TEAM CODE-

THE 28TH ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION FOR KERALA

LAW ACADEMY TROPHY

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

WRIT (CIVIL) NO. ____/2016

IN THE MATTER OF

SOMANI- - - - - - - - - -PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. - - - - - - -

RESPONDENT

WITH

DHARMATHAN STATE PENSIONER ’S ASSOCIATION - - - -PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF INDIA AND ANR. - - - - - - -

RESPONDENT

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO

THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES

OF

THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Index of Authorities...............................................................................................................III

List of Abbreviations............................................................................................................XV

Statement of Jurisdiction..................................................................................................XVII

Statement of Facts............................................................................................................XVIII

Questions Presented............................................................................................................XIX

Summary of Pleadings.........................................................................................................XX

Pleadings...................................................................................................................................1

I. .......THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE.................................................................................................1

I.1. The petitioners have a locus standi to file the present writ petition...............................1

I.1.1.Somani is the aggrieved party..............................................................................1

I.1.2.DSPA, being a public spirited body, has the locus standi to file a PIL..............3

I.2. Direct action of the State has led to violation of Fundamental Rights...........................5

I.3. There has been a violation of Fundamental Rights........................................................6

I.3.1.Article 21 has been violated.................................................................................7

I.3.2.Article 14 has been violated...............................................................................10

I.4. Alternative remedy is not a bar....................................................................................12

II. THE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO DEMONETISE THE CURRENCY

NOTES AND THE ORDER OF RBI IN THIS REGARD ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND

ILLEGAL..............................................................................................................................13

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II.1.....Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order is in conflict with provisions of the
Constitution..................................................................................................................13

II.1.1......Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order in this regard violates the
Principle of Equality i.e. Art. 14 of the Constitution of India..........................14
a. The decision and the orders of RBI are arbitrary, vague and
unreasonable………………………………………………………………15
b. The decision and the orders of RBI have violated the principle of
intelligible differentia.............................................................................................................17

II.1.2......Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order in this regard violates the
Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution........................................................................18
a. Restrictions imposed by the RBI and the Central Government are
unreasonable..............................................................................................................................19

II.1.3................................................................................................................................
The decision of the Central Government and the order of RBI violates Art.
21……………………………………………………………………………….21
a. The decision and the order of RBI violates the right to life.................................21
b. The decision and the order of RBI violates the right to personal liberty.......22

II.1.4.....Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order in this regard violates Art.
300A of the Constitution....................................................................................22

II.2............................................Orders of RBI is in conflict with other statutory provisions.

......................................................................................................................................23

II.2.1.Conflict with RBI

Act………………………………………………………….23

II.3....The question involved in this case is of policy decision and is thus subject to judicial
review...........................................................................................................................23

Prayer...................................................................................................................................XXI

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES REFERRED -

SUPREME COURT

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 -6, 12- ¶ 32, 36
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 272 -24- ¶ 64
A.P. Grains & Seeds Merchants Association v. Union of India, (1971) 1 -15- ¶ 39
S.C.R. 166
A.V. Nachane v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 246 -10- ¶ 29
Adi Ferozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, (1971) 1 S.C.R. 863 -2- ¶3
Air India Statutory Corp. v. United Labour Union, (1996) Supp 9 S.C.R. -7- ¶ 21
579
All India Sainik School Employees Asso. v. Sainik School Society, -11- ¶ 30
(1988) 3 S.C.R. 398
Ameeroonissa v. Mahboob, (1953) S.C.R. 404 -10- ¶ 28, 29
Anand Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 9 S.C.R. 133 -15- ¶ 40
Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of I&E, (1975) 1 S.C.R. -13- ¶ 34
321
Ashok v. Union of India, (1997) Supp 1 S.C.R. 14 -8- ¶ 22
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 649 -10, 17- ¶ 29, 45
B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, (1975) 2 S.C.R. 774 -21- ¶ 54
Babulal v. Collector of Customs, (1957) S.C.R. 1110 -10- ¶ 29
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145 -6, 21- ¶ 17, 54
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 -1, 3- ¶ 2, 16
Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees’ Co-op. -10- ¶ 29
Society Ltd., (2012) 4 S.C.R. 881
Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 102 -2- ¶3
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. C.T.O., (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 264 -15- ¶ 39
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. N.V. Dabholkar, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 306 -2- ¶3
Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 757 -6- ¶ 17
Bhagwandas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 175 -1- ¶2
Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Sunil Bansal, (2009) 14 S.C.R. 711 -10, 17- ¶ 29, 45
Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 S.C.R. 1051 -15- ¶ 40
Bishambhar Dayal Chander Mohan v. State of U.P., (1982) 1 S.C.R. -22- ¶ 60
1137
Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Shubha Chakravarti, (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 731 -6, 10- ¶ 16, 27
Budhan v. State of Bihar, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1045 -11- ¶ 30
Centre for PIL v. Union of India, (2011) 4 S.C.R. 445 -15, 24- ¶ 40, 65
Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. Chandrima Das and Ors., (2000) -18- ¶ 49
1 S.C.R. 480
Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 827 -7- ¶ 21

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Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 6 -2- ¶5

Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (1989) Supp 2 S.C.R. 597 -3- ¶8
Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent, Central Jail, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 512 -13- ¶ 34
Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., (1950) S.C.R. 759 -20- ¶ 53
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, (1950) S.C.R. 869 -1, 10- ¶ 2, 28
Coffee Board, Bangalore v. Jt. C.T.O., Madras, (1970) 2 S.C.R. 147 -1, 13- ¶ 2, 34
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) -21- ¶ 55
Supp 4 S.C.R. 872
Consumer Education and Research Centre v. Union of India, (1995) 1 -7- ¶ 21
S.C.R. 626
Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner, (1954) S.C.R. 873 -20- ¶ 54
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 165 -4- ¶ 12
Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 S.C.R. 574 -12- ¶ 33
Dattraj Nathuji v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 900 -3- ¶8
Deena v. Union of India, (1984) 1 S.C.R. 1 -10- ¶ 29
Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, (2007) 13 -24- ¶ 66
S.C.R. 811
Dhirendra v. Legal Remembrancer, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 224 -10- ¶ 28
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of -11- ¶ 32
Maharashtra, (1990) 2 S.C.R. 900
District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, (2004) -22- ¶ 58
Supp 5 S.C.R. 833
Dolly Chanda v. Chairman, JEE, (2004) Supp 5 S.C.R. 79 -15- ¶ 39
Dr D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1987) 1 S.C.R. -4- ¶ 11
798
Dr. Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General -17- ¶ 45
and Anr., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 371
Dr Ram Krishna Bharadwaj v. State of Delhi, (1953) 4 S.C.R. 708 -20- ¶ 54
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees, Bombay Port, (1989) -15- ¶ 39
2 S.C.R. 751
Dwarkadas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., (1954) S.C.R. 674 -3- ¶7
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 S.C.R. 348 -15- ¶ 39
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 382 -20- ¶ 52
Federation of Bar Associations v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 1 S.C.R. -1- ¶2
655
Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. -1- ¶2
52
Food Corp. of India v. Bhanu Lodh, (2005) 2 S.C.R. 350 -10- ¶ 29
Forward Construction Company v. Prabhat Mandal, (1985) 3 S.C.R. -4- ¶9
766
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, -7, 8- ¶ 20, 22
(1981) 2 S.C.R. 516
G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 2 S.C.R. 715 -10- ¶ 29

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Gang-Rape on orders of Community Panchayat, In re., (2014) 4 S.C.R. -9- ¶ 27

264
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 -17- ¶ 45
Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, (2001) Supp 3 S.C.R. 504 -3- ¶7
Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 87 -10- ¶ 29
Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) -3- ¶8
Supp 2 S.C.R. 619
Haji Esmail v. Competent Officer, (1967) 3 S.C.R. 134 -1- ¶2
Haradhan Saha v State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154 -22- ¶ 58
Harakchand v. Union of India, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 479 -11, 20- ¶ 30, 54
Himmatlal v. State of M.P., (1954) S.C.R. 1122 -12- ¶ 32
Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 588 -6- ¶ 17
Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1979) 3 S.C.R. 532 -13- ¶ 34
I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 -19- ¶ 50
Indian Bank’s Association, Bombay and Ors. v. M/s Devkala -4- ¶ 10
Consultancy Service and Ors., (2004) Supp 1 S.C.R. 225
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 2 S.C.R. 287 -1- ¶2
Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 347 -11- ¶ 30
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1999) Supp 5 S.C.R. 229 -14- ¶ 38
Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, (1986) 3 -15- ¶ 40
S.C.R. 1049
Jagannath Prasad v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 S.C.R. 151 -10- ¶ 28
Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1975) Supp S.C.R. 428 -10- ¶ 29
Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1991) Supp 2 S.C.R. 226 -3, 4- ¶ 8, 9
Jashbhai Motibhai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 58 -2- ¶3
Javeed v. State of Haryana, (2003) Supp 1 S.C.R. 947 -19- ¶ 51
Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. RBI and Ors., (1996) Supp 4 S.C.R. 443 -22- ¶ 59
K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 316 -2, 12- ¶ 5, 32
K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, (2000) Supp 5 -10- ¶ 29
S.C.R. 368
Kasturi and Sons v. Salivakeswaran, (1959) S.C.R. 1 -1- ¶2
Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1338 -15- ¶ 40
Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1988) 3 S.C.R. 1102 -7- ¶ 19
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp S.C.R. 1 -10- ¶ 28
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 S.C.R. 332 -12- ¶ 32
Khudiram Das v. State of W.B., (1975) 2 S.C.R. 832 -7- ¶ 21
Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam, (1964) 5 S.C.R. 975 -1- ¶2
Kuriakose v. State of Kerala, (1977) 3 S.C.R. 389 -1- ¶2
Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) Supp 3 S.C.R. 462 -12- ¶ 33
Lakshmanrao v. Judicial Magistrate, (1971) 2 S.C.R. 822 -20- ¶ 54
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 3 S.C.R. 92 -21- ¶ 54
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819 -3, 12- ¶ 7, 32
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, (2000) Supp 5 S.C.R. 302 -10- ¶ 28
M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) Supp 1 S.C.R. 671 -11- ¶ 32
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 -7, 18- ¶ 20, 48
Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commr., Pondicherry, (1962) Supp 1 S.C.R. -13- ¶ 34

