
2. (IRRELEVANT) Whether CC 285 is limited to “natural” children? NO.
3. (IRRELEVANT) Whether the complaint must fail for failure to implead CA. NO.

Held/Ratio:
1. CC provision at BAR IS A SUBSTANTIVE LAW (not merely procedural) which gives rise to a vested
right which cannot be imparied by the retroactive applicaton of the FC.

•The FC provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to itsenactment should not be prejudiced
or impaired (FC 255). Adrian’s right to  an action or recognition under the CC is a VESTED RIGHT
(definition of vested right: that which is absolute and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists
and is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.)

•IMPORTANT IN THIS CASE

: Respondent argues that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and as a general rule, “no vested
right may attach or arise from procedural laws”.

 The SC in this case held that the provision at bar is SUBSTANTIVE LAW, and not merely procedural. Hence,
vested right may attach.

FABIAN VS DESIERTO
: the SC laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive/procedural: If the rule merely regulates
procedure, that is the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties, and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them, it is merely PROCEDURAL. But if the rule creates a right, such as the right to
appeal, it is SUBSTANTIVE. However, if it operates merely as a means to implementing an existing right, then the rule merely
deals with PROCEDURE.2.CC 285 is not limited to natural children.

•Definition of natural children: one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal
impediment from marrying each other.

•While CC 285 explicitly refers to “natural children”, it has been applied by the SC liberally.

The new Rules of Court no longer requires the lower judges/courts to be impleaded as

petitioner/respondent. Hence, failure to implead CA is not an error, it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

ARUEGO VS. CA
“The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its
application will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article
285 of the Civil Code.”

FACTS: Private respondent Antonia & Evelyn Aruego, as represented by her mother Fabian, filed a petition, in
the RTC, compelling the Aruego children of Torres to recognize and acknowledge them as compulsory heirs
of the deceased Jose. M. Aruego; on the grounds that they possess an open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children to wit:

(a)The plaintiffs' father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his
children verbally among plaintiffs' and their mother's family friends, as well as by myriad different
paternal ways.

(b)The plaintiffs are thus, in CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS

OF  (ILLEGITIMATE) CHILDREN of the deceased Jose M.Aruego who showered them, with the
continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above outlined.

Petitioner denied all these allegations.

The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the private respondent, declaring Antonia Aruego as
illegitimate daughter of Jose M. Aruego.

Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration alleging that the trial court lost its jurisdiction over the
complaint by virtue of the passage of Family Code of the Philippines. The motion was denied the lower court.

Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Respondent Court of Appeals. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner was also dismissed by the respondent court.

ISSUES: Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
W/N the provisions of the Family Code be applied.
W/N the application of the Family Code in this case impairs nay vested rights of the private respondent such
that it should not be given retroactive effect.

DECISION:

The Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The action brought by private
respondent Antonia Aruego for compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was
filed prior to the advent of the Family Code, MUST BE GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 285 OF THE CIVIL
CODE and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.

“Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; x x x.”
 “Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.”
“Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.

The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application
will prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article285 of the Civil
Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and
its Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

CORITO OCAMPO TAYAG, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIE DAYRIT
CUYUGAN, respondent

Herein private respondent, in her capacity as mother and legal guardian of minor CHAD D. CUYUGAN,
filed on April 9, 1987 a complaint denominated "Claim for Inheritance" against herein petitioner as the
administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo.

Plaintiff has been estranged from her husband, Jose Cuyugan, for several years now and during which time,
plaintiff and Atty. Ricardo Ocampo had illicit amorous relationship with each other that, as a consequence
thereof, they begot a child who was christened Chad Cuyugan in accordance with the ardent desire and behest
of said Atty. Ocampo

Chad, the son of plaintiff by the late Atty. Ricardo Ocampo, who was born in Angeles City on October 5,
1980 bad been sired, showered with exceptional affection, fervent love and care by his putative father for
being his only son as can be gleaned from indubitable letters and documents of the late Atty. Ocampo to
herein plaintiff

Chad D. Cuyugan, although illegitimate is nevertheless entitled to a share in the intestate estate left by his
deceased father, Atty. Ricardo Ocampo as one of the surviving heirs

The only known surviving heirs of the deceased Atty. Ricardo Ocampo ARE HIS CHILDREN, namely:
Corito O. Tayag, Rivina O. Tayag, Evita O. Florendo, Felina Ocampo, and said minor Chad, for and in whose
behalf this instant complaint is filed.

