NAME: PRACHETA DWIVEDI

INSTITUTE NAME: KIRIT P. MEHTA SCHOOL OF LAW,

NAVI MUMBAI
YEAR:2021
EMAIL ID: prachetadwivedi@gmail.com
PHONE NUMBER:9718584977
TYPE OF SUBMISSION: EXTENSIVE RESEARCH

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

This is to certify that to the best of my knowledge the content of this article is written done by
me. This thesis has not been submitted for any degree or other purposes.
MOHRI BIBIE VS. DHARMODAS GHOSH (1903)30 Cal. 539
CITATIONS: ILR (1903) 30 CAL 539 (PC)
PETITIONER: MOHRI BIBEE
RESPONDENT: DHARMODAS GHOSE
DATE OF JUDGEMENT: 4 MARCH, 1903.
BENCH OF JUDGES: LORD MCNAUGHTON, LORD DAVEY, LORD LINDLEY, SIR
FORD NORTH, SIR ANDREW SCOBLE, SIR ANDREW WILSON, JJ.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE:

“Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose is a Contract Law case from India that deals with a
contract with a minor. A contract is only effective if it is entered into by parties who are
competent to contract, according to Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. A minor is
not competent to contract, according to Section 11 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. A minor
is someone who has not reached the age of majority and is under the age of eighteen. A
contract with a minor is considered void from the start. A minor is not deemed mature
enough to grasp the terms of a contract, which is why this restriction exists.”
“A contract with a minor is void from the start, according to this case. The Privy Council also
believed that when children enter into a contract with a big person, they should be afforded
certain protections."
FACTS OF THE CASE
 On 20 July 1895, Rs 20,000, at 12 per cent interest, was repaid to certain homes
belonging to the responding party by Rns. Dharmodas Ghose in favour of Brahmo
Dutt.
 Back in September of the same year alone, the respondent was juvenile and reached
the age of 21. The entire deal was carried out by his lawyer Kedar Nath Mitter
without Brahmo Dutt from Calcutta and his manager, Dedraj, spent the money on it.
 It was stated that the respondent's mom and guardian Smt. Jogendranundinee Dasi had
sent a letter through their lawyer, Mr. Bhupendra Nath Bose, disclosing to the
minority of the respondent that the money he had been lending to the respondent was
at the risk of the lender.

 The mortgage deed contained a declaration from the respondent that the majority of
he had had received and that the mortgagee had obtained the consent to lend him
money on the basis of assurance.
 The respondent's status as a minor was known to Mr. Kedar Nath Mitter. The
respondent and his mother launched the proceedings on 10 September 1895 to declare
the mortgage as void and tried to cancel the mortgage.
 The Court of First Instance granted the intimate relief and the Court of Appeal refused
the appeal. After this appeal was brought, Mr. Brahmo Dutt died and his executors
were charged with this appeal.
ISSUES OF THE CASE

 Whether the mortgage deed was void under section 10 and 11 of the Indian Contract
Act?
 Whether the mortgage deed was voidable under the section 10 and 11 of the Indian
Contract Act?
 Whether the respondent was liable to repay the loan amount received by him under
the mortgage deed?

ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT

1. Dharmodas was a major at the time of the agreement

2. At the time of the mortgaged deed, the appellant and his agent were unaware that the
respondent was a minor.
3. Because the respondent made a false declaration regarding his age, he is not entitled
to age relief.
4. Under section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act 1972, the rule of estoppel should be
applied to the respondent.
5. Under sections 38, 64, and 41 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, and section 41 of the
Specific Relief Act 1877, respondent is obliged to pay the whole sum he takes during
the mortgaged deed.

RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS

1. At the time of the mortgaged deed, Dharmodas and his agent were aware that the
respondent was a minor.
2. Because the respondent was a minor at the time of the mortgage deed, no contract
was formed and the loan amount was not repaid.
JUDGEMENT:

