Expansion and Consolidation of Colonial Power1
Expansion and Consolidation of Colonial Power1
Subject : History
Course Developers
and
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Expansion and consolidation of colonial power
Table of contents
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Expansion and consolidation of colonial power
Introduction
The second half of the 18th century saw the formal induction of the English East India
Company as a power in the Indian political system. The battle of Plassey (1757) followed by
that of Buxar (1764) gave the Company access to the revenues of the subas of Bengal,
Bihar and Orissa and a subsequent edge in the contest for paramountcy in Hindustan.
Control over revenues resulted in a gradual shift in the orientation of the Company‟s agenda
– from commerce to land revenue – with important consequences. This chapter will trace
the development of the Company‟s rise to power in Bengal, the articulation of commercial
policies in the context of Mercantilism that developed as an informing ideology in Europe
and that found limited application in India by some of the Company‟s officials. This found
expression until the 1750‟s in the form of trade privileges, differential customs payments
and fortifications of Company settlements all of which combined to produce an alternative
nucleus of power within the late Mughal set up.
Founded by a royal charter dated 31 December 1600, the English East India Company was a
joint stock company of London merchants who took the decision to intervene in the Euro-
Asian trade that had been initiated by the Portuguese and subsequently expanded by the
Dutch. The impulse to control trade between Europe and Asia in spices and pepper, calicoes
and textiles went back to the end of the 15th century, when the Portuguese first cut into the
Italian stranglehold of the Levantine trade, and directly transported spices from Asia to
Europe. The Dutch followed suit with measures that were even more draconian, to ensure
complete control over supplies of spices and their carriage, although by the middle of the
17th century, there was a definite shift from the quest for spices to the craze for calicoes.
The same motivation drove the English Company which, however, had only one tenth of the
capital owned and mobilized by the Dutch East India Company known as the Verenigde
Oostindische Compagnie or V.O.C. It was this lack that persuaded the English Company to
turn towards India not only for its valued textiles that paid for spices but also found growing
numbers of buyers in England and Europe. Over the course of a century, the Company
established trading posts in western and eastern India as well as in the Coromandel. From
modest beginnings in 1617, the Company extended its trading activities by the end of the
17th century, when Bombay, Madras and Calcutta emerged as major trading centres and
spheres of influence.
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The Levant is the collective name for countries along the shores of the eastern
Mediterranean and includes Anatolia, Syria and Egypt. The area was the principal
transit point in the transit trade between the East and the west and consisted of
transportation of spices and luxury goods. Traditionally the Levantine trade was
dominated by the Venetian merchants who were until the 16th century the principal
distributors of spice in Europe. Trade coming into the mouths of the Red Sea and the
Persian Gulf and dominated by Asian merchants and Arabs reached the Levant where
the goods were picked up by the merchants of the Italian city states. The discovery
of the all sea route to Asia by the Portuguese ended the stranglehold of the Italians
and directly impacted on the older trade of the Levant.
Sources: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:The_Levant_3.png
In its nascent stage, the English East India Company traded in textiles and functioned within
a well established trading system in India. The Company‟s servants, termed factors,
advanced money to brokers who channeled these to weavers and primary producers. There
was a growing expansion in the textile trade but not at India‟s expense as India received
substantial consignments of bullion in return for its manufactures. In fact, the growth of the
textile industry ensured the enrichment of brokers and supply merchants and in the case of
Bengal even improved the bargaining capacity of weavers. There was thus no question at
this stage of the Company becoming a political power even if they periodically made
demands that were not considered appropriate and that even occasionally undermined the
sovereign dignity of the land.
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What made the Company different from other foreign merchants who came to India, settled
down and traded? There were three major differences and some scholars have associated
these with the play of mercantilist ideas. In the first place, the Company demanded from
the ruling government, privileges that exempted them from paying customs duties even as
they took over the responsibility of maritime protection to indigenous shipping. Secondly,
the Company authorities fortified their centres where they had their own courts of
adjudication and thereby set up a special zone of influence where Mughal writ could not run.
Thirdly they felt emboldened to offer protection to fugitives from the law as part of a
general policy of peopling their centres with a client population of collaborating subjects. In
fact, it was precisely around these issues of privilege and exemption that the Anglo Mughal
wars of 1757, 1764 and the subsequent clash with Muhammed Reza Khan occurred in
Bengal. In fact the element of force used by the English East India Company especially in
the 18th century lent a particular coercive edge to its profile that marked it very distinctly
off from other foreign merchants including the other trading companies. This was partly due
to their secure political position and also because they drew on an older system of force and
„legitimate protection‟ that the Portuguese had introduced into the trading system of the
Indian Ocean.
To what extent were these claims part of a larger mercantilist driven political project? To
answer this we need to understand what mercantilism means and how this encouraged
some Company servants even in the 17th century to confront the Grand Mughal.
Defining mercantilism
The term „mercantilism‟ refers to a corpus of economic theories espoused by states in early
modern Europe and perceived as critical elements in ensuring the health of states. The
objective was to control and regulate trade and ensure its proceeds and maintain the bullion
reserves of the states. Put simply, it was important to prevent an unnecessary outflow of
treasure from the state abroad, to curtail imports and encourage exports. Dominant
between the 16th and 18th centuries, it led to some significant instances of government
intervention over the economy in the form of standardization, of controlling guilds and even
regulating commerce by floating chartered companies, thereby giving them monopoly over
trade with certain regions and giving them sovereign political power in distant continents.
All these were intended to enhance the power of the state. Implicit in mercantilism, was the
assumption that wealth constituted power and that power and wealth were the proper
ultimate ends of national policy.
There is considerable evidence to indicate that from the very beginning the Company could
use force to push its interests and that the Company and the state were united in realizing
certain diplomatic and even financial goals. Recall for instance how the island of Bombay
that Charles II had received as dowry by the Portuguese crown was transferred to the
Company as its base so that it could be used in future against Portuguese settlements in
western India.
The Company settlements at Madras, Bombay and Calcutta began as humble trading
stations that the authorities secured from local political rulers or, as in the case of Bombay,
as part of a settlement with the Portuguese. These settlements were seen as regional hubs -
Madras was the coordinating centre for settlements in southern India, Bombay for the
western part and Calcutta for trading stations and factories in the east. It was here that the
Company established and maintained its full strength, consisting of the Governor and his
council, and through them, coordinated the trading operations of their servants. From the
very beginning, the Company sought to fortify these stations against the local/regional
authorities while simultaneously encouraging local artisans and merchants to come and take
up residence in the new city. The intention was to develop the city as a special zone of
influence and thereby invest it with political authority.
Within the city, there were two clearly demarcated zones – the White and Black towns
whose inhabitants had occasionally to pay taxes for their protection and municipal
safeguards. These occasionally created conflict of interest leading to altercations and the
Company occasionally had to maneuver cautiously to maintain its primacy. However, the
element of force in the Company‟s policies was never entirely absent and the image of the
Company as a semi sovereign power, albeit in a restricted space, was established by the
end of the 17th century. This found expression in repeated fortification measures, in
altercations with local authorities, and in the case of Bombay‟s Governor Sir Josiah Child,
even confrontation with the Mughal State (1688-89). Josiah Child in fact believed that the
commercial success of the Dutch East India Company or VOC as it was known had been due
to its political strategy and that the only way to win recognition from the Mughal Empire and
the right to trade as a sovereign power was by adopting a war policy. Furthermore, Bengal
was to be the testing ground for the region as it was increasingly assuming a critical place in
the Company‟s trade.
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By the early 18th century Bengal became a key region for the Company‟s trade in textiles,
and Bengal goods came to comprise nearly 60 percent of the English imports from Asia.
Even before this, the English Company had secured an important farman from Emperor
Aurangzeb that gave them the right to trade without paying duties in return for a payment
of 3000 rupees. The foundation of Calcutta in 1690 and its fortifications in 1696, followed by
the acquisition of the villages of Kolikata, Gobindapur and Sutanuti gave the Company a
convenient launching pad and with the formalization of the duty free trade farman in 1717
by the emperor Farrukhshiyar, the prospects for an expansion became even brighter. By
this time, the situation in respect to both the political context as well as the trading milieu
had substantially changed, emboldening the Company‟s servants to contemplate limited
political projects primarily to further their commercial interests.
Bengal, as we have seen on an earlier occasion, was the one of the few provinces to have
escaped the spiral of Mughal decline. Under the rule of an enterprising governor, the region
enjoyed a substantial increase in productivity, the benefits of which the regional
administration was able to exploit. With the collaboration of new social groups in the region
– the zamindars, the mahajans or bankers and the administrative and scribal groups, the
ruling aristocracy was able to enjoy substantial power and autonomy. In contrast to the
attitude of the Mughal state, the regional administration resisted the demands of the
European companies when they tended to be excessive, and in the process set the stage for
a major round of confrontation in the future.
The bone of contention between the Company and the ruling administration in Bengal was
the interpretation of the farman of 1717. Theoretically, this granted the Company the right
to carry on duty free trade, to rent thirty eight villages around Calcutta and to use the royal
mint. In fact however, the Company officials chose to amplify the scope of the farman by
claiming exemptions for their private trade ventures as well. Murshid Quli Khan refused to
consider this demand and denied permission to extend the duty free provision for private
trade as well as to buy the thirty-eight villages adjacent to Calcutta. His successors
continued with the policy of containment.