Plaintiff thereafter prays, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering defendant to render an
inventory and accounting of the real and personal properties left by Atty. Ricardo Ocampo; to determine
and deliver the share of the minor child Chad in the ESTATE OF THE DECEASED; AND TO GIVE HIM
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
She maintained by way of affirmative defenses, inter alia, that the complaint states no cause of action; that the
action is premature; that the suit as barred by prescription; that respondent Cuyugan has no legal and judicial
personality to bring the suit; that the lower court was no jurisdiction over the nature of the action; and that
there is improper joinder of causes of action

With the denial of her motion for reconsideration of said order on November 19, 1987, 6 petitioner filed on
December 10, 1987 a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as
CA-G.R. SP No. 13464, which was granted by the Sixth Division of respondent court on August 2, 1989 and
enjoined respondent judge to resolve petitioner's motion praying for the dismissal of the complaint based on
the affirmative defenses within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 7
In compliance with said decision of respondent court, the trial court acted on and thereafter denied the motion to
dismiss, which had been pleaded in the affirmative defenses

RULING OF COURT:
the case at bar is that AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT THEREIN, THE
PETITIONER IN THAT CASE HAD ALREADY REACHED THE AGE OF MAJORITY, whereas the
claimant in the present case is still a minor.

In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional rights from the
putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to allege
in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such
acknowledgment is essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the absence of a cause of action for failure
of the petitioner to allege the fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, BUT THE PRESCRIPTION OF
THE ACTION.

Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the complaint filed by
herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an illegitimate child of the
deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered as
one to compel recognition. Further that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.

If the action is based on the record of birth of the child, a final judgment, or an admission by the parent of the
child's filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten signed instrument, then the ACTION MAY
BE BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE CHILD. However, if the action is BASED ON THE
OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION BY THE CHILD OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE
CHILD, or on other evidence allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, the view has been expressed that
the ACTION MUST BE BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE ALLEGED PARENT. 13

Petitioner submits that Article 175 of the Family Code applies in which case the complaint should have been
filed during the lifetime of the putative father, failing which the same must be dismissed on the ground of
prescription. Private respondent, however, insists that Article 285 of the Civil Code is controlling and, since the
alleged parent died during the minority of the child, the action for filiation may be filed within four years from
the attainment of majority of the minor child.

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has
been vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. 1
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is DENIED and the assailed decision and resolution of respondent Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

DOROTEA, VIRGILIO, APOLINARIO, JR., SULPICIO & DOMINADOR, all surnamed UYGUANGCO,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, Judge SENEN PENARANDA and GRACIANO BACJAO
UYGUANGCO, respondents. 178 SCRA 684 (1989)

Facts: Apolinario Uyguangco died intestate in 1975.

He left his wife and 4 legitimate children (petitioners) some properties which they divided among themselves.

GRACIANO BACJAO UYGUANGCO filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners, alleging
that as the illegitimate son   of   the deceased and   Anastacia Bacjao, he mus t not be left out of the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate.

Petitioners moved to DISMISS THE CASE on the ground that Graciano could not prove his alleged
filiation having none of the documents mentioned in Art. 278, CC—record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Neither may he resort to Art. 285,
CC which provides that the action for the recognition of   natural children may be   brought
only   during   the lifetime of   the presumed parents, except in certain case. Because he IS ALREADY AN
ADULT when his alleged father died and his claim did not come under the exceptions, he could not resort to
Art. 285.