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981
Mohammad Zahir Khan v. Union of India, (1993) Supp (2) S.C.C. 12 -6- ¶ 16
Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India, (2003) 3 S.C.R. 143 -4- ¶ 11
Mohd. Saheb Mahboob v. Dy. Custodian, (1962) 2 S.C.R. 371 -10- ¶ 28
Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area Committee, (1952) S.C.R. 572 -1- ¶2
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658 -7- ¶ 21
Moulin Rouge Pvt. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1997) Supp 5 -11- ¶ 30
S.C.R. 122
Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdul Bhai, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 591 -3- ¶8
Muneeb-ul-Rahman v. Govt. of J&K, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 344 -6- ¶ 16
N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 519 -19- ¶ 50
Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Tikappa Gowda, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 846 -2, 19- ¶ 5, 50
Nain Sukh Das v. State of U.P., (1953) S.C.R. 1184 -1- ¶2
Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala, (2007) 3 S.C.R. 149 -4- ¶ 12
Nandlal v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1181 -20- ¶ 54
Naresh Chandra Ganguly v. State of W.B., (1960) 1 S.C.R. 411 -20- ¶ 54
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 94 -3, 12- ¶ 8, 33
National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shiksha -17- ¶ 46
Prashikshan Sansthan, (2011) 2 S.C.R. 291
Natural Resources Allocation, In re., Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, -24- ¶ 65
(2012) 9 S.C.R. 311
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) Supp 2 S.C.R. 51 -1, 21- ¶ 2, 56
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 693 -16- ¶ 42
Omkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, (2002) Supp 5 S.C.R. 605 -15- ¶ 39
Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 S.C.C. 427 -15- ¶ 40
Oudh Sugar Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1070 -19- ¶ 51
P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) Supp 2 S.C.R. 603 -20- ¶ 54
P.U.C.L. v. Union of India, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 -8- ¶ 23
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 997 -5, 9- ¶ 14, 25
Paschim Bang Khet Majdoor Samity v. State of W.B., (1996) Supp 2 -9- ¶ 26
S.C.R. 331
Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 537 -21- ¶ 54
Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1983) 1 -1, 4- ¶ 2, 9
S.C.R. 456
Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1996) Supp 10 -21- ¶ 56
S.C.R. 321
Poudyal v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 1 S.C.C. 324 -24- ¶ 67
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, (1963) Supp 1 S.C.R. 885 -14- ¶ 37
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 -14, 22- ¶ 37, 58
R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 3 S.C.R. 802 -23- ¶ 64
Raja Jagadambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct -12- ¶ 33
Taxes, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 49
Rajasthan S.E.B. v. Union of India, (2008) 7 S.C.R. 1025 -12- ¶ 32
Rameshwar Proshad v. Commissioner of Land Reforms, A.I.R. 1959 -1- ¶2
S.C. 498

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Ramji Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1957) 1 S.C.R. 860 -20- ¶ 51

Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, (1988) Supp 3 S.C.R. 870 -7- ¶ 20
Ranganath Mishra v. Union of India, (2003) 7 S.C.C. 137 -4- ¶ 11
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, (1950) S.C.R. 566 -12- ¶ 32
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 -12- ¶ 32
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 -4- ¶9
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 644 -24- ¶ 64
Sadasiv v. State of Orissa, (1956) S.C.R. 794 -17- ¶ 46
Sadhu Ram v. Custodian General, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1113 -1- ¶2
Sahibzada Saiyed Muhammad v. State of Madhya Bharat, (1960) 3 -1- ¶2
S.C.R. 138
Sakal Newspapers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 842 -3- ¶7
Sambhu Nath Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 S.C.R. 1 -22- ¶ 58
Samrathmal Keshrimal Agarwal Bus Operator v. Regional Transport -15- ¶ 39
Authority, Indore and Anr., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1986
Sanchit Bansal v. Joint Admission Board, (2011) 15 S.C.R. 1057 -16- ¶ 43
Satywati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 6 S.C.R. 566 -10- ¶ 28
Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 2 S.C.R. 957 -20- ¶ 54
Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 13 S.C.R. 710 -10- ¶ 29
Shri Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 531 -10- ¶ 28
Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1963) 3 S.C.R. 837 -3- ¶ 7, 8
Sirpur Paper Mill Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad, -16- ¶ 40
(1971) 1 S.C.R. 304
Som Raj v. State of Haryana, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 535 -15- ¶ 40
Somawanti v. State of Punjab, (1963) 2 S.C.R. 774 -12- ¶ 33
Special Courts Bill 1978, In re., (1979) 2 S.C.R. 476 -10- ¶ 29
Special Reference under Art. 143 of the Constitution, (1965) 1 S.C.R. -13- ¶ 36
413
Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of T.N., (1992) 2 S.C.R. 164 -11- ¶ 30
St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1991) Supp 3 S.C.R. 121 -3- ¶7
State of A.P. v. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy, (2000) 3 S.C.R. 644 -7- ¶ 19
State of A.P. v. Shree Ramarao, (1964) 3 S.C.R. 25 -20- ¶ 54
State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, (1951) S.C.R. 682 -10- ¶ 28
State of C.T. of Delhi v. Sanjeev, (2005) 3 S.C.R. 151 -15- ¶ 40
State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student of a Medical College, (1985) 3 -4- ¶9
S.C.R. 676
State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 251 -4- ¶9
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 906 -17- ¶ 45
State of M.P. v. Gopal D. Thirthani, (2003) Supp 1 S.C.R. 797 -17- ¶ 45
State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 846 -10- ¶ 28
State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 1120 -9- ¶ 26
State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and Ors., (2013) 5 S.C.R. 18 -3- ¶8
State of Rajasthan v. Praful, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1695 -11, 17- ¶ 30, 45
State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, (2001) 10 S.C.C. 740 -13- ¶ 34
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors., (2015) 1 -18- ¶ 47
S.C.C. 347

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State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhaya, (1961) 1 S.C.R. 14 -10- ¶ 28

State of U.P. v. Kamala Palace, (1999) Supp 5 S.C.R. 452 -10- ¶ 29
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kartar Singh, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 679 -15- ¶ 39
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali, (1952) S.C.R. 284 -17- ¶ 46
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1999) Supp 1 -15- ¶ 39
S.C.R. 591
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 S.C.R. 5 -7- ¶ 21
Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 557 -21- ¶ 56
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S.C.R. -19- ¶ 50
821
Surath Chandra Chakraborthy v. State of West Bengal, (1971) 3 S.C.R. -20- ¶ 54
1
Suresh Chandra Sharma v. Chairman, U.P. S.E.B., A.I.R. 2005 S.C. -15- ¶ 39
2021
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) Supp 3 S.C.R. 587 -11- ¶ 30
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. -12- ¶ 33
1774
Taarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 176 -3- ¶8
Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Sarkar, (1961) 1 S.C.R. 379 -12, 13- ¶ 33, 34
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 S.C.R. 824 -14- ¶ 37
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Co-op. Housing Society -7- ¶ 21
Ltd., (1995) 3 S.C.R. 729
Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778 -6- ¶ 16
Union of India & Anr. v. International Trading Co. & Ors., (2003) Supp -15- ¶ 39
1 S.C.R. 55
Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan, (1999) 3 S.C.R. 1146 -10- ¶ 29
Union of India v. Ram Gopal Aggarwal, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 202 -14- ¶ 38
Union of India v. S.B. Vohra, (2004) 1 S.C.R. 36 -17- ¶ 44
Union of India v. S.C. Bagari, (1999) 2 S.C.R. 690 -11- ¶ 30
U.P.S.C. v. Gyan Prakash Shrivastava, A.I.R. 2012 S.C. (Supp) 621 -15- ¶ 40
V. Subramaniam v. Rajesh Raghuvendra Rao, (2009) 4 S.C.R. 942 -10, 17- ¶ 29, 45
Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 128 -21- ¶ 56
Vincent v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 990 -9- ¶ 26
Virendra Nath Gupta v. Delhi Administration, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 805 -3- ¶7

HIGH COURT AT ALLAHABAD

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

D.O. Vyas v. Gaziabad Development Authority, A.I.R. 1993 (All.) 57 -7- ¶ 21
Shaibya Shukla v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1993 (All.) 171 -7- ¶ 21
U.P. Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2003 (1) A.W.C. 145 -10- ¶ 29

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[IX]
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HIGH COURT AT KERALA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Ammmini E.D. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 (Ker.) 252 -21- ¶ 56
Niyamavedi v. Raman Shrivastava, 1995 (1) K.L.T. 206 -5- ¶ 13
P.A. Jacob v. Superintendent of Police, Kottayams, A.I.R. 1993 (Ker.) 1 -7- ¶ 21

HIGH COURT AT GUJARAT

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Bipinchand J. Diwan v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 2002 (Guj.) 99 -7- ¶ 19
Commercial and Ahmedabad Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 -19- ¶ 50
(Guj.) 20

HIGH COURT AT DELHI

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Ozhair Hussain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 (Del.) 103 -6- ¶ 19
Social Jurist v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors., 2008 (147) D.L.T. 729 -9- ¶ 25

HIGH COURT AT KARNATAKA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

K. Veeresh Babu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 (Kant.) 56 -10- ¶ 29
S.M. Rao v. Dy. Commr. and Dy. Magistrate, Bangalore, I.L.R. 2003 -15- ¶ 40
(Kar.) 4678

HIGH COURT AT ORISSA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Bijayalakshmi Tripathi v. Managing Committee of Working Women’s -7- ¶ 21
Hostel, A.I.R. 1992 (Ori.) 242

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HIGH COURT AT ANDHRA PRADESH

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

G. Gurunadha Reddy v. A.P. Road Transportation Corporation, A.I.R. -7- ¶ 19
1999 (A.P.) 179

HIGH COURT AT JAMMU AND KASHMIR

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Inderpuri General Store v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 (J&K) 11 -7- ¶ 21

FOREIGN JURISDICTION

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., (1948) -16- ¶ 42
1 K.B. 223
Attorney General of Gambia v. N’Jie, (1961) A.C. 617 -2- ¶3
Baker v. Carr, (1962) 369 U.S. 186 -24- ¶ 64
Burton v. Minister of Housing and Local Government, (1961) 1 Q.B. -2- ¶3
278
Cook v. Fortson, (1946) 329 U.S. 675 -23- ¶ 64
Ealing Corp. v. Jones, (1959) 1 Q.B. 384 -2- ¶3
Gomillon v. Lightfoot, (1960) 364 U.S. 339 -23- ¶ 64
Hartsfield v. Sloan, (1958) 357 U.S. 916 -23- ¶ 64
Hillsborought Township v. Cromwell, (1945) 326 U.S. 620 -10, 17- ¶ 29, 45
Lindsley v. Natural Carbolic Co., (1910) 220 U.S. 61 -10- ¶ 29
Luther v. Borden, (1849) 48 U.S. 7 -23- ¶ 64
McCabe v. Atchinson, (1914) 235 U.S. 151 -2- ¶5
McDoughall v. Green, (1948) 335 U.S. 281 -23- ¶ 64
Morril v. Jones, (1883) 106 U.S. 466 -23- ¶ 62
Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, (1927) 274 U.S. 490 -11- ¶ 29
Regina v. Liverpool Corporation, (1972) 2 Q.B. 299 -2- ¶4
Robinson v. Currey, (1981) 7 Q.B.D. 465, 470 -2- ¶3
South v. Peters, (1950) 359 U.S. 276 -23- ¶ 64

BOOKS REFERRED

1. 1, 2, 3 H.M. S EERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing

Co., 4th ed. 2010).

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2. 3, 4, 5, 6 D.D. B ASU, COMMENTARY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA (Lexis Nexis

Butterworths, 9th ed. 2015).
3. 1, 2, 3, 4 D.D. B ASU, COMMENTARY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 8th ed. 2007).
4. A.P. DATAR, DATAR ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Wadhwa and Co., 1st ed. 2007).
5. 3 DJ DE, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Asia Law House, 3rd ed. 2008).
6. 1, 2 L.M. S INGHVI , JAGDISH SWARUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Modern Law
Publication, 2nded. 2007).
7. 1 M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 6th
ed., 2010).
8. MAHENDRA P. SINGH, V.N. SHUKLA 'S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Eastern Book
Company, Lucknow, 12th ed. 2007).
9. 7, 8, 9, 10 M ANOHAR AND CHITALEY, THE AIR MANUAL CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (All
India Reporter Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur, 6th ed. 2011).
10. 2 P.K. MAJUMDAR AND R.P. KATARIA, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF

INDIA (Orient Publishing Co., New Delhi, 10th ed. 2009).

11. P.M. B AKSHI , THE CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.,
3rd ed. 2007).
12. 2 S.C. KASHYUP , CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing Co., 4th ed.
2006).
13. 1(1) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 4th ed. 2008).

