Sanidad v Comelec G.R. No.

L-44640 October 12, 1976

FACTS:

The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the
power of the incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present
Constitution in the absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened

On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD 991 calling for a national
referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve the issues
of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period
of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.

On 22 September 1976, the President issued another PD 1031, amending the previous
Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the
manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. The President also issued PD 1033, stating
the questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The
Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of
the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced
thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be
submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on
Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.

Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD 991, 1033 and
1031. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the
incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new
Constitution.

The Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor
General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political
in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is
a step towards normalization

ISSUE: Whether or not the issue raised is justiciable.

RULING: Justiciable.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act.
Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the
wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but
his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be
amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure
followed or the authority assumed was valid or not. We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor
General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of the President's authority
to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious
circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973?
Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of
inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the
Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the
competence to determine whether the constitutional

norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior not a
posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.

CASE DIGEST : Sanidad Vs Comelec

Facts: On October 23, 1989, Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN
ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
The Commission on Elections, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987 Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), said R.A. 6766 and other pertinent election laws, promulgated
Resolution No. 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region. In a petition dated November 20, 1989, herein petitioner Pablito
V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW" for the BAGUIO
MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras,
assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167, which provides:
Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the plebiscite
campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to
campaign for or against the plebiscite issues It is alleged by petitioner that said provision is void
and unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of
expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution.

Issue : WON the said Section 19 of resolution No 2167 is unconstitutional

Held: it is clear from Art. IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec
was the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other
grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of communication
or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, including
reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates
are ensured Neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor Section 11 (b), 2nd par. of R.A. 6646
can be construed to mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and
regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates
involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 has no statutory
basis. While the limitation does not absolutely bar petitioner's freedom of expression, it is still a
restriction on his choice of the forum where he may express his view. No reason was advanced
by respondent to justify such abridgement. We hold that this form of regulation is tantamount to
a restriction of petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason. Plebiscite issues are
matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to
freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged
discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a
plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to
expression may be exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned
because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or
television times