H e h o w e v e r i n s i s t s t h a t h e   h a s r i g h t   t o s h o w u n d e r A r t . 2 8 3 t h a t h e   i s “ i n continuous
possession of the status of a  child of his alleged father by the direct actsof the latter or of his family.” 

The trial court said he could and was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals. 1 The latter court held
that the trial judge had not committed any grave abuse of discretion or acted without jurisdiction in
ALLOWING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PROVE HIS FILIATION. Moreover, the proper
remedy was an ordinary appeal and not a petition for prohibition. The petitioners ask for a reversal of these
rulings on the ground that they are not in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Issue: WON Graciano may adequately prove filiation

RULING:
NO. Present petition granted & complaint for partition dismissed

The Civil Code provisions they invoke have been superseded, or at least modified by the Family Code which
is now controlling.

Since illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same waya nd on the same evidence
as legitimate children (Art 175), Graciano may establish his filiation by the means given in Art. 172.

Thus while he has no record of birth appearing in the civil registrar or a final judgment or an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument AND SIGNED BY THE
PARENT concerned, he insists that he has nevertheless been “IN   AN OPEN   AND CONTINUOUS
POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD,” WHICH IS ADMISSIBLE AS
EVIDENCE OF FILIATION UNDER ART. 172.
As proof to this open and continuous possession—he claims that he lived with his father from 1967 til 1973,
received support from him, used the name Uyguangco without objection, a special power of attorney executed
in his favor by Apolinario’swife, and another one by Suplcio Uyguangco, shared in the profits of the
copra family business of the Uyguangco’s and was even given a share in his deceased father’s estate as
found in the addendum to the original extrajudicial settlement concluded by the petitioners.

However, since his father has already died, HIS ACTION IS NOW BARRED AS ART. 172
SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES THAT WHEN THE ACTION IS BASED ON OTHER PROOFS OF
FILIATIONS SUCH AS OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION, THE ACTION MUST BE
BROUGHT DURING THE LIFETIMEOF THE ALLEGED PARENT.

Rationale for the rule:

It is a truism that unlike legitimate children who are publicly recognized, illegitimate children
are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence. Who
then can be sure of their filiation but the  parents themselves? But suppose the child claiming to be the
legitimate child of a certain person is not really the child of the latter? The putative parent should thus be
given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she
is already dead.

Graciano’s complaint is based on his contention that he is the illegitimate child of Apolinario, whose estate is
the subject of the partition sought. If this claim can no longer be proved in an action
for recognition, with more reason should it be rejected in the said complaint, where the issue
of Graciano’s filiation is being raised only collaterally.

The problem of the private respondent, however, is that, since he SEEKS TO PROVE HIS FILIATION
UNDER THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 172 OF THE FAMILY CODE, HIS ACTION IS
NOW BARRED BECAUSE OF HIS ALLEGED FATHER'S DEATH IN 1975. The second paragraph of this
Article 175 reads as follows:

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.

However, the Court expressed the hope that the parties will arrive at some kind of rapprochement based
on fraternal and moral ties that will allow Graciano an equitable share in the disputed estate.

CASIMIRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TEOPISTA TORING TUÑACAO, respondents. (G.R.
NO. 86302)

FACTS: Private respondent Teopista Toring Tuñacao alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930 to
Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana
Barrientos.

She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according to her
the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.
            
Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically DENIED the plaintiff's allegations and set-up a
counter claim for damages and attorney's fees.
            
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro. When she married Vallentin Tuñacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to
drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her
and her husband. In 1977. Casimiro allowed his son, LolitoTuñacao, to build a house on his lot and later he
gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring.
On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor.
            
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista, both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio said he was a cousin of
Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a salt-bed in Opao. Casimiro
himself told him she was his sweetheart.

Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's
brother, and his grand mother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him.

ISSUE:
            Whether or not the complaint WARRANTS for compulsory recognition.

HELD: YES, the complaint warrants for compulsory recognition.

           
All illegitimate child to be entitled to support and successional rights from his putative or presumed
parents must prove his filiation to them. Filiation may be established by the voluntary or compulsory
recognition of the illegitimate child. It is COMPULSORY WHEN BY COURT ACTION THE CHILD
BRINGS OUT HIS RECOGNITION.
           