STATUTES REFERRED
1. THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ACT, 1934.
2. THE BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949.
3. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.
4. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986.
5. THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897.

LIST OF DATABASES REFERRED

1. www.manupatra.com

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2. www.scconline.com
3. www.westlawindia.com
4. www.lexisnexis.com
5. www.jstor.org
6. www.epw.in

DICTIONARIES REFERRED
1. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)
2. Justice C.K. Thakker, Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon (Ashoka Law House, 2010)
3. P. Ramnatha Aiyar’s, Advanced Law Lexicon (Wadhwa, 3rd ed. 2007)

MISCELLANEOUS

1. The Constitution of India, 1950

2. Supreme Court Rules, 2013

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS WORDS
& And
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
A.C. Appeal Cases
A.I.H.C. All India High Court Cases
A.I.R. All India Reporter
A.L.D. Andhra Legal Decisions
All. Allahabad
All ER All England Reporter
Anr. Another
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Asso. Association
ATM Automated Teller Machine
Co. Company
Const. Constitution of India
Co-op. Co-operative
COPRA Consumer Protection Act
Corp. Corporation
CPC Code of Civil Procedure
C.P.J. Consumer Protection Judgements
Del. Delhi
D.R.J. Delhi Reported Journal
DSPA Dharamasthan State Pensioners Association
Ed. Edition
F.L.R. Factory Law Reporter
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code
I.T.O. Income Tax Officer
J&K Jammu and Kashmir
J. Justice
J.T. Judgement Today

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Ker. Kerala
L.L.J. Labour Law Journal
Ltd. Limited
M.L.J. Madras Law Journal
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
N.C.D.R.C. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
N.G.E.F. New Government Electrical Factory
Ori. Orissa
Ors. Others
p. Page Number
Pat. Patna
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Pvt. Private
RBI Reserve Bank of India
S.C. Supreme Court of India
S.C.A.L.E. Supreme Court Almanac
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
S.C.J. Supreme Court Journal
S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
Supp S.C.R. Supplementary Supreme Court Reporter
T.N. Tamil Nadu
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
U.S. United States
U.T. Union Territory
v. Versus
Vol. Volume
W.B. West Bengal
W.L.R. Weekly Law Reports

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONERS HUMBLY SUBMIT THIS MEMORANDUM APPROACHING THE HONOURABLE

COURT UNDER ARTICLE 321 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA , 1950, AND ORDER XLVII
RULE V2 OF THE SUPREME COURT RULES, 1966.

IT SETS FORTH THE FACTS , CONTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENT CASE IN THE

JURISDICTION OF THE PETITIONERS .

1
“(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3) Without
prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law
empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (3). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be
suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”
2
“Where there are two or more appeals arising out of the same matter, the Court may at any time on its own
motion or on the application of any party, order that the appeals be consolidated.”

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Mrs Somani (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioner-1’), is the wife of Mr Janeshwar

who is a Data Entry Operator in the State Civil Service in the capital city of
Dharmasthan, Trobay. The petitioner, being pregnant, was under the care of Dr. Manu
Nath at White Fort Clinic since June 18, 2016. On November 8 2016, the petitioner
underwent certain tests and sonography at the hospital and was told that the baby was
due around December 7 2016. On a day prior to November 8 2016, the Prime Minister
declared the decision to withdraw ₹ 1000 and 500 notes from circulation.

II. DELIVERY AND DEATH OF THE INFANT

On the morning of November 9 2016, the petitioner underwent labour and her baby was
delivered under the care of relatives and neighbours. Due to the premature delivery and
loss of blood during the delivery, she was taken to Dr. Manu Nath. After giving primary
care, Dr. Manu Nath refused to admit her because of the inability of the family
concerning payment of ₹ 6000 in currency notes. Even after repeated requests of the
family and despite of the fact that banks and ATMs were shut that day, Dr. Manu Nath
did not relent and sent the petitioner and her baby back. On the next day, when the
condition of the baby worsened, the petitioner and her husband brought him to Dr. Manu
Nath. During the course of waiting for the doctor, the infant died. The incident was
reported in a newspaper in which it was stated that Dr. Manu Nath stated that along with
the inability of the family to pay deposit, another reason for denying admission was non-
availability of the NICU facility in her clinic.

III. FILING OF WRIT PETITIONS

Somani filed a writ petition for the violation of her fundamental rights with a prayer for
payment of ₹ 10 lakhs as palliative. In light of the ongoing chaos, another writ petition
was filed by the Dharmasthan State Pensioner’s Association (hereinafter referred to as
‘petitioner-2’). By citing the newspaper reports, it is alleged that there has been death of
numerous persons by standing in the queue of the banks. It has been prayed that the
Court should declare the decision of the Government and orders of RBI regarding
demonetisation be declared illegal and unconstitutional.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE OR NOT .

2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDER OF THE RESERVE
BANK OF INDIA ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL OR NOT .

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SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I. THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE .

It is humbly submitted that the writ petitions filed by Somani and DSPA are maintainable
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950. The counsel would base its argument on four
premises; firstly, Somani, being the aggrieved party, and DSPA, being a public spirited body,
have the locus standi to file the present writ petitions; secondly, state action of
demonetisation and violation of fundamental rights have a causal relationship; thirdly,
fundamental rights of the petitioners have been violated, and; lastly, alternative remedy is no
bar for filling of the writ petitions.

In the present case, Somani has the locus standi to file the writ petition because, in order to
have locus standi to file a writ petition, a person needs to have a genuine grievance due to an
order that has been made which pre-judicially affects his interest. DSPA also has the locus
standi to file the present PIL. If the writ petition filed affects the interest of the general public,
any member of the public could espouse the cause of the general public so long as his bona
fides are not in doubt.

II. THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND ORDER OF THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL .

It is humbly submitted that the impugned decision of the Central Government to demonetise
the currency notes of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 and the order of RBI in this regard are
unconstitutional and ultra vires the law. The counsel would base its argument on three
premises; firstly, Central Government’s decision and order is in conflict with provisions of
Constitution; secondly, order is in conflict with certain statutory provisions; and, thirdly, the
impugned decision is a policy matter which is subject to judicial review.

If the executive steps beyond the legislative fields assigned to them in case of violation of any
fundamental right, their respective legislative actions are liable to be struck down by courts in
India. It is humbly submitted that the Central Government and the Reserve Bank of India
have stepped beyond the powers conferred upon them by way of delegated legislation, and
hence their executive orders are liable to be struck down.

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PLEADINGS

I. THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE.

1. It is humbly submitted that the writ petitions filed by Somani and DSPA are maintainable
under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Constitution’).
The counsel would base its argument on three premises; firstly, Somani and DSPA have the
locus standi to file the present writ petitions (1.1); secondly, direct action of the State has led
to the violation of the fundamental right (1.2); thirdly, fundamental right of petitioner- 1 has
been violated (1.3); and, fourthly, alternative remedy is no bar for filling of the writ petitions
under Art. 32 (1.4).

1.1. THE PETITIONERS HAVE A LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE PRESENT WRIT PETITION.

2. Art. 32 and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can be invoked only for the enforcement of
rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. 3 Unless a question of enforcement of a
fundamental right arises, Art. 32 does not apply. 4 In furtherance to this, for granting relief for
violation of fundamental rights and thereby invoking the power and jurisdiction of the court,
the locus standi of the petitioner is a sine qua non, i.e. condition precedent.5

1.1.1 Somani is the aggrieved party.

3. The Constitution lays down a traditional rule in regard to locus standi, i.e. judicial redress for
rights under Art. 32 is entitled to a person when such rights are of the petitioner himself who

3
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, (1950) S.C.R. 869 (¶ 44). See also, Mohd. Yasin v. Town Area Committee,
(1952) S.C.R. 572 (¶ 8, 9); Nain Sukh Das v. State of U.P., (1953) S.C.R. 1184 (¶ 5); Sahibzada Saiyed
Muhammad v. State of Madhya Bharat, (1960) 3 S.C.R. 138 (¶ 2, 8); Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam,
(1964) 5 S.C.R. 975 (¶ 19, 32, 66); Haji Esmail v. Competent Officer, (1967) 3 S.C.R. 134 (¶ 8); Kuriakose
v. State of Kerala, (1977) 3 S.C.R. 389 (¶ 7); Coffee Board, Bangalore v. Jt. C.T.O., Madras, (1970) 2 S.C.R.
147 (¶ 15); Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 11); Peoples’
Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 11); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v.
Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11); Federation of Bar Associations v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 1
S.C.R. 655 (¶ 5).
4
Bhagwandas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 175 (¶ 5). See also, Sadhu Ram v. Custodian General,
(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1113 (¶ 4); Kasturi and Sons v. Salivakeswaran, (1959) S.C.R. 1 (¶ 14); Rameshwar
Proshad v. Commissioner of Land Reforms, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 498 (¶ 17); Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar
Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 11); Peoples’ Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,
(1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 11); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11); Olga Tellis
v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1985) Supp 2 S.C.R. 51 (¶ 31); Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India,
(1985) 2 S.C.R. 287 (¶ 82, 83, 111).
5
1 V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS 26 (Eastern Book Company, 6th ed. 2006). See also, Fertilizer
Corporation Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 11).

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complained of infraction of those rights as contemplated under Part III.6 Therefore, in order
to have locus standi to file a writ petition, a person is said to be aggrieved when he has a
genuine grievance due to an order that has been made which pre-judicially affects his
interest.7

4. In Regina v. Liverpool Corporation,8 Lord Denning, M.R. held that the expression ‘person
aggrieved’ would include any person whose interests may be prejudicially affected by what is
taking place. It includes any person who has a genuine grievance because something has been
done or may be done which affects him.

5. It is the fact, clearly established, of the injury to the complainant, not to others, which
justifies judicial interference.9 For maintaining an action under Art. 32, it is necessary that an
overt act be committed that forcibly takes away or abridges the fundamental rights of a
person by its very terms and without any further overt act being done. 10 In case a petitioner
does not have a locus standi to file a petition, he cannot be heard on merits. 11 If the court is
prima facie satisfied that there has been violation of fundamental rights, then the Constitution
of India, by the virtue of Art. 32, confers certain powers to issue writs for enforcement of a
fundamental right.12

6. It is humbly submitted that the fundamental rights of Somani have been violated due to the
decision of the Prime Minister regarding demonetisation and the subsequent orders issued by
RBI, which renders her as an aggrieved party. Due to withdrawal of currency notes of ₹ 500
and ₹ 1000 from circulation, in an emergency situation, Somani was denied admission in the
hospital for treatment as she did not have valid currency notes and to aggravate the situation,
all banks and ATM’s were closed to withdraw new currency, thus was unable to pay the
hospital. This action of the government to demonetise the currency notes of ₹ 500 and ₹
1000 has led to the denial of treatment to her in the hospital despite the fact that they had
money, has violated her fundamental right. Therefore, Somani being the aggrieved party, has
6
Supra Note 3 (¶ 46). See also, Jashbhai Motibhai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 58 (¶ 12); Bangalore
Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 102 (¶ 34, 35); 1(1) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 82-
84 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 4th ed. 2008), ¶ 56.
7
Adi Ferozshah Gandhi v. H.M. Seervai, (1971) 1 S.C.R. 863 (¶ 16). See also, Jashbhai Motibhai v. Roshan
Kumar, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 58 (¶ 34); per Lord Denning, M.R. In Attorney General of Gambia v. N’Jie, (1961)
A.C. 617, 634; Robinson v. Currey, (1981) 7 Q.B.D. 465, 470; Bar Council of Maharashtra v. N.V.
Dabholkar, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 306 (¶ 28); Ealing Corp. v. Jones, (1959) 1 Q.B. 384; Burton v. Minister of
Housing and Local Government, (1961) 1 Q.B. 278.
8
(1972) 2 Q.B. 299, 308-09.
9
Supra Note 3 (¶ 7). See also, McCabe v. Atchinson, (1914) 235 U.S. 151.
10
K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 316 (¶ 10).
11
Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 6 (¶ 15). See also, Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.
Tikappa Gowda, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 846 (¶ 9).
12
Supra Note 10 (¶ 8).