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Expansion and consolidation of colonial power
Between 1740, when the war of Austrian succession broke out in Europe and involved
England and France in hostilities in India, and 1757, when the fateful battle of Plassey was
fought, the English East India Company steadily augmented its position by adding
fortifications, running a trade in dastaks and permits and even offering fugitive subjects of
the Nawab protection in the city of Calcutta that was emerging as an alternative power
centre. The situation rapidly deteriorated under Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah whose actions and
attempts at centralization alienated a section of the ruling class that gravitated towards the
Company and sought its intervention to appoint a new Nawab instead. The formation of the
anti Siraj clique in Murshidabad was sponsored by a powerful group headed by Omi Chand,
the Jagat Seths, Khwaja Wajid and Mir Jafar all of whom represented the ascendancy of the
commercial-administrative lobby and their links with the ruling administration. Whether the
growing dissensions within the ruling administration were responsible for Plassey or whether
the designs of the Company were directly instrumental in producing the conflagration is a
matter of debate among historians. To examine the debate, it is necessary to comment on
the relative trading position of the English East India Company in Bengal, especially in
relation to its rivals, both European and Indian and thereafter to situate it in the context of
the political crisis that gripped Murshidabad in the 1750‟s.
We have already observed on a previous occasion that the Euro-Asian trade carried on by
the trading companies like the English East India Company was ordered around two
important staples – spices and textiles. By the end of the 17th century the share of Bengal
in the total trade of the English East India Company began to increase and in 1710, was 47
per cent. Between 1728 and 1760 the high quality and expensive fabrics of Bengal
accounted for 60 to 80 per cent of the total number of pieces. Textiles were procured
through a contractual agreement between local merchants and the Company – the former
undertaking to supply a specified number of pieces at the port of shipment by a certain date
and organizing their purchase from the manufacturing districts. The system of advances
entered into with the local merchants was referred to as the dadni system – the amount or
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dadan given in advance was often a bone of contention. Supply merchants were primarily
local merchants including Armenians who were known to purchase at prices 30 per cent
below those paid by the Company. Indian intermediary merchants also performed cultural
roles as they were able to negotiate with political authorities as well. Consequently, for the
greater part of the first half of the 18th century, brokers and intermediaries remained an
invaluable part of the investment machinery.
Official or corporate trade however, represented only one facet of the English East India
Company‟s activities. It was the private trade of Company servants that emerged as a
major phenomenon in the 18th century and was largely instrumental in lending an edge to
the political agenda of the English Company. The policy of permitting Company servants to
trade in intra-Asian trade or „country trade‟ as it was called, as a means of compensating
insufficient pay, had meant that private traders had become an entrenched interest group
and made sure that they continued to make fantastic profits by deploying their official
privileges against the authority of the local government. Private enterprise in the first half of
the 18th century provided the basis for the meteoric rise of Calcutta as the premier city,
supplanting the older Mughal town of Hugli.
The expansion of English shipping was primarily at the expense of Asian shipping which had
dominated the trade in the Indian Ocean. European and English private traders increased
their stranglehold partly on account of the better naval protection they afforded to local
merchants against piracy. Operating with larger ships with greater tonnage, the English
private traders were able to dominate the freight trade as well as compete with the other
merchants in the west Asian markets. Their presence and ambitions became a factor to be
reckoned with and in fact provided the material basis for the Company to articulate a
political agenda. Whether this was the determining factor in the breakdown of Anglo-Nawabi
relations is however, a more difficult question to answer categorically. What is evident is the
escalating irritation on the part of the Company authorities to two things. One was the
pressures that the Company in its private and official capacity faced in getting adequate
supplies because of political disruption. Maratha raids in western Bengal often interfered
with the production process and the imperative to procure silk and textiles often outweighed
all other considerations. On the other hand there were also the growing pretensions of
English private traders who, according to some historians, were facing French competition in
the 1750s and had to find a way of getting out of the impasse.
What was the nature of English private trade and how did they come to form a lobby and
how did the ruling authorities respond to the challenge? There is very little doubt that the
private servants of the Company amassed huge fortunes by illegal private trade and by the
sale of dastaks or official permits. Company servants deliberately glossed over these acts of
flagrant abuse and defiantly assumed a confrontationist position in relation to the Nawabi
administration. According to historians like Sushil Chaudhuri, this was the culminating point
of an earlier policy of mercantilist aggression practiced by Josiah Child and assumed more
explicit overtones in the 1750s. The conflict that broke out in 1756-57 was, according to the
same historian, the consequence of „sub-imperialism‟ or the aggression of private traders
who plotted and planned the fateful conspiracy leading to the overthrow of the old regime.
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The aggression was partly fuelled by the pressures of trade that private merchants were
facing especially from French competition. The early 1750s saw a resurgence of French
private trade – their fleet numbering 27 in 1754.
The French factor had more than one ramification. In addition to the challenge of private
trade of the French Company servants, there was the growing presence of the French
Company. Its victories against the English in southern India produced serious apprehensions
among the English about the possibility of a Franco-Nawabi alignment in Bengal as well.
This apprehension found expression in a frantic stepping up of fortifications of the city of
Calcutta without the express permission of the new Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah. The situation
deteriorated even further when the Company stepped forward to extend protection to his
fugitive subjects and thereby directly challenge his sovereign authority. It may be recalled
that the young and impetuous Nawab had by this time alienated a section of the old ruling
class by dislodging old favourites and thereby helped foment a dissident party in his durbar.
The latter, looking for outside support to precipitate a conflict and resolve it in their favour,
approached the Company, which was only too willing to emerge as mediator and
subsequently as de facto ruler.
The first round of confrontations occurred in 1756 with the opening shots being fired by
Siraj. When the Company did not heed the Nawab‟s warnings regarding the grant of
protection to Krishna Ballabh and the abuse of dastaks, he retaliated by taking over the
factory at Kasimbazar. Its governor Drake refused to consider any diplomatic solution, only
to face the ignonimous attack on Calcutta and its capture by Siraj on 20 June.
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The capture of Calcutta and its renaming by Siraj as Alinagar constituted the second and
brief phase of the Anglo-Nawab war in Bengal. For the English Company and its servants the
situation was intolerable and they could hardly bear to consider losing their trade privileges
and prospects. The arrival of the squadron from Madras under Robert Clive changed the
equation. Astutely exploiting the support of the dissenting faction, Clive gave no quarter and
now took the lead in planning the perfect coup d‟etat. Combining forces with the dissenters
led by the Jagat Seth bankers, powerful zamindars and officials, a mock battle was staged
on 23 June 1757 where Siraj was defeated and executed. Mir Jafar, the leader of the
contingent that remained inactive in the battle was made the new Nawab but with real
power effectively passing into the hands of the English Company.
What followed Plassey was the infamous plunder that saw huge transfers of money to the
army and the navy, to Clive and other favorites and a free-for-all fray for the Bengal
revenues. Even more serious was the ruthless exploitation that the region faced at the
hands of English private traders who abused their newly acquired position to extort, trade
unfairly and abuse dastaks even more indiscriminately. Private trade now moved from the
periphery of the region, from principal towns and outposts to the interior, dismantling in the
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process an entire political and moral dispensation. The sky was the limit as far as the
private traders were concerned and the region now lay exposed to a rapacity and extortion
that was unprecedented. For ruler and ryot, for merchant and manufacturer, the situation
became increasingly burdensome as a new structure of exactions came to dominate
Company policy between 1757 and 1765.
The regime that was cobbled together after Plassey was made unviable by the very
agreements that the Company entered into with the new ruler. Mir Jafar had unwisely and
rashly made extravagant financial promises in return for English support without realizing
how empty the treasury actually was. Further, he was not in a position to revoke any of the
trade related privileges that the English merchants enjoyed and was forced to sustain his
base by mounting operations against zamindars and by squeezing local merchants. Neither
of these strategies worked and when in desperation he turned against the Company by
siding with the Dutch and the Mughal prince Ali Gauhar, he was displaced by Mir Qasim
whose reputation in Bihar as an efficient officer had endeared him to the Company. The
Company in its wisdom assumed that his appointment would stabilize their position but
without realizing that their demands were bound to antagonize him in the long run. On his
part Mir Qasim abided by his agreements and focused his energies on developing his base in
Bihar until he ran foul of the English private traders there. A major controversy arose over
the abuse of dastaks by the Company servants with a pronounced anti Mir Qasim clique
emerging. When the Nawab abolished duties altogether and thereby ensured an equal
playing field for Indian and European, the Company intervened and reinstated Mir Jafar on
the throne.
The stage was now set for a second round of confrontation; this time under a more
substantive alliance bloc consisting of Mir Qasim, the ruler of Awadh, and the Mughal
Emperor Shah Alam II. Historian Rajat Ray has identified this bloc as the first serious act of
resistance by the Mughal ruling class to early colonial penetration. This coincided with other
acts of popular resistance and social violence that reflected the extent of upheaval and
erosion that the Bengal political system had been subject to.
The combined forces faced a resounding defeat in the battle of Buxar that followed in 1764.
This was a decisive battle as it signaled the military superiority of the English army and
subsequently inducted the Company as an actual revenue claimant in the political system.
In 1765, the treaty of Allahabad gave the Company the diwani (the revenue collecting right)
over Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and with this an enormous revenue base that they could
deploy in their bid for paramountcy. A resident was now posted at Murshidabad and his
office steadily became the locus of real power in the province. The grant of the diwani to the
English East India Company became the basis for dual government in which native rulers
retained their titles and dignities while the Company administered the government and
collected revenues through Indian officials.