An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and Special Laws", according to the Family Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that
the defendant is her father", according to the Civil Code.

Statements of Gaudencio and Isaac falls on Rule 130, Section 39 of the Rules of Court pertaining to Acts or
Declaration of pedigree. Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule because "it is the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from
the rejection of such proof than from its admission". If we consider the other circumstances narrated under oath
by the respondent and her witnesses, WE CAN REASONABLY CONCLUDE THAT TEOPISTA WAS
THE ILLEGITIMATE DAUGHTER OF CASIMIRO MENDOZA.
          
Judgement is hereby rendered declaring Teopisto Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late
Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.

CAMELO CABATANIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CAMELO REGODOS, respondents.

Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on September 9, 1982 and
that she was the ONE SUPPORTING THE CHILD. She recounted that after her husband left her in the
early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was eventually hired as
petitioner’s household help.

It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2, 1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where
they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got
pregnant.

Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioner’s child 27 days after their sexual encounter. The
sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that Florencia was
pregnant, petitioner’s wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang, Bacolod City where
he rented a house for her.

He testified that HE WAS A SUGAR PLANTER AND A BUSINESSMAN. Sometime in December, 1981, he
hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of her employment, she would often go home to her
husband in the afternoon and return to work the following morning. This displeased petitioner’s wife, hence she
was told to look for another job.

In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Year’s Eve in Cadiz
City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to dinner. While
they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save money. Later,
they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse.

While doing it, he felt something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with
the child of her husband.

After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its discovery that
she MISREPRESENTED HERSELF AS A WIDOW when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in
favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:

The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, BASED ON THE
PERSONAL APPEARANCE OF THE CHILD THEN THERE CAN NEVER BE A DOUBT THAT THE
PLAINTIFF-MINOR IS THE CHILD OF THE DEFENDANT with plaintiff-minor’s mother, Florencia
Regodos.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC.

RULING OF COURT: Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to
establish paternity and filiation.[6] An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome
situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if
PATERNITY OR FILIATION IS ESTABLISHED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.[

A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity
when there is NO SHOWING THAT THE PUTATIVE FATHER HAD A HAND IN THE PREPARATION
OF SAID CERTIFICATE.

The local civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a
third person.

We now proceed to the credibility of Florencia’s testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate court
brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a widow. Both
courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony.

We disagree.
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad
principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy
to protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60, in
Spec. Proc. No. 88-C is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent’s petition for recognition and
support is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO v ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ

G.R. No. 181258, March 18, 2010

Procedural History:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a
Complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-
Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).

By Order of July 4, 2001, Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, granted Arhbencel’s prayer for support pendente
lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.

On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007, reversed the trial court’s
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioner’s illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered

His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, petitioner comes
before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Statement of Facts:
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner
with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a
HANDWRITTEN NOTE dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give her
financial support in the amount ofP1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15,
1999.

Arguing that HER FILIATION TO PETITIONER WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE HANDWRITTEN

NOTE, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to:
(1) recognize her as his child,
(2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month, and
(3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.

By Order of July 4, 2001, Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioner’s handwritten note
which it treated as “contractual support” since the issue of Arhbencel’s filiation had yet to be determined
during the hearing on the merits, GRANTED ARHBENCEL’S PRAYER FOR SUPPORT pendente lite in the
amount of P3,000 a month.

The petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006, whereu
the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20, 2007, reversed the trial court’s
decision, declared Arhbencel to be petitioner’s illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to
give Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month,
or a total of P8,000 a month.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated January 3, 2008, petitioner comes
before this Court through the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not the note would be sufficient for filiation of an illegitimate child?

Answer:
                NO. A’s demand for support is dependent on the determination of her filiation (Art. 195 par. 4). The
note not containing any statement on A’s filiation to C does not fall under Art. 172(2) vis-à-vis Art. 175 which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission  of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument  signed  by the parent concerned.