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locus standi and right to file the present writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of
India, 1950.

1.1.2 DSPA, being a public spirited body, has the locus standi to file a PIL.

7. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding locus standi of a person to reach a court has
undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in India. The
constitutional courts have thereby adopted a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or
dislodging the claim of the litigant merely on hyper technical grounds. 13 The provisions of
Part III of the Constitution should be construed liberally which would enable the citizens to
enjoy those rights in the fullest manner.14

8. On the other hand, the court must interpret the Constitution in a manner which would enable
the citizen to enjoy the rights guaranteed by it in the fullest manner, subject, of course, to
permissible limits.15 If the writ petition filed affects the interest of the general public, any
member of the public could espouse the cause of the general public so long as his bona fides
are not in doubt.16 In order to provide adequate legal representation to groups and interests
who have been unrepresented or underrepresented, poor, disadvantaged, ordinary citizens
lacking access to courts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has evolved the concept of public
interest litigation under Art. 32.17

9. In Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury,18 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that while
considering the rule of locus standi, strict and rigid ‘litmus test’ should not be applied in PIL.
A public interest litigation under Art. 32 can be made by any person, association or
organization acting bona fide or pro bono publico to approach a court.19
13
Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, (2001) Supp 3 S.C.R. 504 (¶ 38).
14
Sakal Newspapers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 842 (¶ 28). See also, Dwarkadas v.
Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., (1954) S.C.R. 674 (¶ 14, 56); Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1963) 3
S.C.R. 837 (¶ 15); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11); M.C. Mehta v.
Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819 (¶ 3, 6); Virendra Nath Gupta v. Delhi Administration, (1990) 1 S.C.R.
805 (¶ 7); St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1991) Supp 3 S.C.R. 121 (¶ 28).
15
Sidhrajbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1963) 3 S.C.R. 837 (¶ 14, 15).
16
State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok and Ors., (2013) 5 S.C.R. 18 (¶ 29).
17
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 12, 15). See also, Mumbai Kamgar Sabha
v. Abdul Bhai, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 591 (¶ 7); Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R.
52 (¶ 37, 40, 43); People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 2, 3, 9);
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp., (1985) Supp 2 S.C.R. 51 (¶ 31); Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India,
(1989) Supp 2 S.C.R. 597 (¶ 33); Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1991) Supp 2 S.C.R. 226 (¶ 109, 110);
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 94 (¶ 230); Guruvayoor Devaswom
Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, (2003) Supp 2 S.C.R. 619 (¶ 69); Dattaraj Nathuji v. State of
Maharashtra, (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 900 (¶ 4, 12, 14); Taarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu, (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 176
(¶ 24).
18
(1992) Supp 1 S.C.R. 226 (¶ 68).
19
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 365 (¶ 17). See also, People’s Union for Democratic Rights v.
Union of India, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 9); Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1992) Supp 1 S.C.R. 226 (¶ 68);

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10. Krishna Iyer, J.20 has rightly observed that if a person belongs to an organisation which has
special interest in the subject matter, if he has a deeper interest than a busybody, he cannot be
told off at the gates, although the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be
considered. It has been held that a petition where the petitioner might have moved a court in
her private interest and redressal of the personal grievance, the court may treat it a necessity
to enquire into the state of affairs of the subject of litigation in the interest of justice and thus
a private interest case can also be treated as a public interest case.21

11. In the landmark judgement of Mohd. Aslam v. Union of India,22 the Hon’ble Apex Court has
observed that on several occasions, the court has treated letters, telegrams, postcards or news
reports as writ petitions and relief has been granted or refused. It is the right of every citizen
to insist that he should be governed by laws made in accordance with the Constitution and not
laws made by the executive in violation of the constitutional provisions, and if any practice is
adopted by the executive which is unflagrant and systemic violation of its constitutional
limitations, petitioner has the right to file the petition to question the act.23

12. Writ petitions under Art. 32 as PIL by public spirited organizations on behalf of persons
belonging to socially and economically weaker sections of the society complaining violation
of their human right is maintainable. 24 A registered society, a non-political, non-profit making
and voluntary organizations exposing cause of old infirm pensioners can maintain a PIL. 25
Further, where a question of grave importance has been brought to the notice of the court, it
will not shut its eyes and refuse to determine the question on the technical plea of lack of
locus standi.26

13. It is humbly submitted that there has been a changing trend regarding admissibility of
newspaper reports, which has evolved with the development of press in India. In the case of
Niyamavedi v. Raman Shrivastava,27 it has been observed that the press has now assumed the
role of the public educator with the purpose of advancing public interest by publishing facts

State of H.P. v. Parent of a Student of a Medical College, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 676 (¶ 4, 5); Forward Construction
Company v. Prabhat Mandal, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 766 (¶ 21); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984)
2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11); State of H.P. v. Umed Ram Sharma, (1986) 1 S.C.R. 251 (¶ 11, 13); Fertilizer Corp.
Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 22, 23).
20
Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 47, 48).
21
Indian Bank’s Association, Bombay and Ors. v. M/s Devkala Consultancy Service and Ors., (2004) Supp 1
S.C.R. 225 (¶ 34).
22
(2003) 3 S.C.R. 143 (¶ 10). See also, Ranganath Mishra v. Union of India, (2003) 7 S.C.C. 137 (¶ 9).
23
Dr D.C. Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., (1987) 1 S.C.R. 798 (¶ 3).
24
Supra Note 17 (¶ 9, 10, 74, 80).
25
D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, (1983) 2 S.C.R. 165 (¶ 64).
26
Nair Service Society v. State of Kerala, (2007) 3 S.C.R. 149 (¶ 22).
27
1995 (1) K.L.T. 206 (¶ 8).

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and opinions. Newspapers are purveyors of news and such news items coming in the papers
cannot be brushed aside as totally baseless and unacceptable. They must be regarded as
having factual foundation. If the incident relates to a situation which affects the very security
of the nation, then the feeling of the public spirited citizen will be more intense. In such a
situation he, according to us, can certainly approach the court to have the entire matter
examined.

14. It is submitted that such an approach is not to be thwarted at the threshold on the ground that
he is a meddlesome interloper or by describing him as a busybody. If such a move is made it
will not be proper on the part of the court to take any action on the basis of the reports
published in the newspapers. But, that can be the basis for examining the entire details and
facts relating to the case. This Hon’ble Court has in many such situations initiated
proceedings based on news items published in newspapers.28

15. Therefore, in light of the above submissions, it is contended that DSPA holds the locus standi
to file the present PIL in order to challenge the constitutional validity of the impugned
decision and the order. Further it is submitted that in the present case where there is violation
of fundamental rights of a group of people belonging to the disadvantaged category, the
government should not be allowed to raise the question as to the maintainability of the
petition.29

1.2 DIRECT ACTION OF THE STATE HAS LED TO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

16. Part III, the Magna Carta of the Constitution, enlists certain basic rights which indirectly
regulate the action and conduct the executive in order to prohibit them from transgressing
into such rights. It preserves the natural rights against State encroachments by making the
Supreme Court the sentinel of these rights.30 With this, the State has been levied with the twin
duty of not interfering with the liberty of the citizens and also fulfilling the role of a protector
of such rights from encroachment. 31 It is thus intended to protect these rights against State
action, other than in the legitimate exercise of its power, to regulate private rights in public
interest. If there is breach of fundamental rights, the petitioner can approach the Supreme
Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution directly.32
28
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 997 (¶ 13).
29
Supra Note 17 (¶ 9, 10, 74, 80). See also, Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan,
(2003) 7 S.C.C. 546 (¶ 50).
30
D.D.BASU, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 55 (Prentice-Hall of India, 2nded. 2005).
31
Supra Note 30.
32
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 (¶ 173). See also, Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1963) 1 S.C.R. 778 (¶ 36); Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 22, 23);

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17. In order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution, the
petitioner has to prima facie satisfy the court not only about the violation of a fundamental
right, but also that such violation is the direct, proximate and inevitable consequence of the
action sought to be taken by the State.33 A law is hit by fundamental rights if the “direct and
inevitable consequences” of such law are to take away any of the rights guaranteed under Part
III. If the impact on any of the rights is merely incidental, indirect, remote or collateral, and is
dependent on the factors which may or may not come into play, the anvil of Art. 19 will not
be available for judging its validity.34

18. It is humbly submitted that in the present case, the action of the executive has caused a direct,
proximate effect and thereby causing violation of fundamental rights of the petitioner. Dr.
Manu Nath has admitted to the fact that the hospital authorities had denied admission to
Somani on November 9 2016,35 due to their inability to pay the required fees in valid
currency notes.36 Had the demonetisation not been brought into effect, Somani and her family
would have been able to pay the fees in the available currency notes and not suffer the
grievances that they have suffered at present. Therefore, it is contended that the present gross
violation of fundamental rights has occurred as a direct and proximate effect of State action.

1.3 THERE HAS BEEN A VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS.

19. The right to life and personal liberty is considered as the most sacrosanct right among all
other fundamental rights.37 It is a declaration of deep faith and belief in human rights. 38 The
object of Art. 21 is to prevent encroachment upon personal liberty by the executive. 39 The
State cannot violate it40 and instead has to act as a guardian of people to provide support to
protect the sanctity of such rights.41 Right to life and personal liberty are compendium terms
which include a variety of rights and attributes. 42 Several international conventions have

Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11); Muneeb-ul-Rahman v. Govt. of J&K,
(1985) 1 S.C.R. 344 (¶ 1, 6); Mohammad Zahir Khan v. Union of India, (1993) Supp (2) S.C.C. 12 (¶ 10,
11); Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Shubha Chakravarti, (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 731 (¶ 6, 7).
33
Bennett Coleman v. Union of India, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 757 (¶ 41, 42, 135). See also, Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti
v. Union of India, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 588 (¶ 6).
34
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145 (¶ 83).
35
The Moot Proposition, ¶ 3.
36
Id, ¶ 2.
37
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) Supp 2 S.C.R. 51 (¶ 32).
38
Ozhair Hussain v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2003 (Del.) 103 (¶ 16).
39
G. Gurunadha Reddy v. A.P. Road Transportation Corporation, A.I.R. 1999 (A.P.) 179 (¶ 7).
40
State of A.P. v. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy, (2000) 3 S.C.R. 644 (¶ 22).
41
Bipinchand J. Diwan v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 2002 (Guj.) 99 (¶ 13, 14).
42
Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1988) 3 S.C.R. 1102 (¶ 7).

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recognised right to life and liberty as an essential part an individual’s life. 43 The violation of
the same is not only in contravention of domestic laws, but also a direct breach of the
obligations under International Law. India has ratified various international conventions and
treaties, which put an obligation on the State to guarantee the right of motherhood to mothers
and the required care to the newly born children.