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Figure 2.1.2: Robert Clive, 1st Baron Clive of Plassey: Clive receiving the land revenues of
Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa
Source: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic-art/482290/100522/Robert-Clive-
receiving-the-land-revenues-of-Bengal-Bihar-and
The most perceptible impact of Plassey and Buxar on the trading economy of Bengal lay in
the realm of its trading economy. The rampant abuse of trade privileges and the
phenomenal expansion of English private trade was at the expense of the local trading
economy – as Mir Qasim had observed, „every village and district in the province was ruined
by their trade‟. After Buxar, the Company tried to introduce a measure of regulation, putting
the private traders under some pressure. At the same time, there was the flagrant use of
political power by the Company to eliminate rival European competition and this was
especially evident in the textile trade. Weavers and artisans came under greater control –
forced to produce exclusively for the Company that enforced a monopsony on textile
production. This meant that buyers were strictly forbidden to compete in the market, the
opposite of monopoly where there were many buyers for one seller. The late 70s and 80s
saw khatbandi regulations binding artisans to sell exclusively to the Company and denied
them any bargaining powers. When these abuses were redressed by the direct agency
system of Cornwallis, the British position as the largest single buyer of textiles had been
ensured. The impact of monopsony on producers was reflected in deteriorating living
standards. On the basis of the little data that is available for regions like Malda, a key textile
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centre, wages lagged behind raw material prices and other prices. At Dacca in 1790
weavers were getting from the Company prices that were 6 to 8 per cent less than what
other traders were offering. Contemporary evidence, albeit fragmentary, indicates that the
Company used its dominant political position to fix terms of exchange and push down wages
to subsistence levels.
While the Company‟s political supremacy made the effects of domination inevitable and
visible, it also ensured the system of the Company investment would be self sufficient.
Bullion imports were no longer necessary to support the Bengal trade – the revenues from
the province were now available to finance the Company‟s trade to both Europe and China.
The resultant bullion scarcity worsened the economic situation of the province –
debasement of silver currency, shortage of specie adding to the problems of the economy.
Native trading capital was subordinated to European enterprise; the process had begun as
early as the abolition of the dadni system and its replacement by the gomastha system
where paid Indian agents under supervision of the Company officers dominated the supply
trade. Between 1770 and 80, more restrictions became visible as the agency system of
1787 -89 excluded even dalals or brokers in the textile business.
The agricultural scene fared even worse. As claimants to land revenue, the Company opted
for a policy of revenue maximization and in the process endorsed dubious methods of land
revenue collection through revenue farming and amils. Several old landed magnates or
zamindars faced rack and ruin even as bankers and creditors expressed reluctance to
advance them credit. Company servants exploited the zamindars, took over the position of
shroffs or bankers and advanced money at exorbitant interest rates, thus adding to the
vulnerability of the zamindars. Agriculture suffered because impoverished zamindars were
not in a position to afford customary exemptions and waivers and even loans to the
peasants. Other factors that added to the decline in agricultural productivity were scarcity of
labour in a number of districts and over assessment through a series of land revenue
collection experiments initiated by the Company. A crisis point was reached in 1769-70
when Bengal experienced a terrible famine that carried off nearly one third of its population.
The failure of the rains compounded with the worst excesses of Company servants who
cornered grain and set up local monopolies top produced terrible conditions of shortage and
starvation.
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The ruling government in Bengal had little power to confront the situation which was clearly
a consequence of Company aggression and private greed. The overriding urge to maximize
profits and to squeeze out indigenous enterprise made the situation intolerable and even if
successive rulers – Mir Qasim and later Muhammed Reza Khan, the Naib Nazim of Bengal
voiced their grievances and reservations, the juggernaut of Company domination could
hardly be arrested. Reza Khan protested against all those exactions and illegal excesses that
not only jeopardized the economy and strained merchant, manufacturer and cultivator, but
he lamented the decline of an older moral economy that the power of the Company had
subverted.
Conclusion
From a small trading body that prostrated before the Mughal Empire for minor trading
concessions and privileges, the English East India Company had emerged as the principal
political player after 1757. There is no doubt that its access to Bengal, India‟s richest
province, gave it the much needed revenue to out-maneuver the other players in the
contest for supremacy over the subcontinent. It could field a larger army, it could pay off its
supporters and it could win the confidence of creditors and financiers to bankroll its
conquests. It is tempting to see in the Company‟s meteoric rise the concrete manifestation
of the policy of mercantilism. In fact however, one could suggest that complex webs of
interconnections and alignments created a situation which made it possible on the one hand
for the Company to be considered as an option of mediation by local powers and for the
Company to consider political power as one of its options on the other. In the case of the
local elite, especially the Bengal ruling class in 1757, the decision to solicit the assistance of
the Company proved a costly miscalculation. The Company did not turn out to be like other
mercenary mediators – instead it turned on its allies and demanded an ever-increasing
share of the pie. From 1757 to 1856 it was but a matter of time when the Company would
move in by hook or by crook, by force or by diplomacy to appropriate the whole of
Hindustan.
The death of Emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 was followed by a rapid disintegration of the
Mughal Empire in the first half of the 18th century. The second half of the 18th century
witnessed the rise of British power in India. The 18th century was also marked by the rise of
several regional powers in south Asia like the Marathas, Durranis, Sikhs, Mysore,
Hyderabad, Awadh and Bengal. Close to the crumbling centre of the Empire were the Jats
based in Bharatpur and Deeg, and the major Rajasthan states. Another important regional
power was Rohilkhand founded by the Pathan warrior Ali Muhammad Khan after the
invasion of Nadir Shah left Mughal control over the area in tatters. Some of these states,
like Awadh, Bengal and Hyderabad were successor states of the Mughal empire founded by
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The Indian states of the 18th century fought frequent wars of expansion against each other.
Sometimes they formed temporary alliances against common enemies. For example the
Nizam and the Marathas competed for control over the Deccan with each other but often
stood together against Mysore. Similarly the nawabs of Awadh and Rohilkhand formed an
alliance with the Afghans against the Marathas to check their growing power in the revenue
rich north Indian plains. This alliance proved fatal to the Marathas at the Third Battle of
Panipat in 1761. These mutually exhausting wars gave the Europeans the opportunity to
interfere in Indian political and military affairs. In the process the European trading
companies extracted significant economic concessions from these states. Thus the decline of
the Mughal Empire paved the way for the rise of British power in India.
Another important feature of the 18th century was the elimination of French influence in
India following the Battle of Wandiwash in 1760. In a series of international conflicts and the
Carnatic Wars fought in south India, Britain defeated France and became the dominant
colonial power in Asia. It is worth remembering here that the Portuguese at this time were
confined to their coastal possessions like Goa, Daman and Diu and posed no threat to the
growing clout of the English East India Company in Indian affairs. In sum, the period from
the mid 18th to the mid nineteenth century (1757-1857) was characterized by the rise and
simultaneous consolidation of British colonial power in India. This power is called colonial
simply because during this phase of Indian history India was converted from a collection of
independent kingdoms into first a mercantile and later an industrial colony of Great Britain.
India‟s economy, polity, society and culture were made subservient to the interests of Great
Britain. During this century for the first time south Asia came to be ruled by a European
power. Moreover Britain was also the first modern industrial capitalist country. These facts
were of profound significance as far as the development of British colonial rule in India was
concerned. The aim of this lesson is to see how the British accomplished this task. Our
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purpose is also to examine the factors which favored the rise of British power in India. The
next lesson will concentrate on the British conquest of some regions of India.
On the whole these wars reflected the territorial and commercial ambitions of the English
East India Company (hereafter Company). From the late 17th century onwards the
Company had followed an aggressive mercantilist policy in India against its European
competitors and the Indian powers. The main aim of the Company‟s policies was to find a
solution to its payments problem. This problem itself resulted from the fact that the
Company could export a wide range of commodities from India but could give India virtually
nothing in return. This trade imbalance was a continuous threat to the Company‟s solvency.
Plunder and territorial acquisition hence emerged over time as the means by which the
payments problem of the Company could be addressed. The Company had, in fact, declared
war on Aurangzeb in the late 17th century but was defeated and pardoned by the Emperor.
On the West coast of India the Company fought local powers like the Angres of Colaba well
into the 18th century. On the whole the aggressive nature of mercantilist trade was evident
in the systematic use of force by the Company in the 17th century itself. The Portuguese
and Dutch had set good examples of using systematic force to augment their commercial
enterprise. The desire to control local resources, obtain supplies of cheap goods and exclude
competitors from trade pushed the Company towards territorial conquest and war. In the
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light of these facts it is impossible to believe that the Company acquired an empire in India
by a quirk of circumstances. It was not by accident but by a design which grew strong over
time that the British rose to prominence in India.
Due to the decline of Mughal power the Company became bold enough to confront weaker
rulers. The history of Company officials flouting rules and misusing the special favours
granted to them by Indian rulers is quite old. The case of Bengal where the Company
misused the privileges granted to it by the Mughal Emperor Farrukhsiyar was typical of such
behaviour. Obviously the decline of the Mughal Empire had created an atmosphere of
political uncertainty in most parts of India and the Company benefited from this. The fact
that the Company officials and traders were not afraid of flouting state regulations should
not be underestimated in any study of the British conquest of India.
The Indian powers of the 18th century made matters worse for themselves. In the absence
of an economic transformation of the country the indigenous powers fought unending wars
of expansion. This was done with the intention of acquiring more land which, in turn, would
yield more revenue. These wars and the struggle for power within the courts of these
kingdoms gave the Europeans the opportunity to interfere in Indian affairs. For example the
First Anglo-Maratha War (1775-82) was started by Raghunath Rao „Raghoba‟ with English
support. Raghoba had wanted to become the Peshwa since the days of Balaji Baji Rao.
Similarly the Second Anglo-Maratha War (1803-05) broke out after Peshwa Baji Rao II got
Jaswant Holkar‟s younger brother murdered in Pune. When Holkar retaliated by attacking
and occupying Pune, the coward Peshwa fled to Bassein. There he signed the Subsidiary
Alliance Treaty. In the same way after Maharaja Ranjit Singh‟s death in 1839 some factions
of the Sikh court and army began to conspire with the Company against other factions at
the Sikh court.