Reasoning:
The note does not contain any statement about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the
ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent EVIDENCE OF
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION AN ADMISSION OF FILIATION IN A PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN
INSTRUMENT SIGNED BY THE PARENT CONCERNED.

The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to
in Herrera case for it is not even notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation.

The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no
probative value to establish filiation to petitioner, the LATTER NOT HAVING SIGNED THE SAME.

Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE.
The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch 130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions
in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force. (287a) 

ANN BRIGITT LEONARDO as represented by her parents GLORIA LEONARDO and EDDIE
FERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. TOMAS AFRICA, et al., respondents.

Petitioner Ann Brigitt Leonardo was on July 14, 1993 born in Manila to common-law-spouses Eddie B.
Fernandez and Gloria C. Leonardo.[1] In her birth certificate, her given surname is that of her mother,
Leonardo.[2]

As petitioner’s parents later wanted her to carry the surname of her father, the latter executed an
AFFIDAVIT[3] of July 29, 1994 to this effect and wrote a letter[4] of August 1, 1994 to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila requesting for the change of petitioner’s registered surname.

The Local Civil Registrar of Manila Lucena D. Dacuan DENIED THE REQUEST OF PETITIONER’S
parents on the ground that petitioner, being illegitimate, should carry her mother’s surname as provided under
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE[5] which took effect on August 3, 1988.[6] Dacuan also cited
Article 412 of the New Civil Code which provides that NO ENTRY IN THE CIVIL REGISTER SHALL BE
CHANGED OR CORRECTED WITHOUT A JUDICIAL ORDER.

Petitioner’s parents appealed the denial of their request for change of petitioner’s surname to the Civil Registrar
General, they citing, among others, the following provision of Title XIII:

Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of
the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the
recognizing parent.

Petitioner’s parents thus sought before the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) the
review of the Civil Registrar General’s decision denying their appeal.

Undaunted, petitioner’s parents appealed to the Office of the President which, by letter[9] of May 11, 1995,
upheld the decision of the Civil Registrar General and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila that the cancellation
or correction of entries in the Civil Registry must be brought directly before courts of law.

In the case at bar, the PRIMARY ISSUE to be resolved before determining petitioner’s available remedy under
the facts of the case is whether an illegitimate child born after the effectivity of the Family Code has the
right to use her father’s surname.

RULING OF COURT: This Court rules in the negative.

Article 176 of the Family Code reads:

Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether or not the father admits paternity. Consequently, the Local
Civil Registrar correctly refused to register the certificate of live birth of petitioner’s illegitimate child
using the surname of the alleged father, even with the latter’s consent.

The Family Code has effectively repealed the provisions of Article 366 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
giving a natural child acknowledged by both parents the right to use the surname of the father . The
Family Code has limited the classification of children to legitimate and illegitimate, thereby eliminating the
category of acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Since petitioner was born an illegitimate child after the Family Code took effect, she has no right to use her
father’s surname.
WHEREFORE, upon the ground discussed above, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, WERE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY each other may be
legitimated. 

REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW
MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
AS AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines",
as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the
former, WERE NOT DISQUALIFIED BY ANY IMPEDIMENT TO MARRY EACH OTHER, or were so
disqualified only because either or both of them were below eighteen (18) years of age, MAY BE
LEGITIMATED."

"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation."

Section 2. Implementing Rules. – The civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the
Committee on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Youth, Women and
Family Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine
Association of Civil Registrars (PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the
effective implementation of this Act not later than one (1) month from its effectivity.

MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS, petitioner, vs. HON. ADORACION G. ANGELES, JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CALOOCAN CITY, BRANCH 121 and CONCHITA TALAG DE
SANTOS, respondents.

On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter,
herein petitioner MARIA ROSARIO DE SANTOS. After some time, their relationship became strained to
the breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a fellow doctor, CONCHITA TALAG, PRIVATE
RESPONDENT HEREIN. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first marriage by obtaining a divorce
decree from a Nevada court in 1949.