1.3.1 Article 21 has been violated.

20. The liberal interpretation of Art. 21 in terms of its application has now been extended to
protection against arbitrary actions of the executive 44 which would include all these aspects of
life which go onto make a man’s life meaningful and worth living.45

21. With changing circumstances, the concept of personal liberty has been extended to the
changing needs of a person, which is inclusive of liberty in different spheres of life. 46 In an
organised society, right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the animal
needs of a man.47 Right to life in any civilised society includes the right to medical
healthcare. These are basic human rights and necessities of life known to any civilised
society. It includes the rights to carry on such functions and activities to constitute the bare
minimum necessities of human self.48

22. In the landmark judgement of Ashok v. Union of India,49 it has been held that among all other
rights right to health has been included in the expansive definition of right to life and personal
liberty. Considering health as an indispensable element of leading a dignified and meaningful

43
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 3; Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, Art. 9(1);
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Art. 2.
44
Supra Note 42 (¶ 7).
45
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (¶ 6); Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 4-7); Ramsharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, (1988)
Supp 3 S.C.R. 870 (¶ 13, 14).
46
Khudiram Das v. State of W.B., (1975) 2 S.C.R. 832 (¶ 5).
47
Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 827 (¶ 8). See also, Consumer Education and
Research Centre v. Union of India, (1995) 1 S.C.R. 626 (¶ 20, 22); P.A. Jacob v. Superintendent of Police,
Kottayams, A.I.R. 1993 (Ker.) 1 (¶ 19, 23, 24); D.O. Vyas v. Gaziabad Development Authority, A.I.R. 1993
(All.) 57 (¶ 14); Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 S.C.R. 5 (¶ 7); Bijayalakshmi Tripathi v.
Managing Committee of Working Women’s Hostel, A.I.R. 1992 (Ori.) 242 (¶ 3, 4); Air India Statutory
Corp. v. United Labour Union, (1996) Supp 9 S.C.R. 579 (¶ 14, 15); U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v.
Friends Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., (1995) 3 S.C.R. 729 (¶ 8).
48
Supra Note 45 (¶ 4); Bijayalakshmi Tripathi v. Managing Committee of Working Women’s Hostel, A.I.R.
1992 (Ori.) 242 (¶ 3, 4); Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 S.C.R. 658 (¶ 12); Shaibya Shukla v.
State of U.P., A.I.R. 1993 (All.) 171 (¶ 8); Inderpuri General Store v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1992 (J&K) 11
(¶ 5).
49
(1997) Supp 1 S.C.R. 14 (¶ 4, 5). See also, Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶
10); Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (¶ 8).

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life, the Supreme Court by widening the ambit of Art. 21, has recognised the right to primary
medical health care.50

23. The right to life and personal liberty has been given an extensive meaning by considering the
changing conception of a dignified life.51 In furtherance to the same, the Hon’ble Apex Court,
at various instances, has taken into consideration several International Conventions and
Charters.52 The Convention for Child Rights recognises Right to motherhood as a basic
human right53 by ensuring appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers, 54
diminish infant and child mortality.55 According to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. 56 The
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provides that special
protection should be accorded to mothers during a reasonable period before and after
childbirth.57

24. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further recognised the certain ‘survival rights’ enforceable
under Art. 21 which includes right to healthcare, including the right to access public health
facilities, to receive a minimum standard of treatment and care, the enforcement of the
reproductive rights of the mother, and the right to nutrition and medical care of a newly born
child.58 The Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights has in its General Comment
No. 14 of 2000 on the right to health under the ICESCR explained the scope of the rights as
containing contains both freedoms and entitlements and an inclusive right extending to timely
and appropriate health care.59

25. In the landmark judgement of Laxmi Mandal v. Deen Dayal Harinagar Hospital & Ors.,60 it
has been held that lack of provision of post-natal health care to the mother can be held as
violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Not only
medical care but right to life also includes within its ambit widest possible protection and
assistance to the family which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society,

50
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 997 (¶ 7, 8).
51
Supra Note 45 (¶ 7, 8); Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 3); Ramsharan
Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, (1988) Supp 3 S.C.R. 870 (¶ 13).
52
P.U.C.L. v. Union of India, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 13).
53
Convention for Child Rights, 1990, Art. 24.
54
Id, Art. 24(d).
55
Id, Art. 24(a).
56
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 25.
57
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966, Art. 10.
58
P.U.C.L. v. Union of India, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 13).
59
ICESCR, 2000, Comment 14.
60
172 (2010) D.L.T. 9 (¶ 5, 24, 25, 26).

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particularly for its establishment.61 Every doctor, whether at a government hospital or

otherwise, has the professional obligation to extend his services with due expertise for
protecting life.62 The private hospitals have to provide free treatment to the poor in order to
support the State in creating a ‘welfare State’.63

26. It is humbly submitted that in the present case, on the day of November 9 2016, when Somani
was denied treatment in the hospital, the primary reason behind such denial was the inability
of her family to make payments in valid currency notes. The hospital had to take such a step
because of the fact that the existing notes had lost their legal tender. The decision of the
government had led to non-availability of adequate medical facilities to Somani. It is the duty
of the State to not only protect the rights of the individuals but also take steps towards
creation of such circumstances where all persons can exercise their rights. 64 Any actions of
the State which do not respect such obligations are to be held as violative of fundamental
rights.65 In the present case, the decision of government with respect to demonetisation has
had a direct and proximate effect on the violation of non-availability of proper medical care
to Somani, thus denying her one of the basic essentials of life, i.e. health.

27. In the present case, no compensation can be adequate nor can it be of any respite for the
victim, but due to the fact that the State has failed in protecting such serious violation of a
victim’s fundamental right, the State is duty-bound to provide compensation, which may help
in rehabilitating the victim. The level of agony and distress arising out of the loss of a child
cannot be recompensed, but the monetary compensation will at least provide some solace, 66
and act as a palliative. The concept of payment of interim compensation has been recognised
by this court in the case of Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Shubha Chakravarti.67

1.3.2 Article 14 has been violated.

28. Equality is the basic feature of the Constitution 68 and any treatment of equals unequally or
unequals as equals will be violation of basic feature of the Constitution. 69 Equal protection of
law is a positive concept.70 It does not mean that identical law should apply to all persons or
61
European Convention on Human Rights, 1950, Art. 8.
62
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 997 (¶ 14).
63
Social Jurist v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi and Ors., 2007 (140) D.L.T. 698 (¶ 1).
64
Vincent v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 990 (¶ 16); State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 1
S.C.R. 1120 (¶ 26); Paschim Bang Khet Majdoor Samity v. State of W.B., (1996) Supp 2 S.C.R. 331 (¶ 9).
65
Paschim Bang Khet Majdoor Samity v. State of W.B., (1996) Supp 2 S.C.R. 331 (¶ 9).
66
Gang-Rape on orders of Community Panchayat, In re., (2014) 4 S.C.R. 264 (¶ 19, 20).
67
(1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 731 (¶ 18).
68
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp S.C.R. 1 (¶ 1724).
69
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, (2000) Supp 5 S.C.R. 302 (¶ 13, 14).
70
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhaya, (1961) 1 S.C.R. 14 (¶ 24).

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that every law must have a universal application within the country irrespective of difference
of circumstances. Equal protection of laws does not postulate equal treatment of all persons
without distinction. What it postulates is the application of same law alike and without
discrimination to all persons “similarly” situated. 71 It denotes equality of treatment in equality
of circumstances.72 This is because the varying needs of different classes of persons often
require separate treatment.73

29. The principle of equal treatment requires that individuals be treated similarly to the extent
that they are the same and differently to the extent that they are different. 74 Equal protection
of laws means subjection to equal laws applying to all in the same circumstances. 75 It does
not prevent the State from adjusting its legislation to differences in situation to forbid
classification for that purpose but it does require that the classification be not arbitrary, 76 but
based on a real and substantial difference having a reasonable relation to the subject of a
particular legislation.77 The reasonableness of classification would depend upon the purpose
for which the classification is made.78

30. Equal protection of laws must mean the protection of equal laws for all persons similarly
situated.79 A law based on permissible classification fulfilling the twin requirements
reasonable classification and nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 80 Conferment of

71
Gouri Shanakar v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 (¶ 7).
72
Jagannath Prasad v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 S.C.R. 151 (¶ 21). See also, Mohd. Saheb Mahboob v. Dy.
Custodian, (1962) 2 S.C.R. 371 (¶ 8).
73
Dhirendra v. Legal Remembrancer, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 224 (¶ 18). See also, Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India,
(1950) S.C.R. 869 (¶ 86); State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, (1951) S.C.R. 682 (¶ 37); State of M.P. v.
Bhopal Sugar Industries, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 846 (¶ 11); Ameeroonissa v. Mahboob, (1953) S.C.R. 404 (¶ 11);
Satywati Sharma v. Union of India, (2008) 6 S.C.R. 566 (¶ 16).
74
Shri Kishan v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 531 (¶ 3). See also, V. Subramanian v. Rajesh
Raghuvendra Rao, (2009) 4 S.C.R. 942 (¶ 19); Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Sunil Bansal, (2009) 14
S.C.R. 711 (¶ 17, 19-32); Hills Borought v. Cromwell, (1945) 326 U.S. 620.
75
Lindsley v. Natural Carbolic Co., (1910) 220 U.S. 61.
76
Ameeroonissa v. Mahboob, (1953) S.C.R. 404 (¶ 11). See also, Babulal v. Collector of Customs, (1957)
S.C.R. 1110 (¶ 14); Gopi Chand v. Delhi Administration, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 87 (¶ 10, 11); K. Veeresh
Babu v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1994 (Kant.) 56 (¶ 27); Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1975) Supp S.C.R.
428 (¶ 17, 20); Special Courts Bill 1978, In re., (1979) 2 S.C.R. 476 (¶ 82, 83); K. Thimmappa v. Chairman,
Central Board of Directors, (2000) Supp 5 S.C.R. 368 (¶ 3); Union of India v. M.V. Valliappan, (1999) 3
S.C.R. 1146 (¶ 13); R.K. Garg v. Union of India, (1982) 1 S.C.R. 947 (¶ 18, 19); State of UP v. Kamala
Palace, (1999) Supp 5 S.C.R. 452 (¶ 5); U.P. Steels Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2003 (1) A.W.C. 145 (¶ 13);
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 649 (¶ 6); Food Corp. of India v. Bhanu Lodh, (2005)
2 S.C.R. 350 (¶ 16); Deena v. Union of India, (1984) 1 S.C.R. 1 (¶ 9, 68); A.V. Nachane v. Union of India,
(1982) 2 S.C.R. 246 (¶ 8); Bangalore Development Authority v. Aircraft Employees’ Co-op. Society Ltd.,
(2012) 4 S.C.R. 881 (¶ 63, 65); Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 13 S.C.R. 710 (¶ 59); G.K.
Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 2 S.C.R. 715 (¶ 36, 39).
77
Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, (1927) 274 U.S. 490.
78
BURDICK, LAW OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 605 (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1922).
79
1 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 439 (Universal Law Publishing Co., 4th ed. 2010).
80
Budhan v. State of Bihar, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1045 (¶ 5). See also, Harakchand v. Union of India, (1970) 1
S.C.R. 479 (¶ 19); Union of India v. S.C. Bagari, (1999) 2 S.C.R. 690 (¶ 16, 18); Moulin Rouge Pvt. Ltd. v.