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However, the wars of the 18th century clearly demonstrate that even as late as the 1770s
the Company could not decisively defeat a strong enough combination of Indian powers. For
example, during the First Anglo-Maratha war a stalemate occurred because the Maratha
Sardars stood united behind Nana Phadnavis. This led to the defeat of the combined forces
of Raghoba and the Company at the Battle of Wadgaon in 1779 and to the Treaty of
Wadgaon. The war came to an end with the Treaty of Salbai (1782) which restored the
status quo ante. Further, during the Second Anglo-Mysore war Haider Ali was successful in
securing Maratha neutrality. With his rear thus secure, Haider went on to inflict a series of
defeats upon the British. Unfortunately for the indigenous powers such cooperation was an
exception and not the rule. Thus, when the English attacked Mysore in 1798-99 the Nizam
provided them valuable military and logistical support despite the entreaties of Tipu Sultan.
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Most of the Company victories in India resulted from its superior alliance diplomacy. In
diplomacy no Indian power was a match for the English. For example, on the Western Coast
the Company first forged alliances with the Portuguese and later the Peshwa (1756) to
defeat the enemy Angre faction led by Tulajee Angre based in Vijaydurg. This secured
Bombay and several other Company possessions on the west coast. In Bengal the Company
officers successfully isolated Siraj-ud-daula by buying out his rivals and generals. The
Company also successfully involved the Nizam of Hyderabad in the war against Tipu Sultan.
In general, the Company leaders proved skillful diplomats. They made sure that a lasting
alliance of Indian powers against the British never materialized. Means such as intrigue,
bribes and efficient espionage were used rather efficiently by the Company in its pursuit of
commercial and political ambitions.
Bengal had been the richest province of India since the late Mughal period. Undoubtedly its
trade was contested for between the various European Companies active in India. The
English, French and Dutch all had well established factories in Bengal. The conquest of
Bengal (1757-65) provided the English Company the money, men and material needed to
conquer other regions of India. In addition the Company also exercised a naval supremacy
on the Indian seas. The conquest of Bengal also gave the Company easy access to the large
military labour market situated in present day Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The availability of
professional soldiers in large numbers combined with the revenues of Bengal created the
famous Bengal Army. This proved to be the most powerful army in India which helped the
British conquer south and west India. Its battalions were active and effective in the Mysore,
Maratha, Sikh and Afghan wars.
On the whole the well trained and drilled Company troops were regularly paid in cash and
were better disciplined. They were led by men of vision like General Arthur Wellesley (the
victor of Waterloo and future Duke of Wellington) and his elder brother Richard Wellesley,
the unabashedly imperialist Governor General. During campaigns and battles the Company
commanders usually displayed superior tactical coordination in comparison with their
enemies. Company officers, in general, were all English and this seemed to create social
cohesion under pressure. In comparison with the indigenous powers, with the possible
exception of Tipu Sultan, the Company had a long term vision. It represented a mercantile
capitalist system which was fundamentally different from the feudal Indian kingdoms. Wars
were taken seriously by the British because experience taught them that their hold over
many parts of India could easily be challenged by rivals. Hence, the Company forces fought
with a desperation unknown to the native armies. The only possible exception here was Tipu
Sultan who understood what the Company stood for but his appeal to his neighbours fell on
deaf ears.
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Impressed by European military technology and training methods, several Indian states in
the 18th century modernized their armies by hiring European military experts. Consequently,
in the latter half of the 18th century almost all Indian powers had contingents of infantry,
cavalry and artillery trained and led by European mercenaries at their service. However,
these modernization attempts had several noticeable weaknesses. First, the Indian states
generally failed to evolve a system of military finance like the Company did. This meant
their troops were often paid late or not paid at all for a long time. Second, the Indian states
like the Shinde state of Gwalior raised powerful battalions led by English, European and
Anglo-Indian officers who were paid in the jayedad system. This meant that revenue of a
particular area was marked as payment to these foreign officers. In the Shinde domain the
French officers were the chief beneficiaries of these jayedads and this made the Maratha
sardars serving Gwalior jealous. The regular employment of European generals and
commanders increased the factionalism among the Marathas. Third, the excessive reliance
on European mercenaries proved fatal in certain cases. For example, before the Second
Anglo-Maratha War (1803-05) all the European officers of Daulat Rao Shinde defected to
the Company under pressure from Lord Wellesley. After all, no European wanted to be
buried in India. All of them wanted to leave India with their fortunes from ports possessed
by the Company. In fact many of them had investments in the Company trade and hence
opposed the idea of fighting the British. The wholesale discharge of European officers left
the main body of the Maratha armies virtually leaderless during the ensuing battles. Fourth,
the native rulers could not develop a corps of Indian officers because they trusted their
European commanders more than their own relatives due to the constant court intrigue they
faced. A combination of these factors translated into tactical superiority for the Company
forces on the battlefield. On the whole the modernized infantry and artillery battalions of the
Marathas and the Sikhs fought well but could not prevent the Company victories.
Indian states fell to the advancing Company one by one during the 18 th and 19th centuries
due to the causes listed above. Those who were not totally wiped out became part of
Wellesley‟s Subsidiary Alliance treaty system. These nominally independent states later
evolved into the Princely States of the British period and were integrated either into India or
Pakistan after 1947. Here it must be mentioned that none of the Indian states tried to
convert their resistance to the Company into mass resistance. This could not happen simply
because the Indian peasants did not sympathize with their rulers. The outcome of these
wars made no immediate difference to their lives. Most Indian states of the 18 th century,
with the exception of Tipu‟s Mysore, did not do much to improve the conditions of their
subjects. The Marathas, and the Pindaris which usually accompanied their armies as scouts
and raiders, did not endear themselves to the people in many parts of India. Indeed the
practice of the Maratha Bargis collecting tribute by armed force ensured for them a lasting
place in the folklore of Bengal. Hence the Indian peasant watched impassively as contending
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armies marched across the country. There was little to distinguish and choose between the
Maratha battalions and the Company forces for him.
To place the British conquests in India in 18th and 19th century in proper chronological
context we must mention the dates and regions of the decisive wars of the period:
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1765 Carnatic 04
1775 Benaras 01
1843 Sindh 05
1848 Satara 01
1849 Punjab 10
1856 Awadh 02
Total Annexation 98 62
Indian States 59 38
Remaining
Source: Roy, Tirthankar. 2000. The Economic History of India 1857 – 1947. New
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
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Wellesley and Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger had similar views on forming a British
Empire in India. Britain had recently lost her American colonies and both these ambitious
men wanted to compensate this with an Empire in India. Wellesley came to India
determined to extinguish French influence in the sub-continent and destroy the power of
Tipu Sultan and the Marathas. He considered himself an expert in Oriental affairs and was
bent upon following a policy of British expansion in India. The Subsidiary Alliance treaty
system was devised by Wellesley to subjugate the Indian powers and make the English
paramount in India. Under this system, which all Indian princely states followed till 1947,
the Indian kings signed a treaty of Subsidiary Alliance the provisions of which are briefly
described below. By signing this treaty a native power became a subsidiary of the British
and lost its sovereignty. The Peshwa signed it in 1802, the Nizam in 1798 and again in
1800, Tanjore in 1799, Mysore in 1799, Awadh in 1801 and Gwalior in 1803. Once the
major powers had thus been reduced, the smaller and less significant states were left with
little choice in the matter and quickly followed suit. The alternative to signing the treaty was
annihilation which no Indian state was willing to risk ! Generally Wellesley is credited with
having formulated the Subsidiary Alliance treaty system but treaties on similar lines had
been used by Warren Hastings, the first Governor General of Bengal, to strengthen the
English defense against the Marathas who threatened Bengal from central India during the
1770s. However, while Hastings, who had great respect for Indian traditions, had urged
caution in exercising British intervention in the domestic affairs of the friendly Indian states,
Wellesley‟s main aim was the building of a paramount British empire in India.
1. The Indian state would have a British Resident or a Political Agent in its capital. This
Resident would command a strong Subsidiary force comprising British and Indian
troops stationed in the capital. The expenses of the Resident and his force would be
borne by the revenues of the concerned state.
2. The Indian king / prince could not take any major foreign affairs or military decision
without the approval of the Resident.
3. The Resident, his officials and the Subsidiary force were to be held almost immune to
local laws. No action against any of their personnel could be initiated without the
permission of the Resident.
4. The Indian king / prince would not employ foreigners, except the British, without the
consent of the Resident.
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The consequences of this treaty system were grave for the Indian states. They lost their
sovereignty and the real power in their capital shifted to the British residency. Their armies
were disbanded and they began to maintain troops generally for ceremonial and internal
policing duties only. The Subsidiary force consumed large sums of money and its expenses
tended to grow over time. The „protection‟ offered by the British made most of the Indian
princes careless in governance. Most of them neglected the welfare of their subjects and,
actively encouraged by the British, took to a life of ease and debauchery. Much of their time
was spent socializing with the English, traveling abroad under British surveillance, looking
after large harems which included European women and acquiring the latest goodies from
Britain, Europe and America. Some of the Indian states declined due to these developments
and this gave the British the excuse to annex them in the future, as was done during the
tenure of Lord Dalhousie (1848-56). Dalhousie used the „Doctrine of Lapse‟ and the charge
of maladministration to annex some Indian states like Awadh (1856), Jhansi and Nagpur
(1854) and Satara (1848). However, the Great Revolt of 1857 was caused partly by the
annexation of Awadh which was difficult for Dalhousie to justify. Following this widespread
rebellion, the fear of a mass upheaval brought the policy of outright annexation to an end in
1857.