Antonio proceeded to Tokyo, Japan in 1951 to marry private respondent, with whom he had been
cohabiting since his de facto separation from Sofia. This union produced eleven children. On March 30, 1967,

Sofia died in Guatemala. Less than a month later, on April 23, 1967, ANTONIO AND PRIVATE
RESPONDENT CONTRACTED A MARRIAGE IN TAGAYTAY CITY celebrated under Philippine laws.

On March 8, 1981, Antonio died intestate leaving properties with an estimated value of P15,000,000.00.

On May 15, 1981, private respondent went to court 1 asking for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor in connection with the settlement of her late husband's estate. She alleged, among other things, that the
decedent was survived by twelve legitimate heirs, namely, herself, their ten surviving children, and petitioner.
There being no opposition, her petition was granted.

AFTER SIX YEARS of protracted intestate proceedings, however, petitioner decided to intervene. Thus,
in a motion she filed sometime in November 1987, she argued inter alia that PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S
CHILDREN WERE ILLEGITIMATE.

On November 14, 1991, after approval of private respondent's account of her administration, the court a quo
passed upon petitioner's motion. The court, citing the case of Francisco H. Tongoy, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al. (23 SCRA 99 [1983]), declared private respondent's ten children legitimated and thereupon instituted and
declared them, along with petitioner and private respondent, as the heirs of Antonio de Santos.

RULING OF COURT: Hence, she filed the instant petition for certiorari on June 16, 1992, contending that
since only natural children can be legitimized, the trial court mistakenly declared as legitimated her half
brothers and sisters.

This argument is tenable.

Article 269 of the Civil Code expressly states:

Art. 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
are natural.

In the case at bench, there is NO QUESTION THAT ALL THE CHILDREN BORN TO PRIVATE
RESPONDENT AND DECEASED ANTONIO DE SANTOS WERE CONCEIVED AND BORN WHEN
THE LATTER'S VALID MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER'S MOTHER WAS STILL SUBSISTING.

It creates another category of illegitimate children, those who are "conceived or born of marriages which are
void from the beginning," but because there has been a semblance of marriage, they are classified as
"ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILDREN" and, accordingly, enjoy the same status, rights and
obligations as such kind of children.

The Civil Code provides three rights which, in varying degrees, are enjoyed by children, depending on their
filiation: use of SURNAME, SUCCESSION, AND SUPPORT.

Legitimate children and legitimated children are entitled to all three. 2 Thus, they "shall principally use
the surname of the father," 3 and shall be entitled to support from their legitimate ascendants and
descendants, 4 as well as to a legitime consisting of one-half of the hereditary estate of both parents, 5 and to
other successional rights, such as the right of representation. "These rights as effects of legitimacy cannot be
renounced."

Another point to be considered is that although natural children can be legitimized, and natural children by
legal fiction enjoy the rights of acknowledged natural children, this does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that natural children by legal fiction can likewise be legitimized. As has been pointed out, much
more is involved here than the mere privilege to be legitimized. The rights of other children, like the petitioner
in the case at bench, may be adversely affected as her testamentary share may well be reduced in the event that
her ten surviving half siblings should be placed on par with her, when each of them is rightfully entitled to only
half of her share.

The hierarchy of children so painstakingly erected by law and the corresponding gradation of their rights may
conceivably be shattered by elevating natural children by legal fiction who are incontestably illegitimate
children to the level of natural children proper, whose filiation would otherwise be legitimate had their
parents blessed their union with a valid marriage.

Finally, attention must be drawn to the fact that this case has been decided under the provisions of the Civil
Code, not the Family Code which now recognizes only two classes of children: legitimate and illegitimate.
"Natural children by legal fiction" are nothing if not pure fiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed orders of the court a quo dated
November 14, 1991 and January 9, 1992, are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Rosario de
Santos is hereby declared the SOLE LEGITIMATE CHILD of the decedent Antonio de Santos and, as such,
entitled to all the rights accorded to her by law.
SO ORDERED.