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special benefits or protection to a particular group of citizens for rational reasons is envisaged
under Art. 14 and it is implicit in the concept of equality. 81 Treating unequals as equals will
be violative of this article.82 The concept of equality before law does not involve the idea of
absolute equality among all which may be a physical impossibility. 83 All that Art. 14
guarantees is similar treatment and not identical treatment.84

31. It is humbly submitted that in the present case the decision of demonetisation was brought
into effect in an arbitrary manner. This decision led to placing all the differently situated
people on a similar platform. People like Somani, who were in urgent need of certain
necessary facilities such as healthcare, were left devoid of adequate resources with legal
tender of currency being taken away. The Central Government ought to have kept in mind
and created a reasonable classification so as create equality of treatment in equal
circumstances. Since the government did not create this distinction, therefore, it is violative
of equality of circumstances.

1.4 ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IS NOT A BAR.

32. Where there is an alternative procedure which will provide the applicant with a satisfactory
remedy, the courts will usually insist on the applicant exhausting that remedy before seeking
judicial review. However, in matters related to Art. 32, even the Supreme Court cannot, on
the ground of existence of other adequate legal remedy, decline to entertain a petition under
Art. 32.85 The two reasons being; firstly, the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate
proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution is in
itself a guaranteed right;86 and, secondly, the power given to the Supreme Court under Art. 32
are much wider and are not confined to issuing ‘prerogative writs’ only. 87 The mere existence
of an alternative legal remedy cannot per se be a good and sufficient ground for throwing out
Commercial Tax Officer, (1997) Supp 5 S.C.R. 122 (¶ 10).
81
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) Supp 3 S.C.R. 587 (¶ 342).
82
Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers’ Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 S.C.R. 900 (¶
13); M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) Supp 1 S.C.R. 671 (¶ 43); Sri Srinivasa Theatre v. Govt. of
T.N., (1992) 2 S.C.R. 164 (¶ 9, 10); All India Sainik School Employees Asso. v. Sainik School Society,
(1988) 3 S.C.R. 398 (¶ 11); Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, (1976) 2 S.C.R. 347 (¶ 235, 336);
Gourishankar v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 (¶ 8); State of U.P. v. Kamala Palace, (1999)
Supp 5 S.C.R. 452 (¶ 5).
83
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 649 (¶ 6).
84
Shrikishan v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 531 (¶ 3). See also, V. Subramaniam v. Rajesh
Raghuvendra Rao, (2009) 4 S.C.R. 942 (¶ 19); Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Sunil Bansal, (2009) 14
S.C.R. 711 (¶ 17, 30); State of Rajasthan v. Praful, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1695 (¶ 4); Hillsborought Township v.
Cromwell, (1945) 326 U.S. 620.
85
Supra Note 10 (¶ 5).
86
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 819 (¶ 3). See also, Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras,
(1950) S.C.R. 594 (¶ 3).
87
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, (1950) S.C.R. 566 (¶ 6).

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a petition under Art. 32, if the existence of a fundamental right and a breach, actual or
threatened, of such right is alleged and is prima facie established on the petition. 88
Availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion but one of compulsion.89

33. It is a settled proposition of law that the Supreme Court cannot refuse an application under
Art. 32, merely on the ground that such application has been made to the Supreme Court in
the first instance, without resort to a High Court under Art. 226, 90 or proper writ or direction
has not been prayed for.91 Ordinarily, the High Court should not entertain a writ petition by
way of a PIL questioning the validity of a statute or statutory rule.92

34. Once it is proved to the satisfaction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that by State action, the
fundamental right of a petitioner under Art. 32 has been infringed, it is not only the right but
the duty of this duty of the court to afford him relief bypassing appropriate orders in that
behalf.93 At the instance of violation of fundamental right, the party who establishes such
right must be entitled ex debito justitiae to the issue of necessary writ. There would then be
no power in the court to refuse its discretion to issue it. 94 This is so because the Supreme
Court has to play the role of a sentinel on the qui vive. Where gross injustice is done
justifying interference, the existence of alterative remedy would be no bar to exercise
jurisdiction under Art. 21.95

88
Supra Note 10 (¶ 8). See also, Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board Kairana, (1950) S.C.R. 566 (¶ 6); Romesh
Thapar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (¶ 3); Himmatlal v. State of M.P., (1954) S.C.R. 1122 (¶ 9);
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 S.C.R. 332 (¶ 12).
89
Rajasthan S.E.B. v. Union of India, (2008) 7 S.C.R. 1025 (¶ 3).
90
Supra Note 10 (¶ 11); Raja Jagadambika Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, (1976) 1
S.C.R. 49 (¶ 12, 13); A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 (¶ 57); Somawanti v. State of
Punjab, (1963) 2 S.C.R. 774 (¶ 39); Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 S.C.R. 574 (¶ 6, 7, 8); Tata Iron and
Steel Co. v. Sarkar, (1961) 1 S.C.R. 379 (¶ 5); Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (¶ 3).
91
Supra Note 10 (¶ 11).
92
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 94 (¶ 229, 232). See also, T.N.
Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1774 (¶ 26); Kushum Lata v. Union of India,
(2006) Supp 3 S.C.R. 462 (¶ 21).
93
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 S.C.R. 332 (¶ 12). See also, Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1
S.C.R. 574 (¶ 6, 7, 8); K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 316 (¶ 11); Raja Jagadambika
Pratap Narain Singh v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 49 (¶ 12, 13); Romesh Thappar v.
State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 594 (¶ 3); Andhra Industrial Works v. Chief Controller of I&E, (1975) 1
S.C.R. 321 (¶ 10); Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, (1962) Supp 1 S.C.R. 981 (¶ 25);
Charles Sobraj v. Superintendent, Central Jail, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 512 (¶ 4); Hussainara Khatoon v. State of
Bihar, (1979) 3 S.C.R. 532 (¶ 10); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11);
Coffee Board v. Jt. C.T.O., Madras, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 147 (¶ 15); Tata Iron and Steel Co. v. Sarkar, (1961) 1
S.C.R. 379 (¶ 5).
94
Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commr., Pondicherry, (1962) Supp 1 S.C.R. 981 (¶ 25). See also, Fertilizer Corp.
Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 11); Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar, (1979) 3
S.C.R. 532 (¶ 10).
95
State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, (2001) 10 S.C.C. 740 (¶ 4).

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II. THE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO DEMONETISE THE CURRENCY NOTES
AND THE ORDER OF RBI IN THIS REGARD ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.

35. It is humbly submitted that the impugned decision of the Central Government to demonetise
the currency notes of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 and the order of RBI in this regard are
unconstitutional and ultra vires the law. The counsel would base its argument on three
premises; firstly, Central Government’s decision and order is in conflict with provisions of
Constitution (2.1); secondly, order is in conflict with certain statutory provisions (2.2); and,
thirdly, the impugned decision is a policy matter which is subject to judicial review (2.3).

II.1 CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S DECISION AND RBI’S ORDER IS IN CONFLICT WITH

PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

36. If the executive steps beyond the legislative fields assigned to them in case of violation of any
fundamental right, their respective legislative actions are liable to be struck down by courts in
India.96 Constitution being the supreme law of the land, the executive is answerable to the
courts for any transgression into the constitutional provisions and judiciary acts as guardian
of Constitution.97. Any law made by the executive must be such that it does not abridge or
take away the rights under Part III.98

37. According to H.M. Seervai,99 in his book ‘Constitutional Law of India’, and the decision of
the Supreme Court in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,100 the enforcement of
Fundamental Rights by the courts is part of administration of justice. In R.C. Cooper v.
Union of India,101 it was held that Part III of the Constitution provides an integrated or
intertwined scheme for safeguarding the fundamental rights.102 The constitutionality of a law
can be challenged in an application under Art. 32 only when any of the fundamental right is
being violated included in Part III of the Constitution. An administrative act, including
subordinate legislation, is liable to be struck down as unconstitutional and void if it
transgresses any of the mandatory provisions of the Constitution.103

96
Special Reference under Art. 143 of the Constitution, (1965) 1 S.C.R. 413 (¶ 41).
97
Natural Resources Allocation, In re., Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 9 S.C.R. 311 (¶ 95).
98
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 (¶ 3).
99
Supra Note 79.
100
(1969) 2 S.C.R. 824 (¶ 14).
101
(1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 (¶ 52).
102
Id.
103
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, (1963) Supp 1 S.C.R. 885 (¶ 15).

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II.1.1 Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order in this regard violates the
Principle of Equality i.e. Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

38. H.M. Seervai, in Constitutional Law of India,104 explains the ambit and scope of “equal
protection of laws” as-

“If all men are created equal the same laws would apply to all men. But ‘we
know’ that men are unequal, consequently, a right conferred on persons that
they shall not be denied ‘the equal protection of laws’ cannot mean that the
protection of the same laws for all and it provides for equality of treatment for
persons similarly situated.”105

The doctrine of equality enshrined in Art. 14 of the Constitution, the basis of Rule of Law
doctrine, is the basic feature of the Constitution. 106 It is contended that the impugned decision
and order of RBI in this regard are violative of principle of equality. The present argument
being twofold; firstly, the decision and the order of RBI is arbitrary, vague and unreasonable;
and, secondly, the decision and the order of RBI has violated the doctrine of permissible
classification as envisaged under Art.14.

a. The decision and the orders of RBI are arbitrary, vague and unreasonable.

39. Equality, being a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions, cannot be confined
within traditional and doctrinal limits.107 Every State action must be informed by reason 108
and it follows that an act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary. 109 Where a particular mode
is prescribed for doing an act and there is deviation in a manner that does not discloses any
discernible principle of being reasonable in itself shall be labelled as arbitrary. 110 The non-
application of mind is a facet of arbitrary exercise of power.111 Abuse of power is hit by Art.
14.112 In case of arbitrariness in state action, judicial review strikes down such action. 113 If the
standard laid down by law is unreasonable or arbitrary, then law may be struck down as

104
Supra Note 79.
105
Union of India v. Ram Gopal Aggarwal, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 202 (¶ 9, 10).
106
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, (1999) Supp 5 S.C.R. 229 (¶ 560).
107
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1974) 2 S.C.R. 348 (¶ 85).
108
Style (Dress Land) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh, (1999) Supp 1 S.C.R. 591 (¶ 12); Dolly Chanda v.
Chairman, JEE, (2004) Supp 5 S.C.R. 79 (¶ 9, 10).
109
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v. C.T.O., (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 264 (¶ 10).
110
Union of India & Anr. v. International Trading Co. & Ors. (2003) Supp 1 S.C.R. 55 (¶ 14, 15, 16).
111
Omkar Lal Bajaj v. Union of India, (2002) Supp 5 S.C.R. 605 (¶ 24, 25).
112
Suresh Chandra Sharma v. Chairman, U.P. S.E.B., A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2021 (¶ 2).
113
Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Board of Trustees, Bombay Port, (1989) 2 S.C.R. 751 (¶ 22, 23, 24).

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discriminatory.114 Every action of the government must be in conformity with reasons and
should be free from arbitrariness.115

40. Even in cases where there is no fundamental right, the authorities who exercise their statutory
powers should exercise it in such manner that the power should be so exercised to remain in
conformity with Art. 14 i.e. bona fide and non-arbitrary.116 Art.14 strikes at arbitrariness in
State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. 117 Government action must not be
arbitrary or capricious.118 The absence of arbitrary power is the first postulate of the rule of
law upon which our whole constitutional edifice is based.119 Further, merely because the
power is to be exercised by the high officials, there is no presumption as to its legality. 120
When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority, that
something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law.121

41. Going by the factual matrix of the case, the impugned decision and RBI’s order is arbitrary
and unreasonable. The withdrawal of currency circulation would imply that the currency
notes of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 is no more a legal tender and thus cannot be used for any kind of
transaction and business in the country. According to the available data, 86 % of the currency
is in the denomination of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 and sudden decision to demonetise these notes is
way too arbitrary. The value of high denomination notes in circulation is ₹ 14.18 lakh crores
or 86% of the value of all notes in circulation.122

42. It is submitted that the impugned decision and order to the said decision was not released
after considering all the relevant factor. Also, the decision is contrary to law and
unreasonable. Therefore, this decision is also violative of the doctrine of Wednesbury
unreasonableness as held in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v.