Conclusion
The Mughal Empire gave way to the rise of various regional powers in 18th century India. In
the beginning the Company was also like a regional power based in Calcutta, Madras and
Bombay. But the political, economic and institutional system it represented was very
different from the monarchical systems of the Indian regional powers. This difference was
understood and its implications were appreciated by very few Indians like Tipu Sultan. From
the late 18th century onwards the Company seized the political initiative in India and
embarked on a conquest of South Asia. In this process it defeated almost all the Indian
regional states because of the dynamics of expansion studied above. Although the Company
was only a trading representative of Britain, it proved politically and militarily superior to
almost all its competitors in India. Nonetheless, the defeat of the regional Indian states at
the hands of the Company should not lead us to conclude that these states did not achieve
anything. The works of Satish Chandra, Muzaffar Alam and Christopher Bayly, for example,
speak against a generalized picture of regional stagnation and decline in the 18th century.
Randolph Cooper‟s recent research on the second Anglo-Maratha war (1803-05) describes
the military modernization achieved by the Shindes of Gwalior in glowing terms. The hard
fought battles of Assaye and Laswari (1803) were a testimony to this modernization. It is
also true that many regions, including Mysore and Kerala in the far south, recorded various
degrees of prosperity and social change under their Indian rulers. Hence the growth of
Indian history writing since the 1960s tells us a new story of the 18th century. The well
known historical narrative highlighting only the chaos, stagnation and decline in the 18th
century has thus been corrected to some extent. The regional Indian states of that century
were strong enough to destroy the Mughal empire but none of them was capable of
replacing it because of the reasons mentioned in this lecture. The „modernization‟ attempted
by some of them retained their characteristic weaknesses. Their military strength could not
hide their political disunity and court intrigues and their adoption of European military
methods was combined with crucial institutional drawbacks. In the ultimate analysis, these
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powers were generally led by an inward looking, tribute collecting and short-sighted feudal
elite and therefore fell to the advancing Company one by one. In contrast the English were
led by resolute men of vision who were inspired by notions of empire and civilization.
Introduction
The British colonial expansion in India began in the middle of the 18th century and went on
till the annexation of Awadh in 1856. During these hundred years both the expansion and
consolidation of colonial rule took place in India together. The previous lesson of this unit
examined the general features of colonial expansion in India. These features were common
to most of the cases of British conquest in India with regional variations. The case of Awadh
is perhaps different. By 1856 the revenue rich kingdom of Awadh was surrounded by British
territory and its annexation was only a matter of time. Many other states like Hyderabad
survived because they had completely surrendered their sovereignty to the British. Further,
the Revolt of 1857 which followed the annexation of Awadh discredited the policy of outright
annexation favoured by Lord Dalhousie. After 1857 the policy of treating and promoting the
Indian princes as loyal friends of the British and as natural leaders of their people was
followed by the British Raj. Hence the hundreds of small and large princely states, including
Kashmir and Hyderabad, which survived till Indian independence and partition owed a lot to
the rebels of 1857.
Bengal
The foundations of an independent Bengal were laid by Murshid Quli Khan, the last Mughal
subedar of the province. Murshid Quli Khan, and his eventual successor Alivardi Khan,
reorganized the administration of Bengal on the lines of independent dynastic rule. Their
policies were mainly designed to augment state revenue and led to the growth of a strong
group of large zamindars, merchants and financiers. The house of the Jagat Seths who were
influential financiers rose to prominence and great influence during this period. Thus, from
the 1730s onwards, these new rich and powerful men began to play an important role in the
politics of Bengal at the expense of the declining feudal nobility. The death of Alivardi Khan
in 1756 led to a conflict of succession within the Bengal court. Alivardi, who had no son, had
nominated Siraj-ud-daulah, his grandson, as the successor. This was challenged by other
claimants to the throne like Ghasiti Begum the aunt of Siraj, and Shaukat Jang who was his
cousin and the faujdar of Purnea. These claimants were backed by powerful zamindars,
merchant-financiers and ambitious court officials and commanders who began to conspire
against Siraj-ud-daulah. They also received help from the Company which was unhappy
with Siraj becoming the Nawab in 1756. Although the conflict between the Company and
the Nawabs of Bengal had a history by then, matters were precipitated by the Company
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which raised fortifications around Calcutta without the Nawab‟s permission. The Company
also had a well known history of misusing its trade privileges. This had led to its conflict
with Alivardi Khan in the past as well. Company officials often used these privileges for their
private trade which otherwise attracted duties. Moreover, the Company gave refuge to
Krishna Das, son of Raj Ballabh, who retired to Calcutta with a large treasure without the
Nawab‟s consent. The dominant group in the court comprising the Jagat Seth, Amichand,
Raj Ballabh, Rai Durlabh and Mir Jafar opposed the young and inexperienced Nawab and, as
the turn of events soon proved, meticulously planned his downfall.
To enforce his authority Siraj-ud-daulah drove out the English from Calcutta in 1756 after
they disobeyed his orders to dismantle their fortifications. Defeated by the Nawab‟s army,
the English fled to Fulta, an island near the mouth of the Hooghly. Siraj-ud-daulah probably
thought that his business with the Company was finished and hence did not pursue them.
While the Nawab seemed to prematurely celebrate his success, the English regrouped under
Robert Clive who soon arrived from Madras with reinforcements. Upon Clive‟s assumption of
command events moved rapidly in the direction of Plassey where the Company defeated the
army of Siraj-ud-daulah in June, 1757. The result of the Battle of Plassey (1757) had been
decided well in advance and the battle itself was not a great triumph of English arms. After
the battle Mir Jafar, according to plan, was proclaimed the Nawab and the Company became
the effective king maker in Bengal. Almost immediately the loot of Bengal began. Clive and
his followers extracted an enormous tribute from Mir Jafar who began by paying them an
equivalent of Rs. 1, 750, 000 in presents and compensation. Jafar‟s unfortunate reign
proved shortlived. He could not pay his army which rose in rebellion and this forced the
Company to depose him. Jafar was soon replaced by his son in law Mir Qasim who also
began his reign by paying hefty sums to the British. To secure his nawabship he also gave
away the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong to the Company.
But compared with Jafar, Mir Qasim was made of stronger material and he began to
gradually distance himself from the Company. He shifted the capital from Murshidabad to
Mungher in Bihar in a bid to escape the influence of the Company‟s officials. He also began
to staff the bureaucracy with his chosen men besides modernizing the army. Despite these
measures and his stand in favour of the Indian merchants who complained against the
Company‟s malpractices, Qasim‟s rule did not last long. While his enemies, like Ram
Narayan, the Deputy Governor of Bihar, conspired with the British against him, Qasim
forged an alliance with the Mughal Emperor Shah Alam and Shuja-ud-daulah the Nawab of
Awadh. But his hope of driving out the Company from Bengal was dashed when this Indian
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coalition was defeated by a highly motivated and professional Company army at the famous
Battle of Buxar in 1764. Following this battle the ailing Mir Jafar was made the Nawab once
again but died soon thereafter to be replaced by his minor son, a British puppet.
In 1765 Clive came back to Bengal as the Governor and completed its formal conquest. He
signed an agreement with the beleaguered and compliant Emperor Shah Alam who had
been a virtual prisoner of Shuja-ud-daulah since 1761 – the year in which Shuja played a
conspicuous role in the Maratha defeat at Panipat. Shah Alam received Allahabad in return
for a Mughal farman which made the Company the diwan of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.
Thus the Company gained absolute control over the revenues of India‟s richest province.
These revenues, after a period of intense plunder and financial instability, were later
reorganized under the Permanent Settlement system introduced by Lord Cornwallis and
played an important role in the conquest of other parts of India.
Mysore
British expansion in Mysore must be understood in the context of three British imperatives.
First, the Company wanted to protect its Malabar trade. Second, like Bombay, the Company
was worried about the security of Madras and third, the Company was unhappy with the
growing relations between Mysore and the French. The rulers of Mysore, Haider Ali and Tipu
Sultan, were brilliant generals who fought four wars against the Company before Mysore
was finally defeated by the British in 1799. Throughout the Mysore Wars the Marathas, the
nawab of Carnatic and the Nizam of Hyderabad sided with the British at various stages.
During the First Mysore War (1767-1769) Haider skillfully managed to win over the Nizam
and the Marathas. He followed up this diplomatic success by inflicting a series of defeats on
the British. In 1769 he was dictating terms to them at the gates of Madras. Faced with the
prospect of annihilation the Madras Council sued for peace and a treaty of mutual military
assistance was signed with Haider Ali who wanted English support against the unreliable
Marathas and the Nizam. On their part the English acceded to this treaty under pressure
and to buy time. Hence, when the Marathas attacked Mysore in 1771 they did nothing to
help Haider Ali.
The Second Mysore War (1776-1784) began when the Company captured Mahe, a French
commercial settlement under Mysore‟s jurisdiction. During this war the British won over the
Nizam and the Marathas and pushed Haider on the defensive. After suffering a defeat at
Porto Novo in 1781, Haider Ali died in 1782 but his son Tipu Sultan continued the war which
ended with the Treaty of Mangalore in 1784. The Third Mysore War broke out when Tipu
attacked Travancore, a British ally in 1790. This time the British were led by Lord
Cornwallis, a veteran of the American Wars, who came to India as the Governor-General in
1786. Cornwallis successfully isolated Tipu Sultan and the English defeated him at various
places before the war came to an end with the Treaty of Seringapatam in 1792. By this
treaty half of Tipu‟s kingdom passed into British hands and his sons were taken to Calcutta
as hostages. Now it was only a matter of time before he was finally defeated. That task was
completed by Lord Richard Wellesley who came to India in 1798 as a Governor General
committed to extinguishing the Indian states wiping out what remained of the French
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influence in India. Hence Wellesley offered Tipu a choice between the Subsidiary Alliance
and annihilation.