1. “While Mr. Brahmo Dutt was not present at the transaction, Mr. Mitter, his authorized
agent, and Mr. Dedraj, who both believed Mr. Mitter was authorized to be the agent
for Mr. Dutt, were in good faith in the process of his instructions. Therefore, their
lordships argued that the knowledge of the minority of the respondent owned by Mr.
Mitter was rightly charged of Mr. Dutt.”
2. “In this instantaneous instance, Section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act,1872, it was
considered that both parties knew the truth. In the case of a small minority as ruled in
Nelson v. Stocker 4 De G. and J. 458, this clause was also deemed not to apply
(1859). Their lordships further relied on Section 19 of the Indian Contract Act (1872)
that provides that the contract is not rendered void by any fraud or misrepresentation
which does not give rise to the agreement of the Party on which such fraud is
performed or which is misrepresented.”
3. “According to the Indian Contract Act (1872), if a person with the option of an invalid
contract cancels the contract, then he or she must return whatever advantages he or
she may have obtained from that party to the other party. Their duties only applied to
individuals competent in the contract, not to children incapable in contract. Their
duties were similar. It was affirmed by the Privy Council that the lower courts decided
to declare in favour of the defendant without orders him to refund the advanced
money.”
4. “In the moment, the contested mortgage was carried out under the Property Transfer
Act (1882). Section 7 of the same Act stipulates, in order to be able to transfer
property, the individual should be competent to contract. In accordance with Article4
of that Act it must be regarded as part of the Indian Contract Act of 1872 as the
Chapters and sections of that Act relating to contracts. The immediate matter was
therefore regarded to come within the Property Transfer Act (1882).”
5. “Taking into account sections 2, 10, and 11 of the Indian Contract Act (1872), Their
Lordships held that the Act requires all contracting parties to be “competent to
contract,” and expressly states that a person who is incompetent to contract due to
minority cannot make a contract within the meaning of the Act. Their Lordships
further looked at other parts of the same Act that pointed to the invalid character of a
minor's contract. According to section 68, if a person incapable of entering into a
contract or any one whom he is legally obligated to maintain is provided with
 necessaries suitable to his position in life, the person who provided such supplies is
entitled to reimbursement from the incapable person's property. The Act makes it
plain that a minor is not accountable for necessities and that no legal demand for them
can be made against him, even though a statutory claim can be made against his
property. Sections 183 and 184 make it illegal for anybody under the age of majority
to hire or be an agent. Again, under sections 247 and 248, while a person under the
age of majority may be admitted to the advantages of a partnership, he cannot be held
personally accountable for any of its responsibilities; nevertheless, he may assume
those obligations after reaching the age of majority if he so desires.”
6. “Their Lordships concluded that when a contract cannot be formed because one of the
parties is a minor, the question of whether the contract is invalid or voidable does not
arise since the deal is void from the start. Their Lordships also decided that
intervening with lower court judgments not to require the respondent to repay the
amount provided was pointless. They cited Thurston v. Nottingham Permanent
Benefit Building Society [L. R. (1902)1 Ch. 1 (1901); on appeal, L. R. (1903) App.
Cas. 6], which held that a Court of Equity cannot say that it is equitable to compel a
person to pay any moneys in respect of a transaction that the Legislature has
announced void as against that person, and denied the petitioners' claim . The petition
was turned down.”

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In the instance of Mohori Bibee vs. Dharmodas Ghose, the Privy Council said unequivocally
that any contract or arrangement made with a minoror an infant is null and invalid. All
interactions with minors shall be null and invalid from the start. According to the Majority
Act of 1875, any individual under the age of 18 years or who has not completed the age of 18
years is not competent to establish or engage into any contract or agreement.

“Any deal wherein a juvenile is a party to the contract or is somehow engaged in it, is void.
This view is true since minors and infants fall into the group of persons who are unable to
freely consent for the simple reason that they are not in a position to consider in the way that
a wise or regular person would. An agreement is a deal in which all parties provide their free
and equal permission, however in the case of a minor, the consent might be dominated by
major ones, resulting in a breach of one of the conditions for forming a contract, namely, free
consent.”

“By its judgement, the court has also proposed that contact with a child is considered null and
void, which means it is neither legitimate nor invalid. Kids contracts, in my opinion, should
be avoided and prohibited since they might have negative social, economic, and legal
consequences on minors' lives and situations. Such a person committing the crime should,
either in jail or by an order of a fine or both, under the scope of the crime done by the
significant person, be harshly punished by the Court of Law.”

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be concluded at Mohori Bibee c. Dharmodas Ghose that any agreement
or deed in which a minor is or is included in such an arrangement is null and void because it
has no legal approval. In instances when minors are parents or custodians, they must not be
held accountable without their approval for the dealing carried out by the minor, therefore
they are not obligated to reimburse the minor for their moral responsibility.