114
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Kartar Singh, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 679 (¶ 217). See also, A.P. Grains & Seeds
Merchants Association v. Union of India, (1971) 1 S.C.R. 166 (¶ 5, 6); Samrathmal Keshrimal Agarwal Bus
Operator v. Regional Transport Authority, Indore and Anr., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1986 (¶ 14, 15).
115
Netai Baig v. State of W.B., A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 1775 (¶ 7).
116
S.M. Rao v. Dy. Commr. and Dy. Magistrate, Bangalore, I.L.R. 2003 (Kar.) 4678 (¶ 26); U.P.S.C. v. Gyan
Prakash Shrivastava, A.I.R. 2012 S.C. (Supp) 621 (¶ 17); Anand Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 9 S.C.R. 133
(¶ 41, 42, 45); Centre for PIL v. Union of India, (2011) 4 S.C.R. 445 (¶ 43); Bhikhubhai Vithalbhai Patel v.
State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 S.C.R. 1051 (¶ 33); State of C.T. of Delhi v. Sanjeev, (2005) 3 S.C.R. 151 (¶ 15).
117
Supra Note 79.
118
Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of J&K, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1338 (¶ 10, 11, 12, 13).
119
Som Raj v. State of Haryana, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 535 (¶ 6).
120
Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 S.C.C. 427 (¶ 32, 40). See also, Institute of Chartered
Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna, (1986) 3 S.C.R. 1049 (¶ 21).
121
Sirpur Paper Mill Ltd. v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Hyderabad, (1971) 1 S.C.R. 304 (¶ 4).
122
RBI Annual Report, 2015-16
https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/AnnualReport/PDFs/8CURRENCYC8DA67E8EB574B8C84A75AE4D52D
EBE D.PDF, last retrieved on 24-01-17.

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Wednesbury Corp,123 which was affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Om
Kumar v. Union of India.124

43. An action is to be termed as arbitrary and capricious, it is required that the actions must be
illogical and whimsical, something without any reasonable explanation. 125 Rationality,
reasonableness, objectivity, and application of mind are some of the pre-requisites of proper
decision making.126 When both the decision making process and the decision takers are based
on irrelevant fats while ignoring relevant considerations, such an action is normally termed as
‘arbitrary.’127

44. Application of the above rulings and precedents to the factual matrix of the case, it submitted
that the current decision and the order is arbitrary and devoid of proper application of mind as
it does not have any rational basis for its declaration. The orders putting blanket restriction on
the withdrawal limits in banks in the absence of any rational object and reason is prima facie
arbitrary. Reasonableness would imply that the constitutional duties be performed within a
reasonable time so as to satisfy the test of reasonableness contemplated under Art. 14 of the
Constitution.128 The restrictions imposed by banks on the withdrawal limits for a day
providing no future day to remove those restrictions were unreasonable. To support this
contention, reliance can be placed on the case of Union of India v. S.B. Vohra,129 where it was
observed that any prohibitory order should be having a reasonable time of the operation.

b. The decision and the orders of RBI have violated the principle of
intelligible differentia.

45. ‘Equality before the law’ only means that amongst equals, the law should be equal and that
the like should be treated alike.130 Equal protection of law does not postulate equal treatment
of all persons without distinction.131 Instead it postulates is the application of the same alike
and without discrimination to all persons “similarly situated.132 It denotes equality of
123
(1948) 1 K.B. 223.
124
(2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 693 (¶ 24, 26, 66, 67, 68, 71).
125
Sanchit Bansal v. Joint Admission Board (2011) 15 S.C.R. 1057 (¶ 28, 132, 133).
126
2 D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 1474 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 9 th ed.
2015).
127
Id.
128
(2004) 1 S.C.R. 36 (¶ 47, 51).
129
Id.
130
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 (¶ 7).
131
Ashutosh Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 649 (¶ 6).
132
Shrikishan v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 531 (¶ 3). See also, V. Subramaniam v. Rajesh
Raghuvendra Rao, (2009) 4 S.C.R. 942 (¶ 19); Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. v. Sunil Bansal, (2009) 14
S.C.R. 711 (¶ 17); State of Rajasthan v. Praful, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1695 (¶ 5); Hillsborought Township v.
Cromwell, (1945) 326 U.S. 620.

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treatment of treatment in equal circumstances.133 It implies that amongst equals, the law shall
be equal and equally administered and the like should be treated alike without any
distinction.134 The principle of equality of law thus means; that there should be an equality of
treatment under equal circumstances i.e., equals should not be treated unlike and unlike
should not be treated alike.135

46. Art. 14 forbids classification provided that the differentia has a rational nexus to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation in question. 136 The principle underlying the guarantee
of Art. 14 is not that the same rules of law should be applicable to all persons within the
Indian Territory.137 It only means that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.138 Going by the factual matrix of the
current case, the Central Government’s decision and further orders of RBI has led to the
creation of two classes, bank account holders, and non-bank account holders. This
classification as a result of the orders of RBI has unreasonably classified both the people.
Further, this classification has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. The non-bank
holders do not have any options available to them to convert the currency in hand which has
lost its legal tender.

47. The law of demonetisation in the country should not have been uniformly applied throughout
the country without application of mind. The withdrawal of currency notes of ₹ 500 and ₹
1000 is a big decision considering the total value of all notes in circulation in the country. It
cannot be denied that some people do not deserve the same treatment because they are not
similarly situated.139 Going by the factual matrix of the case, RBI through its order exercised
under § 26 (2)140 could have possibly make such an exception and which would have not
violated the principle of equality. Therefore, the application of the above rulings in the factual
matrix of the current case will imply that the current decision and the RBI’s order are
violative of Art. 14 i.e. the principle of equality.

133
State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 906 (¶ 31); State of M.P. v. Gopal D. Thirthani, (2003)
Supp 1 S.C.R. 797 (¶ 23).
134
Dr. Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General and Anr., (1962) 2 S.C.R. 371 (¶ 8).
135
Gauri Shanker v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 (¶ 7).
136
National Council for Teacher Education v. Shri Shyam Shiksha Prashikshan Sansthan, (2011) 2 S.C.R. 291
(¶ 22).
137
State of W.B. v. Anwar Ali, (1952) S.C.R. 284 (¶ 44).
138
Id; Sadasiv v. State of Orissa, (1956) S.C.R. 43 (¶ 7, 8, 9).
139
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors., (2015) 1 S.C.C. 347 (¶ 22).
140
The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, §26(2).

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II.1.2 Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order in this regard violates the
Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

48. Art. 19 of the Constitution, as it stands after 1978, guarantees six fundamental rights, which
may be styled as the seven ‘freedoms’, freedom of profession, occupation, trade or business,
being one of them.141 As held in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,142 the
Constitution makers inscribed certain basic rights in Part III which are essential for the
unfolding and development of his full personality in Part III of the Constitution. In
furtherance to this, the right to carry on any occupation or business is one such right which is
an essential right for the development of one’s personality and it cannot be taken away by a
law.143 The article was thus intended to protect these rights against State action other than in
the legitimate exercise its power to regulate these rights.144

49. Recently it was held that fundamental rights in India have to be read along with UDHR145 and
if need by its domestic jurisprudence.146 Art. 23 of UDHR guarantees every person right to
work along with favourable remuneration supplemented by other means of social protection.
The guarantee under Art. 19(1) (g) extends to practise any profession, or to carry on an
occupation, trade or business which takes into consideration all the avenues through which a
man may earn his livelihood.147 In a nutshell, the guarantee takes into its ambit any activity
carried on by a citizen of India to earn his living.148 The sudden decision to withdraw such
notes implies that in certain sectors of the economy and the commerce, major number of
people will suffer as a consequence of this. This decision is violating the people’s right to
trade, business or occupation.

a. Restrictions imposed by the RBI and the Central Government are

unreasonable.

50. It is submitted that clause (6) of the Art. 19 authorises the State to impose ‘reasonable
restrictions’ upon the freedom of trade, business, occupation, or profession-in the interest of
general public.149 Restriction imposed by the state upon the freedom guaranteed by Art. 19(1)

141
Supra Note 79.
142
(1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 192-198, 201, 203, 211, 212, 215, 217).
143
Supra Note 126, p. 2100.
144
Supra Note 79.
145
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Art. 23.
146
Chairman, Railway Board and Ors. v. Chandrima Das and Ors., (2000) 1 S.C.R. 480 (¶ 19).
147
Supra Note 126, p. 2829.
148
Id.
149
Supra Note 79.

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(g) cannot be justified on any ground outside clause (6). 150 The limitation imposed should not
be one which is far-fetched, hypothetical, problematic or too remote. 151 The expression
‘reasonable restriction’ signifies that the limitation as the right should not be arbitrary or
excessive in nature and it has to strike a proper balance between the freedom under Art. 19(1)
(g) and social control permitted by Art. 19(6).152 The duty of reconciling fundamental right in
Art. 19 and the laws of social control is cast upon the courts. 153 Further, while the
Constitution permits a ‘law’ laying down reasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights
conferred by Art. 19(1), the reasonableness has to originate from a law.154

51. It follows that in order to constitute a ‘reasonable’ restriction under clause (6), both the law as
well as an order made thereunder must satisfy the test of reasonableness. 155 The requirement
of “reasonableness” runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundamental
rights.156 A restriction is unreasonable if it sweeps within its ambit activities which constitute
a legitimate exercise of freedom of speech and expression,157 or the restriction is in excess of
what was necessary to suppress or prevent the social mischief aimed at.158

52. Under the “Principle of Proportionality”, the legislature should maintain a proper balance
between the adverse effects which the legislation may have on the rights and liabilities or
interests of the persons keeping in mind the purpose they were intended to serve159 where the
appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made by the executive so as to
achieve the purpose of the law.160 It is, therefore, submitted that current decision and the order
violates Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution as it of an excessive nature and fails to maintain a
proper balance between the adverse effects which it may have on the rights and liabilities or
interests of the persons in relation to the purpose that it was intended to serve.

53. Considering the nature of business which is being affected, these restrictions on the
withdrawal amount from the bank is totally unreasonable. It is submitted that a proper
balance between the freedom under Art. 19(1)(g) and social control permitted by Art. 19(6) is
not present in the impugned case which are too arbitrary and capricious. Reliance can be

150
Nagar Rice Mills v. Teekappa, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 846 (¶ 8).
151
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 821 (¶ 13).
152
Commercial and Ahmedabad Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 (Guj.) 20 (¶ 17).
153
I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab, (1967) 2 S.C.R. 762 (¶ 16).
154
N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, (1950) S.C.R. 519 (¶ 4).
155
Oudh Sugar Mills v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1070 (¶ 6).
156
Javeed v. State of Haryana, (2003) Supp 1 S.C.R. 947 (¶ 28).
157
Ramji Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1957) 1 S.C.R. 860 (¶ 3, 9).
158
Pathunma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 537 (¶ 14).
159
Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 382 (¶ 73, 75, 76).
160
Chintamanrao v. State of M.P., (1950) S.C.R. 759 (¶ 7).