A large British force backed by the Nizam and Maratha mercenaries invaded Mysore in 1798
under the leadership of Richard Wellesley‟s younger brother Arthur Wellesley. Against these
overwhelming odds Tipu adroitly retreated to the fortified capital Seringapatam on the
banks of the river Kaveri. Ultimately the river island town of Seringapatam fell in 1799 after
a long and bitterly contested siege which demonstrated the military capabilities of Tipu
Sultan. Tipu died fighting at the place where the fortress wall had been breached. Today the
place is marked by a memorial and attracts hundreds of tourists and history students every
day. Tipu‟s death was followed by a savage plunder of Seringapatam and Wellesley could
restore discipline with great difficulty. The Nizam was given a portion of Mysore as payment
for his services and the Wodeyar Raja was restored to the throne as a subsidiary. The
greater part of Karnataka was annexed by the British and became part of the Madras
Presidency. Its land revenue was later organized according to the Ryotwari Settlement
designed by Governor Thomas Munro.
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The Marathas
Since the cause and consequence of the First Anglo-Maratha War (1775-1782) have been
mentioned in the previous lesson we will focus attention on the Second and Third Maratha
Wars here. While the British were busy subjugating Tipu Sultan, the internal differences
among the Marathas reached a flashpoint with the occupation of Pune by Jaswant Rao
Holkar (see the previous lesson for details) following the death of Nana Fadnavis. Despite all
his faults Fadnavis had been successful during his career in maintaining a delicate balance
between the powerful Maratha sardars like the Shinde and Holkar and the Brahmin Peshwa
who was the symbolic head of the Maratha dominions. Following Holkar‟s capture of Poona,
Peshwa Baji Rao II fled to Basein and, to the great joy of the Wellesley brothers, signed the
Subsidiary Alliance treaty in 1802. Following this, the English reinstalled the Peshwa in Pune
and issued an ultimatum to the Maratha sardars opposing him. The Company‟s campaign
(1803-05) was well planned and its main aim was to defeat and subjugate Shinde whose
power extended from Delhi to the Deccan and his junior ally the Bhonsale of Nagpur. The
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Deccan campaign was led by Arthur Wellesley who gradually captured all the important
Shinde strongholds like Ahmadnagar and Gawilgarh and defeated the Marathas in the
decisive battle of Assaye near Ajanta (1803). In the north a large army was fielded under
General Lake. This army moved up from Aligarh and defeated the Shinde army first at the
battle of Delhi which was fought on the grassland of Patparganj and later at Laswari near
Agra (1803). The Maratha defeat in this war eliminated the influence which Gwalior had
exercised till then on Delhi and opened the way for English expansion into north and north-
west India.
Compared with the Second Anglo-Maratha War the Third Anglo-Maratha War (1817-19) was
a minor affair. The war began when the Peshwa, who grew resentful of British influence,
violated the Subsidiary Alliance treaty and rallied some sardars to the cause of Maratha
autonomy. This war ended in a complete rout of the so-called Maratha Confederacy. The
Peshwa was pensioned off to Bithur near Kanpur while most of the Maratha territories
became part of the Bombay Presidency. The Bhonsale dominions north of the Narmada were
also annexed by the British. These events brought down the curtains on the once formidable
Marathas whose rise can be dated to the period of Shivaji in the 17th century.
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Sindh
Sindh was made part of the British Empire both for commercial and geo-strategic reasons.
Compared with the cases of annexation observed above, the conquest of Sindh must be
seen in the context of the disastrous First Afghan War (1838-42) caused by the Russophobic
„forward‟ policies of Lord Auckland. These policies emerged as a response to the imperialist
expansion of Tsarist Russia towards central Asia which gave rise to fears of a Russian, or a
Russian supported, invasion of the north western part of India. The fear of Russia remained
strong among an influential section of British statesmen, scholars and rulers in India
throughout the 19th century. The annexation of Sindh should also be examined in relation
to the perspectives on conquest present among men like General Sir Charles Napier. During
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the 1830s the fear of a Russian invasion of India from the North-West with Iranian
assistance was peaking and the British were trying their best to secure the approaches to
Afghanistan. To make matters worse, the Iranians, with Russian aid, were in fact laying
siege to the western Afghan city of Herat close to the Iran-Aghan border. Such events fired
the imagination of the British during a period when the „great game‟ between them and the
Russians was played out.
By 1838 officers of the Bombay Marine had surveyed the coast of Sindh and the Indus river
for commercial and strategic reasons and the Company had established a Residency in
Sindh to encourage and tap the trade on the river. In 1839 the English annexed Karachi,
the principal port of Sindh, and thus acquired the bridgehead for the subjugation and
conquest of the entire region which was widely perceived as the frontline of defense against
invasions from the north. The capture of Karachi was accomplished with remarkable ease
and paved the way for the eventual annexation of the entire province. Treaties were
imposed on the several Talpur Ameers of Sindh and all sorts of concessions were extracted
from them in the name of „free trade‟, „relaxation of duties and tolls‟ and „abolition of
oppressive laws‟. In 1838 the ill fated Army of the Indus had marched through Sindh on its
way to the Bolan Pass and Kabul and its expenses were forced upon the Ameers on the
pretext of imaginary arrears they owed to Shah Shuja of Afghanistan. The Ameers protested
with reference to documents signed by Shuja in 1835 giving them control of Sindh,
Shikarpur and their dependencies. These protests were brushed aside by the English who
were determined to make Sindh pay for their Afghan adventure. Indeed the cooperative
Ameers were often accused of treachery by the British who remained ever dissatisfied with
their exactions in Sindh. The British not only dealt separately with different Ameers but
could easily „mediate‟ between them. Hence, a few years before its conquest, Sindh was
reduced to a subsidiary client state by British policy.
In 1842 the Afghans rose against the British and drove them out of Kabul towards the snow
bound passes. The British disaster which followed can be gauged from the fact that only one
man from an army of 16,000 survived the Afghan counter attack and reached Jalalabad! In
February 1842 Lord Ellenborough replaced Auckland as the Governor General of India.
Under his leadership the winter defeat was avenged by an army of retribution which
marched upon Kabul, burnt its bazaar and looted the city before marching back to India.
The events of 1842 seemed to have strengthened the British resolve to annex Sindh and
secure their northern frontier once and for all. In September 1842 Sir Charles Napier, a
sixty year old veteran of the Peninsular War (wars fought against Napoleon in Spain and
Portugal), was appointed commander of all British troops in Sindh. Napier was a tough
soldier respected by his troops and “with his fantasies and his misconceptions, a sublime
conviction that he was always in the right, and determination to make a name for himself,
he found himself in Sindh.” (W. F. F. Napier, The History of General Sir Charles Napier’s
Conquest of Scinde, (with an introduction by Hamida Khuhro, OUP, 2001 [first published
1857], p. xiii.) Napier believed in his own civilizing mission in the East and had contempt for
the Ameers and local customs in general. Soon after landing in Sindh from Bombay he
began to make impossible demands upon the Ameers and tested their patience beyond
reasonable limits. His objectives become clear from the entries in his diary: “How is all this
to end? We have no right to seize Scinde, yet we shall do so, and a very advantageous and
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human piece of rascality it will be.”(The History of General Sir Charles Napier’s Conquest of
Scinde).
Napier‟s bullying ultimately provoked the Hyderabad Ameers into a sort of united action
against the British. Realizing that the moment of reckoning had come, and that Napier was
unwilling to listen to the advice given by James Outram the Resident, the Ameers gathered
their troops in Hyderabad, the administrative capital of Sindh. On 14 February 1843, the
Ameers‟ troops “maddened by the continued provocation of the British” attacked the British
Residency in Hyderabad (not to be confused with Hyderabad, the capital of the Nizam State
in the Deccan). This was excuse enough for Napier who defeated the Hyderabad forces on
17 February at Miani and those of Mir Sher Mohammad of Mirpur at Dubbo on 26 March.
The news of the conquest made Lord Ellenborough happy despite the fact that he had sent
Napier to Sindh with the purpose of keeping the Ameers in a position of subordination to the
British. Napier was made the Governor of Sindh and administered it with a free hand and
full support from Calcutta till 1847. A hundred years later Sindh became a province of
Pakistan.
Awadh
The region of north India between Rohilkhand and Bihar with its centre at Lucknow is called
Awadh. The rivers Ganga, Jamuna, Son and Ghagra irrigate its fertile plains which yielded a
substantial revenue in the 18th century. Banaras, Allahbad, Ghazipur, Jaunpur and Faizabad
were the other important towns of the region. An autonomous Awadh was founded by
enterprising Shia nobles like Saadat Khan and his son in law and successor Safdar Jang in
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the first half of the 18th century. Till the beginning of the 19th century Awadh was seen by
the British as a buffer state between the Bengal Presidency and the rest of north India
dominated by the Marathas and Sikhs. The undermining of Awadh began with the Treaty of
Allahabad signed by Shuja-ud-daulah and the British after the former‟s defeat at the Battle
of Buxar (1764). According to this treaty Kora and Allahbad were ceded to the Mughal
Emperor for his upkeep and a war indemnity of Rs. 50,00,000 was imposed on Shuja. After
signing this treaty Shuja, who was aware of the history of the Company‟s conquests in
India, began to seriously modernize his army in an effort to check further English advance
into his territory and assert his authority. However, the Company had its eyes on the
revenues of Awadh and had other plans. Another treaty was signed between Awadh and the
Company, led by Warren Hastings at the time, in 1773 according to which the Nawab
agreed to pay a monthy tribute of Rs. 2,10,000 for each brigade of Company troops present
in Allahabad or Awadh proper. The Company‟s strategy during this period was to fleece the
isolated Nawab and drive Awadh into chronic indebtedness. This was a prelude to the full
fledged Subsidiary Alliance treaty system alluded to in the previous lesson.