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placed on the case Chintamanrao v. State of M.P.,161 where it was held that the phrase
‘reasonable restriction’ connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the
right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the
interests of the public.162

54. The reasonableness of the restrictions is to be adjudged not in the background of theoretical
standards or predetermined patterns.163 In order to determine the reasonableness of the
restrictions regard must be had to the nature of business 164 and the conditions prevailing in the
trade. The Supreme Court of India has invalidated laws on the ground of “vagueness” in a
plethora of cases since.165 Application of the rulings in the current case will imply the fact
that the order putting restrictions is not reasonable, thus, is violative of Art. 19 of the
Constitution of India. Under Art. 19, the burden is never on the petitioner to prove that the
restriction is not reasonable.166 The onus is on the State to justify that the restriction imposed
on any fundamental right guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(a) to (g) is reasonable under clauses 19(2)
to (6).167

II.1.3 The decision of the Central Government and the order of RBI violates Art. 21.

55. The right to life guaranteed under Art. 21 embraces within its sweep not only physical
existence but the quality of life. If any statutory provisions run counter to such a right it must
be held unconstitutional.168 The scope of this article is being widened in an ever expanding
horizon, by courts.

a. The decision and the order of RBI violates the right to life.

56. It was held that the right to life includes the right to carry on such functions and activities
adequate to give expression to human self.169 Life and personal liberty comprehend those
rights which would go to make a man’s life meaning and worth living. A person is entitled to
161
Id (¶ 6).
162
Id.
163
Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner, (1954) S.C.R. 873 (¶ 7).
164
Id.
165
Harakchand v. Union of India, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 479 (¶ 21). See also, P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra,
(2005) Supp 2 S.C.R. 603 (¶ 125); Nandlal v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1181 (¶ 4); Lakshmanrao v.
Judicial Magistrate, (1971) 2 S.C.R. 822 (¶ 8); Sawai Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 2 S.C.R. 957 (¶ 14,
15, 18), Surath Chandra Chakraborthy v. State of West Bengal, (1971) 3 S.C.R. 1 (¶ 6); State of A.P. v.
Shree Ramarao, (1964) 3 S.C.R. 25 (¶ 6, 7); Dr Ram Krishna Bharadwaj v. State of Delhi, (1953) 4 S.C.R.
708 (¶ 4, 5); Naresh Chandra Ganguly v. State of W.B., (1960) 1 S.C.R. 411 (¶ 12, 14).
166
B. Banerjee v. Anita Pan, (1975) 2 S.C.R. 774 (¶ 21). See also, Pathumma v. State of Kerala, (1978) 2
S.C.R. 537 (¶ 6, 8).
167
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 3 S.C.R. 92 (¶ 12, 14). See also, Bachan Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145 (¶ 34, 47).
168
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) Supp 4 S.C.R. 872 (¶ 61).
169
Ammmini E.D. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1995 (Ker.) 252 (¶ 33).

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enjoy his personal rights and any action taken which may create hazards of life will be
encroaching upon the personal rights of a citizen. 170 Right to life includes the right to
livelihood because no person can live without the means of living – that is the means of
livelihood. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his
life.171 The Supreme Court of India has, over the past fifty two years, played a central role in
sustaining democratic institutions and the rule of law for almost a quarter of the world’s
population.172

57. It is contended that the current decision and the order to demonetise the currency notes is
restricting the right to livelihood. It doesn't need an Ivy League or IMF/WB training to
understand that non-availability of 84% of cash and the literal disappearance of lower
denomination of notes, which incidentally replaced the higher value notes for transactions
post the freeze, could kill the livelihoods of millions because people wouldn't have money to
hire or pay daily/weekly wage earners. The employees can postpone both hiring and paying
labourers, but even a few days of deprivation means absolute devastation for the latter. The
informal sector in India accounts for about 45% of GDP and nearly 80% employment.
Undertaking such drastic steps without safeguards to protect livelihoods is a violation of Art.
21.

b. The decision and the order of RBI violates the right to personal liberty.

58. The right to personal liberty in Art. 21 must be read with Art. 19 and Art. 14, with a view to
strengthen the right of personal liberty and to overcome the weakness of guarantee of
procedure established by law.173 As the test propounded by Art. 14 pervades Art. 21 as well,
the law and procedure authorizing interference with personal liberty and the right to life must
also be right and just and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. 174 Therefore since the
decision imposes unreasonable restrictions with respect to Art. 19(1)(a) and is arbitrary,
vague and fanciful with respect to Art. 14, it violates Art. 21.

170
Peoples’ Union of Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1996) Supp 10 S.C.R. 321 (¶ 17, 18). See also, Sunil
Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 557 (¶ 31, 49, 78); Valsamma Paul v. Cochin University,
(1996) 1 S.C.R. 128 (¶ 26, 32); WEN-CHEN CHENG AND LI-ANN THIO, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES
AND MATERIALS (Hart Publishing, 2014).
171
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corportion, (1985) Supp 2 S.C.R. 51 (¶ 32).
172
GRANVILLE AUSTIN, WORKING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE (Oxford
University Press, 2000).
173
Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154 (¶ 25, 28, 29). See also, Sambhu Nath
Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, (1974) 1 S.C.R. 1 (¶ 39); R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R.
530 (¶ 55).
174
District Registrar and Collector, Hyderabad v. Canara Bank, (2004) Supp 5 S.C.R. 833 (¶ 56).

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II.1.4 Central Government’s decision and RBI’s order in this regard violates Art.
300A of the Constitution.

59. It is submitted that imposing restriction on accessing the self-owned money from the bank
account is violation of Art. 300A175. The Hon’ble Apex Court has come to the conclusion that
the bank account constitutes “property".176 The government’s demonetisation wipes out
public debt owed to note holders of such denominations. Consequently, it amounts to a
compulsory acquisition of private property by the State.177

60. It is further contended that the impugned decision and the order has extinguished right to
property without any proper authority of law and is not thus legal. The Hon’ble Apex Court
has held that an executive order is not “law” for the purpose of Art. 300-A 178 which implies
that unless the legislature allows imposition of cash withdrawals limits under a specific
provision, or passes a new law, the government is constitutionally prevented from doing so.
Therefore, application of the above rulings would imply that the current decision and the
order violates right to property under Art. 300-A, and is thus illegal and unconstitutional. In
light of the above facts and rulings, it is submitted that the current decision and the orders of
RBI are unconstitutional since it is in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution.

II.2 ORDERS OF RBI IS IN CONFLICT WITH OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

61. The order of RBI which is a delegated legislation is ultra vires since it is in conflict with the
parent Act and the other Act. A subordinate legislation, must not only confirm to the parent
act under which it is framed or issued, but also to the provisions of other Act.

II.2.1 Conflict with RBI Act.

62. No subordinate legislative body has any inherent power to make rules or any kind of
subordinate legislation, and that if it makes any instrument of subordinate legislation without
statutory authority or in excess of the authority conferred upon it by the executive, the
instrument is bound to be pronounced ultra vires and hence, invalid by the Court.179

63. In the present case, after considering the provisions of the RBI Act, 1934, it can be inferred
that since RBI does not have any inherent power to impose restrictions, RBI has wrongly
imposed restrictions on the withdrawal limits of the people which is thus, ultra vires, and

175
INDIA CONST., art. 300A.
176
Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. RBI and Ors., (1996) Supp 4 S.C.R. 443 (¶ 7).
177
Id.
178
Bishambhar Dayal Chander Mohan v. State of U.P., (1982) 1 S.C.R. 1137 (¶ 41).
179
Morril v. Jones, (1883) 106 U.S. 466.

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invalid. Further, the § 26(2) empowers the government to withdraw the legal tender of “any”
series of currency, this impugned decision has demonetised “all” the currency in circulation
which is in conflict with the § 26(2) of the RBI Act. The word “any” denotes the legislative
intent of the lawmakers and this decision completely destroys the legislative intent of the
legislators.

II.3 THE QUESTION INVOLVED IN THIS CASE IS OF POLICY DECISION AND IS THUS SUBJECT

TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.

64. Judicial review is the basic and essential feature of the Indian constitutional scheme entrusted
to the judiciary.180 In the USA, certain questions called ‘political questions’ were traditionally
considered181 to be non-justiciable because they were committed by the Constitution to the
Consideration of some organ other than judiciary. Though in several cases the above decision
was followed,182 the law declared therein was considerably narrowed down in Gomillon v.
Lightfoot183 and Baker v. Cerr.184 The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India is inclined to follow
the liberalized view take in the Baker v. Carr case185 because of the fact India does not follow
strict separation of powers.186

65. When a State policy or its implementation is challenged as being contrary to larger public
good or violative of constitutional principles, it becomes the duty of court 187 “to exercise its
powers in larger public interest and ensure that the institutional integrity is not compromised
by those in whom the people have reposed trust and who have taken an oath to discharge
duties in accordance with the Constitution and the law without fear or favour, affection or ill
will.”188 This would involve several profound constitutional and legal issues will have to be
judicially examined and settled.189 It is a well-settled principle that the State is bound to act in
conformity with the principles of equality, public trust and larger public good.
Constitutionalism must be reflected at every state of the decision-making process. 190 Exercise

180
R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (1993) 3 S.C.R. 802 (¶ 8).
181
Luther v. Borden, (1849) 48 U.S. 7.
182
McDoughall v. Green, (1948) 335 U.S. 281; Cook v. Fortson, (1946) 329 U.S. 675; South v. Peters, (1950)
359 U.S. 276; Hartsfield v. Sloan, (1958) 357 U.S. 916.
183
(1960) 364 U.S. 339.
184
(1962) 369 U.S. 186.
185
Id; S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 644 (¶ 4).
186
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 272 (¶ 7).
187
Centre for PIL v. Union of India, (2012) 3 S.C.R. 147 (¶ 12).
188
Supra Note 97 (¶ 158).
189
Id (¶ 109-112).
190
Id (¶ 162).

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of judicial review is to protect the citizen from the abuse of the power etc. by an appropriate
government or department.191

66. An executive order termed as a policy decision is not beyond the pale of judicial review. 192
Interference with the policy decision which violates the fundamental right on the part of the
superior court would not be without jurisdiction as it is subject to judicial review.193 Broadly,
a policy decision is subject to judicial review on two grounds, 194 firstly, if it is
unconstitutional, and; secondly, if it is de hors the provisions of the Act and the regulations.

67. Reliance can be placed on the case of Poudyal v. Union of India195 where the court observed
that interpretation the written Constitution is the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts and if any
provision of any law under a policy decision transgresses the Constitution the court must
strike it down as unconstitutional. Further, application of the above rulings to the present case
would imply that the law in the instant case is subject to judicial review since the question
here involved is not a political question but a constitutional question.

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners humbly pray before this Hon’ble Court that it
may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. The writ petitions filed by Somani and the D.S.P.A. be held maintainable.
2. ₹ 10,00,000 be granted as palliative to Somani.
3. The executive decision of the Central Government to demonetise the currency notes
of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 and the said order of R.B.I. in this regard be held constitutionally
invalid and ultra vires the provisions of Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and Banking
Regulation Act, 1946.

Or pass any other order that the court may deem fit in the light of equity, justice and good
conscience.

And for this Act of kindness of Your Lordships the Petitioners shall as duty bound ever
pray.

191
Id (¶ 109-112).
192
Delhi Development Authority v. Joint Action Committee, (2007) 13 S.C.R. 811 (¶ 67, 69).
193
Id.
194
Id.
195
(1994) Supp 1 S.C.C. 324 (¶ 11).

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Sd/- _____________________

COUNSEL FOR PETITIONERS

SOMANI

AND

DHARMASTHAN STATE PENSIONER ’S ASSOCIATION

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