Punjab
The Sikhs began to gain political independence from Mughal rule from the days of Guru
Gobind Singh, the founder of the Khalsa during the last quarter of the 17th century. During
the 18th century the increasing political and military disorder in Punjab, following the
weakening of Mughal control, gave the various Sikh misls the opportunity to expand and
consolidate their power further. The word misl has Arabic roots and means being alike. Misls
were the egalitarian military-administrative Sikh units, based on the jathas led by jathedars,
which arose as a consequence of the guerilla war waged against the Mughals and Afghans
by the Sikhs in the Punjab during the 18th century. The Sikh brotherhood was divided into a
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total of twelve misls, led and dominated by certain powerful Sikh families, which
congregated at Harmandir Saheb in Amritsar twice a year for a Sarbat Khalsa on Deepavali
and Holi. Taken together they comprised the Dal Khalsa, i.e., the Sikh Army which
contained several thousands of committed and well trained Sikh soldiers. Records of each
misl were carefully maintained at the Akal Takht and individual troopers had the freedom to
leave and join misls of their choice. This was an important reason why the misls retained
their social cohesion and egalitarian character because excessive domination by a leader
could easily lead to legally sanctioned desertion.
While the Sikh military organization gained valuable operational mobility due to the misl
sytem, in course of time these misls came to dominate designated areas of the Punjab
where they built forts and collected taxes, at least theoretically, upon the authority granted
to them by the Sarbat Khalsa – the general assembly of the Sikhs. During periods of
invasions from the north-west mounted by the Afghans the misls often undertook joint
military actions in defence of the Sikh faith but most of the time they represented a
decentralized form of Sikh power in the Punjab. Please note, the Sikh misls should not be
confused with the clan system of the Marathas which was neither as egalitarian nor
governed by a general assembly like the Sarbat Khalsa as the misls were.
After Ahmad Shah Abdali‟s death the power of the Durrani kingdom he had founded
dwindled rapidly under inferior successors. It soon became clear that the Afghans could
periodically raid but never establish a lasting rule over the Punjab. Hence the post-Abdali
interventions, like the invasions led by Zaman Shah in 1795, 1796 and 1798, were regional
affairs which actually helped Ranjit Singh consolidate his power. It is well known that the
Maratha advance into north-west India had been checked by the Afghans earlier at Panipat
in 1761. After 1761 the Marathas in the north were led by Mahdav Rao Shinde (also called
Mahadji) who concentrated his attention on Delhi, Agra and the Ganga-Jamuna doab. These
momentous events created the conditions in which a powerful, though short lived, Sikh
state based in Punjab arose.
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The architect of this state, with its capital in Lahore, was Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780-
1839), the extraordinarily gifted son of the Sukerchakia misl chief Mahan Singh. During
Ranjit Singh‟s reign the Sikhs were temporarily united into a state which ruled and
influenced a large part of the sub-continent stretching from Kashmir in the north to Sindh in
the south and Afghanistan in the north-west to present day Haryana in the east. Though
Ranjit Singh was twelve when his father died, by 1820 he was widely recognized and
accepted as the ruler of a vast Sikh kingdom which included the whole of Punjab from the
Sutlej to Indus, Kashmir and Multan. Further, he was a farsighted diplomat who fully
understood the implications of the growing power of the Company in north India. He also
knew that the European mercenaries could not be trusted during crises involving the
Company. Therefore the mercenaries employed in his army never achieved the prominence
which the mercenaries employed by the Marathas did. During his lifetime the English had
defeated the Marathas, who had regrouped under the Shindes of Gwalior to control Delhi
and Agra, and extended their empire to the frontiers of the Punjab after the debacle of
1761.
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Upon the defeat of the Marathas the Company and the Sikh state became immediate
neighbors. Their relations at the time were defined by the Treaty of Amritsar (1809)
according to which Ranjit Singh gave up his claim over the cis-Sutlej Sikh states like
Ludhiana, Ambala and Patiala. By cis-Sutlej is meant the territories on the left bank of the
Sutlej river i.e the British side. In contrast trans-Sutlej would mean on the other side of the
Sutlej i.e. the Sikh side. The treaty thus made the river Sutlej the boundary between the
Sikhs and the English. The Treaty of Amritsar was honoured by both parties till Ranjit Singh
died in 1839. The Maharaja‟s demise was followed by a conflict of succession at the Lahore
durbar and, as a consequence, very soon the stability of Punjab was seriously compromised.
In any case monarchy had never been sanctioned by the Sikh faith and thus could not strike
deep roots among the Sikhs. Fearing that a collapse of the Sikh state would endanger their
Indian possessions in north India, the English began to intervene in the internal affairs of
the Sikhs along lines described earlier in this lesson. The consequence was the First Anglo-
Sikh War (1845-46) which ended with the humiliating Treaty of Lahore in March, 1846.
According to this treaty the Jalandhar doab was annexed by the British and Jammu and
Kashmir was sold to Raja Gulab Singh for five million rupees. Gulab Singh and his Dogra
successors would rule that Muslim majority province, uninterrupted, with British support till
the arrival of Indian independence and partition in 1947. The Sikh army was reduced to
20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry. By another treaty signed in December, 1846 the
English Resident in Lahore acquired greater powers and the English troops stationed in the
Punjab were paid for by the Lahore government. The English victory and capture of Lahore
not only dealt the Sikh monarchy a mortal blow but reduced Punjab to the status of a British
dependency. From 1846 the Lahore Darbar came under the „protection‟ of the English. The
opportunity to annex the whole of Punjab was given to Lord Dalhousie by the Diwan of
Multan who rose in revolt against Lahore in 1848. This revolt spread rapidly throughout
Punjab with the tacit approval of the Lahore Durbar which saw in it an opportunity to get rid
of British influence. Several sections, including groups of soldiers retrenched after the defeat
of the Sikhs in 1846, joined the rising popular movement against the British. The British, for
their part, campaigned vigorously against the revolt in 1849 and decisively defeated the
Sikhs in the Second Anglo-Sikh War. To avoid such rebellions in future the whole of Punjab
was annexed by the British and finally became a province of British India. The annexation of
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Sindh and Punjab should also be viewed in the context of general British expansion in other
parts of Asia like China during the 1840s. By the mid 19 th century Britain had emerged as
the first modern industrial capitalist country and its steam powered industries needed
markets.
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2.1 Summary
The English East India Company was founded by a royal charter dated 31 December
1600. It was a joint stock company of London merchants who took the decision to
intervene in the Euro-Asian trade that had been initiated by the Portuguese and
subsequently expanded by the Dutch.
Over the course of a century, the Company established trading posts in western and
eastern India as well as in the Coromandel.
The Company servants engaged in private trade between the various ports of the
Indian Ocean. This is often referred to as country trade.
The emergence of the English East India Company and its policies are generally
understood to have been the expression of mercantilist ideology.
The Company steadily secured its position in Bengal, which became its principal base
of operations. It was in the city of Calcutta that the origins of the future Company
Raj were laid down.
The first round of confrontation came in 1757 when the Nawab of Bengal
Sirajuddaulah resisted the demands of the Company and attacked Calcutta. This
proved to be a crucial turning point as it directly affected the private trade interests
of the Company servants. The victory at Plassey (23 June 1757) although won by
treachery firmly inducted the Company into the political structure of Bengal. From
here the road to expansion was only a matter of time.
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2.2.1 Summary
The decline and disintegration of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century led to the
rise of several regional powers in India. Some of these were successor states of the
Mughal empire and some were created by rebels like the Marathas and Sikhs.
Although these states emerged during the early modern period of Indian history
almost all of them were monarchies which were more feudal than early modern in
orientation. With the possible exception of Mysore, none of them evolved a system
capable of resisting the advancing English East India Company.
Most of these states were similar in terms of their leadership and state organization.
Many of them inherited the late Mughal military and administrative systems which
were clearly pre-modern.
These regional polities spent a considerable amount of their resources in raising and
maintaining armies, often trained by European mercenaries, and waging war among
themselves. Some historians call this phenomenon „military fiscalism‟ although
„feudalism‟ is an equally good descriptive term for these states.
Ultimately the shortsightedness of the Indian elites ruling these states, insufficient
modernization of the Indian state and military apparatus, inherent institutional
weaknesses, Indian political disunity and economic weaknesses paved the way for
the rise of British power in India.
In the rise of British power in India the policies of two Governor Generals played a
crucial role. The first was Lord Richard Wellesley the architect of the openly
imperialist Subsidiary Alliance treaty system. The second was Lord Dalhousie who
annexed Awadh on grounds of maladministration and used the infamous „doctrine of
lapse‟ to annex smaller Indian kingdoms.
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2.2.2 Summary
The expansion and consolidation of British colonial power in the Indian sub-continent
began in the mid 18th century and went on till 1856 when Awadh was annexed by
Lord Dalhousie.
The first part of India which fell to the British was Bengal. Bengal gave the Company
crucial advantages in its wars against the Indian powers were concerned. One, it was
probably the richest province of India. Two, it gave the Company access to the vast
military labour market of north India which bordered on Bengal. Three, the revenues
of Bengal played an important role in addressing the payments problem of the
Company.
After Bengal the Indian states of the period were defeated one by one. From the late
18th century Mysore, the Deccan and Western India and finally Punjab and Sindh
came into the Company‟s hands.
Although Mysore, the Marathas and the Sikhs fought hard against the British to
retain their independence the Company triumphed over them with the aid of superior
diplomacy and the resources of Bengal.
The Marathas and Sikhs also proved hopelessly divided against themselves. At no
stage did the Indian powers combine effectively against the Company.
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2.1: Exercises
Essay questions
1) Identify the principal stages in the development of the English east India Company‟s
power in Bengal between 1717 and 1765.
2) How did English private trade affect the politics of the English East India Company in
the build up to Plassey?
3) What were the consequences of early Company rule on the Bengal economy?
Objective questions
1 Short answer 1
Question
What is Mercantilism?
Reviewer‟s Comment:
2 Short answer 1
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Question
What did the English East India Company demand from the Indian rulers in the early
18th century?
Correct Answer / The English East India Company demanded rights of duty free
Option(s) trade, of fortifications and maintaining its own judicial system
in the settlements they occupied.
Reviewer‟s Comment:
3 Short answer 1
Question
What do you understand by country trade?
Correct Answer / Country trade refers to the trade between the various ports in
Option(s) the Indian Ocean carried on by the servants of the European
East India Companies in their private capacity.
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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Question
Foundation of Calcutta took place in:
a) 1650
b) 1680
c) 1690
Correct Answer /
c)
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
Question
Jagat Seths were:
a) Bankers
b) Revenue officials
c) Scribes
Correct Answer /
c)
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
Question
Where would you find Alinagar?
a) Madras
b) Delhi
a)
c) Calcutta
Correct Answer /
c)
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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2.2.1: Exercises
Essay questions
1) Why and how did the decline of the Mughal Empire cause the rise of various regional
powers in 18th century India?
3) In what way was the English East India Company different from its Indian and
European rivals?
5) Would you agree with the assertion that the Company represented a system which
was totally different from the one represented by the Marathas, Sikhs and the
Nizam?
6) Would it be correct to say that the successor states of the Mughals merely replicated
the systemic errors of the late Mughal period?
7) How was the Indian states‟ excessive reliance on European mercenaries suicidal in
the long run?
8) Would it be right to say that the Subsidiary Alliance Treaty System was a diplomatic
masterpiece?
Objective questions
1 True or False 1
Question
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Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
2 True or False 1
Question
During the 18th century the French emerged as the most powerful force in India.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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Question
The resources of Bengal played a minor role in the British conquest of India.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
4 True or False 1
Question
The Marathas did not try to modernize their army during the latter half of the 18th
century.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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The Marathas, led by the Sindhias of Gwalior, initiated several steps to modernize
their infantry and artillery along European lines following the defeat of the
Marathas at the Third Battle of Panipat (1761). Many of these measures were
quite impressive and helped the Marathas fight hard during the Second Anglo-
Maratha War (1803-05). However, the over-dependence of the Marathas on
European mercenaries, chiefly French and English, proved unproductive in the
long-run.
Reviewer‟s Comment:
5 True or False 1
Question
There was no difference between the European Companies and the Indian states
of the 18th century.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
6 True or False 1
Question
Most of the Indian rulers of the 18th century had ties of affection with their
subjects.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
7 True or False 1
Question
The outcome of the wars between the Company and the Indian states of the 18th
century made no immediate difference to the people of India.
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Correct Answer /
True
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
8 True or false 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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9 True or false 1
Question
Arthur Wellesley was the Governor General of India during the Second Anglo
Maratha War (1803-05).
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
10 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
11 True or False 1
Question
The largest military labour market in India in the 18th century was situated in
Bengal.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
12 True or False 1
Question
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Correct Answer /
True
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
13 True or False 1
Question
In 1756 the Peshwa forged an alliance with the Angres against the British.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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14 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
True
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
15 True or False 1
Question
Nana Phadnavis could not unite the Marathas against the British.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
this unity the Marathas defeated the forces of Raghunath Rao and the British near
Pune at the Battle of Wadgaon. The war ended with the Treaty of Salbai which
restored the status quo between the Marathas and the British.
Reviewer‟s Comment:
16 True or False 1
Question
In the late 17th century the Company had defeated the army of the Mughal
Emperor Aurangzeb.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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17 True or False 1
Question
The Company forces were overconfident and hence fought casually in the battles
against the Indian powers.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
18 True or False 1
Question
Ahmad Shah Abdali defeated the Marathas alone at the Third Battle of Panipat in
1761.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
19 True or False 1
Question
The European mercenaries employed by the Indian states were professional but
their loyalty could not be taken for granted.
Correct Answer /
True
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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20 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
21 True or False 1
Question
The doctrine of lapse was used by William Bentinck to annex Indian states.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
22 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
True
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
23 True or False 1
Question
The Battle of Wandiwash was fought between the Marathas and the British.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
24 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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2.2.2: Exercises
Essay questions
9) Critically examine the British conquest of Bengal with reference to the role played in
it by the native Bengali elites.
10) Do you agree that Mysore was conquered by the British primarily because of the role
played by the Nizam and Marathas during the Second and Third Anglo-Mysore wars?
11) Can it be said that the decentralization of Maratha power between the various
Maratha Sardars and the Brahman Peshwa was both a source of Maratha strength
and weakness.
12) In Lord Wellesley, General Arthur Wellesley, Sir Charles Napier and Lord Dalhousie
the Company had exemplary leaders of men. Discuss with reference to the overall
British conquest of India.
13) Why did the Sikhs of Punjab fail to arrest the advance of the Company despite their
formidable military prowess?
14) To what extent was „Russophobia‟ responsible for British expansion into Sindh and
north-western India during the 19th century?
Objective questions
1 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
2 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
3 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
4 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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5 True or False 1
Question
Nana Phadnavis failed to unite the Marathas during the First Anglo-Maratha War.
Reviewer‟s Comment:
6 True or False 1
Question
The whole of Punjab was annexed during the times of Lord Bentinck.
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
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Reviewer‟s Comment:
7 True or False 1
Question
Correct Answer /
False
Option(s)
Reviewer‟s Comment:
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2.1 Glossary
Black Town: the segregated Indian area in the port cities of Calcutta, Bombay and Madras
Brokers:originally meant a simple mediator who brought buyers and sellers together and
earned a commission on transactions. Over time, the broker became in Mughal India a key
figure in the trading economy as he dealt with specific commodities, guaranteed supply of
export goods and marketing of imports and even stood guarantee for cash advances made
to supply merchants and primary producers.
Dadni: a system of cash advances that the English Company used in procuring their annual
Textile Investment. It involved a system of cash advances made to merchants who in turn
channeled them to the weavers. Under the dadni system, the Company entered into a
contractual agreement with local merchants who agreed to supply a specified consignment
at a specified time. The Company in turn paid a proportion of the total value of goods in
advance known as dadan and the rest on delivery. The risk of default by the producers was
underwritten by the merchants.
Farman:a royal order bearing the emperor‟s seal
Zamindar:holder of revenue collecting rights. There were several categories of zamindar –
primary, autonomous and intermediary.
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2.2.1 Glossary
Bargi: An extremely mobile Maratha horseman usually armed with light weapons
Jayedad: An assignment of land yielding revenues which were given to European officers
serving the Shindes for their upkeep etc
Nizam: The Shia ruler of a large state in the Deccan with its capital at Hyderabad
Peshwa: Prime minister of the Maratha kingdom
Pindaris: Irregular bands of troops acting as scouts, raiders and advance guard attached to
almost all early modern armies operating in India
Subedar: Literally head of a Subah – province; a provincial governor under the Mughals
2.2.2 Glossary
Calkins, Philip. 1970. The Formation of a regionally oriented ruling group in Bengal 1700-
1740. Journal of Asian Studies Vol 29 No 4.
Chaudhury, Sushil. 1995. From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth century Bengal. Delhi:
Manohar.
Mclane, John. 1993. Land and Local Kingship in 18th century Bengal. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Marshall, P. J. 1987. Bengal: The British Bridgehead, eastern India 1740-1828. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Marshall, P. J. 1976. East Indian Fortunes: The British in Bengal in the eighteenth century.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Ray, Ratnalekha. 1979. Change in Bengal Agrarian Society, 1760-1850. New Delhi:
Manohar.
Ray, Rajat Kanta. 1985-86. Colonial Penetration and Initial Resistance: The Mughal Ruling
Class, the English East India Company and the Struggle for Bengal 1756-1800. Indian
Historical Review. Vol XII Nos 1-2.
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Delhi: Mittal Publications.
Peers, M. Douglas. 2006. India under Colonial Rule 1700-1885. Harlow: Pearson.
Singh, K. 1999. A History of the Sikhs. New Delhi. Oxford University Press.
Alam, M. 1986. The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-
1748. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Alavi, S. 1995. The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India,
1770-1830. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Bayly, C. A. 1988.Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire: The New Cambridge
History of India, II.1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, R. G. S. 2003. The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The
Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Gordon, S. 1993. The Marathas, 1600-1818: The New Cambridge History of India, II.4.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Colley, L. 2002. Captives: Britain, Empire and the World, 1600-1850. London: Cape.
Ludden, D. 2002. India and South Asia A Short History. Oxford: Oneworld.
Major, A. J. 1996.Return to Empire: Punjab under the Sikhs and British in the Mid-
nineteenth Century. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers.
Marshall P. J., ed. 2003 The Eighteenth Century in Indian History: Evolution or Revolution?
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Panikkar, K.M. 1986. The Evolution of British Policy Towards Indian States 1774-1858.
Delhi: Mittal Publications.
73
Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi
Expansion and consolidation of colonial power
Peers, M. Douglas. 2006. India under Colonial Rule 1700-1885. Harlow: Pearson.
Singh, K. 1999. A History of the Sikhs. New Delhi. Oxford University Press.
74
Institute of lifelong learning, University of Delhi